id stringlengths 1 6 | datetime stringlengths 13 16 | cable_id stringlengths 6 27 | origin stringclasses 272 values | classification stringclasses 6 values | references sequencelengths 0 93 | body stringlengths 181 2.2M | parse_status stringclasses 1 value | parse_error_details null | original_start_line int64 1 39M |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 12/28/1966 18:48 | 66BUENOSAIRES2481 | Embassy Buenos Aires | UNCLASSIFIED | [
"66STATE106206"
] | P R 281848Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USCINCSO
CINCLANT
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC","UNCLASSIFIED BUENOS AIRES 2481
Original Telegram was Confidential but has since been
de-classified
--------------------------------------------- ----
Copy from the National Archives
RG 59: General Records of the Department of state
1964-66 Central Foreign Policy File
File: POL 33-4 ARG
--------------------------------------------- ----
E.O. 12958: DECL: DECLASSIFIED BY NARA 09/02/2009
TAGS: EFIS, PBTS, AR
SUBJECT: EXTENDED NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS OVER HIGH SEAS
REF: STATE 106206 CIRCULAR; STATE CA-3400 NOV 2, 1966
1. PRESS REPORTS AND VARIETY EMBASSY SOURCES CONFIRM
NEW ARGENTINE LEGISLATION UNILATERALLY CHANGING SEAS JURIS-
DICTION NOW UNDER ADVANCED REVIEW. REPORTEDLY LAW WOULD
ESTABLISH SIX MILE TERRITORIAL SEA, PLUS ANOTHER SIX MILES
OF EXCLUSIVE FISHING JURISDICTION, PLUS ANOTHER EXTENDED ZONE
OF \"PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION\" FOR FISHING PURPOSES. DRAFT-
LAW UNDER CONSIDERATION IN ARGENTINE SENATE BEFORE JUNE 28
COUP WOULD HAVE DEFINED ZONE OF PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION
AS \"EPICONTINENTAL SEA OUT TO 200 METER ISOBAR\". IN SOUTHERN
ARGENTINA THIS ZONE SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES WIDE AND BLANKETS
FALKLAND ISLANDS.
2. NAVATT STATES ARGENTINE NAVY THINKING OF PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION OUT TO 200 MILES (AS IN PERU, ECUADOR, CHILE)
RATHER THAN EPICONTINENTAL SEA. 200 MILE LIMIT DOES NOT
RPT NOT REACH FALKLANDS. ARGENTINE NAVY OFF TOLD NAVATT
\"200 MILE LIMIT SOON WILL BE STANDARD THROUGH HEMISPHERE\".
3. FONOFF OFFICIALS REFERRING TO RECENT BRAZILIAN AND US
LEGISLATION HAVE INFORMALLY INDICATED DECISION ALREADY
FINAL RE SIX MILE TERRITORIAL SEA PLUS SIX MILE EXCLUSIVE
FISHING JURISDICTION, BUT THAT \"PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION\"
STILL UNDER STUDY. TWO FONOFF MEN VOLUNTARILY AND INFORMALLY
SOUGHT EMBASSY REACTION TO POSSIBLE EXTENDED PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION BY SUGGESTING THAT US IN FACT HAS ACCEPTED
UNILATERALLY CREATED ECUADORIAN, PERUVIAN AND CHILEAN 200 MILE
LIMITS. EMBOFF REJECTED IDEA US ACCEPTS THESE LIMITS IN ANY
WAY AND POINTED OUT 1965 AMENDMENTS TO AID LEGISLATION AIMED
AT FURTHER PROTECTING US FISHING RIGHTS.
4. FONOFF LEGAL ADVISOR CONCEDES DISTINCTION BETWEEN
\"EXCLUSIVE\" AND \"PREFERENTIAL\" FISHING JURISDICTION A SEMANTIC
NICETY. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT IN ZONE OF \"PREFERENTIAL\" JURIS-
DICTION ARGENTINA WOULD CLAIM RIGHT TO TAX, LICENSE AND OTHER-
WISE CONTROL ALL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EXPLOITATION OF
RESOURCES OF SEA.
5. DRAFT LEGISLATION ON SEAS JURISDICTION LAY DORMANT UNTIL
SUDDEN AND SUBSTANTIAL IN FISHIN ARGENTINE EPICONTINENTAL SEAS
BY CUBAN AND EAST EUROPEAN (ESPECIALLY SOVIET) VESSELS PAST
SIX MONTHS ALARMED ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES. (SEE NAVATT IR
5-804-0-140-66 OF NOV 18) NOT RPT NOT ALL SOVIET VESSELS WERE
FISHING OR FACTORY TYPES. FONOFF SOURCES INFORMALLY STATE
ARMED FORCES PRESSURE MAKES EMISSION NEW LAW IMPERATIVE, QUITE
POSSIBLY APPEARING WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS. WHEN ASKED BY FONOFF
MEN ABOUT \"SECURITY PROBLEMS CREATED BY SOVIET TRAWLERS OFF US
COAST\", EMBASSY OFF REPLIED US DID NOT RPT NOT SEE THAT
UNILATERAL ATTEMPT TO EXTEND SEAS JURISDICTION OFFERED ANY
REALISTIC SOLUTION FOR POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS, WHILE SUCH
ACTION COULD CREATE NEW SOURCES POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING AND
CONFLICT.
6. RE PAR 3 STATE 106206 BELIEVE OUTLINED PROPOSAL MIGHT
FORESTALL UNILATERAL ARGENTINE ATTEMPT TO SUBSTANTIALLY EXTEND
\"PREFERENTIAL\" FISHING JURISDICTION ONLY IF EMBASSY CAN BE
AUTHORIZED DISCUSS IDEA WITH ARGENTINES IMMEDIATELY. EVEN THEN
CHANCES SUCCESS LIMITED BY (A) ADVANCED STAGE PROPOSED ARGENTINE
LAW AND (B) PRIMACY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ARGENTINE THINKING.
WE WOULD BENEFIT SOME FROM FONOFF LEGAL ADVISORS\' QUALMS ABOUT
UNILATERAL ACTION, AND FROM RESTRAINT OF RECENT BRAZILIAN
LEGISLATION WHICH DID NOT RPT NOT GO BEYOND 12-MILE LIMIT.
7. FOR DISCUSSION WITH ARGENTINES WOULD MODIFY TEXT IN STATE
10942 CIRCULAR TO: (A) MAKE ALL REFERENCES TO ARGENTINA, VICE
CANADA; (B) REFER TO PROPOSED ARGENTINE CLAIMS OF PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION OVER WATERS WE REGARD AS HIGH SEAS; (C) ELIMINATE
REFERENCES TO \"TRADITIONAL DISTANT WATER FISHERIES\", SINCE
ARGENTINE COAST NOT RPT NOT TRADITIONAL FISHING ZONE (WHEREAS
NO. 3); (D) ADD NOTATION THERE NO TRADITIONAL FISHING AND
CONFINE OPERATIVE AGREEMENT TO PROVISIONS FOR NON-TRADITIONAL
FISHING; (E) ELIMINATE LAST THREE PARS OF AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED
TO CANADIAN AMB.
8. IF AUTHORIZED, ENVISAGE TWO-STEP APPROACH TO FONOFF.
FIRST, INFORMAL AND ORAL, STRESSING OUR INTEREST IN FREEDOM OF
HIGH SEAS, NOTING EARLIER FONOFF CONFIRMATION NEW LAW UNDER
STUDY, OUTLINING OUR PROPOSAL IN GENERAL TERMS. ON BASIS
FONOFF REACTION, WE WOULD THEN COUCH AIDE-MEMOIRE IN TERMS
WHICH WOULD APPEAR MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED.
GP-3
SACCIO
" | Success: CSV parsed | null | 1 |
2 | 2/25/1972 9:30 | 72TEHRAN1164 | Embassy Tehran | UNCLASSIFIED | [
"72MOSCOW1603",
"72TEHRAN1091",
"72TEHRAN263"
] | R 250930Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7561
INFO SECDEF
EUCOM
CSAF
","UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1164
E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006
TAGS: MASS, MARR, IR
SUBJECT: ACCELERATION OF F-4ES FOR IRAN
REF: TEHRAN 1091: TEHRAN 263: MOSCOW 1603
COUNTRY TEAM. MESSAGE
BEGIN SUMMARY
GENERAL AZIMI, MINISTER OF WAR, ON INSTRUCTION OF SHAH ASKS THAT WE TAKE ANOTHER HARD LOOK AT F-4E PRODUCTION LINE IN ORDER ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF ONE SQUADRON OF F-4ES TO IRAN IN 1972. REQUEST REFLECTS SHAH\'S INCREASING CONCERN OVER SOVIET AMBITIONS IN AREA AND ESPECIALLY THREAT SHAH SEES TO IRAN OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY UNDER CONSIDERATION BY IRAQ AND USSR. SHAH RECOGNIZES PROBLEMS THIS POSES FOR US BUT IS TURNING TO USG WITH THIS REQUEST TO GIVE IRAN HIGHER PRIORITY ON FA-4E PRODUCTION SCHEDULE BECAUSE HE REGARDS US AS MOST DEPENDABLE FRIEND. END SUMMARY
ACTION REQUESTED: COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS US REVIEW F-4E PRODUCTION LINE AND RESPOND FAVORABLY TO SHAH\'S REQUEST FOR 16 F-4ES IN 1972 FROM WHATEVER SOURCE MAY BE AVAILABLE.
1. ON FEB 24 CHARGE WAS CONVOKED BY MINSTER OF WAR, GEN. REZANUZIMI, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM SHAH. AZIMI SAID SHAH MOST DEEPLY CONCERNED AT TRENDS IN SECURITY SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AND EXPECIALLY ON HIS WESTERN BORDERS. US OFFICALS ALREADY AWARE OF SHAH\'S CONCERN THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER GOI OFFICIALS (SEE REFTELS), BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ SOVIET RELATIONS INCLUDING AGREEMENT TO DELIVER MORE MIGS AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT PLUS INDICATION THAT RECENT IRAQI-SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY AS WELL AS INCREASED MILITARY COOPERATION INJECT NEW SENSE OF URGENCY IN SHAH\'S TIMETABLE FOR MODERNINZING AND STRENTHENING HIS ARMED FORCES. MOST SPECIFICALLY, SITUATION REQUIRED IRAN ACCELERATE ITS MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND HOST PARTICULARLY DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT.
2. AZIMI RECALLED THAT GOI HAD REQUESTED DELIVERY OF 16 OF F-4E AIRCRAFT NOW ON ORDER BY IRAN (FIRST OF WHICH WAS NOT SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY UNTIL AUGUST 1973) BE ADVANCED TO CY 1972. HOWEVER, GOI HAD RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED BY USG AND MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS THAT PRODUCTION LINE FOR IRAN COULD NOT RPT NOT BE ADVANCED TO MEET 1972 DELIVERY DATES DESIRED. SHAH WAS MOST DISTURBED, AS ADDITION OF F-4ES IN 1972 WAS VITAL TO IRAN\'S SECURITY AT THIS TIME. SHAH HAD DIRECTED THAT USG BE ASKED, IF PRODUCTION FOR IRAN COULD NOT IN FACT BE ADVANCED, TO MAKE REQUESTED F-4ES AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES. SHAH\'S DESIRE IS FOR DELIIVERY OF F-4FS IN LOTS OF FOUR DURING JUNE TO DECEMBER TIME-FRAME.
3. CHARGE REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT AND CREDIT, AND STRESSED THAT RECORD INDICATED WE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED SHAH\'S CONCERNS AND DESIRES AND HAD BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY RESPONSIVE TO SHAH\'S WISHES. CURRENTLY, AZIMI\'S DEPUTY GEN. TOUFANS, WAS IN US DISCUSSING VERY QUESTION OF ACCLERATED EQUIPMENT ACQUISIION INCLUDING F-4E. ACCELERATION OF F-4E DELIVERY RAISED DIFFICULT TECHNICAL AND COST PROBLEMS AS WELL AS QUESTIONS OF OTHER COMMITMENTS AND PRIORITIES. UNDOUBTEDLY THESE ISSUES WERE BEING DISCUSSED IN FULL WITH GEN. TOUFANIAN TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY INFORMED OF POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS AND REASONS FOR ANY LIMITATIONS ON MEETING GOI REQUEST THAT MIGHT EXIST. GEN. TOUFANIAN PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FULLER PICTURE OF SITUATION THAN WE NOW HAD IN IRAN.
4. AZIMI RESPONDED THAT GOI WAS BEING KEPT INFORMED OF TOUFANIAN DISCUSSIONS, BUT DECISON ON F-4E COULD NOT BE DELAYED. AZIMI MADE CLEAR SHAH FELT AQUISITION OF 16 F-4E AIRCRAFT IN 1972 WAS MOST IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE MILITARY PROBLEM OUTSTANDING. HE STRESSED SHAH BELIEVED THAT NUMBER REQUIRED WAS SMALL IN RELATION TO US INVENTORY, AND THAT UNSETTLED SITUATION CONFRONTING IRAN WARRANTED ACCELERATED DELIVERY TO IRAN AS AGAINST OTHER POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS (AS TO EUROPE OR EVEN USAF) IN SAME TIME FRAME.
5. CHARGE NOTED WE WOULD TRANSMIT SHAHS REQUEST TO, WASHINGTON AND THAT USG IN SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH MARKED OUR RELATIONS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE RESPONSIVE. CHARGE SAID THIS SAME FRIENDSHIP REQUIRED HIM TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT ALTHOUGH WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MEET SHAH\'S NEEDS AS SHAH SAW THEM, OUR MILITARY ADVISERS, AS GOI KNEW, WERE CONCERNED THAT ACCELERATION OF AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION WOULD STRAIN SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL MANPOWER OF IIAF AND COULD LEAD TO DECREASE RATHER THAN INCREASE IN IIAF EFFECTIVENESS. AZIMI REPLIED THAT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED HAD BEEN, CLOSELY STUDIED BY IlAF WITH MAAG ASSISTANCE, AND IIAF WAS SATISFIED THAT SIXTEEN AIRCRAFT REQUESTED COULD BE EFFECTIVELY INTEGRATED INTO PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE. AZIMI CLOSED MEETING BY ASKING THAT USG ANSWER SHAH\'S REQUEST AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.
6. COMMENT. SHAH IS DEEPLY CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS OVER PAST YEARS STRENGTHENING SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN MIDEAST AND INDIAN OCEAN AND APPEARING TO INDICATE SUBSTANTIALLY ENLARGED SOVIET COMMITMENT, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY, TO IRAQ. HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT INCREASED PRESENT DANGER REQIRES IRAN\'S FIRST LINE AIR DEFENSE TO BE BEEFED-UP NOW RATHER THAN IN PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED SCHEDULE STARTING IN EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE NUMBER, FREQUENCY AND TONE OF DEMARCHES ON SUBJECT WE HAVE RECEIVED IS VIRTUALLY UNPARALLELLED, AND CAN LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT HIM CONSIDERS ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE.
7. WHETHER WE FULLY AGREE WITH SHAH\'S CONCERN, WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT REQUEST --LIKE USG DECISION IN 1970 ON SALE TO IRAN OF SEVENTH AND EIGHTH SQUADRONS OF F-4E --HAS BECOME ANOTHER GUT ISSUE IN SHAH\'S MIND. SHAH IS AGAIN TURNING TO USG BECAUSE IN PERIODS OF ANXIETY SHAH FEELS HE CAN LOOK TO US FOR COOPERATION AND HE HOPES THAT US AS RELIABLE FRIEND WILL FIND CHANCE BE RESPONSIVE ON MATTER HE CONSIDERS IMPORTANT AND VITAL TO IRAN\'S SECURITY. THUS USG CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST MUST RECOGNIZE THAT DECISION INVOLVES UNUSUAL DEGREE OF POLITICAL IMPORTANCE RELATED TO FABRIC OF USG-GOI RELATIONS. DECISION SHOULD ALSO NOT OVERLOOK OR UNDERESTIMATE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN FOR VITAL US NATIONAL INTERESTS.
8. ACTION REQUESTED. COUNRY TEAM URGES THAT USG GIVE PROMPT AND SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION TO SHAH\'S REQUEST FOR 1972 DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT, FROM WHATEVER SOURCES MAY BE AVAILABLE TO BE TAPPED (INCLUDING DELIVERIES TO USAF). WE RECOGNIZE THAT REQUEST MAY RAISE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, BUT URGE THAT EVERY AVENUE BE EXPLORED TO REACH POSITIVE RESPONSE. IT IS ALSO MOST IMPORTANT THAT COUNTRY TEAM BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS TO ENABLE US CONTINUE TO MEET AND TEMPER SENSE OF URGENCY ON SUBJECT WHICH PREVAILS WITHIN GOI. IF DELAYS OR BARRIERS TO FULLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE MATERIALIZE, WE TRUST THAT EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE (E.G. PARTIAL DELIVERY IN 1972) AND THAT PERSUASIVE RATIONALE CAN BE DEVELOPED TO FULLY EXPLAIN TO SHAH REASONS FOR ANY SHORTCOMING. IN ORDER TO DIMINISH AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPACT.
HECK
" | Success: CSV parsed | null | 116 |
3 | 3/9/1972 5:40 | 72TEHRAN1381 | Embassy Tehran | UNCLASSIFIED | [] | "R 090540Z MAR 72 \n\nFM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN\n\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 7682 \n\nINFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA\n\nAM(...TRUNCATED) | Success: CSV parsed | null | 157 |
37 | 3/8/1985 12:08 | 85CAIRO6360 | Embassy Cairo | CONFIDENTIAL | [
"85CAIRO5284"
] | "R 081208Z MAR 85\n\nFM AMEMBASSY CAIRO\n\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 4143\n\nINFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA\n\nAM(...TRUNCATED) | Success: CSV parsed | null | 4,362 |
38 | 3/15/1985 16:19 | 85BEIRUT1640 | Embassy Beirut | CONFIDENTIAL | [
"85BEIRUT1635"
] | "O 151619Z MAR 85\n\nFM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT\n\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2214\n\nINFO AMEMBASSY DAMA(...TRUNCATED) | Success: CSV parsed | null | 4,586 |
39 | 3/15/1985 17:45 | 85BEIRUT1645 | Embassy Beirut | UNCLASSIFIED | [] | "P 151745Z MAR 85\n\nFM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT\n\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2216\n\nINFO AMEMBASSY DAMAS(...TRUNCATED) | Success: CSV parsed | null | 4,713 |
40 | 3/15/1985 17:52 | 85BEIRUT1646 | Embassy Beirut | CONFIDENTIAL | [
"85BEIRUT1635"
] | "O 151752Z MAR 85\n\nFM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT\n\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2218\n\nINFO AMEMBASSY DAMA(...TRUNCATED) | Success: CSV parsed | null | 4,855 |
46 | 3/18/1985 18:23 | 85BEIRUT1683 | Embassy Beirut | SECRET | [] | "O 181823Z MAR 85\n\nFM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT\n\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2249\n\nAMEMBASSY TEL AVIV (...TRUNCATED) | Success: CSV parsed | null | 5,571 |
80 | 7/1/1985 12:58 | 85MOSCOW8814 | Embassy Moscow | CONFIDENTIAL | [
"85MOSCOW8415"
] | "R 011258Z JUL 85\n\nFM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW\n\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 2098\n\nINFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD\n\nAM(...TRUNCATED) | Success: CSV parsed | null | 11,338 |
81 | 7/2/1985 11:26 | 85ALEXANDRIA547 | Consulate Alexandria | CONFIDENTIAL | [
"85ALEXANDRIA524"
] | "R 021126Z JUL 85\n\nFM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA\n\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 5370\n\nINFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO\n\n\"(...TRUNCATED) | Success: CSV parsed | null | 11,433 |
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Wikileaks Cables Dataset
This dataset contains the full dump of US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, as well as a robustly parsed JSONL version for programmatic use.
File Info
cables.csv
- File:
cables.csv - Size: ~1GB
- Rows: ~20 million (unfiltered)
- Delimiter: comma (
,) - Description: Raw dump of the cables. Provided as-is, unparsed. Some rows may contain malformed CSV data (e.g., extra commas, broken quotes).
cables_parsed.jsonl
- File:
cables_parsed.jsonl - Format: JSON Lines
- Encoding: UTF-8
- Description: Cleaned and robustly parsed version of the cables. Each line is a valid JSON object containing structured fields such as
id,date,canonical_id,origin,classification,references,header, andbody.
Notes
cables.csvis untouched and useful for archival or raw data processing.cables_parsed.jsonlis recommended for analysis, search indexing, and use with NLP models.- Parsing errors in the CSV were handled via custom logic to retain as much data as possible while ensuring structural consistency.
License
Public domain or as per original source — verify before redistribution.
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