Split (1)

train · 125k rows

id stringlengths 1 6	datetime stringlengths 13 16	cable_id stringlengths 6 27	origin stringclasses 272 values	classification stringclasses 6 values	references listlengths 0 93	body stringlengths 181 2.2M	parse_status stringclasses 1 value	parse_error_details null	original_start_line int64 1 39M
1	12/28/1966 18:48	66BUENOSAIRES2481	Embassy Buenos Aires	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "66STATE106206" ]	P R 281848Z DEC 66 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY INFO USCINCSO CINCLANT AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO AMEMBASSY QUITO AMEMBASSY LIMA AMEMBASSY MEXICO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY LONDON STATE GRNC","UNCLASSIFIED BUENOS AIRES 2481 Original Telegram was Confidential but has since been de-classified --------------------------------------------- ---- Copy from the National Archives RG 59: General Records of the Department of state 1964-66 Central Foreign Policy File File: POL 33-4 ARG --------------------------------------------- ---- E.O. 12958: DECL: DECLASSIFIED BY NARA 09/02/2009 TAGS: EFIS, PBTS, AR SUBJECT: EXTENDED NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS OVER HIGH SEAS REF: STATE 106206 CIRCULAR; STATE CA-3400 NOV 2, 1966 1. PRESS REPORTS AND VARIETY EMBASSY SOURCES CONFIRM NEW ARGENTINE LEGISLATION UNILATERALLY CHANGING SEAS JURIS- DICTION NOW UNDER ADVANCED REVIEW. REPORTEDLY LAW WOULD ESTABLISH SIX MILE TERRITORIAL SEA, PLUS ANOTHER SIX MILES OF EXCLUSIVE FISHING JURISDICTION, PLUS ANOTHER EXTENDED ZONE OF \"PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION\" FOR FISHING PURPOSES. DRAFT- LAW UNDER CONSIDERATION IN ARGENTINE SENATE BEFORE JUNE 28 COUP WOULD HAVE DEFINED ZONE OF PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION AS \"EPICONTINENTAL SEA OUT TO 200 METER ISOBAR\". IN SOUTHERN ARGENTINA THIS ZONE SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES WIDE AND BLANKETS FALKLAND ISLANDS. 2. NAVATT STATES ARGENTINE NAVY THINKING OF PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION OUT TO 200 MILES (AS IN PERU, ECUADOR, CHILE) RATHER THAN EPICONTINENTAL SEA. 200 MILE LIMIT DOES NOT RPT NOT REACH FALKLANDS. ARGENTINE NAVY OFF TOLD NAVATT \"200 MILE LIMIT SOON WILL BE STANDARD THROUGH HEMISPHERE\". 3. FONOFF OFFICIALS REFERRING TO RECENT BRAZILIAN AND US LEGISLATION HAVE INFORMALLY INDICATED DECISION ALREADY FINAL RE SIX MILE TERRITORIAL SEA PLUS SIX MILE EXCLUSIVE FISHING JURISDICTION, BUT THAT \"PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION\" STILL UNDER STUDY. TWO FONOFF MEN VOLUNTARILY AND INFORMALLY SOUGHT EMBASSY REACTION TO POSSIBLE EXTENDED PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION BY SUGGESTING THAT US IN FACT HAS ACCEPTED UNILATERALLY CREATED ECUADORIAN, PERUVIAN AND CHILEAN 200 MILE LIMITS. EMBOFF REJECTED IDEA US ACCEPTS THESE LIMITS IN ANY WAY AND POINTED OUT 1965 AMENDMENTS TO AID LEGISLATION AIMED AT FURTHER PROTECTING US FISHING RIGHTS. 4. FONOFF LEGAL ADVISOR CONCEDES DISTINCTION BETWEEN \"EXCLUSIVE\" AND \"PREFERENTIAL\" FISHING JURISDICTION A SEMANTIC NICETY. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT IN ZONE OF \"PREFERENTIAL\" JURIS- DICTION ARGENTINA WOULD CLAIM RIGHT TO TAX, LICENSE AND OTHER- WISE CONTROL ALL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES OF SEA. 5. DRAFT LEGISLATION ON SEAS JURISDICTION LAY DORMANT UNTIL SUDDEN AND SUBSTANTIAL IN FISHIN ARGENTINE EPICONTINENTAL SEAS BY CUBAN AND EAST EUROPEAN (ESPECIALLY SOVIET) VESSELS PAST SIX MONTHS ALARMED ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES. (SEE NAVATT IR 5-804-0-140-66 OF NOV 18) NOT RPT NOT ALL SOVIET VESSELS WERE FISHING OR FACTORY TYPES. FONOFF SOURCES INFORMALLY STATE ARMED FORCES PRESSURE MAKES EMISSION NEW LAW IMPERATIVE, QUITE POSSIBLY APPEARING WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS. WHEN ASKED BY FONOFF MEN ABOUT \"SECURITY PROBLEMS CREATED BY SOVIET TRAWLERS OFF US COAST\", EMBASSY OFF REPLIED US DID NOT RPT NOT SEE THAT UNILATERAL ATTEMPT TO EXTEND SEAS JURISDICTION OFFERED ANY REALISTIC SOLUTION FOR POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS, WHILE SUCH ACTION COULD CREATE NEW SOURCES POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING AND CONFLICT. 6. RE PAR 3 STATE 106206 BELIEVE OUTLINED PROPOSAL MIGHT FORESTALL UNILATERAL ARGENTINE ATTEMPT TO SUBSTANTIALLY EXTEND \"PREFERENTIAL\" FISHING JURISDICTION ONLY IF EMBASSY CAN BE AUTHORIZED DISCUSS IDEA WITH ARGENTINES IMMEDIATELY. EVEN THEN CHANCES SUCCESS LIMITED BY (A) ADVANCED STAGE PROPOSED ARGENTINE LAW AND (B) PRIMACY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ARGENTINE THINKING. WE WOULD BENEFIT SOME FROM FONOFF LEGAL ADVISORS\' QUALMS ABOUT UNILATERAL ACTION, AND FROM RESTRAINT OF RECENT BRAZILIAN LEGISLATION WHICH DID NOT RPT NOT GO BEYOND 12-MILE LIMIT. 7. FOR DISCUSSION WITH ARGENTINES WOULD MODIFY TEXT IN STATE 10942 CIRCULAR TO: (A) MAKE ALL REFERENCES TO ARGENTINA, VICE CANADA; (B) REFER TO PROPOSED ARGENTINE CLAIMS OF PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION OVER WATERS WE REGARD AS HIGH SEAS; (C) ELIMINATE REFERENCES TO \"TRADITIONAL DISTANT WATER FISHERIES\", SINCE ARGENTINE COAST NOT RPT NOT TRADITIONAL FISHING ZONE (WHEREAS NO. 3); (D) ADD NOTATION THERE NO TRADITIONAL FISHING AND CONFINE OPERATIVE AGREEMENT TO PROVISIONS FOR NON-TRADITIONAL FISHING; (E) ELIMINATE LAST THREE PARS OF AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED TO CANADIAN AMB. 8. IF AUTHORIZED, ENVISAGE TWO-STEP APPROACH TO FONOFF. FIRST, INFORMAL AND ORAL, STRESSING OUR INTEREST IN FREEDOM OF HIGH SEAS, NOTING EARLIER FONOFF CONFIRMATION NEW LAW UNDER STUDY, OUTLINING OUR PROPOSAL IN GENERAL TERMS. ON BASIS FONOFF REACTION, WE WOULD THEN COUCH AIDE-MEMOIRE IN TERMS WHICH WOULD APPEAR MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED. GP-3 SACCIO "	Success: CSV parsed	null	1
2	2/25/1972 9:30	72TEHRAN1164	Embassy Tehran	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "72MOSCOW1603", "72TEHRAN1091", "72TEHRAN263" ]	R 250930Z FEB 72 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7561 INFO SECDEF EUCOM CSAF ","UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1164 E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006 TAGS: MASS, MARR, IR SUBJECT: ACCELERATION OF F-4ES FOR IRAN REF: TEHRAN 1091: TEHRAN 263: MOSCOW 1603 COUNTRY TEAM. MESSAGE BEGIN SUMMARY GENERAL AZIMI, MINISTER OF WAR, ON INSTRUCTION OF SHAH ASKS THAT WE TAKE ANOTHER HARD LOOK AT F-4E PRODUCTION LINE IN ORDER ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF ONE SQUADRON OF F-4ES TO IRAN IN 1972. REQUEST REFLECTS SHAH\'S INCREASING CONCERN OVER SOVIET AMBITIONS IN AREA AND ESPECIALLY THREAT SHAH SEES TO IRAN OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY UNDER CONSIDERATION BY IRAQ AND USSR. SHAH RECOGNIZES PROBLEMS THIS POSES FOR US BUT IS TURNING TO USG WITH THIS REQUEST TO GIVE IRAN HIGHER PRIORITY ON FA-4E PRODUCTION SCHEDULE BECAUSE HE REGARDS US AS MOST DEPENDABLE FRIEND. END SUMMARY ACTION REQUESTED: COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS US REVIEW F-4E PRODUCTION LINE AND RESPOND FAVORABLY TO SHAH\'S REQUEST FOR 16 F-4ES IN 1972 FROM WHATEVER SOURCE MAY BE AVAILABLE. 1. ON FEB 24 CHARGE WAS CONVOKED BY MINSTER OF WAR, GEN. REZANUZIMI, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM SHAH. AZIMI SAID SHAH MOST DEEPLY CONCERNED AT TRENDS IN SECURITY SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AND EXPECIALLY ON HIS WESTERN BORDERS. US OFFICALS ALREADY AWARE OF SHAH\'S CONCERN THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER GOI OFFICIALS (SEE REFTELS), BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ SOVIET RELATIONS INCLUDING AGREEMENT TO DELIVER MORE MIGS AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT PLUS INDICATION THAT RECENT IRAQI-SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY AS WELL AS INCREASED MILITARY COOPERATION INJECT NEW SENSE OF URGENCY IN SHAH\'S TIMETABLE FOR MODERNINZING AND STRENTHENING HIS ARMED FORCES. MOST SPECIFICALLY, SITUATION REQUIRED IRAN ACCELERATE ITS MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND HOST PARTICULARLY DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT. 2. AZIMI RECALLED THAT GOI HAD REQUESTED DELIVERY OF 16 OF F-4E AIRCRAFT NOW ON ORDER BY IRAN (FIRST OF WHICH WAS NOT SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY UNTIL AUGUST 1973) BE ADVANCED TO CY 1972. HOWEVER, GOI HAD RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED BY USG AND MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS THAT PRODUCTION LINE FOR IRAN COULD NOT RPT NOT BE ADVANCED TO MEET 1972 DELIVERY DATES DESIRED. SHAH WAS MOST DISTURBED, AS ADDITION OF F-4ES IN 1972 WAS VITAL TO IRAN\'S SECURITY AT THIS TIME. SHAH HAD DIRECTED THAT USG BE ASKED, IF PRODUCTION FOR IRAN COULD NOT IN FACT BE ADVANCED, TO MAKE REQUESTED F-4ES AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES. SHAH\'S DESIRE IS FOR DELIIVERY OF F-4FS IN LOTS OF FOUR DURING JUNE TO DECEMBER TIME-FRAME. 3. CHARGE REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT AND CREDIT, AND STRESSED THAT RECORD INDICATED WE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED SHAH\'S CONCERNS AND DESIRES AND HAD BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY RESPONSIVE TO SHAH\'S WISHES. CURRENTLY, AZIMI\'S DEPUTY GEN. TOUFANS, WAS IN US DISCUSSING VERY QUESTION OF ACCLERATED EQUIPMENT ACQUISIION INCLUDING F-4E. ACCELERATION OF F-4E DELIVERY RAISED DIFFICULT TECHNICAL AND COST PROBLEMS AS WELL AS QUESTIONS OF OTHER COMMITMENTS AND PRIORITIES. UNDOUBTEDLY THESE ISSUES WERE BEING DISCUSSED IN FULL WITH GEN. TOUFANIAN TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY INFORMED OF POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS AND REASONS FOR ANY LIMITATIONS ON MEETING GOI REQUEST THAT MIGHT EXIST. GEN. TOUFANIAN PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FULLER PICTURE OF SITUATION THAN WE NOW HAD IN IRAN. 4. AZIMI RESPONDED THAT GOI WAS BEING KEPT INFORMED OF TOUFANIAN DISCUSSIONS, BUT DECISON ON F-4E COULD NOT BE DELAYED. AZIMI MADE CLEAR SHAH FELT AQUISITION OF 16 F-4E AIRCRAFT IN 1972 WAS MOST IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE MILITARY PROBLEM OUTSTANDING. HE STRESSED SHAH BELIEVED THAT NUMBER REQUIRED WAS SMALL IN RELATION TO US INVENTORY, AND THAT UNSETTLED SITUATION CONFRONTING IRAN WARRANTED ACCELERATED DELIVERY TO IRAN AS AGAINST OTHER POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS (AS TO EUROPE OR EVEN USAF) IN SAME TIME FRAME. 5. CHARGE NOTED WE WOULD TRANSMIT SHAHS REQUEST TO, WASHINGTON AND THAT USG IN SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH MARKED OUR RELATIONS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE RESPONSIVE. CHARGE SAID THIS SAME FRIENDSHIP REQUIRED HIM TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT ALTHOUGH WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MEET SHAH\'S NEEDS AS SHAH SAW THEM, OUR MILITARY ADVISERS, AS GOI KNEW, WERE CONCERNED THAT ACCELERATION OF AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION WOULD STRAIN SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL MANPOWER OF IIAF AND COULD LEAD TO DECREASE RATHER THAN INCREASE IN IIAF EFFECTIVENESS. AZIMI REPLIED THAT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED HAD BEEN, CLOSELY STUDIED BY IlAF WITH MAAG ASSISTANCE, AND IIAF WAS SATISFIED THAT SIXTEEN AIRCRAFT REQUESTED COULD BE EFFECTIVELY INTEGRATED INTO PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE. AZIMI CLOSED MEETING BY ASKING THAT USG ANSWER SHAH\'S REQUEST AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. 6. COMMENT. SHAH IS DEEPLY CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS OVER PAST YEARS STRENGTHENING SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN MIDEAST AND INDIAN OCEAN AND APPEARING TO INDICATE SUBSTANTIALLY ENLARGED SOVIET COMMITMENT, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY, TO IRAQ. HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT INCREASED PRESENT DANGER REQIRES IRAN\'S FIRST LINE AIR DEFENSE TO BE BEEFED-UP NOW RATHER THAN IN PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED SCHEDULE STARTING IN EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE NUMBER, FREQUENCY AND TONE OF DEMARCHES ON SUBJECT WE HAVE RECEIVED IS VIRTUALLY UNPARALLELLED, AND CAN LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT HIM CONSIDERS ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE. 7. WHETHER WE FULLY AGREE WITH SHAH\'S CONCERN, WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT REQUEST --LIKE USG DECISION IN 1970 ON SALE TO IRAN OF SEVENTH AND EIGHTH SQUADRONS OF F-4E --HAS BECOME ANOTHER GUT ISSUE IN SHAH\'S MIND. SHAH IS AGAIN TURNING TO USG BECAUSE IN PERIODS OF ANXIETY SHAH FEELS HE CAN LOOK TO US FOR COOPERATION AND HE HOPES THAT US AS RELIABLE FRIEND WILL FIND CHANCE BE RESPONSIVE ON MATTER HE CONSIDERS IMPORTANT AND VITAL TO IRAN\'S SECURITY. THUS USG CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST MUST RECOGNIZE THAT DECISION INVOLVES UNUSUAL DEGREE OF POLITICAL IMPORTANCE RELATED TO FABRIC OF USG-GOI RELATIONS. DECISION SHOULD ALSO NOT OVERLOOK OR UNDERESTIMATE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN FOR VITAL US NATIONAL INTERESTS. 8. ACTION REQUESTED. COUNRY TEAM URGES THAT USG GIVE PROMPT AND SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION TO SHAH\'S REQUEST FOR 1972 DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT, FROM WHATEVER SOURCES MAY BE AVAILABLE TO BE TAPPED (INCLUDING DELIVERIES TO USAF). WE RECOGNIZE THAT REQUEST MAY RAISE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, BUT URGE THAT EVERY AVENUE BE EXPLORED TO REACH POSITIVE RESPONSE. IT IS ALSO MOST IMPORTANT THAT COUNTRY TEAM BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS TO ENABLE US CONTINUE TO MEET AND TEMPER SENSE OF URGENCY ON SUBJECT WHICH PREVAILS WITHIN GOI. IF DELAYS OR BARRIERS TO FULLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE MATERIALIZE, WE TRUST THAT EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE (E.G. PARTIAL DELIVERY IN 1972) AND THAT PERSUASIVE RATIONALE CAN BE DEVELOPED TO FULLY EXPLAIN TO SHAH REASONS FOR ANY SHORTCOMING. IN ORDER TO DIMINISH AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPACT. HECK "	Success: CSV parsed	null	116
3	3/9/1972 5:40	72TEHRAN1381	Embassy Tehran	UNCLASSIFIED	[]	R 090540Z MAR 72 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7682 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BONN AMCOMSUL DHAHRAN AMEMBASSY JIDDA AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS ","UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1381 E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IR SUBJECT: TRIALS/EXECUTIONS OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS: STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AND SHAH LASHES OUT AT FOREIGN CRITICS 1. IN PROTEST AGAINST RECENT TRIALS/PUNISHMENT (PARTICULARLY EXECUTIONS, WHICH NOW TOTAL 10) OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT-ELEMENTS, TEHRAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS -- LEAD BY FACULTY OF ENGINEERING STUDENTS-- MOUNTED ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATION AFTERNOON OF MARCH 7 AND EVEN LARGE ONE (CIRC 600) MORNING OF MARCH 8. WHILE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION FELT CAPABLE OF HANDLING MARCH 7 DEMONSTRATION WITHOUT HELP OF OUTSIDE POLICE, THEY APPARENTLY FELT UNABLE DO SO MARCH 8 AND CALLED NATIONAL POLICE ONTO CAMPUS FOR BRIEF PERIOD. RESULT WAS MUCH MANHANDLING OF STUDENTS BUT THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF ANY SERIOUS CASUALTIES/CLASHES, AND UNIVERSITY WAS QUIET BY EARLY AFTERNOON. 2. SOME FACULTIES AT OTHER TEHRAN UNIVERSITIES (E.G. ARYAMEHR, NATIONAL AND POLYTECHNIC) ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ENGAGED IN SYMPATHY STRIKES\" MARCH 8 BUT SO FAR NO DEMONSTRATIONS REPORTED* THERE IS RELIABLE REPORT THAT DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITY OF MESHED (SIX OF 10 EXECUTED CAME FROM MESHED AREA) BECAME SERIOUS ENOUGH THAT UNIVERSITY WAS CLOSED THREE DAYS AGO AND STILL REMAINS CLOSED. (COMMENT: WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF GOI ORDERS TEHRAN UNIVERSITIES CLOSED UNTIL AFTER NO RUZ HOLIDAY.) 3. FROM COMMENTS OF STUDENTS AND OBSERVERS CLOSE TO ACADEMIC CIRCLES, IT SEEMS CLEAR LARGE PART OF MOTIVATION FOR DEMONSTRATION AND SYMPATHY STRIKES IS STUDENT ANGER OVER GOI\'S CONTINUED DETENTION OF SEVERAL STUDENTS AS \"ANTI-STATE\" SUBVERSIVES AND, EVEN MORE, ANGER OVER RECENT TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS OF THOSE CONVICTED OF ANTI-STATE ACTIVITIES. THERE ARE ALREADY INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT GOI CONSIDERS TIMING OF DEMONSTRATIONS (PERHAPS DEMONSTRATIONS THEMSELVES) PROMOTED BY ANTI-STATE ELEMENTS TO EMBARRASS GOI DURING VISIT OF CHANCELLOR BRANDT AND HIS CONSIDERABLE PRESS RETINUE. 4. IN RELATED DEVELOPMENT, WHICH MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN INTENDED FOR EARS OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS SHAH LASHED OUT STRONGLY IN MARCH 7 PRESS CONFERENCE (WITH GERMAN PRESSMEN) AT WHAT HE LABELLED DISTORTED FOREIGN REPORTING ABOUT TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS. HIM HIT AT LE MONDE VIGOROUSLY AND REPEATEDLY, AND TOOK PARTICULAR EXCEPTION TO LE MONDE\'S APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY FOR THOSE CONVICTED IN RECENT TRIALS. AFTER ASKING TWO RHETORICAL QUESTIONS \"HAS LE MONDE EVER ASKED WHETHER THESE MURDERERS HAVE RIGHT TO TAKE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE? HAS LE MONDE EVER WRITTEN ONE WORD OF CONDEMNATION AGAINST TERRORISTS AND ASSASSINS SENT BY IRA TO EXTERMINATE PEOPLE?\"), SHAH SAID FOREIGN PRESS HAS NO RIGHT GIVE ADVICE ON MATTERS THEY KNOW NOTHING ABOUT. HE RECALLED HIS \"CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY\" NOT TO PERMIT \"TERROR OR ATTEMPTS AGAINST MY COUNTRY\'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BY AGENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.\" EXEMPT HECK " "4","8/10/1972 4:00","72TEHRAN4789","Embassy Tehran","UNCLASSIFIED","72TEHRAN3312","R 100400Z AUG 72 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9341 ","UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 4789 E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006 TAGS: IR, PTER SUBJECT: CONTINUING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN IRAN REF: TEHRAN\'S A-077 OF MAY 15, 1972: TEHRAN 3312 SUMMARY: TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN IRAN SEEM TO BE INCREASING INSTEAD OF USUAL SUMMER SUBSIDENCE DUE TO VACATION FOR STUDENTS, PERHAPS INDICATING BETTER ORGANIZATION AND BROADENING OF APPEAL TO NON-STUDENT GROUPS. VIGOROUS ANTI-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN ON PART OF IRANIAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS IS NETTING NUMBERS OF INDIVIDUALS BUT HARSH GOI POLICY APPARENTLY UNABLE BRING GUERRILLAS UNDER CONTROL AND MAY IN FACT BE HARDENING ATTITUDES OF GUERRILLAS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS. WHILE TERRORIST GROUPS NOT YET THREAT TO REGIME, GOI UNLIKELY SUCCEED IN HALTING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITHOUT FIRST ADDRESSING BASIC QUESTION OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS. END SUMMARY 1. DESPITE CONTINUING LARGE-SCALE CAMPAIGN ON PART OF GOI SECURITY ORGANS, URBAN GUERRILLAS ARE MAINTAINING RATE OF ACTIVITY. DURING PAST FOUR MONTH PERIOD THERE HAVE BEEN 28 CONFIRMED EXPLOSIONS (11 OF WHICH DIRECTED AGAINST US PRESENCE), TEN SHOOTOUTS AND SEVERAL OTHER INCIDENTS INCLUDING UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP DAUGHTER OF COURT MINISTER ALAM, AND PLOT TO SABOTAGE ISFAHAN STEEL MILL. OTHER UNCONFIRMED INCIDENTS REPORTED ON ALMOST DAILY BASIS. 2. IRANIAN SECURITY ORGANS, INCLUDING SAVAEEEAAA GENDARMERIE AND LOCAL POLICE, REACTING VIGOROUSLY AND WITH HEAVY HAND. DURING SAME PERIOD AT LEAST 16 GUERRILLAS KILLED IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES, 13 OTHERS ANNOUNCED EXECUTED, TEN SENTENCED TO DEATH BUT REPRIEVED AND SENTENCE TO LIFE IN PRISON, NINE OTHERS GIVEN LIFE, AND 39 CONVICTED AND GIVEN SENTENCES RANGING FROM 3 TO 15 YEARS. ALL OF ABOVE TRIED BY MILITARY TRIBUNALS, AND MAJLES HAS RECENTLY PASSED LAW PROVIDING SPECIFICALLY THAT ALL THOSE ENGAGING IN ACTS OF SABOTAGE WILL BE TRIED BY MILITARY COURTS WITH POSSIBLE SENTENCES RANGING FROM ONE YEAR TO DEATH. GOI HAS COMMITTED CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES TO SO FAR UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO CONTROL TERRORISTS--FOR EXAMPLE, TWO OF OFFICERS NORMALLY DETAILED TO WORK WITH BNDD AGENTS ON NARCOTICS MATTERS HAVE BEEN REASSIGNED TO GUERRILLA PROBLEM. 3. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED IN TEHRAN THAT URBAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IS INCREASING AND IT IS CERTAIN THAT A GREATER NUMBER OF INCIDENTS ARE BEING REPORTED IN THE CONTROLLED LOCAL MEDIA. BUT INCREASED RAPPORTAGE, WHICH MAY RESULT AS MUCH FROM REPUTED PRESSURE FROM LOCAL PRESSMEN ON GOI AS FROM CONTINUING GOVERNMENT DESIRE TO EXPLOIT LESS SAVORY ASPECTS OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS DOES NOT COVER ALL INCIDENTS INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED BY EMBASSY LET ALONE THE MANY GUERRILLA ACTIVITY WHICH ARE RUMORED BUT NOT CONFIRMED. MOREOVER FREQUENCY OF UNCONFIRMED INCIDENTS HAS INCREASED BY A FACTOR AT LEAST AS GREAT AS THAT OF THOSE GIVEN MEDIA COVERAGE, LEADING TO PRESUMPTION THAT STEPPED UP TERRORIST ACTIVITY IS A REALITY AND NOT A RESULT OF INSPIRED PUBLICITY. PERHAPS MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN INCREASED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IS FACT THAT HIGH LEVEL OF INCIDENTS HAS CONTINUED INTO SUMMER WHEN STUDENTS, WHO HAVE IN PAST PROVIDED BULK OF RECRUITS FOR GUERRILLAS, DISPERSED FOR VACATIONS. THIS MAY MEAN THAT UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS ARE BECOMING BETTER ORGANIZED AND ARE CATCHING ON WITH NON-STUDENT GROUPS, WHICH IF TRUE, WOULD HEIGHTEN DIFFICULTY OF PENETRATING AND CONTROLLING GUERRILLA GROUPS. 4. DESPITE GOI APPARENT INABILITY TO SUPPRESS GUERRILLAS, EMBASSY CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT TERRORISTS AT PRESENT CONSTITUE AN IRRITANT AND EMRARRASSMENT BUT POSE NO THREAT TO REGIME. HOWEVER, IT IS APPARENT TO US, AGAIN VERY TENTATIVELY, THAT GOI TACTICS OF HARSH REPRESSION AGAINST GUERRILLAS ARE NOT WORKING VERY WELL AND MAY PROVOKE SNOWBALL EFFECT OF ACTION AND REACTION PART OF SAVAK TERRORISTS, LEADING TO BROADENING RESENTMENT AMONG POPULACE AGAINST SAVAK PERVASIVENESS AND TACTICS. EVENTUALLY REGIME WILL HAVE TO IMPLEMENT PROGRAMS RESPONSIVE TO AT LEAST SOME OF THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMPLAINTS WHICH FORM BASES OF GUERRILLA DISSATISFACTION. WE DO NOT ENUMMERATE THESE COMPLAINTS HERE, PARTIALLY BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT COMPLETELY FORMED AND DEFINED IN OUR OWN MINDS OR EVEN, PERHAPS IN THE MINDS OF THE TERRORISTS THEMSELVES. MOREOVER, TERRORIST MOVEMENT IS NOT IDEOLOGICALLY OR ORGANIZATIONALLY UNIFIED AND NATURE OF THEIR COMPLAINTS VARIES FROM GROUP TO GROUP. WE SHALL BE EXAMINING FURTHER AND REPORTING ON THESE AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT. MEANWHILE, WITHOUT SOUNDING ANY ALARM BELLS, THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO ALERT THE DEPARTMENT THAT THE URBAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN IRAN CONTINUES TO BE A FACT OF LOCAL POLITICAL LIFE WHICH BEARS CONTINUING SCRUTINY. 5. THE U.S. PRESENCE IN IRAN, WHILE TARGETED BY THE TERRORISTS, IS NOT THEIR PRIMARY TARGET AND SOME SORT OF INCENTIVE SUCH AS PRESIDENT NIXON\'S MAY VISIT (SEE REFTEL) OR THE JANUARY SAVAK TV SHOW WHICH PRECEDE LAST SPRING\'S SHOW TRIALS HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO BRING ON BOMBINGS AT AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS. WE ARE CONTINUING ALL REASONABLE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. FARLAND " "5","8/22/1972 9:27","72TEHRAN5055","Embassy Tehran","UNCLASSIFIED","72TEHRAN4887","R 220927Z AUG 72 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9461 ","UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 5055 E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006 TAGS: IR, PTER SUBJECT: CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE REF: TEHRAN 4887 SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SAID TAHERI, BOMBING AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE. SAVAK MAINTAINING ITS POLICY OF WIDESPREAD PREVENTIVE ARRESTS AND, WHILE THIS RUNS RISK OF HEIGHTENING RESENTMENT AMONG POPULACE, OFFICIALS SEEM CONFIDENT THAT GUERRILLAS ARE ON THE RUN. WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE OFFICIAL OPTIMISM AND FEEL THAT SANGUINE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THE GUERRILLA REACTION THEY USUALLY PROVOKE MAY FURTHER ERODE CREDIBILITY OF SECURITY ORGANS IN MIND OF PUBLIC. END SUMMARY 1. IN WAKE OF SMOOTHLY HANDLED ASSASSINATION AUGUST 13 OF HEAD OF PRISONS BRIGADIER GENERAL SAID TAHERI (REFTEL) WHO WAS ALSO CHIEF OF AN ANTI-GUERRILLA SUBCOMMITTEE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAS INCREASED. RECENT CONFIRMED INCIDENTS HAVE INCLUDED A BOMB IN A TEHRAN DEPARTMENT STORE WHICH INJURED THE TERRORIST PLANTING IT, BOMB IN TEHRAN NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY BUILDING WHICH KILLED WATCHMAN, APPREHENSION OF A TERRORIST IN SOUTH TEHRAN WHICH RESULTED IN ONE KILLED AND FIVE WOUNDED, AND SHOOTING TO DEATH OF THREE POLICEMEN IN A SMALL BAZAAR IN SOUTH TEHRAN. NUMEROUS OTHER BOMBINGS AND SHOOTINGS RUMORED BUT NOT VERIFIED BY EMBASSY OR CONFIRMED BY GOI. 2. SAVAK AND OTHER SECURITY ORGANS ARE PROCEEDING WITH A WIDESPREAD AND, WE HEAR, NOT VERY WELL TARGETED ROUND-UP OF SUSPECTS, AIDED BY LISTS OF NAMES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FOUND IN DWELLING OF A RECENTLY SLAIN TERRORIST LEADER. POLICE NETS, WHICH ARE REPORTEDLY HAULING IN THE INNOCENT WITH THE GUILTY, HAVE EXTENDED AS FAR AFIELD AS ISFAHAN WHERE A NUMBER OF SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED TWO WEEKS AGO. 3. DESPITE INCREASING LEVEL OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, POLICE OFFICIALS REMAIN OPTIMISTIC. CHIEF OF NATIONAL POLICE LTG JAFFARQOLI SADRI ASSURED EMBOFF AUG. 17 THAT CURRENT FLURRY OF INCIDENTS CONSTITUTES DYING GASP OF GUERRILLAS WHO, HE CLAIMS, HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY TWO THIRDS IN PAST YEAR AND ARE FORCED TO ACT NOW TO SHOW THEY STILL EXIST. IN A MEDIA INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN LOCAL PRESS AUG. 19, SADRI UPPED FIGURE FOR REDUCTION OF GUERRILLA FORCES TO THREE FOURTHS, PREDICTED THAT REMAINING TERRORISTS WOULD SOON BE WIPED OUT AND REITERATED STANDARD GOVERNMENT LINE THAT GUERRILLAS ARE CONFUSED MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS OF MARXIST-LENINIST BENT BUT WITHOUT GOALS OR PROGRAM. IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF SADRI ATTACHED NO PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO MURDER OF GENERAL TAHERI, ASSERTING THAT TERRORISTS WOULD HAVE BEEN SATISIFED WITH ANY HIGH-RANKING OFFICER AND CHOSE TAWERI ONLY BECUASE OF IOSLATED LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR LONG WALKS ALONE. SADRI ALSO DISCOUNTED POSSIBILITY THAT ASSASSINS WERE OF HIGHER CALIBER THAN RUN-OF-THE-MILL GUERRILLAS, POINTING OUT THAT SHOTS WHICH KILLED TAHERI HAD BEEN FIRED FROM 50 CENTIMETERS AND THAT \"A CHILD COULD HIT A MAN FROM THAT DISTANCE.\" COMMENT: WE CONSIDER IT MORE LIKELY THAT TAHERI WAS PERSONALLY TARGETED DUE TO HIS DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, SKILLFUL MANNER IN WHICH ASSASSINATION CARRIED OUT, REQUIRING CAREFUL PLANNING AND RECONNAISSANCE AS WELL AS DEFT EXECUTION, APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THOSE INVOLVED WERE MUCH BETTER TRAINED THAN AVERAGE TERRORISTS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN BLOWN UP BY THEIR OWN BOMBS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NUMBER OF GUERRILLA INCIDENTS WILL BEGIN TO TAPER OFF, BUT WE DO NOT SHARE SADRI\'S CONFIDENCE THAT HIS TACTICS AND THOSE OF SAVAK CAN COMPLETELY HALT TERRORIST ACTIVITY. IN FACT OVER REACTION AND TOO ZEALOUS A REPRESSION BY SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS SEEM AT LEAST AS LIKELY TO RECRUIT NEW GUERRILLAS AS TO STAMP OUT OLD ONES. IN ADDITION WISDOM SEEMS QUESTIONABLE OF SECURITY OFFICIALS MAKING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT BREAKUP OF GUERRILLA GROUPS AND PREDICTIONS OF THEIR DEMISE. WE RECALL THAT THE LAST SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT LAST JANUARY WAS FOLLOWED BY SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS ON US-PROPERTIES AND OTHER SITES IN TEHRAN. IN OUR VIEW SUCH PUBLIC DECLARATIONS RUN RISK OF INCREASING CREDIBILITY GAP AND RESENTMENT ON PART OF PUBLIC WHO LIKELY BE INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE OF INDISCRIMINATE ARRESTS THAT DO NOT SEEM TO BE STAMPING OUT TERRORISTS. THE PROGNOSTICATION THEREFORE IS FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE TERRORISM BUT, DESPITE SUCCESSFUL MURDER OF TAHERI, WE DO NOT CONCLUDE THAT GUERRILLAS WILL NOW PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON ASSASSINATION AS A TOOL. REASON IS THAT TERRORISTS STILL LACK ENOUGH TRAINED PERSONNEL TO PULL OFF ASSASSINATIONS ON REGULAR BASIS. FARLAND " "6","4/2/1973 8:34","73TEHRAN2077","Embassy Tehran","SECRET","73STATE53670","P 020834Z APR 73 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1692 INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY ","S E C R E T TEHRAN 2077 Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y ( FIRST PARAGRAPH AND PARA. 2.) E. O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PFOR, IR, PK, XF SUBJECT: AUDIENCE WITH SHAH APRIL 5 REF: STATE 053670 SUMMARY: AFTER APRIL 5 PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS EXPECT HAVE PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH SHAH. I PLAN LISTEN BUT IF SUBJECT OF PAKISTAN AND SHAH\' S CONCERNS REGARDING US/ USSR NEGOTIATIONS COME UP THIS WILL BE GOOD OCCASION TO PASS ON ANY THOUGHTS WE HAVE REGARDING PAKISTAN AS BHUTTO ARRIVING TEHRAN APRIL 7 AND TO REASSURE SHAH TOTAL ERA OF NEGOTIATION WITH MOSCOW DOES NOT IN ANY WAY IMPLY LESSENING OF TIES WITH IRAN. END SUMMARY. ACTION REQUESTED: IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE BY OPEN OF BUSINESS APRIL 4 SUMMARY OF OUR ECONOMIC AID TO PAKISTAN IN LAST 18 MONTHS, HIGHLIGHTS OF RECENTLY REVISED ANNOUNCED ARMS POLICY TO PAKISTAN AND ANY OTHER POINTS DEPT OR ISLAMABAD THINK USEFUL TO PASS TO SHAH REGARDING BHUTTO VISIT. 1. ON MORNING APRIL 5 I WILL BE PRESENTING MY CREDENTIALS TO SHAH. THIS OCCASION TOGETHER WITH SEVERAL OTHER AUDIENCES BEING SCHEDULED FOR APRIL DURING VISITS OF DEPSEC RUSH AND GENERALS GOODPASTER AND RYAN WILL PROVIDE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT TO SHAH MESSAGES OR THOUGHTS WE MAY HAVE ON: ( A) US/ IRANIAN RELATIONS, ( B) DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD AND, ( C) ROLE IRAN CAN PLAY IN THESE DEVELOPMENTS TO OUR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. 2. AT PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS CEREMONY SHAH\' S CUSTOM IS TO TAKE AMBASSADOR ASIDE AFTER CEREMONIALS FOR PRIVATE CONVERSATION. THIS BEING MY FIRST OFFICIAL MEETING WITH SHAH AS AMBASSADOR, MY INTENTION IS TO LISTEN TO WHAT SHAH HAS TO SAY. I ANTICIPATE SHAH, AS IS HIS CUSTOM, WILL TAKE ME ON ONE OF HIS \" TOUR D\' HORIZONS\". WITH BHUTTO EXPECTED IN TOWN APRIL 7, PAKISTAN WILL UNDOUBTEDLY COME UP. SHAH WILL PROBABLY CHIDE US FOR NOT HELPING BHUTTO ADEQUATELY. IF SO, I PLAN REMIND SHAH OF ALL WE HAVE DONE ECONOMICALLY FOR PAKISTAN IN LAST YEAR OR SO AND OF RECENT DECISION TO LIFT ARMS EMBARGO ON NILITARY ITEMS FROZEN IN PIPELINE SINCE 1971. TO THIS END WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING BY MORNING APRIL 4 LOCAL TIME BREAKDOWN OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN FOR LAST 18 MONTHS AND MAIN POINTS OF OUR PRESENT ARMS POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN AND INDIA. 3. IN ADDITION GIVEN SHAH\' S CLOSE RELATIONS WITH BHUTTO AND INFLUENCE ON PAK PRESIDENT, ARE TTHERE ANY POINTS REGARDING PAKISTAN WHICH DEPT OR ISLAMABAD THINK I COULD USEFULLY PUT TO SHAH FOR HIS TALKS WITH BHUTTO. 4. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED ZAHEDI\' S DESCRIPTION OF SHAH\' S CONCERNS, WE BELIEVE THIS TO REFLECT SHAH\' S WORRY OVER TREND OF EVENTS IN THIS AREA WHICH HE CONSIDERS HOSTILE TO IRANIAN INTERESTS AND HIS NEED FOR PERIODIC REASSURANCE THAT HE IS NOT ISOLATED, THAT HE CAN COUNT ON CONTINUED US INTEREST IN IRAN AND THAT ANY DETENTE ACHIEVED BETWEEN US AND USSR WILL NOT WORK TO IRAN\' S DISADVANTAGE. 5. IF SUBJECT COMES UP I PROPOSE MAKE SAME POINTS AS DEPSEC RUSH MADE TO ZAHEDI AND ASSURE HIM THAT WE HAVE NOT AND WOULD NOT DISCUSS IRAN/ US RELATIONS WITH USSR WITHOUT IRAN\' S FULL KNOWLEDGE. 6. FINALLY, AT APPROPRIATE TIME I SHALL MENTION PRESIDENT\' S DEEP INTEREST IN HAVING SHAH AND EMPRESS PAY OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON DURING 1973. HELMS " "7","10/2/1973 14:00","73TEHRAN7005","Embassy Tehran","UNCLASSIFIED","","O 021400Z OCT 73 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4042 ","UNCLAS TEHRAN 7005 Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: PINS IR SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION/KIDNAP PLOT AGAINST SHAH REVEALED SUMMARY: GOI ANNOUNCED TODAY ARREST OF TWELVE PERSONS INCLUDING TWO WOMEN FOR PLOTTING TO KIDNAP OR KILL SHAH, EMPRESS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF IMPERIAL FAMILY. PLOTTERS SAID TO BELONG TO WING OF OUTLAWED TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY AND ARE SAID TO HAVE MADE CONFESSIONS. END SUMMARY. 1. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION ANNOUNCED OCTOBER 2 THE ARREST OF TWELVE PERSONS INCLUDING TWO WOMEN ON CHARGES OF PLOTTING TO KIDNAP OR KILL MEMBERS OF THE IMPERIAL FAMILY. ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT, GROUP, WHICH INCLUDED FILMMAKERS, CAMERAMEN AND NEWSPAPERMEN, HAD RECONNOITERED SHAH\'S CASPIAN PALACE AT NOWSHAHR AS WELL AS RESIDENCE OF HIM\'S YOUNGER SISTER PRINCESS FATEMEH. PLAN WAS TO KILL SHAH, EMPRESS, CROWN PRINCE AND POSSIBLY OTHERS, PERHAPS INCLUDING UNNAMED FOREIGN AMBASSADOR, OBTAIN AN AIRLINER TO FLEE COUNTRY WITH HOSTAGES AND DEMAND RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, THREATENING DEATH TO ROYAL FAMILY IF DEMANDS REFUSED. SHAH\'S FORMER SON-IN-LAW AND PRESENT IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO US ARDESHIR ZAHEDI AND HIM\'S GRANDDAUGHTER MAHNAZ ALSO REPORTEDLY TARGETED. 2. SECURITY AUTHORITIES ANNOUNCED THAT QUATITIES OF FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES WERE SEIZED AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP HAVE BEEN CAPTURED. INTERESTINGLY, ONE OF PLOTTERS WAS MANOUCHEHR MOGHADAM-SALIMI, WHO WAS SENTENCED TO THREE YEARS IN PRISON FOR HIS PART IN ATTEMPT ON SHAH\'S LIFE AT MARBLE PALACE IN 1965. ONE OF TWO WOMEN INVOLVED WAS MARYAM ETEHADIEH (MEMBER OF WELL-KNOWN MERCANTILE FAMILY AND NEWSPAPER EMPLOYEE) WHO PROVIDED DATA ON MOVEMENTS OF PRINCESS MAHNAZ. SECOND WOMAN WAS SHOUKOUH FARHANG (NEWSPAPER EMPLOYEE), WHO JOINED WITH HUSBAND EBRAHIM FARHANG-RAZI (COMMERCIAL COMPANY EMPLOYEE). OTHERS INCLUDED MORTEZA SIAPOUSHI (NEWSPAPER EMPLOYEE) AND FARHAD QEYSARI. 3. PLOTTERS REPORTEDLY MEMBERS OF OUTLAWED TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY AND ARE SAID TO HAVE CONFESSED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO PLANNING ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON EMPRESS FARAH OR OTHER MEMBER OF IMPERIAL FAMILY AT CHILDREN\'S FILM FESTIVAL SCHEDULED FOR LATER THIS MONTH. A MAJOR FIGURE IN THIS PORTION OF PLOT WAS REZA ALAMEZADEH, A CANDIDATE FOR PRIZE FOR YEAR\'S BEST CHILDREN\'S FILM. OTHERS INCLUDED ABBAS ALI SAMAKAR, TEYFOUR BATHAII (FILMMAKERS), RAHMATOLLAH IRAJ JAMSHIDI (REPORTER), AND KERAMATALLAH DANESHIAN (CONSTRUCTION COMPANY EMPLOYEE). PLAN CALLED FOR ALAMEZADEH AND SAMAKAR TO GO ARMED TO PRIZEGIVING CEREMONY AND MAKE ASSAULT AT MOMENT OF PRESENTATION. OTHER THREE TOBE PRESENT AT CEREMONY, ALSO ARMED, TO PROVIDE DEVERSION IF NECESSARY. COMMENT: NO INDICATION OF DATE ARREST TOOK PLACE. WILL REPORT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. HELMS Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 NNN " "8","11/21/1973 12:20","73TEHRAN8233","Embassy Tehran","SECRET","","R 211220Z NOV 73 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4574 ","S E C R E T TEHRAN 8233 Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PINT, IR SUBJECT: SHAH ON CORRUPTION 1. AFTER AMBASSADOR BYROADE\'S AUDIENCE WITH SHAH WAS FINISHED, I ASKED TO STAY BEHIND TO DISCUSS WITH SHAH APPROACH OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO SWEDISH AMBASSADOR AND OTHERS ABOUT ALLEGED INCREASE IN DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO GOI AS RESULT SHAH\'S RECENT DECREES ON CORRUPTION AND ON NEW REQUIREMENT THAT GOVERNMENT MINISTERS AND IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES DIVEST THEMSELVES OF ANY SHARES THEY HOLD IN ANY COMPANIES OR INDUSTRIES. SHAH WAS OBVIOUSLY STARTLED TO LEARN THAT SOVIETS WERE CLAIMING TO NOTE INCREASED OPPOSITION AND ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW ANYONE COULD IMAGINE SUCH A THING. WE AGREED THAT THIS WAS SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DESIGNED TO UNSETTLE THE GOVERNMENT. THE SHAH IMMEDIATELY TIED IT IN TO THE RECENT TUDEH PARTY/IRAQI COMMUNIST PROCLAMATION CRITICIZING GOI ACTIVITIES. SHAH IS CONVINCED THAT SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO RECREATE TUDEH PARTY AND PUT MONEY INTO STRENGTHENING OF IRANIAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. 2. BEING PENSIVE FOR A MOMENT ABOUT WHAT WE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING, THE SHAH SAID, \"PERHAPS I HAVE BEEN TOO TOUGH ON CORRUPTION.\" TO WHICH I IMMEDIATELY REPLIED, \"NO, SIR, YOU CANNOT BE TOO TOUGH ON CORRUPTION.\" THERE THEN ENSUED A DISCUSSION OF WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN IRAN IN THE YEARS AHEAD IF CORRUPTION IS NOT STEMMED WITH BILLIONS OF DOLLARS FLOATING AROUND IN THE ECONOMY. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR FROM THIS DISCUSSION THAT THE SHAH INDEED IS CONVINCED THAT HIS PROGRAM AND THE COUNTRY\'S FUTURE WILL GO RIGHT DOWNHILL IF HE IS NOT ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE CORRUPTION ISSUE. 3. WHEN THE SHAH MENTIONED HIS INSISTENCE THAT CERTAIN HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DIVEST THEMSELVES OF STOCKS AND HOLDINGS, I SAID, \"WON\'T MANY OF THEM HAVE TO UNLOAD?\" THE SHAH REPLIED, \"A FEW, NOT ALL.\" HELMHD " "9","3/4/1975 11:25","75TEHRAN2069","Embassy Tehran","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 041125Z MAR 75 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 475 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 2069 Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PINT, IR SUBJECT: IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY CREATED BY SHAH SUMMARY: CREATION OF IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY ANNOUNCED BY SHAH MARCH 2 IS MOVE TO SEEK BROADER SUPPORT FOR MONARCHY AND THE SHAHPEOPLE REVOLUTION. ALL IRANIANS OF VOTING AGE ARE EXPECTED TO EXPRESS ALLEGIANCE TO NEW PARTY OR RISK BEING VIEWED AS OPPONENTS OF SHAH AND EVEN TRAITORS WHO SHOULD LEAVE IRAN OR GO TO PRISON. SHAH EXPLAINED IRAN\'S RETURN TO SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM AS NECESSARY BECAUSE QTE SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES UNQTE BY SOME IRANIANS SHOWED NEED FOR IRANIANS TO CLOSE RANKS IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE QTE GREAT CIVILIZATION, UNQTE AND BECAUSE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD FAILED. ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR SUMMER WILL APPARENTLY BE HELD, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW THEY WILL BE ORGANIZED. NET RESULT IS TO MAKE IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM LESS FLEXIBLE. INTERNATIONAL REACTION WILL PROBABLY RANGE FROM INDIFFERENCE TO CHARGES OF INCREASED TOTALITARIANISM. SHAH APPARENTLY PLANS TO CONTINUE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DAILY POLITICAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS CONTRARY TO EARLIER SUGGESTIONS THAT HE MIGHT BE MOVING GRADUALLY TO CONFINE HIMSELF TO BROAD POLICY GUIDANCE AND LEAVE IMPLEMENTATION TO GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY. 1. SHAH\'S LENGTHY STATEMENT AT HIS MARCH 2 PRESS CONFERENCE, FROM WITH CORRESPONDENTS FOR FOREIGN MEDIA WERE EXCLUDED, (TEXT SENT BY AIRGRAM) ESTABLISHED IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY. NEW PARTY WILL ABSORB RULING IRAN NOVIN PARTY, LOYAL OPPOSITION MARDOM PARTY, AND THE ULTRA-NATIONALIST PAN IRANIST PARTY AND ITS SPLINTER GROUP THE IRANIANS PARTY. PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDA IS TO BE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST TWO YEARS. SHAH WILL LATER PROPOSE CHAIRMAN OF NEW PARTY\'S EXECUTIVE BOARD AND PRESIDENT FOR ITS POLITICAL BUREAU. A PARTY CONGRESS WILL BE HELD, PERHAPS WITHIN TWO MONTHS. GENERAL ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD THIS SUMMER UNDER AUSPICES OF NEW PARTY. 2. SHAH\'S STATEMENT BEGAN WITH FAMILIAR RECITATION OF IRAN\'S GROWING SELF-RELIANCE AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE CONTRASTING SHARPLY WITH ITS RELATIVE WEAKNESS IN FIRST HALF OF CENTURY. HE NOTED THAT OPPOSITION PARTIES WERE CREATED IN RESPONSE TO HIS OWN WISHES AND COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD BEEN FACED WITH A DIFFICULT TASK. SHAH OBSERVED THAT THEY HAD FAILED TO FULFILL THEIR PROPER ROLE. HE COMMENTED THAT SOME IRANIANS HAD MADE QTE SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES UNQTE WHICH REFLECTED A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF IRAN\' GOALS. IN ORDER TO WELD ALL IRANIANS TOGETHER IN PURSUIT OF GOALS OF THE SHAH-PEOPLE REVOLUTION, HE HAD, THEREFORE, DECIDED TO CREATE NEW ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD SUPPRESS PARTY DIFFERENCES. ONLY REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NEW ORGANIZATION WOULD BE LOYALTY TO (1) MONARCHY, (2) IRAN\'S CONSTITUTION, AND (3) SIXTH OF BAHMAN (SHAHPEOPLE) REVOLUTION. HE SPECIFICALLY SAID NEW PARTY WOULD FOSTER CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM, AND HE PREDICTED THAT POLITICAL WINGS WOULD EVOLVE WITHIN NEW PARTY. HE URGED ALL IRANIANS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE TO ENTER INTO NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE OR CLARIFY THEIR POSITION. BY THIS HE MEANT THAT THOSE WHO COULD NOT AGREE WITH THE THREE PRINCIPLES SHOULD LEAVE IRAN OR GO TO PRISON AS TRAITORS UNLESS THEY OPENLY EXPRESSED THEIR DISAPPROVAL AND WERE NOT ANTINATIONAL. IF DISAPPROVAL IS IDEOLOGICAL, PERSON WOULD REMAIN FREE IN IRAN BUT QTE SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY EXPECTATIONS UNQTE. FULL PARTICIPATION IN IRAN\'S PROGRESS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE MEMBERSHIP IN THE IRAN RESURGENCE PARTY. HE SAID IT WAS HIS EXPECTATION THAT WORKERS, FARMERS, AND TEACHERS WOULD BE THE FIRST GROUPS TO ANNOUNCE THEIR LOYALTY TO THE NEW PARTY. 3. COMMENT: ABOVE ALL, SHAH\'S ACTION IN RETURNING TO SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM OF 1964-67 PERIOD SHOWS HIS EXTREME SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM AND STRONG DESIRE TO RECEIVE OVERT EVIDENCE OF POPULAR SUPPORT. AFTER HE EXPERIMENTED WITH TAME OPPOSITION PARTIES IN 1956-64 PERIOD WITH POOR RESULTS, SHAH THEN TURNED TO HASSAN ALI MANSUR\'S PROGRESSIVE SOCIETY TO CREATE IRAN NOVIN PARTY AS INSTRUMENT TO IMPLEMENT HIS SIXTH OF BAHMAN REVOLUTION. MARDOM PARTY WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REJUVENATED TO STIMULATE IRAN NOVIN TO PERFORM MORE EFFECTIVELY. DESPITE CONSTANT STATEMENTS OF LOYALTY TO SHAH AND HIS PLANS FOR IRAN, PARTIES HAVE APPARENTLY NOT PLEASED HIM. AS INDICATED BY FAILURES OF FORMER MARDOM PARTY SECRETARIES GENERAL ALI NAQI AND NASSER AMERI, EVEN ACTIVITIES OF GELDED OPPOSITION HAD PROVED TOO CRITICAL FOR SHAH\'S TASTE. NEVERTHELESS HIS PAST STATEMENTS INDICATED CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR COCCEPT OF MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN IRAN, AND IMPERIAL DECISION TO INSTITUTE ONEPARTY STATE REPRESENTS 180-DEGREE SHIFT IN POLICY WHICH ALSO APPEARS TO NEGATE EARLIER PROMISES OF FREER ELECTIONS LATER THIS YEAR. KEY SECTION OF SPEECH IS COMMENT THAT HE HAD HEARD QTE SOME REALLY SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES, WHICH IN NOW WAY SHOULD BE EXPECTED FROM AN IRANIAN. THIS SCENE, OF COURSE, HAS ALWAYS RECURRED WHEN IRAN HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE DEFENCE OF ITS RIGHTS AT A HISTORIC JUNCTURE. THIS SITUATION IS INTOLERABLE, UNQTE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE DOUBT THAT MUCH CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM WILL EMERGE FROM THE IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY. 4. IN OPERATIONAL TERMS LITTLE HAS CHANGED, FOR DESPITE FACADE OF QTE ME-TOO UNQTE OPPOSITION PARTIES SHAH HAS ALWAYS CALLED THE TUNE AND ONLY RULING IRAN NOVIN PARTY HAD ANY IMPORTANCE. PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN LEAD DANCER, AND HIS SELECTION AS SECGEN AT JANUARY PARTY CONGRESS HAD TIED IRAN NOVIN PARTY EVEN CLOSER TO SHAH. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF NEW MOVE HAS BEEN FLOOD OF STATEMENTS OF LOYALTY TO SHAH, CONSTITUTION AND REVOLUTION, BOTH BY GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS. THERE IS CLEARLY NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR IRANIANS WHO WANT TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN IRAN\'S DEVELOPMENT AND SHARE ITS PROSPERITY. ALL DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT SHAH\'S PLAN FOR IRAN WILL BE SUPPRESSED UNTIL NEW PARTY DEVELOPS AN IDEOLOGY AND ITS LEADERSHIP IS CONSTITUTED. 5. SHAH\'S SPEECH IS VAGUE ON GOALS OF IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY AND MANY OTHER POINTS. IT IS NOT CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, HOW CANDIDATES WILL BE SELECTED FOR SUMMER ELECTIONS AND ON WHAT PLATFORMS THEY WILL RUN. SPEECH SHOWS SIGNS OF HURRIED PREPARATION FOR ISSUANCE PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR ALGIERS. WHILE MOST IRANIANS WILL ACCEPT NEW CHANGE WITH TYPICAL CYNICISM, IMPLIED CRITICISM OF ALL PARTIES FOR FAILING TO GET BEHIND SHAH\'S PUSH FOR REVOLUTION FROM THE TOP MAY ALIENATE SOME PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO HAVE WORKED HARD FOR IRAN NOVIN PARTY ON ASSUMPTION THEY WERE CARRYING OUT SHAH\'S WISHES. 6. INTERNATIONAL REACTION WILL PROBABLY VARY FROM INDIFFERENCE TO INCREASINGLY SHRILL CHARGES OF TOTALITARIANISM. IRAN\'S IMAGE AS COUNTRY IN WHICH ALL ELEMENTS WERE BEING TAPPED IN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS MAY SUFFER UNLESS NEW PARTY\'S MEMBERSHIP COMES FROM BROAD SPECTRUM. IT APPEARS THAT EARLIER SUCCESSFUL IRANIAN POLICY OF COMPROMISE AND COOPERATION HAS BEEN REPLACED BY QTE TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT UNQTE STANCE IN DEALING WITH OPPOSITION. 7. IN A-19 EMBASSY NOTED THAT SHAH HOPES TO MOVE TOWARD SITUATION IN WHICH HE GIVES POLICY GUIDANCE BUT KEEPS HIS DISTANCE FROM DAILY ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENT. INITAL IMPRESSION OF HIS ACTION IN CREATING NEW POLITICAL PARTY AND FORECASTING HIS PERSONAL SELECTION OF SOME OF ITS LEADERS IS THAT HE HAS RETURNED TO MORE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT. BETTER JUDGMENT ON THIS POINT CAN BE MADE WHEN FUNCTION OF NEW PARTY BECOME CLEAR. 8. IN SUM, GIVEN EXISTING STRICT DEGREE OF POLITICAL CONTROLS, SHAH\'S DECISION TO MELD ALL POLITICAL PARTIES INTO ONE APPEARS TO OFFER LITTLE IN WAY OF IMPROVEMENTS TO IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM WHILE ADDING SEVERAL DISADVANTAGES BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. HELMS Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 " "10","11/18/1975 12:05","7575LIBREVILLE1895","Embassy Libreville","CONFIDENTIAL","75STATE272523","O R 181205Z NOV 75 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE TO USMISSION USUN NEWYORK NIACT IMMEDIATE SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7102 INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY SEOUL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L 75 LIBREVILLE 1895 E.O. 11652: NGDS TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, GB, KS, KN SUBJ: KOREA AT 30TH UNGA: GABON REF: STATE 272523; USUN 6028 1. PRESIDENT BONGO HAS JUST PERSONALLY ASSURED ME THAT GOG PERMREP HAS NOW RECEIVED FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTE AGAINST HOSTILE RESOLUTION IN PLENARY THIS AFTERNOON. 2. ACCORDING ROK AMBASSADOR KIM, INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOW BEEN SENT THROUGH TWO CHANNELS: (A) BY PHONE FROM PRESIDENT TO GABONESE AMBASSADOR IN PARIS, WITH LATTER SENDING THEM ON BY TELEGRAM TO NEW YORK IN PRESIDENT\'S NAME; AND (B) DIRECTLY FROM LIBREVILLE BY ACTING FONMIN REKANGALT TO ESSONGHE IN NEW YORK. 3. PRESIDENT ADDED THAT HIS CALL TO PARIS WAS PROMPTED BY REQUEST LATE LAST NIGHT FROM FRENCH CHARGE, WHO TELEPHONED HIM AFTER CONSULTING WITH KIM. PRESIDENT ADDED THAT HE WOULD SACK ESSONGHE AS PERMREP IF HE FAILS CAST NEGATIVE VOTE ON HOSTILE RESOLUTION AS INSTRUCTED. 4. AMBASSADOR KIM WILL ATTEMPT CALL PARK IN NEW YORK AT OPENING OF BUSINESS TO CONFIRM RECEIPT OF INSTRUCTIONS, AND HAS EXTRACTED PROMISE FROM REKANGALT TO PHONE ESSONGHE DIRECTLY THIS AFTERNOON IF HE STILL APPEARS TO BE WAVERING. STEIGMAN CONFIDENTIAL " "11","1/11/1978 13:00","78TEHRAN389","Embassy Tehran","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 111300Z JAN 78 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6361 INFO USINT BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY JIDDA AMEMBASSY LONDON ","C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 0389 Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2006 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PINS IR SUBJ: SERIOUS RELIGIOUS DISSIDENCE IN QOM 1. IN MOST SERIOUS INCIDENT OF THIS SORT FOR YEARS, 5 DEMONSTRATORS WERE SHOT DEAD AND 9 INJURED WHEN POLICE OPENED FIRE ON A CROWD ATTEMPTING TO OCCUPY A POLICE STATION IN THE HIGHLY RELIGIOUS CITY OF QOM JAN 9. A POLICE OFFICE AND 3 POLICEMEN WERE INJURED BY THE DEMONSTRATORS AND ONE 13 YEAR BOY WAS TRAMPLED TO DEATH IN THE STAMPEDE THAT FOLLOWED THE SHOOTING. 2. INCIDENT OCCURRED ON ANNIVERSARY OF LAND REFORM LEGISLATION PASSED IN 1963. IT FOLLOWED A MUCH MILDER PROTEST BY STUDENTS OF RELIGION SHOUTING ANTI-NATIONAL SLOGANS ON JAN 7 THE 42ND ANNIVERSARY OF REZA SHAH\'S DECREE ABOLISHING THE VEIL FOR WOMEN. 3. ON THE 9TH A MOB OF PROTESTORS ARMED WITH STONES, IRON BARS, AND WOODEN STAVES REPORTEDLY RAMPAGED THROUGH THE STREETS SMASHING WINDOWS OF SHOPS AND DESTROYING PREMISES OF REASTAKHIZ PARTY HEADQUARTERS. THEY THEN TRIED TO TAKE OVER A POLICE STATION, DAMAGING POLICE VEHICLES OUTSIDE. POLICE WARNINGS AND WARNING SHOTS INTO THE AIR WENT UNHEEDED, AND POLICE THEN FIRED INTO THE CROWD. 4. INFORMATION ON THIS INCIDENT WAS RELEASED TO THE PRESS BY PARS NEW AGENCY AFTERNOON JAN 10. SAME INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO DCM BY COURT MINISTER HOVEYDA AT SHAH\'S DINNER THAT EVENING FOR VISITING CODE. 5. COMMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS ARE BEING ASCRIBED BY POLICE AUTHORITIES -- ACCURATELY WE BELIEVE -- TO CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION ELEMENTS (THOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY TO FOLLOWERS OF KHOMEINI OR TO ISLAMIC MARXISTS AS SUCH). THIS IS FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS, IN OUR RECOLLECTION, THAT POLICE HAVE KILLED SEVERAL DEMONSTRATORS BY FIRING INTO A CROWD. SEVERITY OF THIS INCIDENT WOULD APPEAR TO ARGUE AGAINST THOSE AMONG THE JOURNALISTS AND OTHER OBSERVERS HERE WHO HAVE SUSPECTED MANY RECENT INCIDENTS WERE COOKED UP BY IRANIAN SECURITY FORCES TO IMPRESS THE SHAH AND/OR USG. BY THE SAME TOKEN, IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE THAT RELATIVE POLICE LENIENCY, AS FOR EXAMPLE IN LACK OF EFFECTIVE REACTION TO STUDENT DEMONSTRATION JAN 7, ENCOURAGED MORE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION WHICH NECESSITATED VIOLENT REPRESSION TO PUT DOWN. AT LEAST IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE MANY PROPONENTS OF THE MAILED FIST IN GOI ESTABLISHMENT MIGHT SO ARGUE TO THE SHAH AND PRIMIN AMOUZEGAR IN EFFORT TO REVERSE RELATIVE LIBERALIZATION OF RECENT MONTHS. SULLIVAN CONFIDENTIAL Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2006 " "12","5/6/1978 16:01","78KABUL3619","Embassy Kabul","CONFIDENTIAL","","061601Z MAY 78 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO SECSTATE WASHDC INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY TEHRAN","CONFIDENTIAL KABUL 3619 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINT, AF, US SUBJECT: FIRST CONVERSATION WITH NEW AFGHAN PRESIDENT 1. MUR MOHAMHAD TARAKI, THE PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN\'S NEW REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND HE LIKES TO BE CALLED \"MR. PRESIDENT,\" RECEIVED ME ALONE IN HIS OFFICE AT THE OLD PRIME MINISTRY BUILDING AT 5 P.M. ON MAY 6, I WAS RECEIVED AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE BUILDING BY THE SAME CHIEF AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF PROTOCOL WHO HAD SERVED THE PREVIOUS REGIME. AS AN INDICATION OF THE TIMES, THE DEPUTY CHIEF, WHO IS A MOHAMMADZAI, STARTED WEEPING WHEN I ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS FAMILY. IT WAS IN THIS MOOD THAT HE USHERED ME INTO HIS NEW CHIEF\'S OFFICE. SECURITY PRECAUTIONS SEEMED TO BE MINIMAL, WITH ONLY ONE ARMORED VEHICLE VISIBLE IN THE COMPOUND OF THE PRIME MINISTRY. 2. TABAKI GREETED ME WITH A WARM HANDSHAKE AND A FRIENDLY SMILE, DULY RECORDED BY PHOTOGRAPHERS. WE THEN SAT DOWN IN THE CORNER OF HIS OFFICE AND EXCHANGED A FEW PLEASANTRIES WHILE OUR PICTURES CONTINUED TO BE SNAPPED. I GOT A GOOD LAUGH FROM HIM WHEN I SAID I WAS SORRY I HAD NOT MET HIM DURING MY FOUR AND ONE-HALF YEARS IN AFGHANISTAN -- AND EVEN SORRIER DURING THE PAST NINE DAYS. TARAKI SPOKE EXCELLENT, IF SOMEWHAT RUSTY, ENGLISH. 3. TARAKI BEGAN HIS CONVERSATION BY RECOUNTING WITH OBVIOUS PRIDE AND RELISH THE SUCCESS OF HIS REVOLUTION, STRESSING THAT IT IS A REVOLUTION AND NOT A COUP. HE SAID ON THURSDAY, APRIL 27, THE TANKS FIRST MOVED IN THE DIRECTION OF KABUL ABOUT 9 A.M., BUT TOOK MORE THAN TWO HOURS TO REACH THE CENTER OF THE CITY. BY EVENING, THE DAOUD REGIME HAD LOST THE BATTLE, ALTHOUGH THEY TRIED IN VAIN DURING THE NIGHT TO SEND REINFORCEMENTS FROM CENTRAL CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND FROM KARGHA. WITH THE COMING OF DAYLIGHT, HE SAID, THE AIR FORCE WAS ABLE TO FINISH THE JOB. MEANWHILE, WITHIN THE PALACE DAOUD HAD BEEN ASKED TO SURRENDER, BUT REFUSED, SHOT AT HIS ATTACKERS, AS DID HIS WIFE AND FAMILY, AND WAS THEREFORE KILLED. THE INTENTION, SAID TARAKI, HAD BEEN TO TAKE HIM AS A CAPTIVE. TARAKI ADDED THAT DAOUD PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN COURT-MARTIALED AND POSSIBLY SHOT. TARAKI HAD YESTERDAY THE SOLDIER WHO HAD BEEN SHOT BY DAOUD\'S \"WHITE PISTOL\". 4. TARAKI THEN SAID HE WAS SURPRISED THAT I HAD NOT BEEN THE FIRST AMBASSADOR TO CALL ON HIM, BECAUSE WHAT HE IS TRYING TO ESTABLISH IN AFGHANISTAN IS A \"GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEOPLE, AND FOR THE PEOPLE.\" CORRECTING HIMSELF A BIT, HE SAID HE HAD ASKED THE SAME QUESTION OF THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR BECAUSE PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN HAVE SO MUCH IN COMMON, CULTURALLY AND ETHNICALLY. 5. I THEN EXPLAINED THAT IN CASES LIKE THIS, WE DO NOT EXTEND FORMAL RECOGNITION BUT INDICATE, AS WE HAVE DONE, THAT WE WANT TO CONTINUE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. I SAID, IN FACT, WE HOPE TO HAVE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT. I ADDED, AS OUR NOTE STATED, THAT I HOPE HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE A CHANCE SOON TO AFFIRM THE VALIDITY OF EXISTING TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS. HE MAD NO COMMENT ON THAT SUGGESTION. 6. AT SEVERAL POINTS DURING THESE PRELIMINARY EXCHANGES, TARAKI REFERRED TO THE TIME HE HAD SPENT IN THE UNITED STATES, HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR AMERICANS, AND HIS LIKING FOR THE AMERICAN QUALITY OF FRANKNESS. WE AGREED THAT AFGHANS AND AMERICANS HAVE LOTS IN COMMON IN THIS REGARD. 7. I THEN STATED I WANTED TO BE FRANK WITH HIM. I SAID THAT, AS HE KNEW, THE UNITED STATES HAD NEVER SOUGHT ANY STRATEGIC OR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE FROM AFGHANISTAN. HE AGREED. I SAID THAT ONE OF THE CARDINAL POINTS OF OUR POLICY IS TO HELP AFGHANISTAN MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENCE, ITS INTEGRITY, AND ITS NATIONAL IDENTITY. HE NODDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY. I SAID THAT SINCE THE BRITISH LEFT INDIA, IT WAS OUR VIEW THAT THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT COULD POSSIBLY THREATEN AFGHANISTAN\'S INDEPENDENCE IS THE SOVIET UNION. IN PAST TIMES, I NOTED, OUR POLICY HAD BEEN TO TRY TO CONSTRUCT BLOCS AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, BUT THAT OUR APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM HAD, IN THE COURSE OF TIME BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED. I STATED WE COULD READILY UNDERSTAND -- GIVEN AFGHANISTAN\'S GEOGRAPHIC POSITION AND ECONOMIC NEEDS -- WHY IT WOULD WANT A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT, I SAID, WE WOULD BE DISTURBED IF AFGHANISTAN\'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES WERE TO BECOME INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE THAT WOULD OBLITERATE AFGHANISTAN\'S NATIONAL IDENTITY AND WOULD GIVE RISE TO TENSIONS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD WHICH COULD THREATEN PEACE. I SAID THAT IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE APPRECIATE AFGHANISTAN\'S NONALIGNED POLICY. 8. IN RESPONSE, TARAKI AFFIRMED THAT AFGHANISTAN IS AND DESIRES TO REMAIN AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY AND MASTER OF ITS OWN DESTINY. HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE UNITED STATES TAKES A MORE FLEXIBLE VIEW OF THE WORLD AND ADMITS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT MADE A MISTAKE IN VIETNAM. HE REFERRED TO HIS BEING IN WASHINGTON DURING THE DAYS OF SENATOR MCCARTHY, AND NOTED THAT THE THEN VICE PRESIDENT NIXON HAD REFUSED ONCE TO COME TO AN AFGHAN EMBASSY RECEPTION BECAUSE AFGHANISTAN WAS TOO CLOSE TO THE SOVIET UNION. HE WAS PLEASED THAT THAT IS NO LONGER THE APPROACH THE UNITED STATES TAKES TOWARD HIS COUNTRY. 9. I THEN SAID THAT IN EVALUATING THE POLICIES OF A GOVERNMENT IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY LIKE AFGHANISTAN, THE UNITED STATES WOULD LOOK FIRST AND FOREMOST AT WHAT THAT GOVERNMENT IS DOING TO RAISE THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF ITS PEOPLE AND TO ASSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS -- ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL. AT THIS POINT, TARAKI BECAME MUCH MORE ANIMATED AND HELD FORTH AT SOME LENGTH ON THE SUBJECT OF HOW HIS GOVERNMENT WANTS TO HELP THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES -- UNLIKE HIS PREDECESSORS, REALLY CARE ABOUT THE POOR PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY AND HAVE NO INTEREST IN PUTTING MONEY IN SWISS BANKS. HE SAID THAT IN JUDGING HIS GOVERNMENT\'S POLICIES, WE SHOULD ASK THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN WHETHER THEY THINK THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL. IN THE PAST, HE BELIEVED FOREIGNERS TENDED TO ASK THE ARISTOCRATS WHO, OF COURSE, WERE NOT INTERESTED IN HELPING THE POOR BECAUSE SUCH A POLICY WOULD THREATEN THEIR OWN PROSPERITY. REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS, TARAKI SAID THIS IS A VERY COMPLICATED PROBLEM AND THAT EACH NATION MUST JUDGE FOR ITSELF THE KIND OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAT ARE MOST SUITED TO ITS OWN SITUATION AND CULTURE. HE MADE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT US TO MAKE VALUE JUDGEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN\'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. I ASSURED HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NO DESIRE TO TRY TO TRANSPLANT ITS GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM ELSEWHERE, BUT THAT WE, NEVERTHELESS, CARE DEEPLY ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS. 10. TARAKI THEN SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD JUDGE OTHER GOVERNMENTS BY THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HELP AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT\'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS HAD NOT YET BEEN FORMULATED, BUT THAT HE WOULD BE ASKING US FOR ASSISTANCE AS, INDEED, HE WOULD BE ASKING THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT THE PRINCIPAL SLOGAN, ADDING THAT HE REALLY MEANT POLICY AND NOT SLOGAN, OF HIS GOVERNMENT IS TO PROVIDE BREAD, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER FOR THE MASSES. I DESCRIBED OUR AID PROGRAM OF RECENT YEARS AND ITS EMPHASIS ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND AGRICULTURE FOR THE RURAL POOR. HE SAID HE WOULD TELL ME, AS HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AID PFORAMS HAD FAILED, AND THAT THE FAILURE WAS DUE TO THE LACK OF COMMITMENT OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME. I SAID I AGREED WITH HIM THAT OUR AID PROGRAM HAD NOT ACHIEVED ITS GOALS. HE ASKED ME WHY. I REPLIED THAT HE KNEW HIS OWN COUNTRY BETTER THAN I, AND THAT I WOULD MERELY SAY THAT THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT WAS NOT CAPABLE OF IMPLEMENTING THE KIND OF PROGRAM THAT WE WISHED TO SEE IMPLEMENTED. HE OBVIOUSLY TOOK GREAT PLEASURE IN MY SAYING THIS. 11. TARAKI THEN SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT I UNDERSTOOD WHAT HE MEANT BY \"BREAD\". HE SAID HE WANTS TO PROVIDE JOBS FOR THE THOUSANDS OF AFGHANS WHO HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY TO WORK IN IGNOMINY ABROAD. THIS WILL MEAN THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRY AND INFRASTRUCTURE, AND HE HOPED WE WOULD HELP WITH THAT. I TOLD HIM THAT ONCE THE APPROPRIATE MINISTERS IN HIS GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS WITH US, MY AID MISSION DIRECTOR AND I WOULD BE HAPPY TO DO SO. 12. I THEN SAID THAT ONE OTHER MATTER OF IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES IS THE STABILITY OF THIS REGION IN THE WORLD. I SAID WE HAVE BEEN DELIGHTED AT THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS IN DEVELOPING REGIONAL COOPERATION. TARAKI SAID THAT THAT WAS, OF COURSE, A MATTER THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE STUDYING. HE ALSO SAID THAT WHEN ONE TALKS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION, THAT MEANS NOT ONLY COOPERATION WITH INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND IRAN -- BUT ALSO WITH THE SOVIET UNION. 13. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH PLEASANTRIES AS IT HAD BEGUN. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT JUDGE HIM BADLY IF HE BUILT MORE MOSQUES. BY THE SAME TOKEN, HE HOPED WE WOULD NOT JUDGE HIM BADLY IF HE, HIMSELF, DID NOT GO TO A MOSQUE. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT EVERYTHING HE HAD TOLD ME HE HAD ALSO TOLD THE SOVIET UNION. 14. COMMENT: TARAKI IS A SLIM, WHITE-HAIRED, PROFESSIONAL MAN WHO LOOKS SOMEWHAT OLDER THAN 61. HE HAS THE CHAN AND EMPATHY THAT ONE LEARNS TO ASSOCIATE WITH AFGHANS. HE IS ALSO CLEARLY HARDHEADED AND EXHILARATED BY HIS SUCCESS. WHEN HE IS PARTICULARLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A POINT HE IS MAKING, HIS EYES ASSUME A FIERCE, INTENSITY. OUR CONVERSATION WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL AND WAS ALSO, I THINK, A REAL DIALOGUE. ELIOT " "13","8/13/1979 4:58","79TEHRAN8980","Embassy Tehran","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 130458Z AUG 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3182 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 08980 E.O. 12065: GDS 8/12/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P TAGS: PEPR, IR SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT). 2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN INVOLVED HERE, RANGING FROM COMPOUND SECURITY TO VISA OPERATIONS TO GTE TO THE SHERRY CASE, HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL SPECIAL FEATURES OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN THE PERSIAN ENVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE A PARTIAL REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, BUT WE BELIEVE THE UNDERLYING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL QUALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE NATURE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES ARE AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT. THEREFORE, WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS BE USED TO BRIEF BOTH USG PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES WHO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND IN THIS COUNTRY. END INTRODUCTION. 3. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE PERSIAN PSYCHE IS AN OVERRIDING EGOISM. ITS ANTECEDENTS LIE IN THE LONG IRANIAN HISTORY OF INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY WHICH PUT A PREMIUM ON SELF-PRESERVATION. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF IT IS AN ALMOST TOTAL PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR UNDERSTANDING POINTS OF VIEW OTHER THAN ONE\'S OWN. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO AN IRANIAN THAT U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW MAY PROHIBIT ISSUING HIM A TOURIST VISA WHEN HE HAS DETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA. SIMILARLY, THE IRANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY IN CLAIMING FORCE MAJEURE TO AVOID PENALTIES FOR LATE PAYMENT OF INTEREST DUE ON OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF WHICH IT IS A PART IS DENYING THE VAILIDITY OF THE VERY GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS MADE WHEN CONFRONTED BY SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM FOREIGN FIRMS FORCED TO CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. 4. THE REVERSE OF THIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN, AND HAVING THE SAME HISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM, IS A PERVASIVE UNEASE ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IN WHICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT NOTHING IS PERMANENT AND IT IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED THAT HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT EACH INDIVIDUAL MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE MALEVOLENT FORCES THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE HIS UNDOING. HE IS OBVIOUSLY JUSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. THIS APPROACH UNDERLIES THE SOCALLED \"BAZAAR MENTALITY\" SO COMMON AMONG PERSIANS, A MIND-SET THAT OFTEN IGNORES LONGER TERM INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE ADVANTAGES AND COUNTENANCES PRACTICES THAT ARE REGARDED AS UNETHICAL BY OTHER NORMS. AN EXAMPLE IS THE SEEMINGLY SHORTSIGHTED AND HARASSING TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE PGOI IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH GTE. 5. COUPLED WITH THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IS A GENERAL INCOMPREHENSION OF CASUALITY. ISLAM, WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD, APPEARS TO ACCOUNT AT LEAST IN MAJOR PART FOR THIS PHENOMENON. SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, EVEN THOSE IRANIANS EDUCATED IN THE WESTERN STYLE AND PERHAPS WITH LONG EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE IRAN ITSELF FREQUENTLY HAVE DIFFICULTY GRASPING THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVENTS. WITNESS A YAZDI RESISTING THE IDEA THAT IRANIAN BEHAVIOR HAS CONSEQUENCES ON THE PERCEPTION OF IRAN IN THE U.S. OR THAT THIS PERCEPTION IS SOMEHOW RELATED TO AMERICAN POLICIES REGARDING IRAN. THIS SAME QUALITY ALSO HELPS EXPLAIN PERSIAN AVERSION TO ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE\'S OWN ACTIONS. THE DEUS EX MACHINA IS ALWAYS AT WORK. 6. THE PERSIAN PROCLIVITY FOR ASSUMING THAT TO SAY SOMETHING IS TO DO IT FURTHER COMPLICATES MATTERS. AGAIN, YAZDI CAN EXPRESS SURPRISE WHEN INFORMED THAT THE IRREGULAR SECURITY FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE EMBASSY REMAIN IN PLACE. \"BUT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOLD ME THEY WOULD GO BY MONDAY,\" HE SAYS. AN MFA OFFICIAL REPORTS THAT THE SHERRY CASE IS \"90 PERCENT SOLVED,\" BUT WHEN A CONSULAR OFFICER INVESTIGATES HE DISCOVERS THAT NOTHING HAS CHANGED. THERE IS NO RECOGNITION THAT INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE FOLLOWED UP, THAT COMMITMENTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY ACTION AND RESULTS. 6. FINALLY, THERE ARE THE PERSIAN CONCEPTS OF INFLUENCE AND OBLIGATION. EVERYONE PAYS OBEISANCE TO THE FORMER AND THE LATTER IS USUALLY HONORED IN THE BREACH. PERSIANS ARE CONSUMED WITH DEVELOPING PARTI BAZI--THE INFLUENCE THAT WILL HELP GET THINGS DONE--WHILE FAVORS ARE ONLY GRUDGINGLY BESTOWED AND THEN JUST TO THE EXTENT THAT A TANGIBLE QUID PRO QUO IS IMMEDIATELY PRECEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST YEAR OR EVEN LAST WEEK; WHAT CAN BE OFFERED TODAY? 7. THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH PERSIANS IN ALL THIS: - --FIRST, ONE SHOULD NEVER ASSUME THAT HIS SIDE OF THE ISSUE WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LET ALONE THAT IT WILL BE CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH SELF PRECLUDES THIS. A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNITION OF HIS POSITION UPON HIS PERSIAN OPPOSITE NUMBER. - --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY TO PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGES OF A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP BASED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT HIS OPPOSITE NUMBER IS ESSENTIALLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WITH HIM HE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS TO HIMSELF THAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE. HE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, INCLUDING RUNNING THE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WHOEVER HE IS DEALING WITH THAT FUTURE BUSINESS WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE, AT LEAST TO THE LATTER. - --THIRD, INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECTS OF AN ISSUE MUST BE PAINSTAKINGLY, FORECEFULLY AND REPEATEDLY DEVELOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY COMPREHENDED NOR ACCEPTED BY PERSIAN NEGOTIATORS. - --FOURTH, ONE SHOULD INSIST ON PERFORMANCE AS THE SINE QUA NON AT ESH STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. STATEMENTS OF INTENTION COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING. - --FIFTH, CULTIVATION OF GOODWILL FOR GOODWILL\'S SAKE IS A WASTE OF EFFORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE AT ALL TIMES SHOULD BE IMPRESSING UPON THE PERSIAN ACROSS THE TABLE THE MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAKINGS, HE MUST BE MADE TO KNOW THAT A QUID PRO QUO IS INVOLVED ON BOTH SIDES. - --FINALLY, ONE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE THREAT OF BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT AND NOT BE COWED BY THE POSSIBLITY. GIVEN THE PERSIAN NEGOTIATOR\'S CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS, HE IS GOING TO RESIST THE VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL (FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW) NEGOTIATING PROCESS. LAINGEN CONFIDENTIAL " "14","9/10/1979 7:01","79ANKARA6618","Embassy Ankara","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 100701Z SEP 79 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC INFO REFLEPA/AMCONSUL ADANA RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 285 RUGMPL/AMCONSUL INSTANBUL 8561 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6148 RUFLAEA/AMCONSUL IZMIR 1753 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 6618 Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2006 E.O.12065: GDS 9/7/85 (XUX, DENNIS) CR-P TAGS: PFOR, PEPR, TU, IR SUBJ: (c) TURKISH VIEWS ON KURDISH TROUBLES IN IRAN 1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. THIS IS AN INFORMATION MESSAGE; NO ACTION REQUIRED. 3. MFA DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA KOKSAL, HAS TOLD US THAT TURKS HAD HEARD IRANIANS WERE PLANNING TO LAUNCH NEW MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CONCENTRATION OF KURDISH REBELS IN AREA NEAR IRAQI BORDER. WHILE FOR THE MOMENT SITUATION IN KURDISH AREA SEEMS CALM, REPORT SUGGESTED THAT TEST OF STRENGTH BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND KURDISH OPPONENTS WAS LIMITED BUT THEY HAD THE IMPRESSION THE KURDS, DESPITE LACK OF POLITICAL UNITY AMONG THE VARIOUS GROUPS, HAD MANAGED TO AMASS A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF ARMS AND COULD POSE A CONSIDERABLE GUERRILLA THREAT TO THE IRANIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FORCES. 4. THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED ACTION NEAR THE IRAQI BORDER ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF IRAQI RESPONSE. SO FAR THE GOT WAS UNCLEAR WHAT GAME IRAQ WAS PLAYING VIS-A-VIS IRAN. ON THE ONE HAND INSTABILITY IN THE REGION WAS AS UNHELPFUL TO IRAQ AS IT WAS TO ANYONE ELSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE SUFFICIENT POINTS OF FRICTION BETWEEN A REVOLUTIONARY IRAN AND IRAQ THAT THE LATTER MIGHT WELL WISH TO STRENGTHEN ANTI-KHOMEINI FORCES. 5. REGARDING TIES BETWEEN IRANIAN KURDS AND OUTSIDE COUNTRIES, KOKSAL SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY REPORTS, BUT NOT MUCH HARD EVIDENCE, OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT WITH THE IRANIAN KURDS. HE ASSUMED THAT OUTSIDE POWERS NOTWITHSTANDING PREDICTABLE DENIALS WOULD FEEL STRONG URGE TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN KURDISH ACTIVITIES. REGARDING LINKS BETWEEN TURKISH AND IRANIAN KURDS, KOKSAL EMPHASIZED THAT RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT TURKISH KURDS WERE PROVIDING LARGE-SCALE ASSISTANCE WERE TOTAL JOURNALISTIC FABRICATIONS. TO DATE, GOT DID NOT HAVE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS ANY SUBSTANTIAL LINKAGE ALTHOUGH, OBVIOUSLY, WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE KURDS IN IRAN WOULD HAVE A GREAT IMPACT ON ATTITUDES OF TURKISH KURDS. 6. BECAUSE OF THIS, AS WELL AS IN THE INTEREST OF REGIONAL STABILITY, TURKEY\'S OVERRIDING CONCERN WAS THAT IRAN MAINTAIN ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND HAVE A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. FOR THIS REASON THE GOT HAD NOTED WITH INTEREST AND APPROVAL CHARGE LAINGEN\'S RECENT STATEMENT AFFIRMING US SUPPORT FOR IRAN\'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. 7. COMMENT: WHILE NEW TO THE JOB, KOKSAL, FORMERLY WITH THE POLICY PLANNING STAF, WAS SUBSTANTIALLY MORE OPEN THAN HIS PREDECESSORS IN DISCUSSING KURDISH QUESTION. SPIERS " "15","9/17/1979 11:40","79TEHRAN12130","Embassy Tehran","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 171140Z SEP 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO SECDEF WASH DC JCS WASH DC AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY ANKARA USINT BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY DOHA AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY JIDDA AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY PARIS USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 12130 Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2006 E.O. 12065: GES 9/17/95 (LIMBERT, JOHN) OR-P TAGS: PGOV, PINT, IR SUBJECT: PM BAZARGAN CRITICIZED 1. (C) SUMMARY: DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, PM MEHDI BAZARGAN HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF CRITICISMS FROM VARIOUS SIDES. HE HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF ANTI-CLERICALISM, OF INEFFECTIVENESS, AND OF GENERAL BUNGLING. BAZARGAN HAS ANSWERED THESE ATTACKS BY CLAIMING THAT THE SAME PERSONS WHO WERE CRITICIZING HIM ARE NOT ALLOWING HIS GOVERNMENT TO FUNCTION. DEPSITE THESE ATTACKS, IT APPEARS THAT BAZARGAN STILL ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI AND WILL NOT BE REPLACED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. END SUMMARY 2. (C) THE FIRST ATTACK ON BAZARGAN CAME FROM AYATOLLAH DR. MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI, VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS, MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH PARS NEW AGENCY IN QOM ON SEPTEMBER 14, DR. BEHESHTI BLAMED THE GOVERNMENT AND PM BAZARGAN FOR FAILING TO IMPLEMENT A BILL ON THE FORMATION OF LOCAL COUNCILS. ACCORDING TO BEHESHTI, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TWO MONTHS BEFORE HAD APPROVED A BILL CALLING FOR THE FORMATION OF COUNCILS AT PROVINCE, CITY, DISTRICT, AND VILLAGE LEVELS. BEHESHTI SAID DR. BAZARGAN\'S GOVERNMENT FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THIS BILL, EITHER BECAUSE OF DELIBERATE PROCRASTINATION OR BECAUSE OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE WEAKNESS. (DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BANI-ASSADI TOLD CHARGE SEPT 17 THAT BAZARGAN\'S OFFICE, IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECEIVING THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL\'S BILL, HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE COUNCIL TELLING THEM THAT THE BILL AS DRAFTED WAS UNREALISTIC BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD WORK OUT A FEASIBLE BILL ALONG THOSE LINES. 3. (C) LATER THE SAME DAY, THE MONOTHEISM PARY (HEZB-E- TOWHIDI) ISSUED A SEVEN-POINT STATEMENT CRITICIZING THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT FOR NEGLECT AND INDIFFERENCE. LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT THE HEZB-E-TOWHIDI EXCEPT THAT IT IS AN ISLAMIC POLITICAL GROUPING WITH POSSIBLE TIES TO AYATOLLAH SADEQ ROWHANI. THE CRITICISMS DIRECTED AT BAZARGAN INCLUDED: - (A) GOVERNMENT INDIFFERENCE TO CRITICISMS OF IRAN IN THE FOREIGN PRESS, BOTH WESTERN AND NON-ALIGNED. - (B) SEEKING POPULARITY BY PLAYING WITH WORDS AND BY OPPOSING THE ADVICE OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS. \"PERHAPS YOU HAVE FORGOTTEN THAT THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS LED BY THE CLERGY.\" - (C) DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL\'S BILL ON FORMATION OF LOCAL COUNCILS. - (D) NEGLECTING TO FOLLOW AYATOLLAH ROWHANI\'S ADVICE ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF PURGING THE GOVERNMENT OF ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS. 4. (U) THESE ATTACKS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ATTACK ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15 BY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND COUNCIL OF EXPERTS MEMBER ABU-AL-HASAN BANI-SADR. SPEAKING TO AN AUDIENCE IN YAZD, BANI-SADR ATTACKED BAZARGAN\'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND ACCUSED HIM OF HINDERING THE WORK OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BANI-SADR ALSO ACCUSED BAZARGAN OF: - (A) REFUSING TO ACCEPT CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM. - (B) BUNGLING IN KURDESTAN AND THEN TRYING TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION THERE. - (C) OPPOSING THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKS, A FAVORITE PROGRAM OF BANI-SADR. - (D) BURYING HIMSELF IN TRIVIA AND NOT ORGANIZING HIS WORK PROGRAM. 5. (U) IN AN ATTACK APPEARING IN THE ENGLISH AND PERSIAN- LANGUAGE PRESS OF SEPTEMBER 16, TEHRAN REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR AYATOLLAH AHMAD AZARI-QOMI CRITICIZED BAZARGAN FOR ALLEGEDLY ANTI-CLERICAL STATEMENTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER\'S EULOGY FOR AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY ON SEPTEMBER 11. AZARI-QOMI (WHO ANNOUNCED HIS RESIGNATION FOR HEALTH REASONS) SAID THAT BAZARGAN HAD SAID THAT TALEGHANI, UNLIKE THE MAJORITY OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS, WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THE MANIFESTATIONS OF MODERN CIVILIZATION. ACCUSING BAZARGAN OF WEAKENING REVOLUTIONARY UNITY, AZARI-QOMI SAID, \"IT IS VERY STRANGE THAT A DISTINGUISHED FIGURE AS MR. BAZARGAN WOULD MAKE AN UNFAIR ACCUSATION AGAINST THE CLERGY. WAS IT NOT TALEGHANI\'S GOAL TO UNITE ALL GROUPS, THE FOREMOST OF WHICH WAS A COMMITTED AND ACTIVE CLERGY? HOW CAN HE (BAZARGAN) PRAISE TALEGHANI BY STIRRING UP THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE CLERGY AND BY CONDEMNING THIS PROGRESSIVE AND ACTIVE GROUP AS REACTIONARY?\" 6. (C) LOCAL PRESS ACCOUNTS OF BAZARGAN\'S SPEECH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENTS WHICH OFFENDED AZARI-QOMI. EMBASSY WILL CHECK FULL TEXT OF SPEECH (WHEN AVAILABLE) TO ESTABLISH EXACTLY WHAT PRIME MINISTER SAID. 7. ALTHOUGH THE PRESS HAS BEEN GIVING WIDE PUBLICITY TO THESE ATTACKS, BAZARGAN\'S REACTION HAS SO FAR BEEN LIMITED TO A STATEMENT AT AN ECONOMIC SEMINAR (REPORTED BY ETTELAAT OF SEPTEMBER 16) THAT THE SAME (UNNAMED PERSONS WHO WERE CRITICIZING HIS GOVERNMENT FOR ITS INEFFECTIVENESS WERE THE SAME ONES WHO WERE INTERFERING IN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AND PREVENTING HIS CABINET FROM OPERATING.) 8. (C) THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME (NOR WILL IT BE THE LAST TIME) THAT BAZARGAN HAS BEEN UNDER ATTACK FROM MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. ALTHOUGH THE ATTACKS COMING FROM VARIOUS DIRECTIONS AND FROM VARIOUS PERSONALITIES, ARE NOT NECESSARILY PART OF ANY CONCERTED ANTI-BAZARGAN CAMPAIGN, THERE ARE ENOUGH COMMON THEMESE IN THE CRITICISMS TO INDICATE THE COMMON INTERESTS OF HIS OPPONENTS. THESE THEMES INCLUDE: - (A) IGNORING THE ADVICE OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS. - (B) IGNORING THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. - (C) GENERAL INEFFECTIVENESS AND BUNGLING. 9. (C) IT IS WORTH NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT NONE OF THESE ATTACKS MENTION AYYATOLLAH KHOMEINI BY NAME AND THAT NONE OF THE ATTACKERS NOTE ANY CLAIM TO SPEAK FOR HIM. IN PREVIOUS DISAGREEMENTS OF THIS KIND, BAZARGAN HAS HAD ENOUGH SUPPORT FROM THE IMAM TO OVERCOME CALLS FOR HIS DISMISSAL. IT IS LIKELY THAT AS LONG AS BAZARGAN CONTINUES TO HAVE KHOMEINI\'S SUPPORT (AND THERE IS NO SIGN OF HIS LOSING IT) HE WILL BE ABLE TO SURVIVE SUCH ATTACKS. BAZARGAN\'S SURVIVAL, HOWEVER, IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE HIS GOVERNMENT ANY MORE EFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY TAKEN OVER MOST OF HIS FUNCTIONS. LAINGEN " "16","10/24/1979 12:08","79TEHRAN11260","Embassy Tehran","CONFIDENTIAL","","0 241208Z OCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4442 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0343","C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11260 Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2006 E.O. 12065: GDS 10/24/85 (LAINGEN, D. BRUCE). OH-P TAGS: IR, UR, PEPR SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTS ON IRAN 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT). 2. AT DINNER RECENTLY SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV SPOKE CANDIDLY OF PGOI. HE HAS SEEN VIRTUALLY ALL KEY LEADERS. AS AMIR-ENTEZAM OBSERVED, \"IF YOU CLOSE ONE DOOR, HE COMES IN THE OTHER WITH A PROPOSAL OR SOME DEAL.\" 3. VINOGRADOV HAS SEEN KHOMEINI FOUR TIMES. HE DESCRIBED THE AYATOLLAH AS A MAN OF GREAT RECTITUDE, A TEACHER DISINCLINED TO LISTEN AND LITTLE VERSED IN POLITICAL REALITIES DOMESTICALLY OR INTERNATIONALLY. TALAGHANI, THE AMBASSADOR SAID, WAS MUCH MORE THE REALIST. VINOGRADOV THOUGHT SKHESHTI WAS THE MOST INTELLIGENT AND POLITICALLY SKILLFUL OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. BANI SADR MERITED ONLY SCORN. 4. THE SOVIETS THINK THE PGOI\'S MOST DANGEROUS PROBLEM IS THE KURDISH REVOLT, FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY THE STAGNATED ECONOMY. VINOGRADOV FEELS THE IRANIANS ARE TRYING TO MANAGE THE KURDS WITH FORCE AND THE ECONOMY WITH DREAMY ISLAMIC THEORIES. NEITHER WILL WORK. ALTHOUGH THE KURDISH PROBLEM MAY EVENTUALLY BE SETTLED, THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT OF SHORTAGES, UNEMPLOYMENT AND OTHER SERIOUS ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES LEADING TO DISAFFECTION OF THE LOWER CLASSES FROM KHOMEINI. IT HAS ALREADY STARTED, BUT THE PROCESS COULD CONTINUE FOR A COUPLE YEARS. HE SUSPECTED THE IRAQIS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN CAUSING PROBLEMS WITH IRAN\'S KURDS AND ARABS, BUT DISMISSED THE THOUGHT THAT THESE USSR MIGHT HAVE INFLUENCE IN BAGHDAD TO RESTRAIN THE IRAQIS. \"THEY ARE JUST CRAZY PEOPLE.\" LAINGEN " "17","10/26/1979 7:32","79TEHRAN11319","Embassy Tehran","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 260732Z OCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4479 INFO SECDEF WASH DC JCS WASH DC AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0343 AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0335 USINT BAGHDAD 0341 AMEMBASSY DOHA 0313 AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0385 AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0401 AMEMBASSY KABUL 0383 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0351 AMEMBASSY LONDON 0467 AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0312 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0348 AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0221 AMEMBASSY PARIS 0419 USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 11319 E.O. 12065: GDS 10/25/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P TAGS: PINT, SHUM, PINR, IR SUBJECT: MODERATION: DOES IT HAVE A CHANCE? 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY: THE MODERATE IRANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES, WHICH WERE ACTIVE DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND WHICH HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH, HAVE BEEN PUSHED INTO THE BACKGROUND BY THOSE INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS WHO FOLLOW A NARROW AND AUTHORITARIAN INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM. WITHIN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, MODERATE GROUPS WHO FAVOR A MORE BALANCED SOCIETY RESEMBLING A WESTERN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY, HAVE BECOME MORE VOCAL. WHILE NOT DIRECTLY CRITICIZING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, THEY HAVE FOCUSED THEIR CRITICISM ON SOME OF THE OBVIOUS FAILURES OF THE PRESENT REGIME. THE POLITICAL POSITION OF THESE GROUPS IS STILL PRECARIOUS. IT EXPRESSES ITSELF THROUGH A FEW SECULAR SPOKESMEN, SOME LIBERAL CLERICS, AND SOME SMALL NEWSPAPERS. ALTHOUGH STILL NOT A MAJOR FORCE ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE, THESE GROUPS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES ENOUGH TO EXPRESS IDEAS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE RULING ESTABLISHMENT. END SUMMARY. 3. THE ROLE OF SECULAR AND CLERICAL MODERATES -- THE HEIRS IS STILL A MATTER OF DEBATE. SINCE THE REVOLUTION FIGURES SUCH AS MATIN-DAFTARI NAZIH, FORUHAR, SANJABI, AND BAZARGAN HIMSELF HAVE BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY KHOMEINI AND BY HIS ALLIES WHO SHARE HIS VISION OF A THEOCRATIC IRAN. NOT ALL OF THESE SUPPORTERS OF KHOMEINI ARE CLERICS; THEY INCLUDE THE \"SECULAR MULLAHS\" SUCH AS QOTEZADEH, YAZDI, CHAMRAN, TABATABA\'I AND OTHERS. THIS GROUP HAS DOMINATED THE GOVERNMENT, THE PRESS, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS. IT HAS HARRASSED AND IGNORED ITS OPPONENTS. BARZARGAN REMAINS POWERLESS; MATIN-DAFTARI AND NAZIH ARE IN HIDING; FORUHAR IS IGNORED; AND SAXJABI QUIT HIS JOB IN DISGUST AND LEFT THE COUNTRY. 4. ALTHOUGH THE POSITION OF THE MODERATE PARTIES IS STILL VERY FRAGILE, IN RECENT WEEKS THEY HAS SHOWN SOME SIGNS OF LIFE. ALTHOUGH THEIR MOST IMPORTANT ORGANS, INCLUDING THE NEWSPAPER AYANDEGAN AND THE POPULAR HUMOR MAGAZINE AHANGAR, WERE SUPPRESSED IN AUGUST, THEY HAVE BEGUN PUBLISHING SMALL PAPERS SUCH AS KHALO-E-MOSALMAN (FROM THE MUSLIME REPUBLICAN PEOPLES\' PARTY); JONBESH (PUBLISHED BY ALI ASGHAR HAJ SEYYID JAVADI), JFBHEH-YE-AZADI FROM THE IRAN PARTY AND AZADI FROM THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT. ALTHOUGH THE CIRCULATION OF THESE PAPERS IS LIMITED AND THEY CARRY MUCH LESS INFLUENCE THAN THE THREE MAJOR DAILIES (SAYHAN, ETTELAAT, AND BAMDAD) THEY DO OFFER SUBSTANTIAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON EVENT -- A COMMENTARY OFTEN AT VARIANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL VERSION. 5. FOR THE PAST SIX WEEKS, THE MUSLIM REPUBLICAN PEOPLES PARTY (MPRP) HAS ORGANIZED FRIDAY AFTERNOON MEETINGS AT ITS TEHRAN HEADQUARTERS. ALTHOUGH THE FIRST MEETING ATTRACTED ONLY ABOUT 100 PEOPLE, EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER AND POLITICAL ASSISTANT ATTENDED OCTOBER 19 MEETING AND FOUND AN OVERFLOW OF OVER 1500. THE CROWD WAS LARGELY MIDDLE-CLASS AND WELL-EDUCATED. THERE WERE MANY WOMEN, SOME VEILED, A FEW CLERICS. THE SPEAKERS INCLUDED AHMAD ALIZADRH, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MPRP, AND KAHMATULLAH MOQOADAM-MARAGHE\'I, LEADER OF THE RADICAL MOVEMENT AND EAST AZARBAIJAN DELEGATE TO THE COUNCIL OF MOVEMENT AND EAST AZARBAIJAN DELEGATE TO THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS. ALTHOUGH THE AUDIENCE AND SPEAKERS HAD NO AFFECTION FOR THE OLD REGIME, THERE WERE FEW MENTIONS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AND NO ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS. 6. THE SPEAKERS ELICITED THE GREATEST RESPONSE BY THEIR ATTACKS ON AKHUNDBAZI (CLERICAL MEDDLING), ON THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS, AND ON ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A THEOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP THROUGH THE VELAYAT-E-FAQIM. ONE OF THE SPEAKERS FOUND THE CROWD\'S PULSE WHEN HE SAID, \"WE WANT THE ISLAM OF DR. SHAR\'IATI; WE DON\'T WANT THE ISLAM OF ........)\" AND LEFT THE END EMPTY FOR THE CROWD TO FILL IN. BOTH MOQOADAM-MARAGHE\'I AND ALIZADEH WERE CRITICAL OF THE VELAYAT-E-FAQIH. THE LATTER SAID, \"THIS CLAUSE IS AN ACT OF TREASON AGAINST FUTURE GENERATIONS OF IRANIAN PEOPLE. WE HAD A REVOLUTION NOT TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR A DIFFERENT KIND OF DESPOTISM.\" sPEAKING PRIVATELY AFTER THE MEETING, MOQOADAM-MARAGHE\'I SAID THAT EVEN THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP HAS NOW REALIZED THAT IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SELL THE VELAYAT-E-FAQIH TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE IN ITS PRESENT FORM. \"THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS HAS DECIDED TO REOPEN DEBATE ON THIS ISSUE. I HOPE THAT SOME KIND OF IMPROVEMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE.\" 7. THE MODERATES, IN CRITICISING VELAYAT-E-FAQIH, HAVE FOUND SOME ALLIES AMONG CLERICS SUCH AS AYATOLLAHS NURI AND SHARI\'AT- MADARI WHO SHARE THE VIEW THAT SUCH AN INSTITUTION, IF NOT PROPERLY DEFINED, COULD LEAD TO A DICTATORSHIP. ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAS BEEN THE ENTRANCE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI\'S SON, HOJJAT AL-ISLAM AHMAD KHOMEINI, INTO THE DEBATE ON THIS SUBJECT. IN THESE DEBATES, THE YOUNG KHOMEINI HAS TAKEN A POSITION WHICH HAS MUCH IN COMMON WITH THE MODERATE VIEW THAT VELAYAT-E-FAQIH, AS DEFINED BY THE CONSTITUTION, CONTAINS SOME DANGEROUS AMBIGUITIES. EMBASSY WILL DISCUSS THIS QUESTION IN MORE DETAIL IN SEPARATE MESSAGE. 8. IN PART, RECENT OUTSPOKENNESS OF THE MODERATES CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO DISILLUSION WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION -- ESPECIALLY TRENDS TOWARD AUTHORITARIAN, CLERICAL RULE. THE MODERATES HAVE ALSO TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT\'S OBVIOUS MISHANDLING OF CERTAIN ISSUES TO ATTRACT ALLIES BEYOND THE NORMALLY MINISCULE CONTITUENCY OF GROUPS SUCH AS THE RADICAL MOVEMENT, THE IRAN PARTY, AND TEH NATIONAL FRONT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE OBVIOUS FAILURE OF A MILITARY POLICY IN KURDESTAN HAS BROUGHT CALLS FOR RECONCILIATION, EVEN BY FIGURES WITHIN THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. A COLUMNIST IN THE NORMALLY CONSERVATIVE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEHRAN TIMES HAS URGED THE WITHDRAWAL OF NON- KURDISH GUARDS FROM THE REGION; THE TUDEH PARTY PAPER MARDOM, STUNG BY ACCUSATIONS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN, HAS CALLED FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ONLY THE RIGHT-WING ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY, THROUGH ITS ORGAN JOMHURI-YE-ISLAMI, HAS CONTINUED TO REFER TO THE KURDISH INSURGENTS AS \"AMERICAN MERCENARIES\". HOWEVER, THE IRP HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY ISOLATED IN ITS POSITION. 9. THE GOVERNMENT\'S FAILURE TO ENSURE PERSONAL SECURITY, ITS CRUDE ATTEMPTS AT CENSORSHIP, AND SCANDALS INVOLVING THE REVOLUTIONARY COURT SYSTEM -- LARGE-SCALE BRIBERY AND THEFT INVOLVING NO LESS A FIGURE THAN FORMER TEHRAN PROSECUTOR AYATOLLAH AZARI-QOMI HIMSELF -- HAS ALSO WIDENED THE APPEAL OF THE MODERATE MESSAGE. THE PAPER AZADI OF OCTOBER 18 PRINTED A BITTER ATTACK ON THE REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE SYSTEM ACCUSING IT OF IGNORING THEFTS BY ILYAVI, FORMER ASSISTANT TO PROSECUTOR- GENERAL HADAVI, WHILE SENDING PROSTITUTES AND SMALL-TIME DRUG SMUGGLERS TO THE FIRING SQUAD. THE RECENT ATTACK ON TWO JOURNALISTS AT THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS BUILDING LED THE ULTRA- ESTABLISHMENT PAPER ETTELAAT OF OCTOBER 22 TO WRITE A STRONG FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL ENTITLED \"LET US NOT REPEAT MISTAKES\", POINTING OUT THAT THE PEOPLE OF QOM AND TABRIZ REBELLED IN THE SHAH\'S TIME BECAUSE FOR DECADES THEY HAD BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES. 10. WHAT DOES ALL OF THIS ADD UP TO? MOST IMPORTANT, THE MODERATES OF THE IRAN PARTY, THE NATIONAL FRONT, AND OTHER GROUPS ARE ONCE AGAIN FINDING THEIR VOICE AND BEGINNING TO SPEAK OUT. IN DOING SO, THEY WILL HAVE TO OVERCOME SEVERAL MAJOR OBSTACLES: - A) THE MEDIA REMAIN FOR THE MOST PART IN THE HANDS OF THEIR OPPONENTS. JOMHURI-YE-ISLAMI BECOMES MORE RABID BY THE DAY, AND THE OTHER MAJOR PAPERS ARE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS. THE RADIO AND THE TELEVISION, UNDER QOTEZADEH\'S OPPORTUNISTIC AND UNENLIGHTENED GUIDANCE, RARELY DEVIATES FROM ITS DAILY MENU OF PSEUDO- RELIGIOUS DRIVEL INTERSPERSED WITH PSEUDO-REVOLUTIONARY DRIVEL. - B) ALL INTELLECTUALS HAVE BEEN TAINTED BY KHOMEINI\'S DENUNCIATIONS. HIS FAMOUS AUGUST DECLARATION THAT \"WE DO NOT WANT INTELLECTUALS\" IS STILL REMEMBERED. HIS DIATRIBES AGAINST WESTERN DECADENCE HAVE MADE ALL WESTERN MANIFESTATIONS, INCLUDING NICETIES, SUSPECT IN HIS FOLLOWERS\' EYES. 11. THESE MODERATE GROUPS STILL LEAD A PRECARIOUS EXISTENCE ON THE FRINGES OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY ARE LEFT ALONE TO HOLD THEIR MEETINGS AND PUBLISH THEIR NEWSPAPERS BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. HOWEVER, IN HIS MOST RECENT SPEECHES, KHOMEINI HAS TAKEN NOTE OF THEM AND HAS CRITICIZED THEM HARSHLY FOR THEIR ATTACKS ON VELAYAT-E-FAQIH AND ON THE CLERGY. IN A SPEECH TO TEHRAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON OCTOBER 20, KHOMEINI REFERRED DIRECTLY TO THE MPRP MEETING, SAYING, \"RECENTLY, IN ONE OF THEIR MEETINGS, ONE OF THESE MISGUIDED ONES, WHO KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT ISLAM, SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE DISSOLVED. AND THE REST CHEERED... YOU, WHO DID NOT EVEN PARTICIPATE IN THE VOTING (FOR THE COUNCIL) HAVE NO RIGHT TO SAY THIS... IT WAS THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO GAVE YOU (OPPONENTS OF VELAYATI-E-FAQIH) THE FREEDOM TO SAY WHATEVER YOU WANT TO SAY. YOU WERE IN HIDING WHEN THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS WERE STRUGGLING AGAINST THE SHAH AND HIS FATHER. NOW YOU WANT TO DISSOLVE THE ASSEMBLY?... YOU DO NOT HAVE THE POWER TO DO SO. I WILL SLAP YOU IN THE MOUTH. STOP THIS AND JOIN THE RANKS OF ISLAM AND LET THIS COUNTRY PUT ITSELF IN ORDER.\" 12. KHOMEINI\'S ATTACKS ON THIS GROUP ARE STILL ONLY WORDS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO TAKE THE FORM OF ALL-OUT REPRESSION INVOLVING THE CLOSING OF NEWSPAPERS, THE BANNING OF MEETINGS, AND THE ARREST OF LEADERSHIP. MANY OF THESE GROUPS AND THEIR LEADERS HAVE DISTINGUISHED RECORDS OF OPPOSITION TO THE MONARCHY - RECORDS WHICH ARE DIFFICULT TO IGNORE. HOWEVER, THE HARD-LINE CLERGY AND ITS ALLIES HAVE BEEN ISOLATING AND ATTACKING INDIVIDUAL TARGETS FROM AMONG THE MODERATES SUCH AS ??AZIH, METEN-DAFTARI, AND FORUHAR. 13. AS THE AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO MISHANDLE MATTERS SUCH AS ARAB- IRANIAN RELATIONS, PROVINICIAL AFFAIRS, AND REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, THE MESSAGE OF THESE MODERATE GROUPS COULD ATTRACT A WIDER FOLLOWING. PERHAPS THEY COULD FORCE SOME CONCESSION TO THOSE WHO DO NOT SHARE THE IMAM\'S VISION OF AN IRAN RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEACHINGS OF THAT SPECIALIZED VIEW OF ISLAM HELD BY ONE SECTOR OF A MINORITY SECT OF THAT RELIGION. 14. IN THE LONGER TERM, IF THESE GROUPS CAN PRESERVE SOME COHERENCE THEY MAY PRESENT AN ALTERNATIVE TO A CLERICAL MONOPOLY OF POWER IN POST-KHOMEINI IRAN. AT THAT TIME THEIR REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS MAY BECOME VERY IMPORTANT; BUT FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THIS GROUP WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE PERIPHERY OF IRANIAN POLITICS -- ARTICULATE, INTERESTING, BUT WIELDING LITTLE REAL POWER. LAINGEN " "18","1/8/1985 9:00","85TOKYO364","Embassy Tokyo","CONFIDENTIAL","85STATE5140","O 080900Z JAN 85 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5749 USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY BRASILIA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 00364 DEPARTMENT FOR OES/OFA/OPA, EAP/J USDOC FOR NOAA ADMINISTRATOR CALIO AND FOR NOAA/NMFS TO PASS TO F/M321 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: EFIS, JA, IWC-2 SUBJECT: GOJ WHALING REF: STATE 5140 - 1. (C) SUMMARY. POST DELIVERS WHALE TALKING POINTS IN REFTEL TO GOJ OFFICIALS IN MOFA. MOFA OFFICIALS QUESTION USG CALCULATION OF GOJ QUOTA UNDER \"PAST PRACTICES\" FORMULA. GOJ HAS NOT MADE DECISION REGARDING ACTUAL NUMBER OF WHALES TO BE HARVESTED BY ANTARCTIC FLEET THIS SEASON, BUT GOJ AND USSR OFFICIALS HAVE EXCHANGED \"EXPRESSIONS OF INTENTION\" NOT TO EXCEED LAST YEAR\'S HARVESTS. TOTAL COASTAL SPERM WHALE CATCH AS OF JANUARY 7 IS 106 WHALES. END SUMMARY. - 2. (C) ON JANUARY 8, REGFISHATT MET WITH SUSUMU AKIYAMA AND KENRO IINO, DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR RESPECTIVELY OF THE FISHERY DIVISION OF THE ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BUREAU OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MOFA), AND DELIVERED A COPY OF THE FIVE TALKING POINTS GIVEN IN PARA 3 OF REFTEL. BOTH INDICATED THE TALKING POINTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER WITHIN MOFA AND WITH OFFICIALS OF THE FISHERY AGENCY OF JAPAN (FAJ). IINO NOTED IMMEDIATELY THAT FAJ OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATIONS REGARDING THE WHALING ISSUE WITH USG OFFICIALS. AKIYAMA STATED THAT \"NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE\" IN GOJ REGARDING THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF WHALES TO BE HARVESTED IN THE ANTARCTIC BY THE JAPANESE FLEET THIS SEASON. HE MENTIONED THREE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DECIDING AN \"APPROPRIATE\" HARVEST AS FOLLOWS: - (A) THE MOST RECENT HARVEST LEVELS SET BY THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION (IWC) THAT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY GOJ (I.E., THE 1984 SEASON OVERALL QUOTA OF 3,027); - (B) CONSULTATIONS WITH CONCERNED COUNTRIES; AND - (C) THE FINDINGS OF THE IWC SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE AT THE 1984 IWC MEETING. - HE FURTHER MENTIONED HIS \"PERSONAL VIEW\" THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE THOSE WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT GOJ WOULD OFFICIALLY RESPOND LATER TO THE U.S. BELIEF THAT \"THERE IS NO NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS.\" AKIYAMA ALSO POINTED OUT THAT JAPAN HAS NO INTENTION OF TAKING AN UNLIMITED NUMBER OF WHALES EVEN THOUGH THE FILING OF AN OBJECTION WITH THE IWC MEANS GOJ IS NOT BOUND TO ANY SPECIFIC QUOTA. - 3. (C) AKIYAMA SAID THAT GOJ AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE EXCHANGED \"EXPRESSIONS OF INTENTION\" TO CONDUCT THIS SEASON\'S WHALING FOR MINKE WHALES IN THE ANTARCTIC IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE TOTAL CATCH WILL NOT EXCEED LAST SEASON\'S HARVEST LEVELS OF 3,027 WHALES FOR JAPAN AND 3,028 WHALES FOR THE SOVIET UNION. AKIYAMA NOTED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF INTENTIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION CORRESPONDED TO THE ARRANGEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE USSR, GOJ, AND BRAZIL REGARDING LAST SEASON\'S ANTARCTIC HARVEST, A COPY OF WHICH IS ON FILE WITH THE IWC SECRETARIAT. - 4. (C) SEVERAL QUESTIONS WERE POSED REGARDING THE TALKING POINTS: - (A) IINO REFERRED TO THE LAST TALKING POINT, AND POINTED OUT THAT PAST PRACTICE ESTABLISHES A 1984/85 HARVEST OF 342 WHALES FOR BRAZIL INSTEAD OF THE 376 USED BY THE USG. AKIYAMA THOUGHT THAT THE 376 FIGURE PROBABLY INCLUDES THE TEN PERCENT IWC MARGIN OF ERROR THAT IS ALLOWED FOR WHALING IN AREA II, BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT PAST PRACTICE OF THE USSR/GOJ/BRAZIL AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN NOT TO PROVIDE FOR ANY MARGIN OF ERROR FOR THE HARVEST IN AREA II. THUS, IN THE 1983/84 SEASON THE FIVE PERCENT MARGIN OF ERROR ALLOWED BY THE IWC FOR AREA II WOULD HAVE ALLOWED A BRAZILIAN HARVEST OF 630 MINKE WHALES, BUT THE GOJ/USSR/BRAZIL ARRANGEMENT LIMITED BRAZIL\'S HARVEST TO 600 WHALES. SIMILARLY, FOR THE 1984/85 SEASON, BRAZIL WILL HARVEST 342 WHALES IN AREA II, NOT 342 PLUS TEN PERCENT, OR 376 WHALES. ACCORDINGLY, GOJ\'S QUOTA UNDER THE IWC GUIDELINES SHOULD BE 1,941 MINKE WHALES, NOT 1,924. AKIYAMA AND IINO WANTED TO BE SURE THAT THE USG REALIZED THAT A \"PAST PRACTICE\" CALUCATIONS WOULD ALLOW GOJ A HARVEST QUOTA OF 1,941 FOR THIS SEASON. (B) THE FISHERY DIVISION OFFICIALS ALSO ASKED FOR USG CLARIFICATION OF THE REFERENCE IN THE SECOND TALKING POINT TO THE NOVEMBER 13, 1984, LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE REGARDING THE PHRASE \"IN EXCESS OF THE 1984/85 QUOTA FOR SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE MINKE WHALES.\" IN PARTICULAR, GOJ WANTS TO KNOW IF GOJ IS SAFE FROM THE THREAT OF CERTIFICATION UNDER THE PACKWOOD AMENDMENT TO THE MAGNUSON FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT (MFCMA) IF GOJ HARVESTS FOR ANTARCTIC MINKE WHALES DO NOT EXCEED A CEILING OF 1,924 (OR 1,941) WHALES. FURTHER ELABORATION ON THE SAME QUESTION WAS RAISED WITH THE COMMENT THAT USSR AND GOJ WHALERS BOTH OPERATE IN AREAS 4 AND 6 BUT ONLY GOJ OPERATIONS OCCUR IN AREA 5. AS A RESULT, AKIYAMA AND IINO WONDERED IF THE TALKING POINTS WERE ONLY REFERRING TO AN OVERALL ANTARCTIC QUOTA FOR GOJ OF 1,924 (OR 1,941) OR WHETHER THE QUOTA FOR EACH AREA WOULD BE EXAMINED IN ANY USG EVALUATION OF WHETHER MINKE CATCH LIMITS ARE BEING EXCEEDED THIS SEASON. - 5. (U) REGARDING REFTEL\'S PARA 5, AKIYAMA CONFIRMED THAT 106 SPERM WHALES, ALL MALES, HAD BEEN HARVESTED BY THE JAPANESE COASTAL WHALING FLEET THROUGH JANUARY 7. - CLARK " "19","1/9/1985 15:30","85GABORONE97","Embassy Gaborone","UNCLASSIFIED","","R 091530Z JAN 85 FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2134 INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA AMCONSUL CAPETOWN AMEMBASSY HARARE AMEMBASSY LUSAKA AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM ","UNCLAS GABORONE 0097 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DEPT FOR AF/S - MS. BLACKFORD; CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY; DEPT PASS TO USIA/AF - WALSH E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PREL, PGOV, US, SF, BC SUBJECT: BOTSWANA NEWSPAPER CARRIES ARTICLE MISREPRESENTING U.S. SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY 1. (U) THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS (JANUARY 8, 1985) CARRIED A LONG VERBOSE OVERVIEW OF 1984, THE \"ORWELLIAN\" YEAR (\"VIOLENCE AND DISASTER, A GLEAM OF HOPE\") CREDITED TO DEREK INGRAM OF GEMINI NEWS SERVICE. ONE PARAGRAPH MISREPRESENTS ONE FACET OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. 2. (U) NINE PARAGRAPHS OF THE FULL-PATE ARTICLE DEAL WITH \"AFRICA\'S MOST DRAMATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS\" IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND TOUCH ON SOUTH AFRICA\'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES, ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND THE RENEWED ATTEMPT TO CREATE \"A BUFFERS REGION OF SUBDUED OR FRIENDLY NEIGHBORING STATES,\" BLACK UNIONS AND THE VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN TOWN- SHIPS, AND BISHOP DESMOND TUTU\'S CONDEMNATION OF U.S. SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY. THE OFFENDING PARAGRAPH READS QUOTE THE AMERICANS ARE CLOSELY INVOLVED IN MANY OF THESE MOVES IN A POLICY (OF) \"CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT\" AND ANOTHER PLANK OF THAT POLICY IS FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO TRY TO MAKE NKOMATI-TYPE AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER NEIGHBORS, NOTABLY BOTSWANA, LESOTHO, AND SWAZILAND. THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN SWAZILAND, BUT THE OTHER TWO PROVED MORE STUBBORN. BOTSWANA SAYS NO. END QUOTE 3. (LOU) DRAWING ON EXISTING GUIDANCE, EMBASSY PLANS TO SEND THE FOLLOWING LETTER OVER THE SIGNATURE OF THE PAO TO THE EDITOR OF THE BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS: QUOTE: IN HIS \"VIOLENCE AND DISASTER, A GLEAM OF HOPE,\" WHICH APPEARED IN THE BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS OF JANUARY 8, 1985, MR. DEREK INGRAM WRITES THAT ON \"PLANK\" OF THE U.S. POLICY OF \"CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT\" IS \"FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO TRY TO MAKE NKOMATI-TYPE AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER NEIGHBORS, NOTABLY BOTSWANA, LESOTHO, AND SWAZILAND.\" THIS IS A MISSTATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY. THE POLICY OF \"CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT\" INCLUDES AN EFFORT TO REDUCE CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBORS. IN THE CASE OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA, WE WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT AS A TURNING POINT AWAY FROM THE DESTABILIZING POLITICS OF CONFRONTATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, IN FAVOR OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH OF NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THOSE TWO COUNTRIES, A FORMAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT MET THE NEEDS OF BOTH PARTIES. HOWEVER, AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE CHESTER CROCKER HAS SAID, \"THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS NOT PARTY TO ANY EFFORT TO IMPOSE A STANDARD FORMULA ON RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBORS. EACH RELATIONSHIP IS DISTINCT AND STANDS ON ITS OWN MERITS. COEXISTENCE CAN TAKE MANY FORMS. WHAT WE DO SUPPORT IS A REGIONAL CLIMATE OF DIALOGUE WHICH GIVES NEGOTIATON AND PEACEFUL CHANGE A CHANCE.\" THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE RIGHT OF EACH OF SOUTH AFRICA\'S NEIGHBORS TO MAKE ITS OWN DECISION ABOUT THE TYPE OF ARRANGEMENTS IT WISHES TO MAKE WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON THE BASIS OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND STRICT RECIPROCITY. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT NO COUNTRY SHOULD BE FORCED TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT WHICH IT VIEWS AS CONTRARY TO ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS. END QUOTE MAINO " "20","1/10/1985 10:05","85GABORONE98","Embassy Gaborone","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 101005Z JAN 85 FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2135 INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY GENEVA AMEMBASSY LISBON USLO WINDHOEK AMEMBASSY MAPUTO ","C O N F I D E N T I A L GABORONE 0098 DEPT FOR AF/S - MS. BLACKFORD; ROME FOR INS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, SREF, SHUM, PGOV, WA, SF, BC SUBJECT: ANGOLANS IN SADF SEEK REFUGE IN BOTSWANA 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 4, TWO ANGOLAN MEMBERS OF THE SADF, WITH THEIR FAMILIES, SOUGHT REFUGEE STATUS IN BOTSWANA AND APPLIED FOR THE AMERICAN RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM. AFTER MEETING WITH EMBOFFS, THE MEN WERE SENT TO THE LOCAL UNHCR OFFICIALS TO REGISTER AS REFUGEES. PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THEIR APPLI- CATIONS FOR REFUGEE STATUS ARE REPORTED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY. 3. ON JANUARY 4, TWO ANGOLAN MEMBERS OF THE SADF\'S 32ND- BATTALION \"BUFFALO COMPANY,\" CAME TO THE EMBASSY SEEKING REFUGEE STATUS AND INQUIRING ABOUT THE AMERICAN RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM (SEPTEL). THE TWO FAMILIES TOTAL 15 PEOPLE. 4. THE MEN, JOAO FAUSTINO SALES AND LASERU NHUKWETE, CLAIMED THAT THEY AND THEIR FAMILIES HAD FLED SOUTHERN ANGOLA IN THE DEBACLE OF 1976, SALES FROM SA DA BANDIERA (NOW LUBANGO) AND NHUKWETE FROM LUIMBALE (NEAR HUAMBO). BOTH MEN SUPPORTED FNLA, SALES BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING FOOD AND GUNS FOR THE FNLA. 5. FROM 1976 TO 1978, THE FAMILIES REPORTEDLY LIVED IN AN ANGOLAN REFUGEE CAMP NEAR RUNDU ON THE ANGOLAN-NAMIBIAN BORDER; ANOTHER ANGOLAN REFUGEE CAMP WAS LOCATED FURTHER EAST IN THE CAPRIVI. IN 1978, THE SOUTH AFRICANS GAVE THE REFUGEES TWO OPTIONS: THEY COULD JOIN THE SADF, OR BE RETURNED TO ANGOLA. THE REFUGEE CAMPS WERE TO BE DESTROYED. SALES AND NHUKWETE JOINED THE SADF AND ENDED UP AS TEACHERS FOR ANGOLAN CHILDREN OF OTHER RECRUITS. SALES TAUGHT PORTUGUESE AND NHUKWETE SCIENCE. SALES HELD RANK OF LANCE CORPORAL AND NHUKWETE CORPORAL. 6. ACCORDING TO SALES AND NHUKWETE, THE 32ND BATTALION IS COMPOSED COMPLETELY OF ANGOLANS, UNTIL 1978 ALL FNLA SUPPORTERS. SINCE THEN, A NUMBER OF UNITA SUPPORTERS AND \"APOLITICAL\" ANGOLANS HAVE ALSO JOINED THE 32ND. WHILE THE ENLISTED MEN ARE BLACK ANGOLANS, THE OFFICERS ARE WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS, WHO ARE EORCED TO LEARN PORTUGESE IN ORDER TO COMMUNICATE. (SALES AND NHUKWETE SPOKE PASSABLE ENGLISH, BUT FELT MORE COMFORTABLE TALKING IN PORTUGUESE WITH THE EMBASSY\'S REFUGEE OFFICER.) 7. IN NOVEMBER 1983, THE MEN SAID THAT \"SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE\" OFFICERS ENCOURAGED THE FOUNDING IN WINDHOEK OF A GROUP CALLED \"THE SOCIO-CULTURAL ASSOCIATION OF ANGOLANS IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA.\" THE CURRENT PRESIDENT OR NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION IS ALLEGEDLY TIMOTYO VICTOR, A UNITA SYMPATHIZER. THE NEW ORGANIZATION WAS INTRODUCED TO THE ANGOLANS AT RUNDU BY A COL. VILJOEN (WHOSE NICKNAME IS \"FANAKOLO,\" THE NAME GIVEN TO THE LANGUAGE USED IN SOUTH AFRICAN MINES, SINCE VILJOEN ALLEGEDLY WORKED IN THE MINES BEFORE JOINING THE SADF). THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUNDU BRANCH IS JOAO APOLINARIO WHILE NHUKWERE WAS VICE-PRESIDENT AND SALES SECRETARY. ACCORDING TO A COPY OF THE SPEECH GIVEN BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER (EMBASSY HAS ENGLISH COPY WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED TO AF/S), THE PURPOSE OF THE REORGANIZATION IS \"TO PROMOTE FRIENDLY CULTURAL TIES AMONGST MEMBERS OF THE ANGOLAN COMMUNITY IN SWA...TO MEET FELLOW SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS OF WINDHOEK, TSUMEB, KATIMA MULILO, AND RUNDU AT SOCCER MATCHES AND OTHER SPORTS EVENTS.\" EVERYONE WHO IS A \"TRUE ANGOLAN\" WAS EN- COURAGED TO JOIN THE ORGANIZATION. 8. IN NOVEMBER 1984, AN EXECUTIVE MEETING OF THE ORGANIZATION WAS HELD IN WINDHOEK AND ATTENDED BY ALL BRANCH LEADERS AND A LARGE NUMBER OF SADF OFFICERS OF COLONEL RANK OR HIGHER, ALL BELIEVED BY THE ANGOLANS TO BE FROM SADF INTELLIGENCE. THE ANGOLANS WERE TOLD THAT THE \"FIRST PHASE\" OF THE PROGRAM HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND THEY COULD MOVE ON TO THE \"SECOND PHASE.\" THE MEN RECEIVED A LECTURE ON THE DANGERS AND THREAT OF COMMUNISM IN THE AREA AND WERE TOLD THAT ELECTIONS WOULD SOON TAKE PLACE IN NAMIBIA; THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE FOUGHT BETWEEN THE INTERNAL PARTIES AND SWAPO. THE TWO MEN FELT THAT THEIR ORGANIZATION WAS BEING POLITICIZED AND THEY WERE BEING PREPARED TO TAKE PART IN AN ANTI-SWAPO CAMPAIGN IN NAMIBIA. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ANGOLANS WERE TOLD THAT THE SADF WOULD LEAVE SOUTHWEST AFRICA AND RETURN TO SOUTH AFRICA; THE ANGOLANS IN THE SADF WOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO SOUTH AFRICA WITH THEM, BUT NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER THAT. 9. SALES AND NHUKWETE THEN REPORTEDLY DECIDED THAT THEY HAD A DIM FUTURE IN THE SADF AND DECIDED TO SEEK REFUGE IN BOTSWANA. THEY OBTAINED TRAVEL DECUMENTS, TOOK OFFICIAL LEAVE FROM THE SADF, AND TRAVELLED THROUGH THE CAPRIVI TO KATIMA MULILO, CROSSED INTO ZAMBIA, AND THENCEOINTO BOTSWANA AT KAZUNGULA. ACCORDING TO THE MEN, THEIR LEAVE EXPIRED ON JANUARY 7. MAINO " "21","1/10/1985 16:42","85BEIRUT172","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 101642Z JAN 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1309 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 00172 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINT, LE SUBJECT: CHRISTIAN CHURCHES BOMBED IN TRIPOLI 1. (U) THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL ATTACKS AGAINST CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS IN TRIPOLI DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 8-9. TWO CHURCHES, MARONITE AND GREEK ORTHODOX, WERE BOMBED ON TUESDAY, CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGE, WHILE ANOTHER GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH AND AN EVANGELICAL INSTITUTION WERE DAMAGED IN ATTACKS WEDNESDAY. A CHRISTIAN CEMETARY WAS ALSO BOMBED WEDNESDAY NIGHT. 2. (U) ISLAMIC UNIFICATION MOVEMENT (TAWHIID) HAS ISSUED TWO CONSECUTIVE CONDEMNATIONS OF THE ATTACKS, NOTING THAT TRIPOLI HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN AN EXAMPLE OF RELIGIOUS UNITY, AND DEPLORING EFFORTS \"TO FRIGHTEN THE CHRISTIANS OUT OF THE CITY.\" WEEKLY MEETING OF ISLAMIC DAR AL-FATWA WEDNESDAY ALSO CONDEMNED THE BOMBINGS, AS DID BRIG. OTHMAN OTHMAN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES DURING A VISIT TO TRIPOLI WEDNESDAY. 3. (C) CHRISTIAN NOTABLE AND LEBANESE FORCES CHARTER MEMBER, CHARLES MALIK, TOLD POLOFF THAT FOUR CHRISTIANS HAVE, AS WELL, BEEN MURDERED ON ROADS NEAR TRIPOLI, AND THAT CHRISTIAN RESIDENTS OF AREA FEAR FOR THEIR LIVES. HE SAID THAT \"LEBANESE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY\" IS THINKING OF PREPARING A DEMARCHE TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON TRIPOLI VIOLENCE. 4. COMMENT (C): AS ALWAYS IN BEIRUT, LIST OF POSSIBLE PERPETRATORS OF THESE ATTACKS IS A LONG ONE, BEGINNING WITH TAWHIID ITSELF. MANY OBSERVERS ATTRIBUTE BOMBINGS, WHICH COME SOON AFTER RECENT DEPLOYMENT OF LAF INTO TRIPOLI AS PART OF NORTHERN SECURITY PLAN, AS EFFORT TO EMBARASS GOL (WHILE AT SAME TIME INTIMIDATING CHRISTIANS). ELABORATING ON THIS HYPOTHESIS, CHRISTIAN LEBANESE EMBASSY EMPLOYEE FROM KOURA REGION HAS TOLD US THAT MUCH BLAME IS BEING LAID AT FEET OF STILL-ACTIVE COMMUNISTS IN TRIPOLI, WITH RATIONALE BEING THAT LATTER ARE TRYING TO DISRUPT SECURITY PLAN THERE AND PLACE THE BLAME ON TAWHIID \"PRINCE\" SHA\'BAN, WHO RECENTLY BOASTED IN A PUBLIC SPEECH THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD BEEN CRUSHED IN TRIPOLI. A SIMILAR ARGUMENT, HOWEVER, COULD BE MADE THAT TAWIID\'S MAIN RIVAL IN TRIPOLI, THE ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY, IS BEHIND BOMBINGS. BARTHOLOMEW " "22","1/14/1985 14:05","85BEIRUT240","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 141405Z JAN 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1346 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 00240 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, LE SUBJECT: BOMBS IN WEST BEIRUT 1. (C) SINCE THE SMUGGLER\'S INN BLAST OF JANUARY 9, THERE HAVE BEEN FOUR MORE BOMBINGS IN WEST BEIRUT, KILLING SEVEN MORE PEOPLE AND INJURING AS MANY AS 80 MORE. IN ADDITION, A LARGE EXPLOSIVE CHARGE PLACED IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING HOUSING THE EMBASSY\'S CHIEF POLITICAL SECTION LOCAL EMPLOYEE FAILED TO DETONATE WHEN ITS FUSE EXPLODED SUNDAY NIGHT. DETAILS FOLLOW. 2. (U) THREE PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 27 INJURED FRIDAY WHEN A BOMB EXPLODED OUTSIDE THE BANK OF BEIRUT AND ARAB COUNTRIES ON CORNICHE MAZRA\' IN WEST BEIRUT. EXPLOSION DEVASTATED THE INSIDE OF BANK, DUG A LARGE CRATER IN SIDEWALK, AND CAUSED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO VEHICLES AND OTHER BUILDINGS. 3. (U) THREE BOMBS EXPLODED SATURDAY, KILLING THREE PEOPLE AND INJURING AS MANY AS 60. TWO OF THE BOMBS, BOTH PACKED WITH NAILS, WENT OFF WITHIN FIVE MINUTES OF EACH OTHER IN THE PSP-CONTROLLED MUSSEITBEH AREA WHILE THE THIRD INJURED SIX PERSONS AND DAMAGED PROPERTY ON HAMRA STREET NEAR A PSP CHECKPOINT. 4. (C) EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION EMPLOYEE GABY AKKAR, A CHRISTIAN, SAID THAT UNLIKE BOMB WHICH DESTROYED HIS CAR LAST MONTH, HE IS CERTAIN THAT LAST NIGHTS ABORTED EXPLOSION WAS IMED AT HIM. HE SAID THAT CHARGE WAS PLACED DIRECTLY UNDER THE BALCONY OF HIS APARTMENT. AKKAR SAID THAT HE IS NOW MAKING PLANS TO MOVE HIS FAMILY INTO THE EAST WHERE IT IS SAFE. 5. (C) COMMENT: LEBANESE PUBLIC FIGURES HAVE INEVITABLY ACCUSED ISRAEL OF BEING BEHIND BLASTS, WHILE THE SYRIAN BA\'ATH PARTY HAS SINGLED OUT PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS. JOURNALISTS RESIDENT IN THE WEST VARIOUSLY ATTRIBUTE THE BLASTS TO THE MUR- ABITUN, WHICH THEY SAY IS RETURNING TO THE AREA IN FORCE AND REINVIGORATING THE OLD MURABITUN-PSP FEUD, OR HIZBALLAH,SIGNS OF WHOSE PRESENCE THEY SAY ARE INCREASINGLY DAILY. IN THIS REGARD, U.S. JOURNALISTS DESCRIBED THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN WEST BEIRUT AS HAVING SUNK TO TRULY HOBBESIAN LEVELS OF NASTINESS IN LAST MONTH, WITH THE COMBINATION OF CAR BOMBS AND ARMED ROBBERIES KEEPING MQST PEOPLE LOCKED INDOORS AT NIGHT. THERE ARE PRESENTLY REPRESENTA- TIVES OF ONLY THREE AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA RESIDENT IN BEIRUT (ASSOCIATED PRESS, LOS ANGELES TIMES, AND NEW YORK TIMES); SOME OF THESE ARE THINKING ABOUT LEAVING. BARTHOLOMEW " "23","1/17/1985 14:14","85BOGOTA555","Embassy Bogota","UNCLASSIFIED","","R 171414Z JAN 85 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7774 INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS//SCJ2// DIA WASHDC JCS//J5//WASHDC USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HEIGHTS//JS// USAFSO/DOI HOWARD AFB PN ","UNCLAS BOGOTA 00555 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PINS, CO SUBJECT: DISSIDENT FARC GROUP ATTACKS COLOMBIAN NAVY BOAT 1. ON JANUARY 14 A DISSIDENT COLUMN OF FARC GUERRILLAS ATTACKED A COLOMBIAN NAVY BOAT ON PATROL IN THE MAGDALENA RIVER, SOUTH OF BARRANCABERMEJA IN SANTANDER DEPARTMENT. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THREE MARINES WERE KILLED AND THREE OTHERS WOUNDED. THE NAVY BOAT WAS FIRED UPON BY APPROXIMATELY 20 MEN ARMED WITH MORTARS AND SUB-MACHINE GUNS. - 2. MILITARY SOURCES INDICATED TO REPORTERS THAT FOUR NAVY BOATS WERE EN ROUTE TO ECOPETROL INSTALLATIONS IN THE TOWN OF CASABLE TO REFUEL AND THEN WERE TO CONTINUE PATROLLING THE MAGDALENA RIVER WHEN THE SURPRISE STRIKE OCCURRED. THE MASKED GUERRILLAS ATTACKED FROM SPEEDBOATS AND THEN FLED DOWN RIVER, AFTER SEIZING ARMS FROM SOME OF THE NAVY BOATS. - 3. THE SAILORS IDENTIFIED THE GUERRILLAS AS MEMBERS OF THE FARC. THE BOGOTA PAPER \"EL TIEMPO\" REPORTED HAVING RECEIVED A COMMUNIQUE FROM THE DISSIDENT RICARDO FRANCO FRONT WHICH PROCLAIMED THE FRONT\'S INTENTION TO CONTINUE ARMED COMBAT. - 4. COMMENT: THIS IS THE LATEST AND MOST VIOLENT OF SEVERAL RECENT INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN VARIOUSLY ATTRIBUTED TO ELN AND FARC GUERRILLAS. END COMMENT. - 5. DAO COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST MAJOR INCIDENT IN THE RELATIVELY QUIET MAGDALENA MEDIO REGION IN SEVERAL MONTHS. IT IS ALSO THE FIRST TIME THAT THE INSURGENTS HAVE ATTACKED THE MARINE CORPS/NAVY PATROL BOATS WITH SUCH BRUTALITY AND IMPUNITY. AFTER CORINTO THE GENERAL TREND IN THE MOST RECENT GUERRILLA/TERRORIST ACTS IS TO PLACE THE BLAME ON FARC DISSIDENT GROUPS OR THE PROSCRIBED ELN--WHILE THE PEACE PROCESS MOVES ON OVER VERY SHAKY GROUNDS. END DAO COMMENT. TULL " "24","1/31/1985 5:31","85MOGADISHU1175","Embassy Mogadishu","UNCLASSIFIED","84MOGADISHU1091\|84STATE369917","R 310531Z JAN 85 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2011 DEPTOTREAS WASHDC INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY ROME ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 MOGADISHU 01175 TREASURY FOR OASIA/IDN DEBORAH ROCHA STATE FOR EB/IFD/ODF FOR CHARLES ENGLISH AID/PPC/EA FOR KEN KAUFMANN ROME ALSO FOR MFO/MILLIKEN E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: EFIN, ECON, EAID, SO SUBJ: ECONOMIC POLICY PROFILE: SOMALIA REFS: A) 84 STATE 369917 B) 84 MOGADISHU 1091 1. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND POLICIES: - 2. RESOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE: SOMALIA IS A LARGE, SPARSELY SETTLED COUNTRY OF 5 MILLION PEOPLE, WHOSE MAJOR RESOURCES ARE ITS LAND AND LOCATION. SITUATED ADJACENT TO THE MARKETS OF THE PERSIAN GULF, AND WITHIN EASY SHIPPING RANGE OF EUROPE, SOMALIA POSSESSES A LAND AREA OF APPROXIMATELY 64 MILLION HECTARES. OF THIS, ABOUT 8.2 MILLION HECTARES ARE ARABLE, BUT, WITH WATER AND AGRICULTURAL LABOR LIMITING FACTORS ONLY ABOUT 900,000 HECTARES ARE UNDER CULTIVATION. OF THE REMAINING LAND, ABOUT 60 PERCENT IS SUTIABLE FOR GRAZING WITH THE BALANCE WASTE. ITS FISHING POTENTIAL AND MINERAL RESOURCES REMAIN LARGELY UNKNOWN AND UN- EXPLOITED, THOUGH SIX FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN SURVEYS AND EXPLORATION. THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE BASE IS WEAK, WITH ONLY TWO MAJOR URBAN CENTERS (MOGADISHU AND HARGEISA), THREE DEEPWATER PORTS (MOGADISHU, KISMAYO AND BERBERA), A POORLY DEVELOPED INTERNAL ROAD NETWORK, AND NO RAILROAD. PUBLIC UTILITY, EDUCATIONAL AND HEALTH SERVICES ARE LARGELY CONFINED TO THE MAJOR CITIES. THE HUMAN RESOURCE BASE IS ALSO WEAK, WITH MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL SKILLS PARTICULARLY SCARCE. - 3. STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY: THE ECONOMY IS DOMINATED BY THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, AND WITHIN AGRICULTURE BY LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION. OVERALL GDP (AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES) WAS ABOUT US DOLS 1.3 BILLION IN 1983; WITH A POPULATION (INCLUDING REFUGEES) OF 5 MILLION, PER CAPITA GDP WAS ABOUT US DOLS 260. LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION NORMALLY ACCOUNTS FOR ABOUT 38 PERCENT OF GDP; 50-60 PERCENT OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT AND 80 PERCENT OF EXPORT EARNINGS. CROP PRODUCTION CONTRIBUTES ABOUT 7-10 PERCENT OF GDP, WITH BANANAS THE ONLY IMPORTANT EXPORT CROP, AND SORGHUM, MAIZE AND SESAME GROWN FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION. THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IS SMALL (7 PERCENT OF GDP), INEFFICIENT, AND DOMINATED BY 38 PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, WHICH NOW ACCOUNT FOR 80 PER- CENT OF ALL VALUE ADDED IN MANUFACTURING. DESPITE CHANGES UNDERWAY, SERVICES ARE STILL DOMINATED BY PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, WITH BANKING, INSURANCE AND PORTIONS OF IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE THE PROVINCE OF PUBLIC SECTOR MONOPOLIES. REMITTANCES REMAIN AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN NATIONAL INCOME, WITH TRANSFERS FROM 100,000 SOMALIS NOW WORKING IN THE GULF ACCOUNT- ING IN PAST YEARS FOR UP TO ONE-THIRD OF SOMALIA\'S TOTAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS. THE GOVERNMENT IS RELATIVELY STABLE. IN PLACE FOR 15 YEARS, WITH THE SECURITY SERVICES UNDER FIRM CONTROL, IT HAS THUS FAR WEATHERED SUCCESSFULLY DROUGHTS, WARS AND REFUGEE CRISES, AND, MORE RECENTLY, ETHIOPIAN MILITARY PRESSURES ON THE BORDER AND ATTACKS ON NORTHERN TERRITORIES BY DISSIDENT GROUPS BASED IN ETHIOPIA. - 4. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS: SOMALIA\'S OVERALL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE HAS DETERIORATED BADLY OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS AS A SERIES OF BLOWS TO ITS EXTERNAL ACCOUNT HAVE COMBINED WITH BURGEONING FISCAL DEFICITS TO RECREATE THE LOW GROWTH, HIGH INFLATION ENVIRONMENT THAT HAD PREVAILED IN THE LATE 1970S. WITH EXPORT EARNINGS CUT TO LESS THAN HALF THEIR 1982 LEVEL (LARGELY AS A RESULT OF SAUDI ARABIA\'S 1983 BAN ON CATTLE IMPORTS FROM AFRICA) AND FOREIGN AID FINANCING DOWN 18 PERCENT FROM ITS 1982 PEAK, SOMALIA CLOSED 1984 WITH ITS SEVENTH CONSECUTIVE OVERALL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT, A NEGATIVE NET FOREIGN ASSETS POSITION AND GROSS FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES EQUAL TO BARELY SIX WEEKS OF CASH FINANCED IMPORTS. DEPRESSED BY IMPORT SHORTAGES AND WEAK RAINS, REAL GDP GROWTH IN 1983 SLIPPED TO ONLY 1 PERCENT AND SEEMS IN 1984 LIKELY TO HAVE TOTALLED NO MORE THAN 1 TO 2 PERCENT, EVEN WITH STRONG RAINS AND RECORD CROP PRODUCTION. INFLATION, MEANWHILE, HAS SOARED, RISING FROM AN AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF 24 PERCENT IN 1982 TO 36 PER- CENT IN 1983 AND 93 PERCENT IN 1984. - 5. LOOKING AHEAD TO 1985, PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH AND PRICE STABILITY WILL DEPEND UPON THE WEATHER, SOMALIA\'S SUCCESS IN MUSTERING INTERNATIONAL AID SUPPORT FOR ITS PROPOSED IMF STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT, AND THE GOVERNMENT\'S CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ECONOMIC REFORM PROCESS. IF THE POLITICAL COMMITMENT IS FIRM, THE RAINS ADEQUATE, AID SUPPORT SUFFICIENT, SOMALIA MAY BE ABLE TO WORK THROUGH ITS PROPOSED STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT TOWARDS CONSISTENT, EXPORT LED GROWTH. IF NOT, SOMALIA COULD WELL REMAIN TRAPPED WITHIN THE LOW GROWTH, HIGH INFLATION VORTEX INTO WHICH IT STUMBLED IN 1983 AND 1984. - 6. ON THE DEVELOPMENT SIDE, A WORLD BANK SPONSORED CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING ON SOMALIA IN OCTOBER 1983 PROVIDED THE STIMULUS FOR AN INITIAL REVIEW OF SOMALIA\'S PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM, WHICH THE WORLD BANK HAS SINCE FOLLOWED UP WITH STAFF VISITS THROUGHOUT 1984. AS OF THE BEGINNING OF 1985, THE RESULT OF THESE REPEATED REVIEWS IS A PUBLIC INVEST- MENT PROGRAM LARGELY FREE OF THE WHITE ELEPHANTS THAT HAD PLAGUED PREVIOUS DEVELOPMENT PLANS, BUT STILL OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE COUNTRY\'S REAL FISCAL AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT RESOURCES. RETURNS ON IN- VESTMENT HAVE BEEN ABSURDLY LOW OVER THE PAST 13 YEARS (BELOW 6.7 PERCENT PER ANNUM ON AVERAGE TO JUDGE FROM GDP GROWTH AND NATIONAL INVESTMENT RATES) AND LIKELY WILL REMAIN LOW IN COMING YEARS, IF MORE CARE- FUL CONTROL IS NOT EXERTED OVER THE DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF INVESTMENT FUNDS. A SECOND CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING NOW TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 1985 WILL PROVIDE DONORS WITH A SECOND OPPORTUNITY TO IN- FLUENCE THIS PROCESS. - 7. POLICY FRAMEWORK: SOMALIA HAS TAKEN SIGNIFICANT STEPS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS TO ESTABLISH THE INCENTIVES, OPPORTUNITIES AND FREE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT THAT ARE CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF A MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIC SYSTEM. IT HAS ENDED PRICE CONTROLS, VIRTUALLY ABOLISHED IMPORT AND EXPORT LICENSING, DEVALUED REPEATEDLY (BY A TOTAL OF 83 PER- CENT IN FOREIGN CURRENCY TERMS), AND, IN JANUARY 1985, ESTABLISHED A DUAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET WITH A FREE AND LEGAL PARALLEL MARKET FOR MOST FOREIGN EX- CHANGE TRANSACTIONS. IT HAS ALSO BOOSTED BANKING SYSTEM LOAN AND DEPOSIT RATES BY 8 TO 10 POINTS (IN TWO STAGES OVER THREE YEARS), AND COMPLETELY LIBERAL- IZED INTERNAL FOODGRAIN MARKETING. HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONSISTENTLY BACK THESE REFORMS WITH THE REQUISITE FISCAL AND MONETARY DISCIPLINE. REAL INTEREST RATES REMAIN NEGATIVE, AND THE EFFECTS OF PAST DEVALUATIONS HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY WIPED OUT BY EXCESSIVE MONETARY EXPANSION. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO BEEN SLOW TO ATTACK INTERNAL MONOPOLY POSITIONS. WHILE IT HAS ENDED MOST PUBLIC SECTOR TRADING MONO- POLIES, IT HAS LEFT IN PLACE MONOPOLIES IN BANKING, INSURANCE, MANUFACTURING, AND OTHER SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY. IT HAS ALSO LEFT IN PLACE AN UNREALISTIC (THOUGH LARGELY UNENFORCED) LABOR CODE WMICH OFFICIALLY DEPRIVES EMPLOYERS OF THE RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE AS THEY PLEASE. OVERALL, THEREFORE, WHILE SOMALIA HAS TAKEN MANY OF THE BASIC AND MOST CRITICAL STEPS TOWARDS A FREELY OPERATING MARKET ECONOMY OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, IT STILL NEEDS TO COMPLETE THE TASK WITH ADJUSTMENTS IN INTERNAL MARKET CONDITIONS, AND IMPROVE- MENTS IN GENERAL PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT. - 8. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES) - 1972-1980 1981-1983 REAL PER CAPITA INCOME (1) - 2.7 2.4 MONEY (M1) 23.0 14.6 SAVINGS AND TIME DEPOSITS - (QUASI-MONEY) 25.6 23.0 TAXES/GDP 12.7 14.2 CONSUMER PRICES 17.7 34.7 - (1) REAL PER CAPITA GDP AT MARKET PRICES FOR - NON-REFUGEE POPULATION - 9. POLICY INDICATORS 10. MONEY SUPPLY: FISCAL DEFICITS, ONLY PARTIALLY OFFSET BY CONSEQUENTIAL DECLINES IN NET FOREIGN ASSETS, HAVE PROVIDED THE MAJOR IMPETUS FOR MONEY SUPPLY GROWTH IN SOMALIA OVER THE PAST TWELVE YEARS. THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS PATTERN WAS DURING THE 1981 TO 1983 PERIOD, WHEN, UNDER THE GUIDELINES OF A SERIES OF IMF PROGRAMS, NEW NET CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR ACCOUNTED FOR VIRTUALLY ALL MONEY SUPPLY GROWTH. WHEN SOMALIA\'S IMF PROGRAMS LAPSED IN 1984, HOWEVER, GOVERNMENT DEMAND FOR CREDIT REASSERTED ITSELF, ALONE ACCOUNTING FOR TWO-THIRDS OF A 72 PERCENT INCREASE IN NET DOMESTIC CREDIT DURING THE YEAR\'S FIRST NINE MONTHS. - 11. MONEY SUPPLY DETERMINANTS: CHANGE IN OUTSTANDING - STOCKS (SO.SH. MILLIONS) - 1972-80 1981-1983 M1 2342.7 1526.3 NET DOMESTIC CREDIT TO - THE GOVERNMENT 1927.2 - 97.4 NET DOMESTIC CREDIT TO - PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 1513.0 - 388.1 NET DOMESTIC CREDIT TO - THE PRIVATE SECTOR 111.0 1866.7 NET FOREIGN ASSETS - 156.1 -2372.4 - 12. MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS: SOMALIA OPERATES A RELATIVELY SIMPLE FINANCIAL SYSTEM CONSISTING OF A CENTRAL BANK, A COMMERCIAL BANK, A DEVELOPMENT BANK AND A SINGLE INSURANCE COMPANY, ALL GOVERNMENT OWNED. THE CENTRAL BANK TENDS TO RELY UPON QUANTI- TATIVE CONTROLS ON CREDIT ALLOCATIONS TO CONTROL THE MONEY SUPPLY. THE CENTRAL BANK ALSO HAS POWERS TO FIX INTEREST RATES AND ADJUST COMMERCIAL BANK RESERVE REQUIREMENTS (NOW 10 PERCENT). HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT ADJUSTED RESERVE REQUIREMENTS SINCE 1972, AND INTEREST RATES, WHILE ADJUSTED UPWARDS IN RECENT YEARS, REMAIN NEGATIVE IN REAL TERMS AND INEFFECTIVE IN CONTROLLING THE MONEY SUPPLY. THERE IS NO MONEY MARKET OR OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA. - 13. FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE AND MARKET POLICIES: SOMALIA NOW OPERATES A DUAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET. THE OFFICIAL MARKET, WHICH IS FUNDED BY GOVERNMENT GRANTS AND LOANS AND 35 PERCENT OF ALL EXPORT EARNINGS, PROVIDES FINANCING FOR ALL DEBT AND OTHER OFFICIAL SERVICE PAYMENTS AND FOR ALL PUBLIC SECTOR OIL IMPORTS. THE EXCHANGE RATE IN THIS MARKET IS NOW 36:1 (SHILLINGS TO DOLLARS) AND IS ADJUSTED UPWARDS MONTHLY BY HALF A SHILLING PLUS THE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN SOMALIA\'S CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF THE IN- FLATION RATES OF THE FIVE SDR BASKET CURRENCIES. - 14. ALL OTHER FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS; I.E., ALL TRANSACTIONS NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICIAL MARKET, ARE COVERED IN A LEGAL PARALLEL MARKET, WHICH IS FUNDED BY PRIVATE TRANSFERS AND RETAINED EXPORT EARNINGS (65 PERCENT OF ALL EARN- INGS). ALL TRANSACTIONS IN THIS MARKET TAKE PLACE THROUGH FOREIGN AND LOCAL CURRENCY ACCOUNTS OF THE COMMERCIAL AND SAVINGS BANK, WHICH CAN BE OPENED BY ANY RESIDENT (FOREIGNER OR NATIONAL) OF SOMALIA. THE EXCHANGE RATE IN THIS MARKET FLOATS, WITH THE COMMERCIAL AND SAVINGS BANK SETTING A DAILY RATE FOR ITS OWN TRANSACTIONS AT THE AVERAGE OF THE PREVIOUS DAY\'S MARKET TRANSACTIONS. STARTING AT 75:1 (SHILLINGS TO DOLLARS), THIS BANK RATE HAS MOVED TO 82 IN THE THREE WEEKS SINCE THIS NEW MARKET WAS ESTABLISHED ON JANUARY 2, 1985, AND WILL EVENTUALLY APPROACH THE REAL CURRENT PARALLEL MARKET RATE OF 93 TO 95:1. - 15. EXCHANGE CONTROLS IN SOMALIA INCLUDE DIRECT RESTRICTIONS ON REMITTANCES OF PROFITS, EARNINGS AND CAPITAL, AND A LICENSING REQUIREMENT FOR ALL CAPITAL INVESTMENTS. UNDER SOMALIA\'S CURRENT INVESTMENT LAW, REGISTERED INVESTMENTS WHICH ARE DEEMED \"PRODUCTIVE\" ARE ENTITLED TO REMIT ANNUALLY EARNINGS EQUIVALENT TO 30 PERCENT OF INVESTED CAPITAL; \"NON-PRODUCTIVE\" INVESTMENTS ARE PERMITTED NO REMITTANCES FOR THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS, AND REMITTANCES ANNUALLY EQUIVALENT TO ONLY 10 PERCENT OF INVESTED CAPITAL. WAGE EARNINGS OF FOREIGN WORKERS, SIMILARLY, ARE RESTRICTED TO 50 PERCENT OF ANNUAL INCOME. ALL OF THESE RESTRICTIONS REMAIN IN EFFECT UNDER SOMALIA\'S NEW DUAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET SYSTEM. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF ACCOUNT ARRANGEMENTS AT THE COMMERCIAL BANK, THESE RESTRIC- TIONS EFFECTIVELY APPLY ONLY TO THOSE FUNDS WHICH ORIGINALLY ARRIVED IN COUNTRY AS EXPORT PROCEEDS. - 16. GOVERNMENT BUDGET OPERATIONS: CENTRAL GOVERN- MENT OPERATIONS HAVE ABSORBED A HIGH AND INCREASING PERCENTAGE OF GDP IN SOMALIA. BETWEEN 1972 AND 1980, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ABSORBED AN AVERAGE OF 22.6 PERCENT OF GDP ANNUALLY, A PERCENTAGE WHICH ROSE TO 26.3 PERCENT BETWEEN 1981 AND 1983. REVENUES, HOWEVER, HAVE NOT KEPT PACE, AVERAGING 15.3 PERCENT OF GDP IN BOTH PERIODS. DEFICITS IN BOTH PERIODS WERE FINANCED PRIMARILY BY FOREIGN GRANTS AND LOANS. IN THE EARLIER PERIOD, HOWEVER, THIS FOREIGN FINANCING WAS SUPPLEMENTED BY SIZEABLE BANKING SYSTEM CREDITS, A REQUIREMENT THAT WAS ELIMINATED BETWEEN 1981 AND 1983 BEFORE REAPPEARING IN 1984. - 17. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET OPERATIONS (AS A - PERCENT OF GDP) - 1972-80 1981-83 EXPENDITURES 22.6 26.3 REVENUE 15.3 15.3 DEFICIT 7.3 11.0 18. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT FINANCING BY - SOURCE (AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL DEFICIT) - 1972-80 1981-83 DEFICIT 100.0 100.0 DOMESTIC FINANCING 38.0 - 2.0 - BANKING SYSTEM 38.0 - 1.5 - OTHER - - .5 FOREIGN FINANCING 62.0 103.1 - GRANTS 17.4 40.7 - LOANS 44.6 62.4 DISCREPANCY - - 1.1 - 19. TAXATION: SOMALIA RAISES THE VAST MAJORITY OF ITS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM TAXES ON TRADE AND TRANSACTIONS. ACCORDING TO PRELIMINARY GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES, TAXES ON INCOME AND PROFIT IN 1983 ACCOUNTED FOR ONLY 4 PERCENT OF TOTAL REVENUE; PROPERTY TAXES CONTRIBUTED 5 PERCENT; WHILE LEVIES ON PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND DEPARTMENTAL SURPLUSES ACCOUNTED FOR 17 PERCENT. THE BALANCE WAS COVERED BY TAXES ON IMPORTS (51 PERCENT OF TOTAL REVENUE), EXPORTS (3 PERCENT), EXCISE TAXES (12 PERCENT) AND STAMP TAXES (6.8 PERCENT). RATES VARIED BY SOURCE. ON PERSONAL INCOME EARNED FROM EMPLOYMENT, TAX RATES RANGED FROM ZERO FOR EARNINGS LESS THAN US DOLS 6 PER MONTH TO 18.9 PERCENT FOR EARNINGS ABOVE US DOLS 42 PER MONTH. FOR OTHER PERSONAL INCOME, RATES RANGE FROM ZERO FOR EARNINGS LESS THAN US DOLS 67 PER YEAR TO 30 PERCENT FOR EARN- INGS ABOVE US DOLS 835 PER YEAR. PRIVATE CORPORATE PROFITS ARE TAXED AT A FLAT 35 PERCENT RATE. SPECIFIC EXCISE TAXES ARE LEVIED ON SUGAR, TOBACCO, MATCHES, BEVERAGES, MINERAL WATER, SOAP AND SHAMPOO; A GENERAL 5 PERCENT SALES TAX HAS ALSO BEEN DEVELOPED WHICH WILL APPLY TO ALL BUT ESSENTIAL GOODS. CUSTOMS DUTIES AVERAGE 60-65 PERCENT OF THE VALUE OF DUTIABLE MERCHANDISE AND ARE APPLIED AT RATES THAT RANGE FROM ZERO TO OVER 100 PERCENT ON 120 PERCENT OF THE L/C VALUE OF IMPORTED COMMODITIES VALUED AT AN ADMINISTRATIVE RATE OF 60:1 (SHILLINGS TO DOLLARS). EXPORT TAXES ARE APPLIED ON ALL MAJOR EXPORTS AT RATES RANGING UP TO 30 PERCENT OF FOB VALUE. ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATISTICAL TAXES ARE ALSO APPLIED AT A 10 PERCENT AD VALOREM RATE TO ALL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS. TAXES ON PUBLIC ENTERPRISES INCLUDE A TURNOVER TAX (APPLIED AT A RATE OF 50 PERCENT ON NET PROFIT), A PROFIT TAX (APPLIED AT A 35 PERCENT RATE AFTER DEDUCTION OF THE TURNOVER TAX) AND A 50 PERCENT GOVERNMENT SHARE IN ANNUAL DEPRECIA- TION ALLOWANCES. - 20. PRICING POLICIES: CONSUMER PRICES: SOMALIA OFFICIALLY ENDED ALL CONSUMER PRICE CONTROLS IN JANUARY 1985. OIL PRODUCTS WHICH ARE IMPORTED BY A GOVERNMENT TRADING AGENCY OPERATING AT THE OFFICIAL (36:1) EXCHANGE RATE, ARE STILL AVAILABLE AT WHAT AMOUNTS TO SUBSIDIZED PRICES (E.G., 17 SHILLINGS PER LITER OF GASOLINE). ALL OTHER PRICES, HOWEVER, INCLUDING PRICES FOR ELECTRICITY AND WATER, HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED TO REFLECT FULL COSTS AT THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE OF EXCHANGE. - 21. PRODUCER PRICES: AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AND PRICES WERE LARGELY DECONTROLLED BY SOMALIA IN JANUARY 1984, AND, IN THE YEAR SINCE, BASIC FOOD PRICES HAVE RISEN TO MARKET RATES. THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, THE GOVERNMENT TRADING AGENCY WHICH PREVIOUSLY HELD A MONOPSONY ON ALL GRAIN PURCHASES IN SOMALIA, STILL HOLDS THE LEGAL RIGHT TO PURCHASE UP TO 5 PERCENT OF EACH YEAR\'S CROP, BUT HAS NOT EXERCISED THAT RIGHT IN RECENT YEARS. BANANA EXPORTS FROM SOMALIA ARE ENTIRELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF A PRIVATE/PUBLIC JOINT VENTURE, WHICH, OBLIGED IN THE PAST TO OPERATE AT THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE, HAS NOT ALWAYS OFFERED COMPETITIVE PRICES FOR EXPORT QUALITY FRUIT. NOW FREE TO OPERATE AT THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE OF EXCHANGE, IT SHOULD BE ABLE TO OFFER COMPETITIVE PRICES IN THE FUTURE. - 22. STATE ENTERPRISE PRICES: THE PRICE DECONTROL INTRODUCED IN JANUARY 1985 HAS LEFT ALL PUBLIC ENTERPRISES WITH FULL FREEDOM TO SET INPUT AND OUTPUT PRICES AT LEVELS THAT WILL FULLY COVER COSTS. MANY, HOWEVER, ENJOY MONOPOLY POSITIONS IN THE ECONOMY, AND HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED BY COMPETITIVE PRESSURES OR PRICE DEVELOPMENTS ELSEWHERE IN THE ECONOMY TO MOVE THEIR PRICES TO ECONOMIC LEVELS. IN THIS CLASS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MONOPOLIES ARE THE COMMERCIAL AND SAVINGS BANK; THE STATE INSURANCE COMPANY OF SOMALIA; THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM AGENCY, WHICH CONTROLS OIL IMPORTS; THE SOMALI COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT,WHICH CONTROLS IN-COUNTRY OIL DISTRIBUTION AND, THROUGH THE FRANKINCENSE AND MYRRH AGENCY, EX- PORTS OF AROMATIC GUMS; THE SOMALI LEATHER AGENCY, WHICH CONTROLS EXPORTS OF HIDES AND SKINS, ASPIMA, WHICH CONTROLS IMPORTS OF VETERINARY DRUGS; SOMALFRUTTA, WHICH CONTROLS EXPORTS OF BANANAS; THE SOMALI SHIPPING AGENCY, AND THE SOMALI CLEARING AND FORWARDING AGENCIES. - 23. SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT POLICIES: THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: THERE ARE NOW 51 PARASTATAL CORPORATIONS OPERATING IN SOMALIA, INCLUDING FIVE FINANCIAL, 33 NON-FINANCIAL AND EIGHT NON-COMMERCIAL PUBLIC ENTER- PRISES, WHICH TOGETHER DOMINATE MOST BANKING, INSURANCE, AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN SOMALIA. DURING THE 1970\'S THESE ENTERPRISES WERE NOT TREATED PRIMARILY AS PROFIT-MAKING COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS, BUT OFTEN AS SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES. SURPLUSES WERE TAXED AWAY BY HIGH PROFIT TAXES AND GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ON DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES; WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT WERE DISTORTED BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES, AND PRICES FOR BOTH INPUTS AND OUTPUTS MAINTAINED AT UNREALISTICALLY LOW LEVELS. BEGINNING IN 1981, SOMALIA HAS TAKEN SOME STEPS TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS. THREE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES HAVE BEEN CLOSED; OTHERS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED WITH FOREIGN MANAGERIAL ASSISTANCE. THE REST ARE BEING REVIEWED TO DETERMINE WHICH TO RETAIN AS SERVICE INSTITUTIONS ON PUBLIC SUBSIDIES, WHICH TO DIVEST OR CLOSE, AND WHICH TO ESTABLISH AS COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS. DECISIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN TAKEN TO GRANT ALL PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AUTONOMY IN REGARD TO WAGE, EMPLOYMENT AND PRICING DECISIONS, AND WHERE POSSIBLE, TO ELIMINATE THE REMAINING PUBLIC SECTOR MONOPOLIES IN TRADE, BANKING AND SERVICES. PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THESE DECISIONS, HOWEVER HAS BEEN SLOW. - 24. PRIVATE INVESTMENT: INCENTIVES: SOMALIA\'S CURRENT INVESTMENT LAW OFFERS NEW INVESTMENTS TAX HOLIDAYS ON ALL INCOME, IMPORT, EXCISE AND PROPERTY TAXES FOR PERIODS OF UP TO FIVE YEARS. IT ALSO GUARANTEES REMITTANCES AT THE RATES OUTLINED ABOVE. IN ADDITION, J FHE NEW FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET ARRANGEMENTS, FACILITIES FOR REMITTANCES ABOVE THE RATES DEFINED IN THE LAW ARE AVAILABLE IN THE NEW LEGAL PARALLEL MARKET. SOMALIA HAS NEGOTIATED A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, WHICH PROVIDES FOR MOST FAVORED NATION OR NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR GERMAN INVESTORS, PROMPT AND ADEQUATE COMPENSATION IN CASE OF EXPROPRIATION, AND FREE TRANSFER OF CAPITAL, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST AND EARNINGS. IT ALSO HAS UNDER CONSIDERATION TWO DRAFT BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES WITH THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN. - 25. DISINCENTIVES: DISINCENTIVES TO PRIVATE INVEST- MENT INCLUDE THE COUNTRY\'S GENERAL INFRASTRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES, THE CONTINUING THREAT OF POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC INSTABILITY, THE PRE-EMPTION OF INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MONOPOLIES, A CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY REGARDING MARKET FREEDOMS, THE CONTINUING RESTRICTIONS ON WAGE AND CAPITAL REMITTANCES, THE LACK OF A WELL DEFINED BODY OF COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL LAW, AND AN ONEROUS (THOUGH UNENFORCED) LABOR CODE WHICH OFFICIALLY DEPRIVES THE EMPLOYER OF THE RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE FREELY, MANDATES AN UNECONOMICALLY HIGH LEVEL OF WORKER BENEFITS, AND RESTRICTS THE EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS. A REVIEW OF INVESTMENT LAW NOW UNDER WAY MAY ELIMINATE SOME OF THE RESTRICTIONS NOW IMPOSED ON REMITTANCES, AND PROVIDE A FULLER SET OF PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR NEW INVESTORS. - 26. LEVELS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT: THERE HAVE BEEN WIDE FLUCTUATIONS IN PRIVATE SECTOR SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT OVER THE PAST 13 YEARS, AS WEATHER INDUCED FLUCTUATIONS IN INVENTORY ACCUMULATION IN THE ALL-IMPORTANT LIVESTOCK SECTOR OVERWHELMED RELATIVELY LOW LEVELS OF PRIVATE SECTOR FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION. PUBLIC SECTOR SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT HAVE ALSO VARIED WIDELY AS WARS, DROUGHTS AND REFUGEE CRISES HAVE REPEATEDLY SWELLED RECURRENT EXPENDITURES. OVERALL, DOMESTIC INVESTMENT TOTALLED APPROXIMATELY 18 PERCENT OF GDP (10 PERCENT PUBLIC, 8 PERCENT PRIVATE) BETWEEN 1972 AND 1980, RISING TO 21 PERCENT (10 PERCENT PUBLIC, 11 PERCENT PRIVATE) BETWEEN 1981 AND 1983. SAVINGS LAGGED, TOTALLING ONLY 3 PERCENT OF GDP (MINUS 7 PERCENT PUBLIC, 10 PERCENT PRIVATE) IN 1972 TO 1980, AND 4 PERCENT OF GDP (MINUS 10 PERCENT PUBLIC, 14 PERCENT PRIVATE) BETWEEN 1981 AND 1983. THE BALANCE OF INVESTMENT EXPENDITURES WERE COVERED BY FOREIGN GRANTS AND LOANS, AND REMITTANCES, WHICH TOGETHER AVERAGED 15 PERCENT OF GDP BETWEEN 1972 AND 1980, AND 18 PERCENT OF GDP BETWEEN 1981 AND 1983. FOR 1984 TO 1986, SOMALIA HAS PROPOSED A PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM WHICH WOULD RAISE NATIONAL INVESTMENT TO 23 PERCENT OF GDP (16 PERCENT PUBLIC AND 7 PERCENT PRIVATE) FINANCED ENTIRELY BY FOREIGN GRANTS AND LOANS (25.5 PERCENT OF GDP). WITH FOREIGN FINANCING AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR\'S OWN ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY SETTING LIMITS TO PUBLIC SECTOR ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, ACTUAL PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT TOTALLED ONLY ABOUT 9 PERCENT OF GDP IN 1984 - A RATE THAT LIKELY WILL HOLD FOR THE NEXT TWO TO THREE YEARS. - 27. SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT (AS SHARES OF GDP): - 1972-80 1981-83 INVESTMENT 18.4 21.1 - PUBLIC 10.0 10.1 - PRIVATE 8.4 11.0 DOMESTIC SAVINGS 3.0 3.6 - PUBLIC - 7.2 - 10.2 - PRIVATE 10.2 13.8 REMITTANCES 1.6 1.8 FOREIGN GRANTS AND LOANS 13.8 15.7 - 28. AID ASSISTANCE: DISBURSEMENTS OF GRANTS AND LOANS TO SOMALIA FROM ALL OFFICIAL SOURCES FOR ALL USES (REFUGEE, DEVELOPMENT AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ASSISTANCE) HAS INCREASED RAPIDLY OVER THE PAST NINE YEARS, RISING FROM SLIGHTLY OVER US DOLS 120 MILLION IN 1975 TO APPROXIMATELY US DOLS 300 MILLION IN 1983, BEFORE DROPPING OFF SLIGHTLY IN 1984 TO APPROXIMATELY US DOLS 260 MILLION. GRANTS ACCOUNTED FOR A GRADUALLY IN- CREASING PROPORTION OF THIS ASSISTANCE (ABOVE 50 PERCENT IN 1984), AND LOANS, INCLUDING LOANS FROM THE IMF AND ARAB MONETARY FUND, FOR THE BALANCE. MAJOR DONORS AND LENDERS INCLUDED SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, THE UNITED STATES, ITALY, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE EEC, THE IBRD, THE IMF, THE ARAB FUND FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK. FOR 1985 AND 1986, SOMALIA HAS PROJECTED FURTHER GRANT AND LOAN DIS- BURSEMENTS OF APPROXIMATELY US DOLS 900 MILLION, THOUGH ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS MAY FALL SOMEWHAT SHORT OF THIS TARGET. - 29. PARALLELING THE RAPID INCREASE IN AID DIS- BURSEMENTS HAS BEEN AN EQUALLY RAPID RISE IN SOMALIA\'S EXTERNAL DEBT. BETWEEN YEAR END 1979 AND YEAR END 1984, SOMALIA\'S TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT ROSE TO APPROX- IMATELY US DOLS 1445 MILLION, UP US DOLS 848 MILLION FROM THE US DOLS 597 MILLION LEVEL WHICH HAD PRE- VAILED AT THE CLOSE OF 1979. THANKS TO EXTENSIVE REFINANCING ARRANGEMENTS, (WITH MIDDLE EASTERN CREDITORS, IN PARTICULAR), OVERALL DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS HAVE REMAINED MANAGEABLE (50 PERCENT OF GOODS AND SERVICE EXPORTS IN 1984). WITHOUT FURTHER RESCHEDULINGS, HOWEVER, DEBT SERVICE PAY- MENTS WILL RISE TO, AND MAY EXCEED, THE TOTAL OF SOMALIA\'S GOODS AND SERVICE EXPORTS OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS. - 30. SOURCES: THE PRIMARY SOURCES USED IN COMPILING THIS REPORT WERE THE WORLD BANK\'S PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL ACCOUNT AGGREGATES PUBLISHED IN AUGUST 1984, THE IMF\'S REVIEW OF SOMALIA\'S STAND- BY ARRANGEMENT PUBLISHED IN APRIL 1984, THE IMF\'S DRAFT FINANCIAL PROGRAM FOR SOMALIA\'S PROPOSED 1985 STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT, WHICH WAS DEVELOPED IN NOVEMBER 1984, AND THE IMF\'S GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK FOR 1983, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK FOR 1984, AND REPORT ON EX- CHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS FOR 1984. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL DATA FOR 1983 AND 1984 ARE PRELIMINARY. THE MONETARY DATA IS RELIABLE THROUGH THE CLOSE OF 1983. THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS DATA ARE RELIABLE THROUGH THE CLOSE OF 1982. BRIDGES " "25","2/2/1985 7:08","85MOGADISHU1242","Embassy Mogadishu","SECRET","","P 020708Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2048 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY ROME ","S E C R E T MOGADISHU 01242 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINT, PINS, SO SUBJECT: RUMORS OF TENSIONS IN THE SOMALI REGIME 1. SECRET/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. RUMORS ARE PROBABLY ALWAYS ABUNDANT HERE BUT AN FSN EMPLOYEE (PROTECT SOURCE) TELLS US THAT RUMORS OF A NEW KIND ARE CIRCULATING, AS FOLLOWS: --FAILURE TO ANNOUNCE A DATE FOR THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE NEW PARLIAMENT REFLECTS SIAD BARRE\'S INDECISION ABOUT POSSIBLE MAJOR CHANGES; --THE PRESIDENT MAY ABSENT HIMSELF FROM THE COUNTRY FOR EIGHT OR NINE MONTHS ON GROUNDS OF HEALTH, DECIDING ONLY AT THE END OF THAT PERIOD WHETHER TO RETURN; --HE MAY RE-CREATE THE POST OF PRIME MINISTER AND MAKE SAMANTAR, NOW FIRST VICE PRESIDENT AND DEFENSE MINISTER, PRIME MINISTER TO RUN THE COUNTRY IN HIS ABSENCE; --GENERAL GANNI, THE HARSH MILITARY COMMANDER IN THE NORTH, MIGHT REPLACE SAMANTAR AS DEFENSE MINISTER; --SECOND VICE PRESIDENT KULMIE MIGHT BE GIVEN THE HONORIFIC POST OF CHAIRMAN OF PARLIAMENT. 3. COMMENT: THESE RUMORS ARE NOT OUT OF LINE WITH OTHER INFORMATION THE EMBASSY (INCLUDING SIRO) HAS REPORTED, WHICH INDICATE THAT SIAD BARRE IS FEELING MORE AGED AND WORRIED AND THAT THE QUESTION OF HIS LEAVING THE COUNTRY HAS INDEED COME UP, ALTHOUGH HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT HE WILL NOT LEAVE. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCT ADDOU CONFIRMED TO THE AMBASSADOR A FEW DAYS AGO THAT A CABINET SHAKEUP WAS COMING AND MIGHT INVOLVE THE TWO VICE PRESIDENTS. WHETHER THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF PARLIAMENT IS ACTUALLY BEING DELAYED IS NOT CLEAR; WE CONTINUE TO HEAR THAT IT MAY BE HELD THIS COMING WEEK. BRIDGES " "26","2/4/1985 5:02","85MOGADISHU1292","Embassy Mogadishu","SECRET","85STATE7202","R 040502Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2074 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM ","S E C R E T MOGADISHU 01292 E.O. 12356: DNG: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINT, SO SUBJ: LIBYAN ACTIVITY IN AFRICA: SOMALIA REFS: STATE 7202 1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT). - 2. THE FOLLOWING IS IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS POSED IN PARAGRAPH FIVE OF REFTEL. - 3. CURRENTLY THERE IS NO LIBYAN PRESENCE IN SOMALIA. - 4. SOMALIA HAS NO OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH LIBYA. THE GSDR VIEWS QADHAFI AS AN ENEMY BECAUSE HE SUPPORTS THE SOMALI DISSIDENT ORGANIZATIONS TRYING TO BRING DOWN THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT. THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS RECENTLY OF TENTATIVE CONTACTS BETWEEN SOMALIA AND LIBYA ABOUT RESTORING RELATIONS. ITALIANS HAVE TOLD US THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE UNDER WAY ABOUT PLACING A SOMALI DIPLOMAT IN THE ITALIAN EMBASSY IN TRIPOLI AND A LIBYAN DIPLOMAT IN THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN MOGADISHU. IT SEEMS LIKELY, IF TRUE, THAT PRESIDENT SIAD WILL TRY TO USE THE LIBYANS\' DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS AS A LEVER TO PERSUADE THEM TO STOP SUPPORTING THE DISSIDENTS. - 5. OVERT OPPOSITION TO THE SIAD REGIME IS CENTERED ON TWO DISSIDENT GROUPS, THE SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT (SNM) AND THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC SALVATION FRONT (SDSF), WHICH ARE HEADQUARTERED IN ADDIS ABABA AND OPERATE AGAINST SOMALIA OUT OF ETHIOPIA. WE UNDERSTAND LIBYA HAS BEEN SUPPORTING THESE GROUPS FOR SEVERAL YEARS. - 6. LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR THE DISSIDENTS HAS BEEN CONSTRAINED ON OCCASION BECAUSE OF THE MOVEMENTS\' RELUCTANCE TO MERGE AS QADHAFI DESIRES OR TO FOLLOW A MORE RADICAL IDEOLOGICAL LINE. - 7. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE GSDR IS UNLIKELY TO SUPPORT LIBYAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ANYWHERE IN AFRICA EXCEPT AGAINST ETHIOPIA. OVER THE PAST YEAR, SOMALIA PUBLICLY HAS CRITICIZED LIBYAN ACTIVITIES IN CHAD AND ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA, AS WELL AS LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR THE SNM AND THE SDSF. HOWEVER, SOMALIA DOES NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO ASSIST ANY COUNTRY THREATENED BY THE LIBYANS. - 8. THE FACT THAT SOMALIA AND LIBYA ARE BOTH ISLAMIC COUNTRIES IS NOT A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER. - 9. ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN SOMALIA AND LIBYA IS POSSIBLE IF LIBYAN FORCES WERE TO BE SENT TO ETHIOPIA AND TOOK UP POSITIONS ALONG THE BORDER WITH SOMALIA. WE BELIEVE THAT FULL-SCALE WAR BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA IS UNLIKELY. CROSS BORDER SKIRMISHES, HOWEVER, ARE RECURRENT AND POSSIBLE LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT CANNOT BE EXCLUDED, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD MEAN ADDING A NEW ELEMENT TO THE CURRENT SOVIET/CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA. BRIDGES " "27","2/5/1985 12:45","85GABORONE501","Embassy Gaborone","SECRET//NOFORN","85GABORONE461","O R 051245Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2350 SECDEF WASHDC USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN AMEMBASSY HARARE AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY LUSAKA AMEMBASSY LILONGWE AMEMBASSY MAPUTO AMEMBASSY MASERU AMEMBASSY MBABANE AMEMBASSY PRETORIA ","S E C R E T GABORONE 0501 NOFORN LONDON FOR FRASURE: CAPE TOWN ALSO FOR EMBASSY E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, SF, BC SUBJECT: BOTSWANA CHARGES BOPHUTHATSWANA WITH THREAT TO INVADE REF: GABORONE 461 (NOTAL) 1. (C) SUMMARY. THE GOVERNMENT OF BOTSWANA HAS ISSUED A PRESS RELEASE STATING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF BOPHUTHATSWANA HAS THREATENED TO INVADE BOTSWANA UNLESS IT HALTS THE PASSAGE OF ANC CADRE THROUGH BOTSWANA INTO ITS TERRITORY AND THAT OF SOUTH AFRICA. THE RELEASE ALSO CITES PIK BOTHA AS SAYING THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MARCH INTO ANY NEIGHBORING COUNTRY THROUGH WHICH THEY BELIEVE ANC GROUPS ARE PASSING INTO THEIR TERRITORY. THE RELEASE STATES THAT BOTSWANA DOES NOT PERMIT USE OF ITS TERRITORY FOR ATTACKS ON ITS NEIGHBORS AND THAT SOUTH AFRICA AND BOPHUTHATSWANA \"WITH THEIR LARGE SECURITY FORCES AND ARMIES\" SHOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO SEAL THEIR BOUNDARIES THAN BOTSWANA. THE RELEASE WAS APPARENTLY AIRED ON RADIO BOTSWANA THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 4 AND WAS PICKED UP ON BOPHUTHATSWANA TV THE SAME EVENING. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED A RECENT MEETING BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER CHIEPE AND BOPHUTHATSWANA OFFICIALS, DENIED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THE PRESS STATEMENT MAY REPRESENT GOB EFFORTS TO POSITION ITSELF FOR THE UPCOMING MEETING WITH SAG OFFICIALS REPORTED REFTEL. END SUMMARY. 2. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A GOB PRESS STATEMENT RELEASED LATE FEBRUARY 4. QUOTE: BOPHUTHATSWANA HAS THREATENED TO INVADE BOTSWANA UNLESS THAT PASSAGE OF A.N.C. CADRES INTO REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND BOPHUTHATSWANA, WHICH BOPHUTHATSWANA BELIEVES TAKES PLACE THROUGH BOTSWANA, STOPS. THIS WARNING HAS SINCE BEEN REPEATED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THE HON. PIK BOTHA, WHO HAS STATED THAT THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND BOPHUTHATSWANA RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MARCH INTO ANY NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY THROUGH WHICH THEY BELIEVE A.N.C. CADRES PASS INTO BOPHUTHATSWANA AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHETHER SUCH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY APPROVES OR KNOWS ABOUT SUCH INFILTRATION OR NOT BOTSWANA THEREFORE FACES THE RISK OF INVASION WHETHER OR NOT IT APPROVES OF THE ALLEGED A.N.C. INFILTRATION OR EVEN KNOWS ABOUT IT OR NOT. THE BOPHUTHATSWANA THREAT IS ALL THE MORE SURPRISING AS BOPHUTHATSWANA HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY COMPLAINED TO BOTSWANA ABOUT SECURITY MATTERS. BOTSWANA FOR ITS PART, HAS EXPLAINED, AS IT HAS ALWAYS DONE, THAT IT DOES NOT ALLOW THE USE OF ITS TERRITORY AS A BASE FOR ATTACKS ON ITS NEIGHBOURS OR ANY OTHER COUNTRIES FOR THAT MATTER. BOTSWANA HAS ALWAYS ARRESTED, TRIED AND IMPRISONED ANYBODY WHO WAS CAUGHT IMPORTING OR CARRYING OR IN POSSESSION OF WEAPONS IN BOTSWANA. BOTSWANA IS NO MORE GUILTY OF PERMITTING A.N.C. CADRES TO ENTER ITS TERRITORY THAN BOPHUTHATSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICA ARE OF PERMITTING THESE CADRES TO ENTER THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES. SOUTH AFRICA AND BOPHUTHATSWANA WITH THEIR LARGE SECURITY FORCES AND ARMIES, CAPABLE OF INVADING BOTSWANA, SHOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO SEAL THEIR BOUNDARIES AGAINST A.N.C. INFILTRATION WHICH BOTSWANA WITH ITS SMALL POLICE FORCE AND ARMY AND SEVERELY LIMITED RESOURCES IS UNABLE TO DO. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FEBRUARY 4, 1985. END QUOTE. 3. (C) OUR COPY OF THE RELEASE INDICATES THAT THE STATEMENT WAS TO BE READ OVER RADIO BOTSWANA\'S ENGLISH NEWS AT 6 P.M. AND 9 P.M. FEBRUARY 4. EMBASSY OFFICIALS DID NOT HEAR THESE BROADCASTS BUT PICKED UP A REPORT ON BOPHUTHATSWANA TV DURING THE SAME EVENING REPORTING ON THE RELEASE. IT WAS NOT AIRED ON THE 7 A.M. RADIO BOTSWANA ENGLISH NEWS FEBRUARY 5. 4. (S-NOFORN) COMMENT. WE ARE SEEKING EARLY MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY AND OTHER OFFICIALS TO ASCERTAIN THE BACKGROUND TO THIS BPZARRE PRESS RELEASE. WE SUSPECT THAT IT REPRESENTS GOB EFFORTS TO POSITION ITSELF FOR THE SECURITY MEETING WHICH THE SAG REPORTEDLY HAS INSISTED UPON (REFTEL). INTERESTINGLY, THE INDEPENDENT GUARDIAN REPORTED ON FEBRUARY 1 THAT MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CHIEPE MET SEDETLY ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO IN A GABORONE MOTEL WITH BOPHUTHATSWANA OFFICIALS. THE GUARDIAN SAID THAT DR. CHIEPE HAS \"EMPHATICALLY DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH A MEETING. THE GUARDIAN CONTINUED THAT INFORMED SOURCES HAVE INDICATED THAT THE BANTUSTAN GOVERMMENT SEEKS ASSURANCE FROM GABORONE THAT ANC FREEDOM FIGHTERS ARE NOT OPERATING FROM BOTSWANA.\" THE PRESS RELEASE ALSO FOLLOWS A SIRO REPORT OF AN ARMED CLASH FEBRUARY 3 ON THE FRONTIER TWO KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE TLOKWENG BORDER POST BETWEEN 3 ARMED ANC CADRE AND A SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE PATROL IN WHICH ONE SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIER WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN CRITICALLY WOUNDED. THE ANC GROUP REPORTEDLY FLED BACK INTO BOTSWANA. END COMMENT. MAINO " "28","2/7/1985 22:58","85STATE38496","Secretary of State","SECRET","85ROME1902\|85STATE14859\|85STATE31565","O P 072258Z FEB 85 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY ","S E C R E T STATE 038496 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PTER SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL LINKS OF LARF REF: 1. ROME 1902, 2. STATE 31565 3. STATE 014859 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT. 2. REFTEL 1 RAISES A NUMBER OF ISSUES AND QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND LEBANESE TERRORIST GROUPS AS THEY MIGHT RELATE TO INVESTIGATON OF LADISPOLI SEVEN. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION MIGHT BE USEFUL IN DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WITH ITALIAN MAGISTRATE. 3. AN ETA-LARF LINK. ACCORDING TO ROME 1902 THERE IS REASON TO SUSPECT THAT SOME OF THE RECENT BOMB ATTACKS ON TRAINS CLAIMED BY BASQUE FATHERLAND THE FREEDOM (ETA) HAVE, IN FACT, BEEN CARRIED OUT BY THE LEBANESE ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION (LARF) ON BEHALF OF ETA. 4. WE HAVE NO IDEA OF THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THIS IS BASED. IN LATE 1984 THERE WERE THREE INCIDENTS IN WHICH ETA WAS SUSPECTED OF CARRYING OUT BOMBINGS ON RAILWAY STATIONS OR NEAR RAILWAY TRACKS, BUT NOT AGAINST A TRAIN. TWO OF THESE WERE LOW-LEVEL EXPLOSIONS CAUSING NO CASUALTIES AND LITTLE DAMAGE. THE THIRD WAS A BOOBY-TRAPPED DEVICE THAT KILLED SEVERAL CIVIL GUARDS, BUT WAS CONSISTENT WITH PAST ETA ACTIONS. 5. THE REFERENCE IN ROME 1902 MAY BE TO A FEBRUARY18, 1984 EXPLOSION AT URRUGNE NEAR THE FRENCH-SPANISH BORDER THAT APPARENTLY WAS DESIGNED TO CAUSE A MID-COURSE COLLISION BETWEEN TWO TRAINS, ONE BOUND FOR MADRID, THE OTHER FOR PARIS. THE EXPLOSION CAUSED NO INJURIES OR COLLISION, BUT ONLY A STROKE OF LUCK PREVENTED A MAJOR CATASTROPHE. CLAIM FOR THE ATTACK, HOWEVER, WAS NOT MADE BY ETA BUT BY IPARRETARRAK (\"MEN OF THE NORTH\"), A FRENCH BASQUE GROUP FIGHTING FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THREE BASQUE-POPULATED FRENCH PROVINCES. ALTHOUGH THE TWO GROUPS ARE SEPARATE ORGANIZATIONS, THE SIMILARITY OF THEIR AIMS COULD CAUSE CONFUSION. IN THE PAST ETA HAS GENERALLY SHUNNED RELATIONS WITH IPARRETARRAK NOT WISHING TO OFFEND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. 6. THE FEBRUARY 18 INCIDENT WAS A POTENTIALLY MUCH MORE VIOLENT ATTACK THAN USUAL IPARRETARRAK ACTIONS, AND IT REPORTEDLY ANGERED SEVERAL JAILED IPARRETARRAK MEMBERS. THE BOMBING, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY WAS THE WORK OF IPARRETARRAK MEMBERS WHO (CLAIMED) THAT THEY HAD WARNED FRENCH OFFICIALS ABOUT THE BOMB TEN MINUTES BEFORE IT WENT OFF AND DID NOT INTEND TO CAUSE A TRAIN COLLISION. 7. THE RED BRIGADES-LARF LINK. AGAIN ACCORDING TO ROME 1902 LARF AND THE ITALIAN RED BRIGADES (RB) HAVE BEEN PROVEN TO HAVE CONNECTIONS. WE SUSPECT THAT THIS ASSERTION IS BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF LEAMON HUNT\'S DRIVER WHO HAS IDENTIFIED MOHAMAD FAHS -- ONE OF THE ROME SEVEN -- AS HUNT\'S ASSASSIN. GIVEN THAT BOTH LARF AND THE RB CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUNT\'S DEATH, SOME ITALIAN OFFICIALS MAY BELIEVE THAT FAHS WAS CONNECTED WITH LARF AND PERHAPS \"CONTRACTED\" BY THE RB TO KILL HUNT -- HENCE A LARF-RB LINK. ALTHOUGH IN NO POSITION TO DISPROVE THIS THEORY, WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO CONFIRM THIS LINK BASED UPON AVAILABLE EVIDENCE. 8. THE LARF ISLAMIC JIHAD LINK. WE CANNOT YET VERIFY THAT THERE IS A CONNECTION BETWEEN LARF AND ISLAMIC JIHAD. THE TWO GROUPS APPEAR TO BE COMPOSED OF MEMBERS FROM SEPARATE ISLAMIC SECTS. THEY ARE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, AND USE DIFFERENT MO\'S. 9. \"ISLAMIC JIHAD\" IS APPARENTLY THE OPERATIONAL COVERNAME USED BY ONE OR MORE PROIRANIAN RADICAL LEBANESE SHIITE ORGANIZATIONS. THESE GROUPS, GENERALLY KNOWN UNDER THE RUBRIC HIZBALLAH (PARTY OF GOD) ARE OFFSHOOTS OF THE MODERATE AMAL ORGANIZATION LED BY NABIH BERRI. SOME HIZBALLAH MEMBERS RETAIN TIES TO AMAL AND MAY EVEN KEEP UP MEMBERSHIP IN IT. 10. HIZBALLAH HAS PROBABLY BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SEVERAL MAJOR ANTI-WESTERN TERRORIST ACTS IN LEBANON. THE EARLIEST OF THESE, BEGINNING IN 1983, INVOLVED CAR BOMBS LOADED WITH HIGH EXPLOSIVES SUCH AS HEXOGER. LATER ATTACKS IN LEBANON CLAIMED BY ISLAMIC JIHAD ALSO INCLUDED SHOOTINGS AND KIDNAPPINGS. ALTHOUGH ANONYNOUS CALLERS ALLEGED TO BE SPOKESMEN FOR \"ISLAMIC JIHAD\" HAVE CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATTACKS OUTSIDE LEBANON (MURDER OF GENERAL OVERSSI, MINING OF RED SEA AND DECEMBER L983 KUWAIT BOMBINGS) WE CANNOT SUBSTANTIATE THIS. 11. LARF, ACCORDING TO MOST REPORTING, IS COMPOSED OF LEFTIST/MARXIST LEBANESE AND/OR PALESTINIAN CHRISTIANS FORMERLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE. LARF SEEMS TO OPERATE ON A SMALLER SCALE THAN ISLAMIC JIHAD. 12. INFORMATION ON MOHAMED FAHS. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON MOHAMAD FAHS THAT IS NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO THE ITALIANS. 13. THERE FOLLOWS A LIST OF LARF ACTIONS: NOVEMBER 1, 1981 ATTEMPTED SHOOTING OF CHRISTIAN CHAMPMAN US CHARGE D\'AFFAIRS IN PARIS JANUARY 8, 1982 ASSASSINATION OF COL. CHARLES RAY US ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE IN PARIS APRIL 9, 1982 ASSASSINATION OF SECOND SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS AT THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN PARIS - YACOV BARSIMANTOV AUGUST 21, 1982 ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF CAR BELONGING TO US COMMERCIAL COUNSELAR RODERICK GRANT IN PARIS SEPTEMBER 17, 1982 BOMBING OF CAR BELONGING TO ISRAELI DEFENSE PURCHASING MISSION IN PARIS SERIOUSLY WOUNDING THREE OCCUPANTS PLUS BYSTANDERS. SEPTEMBER 30, 1983 BOMBING OF MARSEILLE TRADE FAIR, KILLING ONE WOUNDING 27. ALSO CLAIMED BY ARMENIANS AND RIGHTIST FRENCH GROUPS. . FEBRUARY 1, 184 ASSASSINATION OF LEAMON HUNT SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS DIRECTOR, IN ROME. ALSO CLAIMED BY RED BRIGADES MARCH 26, 1984 ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF ROBERT HOMME US CONSUL GENERAL TO STRASBOURG 14. GROUPS USING THE COVER NAME ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION (IJO) HAVE CLAIMED CREDIT OR ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FOLLOWING ATTACKS IN 1982-1984: MAY 24, 1982 CAR BOMBING AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN BEIRUT IN WHICH 2 PERSONS WERE KILLED AND 27 WOUNDED. MARCH 15-16, 1983 GRENADE/ROCKET ATTACKS ON U.S. AND ITALIAN MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN BEIRUT. APRIL 18, 1983 AMERICAN EMBASSY TRUCK BOMBING IN BEIRUT. JUNE 5, 1983 ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF THE LIBYAN AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON IN THE NAPOLEON HOTEL IN BEIRUT. OCTOBE 2, 1983 TWIN TRUCK BOMBINGS AGAINST AMERICAN AND FRENCH MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN BEIRUT. NOVEMBER 4, 1983 TRUCK BOMBING ATTACK AGAINST AN ISRAELI MILITARY BUILDING IN TYRE. DECEMBER 12, 1983 SIX BOMB ATTACKS IN KUWAIT IN WHICH THE TARGETS INCLUDED BOTH THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH EMBASSIES. DECEMBER 21, 1983 TWO BOMBINGS IN BEIRUT AGAINST A FRENCH MULTINATIONAL FORCE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING AND A BAR FREQUENTED BY WESTERNERS. JANUARY 17, 1984 KIDNAPPING OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSUL HUSSEIN FARRASH IN BEIRUT. JANUARY 18, 1984 ASSASSINATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT PRESIDENT MALCOLM KERR IN BEIRUT. FEBRUARY 7, 1984 ASSASSINATION OF GHOLAM ALI OVEISSI AND GHOLAM HOSEIN OVEISSI, TWO LEADING MILITARY FIGURES OF PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN, IN PARIS. FEBRUARY 8,1984 ASSASSINATION OF UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AMBASSDOR IN PARIS. FEBRUARY10,19984 KIDNAPPING OF AN AMCIT FRANK REGIER, AN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING PROFESSOR AT THE AUB IN BEIRUT. MARCH-APRIL1984 THREATENING LETTERS RECEIVED BY U.S., BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN DIPLOMATS AND SEVERAL U.S. BUSINESSES IN A NUMBER OF NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIAN AND EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES. MARCH 7,1 984 KIDNAPPING OF CABLE NEWS NETWORK BEIRUT BUREAU CHIEF JEREMY LEVIN. MARCH166, 1984 KIDNAPPING OF AMERICAN EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER WILLIAM BUCKLEY. MARCH 27, 1984 A FRENCH DIPLOMAT, SAUVEUR GLIOZZO, WAS SHOT AND SERIOUSLY INJURED IN BEIRUT. APRIL 2,1 984 BOMBINGS IN WEST BEIRUT TARGETING DRUZE-OWNED ESTABLISHMENTS. MAY 8, 1984 KIDNAPPING OF U.S. CLERGYMAN BENJAMIN WEIR IN BEIRUT. JUNE 7, 1984 EXPLOSION AT THE SAUDI EMBASSY. JULY 1984 PLACING OF MINES IN THE GULF OF SUEZ AND THE RED SEA. AUGUST 5, 1984 ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF KHALID ALMARZOOK, PUBLISHER OF AL-ANBA, IN MARBELLA, SPAIN. SEPTEMBER 12, 1984 ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF A LIBYAN DIPLOMAT IN MADRID. SEPTEMBER 14, 1984 ONE SAUDI WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER WOUNDED IN A TERRORIST ATTACK IN MARBELLA. THE SAUDIS WERE CIVIL ENGINEERS. SEPTEMBER 20, 1984 BOMBING OF AMERICAN EMBASSY ANNEX IN EAST BEIRUT. DECEMBER 3,1984 KIDNAPPING OF MR. KILBURN, LIBRARIAN OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN BEIRUT. JANUARY 8,1985 KIDNAPPING OF FATHER JENCO, HEAD OF CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES IN BEIRUT. NOTE: IN SOME CASES, OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE ALSO CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE SAME INCIDENT. THE BEST AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT LIBYA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR GULF/RED SEA MINES. SHULTZ " "29","2/12/1985 12:49","85MOGADISHU1643","Embassy Mogadishu","SECRET","85MOGADISHU1520","P 121249Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2255 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY ROME ","S E C R E T MOGADISHU 01643 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, SD, UR, US SUBJECT: REPORT OF SOMALI OVERTURE T0 SOVIETS 1. (SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NO CONTRACT/ORCON-ENTIRE TEXT) - 2. AN ARAB AMBASSADOR TOLD ME FEBRUARY 1T THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR ILICHEV HAD TOLD HIM OF BEING APPROACHED RECENTLY BY THE SOMALIS ON THE QUESTION OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS. ILICHEV REPORTEDLY SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INVITED TO DINNER BY A RANKING OFFICER OF THE SOMALI FOREIGN MINISTRY, WHO HAD WITH HIM TWO OTHER MFA OFFICERS. THE SOMALI\'S MESSAGE TO ILICHEV HAD BEEN THAT SOMALIA WAS FULLY READY TO NORMALIZE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ACCORDING TO MY ARAB SOURCE, ILICHEV SAID THAT HE HAD RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE READY BUT SEVERAL THINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE. THE SOMALIS WOULD HAVE TO TREAT HIM PRDPERLY AS AN AMBASSADOR; THEY WOULD HAVE TD STOP THEIR ANTI- SOVIET COMPAIGN; THEY WOULD HAVE TD CALL OFF THE SECURITY FORCES WHICH HAD PRACTICALLY BUILT A WALL AROUND HIS EMBASSY; AND TASS AND THE SOMALI NEWS AGENCY SHOULD EXCHANGE CORRESPONDENTS. ILICHEV REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SO FAR THE SOMALIS HAD NOT RE- SPONDED TO HIS SUGGESTIONS. (I RECALL SIRO\'S APM-2452 WHICH MIGHT BE REFERRING TO THE SAME SOMALI-SOVIET CONTACT, REPORTING THAT IN MID-JANUARY ILICHEV WAS APPROCHED BY THE RECENTLY APPOINTED SOMALI AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW, ABDULLAHI SHEIKH ISMAIL, AND THEN BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE MPAS ASIA AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DEPARTMENT, ABDULLAHI EGAL NUR, TO SEEK SOVIET ASSIS- TANCE IN CONVINCING ETHIOPIA TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH SOMALIA TO ATTEMPT T0 RESOLVE THE SOMALI- ETHIOPIAN CONFLICT.) - 3. AT THE OPENING SESSION OF PARLIAMENT ON THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 11, PRESIDENT SIAD BARRE DID NOT MENTION THE UNITED STATES OR WESTERN EUROPE BUT SPOKE HARSHLY ABOUT ETHIOPIAN EFFORTS TO DESTABLIZE SOMALIA; HE ALSO CRITICIZED SOMALI DISSIDENTS WITHOUT NAMING THEM AS SUCH. HE WENT ON TO SAY (ACCORDING TO THE INTERPRETATION; A WRITTEN TEXT IS NOT YET AVAILABLE) THAT THE ETHIOPIANS WERE RECEIVING EXTENSIVE SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET REGIME AND ITS ALLIES. - 4. COMMENT: THE REPORT FROM THE ARAB AMBASSADOR SOUNDS CREDIBLE. DESPITE HIS STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT, SIAD BARRE MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT LAST WEEK (MOGADISHU 1520) OF HIS READINESS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW; MOREOVER, AS WE NOTED, THIS WAS NOT A NEW DEPARTURE IN SIAD\'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS. WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT MOTIVE SIAD BARRE MIGHT HAVE FOR MAKING A PRIVATE APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS ON NORMALIZATION. MY ARAB SOURCE SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS TO GOAD US INTO PROVIDING MORE ASSISTANCE, SINCE SIAD WOULD ASSUME THAT WE WOULD BECOME AWARE OF THE APPROACH. BUT I THINK IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT EVEN IF SIAD SEES NO POSSIBILITY OF RECEIVING FUTURE MILITARY OR DEVELOPMENT AID FROM THE SOVIETS, HE MIGHT THINK IT POSSIBLE TO GET THE SOVIETS TO RESTRAIN THE ETHIOPIANS FROM PUTTING PRESSURE ON HIS BORDERS. BRIDGES " "30","2/12/1985 12:49","85NOFORNMOGADISHU1643","Embassy Mogadishu","SECRET","85MOGADISHU1520","P 121249Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2255 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY ROME ","S E C R E T N O F O R N MOGADISHU 01643 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, SD, UR, US SUBJECT: REPORT OF SOMALI OVERTURE T0 SOVIETS 1. (SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NO CONTRACT/ORCON-ENTIRE TEXT) - 2. AN ARAB AMBASSADOR TOLD ME FEBRUARY 1T THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR ILICHEV HAD TOLD HIM OF BEING APPROACHED RECENTLY BY THE SOMALIS ON THE QUESTION OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS. ILICHEV REPORTEDLY SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INVITED TO DINNER BY A RANKING OFFICER OF THE SOMALI FOREIGN MINISTRY, WHO HAD WITH HIM TWO OTHER MFA OFFICERS. THE SOMALI\'S MESSAGE TO ILICHEV HAD BEEN THAT SOMALIA WAS FULLY READY TO NORMALIZE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ACCORDING TO MY ARAB SOURCE, ILICHEV SAID THAT HE HAD RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE READY BUT SEVERAL THINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE. THE SOMALIS WOULD HAVE TO TREAT HIM PRDPERLY AS AN AMBASSADOR; THEY WOULD HAVE TD STOP THEIR ANTI- SOVIET COMPAIGN; THEY WOULD HAVE TD CALL OFF THE SECURITY FORCES WHICH HAD PRACTICALLY BUILT A WALL AROUND HIS EMBASSY; AND TASS AND THE SOMALI NEWS AGENCY SHOULD EXCHANGE CORRESPONDENTS. ILICHEV REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SO FAR THE SOMALIS HAD NOT RE- SPONDED TO HIS SUGGESTIONS. (I RECALL SIRO\'S APM-2452 WHICH MIGHT BE REFERRING TO THE SAME SOMALI-SOVIET CONTACT, REPORTING THAT IN MID-JANUARY ILICHEV WAS APPROCHED BY THE RECENTLY APPOINTED SOMALI AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW, ABDULLAHI SHEIKH ISMAIL, AND THEN BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE MPAS ASIA AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DEPARTMENT, ABDULLAHI EGAL NUR, TO SEEK SOVIET ASSIS- TANCE IN CONVINCING ETHIOPIA TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH SOMALIA TO ATTEMPT T0 RESOLVE THE SOMALI- ETHIOPIAN CONFLICT.) - 3. AT THE OPENING SESSION OF PARLIAMENT ON THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 11, PRESIDENT SIAD BARRE DID NOT MENTION THE UNITED STATES OR WESTERN EUROPE BUT SPOKE HARSHLY ABOUT ETHIOPIAN EFFORTS TO DESTABLIZE SOMALIA; HE ALSO CRITICIZED SOMALI DISSIDENTS WITHOUT NAMING THEM AS SUCH. HE WENT ON TO SAY (ACCORDING TO THE INTERPRETATION; A WRITTEN TEXT IS NOT YET AVAILABLE) THAT THE ETHIOPIANS WERE RECEIVING EXTENSIVE SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET REGIME AND ITS ALLIES. - 4. COMMENT: THE REPORT FROM THE ARAB AMBASSADOR SOUNDS CREDIBLE. DESPITE HIS STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT, SIAD BARRE MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT LAST WEEK (MOGADISHU 1520) OF HIS READINESS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW; MOREOVER, AS WE NOTED, THIS WAS NOT A NEW DEPARTURE IN SIAD\'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS. WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT MOTIVE SIAD BARRE MIGHT HAVE FOR MAKING A PRIVATE APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS ON NORMALIZATION. MY ARAB SOURCE SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS TO GOAD US INTO PROVIDING MORE ASSISTANCE, SINCE SIAD WOULD ASSUME THAT WE WOULD BECOME AWARE OF THE APPROACH. BUT I THINK IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT EVEN IF SIAD SEES NO POSSIBILITY OF RECEIVING FUTURE MILITARY OR DEVELOPMENT AID FROM THE SOVIETS, HE MIGHT THINK IT POSSIBLE TO GET THE SOVIETS TO RESTRAIN THE ETHIOPIANS FROM PUTTING PRESSURE ON HIS BORDERS. BRIDGES " "31","2/18/1985 11:59","85BEIRUT992","Embassy Beirut","UNCLASSIFIED","","P 181159Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1795 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ","UNCLAS BEIRUT 00992 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PINT, PTER, LE SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH CALLS FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN LEBANON 1. IN A STATEMENT PUBLISHED IN BEIRUT NEWSPAPERS ON FEBRUARY 18, HIZBALLAH DECLARED ITS ALLEGIANCE TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND PLEDGED TO ESTABLISH \"REVOLUTION- ARY ISLAMIC RULE\" IN LEBANON. STATEMENT DENIED THAT HIZBALLAH WOULD ESTABLISH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST RULE BY FORCE, BUT \"WE DO NOT HIDE OUR COMMITMENT TO ISLAMIC RULE, AND WE CALL ON ALL PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THIS REGIME. WE WILL FIGHT ABSOLUTISM TO ITS ROOTS.\" 2. STATEMENT IS REPORTED BY LOCAL PRESS TO BE HIZBALLAH\'S FIRST PUBLIC MANIFESTO. BARTHOLOMEW " "32","2/19/1985 12:37","85BEIRUT1013","Embassy Beirut","UNCLASSIFIED","85BEIRUT992","O 191237Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1805 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY ","UNCLAS BEIRUT 01013 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E.O. 12356: NA TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PTER, LE, IR SUBJECT: FURTHER ON HIZBALLAH \"MANIFESTO\" REF: BEIRUT 992 1. AS REPORTED REFTEL, HIZBALLAH PUBLISHED ON FEBRUARY 16 FOR THE FIRST TIME IN LEBANON A POLITICAL \"MANIFESTO.\" HIZBALLAH\'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, AS CITED FROM THE MANIFESTO BY THE LOCAL FRENCH-LANGUAGE PRESS, FOLLOW. BEGIN TEXT. -- THE DEPARTURE OF THE ISRAELIS, PRELUDE TO THE ANNIHILATION OF ISRAEL AND THE LIBERATION OF THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM. -- THE DEFINITIVE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND THEIR ALLIES AND THE END OF THE INFLUENCE OF ANY COLONIALIST STATE OVER THE COUNTRY. -- THE JUDGMENT OF PHALANGE PARTY MEMBERS FOR ALL THE CRIMES THEY HAVE COMMITTED AGAINST MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS, WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. -- THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL THE SONS OF OU PEOPLE, AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE OF THE POLITICAL REGIME WHICH THEY DESIRE. WE DO NOT HIDE, HOWEVER, OUR PREFERENCE FOR AN ISLAMIC REGIME AND CALL ON EVERYONE TO CHOOSE IT, BECAUSE IT ALONE GUARANTEES JUSTICE AND DIGNITY FOR ALL AND PREVENTS ANY ATTEMPTS AT NEOCOLONIALIST INFILTRATION INTO OUR COUNTRIES END TEXT. 2. ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS, THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES WERE CONTAINED IN A FIFTY-PAGE MANIFESTO ENTITLED \"OPEN LETTER TO THE OPPRESSED OF LEBANON AND THE WORLD.\" THE MANIFESTO WAS PRESENTED BY SHEIKH HASSAN GHIBRISS, SPOKESMAN OF THE \"HIZBALLAH NATION,\" TO A GATHERING OF ABOUT 1000 SUPPORTERS ON FEBRUARY 16 IN THE SOUTHERN BEIRUT SUBURB OF SHIYAH. 3. SEVERAL SHIITE AND SUNNI RELIGIOUS LEADERS REPORTEDLY ATTENDED THE GATHERING, MOST NOTABLY SHEIKHS SOBHI TUFAYLI HASSAN NASRALLAH, AND JALAL EDDIN ARKANDAN. HOWEVER, BOTH HIZBALLAH \"SPIRITUAL GUIDE\" SHEIKH FADLALLAH AND TAWHIID MOVEMENT LEADER SHEIKH SHA\'BAN WERE ABSENT DUE TO THEIR CURRENT VISIT TO IRAN WHERE, ACCORDING TO LEBANESE TELEVISION, THEY WERE RECEIVED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ON FEBRUARY 15. 4. WE WOULD ALSO DRAW ADDRESSEES\' ATTENTION TO FBIS GF190720 AND GF190722 IN WHICH TEHRAN RADIO REPORTS A MEETING ON FEBRUARY 16 BETWEEN SHEIKH FADLALLAH AND GRAND AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI FOLLOWING WHICH THE TWO RELIGIOUS LEADERS CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON. BARTHOLOMEW " "33","2/19/1985 13:22","85BEIRUT1014","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","85BEIRUT1013\|85BEIRUT993","O 191322Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1806 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 01014 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINT, LE SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH ON THE MOVE 1. C-ENTIRE TEXT. 2. BEGIN SUMMARY: SOME WEEKS AGO, IN A MESSAGE ON POTENTIAL NEW HIZBALLAH TACTICS IN THE WAKE OF THE JENCO KIDNAPPING AND THE MURDER OF TWO FRENCH MILITARY OBSERVERS, EMBASSY BEIRUT SPECULATED THAT HIZBALLAH IS BEGINNING TO SHIFT TOWARD A MORE PUBLIC, VISIBLE STANCE, PARTLY BECAUSE WE THOUGHT THEY FELT STRONG ENOUGH. WE NOW HAVE MORE EVIDENCE OF THIS. FIRST, ON FEBRUARY 16 HIZBALLAH ISSUED ITS FIRST PUBLIC PROGRAMMATIC MANIFESTO (BEIRUT 1013), INTER ALIA, CALLING FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE US, FRANCE AND THEIR ALLIES FROM LEBANON AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC REGIME. SECOND, ON FEBRUARY 18, ARMED HIZBALLAH DEMONSTRATORS, VARIOUSLY NUMBERED AT 1500-12,000, WERE BUSSED TO SIDON FROM BEIRUT AND CONTROLLED THE CITY\'S STREETS FOR A DAY AS ARMY STOOD BY. THIS WAS AN OMINOUS DEMONSTRATION OF STRENGTH AND WILL AND ABILITY TO ACT THAT WILL SHARPEN EXISTING BATTLE LINES AND TENSIONS IN LEBANON. END SUMMARY. 3. BUSLOADS OF HEAVILY ARMED HIZBALLAH DEMONSTRATORS, BOTH MEN AND WOMEN AND ESTIMATED BY WESTERN NEWS AGENCIES TO NUMBER 1500-12,000, DROVE FROM BEIRUT TO SIDON ON FEBRUARY 18 TO MARCH THROUGH CITY STREETS, BURNING THE LEBANESE FLAG AND SHOUTING SLOGANS AGAINST PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. SOME 20 SHOPS SELLING ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES WERE SACKED. AS SIDON RESIDENTS AND LAF TROOPS LOOKED ON WITHOUT INTERVENING, DEMONSTRATORS ARMED WITH AK-47S AND ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES RALLIED IN CITY SQUARES, SHOUTING SLOGANS SUCH AS \"DEATH TO GEMAYEL,\" \"SIDON IS MUSLIM AND CANNOT BE RULED BY A MARONITE,\" AND \"GEMAYEL IS AN AGENT.\" DEMONSTRATORS WAVED IRANIAN AND HIZBALLAH FLAGS AND CARRIED PICTURES OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. A SMALLER GROUP OF AMAL MEMBERS CONDUCTED THEIR OWN DEMONSTRATION SEPARATE FROM THAT OF HIZBALLAH. (AMAL LATER ISSUED A STATEMENT DENOUNCING THE HIZBALLAH RALLIES AND CONDEMNING THE VIOLENCE.) 4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, AT THE ARMY CHECKPOINT AT KHALDE, LAF TROOPS CHEERED AND WAVED THE BUS CONVOY THROUGH, WHILE PSP MILITIAMEN FURTHER SOUTH ALSO WELCOMED IT. 5. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE DAILY STAR, SIDON DEPUTY NAZIH BIZRI, A SUNNI, EXPRESSED DISMAY THAT THE MILITIAMEN IGNORED THE AGREEMENT REACHED BY SIDON\'S LEADERS NOT TO ALLOW THE BEARING OF ARMS IN THE CITY. HE SAID THAT THE PEOPLE OF SIDON WERE CROSS AND ANGRY, BUT THAT THE INCIDENT WILL NOT SPOIL THE UNITY OF THE CITY. HE SAID THAT THE ARMY DID NOT INTERVENE IN ORDER NOT TO PROVOKE A CLASH. ON MONDAY, A GROUP OF SIDON SUNNI NOTABLES ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE CONDEMNING MONDAY\'S \"ARMED AND MASSIVE\" DEMONSTRATION. \"WE WILL NOT ALLOW ANYONE, REGARDLESS OF FACTION, TO VIOLATE THE DECISION TO BAN ARMS FROM THE LIBERATED CITY, OTHER THAN THOSE OF THE ARMY AND THE ISF.\" 6. COMMENT: THE FEBRUARY 16 MANIFESTO AND MONDAY\'S DEMONSTRATION MARK A NEW STEP BY HIZBALLAH TOWARDS BE- COMING AN ACTIVE POLITICAL MOVEMENT OVERTLY DECLARING AND PURSUING ITS GOAL OF THE ISLAMICIZATION OF LEBANON. AT A MINIMUM, THIS MEANS THAT THE TENSIONS AND BATTLE LINES AMONG COMPETING FORCES IN LEBANON WILL BE MUCH MORE SHARPLY DRAWN: A. WITHIN THE SHIA COMMUNITY. THE MONDAY DEMONSTRATIONS PROVIDED GRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF AMAL-HIZBALLAH RIVALRY. PRESS REPORTS SPOKE OF EVIDENT DISPLEASURE ON THE PART OF AMAL DEMONSTRATORS, WHILE AMAL\'S LATER DENUNCIATION OF THE DEMONSTRATION IS THE FIRST EXPLICIT DISAPPROVAL OF THIS TYPE THAT WE CAN RECALL. MOREOVER, HIZBALLAH HAS CLEARLY MARKED OUT ITS FUTURE POLITICAL IDENTITY IN LEBANON--IN THE SIDON RALLIES, ITS SLOGANS SUPPORTING AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC TOOK PRIDE OF PLACE OVER AMAL\'S CALLS FOR THROWING THE ISRAELIS OUT OF THE SOUTH. B. SUNNI-SHIA. HIZBALLAH\'S RALLY IN THE VERY HEART OF THE SUNNI CAPITAL OF THE SOUTH RECALLS THE WORST FEARS OF THE SUNNIS, AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR COMMUNIQUE. IN FURTHER SUNNI REACTION, A DELEGATION FROM THE SUNNI CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION MAQASSAD (WHICH IS HEADED BY SAIB SALAM\'S SON TAMAM) IS TRAVELLING TO SIDON ON TUESDAY IN THE WAKE OF REPORTS THAT A PTT EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN KILLED BY ARMED MEN NEWLY APPEARING ON CITY STREETS. C. THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. THE MONDAY DEMONSTRATIONS WILL ALSO EVOKE THE WORST FEARS OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, FURTHER PROVOKING A DEFENSIVE, SEIGE MENTALITY AND PUTTING MORE OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. WE ARE STRUCK, FOR EXAMPLE, BY HIZBALLAH\'S SINGLING OUT THE PHALANGE IN ITS WEEKEND COMMUNIQUE AND BY ITS ATTACKS ON GEMAYEL. THIS, TOGETHER WITH JUMBLATT\'S HEATED RHETORIC AGAINST THE REGIME AND MIMICKING OF THE ISLAMIC CAUSE OVER THE WEEKEND (BEIRUT 0993),WILL HARDLY ENCOURAGE ANY CHRISTIAN TENDENCIES TOWARD FLEXIBILITY. D. SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF THE ARMY. THE LIMP AND EVEN HARMFUL PERFORMANCE OF THE ARMY ON MONDAY HAS ABRUPTLY NULLIFIED THE EUPHORIA OF THE SIDON CITIZENRY AS A RESULT OF THE LAF\'S TRIUMPHAL ENTRY INTO THE CITY ON SATURDAY. PRECISELY WHEN IT WAS EXPECTED TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND TO SUPPORT SIDON NOTABLES\' CALLS FOR \"DISARMAMENT,\" THE LAF FAILED ITS FIRST, AND PERHAPS MOST CRUCIAL, TEST. 7. IN ONE SENSE, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE MORE HIZBALLAH COMES OUT OF THE WOODWORK AND BATTLE LINES ARE DRAWN, THE BETTER THE SITUATION IS IN TERMS OF GALVANIZING BARRI (WHOM WE HAVE BEEN WARNING ON THIS VERY TOPIC FOR SOME TIME) AND THE SUNNIS, AT LEAST IN SIDON. ONE THING IS CLEAR: FEW LEBANESE OF ANY COMMUNITY OR PERSUASION WANT TO LIVE IN AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. (THE BULK OF THE SHIA DO NOT FOLLOW THIS LINE YET, ALTHOUGH IT MAY HAVE CONSIDERABLE LATENT STRENGTH.) IN ANY EVENT, ON THIS POINT, THERE IS A TIE THAT BINDS THE GREAT MAJORITY OF MUSLIMS TO THE GREAT MAJORITY OF CHRISTIANS. ACCORDINGLY, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A BASIS FOR CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM COOPERATION IN MEETING A THREAT TO ALL OF THEM WHICH IS GREATER THAN ANY DIFFERENCES THAT MAY SEPARATE THEM. THEN AGAIN, THIS IS LEBANON. IN ANY CASE, WE WILL BE CLOSELY TRACKING THE REACTION TO THE SIDON DEMONSTRATIONS, PARTICULARLY ON THE PART OF THE MODERATE SHIAS. BARTHOLOMEW " "34","2/26/1985 15:25","85DAMASCUS1314","Embassy Damascus","SECRET","85DAMASCUS575","R 261525Z FEB 85 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0407 INFO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 DAMASCUS 01314 E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KPRP, PINS, PGOV, PREL, PTER, SY SUBJECT: THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD REF: DAMASCUS 575 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. - 2. SUMMARY: THE ONLY POPULAR MOVEMENT EVER TO HAVE MOUNTED A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO ASAD\'S REGIME--THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD--HAS NOT RECOVERED FROM ITS INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND THE DEVASTATING BLOW SUFFERED AT HAMA. THE JANUARY 25 \"PARDON\" ANNOUNCED FOR CERTAIN MUSLIM BROTHER EXILES IS FAR LESS THAN A GENERAL AMNESTY; PROBABLY FEW MUSLIM BROTHERS WERE INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATING IT AND FEW WILL BENEFIT FROM IT. THE \"PARDON\" WAS USE- FUL TO ASAD IN BOLSTERING HIS IMAGE OF \"BENEVOLENCE\" IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE FEBRUARY 10 REFERENDUM. IT TESTIFIES TO THE CONTINUED WEAK STATE OF THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS. END SUMMARY. SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS: DEFEATED, DIVIDED, & DISCREDITED --------------------------------------------- ------------ 3. SINCE THE MASSIVE ARRESTS THAT BEGAN IN DECEMBER 1981 AND THE DEMOLITION OF HAMA IN FEBRUARY 1982, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD HAS BEEN TAME. IN THE INTERIM, ASAD\'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS HAVE DERIVED FROM AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AREA--HIS OWN LAPSE OF HEALTH AND HIS BROTHER RIF\'AT\'S GRAB FOR POWER. HAMA IS USUALLY VIEWED AS THE WHOLE EXPLANATION FOR THE MUSLIM BROTHERS\' FALL, BUT THE EXPLANATION IS MORE COMPLEX. - 4. LONG BEFORE HAMA, IN THE SEVENTIES, THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD SPLIT INTO AT LEAST THREE \"TENDENCIES.\" THERE WAS, AND STILL IS, A GROUP CENTERED AT AACHEN IN WEST GERMANY, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF \'ISAM AL-\'ATTAR, WHO WAS EXILED FROM SYRIA IN 1964. AS EARLY AS 1970 MUSLIM BROTHERS IN SYRIA DECIDED THAT THEY NEEDED A LEADER CLOSER TO HOME, AND \'ATTAR HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT. AT PRESENT, ACCORDING TO OUR GERMAN COLLEAGUES, \'ATTAR IS OLD AND AILING, HE IS STILL IN AACHEN, AND HE HAS BECOME ONLY A RELIGIOUS \"THINKER.\" HE SEEMS NO LONGER TO HAVE MUCH OF A FOLLOWING. - 5. LEADERSHIP OF THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS CAME TO BE DIVIDED INTO POLITICAL AND MILITARY \"TENDENCIES.\" THE POLITICAL TENDENCY WAS, AND STILL IS, LED BY A GROUP OF OLDER MEN (BORN IN THE TWENTIES AND THIRTIES) SUCH AS \'ADNAN SA\'D AL-DIN, SA\'ID HAWWA, AND THE AL- BAYANUNI BROTHERS. THESE MEN MAY BE IN BAGHDAD OR THEY MAY MOVE BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND AMMAN. THE \"POLITICAL\" GROUP FALLS INTO THE TRADITIONAL MOLD OF THE FOUNDER OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, THE EGYPTIAN HASAN AL-BANNA: MEN WHO ARE \"FUNDAMENTALIST\" IN WISHING TO CREATE A STATE BUILT ON THE KORAN BUT WHO CAN ACCEPT CERTAIN WESTERN HUMANISTIC AND PARLIAMENTARY IDEAS. IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES, THESE MEN EMBRACED THE IDEA OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (\"JIHAD\"), IN OPPOSITION TO THE LESS MILITARISTIC ORIENTATION OF \'ISAM AL-\'ATTAR, BUT THEY WERE SUBSEQENTLY UPSTAGED BY THE FAR MORE ACTIVE MILITARISM OF THE \"MILITARY TENDENCY\" THAT DEVELOPED IN THE MID-SEVENTIES. (IRONICALLY, \'ATTAR IS TODAY MORE IDEOLOGICALLY ALLIED WITH THE MILITARY TENDENCY THAN THE POLITICAL TENDENCY.) 6. THE \"MILITARY TENDENCY\" FROM THE BEGINNING HAS BEEN LED BY A MUCH YOUNGER GROUP OF MEN. SINCE ITS INCEPTION IN THE MID-SEVENTIES, IT HAS BEEN KNOWN AS AL-TALI\'A AL-MUQATILA LIL-MUJAHIDIN (THE FIGHTING VANGUARD OF WARRIORS). IT HAS BEEN WILLING TO RESORT TO ANY FORM OF TERROR (E.G., BLOWING UP THE CADETS\' ARTILLERY SCHOOL IN ALEPPO IN 1980, WITH OVER FIFTY KILLED). ITS LEADERS HAVE REJECTED WESTERN IDEAS, ANY FORM OF COMPROMISE WITH SECULAR MOVEMENTS, AND ANY MERCY FOR ALAWIS. IN THEIR FANATICISM, THEY FORM A SUNNI ANALOGUE TO THE KHOMEINISTS. THIS GROUP\'S EARLY LEADERS WERE ONE BY ONE KILLED BY ASAD\'S SECURITY FORCES WHEN ASAD BEGAN TO STEP UP HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN 1979-80. THE LEADER--OR \"CALIPH,\" AS HE WAS CALLED BY HIS ADHERENTS--WHO SUCCEEDED THEM WAS \'ADNAN \'UQLA (BORN 1950). 7. FOR A TIME, BEGINNING WITH THE FORMATION OF AN \"ISLAMIC FRONT\" AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE \"MANIFESTO OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF SYRIA\" IN NOVEMBER 1980 (SIGNED BY \'ADNAN SA\'D AL-DIN, SA\'ID HAWWA, AND \'ALI AL- BAYANUNI--THE LAST NAMED AS THE ISLAMIC FRONT\'S \"SECRETARY GENERAL\"), THERI WAS GREATER COOPERATION WITHIN THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. \'ISAM AL-\'ATTAR JOINED THE FRONT, AND \'UQLA AND THE \"POLITICAL TENDENCY\" HELD NEGOTIATIONS TO TRY TO PATCH UP THIIR DIFFERENCES. IT APPEARS THAT THEY MAY EVEN HAVE COORDINATED TO TRY TO EFFECT A COUP AGAINST ASAD, WHICH THEY FORESAW WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY MASS UPRISINGS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. (THEY ALSO HOPED FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE-- FROM IRAQ, IN PARTICULAR.) THE MUSLIM BROTHERS APPARENTLY HAD SYMPATHIZERS IN MANY QUARTERS OF THE REGIME, INCLUDING IN HIGH PLACES IN THE ARMED FORCES. PRESS REPORTING OF THE PERIOD SUGGESTS THAT COORDINATION AND PLANNING WERE, HOWEVER, LACKING. ASAD\'S SECURITY FORCES GOT WIND OF THE PLOTTING AND BEGAN A MAJOR ARREST CAMPAIGN BY THE END OF 1981. FOUR HUNDRED OFFICERS WERE REPORTEDLY ARRESTED IN JANUARY, 1982. BY THE TIME ASAD\'S MEN LOCATED THE MUSLIM BROTHERS\' HEADQUARTERS IN HAMA, ON FEBRUARY 2, 1.82, ASAD\'S MEN HAD PROBABLY ALREADY BROKEN THE BACK OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS\' INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN THE REGIME. THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN HAMA, FORCED TO MAKE A STAND OR FACE ARREST AND EXECUTION, OVERWHELMED THE ARMED FORCE THAT ASAD ORGINALLY SENT IN TO HAMA, AND A SIEGE OF SEVERAL WEEKS ENSUED, RESULTING IN THOUSANDS OF DEATHS. ( A TALI\'A SOURCE IN SEPTEMBER 1982 CLAIMED THAT 6,000 OF ASAD\'S FORCES, 400 \"MUJAHIDIN,\" AND 15,000 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED. MORE RECENTLY, SYRIANS ARE WONT TO CITE VERY MUCH HIGHER FIGURES.) 8. TALI\'A AND THE \"POLITICAL TENDENCY\" HAD ALREADY BROKEN OFF THEIR NEGOTIATIONS IN DECEMBER 1981, AT THE TIME WHEN THE MAJOR ARRESTS HAD BEGUN, TWO MONTHS BEFORE HAMA. HAMA ITSELF, THEREFORE, WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE FINAL RUPTURE, ALTHOUGH THERE IS STRONG FEELING AMONG THE \"POLITICAL TENDENCY\" THAT THE TALI\'A BOTCHED THE JOB IN HAMA. THE RUPTURE BECAME OFFICIAL WHEN THE \"POLITICAL TENDENCY\" JOINED THE NEWLY CONSTITUTED \"NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE LIBERATION OF SYRIA\" IN MARCH 1982, WITH NINETEEN OTHER OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS OR INDIVIDUALS,MOST OF THEM SECULAR AND CENTERED IN IRAQ. SA\'D AL-DIN REPRESENTS THE ISLAMIC FRONT IN THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE, WHICH INCLUDES THE PRO-IRAQI WING OF THE SYRIAN BA\'TH PARTY (MICHEL \'AFLAQ), THE ARAB SOCIALIST MOVEMENT (LED BY \'AFLAQ\'S ERSTWHILE ALLY AKRAM AL-HAWRANI), NASSERISTS, AND INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS FORMER SYRIAN DICTATOR AMIN AL-HAFIZ. 9. THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE SIGNALED HOW FAR THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD HAD FALLEN. NOT ONLY HAD IT LOST MUCH OF ITS INFRASTRUCTURE PLANTED IN THE REGIME AND MUCH OF ITS FIGHTING FORCE, IT HAD BECOME IRRECONCILABLY SPLIT AND THE POLITICAL WING HAD SULLIED ITSELF BY ASSOCIATING WITH GROUPS ALIEN TO THE IDEA OF AN ISLAMIC STATE AND BY PUTTING ITSELF SQUARELY INTO THE GRIP OF THE IRAQI REGIME. IT IS LITTLE WONDER THAT IN THE PERIOD AFTER THOSE DEVASTATING MONTHS, DECEMBER 1981 TO MARCH 1982, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE OR NO TERRORIST ACTIVITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN SYRIA, AND INDEED, LITTLE APPARENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY. (THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON IN JUNE 1982 WAS ALSO A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR, SINCE THAT INVASION HAD THE EFFECT OF BINDING THE SYRIAN POPULACE AGAINST THE PERCEIVED ENEMY, AND MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ACTIVITY--EVEN LEAVING ASIDE THE DISCREDITING TRAUMA OF HAMA--WOULD HAVE FOUND LESS POPULAR SYMPATHY THAN NORMALLY.) 10. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD HAS EVER RECEIVED EXTENSIVE EXTERNAL SUPPORT. WITH ITS INTERNAL STRUCTURE DISRUPTED AND ITS NAME BLACKENED AMONG ITS OWN PURISTS AND AMONG THE SYRIAN POPULACE AT LARGE, IT PRESUMABLY HAS HAD TO LOOK EVEN MORE ACTIVELY FOR EXTERNAL SUPPORT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTRAINTS THAT CAUSE US TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE NOT HAD GREAT SUCCESS: --SECULAR, BA\'THI IRAQ WELCOMED AT LEAST SOME OF THE LEADERS OF THE POLITICAL TENDENCY \"WITH OPEN ARMS.\" BUT IT CLOSED THE DOOR TO THE TALI\'A. (\'UQLA COULD NOT FIND REFUGE THERE. ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS HE WAS ARRESTED WHEN TRYING TO SNEAK BACK INTO SYRIA EITHER IN 1983 OR 1984; HE HAS NOT BEEN HEARD FROM RECENTLY.) A JORDANIAN COLLEAGUE SAYS THAT IRAQ \"MAY BE\" TRAINING THE MUSLIM BROTHERS NOW, BUT ON A LIMITED BASIS. THE IRAQI REGIME APPARENTLY WILL NOT COUNTENANCE ANY OPERATIONS NOT TOTALLY UNDER ITS CONTROL. --JORDAN MAINTAINS AN INTELLIGENCE LINK TO THE BROTHER- HOOD AND REPORTEDLY ALLOWS ALL FACTIONS OF THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, BUT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY NERVOUS ABOUT ANY OPERATION AGAINST SYRIA, WHICH WAS SEEN TO BE PLANNED OR TAKE PLACE FROM JORDAN. IT APPARENTLY GIVES LITTLE ACTIVE ASSISTANCE, AND IT IS SUSPICIOUS OF ALL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ACTIVITY. --ARAFAT\'S PLO HAS A LONG HISTORY OF COOPERATION WITH THE MUSLIM BROTHERS (ONE OF MANY REASONS FOR ASAD\'S ANTIPATHY), BUT ARAFAT\'S ABILITY TO BE HELPFUL IS PROBABLY NOT VERY GREAT. ARAFAT AND OTHER FOUNDERS OF FATAH WERE THEMSELVES MUSLIM BROTHERS , AND FEDAYEEN AND MUSLIM BROTHERS TRAINED TOGETHER IN JORDAN BEFORE THE 1970 CIVIL WAR. MORE RECENTLY, ARAFAT AND SHAYKH SHA\'BAN, TAWHID LEADER IN TRIPOLI, LEBANON, WERE CLOSE ALLIES UNTIL ARAFAT WAS DRIVEN OUT IN DECEMBER 1983. (SHA\'BAN, WE BELIEVE, IS A MUSLIM BROTHER, AND SOME OF THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS WHO FLED AFTER HAMA TOOK REFUGE IN TRIPOLI AND FORM A PART OF THE TAWHID.) ARAFAT\'S DIRECT ASSISTANCE--AT LEAST IN THE FORM OF ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING--WAS PROBABLY DISRUPTED BY HIS OUSTER FROM TRIPOLI AND WE ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO THE DEGREE OF CONTINUING COOPERATION. --IRAN IS ANATHEMA TO THE POLITICAL TENDECY, BOTH BECAUSE OF ITS SUPPORT FOR THE ASAD/ALAWI REGIME AND BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL TENDENCY\'S ASSOCIATION WITH IRAQ. IRAN\'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TALI\'A IS MORE NUANCED. TALI\'A REVILES IRAN FOR ITS SUPPORT FOR ASAD, BUT THERE IS A COMMON FANATICISM AND THERE MAY BE A REALIZATION WITH THE TALI\'A THAT IRAN\'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ASAD IS PURELY TACTICAL AND THEREFORE THAT IRAN IS NOT \"BEYOND REDEMPTION.\" --SAUDI ARABIA IS SIMILARLY REVILED FOR ITS ENORMOUS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE ASAD REGIME, BUT WE HEAR PERSISTENT RUMORS THAT RIYADH HAS ALSO PROVIDED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND REFUGE TO CERTAIN OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS. SAUDI DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS HERE STOUTLY DENY ANY ASSOCIATION WITH ANY SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS, AVERRING THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO GAIN AND MUCH TO LOSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY MUSLIM BROTHERS IN MECCA, WHOSE PRESENCE IS TOLERATED BECAUSE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS UNDERPINNINGS AND TIES TO THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT. THE \"PARDON\": PUBLICITY PLOY AND SIGN OF BROTHERHOOD WEAKNESS --------------------------------------------- --------- 11. INTO THE APPARENT THREE-YEAR VOID IN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ACTIVITY, ASAD HAS NOW INJECTED HIS LIMITED PARDON OF JANUARY 25. SOME SYRIANS AND DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES HAVE EXPRESSED SURPRISE TO US THAT ASAD DID NOT MAKE SOME \"GRAND GESTURE\" SOME MONTHS AGO, BEGINNING AT THE TIME OF HIS RECOVERY IN HEALTH AND RIF\'AT\'S EXILE. HOWEVER, ASAD PROBABLY NEEDED ALL OF 1984 TO BUILD BACK FROM THE CRISIS BROUGHT ON BY HIS HEART ATTACK, AS SHOWN BY HIS CONTINUAL DEFERRAL OF THE EIGHTH REGIONAL CONGRESS. - 12. THE \"PARDON\" IS FAR FROM A GENERAL AMNESTY: --IT DECLARES: \"CONTACTS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN HELD BETWEEN US AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD VANGUARD ORGANIZA- TION (TANZIM AL\'TALI\'A) LEADERSHIP ABROAD.\" THE NAME, \"TANZIM AL\'TALI\'A,\" IS NOT THE SAME AS \"AL-TALI\'A AL- MUQATILA LIL -MUJAHIDIN,\" THE OFFICIAL NAME THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE \"MILITARY TENDENCY.\" --\"ABROAD\" IMPLIES THAT THE AMNESTY IS INTENDED ONLY FOR EXILES, NOT FOR MUSLIM BROTHERS IN PRISON IN SYRIA. (A TALI\'A SPOKESMAN IN 1982 CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE 10,000 MUSLIM BROTHERS IN JAIL IN SYRIA. ALL OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS ON THE SUBJECT ASSERT THAT THERE ARE \"THOUSANDS UPON THOUSANDS\" OF SYRIANS IN JAIL, ACCUSED OF BEING OR ASSOCIATING WITH MUSLIM BROTHERS, DATING FROM THE LATE SEVENTIES BUT ESPECIALLY FROM THE HAMA PERIOD. INDEED, IT IS COMMON TO MEET SYRIANS WHO HAVE SOME FAMILY MEMBER, OR WHO KNOW OTHERS WHO HAVE SOME FAMILY MEMBER, IN JAIL UNDER ACCUSATIONS RELATING TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. 10,000 SEEMS A FAIR ESTIMATE-- AND A VERY LARGE NUMBER FOR A SMALL COUNTRY.) --IT DECLARES THAT \"THIS LEADERSHIP\" HAS EXPRESSED \"NEW CONVICTIONS\" RECOGNIZING THE PERFIDY OF THE \"PLOT CONCOCTED AGAINST SYRIA\" BY \"THOSE TRADING IN THE NAME OF RELIGION.\" THIS FORMULATION SUGGESTS THAT MUSLIM FANATICS--IF INDEED THE TALI\'A--HAD A CHANGE OF HEART, INCLUDING A RECOGNITION THAT THEIR PREVIOUS ACTS AGAINST THE ASAD REGIME IN THE NAME OF ISLAM WERE ACTUALLY CONTRARY TO ISLAM. --IT DECLARES THAT \"THIS LEADERSHIP\" HAS EXPRESSED, IN ITS NAME AND \"THE NAME OF MANY OF THE BROTHERHOOD BASES,\" THE DESIRE TO \"RETURN TO THE HOMELAND\" AND THAT \"THIS PARDON WILL BE APPLICABLE TO EVERYONE WHO RETURNS TO HIS HOMELAND WITH AN OPEN HEART.\" IT SUGGESTS, THUS, THAT THE PARDON--WHILE ONLY ADDRESSED TO EXILES--IS SOMEHOW ADDRESSED NOT TO ONE GROUP ONLY, BUT TO ALL BROTHERHOOD \"BASES\" AND \"EVERYONE\" WHO SOMEHOW \"PROVES\" HIS ALLEGIANCE AND CHANGE OF HEART. --FINALLY, IT DECLARES THAT \"SOME OF THESE CITIZENS HAVE ALREADY RETURNED\" UNDER A \"SPECIAL PARDON FROM HAFIZ AL-ASAD.\" 13. ON THE VERY SAME DAY AS THIS \"PARDON,\" THE FINAL DECLARATION OF THE EIGHTH REGIONAL CONGRESS WAS ISSUED, CARRYING AN ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT MESSAGE. DURING THE CONGRESS, WE HAD HEARD THAT TWO \"SECRET\" SESSIONS DEALT WITH THE ISSUE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AND THESE REPORTS WERE BORNE OUT IN THE FINAL DECLARATION. --\"DURING ITS STUDY OF THE DOMESTIC SITUATION, THE CONGRESS DISCUSSED THE PLOT OF THE AGENT MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD GANG, WHICH HAS SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLANS OF IMPERIALISM AND SOME OF ITS TOOLS IN THE REGION THROUGH BASES OF SUPPORT, SUPPLIES, TRAINING, AND HELP FROM JORDAN AND IRAQ. THE CONGRESS ALSO REVIEWED THE MEASURES TAKEN TO LIQUIDATE THAT AGENT GANG AND TO PURSUE ITS ELEMENTS...IT PRAISED THE MEASURES EXERTED...TO LIQUIDATE THIS GANG AND TO FOIL THE IMPERIALIST-ZIONIST SCHEMES IT WAS IMPLEMENTING.\" - THERE IS NOT A WORD OF LENIENCY IN THIS FORMULATION. IN EFFECT, IT IS A STATEMENT THAT IMPLIES THAT HAMA WAS NECESSARY, THE REGIME IS NOT SORRY ABOUT IT, AND IT WILL DO IT AGAIN IF NECESSARY. 14. THUS THIS \"PARDON\" IS HIGHLY SUSPECT ON SEVERAL COUNTS: --IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE THOUSANDS OF MUSLIM BROTHERS WHO ARE IN PRISON. IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE VERY MANY MUSLIM BROTHER EXILES BEING LURED BACK TO SYRIA WITHOUT A DEMONSTRATION THAT OTHERS, NOT SO FORTUNATE TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FLEE, WOULD NOT ALSO BE FORGIVEN. IN FACT, THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW REPORTS THAT SOME OF THOSE IN PRISON--A \"SMALL NUMBER,\" OR \"MORE THAN A HUNDRED,\" OR \"FIVE HUNDRED\"--HAVE BEEN RELEASED (ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, MOST OF THESE WERE WOMEN). ON THE OTHER HAND, MOST OF OUR CONTACTS KNOW OF NO PROGRESS WHATSOEVER ON RELEASE OF MUSLIM BROTHERS, AND THEIR INQUIRIES INTO THE FATE OF RELATIVES CONTINUE TO MEET THE SAME DEADLY SILENCE AS HAS PREVAILED FOR THREE YEARS. BY THE MOST OPTIMISTIC ACCOUNT, THERE SCARCELY SEEMS TO DE THE KIND OF DEMONSTRATION OF \"GOOD INTENTIONS\" THAT MUSLIM BROTHERS WITH A HEALTHY INSTINCT FOR SELF-PRESERVATION WOULD REQUIRE BEFORE CONTEMPLATING A RETURN TO SYRIA. (THE REGIME WOULD HAVE A MAJOR PROBLEM IN GRANTING A GENERAL AMNESTY. MANY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS WHO WERE IMPRISONED HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY \"DISAPPEARED\"--ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, SEVERAL WERE INTENTIONALLY \"RELEASED\" FROM PALMYRA PRISON AND THEN HUNTED DOWN AND KILLED--AND OTHERS TORTURED TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE \"PRESENTABLE\" TO THE PUBLIC.) --THE \"PARDON\" IS EXTREMELY VAGUE ON HOW AN EXILE IS MEANT TO \"PROVE\" HIS SINCERITY AND ALLEGIANCE, ANOTHER FACTOR THAT WOULD DISSUADE \"HOMESICK\" EXILES. --IT TALKS ABOUT THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD VANGUARD ORGANIZATION LEADERSHIP ABROAD, RATHER THAN THE LEADER- SHIP OF THE FIGHTING VANGUARD OF THE WARRIORS. \"VANGUARD\" (TALI\'A) IS A COMMONLY USED CATCHWORD IN SYRIAN POLITICAL PARLANCE. THE SYRIANS THUS MAY NOT BE REFERRING TO THE SAME GROUP; THEY MAY EVEN BE INTENTIONALLY USING PART OF THE NAME IN AN EFFORT TO DISCREDIT THE \"MILITARY TENDENCY\" FURTHER. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT IF \'ADNAN \'UQLA, THE TALI\'A \"CALIPH,\" IS IN FACT IN A SYRIAN PRISON, THE SYRIANS HAVE SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED HIM IN THEIR FORMULATION. --FINALLY, THE VERY NATURE OF THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS--AND ESPECIALLY THE WELL-KNOWN FANATICISM OF THE TALI\'A--IS SUCH AS TO SUGGEST THAT VERY FEW OF THEIR MEMBERS, MUCH LESS THEIR LEADERS, WOULD ACCEPT THE HUMILIATION OF KOWTOWING TO HAFIZ AL-ASAD. 15. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF REPORTS THAT SYRIAN SECURITY OFFICIALS DID CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF AN ORGANIZATION CALLING ITSELF \"TALI\'A\"--MEANT TO BE THE TALI\'A OF \'ADNAN \'UQLA--A PROCESS THAT SUPPOSEDLY BEGAN WITH THE INTERVENTION OF SA\'ID SHA\'BAN AND POSSIBLY THE IRANIANS. WE EVEN HAVE A REPORT THAT SOME \"FEW HUNDRED\" TALI\'A MEMBERS HAVE RETURNED TO SYRIA FROM REFUGE IN SAUDI ARABIA, THANKS TO THE INTERVENTION OF CROWN PRINCE \'ABDALLAH, WHEN HE WAS IN DAMASCUS JANUARY 21-FEBRUARY 1 (AND POSSIBLY ALSO DURING HIS SEPTEMBER 1984 VISIT), AND THAT TALI\'A MAY EVEN JOIN THE SYRIAN \"NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE FRONT\"* - 16. IF THESE REPORTS HAVE ANY TRUTH TO THEM, THEY ARE THE STRONGEST INDICATION YET OF THE LOW STATE TO WHICH THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS HAVE FALLEN. IN SEPTEMBER 1982, AN UNNAMED SPOKESMAN FOR TALI\'A, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH LE MATIN, POINTED A FINGER AT THE \"POLITICAL TENDENCY,\" DISDAINFULLY ACCUSING ITS LEADERS (SA\'D AL-DIN ET AL) OF BEING ON THE VERGE OF JOINING A COALITION WITH ASAD. NOW IT MAY BE THAT TALI\'A ITSELF, OR SOME ELEMENTS IN IT, HAVE DONE JUST THAT. 17. GIVEN THE RELIABILITY OF THESE RECENT REPORTS, WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT A SMALL OR FRINGE ELEMENT OF THE TALI\'A, OR AN ELEMENT OF MUSLIM BROTHERS WHO HAVE ASSUMED THE NAME, HAS ENGAGED IN THESE NEGOTIA- TIONS WITH THE SYRIANS. THE SHA\'BAN CONNECTION IS PLAUSIBLE--INDEED, OUR SAUDI AND JORDANIAN DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS HERE, WITHOUT PROMPTING, INDICATED TO US THAT THERE WERE NUMEROUS \"MEN FROM TRIPOLI\" MILLING ABOUT IN DAMASCUS IN THE WEEKS BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE \"PARDON,\" AND THEY BELIEVE \"TRIPOLI\" WAS WHAT IT WAS ALL ABOUT. A SWEDISH DIPLOMAT HERE, A LONG-TIME FOLLOWER OF THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS (APPARENTLY THERE ARE MANY OF THEM IN SWEDEN), INFORMS US ALSO THAT HE HAD HEARD, AT THE TIME OF SHA\'BAN\'S REMARK- ABLE VISIT TO DAMASCUS IN SEPTEMBER 1984, THAT SHA\'BAN HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE RETURN TO SYRIA OF SOME OF THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN TRIPOLI. (THE SWEDE ALSO SAYS THAT SHA\'BAN, A MORTAL ENEMY OF ASAD, ONLY AGREED TO COME TO DAMASCUS, AT IRANIAN PRESIDENT KHAMENEI\'S URGING, WHEN KHAMENEI AGREED TO KEEP AN IRANIAN MINISTER IN TRIPOLI AND ASAD AGREED TO SEND A HIGH-RANKING SYRIAN OFFICIAL TO TRIPOLI AS GUARANTORS OF SHA\'BAN\'S SAFE RETURN.) SA\'ID SHA\'BAN MADE HIS SECOND VISIT TO SYRIA ON FEBRUARY 20, THOUGH WE HAVE NOT YET HEARD THAT THE LATTER VISIT HAD A MUSLIM BROTHERS CONNECTION. 18. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE \"PARDON\" FOR MUSLIM BROTHERS FORMED A PART OF THE PRE-REFERENDUM PUBLICITY BUILD-UP. IT IS CLEAR THAT ASAD WANTED TO GO INTO THE REFERENDUM WITH HIS \"RELIGIOUS FLANK\" AS WELL COVERED AS POSSIBLE. IN THE DAYS LEADING UP TO THE REFERENDUM ON FEBRUARY 10, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESS WAS REPLETE WITH HEADLINES OF ACCLAIM FOR ASAD FROM EACH OF THE PRINCIPAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN SYRIA, INCLUDING EVEN A JOINT MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DECLARATION. ASAD HAS ALWAYS BEEN CAREFUL TO APPEAR TO BE A DEVOUT MUSLIM--DESPITE BEING AN ALAWI AND THUS DESPISED BY DEVOUT MUSLIMS--AND HE HAS ALWAYS TROTTED OUT CHRISTIAN LEADERS AT TIMES WHEN IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE NATIONAL UNITY; BUT WE HAVE NEVER SEEN QUITE SO MUCH OF IT ALL AT ONCE. 19. BUT HIS NEED FOR THIS \"PARDON\" AT THIS TIME GOES DEEPER. HAMA CONTINUES AS A VERY PRESENT, VERY HORRIBLE NATIONAL MEMORY. NOTHING LIKE HAMA HAD EVER OCCURRED IN LIVING MEMORY. (JAMAL PASHA\'S HUPPRESSION OF CHRISTIAN MINORITIES INVOLVED TURKISH BUTCHERY OF CHRISTIANS, MOSTLY ARMENIANS AND MARONITES--THUS THIS IS NOT A MEMORY OF SYRIANS BUTCHERING FELLOW SYRIANS.) WE BELIEVE THAT ASAD SOUGHT TO GO INTO HIS THIRD TERM \"CLEANSED,\" WITH THE HORROR OF HAMA PUT BEHIND HIM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE MEMORY OF HAMA HAS ITS UTILITY, IN REMINDING THE PEOPLE THAT ASAD IS WILLING TO BE UNIMAGINABLY TOUGH WHEN HE HAS TO BE. THUS, HE GAVE DOUBLE, APPARENTLY CONTRADICTORY MESSAGES--THE \"PARDON,\" AND THE EIGHTH CONGRESS FINAL DECLARATION ON THE SAME DAY STRESSING CONTINUED TOUGH- NESS. INDEED, THE \"PARDON\" IS ALSO QUITE TOUGH IN ITS CONDEMNATION OF THOSE \"TRADING IN THE NAME OF RELIGION\" AND \"DISTORTING THE NOBLE RELIGION.\" ASAD SEEKS TO GIVE AN IMAGE OF BEING \"BENEVOLENT,\" \"TOUGH,\" AND THE \"UPHOLDER OF RELIGION\" (THOUGH ALAWI) ALL AT THE SAME TIME. - 20. NOTE: POST WOULD WELCOME CRITICISMS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS STUDY FROM DEPARTMENT, CIA, AND DIA, AND EMBASSIES BAGHDAD, AMMAN, AND RIYADH. OUR OWN HISTORICAL SOURCES ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED. 21. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. EAGLETON " "35","3/4/1985 6:20","85BANDARSERIBEGAWAN214","Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 040620Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0511 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 0214 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: ECON BX KPRP SUBJ: BIG BUSINESS IS ROYAL BUSINESS IN BRUNEI 1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: BEGINNING A FEW YEARS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, SIGNIFICANT GROWTH HAD OCCURRED IN THE SHARE OF BRUNEI\'S PRIVATE ECONOMY OWNED BY ETHNIC MALAY CITIZENS, \"BUMIPUTRA\" BUSINESS, AS IT IS CALLED. WHILE THIS HAS ENRICHED A NUMBER OF BUMIPUTRA BUSINESSMEN, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE WEALTH HAS BEEN SHARED HAS NOT SATISFIED EVERYONE. CONTACTS WITH THE LOCAL MALAY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE HAVE ELICITED SEVERAL EXPRESSIONS OF DISSATISFACTION WITH THE EXTENT TO WHICH BUMIPUTRA BUSINESS GROWTH HAS BEEN DOMINATED BY TWO COMPANIES, QAF AND JASRA, PARTICULARLY THE FORMER. THESE TWO COMPANIES ARE OWNED BY THE SULTAN\'S BROTHERS, AND THEIR RAPID GROWTH TO BECOME THE LARGEST PRIVATE EMPLOYERS IN PGUNAI ASIDE FROM BRUNEI SHELL IN JUST A FEW YEARS HAS CAUSEX RESENTMENT. END SUMMARY 3. THE MALAY CHAMBER HAS AMONG ITS LEADERSHIP -- INCLUDING ITS PRESIDENT -- MEN WHO WERE PROMINENT IN THE OPPOSITION PARTY THAT DIED WITH ELECTORAL POLITICS IN THE MID-SIXTIES AND, ACCORDING TO ONE CHAMBER OFFICIAL WHO WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THAT PARTY, THE ORGANIZATION CARRIES A BURDEN IN STILL BEING IDENTIFIED WITH IT. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CHAMBER, HOWEVER, IS A FORMER MENTERI BESAR -- A CHIEF MINISTER -- AND IS ALSO CHAIRMAN OF QAF. THE CHAMBER, DESPITE ITS \"BURDEN\", MANAGES TO SERVE AS A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO THE GOVERNMENT IN ELICITING POLICIES FAVORABLE TO ITS MEMBERS. AN EXAMPLE IS THE CURRENT RUMOR THAT BRUNEI WILL ESTABLISH A NATIONAL BANK: CHAMBER OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT THIS IS THEIR SUGGESTION SINCE THEY ARE UNABLE TO OBTAIN ADEQUATE FINANCING FROM EXISTING BANKS TO SUPPORT THEIR BUSINESS GROWTH. INTERESTINGLY, THEY DO NOT BLAME THE BANKS, OF WHICH ONLY TWO ARE HEADQUARTERED HERE AND EVEN THOSE TWO ARE MAJORITY-OWNED BY FOREIGNERS, FOR THIS LACK OF SUPPORT. THEY UNDERSTAND, THEY SAY, THAT THE BANKS MUST HAVE COLLATERAL FOR A LOAN, BUT MOST BUMIPUTRA BUSINESSMEN HAVE LAND AS THEIR CHIEF ASSET AND THEY CANNOT PLEDGE THEIR LAND AS COLLATERAL BECAUSE THE BANKS COULD NOT SIMPLY FORECLOSE AND GAIN POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT. ALL LAND TRANSFERS ARE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE SULTAN AND LAND CANNOT BE OWNED BY NON-CITIZENS. (THEORY AND PRACTICE DIVERGES SOMEWHAT ON THE QUESTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN BRUNEI. IN THEORY, CITIZENS DO NOT OWN LAND EITHER, IN THE SENSE OF HAVING CLEAR TITLE, BUT MERELY HOLD LAND AT THE SUFFERANCE OF THE SULTAN; IN THEORY THE SULTAN COULD REPOSSESS LAND, E.G., AGRICULTURAL LAND ALWOWED TO LIE IDLE FOR TWO YEARS, BUT IN PRACTICE HE DOES NOT.) THE LAW THAT PROVIDES FOR THESE LIMITATIONS IS BLAMED BY THE CHAMBER OFFICIALS FOR THEIR FINANCING DIFFICULTIES, AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE SULTAN APPROVE LAND TRANSFERS IS REGARDED AS AN UNWARRANTED LIMITATION OF THEIR BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES. CHAMBER MEMBERS HAVE SAID THAT INADEQUATE FULFILLMENT OF PROMISES TO FAVOR BUMIPUTRA BUSINESSES IN AWARDING GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IS A FAVORITE THEME OF THE GOB - CHAMBER MEETINGS. 4. THE TWO BIG BUMIPUTRA BUSINESSES, HOWEVER, HAVE SUFFERED FROM NO SUCH PROBLEMS. QAF IS MAINLY OWNED BY PRINCE MOHAMED, ONE OF THREE YOUNGER BROTHERS OF THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI (AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS) AND ITS RAPID EXPANSION TO A COMPANY WITH 1,500 EMPLOYEES AND SIGNIFICANT ASSETS IN BOTH BRUNEI AND SINGAPORE IN THE SHORT TIME SINCE 1982 IS ACCOUNTED FOR MAINLY BY ITS ABILITY TO DRAW ON HUGE FINANCIAL RESERVES TO BUY EXISTING BUSINESSES AND THEN ASSURE THEIR SUCCESS THROUGH A NETWORK OF GOOD CONNECTIONS. QAF\'S SINGAPORE ASSETS INCLUDE BEN AND CO., THROUGH WHICH QAF STOCK WILL BE TRADED ON THE SINGAPORE STOCK EXCHANGE, AND NATIONAL COLD STORAGE, A WELL-KNOWN FOOD WHOLESALER AND RETAILER THERE, IN ADDITION TO STAKES IN SEVERAL TRADING AND REAL ESTATE COMPANIES. QAF RECENTLY MADE NEWS IN THE BUSINESS PAPERS IN SINGAPORE WHEN IT SOLD ITS PIZZA HUT FRANCHISE. IN BRUNEI, QAF\'S INFLUENCE IS BROAD, RANGING FROM CONTROLLING INTEREST IN THE ONE NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED HERE THROUGH FOOD RETAILING TO REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT. A PARTIAL LIST OF QAF\'S LOCAL HOLDINGS INCLUDE OWNERSHIP OF QAF PLAZA, BRUNEI\'S NEWEST (AND LEAST CONVENIENTLY LOCATED) SHOPPING AND OFFICE COMPLEX: 20 PERCENT OF THE ISLAND DEVELOPMENT BANK, ONE OF TWO LOCALLY-CHARTERED BANKS AND A RECENT ACQUISITION (THE ROYAL FAMILY REPORTEDLY OWNS 30 PERCENT OF THE OTHER LOCAL BANK -- NATIONAL BANK OF BRUNEI -- AND PRINCE SUFRI IS PRESIDENT OF THE BANK); 75 PERCENT OF BRUNEI PRESS, WHICH PUBLISHES THE BORNEO BULLETIN; 50 PERCENT OF LOCAL DAIRY FARM OPERATIONS, WHICH OWNS THE BEST LOCAL SUPERMARKETS AND WESTERN RESTAURANT, IN ADDITION TO CATERING SERVICES (INCLUDING FOR ROYAL BRUNEI AIRLINES) AND WHOLESALE FOOD DISTRIBUTION; 49 PERCENT OF Q-CARRIER, WHICH MARKETS AND SERVICES AIR CONDITIONERS; 50 PERCENT OF AN INDUSTRIAL GAS COMPANY, SUPPLIER TO BRUNEI SHELL, AND 100 PERCENT OF FOUR OR FIVE OTHER COMPANIES THAT SUPPLY PRODUCTS OR SERVICES TO BRUNEI SHELL; PLUS VARYING PERCENTAGES OF COMPANIES THAT ARE AGENTS FOR SUCH FOREIGN COMPANIES AS MERCEDES-BENZ, NISSAN, SUZUKI, BEECHAMS, CADBURY SCHWEPPES, PROCTOR & GAMBLE, AND INTERNATIONAL PAINTS. IN ADDITION, RUMORS HAVE CONNECTED QAF WITH THE PLANNED CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL- STANDARD HOTEL, TO BE CALLED THE PRINCE HOTEL. 5. JASRA HAS ONLY ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AS QAF, BUT IN AN ECONOMY THE SIZE OF BRUNEI\'S, THE GROWTH TO THAT LEVEL OVER ONLY SIX YEARS PUTS JASRA INTO THE SAME VERY VISIBLE CATEGORY. JASRA IS MAINLY OWNED BY PRINCE JEFRI, ALSO DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE GOVERNMENT TENDER COMMITTEE, AND HAS GROWN THROUGH EXPANSION OF ITS SUPPLY AND SERVICE CONTRACTS TO BRUNEI SHELL. NOW THAT ITS CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN CURTAILED, THE MAIN BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY IS OIL. JASRA IS A PARTNER IN THE ONLY ACTIVE OIL EXPLORATION EFFORT IN BRUNEI IN RECENT YEARS OUTSIDE BRUNEI ASMELL, UNDERTAKEN BY JASRA JACKSON, A JOINT VENTURE OF JASRA AND THE AMERICAN JACKSON OIL CO. IF JASRA JACKSON WERE TO STRIKE OIL IN SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES, IT WOULD BE AN INTERESTING COMPLICATION IN THE ROYAL FAMILY\'S BUSINESS AFFAIRS, AS PRINCE JEFRI IS ALSO REPORTEDLY PART-OWNER WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY OF A COMPANY THAT EITHER BUYS OIL FROM BRUNEI SHELL OR RECEIVES A QUANTITY AS A PAYMENT IN KIND AND THEN RESELLS IT THROUGH SHELL OIL\'S MARKETING ORGANIZATION. THIS PAPER TRANSACTION, OF UNKNOWN VALUE, IS WHERE THE ROYAL FAMILY RECEIVES MUCH OF ITS PRIVATE FLOW OF WEALTH FROM BRUNEI\'S OIL. JASRA ALSO OWNS THE LARGEST CAR RENTAL AGENCY IN BRUNEI AND, AS WITH NEARLY ALL BUMIPUTRA BUSINESS, IS ACTIVE IN REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT. A RECENT MAJOR MOVE WAS THE ACQUISITION OF 50 PERCENT OF THE LOCAL OFFICE OF THE VENERABLE HARRISONS AND CROSFIELD TRADING COMPANY, A MAJOR SUPPLIER OF IMPORTED GOODS TO THE PRIVATE ECONOMY, HENCEFORTH TO BE KNOWN IN BRUNEI AS JASRA HARRISONS. JASRA ITSELF HAS ALWAYS BEEN AN IMPORTER AND SUPPLIER TO THE GOVERNMENT AND BRUNEI SHELL. 6. THE RAPID GROWTH OF THE COMPANIES OWNED BY THE ROYAL BROTHERS LEADS TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE IS SOME PLANNED OBJECTIVE FOR THE ROYAL FAMILY IN BECOMING SO ACTIVE SO FAST IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY, AND WHETHER THERE IS ANY COORDINATION OF THE FAMILY\'S BUSINESS ACTIVITIES. SPECULATION ON MOTIVE WAS MERELY FUELED BY AN ANNOUNCEMENT PUBLISHED IN NOVEMBER 1984 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SULTAN OFFICIALLY DENIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF BRUNEI HAD ANY INTENTION TO BUY ANY COMMERCIAL COMPANY \"FOR EXAMPLE, QAF LIMITED\". THE ANNOUNCEMENT, IN BRUNEI\'S OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER, PELITA BRUNEI, WENT ON TO SAY THAT \"THIS STRONG DENIAL WAS MADE TODAY IN A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE WHICH WENT ON TO SAY THAT ANY INVOLVEMENT BY MEMBERS OF THE BRUNEI ROYAL FAMILY IN ANY COMMERCIAL COMPANY WHETHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY IS THEIR OWN PERSONAL MATTER AND HAS NO CONNECTION WHATSOEVER WITH HIS MAJESTY\'S GOVERNMENT.\" THE ANNOUNCEMENT ALSO CAUSED SOME SPECULATION THAT IT MIGHT BE EVIDENCE OF A FAILURE TO COORDINATE THE ROYAL FAMILY\'S BUSINESS ACTIVITIES, THAT, IN FACT, THE SULTAN MIGHT BE ANNOUNCING HIS DISAPPROVAL OF QAF\'S -- AND BROTHER MOHAMED\'S -- ACTIVITIES. 7. THREE POSSIBLE MOTIVES HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY DISCUSSED BY EXPATRIATE OBSERVERS WHO HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE ACCOMPANYING GROWTH IN DISSATISFACTION FROM OTHER BUMIPUTRA BUSINESSMEN AS WELL AS FROM THE CHINESE BUSINESS COMMUNITY. (IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT PARTICULARLY CHINESE BUSINESS IN THE SERIA/ KUALA BELAIT AREA HAS BEEN AFFECTED, WHERE THE CHINESE WHO LONG SERVED AS LOCAL CONTRACTORS TO BRUNEI SHELL HAVE BEEN SQUEEZED.) THERE ARE: (1) THAT THE BUSINESS INTERESTS ARE INTENDED TO ACHIEVE THE SAME THING AS ANY OTHER BUSINESS, MAKE A PROFIT AND ENRICH, IN THIS CASE, FURTHER ENRICH THE OWNERS; (2) THAT THE ROYAL FAMILY OBSERVED THAT EXISTING BUMIPUTRA BUSINESS WAS NOT ADEQUATELY SKILLED OR SUFFICIENTLY FINANCED TO EXPAND INTO AREAS THAT NATIONAL POLICY WANTED TO SEE TAKEN OVER FROM FOREIGNERS (OR THAT THEY WERE DISMAYED BY THE TENDENCY FOR BUMIPUTRA BUSINESSES TO BE \"ALI BABA\" COMPANIES, ONES WHICH HAVE BUMIPUTRA EQUITY PARTICIPATION, AND A MALAY NAME, BUT WHICH ARE ACTUALLY ONLY CONTINUATIONS OF WELL- ESTABLISHED CHINESE FIRMS WHERE THE MANAGEMENT, LABOR AND MOST OF THE EQUITY REMAINS CHINESE), SO THEY DECIDED TO DO IT THEMSELVES, OR (3) THAT THE ROYAL FAMILY, ALREADY ASSURED OF A MONOPOLY ON POLITICAL POWER, WANTED TO ASSURE THAT LEAVING THE HIGH POINTS OF THE ECONOMY IN THE HANDS OF OTHERS, EVEN IF THEY WERE BUMIPUTRAS, DID NOT LEAD TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE POWER CENTERS IN THE SOCIETY. 8. THE THIRD POSSIBILITY PROBABLY CAN BE DISMISSED FAIRLY QUICKLY BECAUSE NOT VERY MUCH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY GOES ON IN BRUNEI THAT IS NOT DEPENDENT ON EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OR BRUNEI SHELL, BOTH OF WHICH CAN BE CONTROLLED BY THE ROYAL POLITICAL MONOPOLY. MOST BUSINESSES HERE OF ANY SIZE COULD BE QUICKLY RUINED IF CUT OFF FROM CONTRACTS FROM THOSE TWO SOURCES. AN ANNOUNCED SCHEME TO SELL QAF STOCK TO BRUNEI CITIZENS, WITH LIMITATIONS ON THEIR ABILITY TO RESELL IT, MAY BE INTENDED TO ALLOW PARTICIPATION IN PRIVATE ECONOMIC GROWTH BY A WIDER GROUP WITHOUT ACTUALLY LOSING CONTROL OF A KEY ECONOMIC SECTOR TO ANYONE. THE PLAN WOULD HAVE 30 PERCENT OF THE QAF STOCK SOLD AT A SPECIAL PRICE TO QUALIFIED BUYERS. 9. SEVERAL OBSERVERS PUT THE DOMESTIC ROYAL BUSINESS ACTIVITIES DOWN TO A SIMPLE DESIRE TO GET RICHER, WHICH MAY SEEM UNNECESSARY, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, BUT NOT UNUSUAL CERTAINLY IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONTEXT. THIS MAY WELL HAVE BEEN THE INITIAL MOTIVATION, BUT THE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF THE TWO COMPANIES SEEM TO BE ALLOWING FOR THE SECOND POSSIBILITY TO BE AT LEAST A CONSIDERATION. OFFICIALS OF BOTH COMPANIES AT THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OR FINANCIAL CONTROLLER LEVEL HAVE DECLARED TO EMBOFF THAT THEY NO LONGER BID FOR THE BASIC CATERING, SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE CONTRACTS OF BRUNEI SHELL AND THE GOVERNMENT THAT THEY ONCE DID. THESE ARE CONSCIOUSLY LEFT TO SMALLER BUMIPUTRA COMPANIES. QAF AND JASRA HAVE MOVED \"UPMARKET\", DOING MORE TECHNICAL OR MORE CAPITAL INTENSIVE THINGS AS THEY SEE OTHER BUMIPUTRA COMPANIES ABLE TO DO THE SIMPLER THINGS. TO THE EXTENT THIS IS NOT A BUSINESS DECISION, BUT INSTEAD A MATTER OF POLICY AIMED AT ACHIEVING A GIVEN STRUCTURE IN THE BUMIPUTRA COMMUNITY, THEN HIGHER MOTIVES CAN BE ASCRIBED TO THE ROYAL BUSINESS ACTIVITIES. HOWEVER, TO SOME EXTENT AT LEAST, IT IS A BUSINESS JECISION, AS A JASRA MANAGER ADMITTED TO EMBOFF. THE LOWER END OF THE RANGE OF CONTRACTS HAS BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE, WITH PROFIT MARGINS THINNER AND PRICING TOUGHER, SO THE MANAGERS OF THE ROYAL COMPANIES MAY SIMPLY BE MOVING ON TO WHERE THE CREAM IS THICKER. 10. AN INTERESTING QUESTION IS WHAT THE FOURTH BROTHER, PRINCE SUFRI, WILL BE ALLOWED AS HIS SHARE. HE APPEARS TO BE BELATEDLY MAKING HIS MOVE INTO THE BRUNEI BUSINESS WORLD, (ASIDE FROM REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT, IN WHICH HE HAS HAD INTERESTS FOR SEVERAL YEARS) WITH THE VEHICLE BEING SINARAN, A COMPANY THAT HAS EXISTED SINCE 1974, BUT INACTIVE UNTIL VERY RECENTLY. SINARAN, REGISTERED AS A TRADING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, MAY BE THE RECIPIENT, IN PARTNERSHIP WITH AN AMERICAN FIRM, OF SOME OF THE LARGE CONTRACTS THAT ARE RUMORED AS AVAILABLE OVER THE NEXT YEAR, INCLUDING A NEW AIR BASE, SEVERAL MORE PIECES OF BRUNEI\'S COASTAL HIGHWAY, A MAJOR BRIDGE ACROSS THE BRUNEI RIVER AND PERHAPS A RE-TENDERING OF THE CONTRACT TO BUILD A COGENERATION PLANT. CERTAINLY THE AMERICAN FIRM HAS INDICATED IT BELIEVES IT HAS A GOOD CHANCE AT THESE, BECAUSE OF ITS CONNECTION WITH SINARAN. IF ALL THREE YOUNGER BROTHERS SET OUT TO BUILD LARGE BUSINESSES WITHIN BRUNEI, THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR OTHER BUMIPUTRA BUSINESSMEN WILL BE ACCORDINGLY LIMITED. THIS IS EVEN MORE TRUE WHEN THE ACTIVITIES OF SISTERS AND OTHER ASSORTED IN-LAWS ARE ADDED. SEVERAL SECOND-RANKING TRADING AND CONSTRUCTION FIRMS COUNT ROYALTY AMONG THEIR OWNERS. 11. THE CONCLUSION IS THAT, FOR WHATEVER REASON, THE ROYAL FAMILY DOMINATES THE MALAY BUSINESS COMMUNITY TO AN EXTENT THAT PROBABLY IS CAUSING GREATER DISSATISFACTION THAN THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY DOMINATE THE NATION\'S POLITICS. MOTIVES MAY BE TRADITIONAL BUSINESS REASONS, AND THE ECONOMIC DOMINANCE INADVERTENT, MERELY THE NATURAL RESULT OF BETTER FINANCING AND GOOD CONNECTIONS, BUT THE RESENTMENT BEARS WATCHING. OFFICIALS OF THE TWO BIG COMPANIES THEMSELVES ARE AWARE OF IT, BUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ROYAL FAMILY BELIEVES IT SOMETHING TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT IS UNKNOWN. PRINCE SUFRI\'S BUSINESS PROSPECTS MAY BE BOTH DEPENDENT ON AND AN INDICATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH CONCERN. KING " "36","3/5/1985 8:46","85BEIRUT1351","Embassy Beirut","UNCLASSIFIED","85BEIRUT1013","P 050846Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2022 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 01351 E.O. 12356: NA TAGS: PINT, PTER, LE SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH \"MANIFESTO\" REF: BEIRUT 1013 FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN FEBRUARY 23 \"MIDDLE EAST REPORTER.\" IT SUMMARIZES 48-PAGE HIZBALLAH TRACT ISSUED ON FEBRUARY 16 (REFTEL). EMBASSY HAS REQUIRED ORIGINAL ARABIC-LANGUAGE TEXT OF FULL MANIFIESTO, WHICH WE WILL POUCH TO INR AND NEA/ARN. BEGIN TEXT. \"HIZBULLAH\" DEFINES ITS MILITANT POLICY --------------------------------------- \"HIZBULLAH\" (PARTY OF GOD) HAS NOW PUBLICLY DEFINED ITS POLICY, GOALS AND IDEOLOGY. AS A GROUP OF FUNDAMENTALIST SHIITES, THEY ARE DEDICATED TO PROMOT ISLAM ON THE PATTERN OF KHOMEINI\'S REVOLUTION IN IRAN. THEY DERIVE THEIR APPELATION FROM TWO KORANIC VERSES WHICH READ: (1) \"AND WHO SO TAKETH ALLAH AND HIS MESSANGER AND THOSE WHO BELIEVE FOR FRIEND (WILL KNOW THAT), LO* THE PARTY OF ALLAH THEY ARE THE VICTORIOUS.\" (SURAH 5/56); (2) \"THOU WILT NOT FIND FOLK WHO BELIEVE IN ALLAH AND HIS MESSENGER, EVEN THOUGH THEY BE THEIR FATHERS OR THEIR SONS OR THEIR BRETHREN OR THEIR CLAN. AS FOR SUCH, HE HATH WRITTEN FAITH UPON THEIR HEARTS AND HATH STRENGTHENED THEM WITH A SPIRIT FROM HIM, AND HE WILL BRING THEM INTO GARDENS UNDERNEATH WHICH RIVERS FLOW, WHEREIN THEY WILL ABIDE. ALLAH IS WELL PLEASED WITH THEM, AND THEY ARE WELL PLEASED WITH HIM. THEY ARE ALLAH\'S PARTY, LO* IS IT NOT ALLAH\'S PARTY WHO ARE THE SUCCESSFUL. (SURAH 58/22-23). ANNIVERSARY: MARKING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIOLENT DEATH OF THE MOSLEM CLERIC SHEIKH RAGHEB HARB, THE IMAM OF THE VILLAGE OF JABSHIT IN SOUTH LEBANON, \"HIZBULLAH\" STAGED A MASS RALLY AT THE CHIYAH SUBURB SATURDAY, FEB. 16, 1985. SHEIKH HARB WAS A STAUNCH OPPONENT OF ISRAEL OCCUPATION, AND AN ADVOCATE OF \"HIZBULLAH\" AND THE RISE OF A PAN-ISLAMIC \"NATION OF THE PARTY OF GOD.\" HE WAS ASSASSINATED REPORTEDLY BY ISRAEL\'S AGENTS IN HIS NATIVE VILLAGE ON FEB. 16, 1984. THE ORGANIZATION SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE THE ACCUSATION THAT IT WAS A HAND OF TERRORISTS. IT UNDER- LINED ITS ALLEGIANCE TO \"WELAYAT AL FAQIH\" (RULE OF THE THEOLOGIAN) UNDER IRAN\'S AYATULLAH RUHALLAH KHOMEINI. AMERICA, FRANCE, ISRAEL AND THE PHALANGE PARTY WERE DECLARED AS ITS PRIME ENEMIES. IT DESCRIBED THE PRESENT LEBANESE SYSTEM AS \"DESPOTIC\" AND RENOUNCED THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL. OPENING THE MEETING, SHEIKH GHABRIS SAID THAT \"HIZBULLAH\" WAS \"MISLEADINGLY DESCRIBED AS A HANDFUL OF FANATICS BENT ON KILLING, PLUNDER AND ROBBERY;\" AND THAT THEY WERE \"BLAMED FOR EVERY UNPLEASANT INCIDENT.\" \"BUT,\" HE EMPHASIZED, \"IT WAS \"HIZBULLAH\" WHICH ACTIVATED THE (FREEDOM) FIGHTERS AND EXPELLED THE ENEMY.\" MANIFESTO: LATER SHEIKH IBRAHIM AL AMIN READ OUT AT THE RALLY A 48-PAGE \"MESSAGE\" DEDICATED TO THE \"MARTYR SHEIKH RAGHEB HARB\" WHICH WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A MANIFESTO OF THE PARTY. (SEE MER OF FEB. 19, PAGE \'). THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME \"HIZBULLAH\" DEFINED ITS MILITANT POSITION AND IDEOLOGY SINCE IT MADE ITS IMPACT ON LEBANESE POLITICS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. THE MESSAGE IDENTIFIED THE MOSLEM FUNDAMENTALIST MEMBERS OF \"HIZBALLAH\" AS \"THE CHILDREN OF THE NATION WHOSE VANGUARD IN IRAN WAS BESTOWED WITH VICTORY.\" \"THIS VANGUARD,\" THE MESSAGE WENT ON, \"HAS LAID THE FOUNDATION OF A PAN-ISLAMIC STATE UNDER THE WISE GUIDANCE OF THE FULLY QUALIFIED FAQIH AYATULLAH RUHALLAH KHOMEINI. \"HIZBULLAH\" MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT HAD NO CARD-CARRYING MEMBERS, \"BUT IT IS LINKED TO ALL MOSLEMS IN THE WORLD BY THE STRONG IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL BOND OF ISLAM.\" EAST AND WEST: THE STATEMENT ATTACKED THE \"HAUTY\" POWERS OF THE EAST AND WEST ALIKE. IT SAID: \"AMERICA HAS TRIED, THROUGH ITS LOCAL AGENTS, TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT THOSE WHO DESTROYED ITS ARROGANCE IN LEBANON AND FOILED ITS CONSPIRACIES WERE BUT A HANDFUL OF FANATIC TERRORISTS WHO HAVE NO MISSION BUT TO BLOW UP LIQUOR STORES, GAMBLING CASINOS AND AMUSEMENT MACHINES.\" THE STATEMENT POINTED OUT THAT SUCH PRACTICES WERE ONLY MARGINAL DEALING WITH THE TAIL INSTEAD OF THE HEAD. \"WE ARE HEADED FOR DEALING WITH EVIL AT THE ROOTS, AND THE ROOTS ARE AMERICA,\" IT SAID, AND STRESSED THAT NOTHING WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER FIGHTING THE U.S. \"HIZBULLAH\" BELIEVES THAT BOTH WESTERN CAPITALISM AND EASTERN COMMUNISM HAVE FAILED TO PROVIDE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MASSES. \"THE ANSWER LIES IN THE MISSION OF ISLAM,\" IT SAID. DEMANDS: THE DECLARATION DEMANDED: 1. COMPLETE EVACUATION OF ISRAEL ARMY FROM LEBANON \"AS A PRELUDE FOR THE REMOVAL OF ISRAEL FROM EXISTENCE AND LIBERATING JERUSALEM FROM CLAWS OF OCCUPATION.\" 2. \"AMERICA, FRANCE AND THEIR ALLIES MUST LEAVE LEBANON ONCE AND FOR ALL, AND ANY IMPERIAL INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRY MUST BE TERMINATED.\" 3. \"THE PHALANGISTS MUST BE SUBJECTED TO JUSTICE AND BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL FOR ALL THE CRIMES THEY HAVE COMMITTED AGAINST THE MOSLEMS AND THE CHRISTIANS WITH ENCOURAGEMENT FROM AMERICAN AND ISRAEL.\" 4. \"ALL OUR LEBANESE PEOPLE MUST BE GIVEN THE CHANCE OF DETERMINING THEIR FUTURE AND CHOOSES THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANT, BEARING IN MIND THAT WE WILL NOT GIVE UP OUR COMMITMENT TO THE RULE OF ISLAM.\" POLITICAL \"MARONISM\": THE POLICY OF THE LEADERS OF \"POLITICAL MARONISM\" AS IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE \"LEBANESE FRONT\" AND THE \"LEBANESE FORCES\" MILITIA CAN NEVER ACHIEVE PEACE OR STABILITY FOR THE CHRISTIANS, SAID \"HIZBULLAH\". \"IT IS A POLICY BASED ON FANATICISM, SECTARIAN PRIVILEGES AND ALLIANCE WITH IMPERIALISM AND ISRAEL,\" IT ADDED. UNIFIL: THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE (UNIFIL) OPERATING IN SOUTH LEBANON, IS ACCUSED BY \"HIZBULLAH\" OF STANDING AS A \"BUFFER\" IMPEDING THEIR RESISTANCE AND \"MAINTAINING ISRAELI\'S SECURITY AND INVADING FORCES.\" \"HIZBULLAH\" DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHOWDOWN WITH UNIFIL \"IF IT CONTINUED TO CONNIVE WITH THE ENEMY.\" OTHER ARAB STATES \"ANXIOUSLY SEEKING PEACE WITH ISRAEL\" ALSO CAME UNDER FIRE FROM \"HIZBULLAH\". THEY WERE URGED INSTEAD TO CLOSE THEIR RANKS, DEFINE THEIR AIMS PRECISELY AND BREAK THE FETTERS RESTRICTING THEIR WILL. MARCH: ARMED MEMBERS OF \"HIZBULLAH WERE REPORTED TO HAVE MARCHED INTO SIDON MONDAY, FEB. 18, AND TORE LEBANESE FLAGS AND PICTURES OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. (SEE MER OF FEB. 19, PAGE 2). THEY SMASHED A NUMBER OF STORES AND SUPER MARKETS SELLING LIQUOR, AND RAISED IRANIAN FLAGS AND PORTRAITS OF THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADER AYATULLAH KHOMEINI. THE ACTION WAS SEEN AS A BACKLASH TO THE VISIT TO THE CITY THE DAY BEFORE BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL JEERED BY THE ARMED DEM- ONSTRATORS \"THE SHAH OF LEBANON\". THE GEMAYELS: IN ITS STATEMENT, \"HIZBULLAH\" LASHED OUT AGAINST PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL AND HIS BROTHER THE LATE BASHIR. IT SAID: \"THE BUTCHER BASHIR HAD REACHED THE PRESIDENCY WITH THE HELP OF ISRAEL, THE ARAB OIL PRINCES AND SYCOPHANT MOSLEM MPS FLATTERING THE PHALANGISTS.\" \"THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY AN ATTEMPT TO RECTIFY HIS REPUGNANT IMAGE BY AN EXERCISE CALLED THE \"SALVATION COMMITTEE,\" WHICH WAS BUT AN AMERICAN-ISRAELI BRIDGE USED BY THE PHALANGISTS TO ACHIEVE CONTROL OVER THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE. HOWEVER, OUR PEOPLE COULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH HUMILIATION. THEY DASHED THE DREAMS OF THE ZIONISTS AND THEIR ALLIES. AMERICA NEVERTHELESS, PERSISTED IN ITS FOLLIES AND BROUGHT (PRESIDENT) AMIN GEMAYEL TO SUCCEED HIS BROTHER. THE FIRST THING HE DID WAS TO DESTROY THE HOUSES OF THE DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM THE SOUTH, DEFILE THE ISLAMIC MOSQUES, ORDER THE ARMY TO BOMBARD THE DOWN-TRODDAN SUBURB AND DESTRUCT THE HOUSES ON THEIR OCCUPANTS, AND TO CALL IN NATO FORCES TO HELP HIM AGAINST US, CONCLUDE THE NOTORIOUS 17 MAY ACCORD WITH ISRAEL WHICH WOULD HAVE TRANSFORMED LEBANON INTO AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE OR AN AMERICAN COLONY.\" U.S. AND NATO: \"HIZBULLAH\" DECLARED \"CLEARLY AND FRANKLY\" THAT \"WE FEAR NO ONE BUT GOD, AND WE CANNOT TOLERATE INJUSTICE, AGGRESSION AND HUMILIATION.\" IT WENT ON TO ANNOUNCE: \"THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO PARTNERS AND THE ZIONIST STATE WHICH HAS USURPED THE HOLY ISLAM LAND OF PALESTINE, HAVE EXERCISED, AND ARE STILL EXERCISING AGGRESSION ON US WITH A VIEW TO HUMILIATING US. WE, THEREFORE, ARE ALWAYS ON THE ALERT AND CONSTANTLY GIRDING OURSELVES TO REPEL THE AGGRESSION AND DEFEND OUR RELIGION, EXISTENCE AND DIGNITY.\" END TEXT. LYNE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	157
37	3/8/1985 12:08	85CAIRO6360	Embassy Cairo	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "85CAIRO5284" ]	R 081208Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4143 INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMCONSUL JEDDAH AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY NICOSIA AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY TUNIS COMSIXTHFLT USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL USINFO WASHDC USMISSION USUN NEW YORK ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 06360 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, SOCI, SHUM, EG SUBJECT: GROWING DEBATE ON SHARIA LAW REF: CAIRO 5284 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. BEGIN SUMMARY. MOMENTUM IS BEGINNING TO BUILD TOWARD A MAY DEBATE IN THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY ON ISLAMIC SHARIA (KORANIC LAW). IN RECENT DAYS, KEY OPPOSITION FIGURES FUAD SIRAJ AL-DIN (CHAIRMAN OF THE NEW WAFD PARTY) AND OMAR TALMASSANI (GENERAL GUIDE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD) APPEARED BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY\'S RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR PURGING OF EXISTING LEGISLATION NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHARIA. THE SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY, RIFAAT EL MAHGOUB, WHILE SUPPORTING THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE, LEFT DELIBERATELY VAGUE THE TIMING AND EXTENT OF THE PURGE. THE ADVOCATES DOUBTLESS KNOW THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING \"FULL SHARIA\" WILL BE PROTRACTED; INDEED, MUBARAK IS PERCEIVED AS UNCOMPROMISING IN OPPOSITION TO \"THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARIA.\" IN ADVANCE OF THE MAY DEBATE PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF, AND MANEUVERING ABOUT, SHARIA ISSUES IS ALREADY UNDERWAY. END SUMMARY. 3. WE RECENTLY REPORTED AT LENGTH ON MUBARAK\'S EVOLVING DEMOCRACY -- SEE CAIRO 5284. THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC IN THE LAST FEW DAYS HAS WITNESSED A REMARKABLE DEMONSTRATION OF THIS DEMOCRACY IN ACTION, AS WAFD PARTY CHAIRMAN FUAD SIRAJ AL-DIN AND MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD GENERAL GUIDE OMAR TALMASSANI BOTH ATTENDED HEARINGS OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. THEIR ATTENDANCE, PROMI- NENTLY REPORTED ON TELEVISION AND IN THE PRESS, WAS A SIGNAL OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND TWO OF THE CHIEF FOES OF FORMER PRESIDENTS NASSER AND SADAT. - 4. THE RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARINGS, ALSO ATTENDED BY SPEAKER RIFAAT EL MAHGOUB, A NUMBER OF AL-AZHAR SHEIKHS, AND OTHER ISLAMIC EXPERTS, ARE IN PREPARATION FOR A MAY ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON SHARIA (KORANIC) LAW. MAHGOUB MADE CLEAR THE GOVERNMENT\'S SUPPORT FOR \"PURGING\" EXISTING LEGISLATION OF PROVISIONS IN CONFLICT WITH SHARIA, AND HE WAS ECHOED BY SIRAJ AL-DIN, TALMASSANI, AND OTHER OPPOSITION PARTY FIGURES. THE SPEAKER, HOWEVER, WAS DELIBERATELY AMBIGUOUS ABOUT THE TIMING AND SPEED OF THE PURGE, AS WELL AS ABOUT HOW FAR IT WOULD GO IN CHANGING THE MYRIAD LAWS ON THE EGYPTIAN BOOKS. THE EXCHANGES GAVE THE PUBLIC A TASTE OF MORE TO COME IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, EGYPTIAN STYLE, WHEREIN ALL SIDES CAN ADDRESS MAJOR ISLAMIC ISSUES LONG UNRESOLVED, BUT WITHOUT ANY CONCRETE RESULT LIKELY -- AT LEAST IMMEDIATELY. - 5. KEY QUESTIONS ARE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO EGYPTIAN SOCIETY -- THE TREATMENT OF THE COPTIC CHRISTIAN MINORITY IF SHARIA LAW IS FULLY IMPLEMENTED; POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE STATUS OF WOMEN; THE IMPACT OF ABOLITION OF BANKING INTEREST ON THE ECONOMY; THE EFFECTS ON TOURISM OF BANNING ALCOHOL; WESTERN REACTION TO THE ADOPTION OF ISLAMIC PUN- ISHMENTS SUCH AS AMPUTATION, FLOGGING, AND STONING (EVEN IF SPARINGLY APPLIED). FEW OBSERVERS EXPECT THESE DIF- FICULT ISSUES UNDERLYING THE SHARIA DEBATE TO BE RESOLVED IN THE ASSEMBLY DISCUSSIONS IN MAY. THOUGH THEY CANNOT SAY SO PUBLICLY, OPPOSITION FIGURES LIKE SIRAJ AL-DIN AND TALMASSANI ACKNOWLEDGE PRIVATELY THAT THE SHARIA DEBATE WILL ONLY BE THE BEGINNING OF A LONG UNCERTAIN PROCESS. INDEED, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND OPPOSITION OBSERV- ERS BELIEVE THAT MUBARAK WILL NOT COMPROMISE IN HIS OP- POSITION TO \"THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARIA,\" BECAUSE THE SOCIAL, SECTARIAN, AND INTERNATIONAL COSTS ARE TOO HIGH. WHAT MARGINAL COMPROMISES, IF ANY, HE MAY CONCEDE - 6. MEANWHILE, HAPPENINGS ON OTHER FRONTS ARE BOTH PROVOKING AND REENFORCING PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF ISLAMIC SHARIA ISSUES. HANDLING OF SUCH DISPARATE SUBJECTS AS OPPOSITION POLITICAL ALLIANCES, PUNISHMENT OF RAPE, AND WOMEN\'S RIGHTS INCREASINGLY FEED THE DEBATE. TO WIT: -- ONE OF THE STRONGEST PROPONENTS OF SHARIA, SHEIKH SALAH ABU ISMAIL, WAS HASTILY EXPELLED FROM THE NEW WAFD OPPOSITION PARTY AFTER CRITICIZING SIRAJ AL-DIN FOR NOT PUSHING SHARIA HARD ENOUGH. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD GUIDE TALMASSANI TURNED HIS BACK ON THE OUTSPOKEN SHEIKH AND HAS MAINTAINED THE MB\'S ALLIANCE WITH THE WAFD. TALMASSANI OBSERVED TO POLCOUNS AND POLOFF MARCH 5 THAT THE SHEIKH SOMETIMES SPEAKS OUT BEFORE HE CONSIDERS ALL THE CONSEQUENCES; SHEIKH SALAH WAS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING PEACE WITH THE WAFD (THOUGH NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT HIS BEING RETURNED TO THE PARTY). -- SHARIA PROPONENTS HAVE BEEN LOUDLY CALLING FOR THE EXECUTION OF OFFENDERS IN SEVERAL NOTORIOUS KIDNAP/RAPE INCIDENTS IN RECENT WEEKS. THE OPPOSITION PRESS IS GIVING FULL PUBLICITY TO THIS EVIDENCE OF EROSION IN TRADITIONAL EGYPTIAN SOCIAL MORES. PUBLIC FEELING IS RUNNING HIGH IN CAIRO, AMIDST CHARGES THAT OFFENDERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN SOFT TREATMENT IN THE COURTS. SOME CRITICS, IN THEIR ENTHUSIASM FOR SEVERE \"ISLAMIC\" PUNISHMENT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT EXECUTION FOR KIDNAP/RAPE IS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE PRESENT LEGAL CODE. (MANY ALSO ARE NOW SAYING THAT AMERICAN-MADE TV FILMS ABOUT VIOLENCE AND CRIME AVAILABLE ON EGYPTIAN TELEVISION ARE CORRUPTING THE YOUTH.) -- THE MINISTER OF AWQAF (ISLAMIC ENDOWMENTS) AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ASSEMBLY\'S COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE HAVE GONE PUBLIC WITH DEMANDS TO AMEND THE LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS -- SO THAT SHARIA PROVISIONS REGARDING DIVORCE AND PROPERTY EOULD AGAIN BE ENFORCED. THE LAW, PASSED UNDER THE LATE PRESIDENT SADAT AND INFORMALLY NAMED THE \"JEHAN LAW\" AFTER HIS WIFE, GAVE THE WIFE THE RIGHT FOR THE FIRST TIME TO INITIATE DIVORCE IF HER HUSBAND MARRIED A SECOND WIFE; THE LAW ALSO GAVE A DIVORCED WIFE FIRST RIGHTS TO THE HOUSEHOLD UNTIL SHE IS PROVIDED EQUIVALENT QUARTERS. TODAY, IMPORTANT SHEIKHS, WHO IN 1979 TRIMMED THEIR INTERPRETATIONS TO SUIT \"WOMEN\'S RIGHTS\" PUSHED BY SADAT AND HIS WIFE, HAVE BEGUN TACKING TOWARD A MORE LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF SHARIA. 7. AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF GROWING SHARIA DISCUSSIONS, THE STATE AUTHORITIES IN RECENT WEEKS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE AGAINST FRINGE ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICO-RELIGIOUS SPECTRUM. -- AT CAIRO\'S AL-NUR MOSQUE, A MAGNET FOR ISLAMIC HARD- LINERS IN THE CAPITAL, RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS (SOME FROM AL-JIHAD, SOME FOR AL-HIDAIYA AL-ISLAMIYA) HAVE BEEN PICKED UP ON THREE SUCCESSIVE WEEKENDS FOLLOWING FRIDAY PRAYERS -- FOR DISTRIBUTING LEAFLETS WHOSE CONTENTS HAVE NOT BEEN REPORTED. NO CHARGES HAVE BEEN PLACED, AND THE DETAINEES RELEASED UPON PAYMENT OF TOKEN FINES. SIMILAR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED (BUT NOT DETAILED) IN THE UNIVERSITY TOWNS OF MINYA AND ASSIUT AGAINST FORMER DEFENDANTS FREED LAST OCTOBER IN THE PROLONGED TRIAL OF THOSE CHARGED IN THE ARMED REVOLT FOLLOWING SADAT\'S 1981 ASSASSINATION. (BEHIND THE SCENES THE MINISTRY OF AWQAF SEEMS TO BE STRUGGLING TO EXERCISE SUPERVISION OVER AL-NUR, WHOSE LEADING SHEIKH IS STILL DENIED THE PULPIT. IN THE LATTER SADAT YEARS, AL-NUR MOSQUE DREW UP TO THIRTY THOUSAND WORSHIPPERS ON FRIDAYS TO LISTEN TO ANTI-SADAT SERMONS.) -- IN ALEXANDRIA, A \"CRAZY DOCTOR\" WAS ARRESTED ALONG WITH 30 OR SO FOLLOWERS; HE CLAIMED TO BE THE PROPHET MOHAMED, AND HAPPENED TO HAVE ONE MILLION DOLLARS PLUS IN HIS BANK ACCOUNT. NO CHARGES HAVE YET BEEN FILED. -- IN LATE FEBRUARY, SOME 40 BAHAIS WERE ARRESTED FOR VIOLATING A 1960 NASSER DECREE (STILL IN EFFECT) OUTLAWING BAHAI ACTIVITIES IN EGYPT. AN AL-AZHAR UNDERSECRETARY SENT DOCUMENTS TO THE STATE SECURITY PROSECUTOR SHOWING THAT THE BAHAIS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED \"APOSTATES\" FROM ISLAM. (THE BAHAIS HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGES AND ARE PRESENTLY REMAINING IN THEIR HOMES. SEE CAIRO 06100.) - -- ON FEBRUARY 26 TALMASSANI WAS SUDDENTLY (AND WITH- OUT EXPLANATION) FORBIDDEN ACCESS TO CAIRO UNIVERSITY. HE HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO ADDRESS A MEETING AT THE COM- MERCE COLLEGE, AT THE INVITATION OF THE STUDENT COUNCIL. PERMISSION WAS IN WRITING, AND STAMPED BY THE VICE CHANCELLOR\'S OFFICE. HOWEVER, HE TOLD POLCOUNS AT 9:30 ON THE MORNING OF THE SPEECH, HE WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE PERMISSION HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. THE STUDENT DEMONSTRA- TION FOLLOWED (SEE CAIRO 5919). TALMASSANI CRITICIZED THE DECISION TO US, NOTING THAT THE STUDENT COUNCIL HAD A \"MODERATE\" ISLAMIC MAJORITY (SUPPORTED BY MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD) AND THAT HIS APPEARANCE WOULD HAVE PACIFIED - NOT INCITED - THE STUDENTS. - 8. COMMENT: THESE MOVES REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT\'S POLISHING OF ITS OWN ISLAMIC CREDENTIALS (IN THE CASES OF THE BAHAIS AND ALEXANDRIA\'S DERANGED PROPHET), AND SETTING LIMITS FOR ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL/RELIGIOUS BE- HAVIOR (IN THE CASE OF AL-NUR MOSQUEAND THE BANNING OF TALMASSANI\'S UNIVERSITY SPEECH.) AS FOR THE INCIPIENT DEBATE IN THE ASSEMBLY AND PRESS ON SHARIA, IT IS AT THIS STAGE MORE SHADOW THAN SUBSTANCE; BUT IT IS NONETHELESS AN IMPORTANT REFLECTION OF THE MOOD OF THE SOCIETY. PRO- FOUND SOCIAL ISSUES ARE INVOLVED. THE GOAL OF \"SECULAR- ISTS\" WHO RUN THE GOVERNMENT IS TO ENCOMPASS MODERATE ISLAMIC ELEMENTS WITHIN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, UNDERCUT- TING EXTREMISM WHILE PREVENTING THE ADOPTION OF THE COM- PLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARIA. THE ISLAMIC SIDE, WHICH INCLUDES THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND TO SOME EXTENT THE WAFD, PLUS MAINSTREAM MUSLIM LEADERS FROM AL-AZHAR AND THE MINISTRY OF AWQAF, HOPES TO USE THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS TO BUILD UP AN IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM TOWARD SHARIA. BOTH SIDES AT PRESENT ARE KEEN TO MAINTAIN THE STABILITY OF EGYPTIAN SOCIETY, THOUGH MISMANAGEMENT OF THE SHARIA ISSUE COULD CREATE SERIOUS TENSIONS. END COMMENT. PRECHT "	Success: CSV parsed	null	4,362
38	3/15/1985 16:19	85BEIRUT1640	Embassy Beirut	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "85BEIRUT1635" ]	O 151619Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2214 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 01640 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PINS, LE SUBJECT: JA\'JA\'S \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT\" AND RECONCILIATION EFFORTS REF: BEIRUT 1635 1. (U) SUMMARY. A COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY THE MARONITE PARTIARCH CONTINUES ITS EFFORTS TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES WHICH ERUPTED ON MARCH 13 WITHIN THE LEBANESE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY BETWEEN JA\'JA\'S \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT\" AND PHALANGISTS LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT. THERE HAS BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS SO FAR, BUT RECONCILATION EFFORTS CONTINUE. 2. (U) THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND REMAINS LARGELY UNCHANGED, WITH JA\'JA\'S MILITIAMEN CONTROLING MOST OF THE CHRISTIAN REGION FROM JUBAYL (BYBLOS) SOUTH TO THE DOG RIVER AND ALSO MUCH OF EAST BEIRUT ITSELF, INCLUDING ASHRAFIYAH. PHALANGE MILITIAMEN LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT CONTROL ONLY THE METN, THE GEMAYEL FIEFDOM SITUATED BETWEEN THE AREAS HELD BY JA\'JA\'. ALL OF THESE AREAS REMAIN TENSE BUT CALM, EXCEPT FOR SOME ISOLATED CLASHES BETWEEN RIVAL LF GROUPS AT DAWRA (NEAR BEIRUT PORT) ON MORNING OF MARCH 15. END SUMMARY. 3. (U) THE SEVEN-MEMBER CHRISTIAN RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE, ESTABLISHED BY THE CHRISTIAN CONCLAVE CONVOKED URGENTLY BY GEMAYEL AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE FOLLOWING JA\'JA\'S MARCH 13 UPRISING, MET FOR THE SECOND TIME IN BKERKE ON MARCH 14. AT THIS SECOND MEETING, THE RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE, WHICH IS CHAIRED BY MARONITE PARTRIARCH KHURAYSH, WAS ABLE TO MEET WITH VARIOUS LF OFFICIALS, INCLUDING FOR THE FIRST TIME JA\'JA\' HIMSELF AND HIS MAIN SUPPORTERS. BESIDES THE PARTRIARCH, THE RECONCILATION COMMITTEE INCLUDES CHRISTIAN MP\'S ELIAS HRAOUI, MICHEL MURR, KHATCHIG BABIKIAN, GEBRANE TOK, MIKEAL DAHER, AND KHALIL ABUHAMAD. AT THE MARCH 14 BKERKE MEETING, THEY MET WITH THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS OF THE LF COMMAND COUNCIL: SAMIR JA\'JA\', ELIE HOBEIKA, TONY BRIDI, CHARLES GHOSTIN, NAOUM FARAH, ELIE ASSWAD, SAMIR TAWILE, AND FAWZI MAHFUZ. LF COMMANER FUAD ABU NADIR DID NOT ATTEND, BUT HIS PREDECESSOR, FADI FREM, DID. 4. (U) JUDGING FROM THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE BKERKE MEETING, LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE DURING THIS FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH JA\'JA\'. \"THE CHRISTIAN DECISON MOVEMENT,\" AS JA\'JA\'S GROUP NOW OFFICIALLY CALLS ITSELF, REAFFIRMED ITS POLITICAL NATURE, ITS DESIRE TO AVOID VIOLENCE, AND ITS AIM OF \"REINFORCING THE INDEPENDENCE AND GLOBALITY OF CHRISTIAN DECISION ACCORDING TO DEMOCRATIC RULES.\" IN THE COMMUNIQUE, JA\'JA\'S MOVEMENT ALSO REAFFIRMED ITS RESPECT FOR EXISTING LAWS AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. IT CLAIMED THAT IT WAS \"PURELY AND UNIQUELY LEBANESE CHRISTIAN,\" I.E., NOT ISRAELI BACKED. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, HOBEIKA CALLED FOR THE REMOVAL OF ROADBLOCKS WHICH HAVE ISOLATED CERTAIN CHRISTIAN AREAS, MOST NOTABLY THE ROADBLOCK ESTABLISHED BY LOYALIST FORCES AT THE NORTHERN EXTREMITY OF THE METN IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DOG RIVER TUNNEL ON THE COASTAL HIGHWAY BETWEEN DUBAYYAH AND JUNNIYAH. 5. (U) FOLLOWING THE BKERKE MEETING, THE RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE REPORTEDLY TOLD PRESIDENT GEMAYEL THAT (A) JA\'JA\'S MOVEMENT WAS A MATTER WITHIN THE PHALANGE PARTY AND BETWEEN THAT PARTY AND THE LEBANESE FORCES AND (B) THAT JA\'JA\' HAD NO INTENTION OF LEADING A COUP D\'ETAT. THE RECONCILATION COMMITTEE THEN MET WITH THE PHALANGE PARTY POLITBURO. 6. (C) SIMULTANEOUSLY FOLLOWING THE BKERKE MEETING, JA\'JA\' AND HIS MAJOR SUPPORTERS MET AT THE HOME OF BASHIR GEMAYEL\'S WIDOW, SOLANGE, AND FORMED AN \"EMERGENCY COMMITTEE\" COMPOSED OF ABU NADIR, JA\'JA\', HOBEIKA, FREM, BRIDI, GHOSTIN, KARIM PAKRADUNI, AND GEORGES ADWAN. SO FAR, THE PURPOSE OF THIS COMMITTEE HAS NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED BUT NAOUM FARAH (SEPTEL) CONFIRMED THAT IT IS AN EMBRYONIC POLITBURO OR COMMAND COUNCIL FOR JA\'JA\'S \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT.\" 7. (U) EARLIER ON MARCH 14, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL RECEIVED GENERAL MUHAMMAD KHOLI, AN EMISSARY SENT BY SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD REPORTEDLY TO REAFFIRM SYRIAN SUPPORT. IT SEEMS HIGHLY UNLIKELY AT THIS POINT THAT SYRIAN VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM WILL RETURN TO LEBANON ON MARCH 16 TO CONTINUE THE INTERCOMMUNAL POLITICAL TALKS UNTERTAKEN LAST MARCH 9-10 AT BIKFAYYA. 8. (U) IN REACTION TO JA\'JA\'S CHALLENGE, DRUZE LEADER WALID JUMBLATT, SPEAKING FOR THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT, LENT SUPPORT TO THE PRESIDENCY AND VEHEMENTLY CRITICIZED JA\'JA\'S MOVEMENT AS \"AN ISRAELI ATTEMPT TO TORPEDO THE POLITICAL ACCORD BEING DRAWN UP UNDER THE AUSPICES OF SYRIAN LEADERS.\" THE NDF REITERATED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE \"SYRIAN OPTION.\" 9. (C) LATE NOTE: ACCORDING TO NAOUM FARAH (SEPTEL), THE \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT\" DOES,IN FACT, SUPPORT THE REOPENING OF THE DOG RIVER TUNNEL AND SEVERAL BRIDGES BLOCKED BY PHALANGE MILITIAMEN FROM THE METN LOYAL TO GEMAYEL. AS OF EARLY AFTERNOON MARCH 15, THE LATTER HAD AGREED TO REMOVE THE BLOCKADES AND TURN THE CHOKE POINTS OVER TO THE LAF. BARTHOLOMEW "	Success: CSV parsed	null	4,586
39	3/15/1985 17:45	85BEIRUT1645	Embassy Beirut	UNCLASSIFIED	[]	P 151745Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2216 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 01645 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PGOV, LE SUBJECT: JA\'JA\'S MOVEMENT COMMUNIQUE 1. ON MARCH 14, SAMIR JA\'JA\'S FORCES, NOW CALLED THE \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT,\" ISSUED THE FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE OUTLINING THEIR AIMS. 2. BEGIN TEXT. \"THERE HAVE BEEN A LOT OF QUERIES LATELY ABOUT WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE AUTONOMOUS DECISION OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, ON WHETHER THIS COMMUNITY HAD ACTUALLY LOST THE INITIATIVE, ON WHETHER SUBSISTANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL UPHEAVAL EMBODIED BY BASHIR GEMAYEL\'S POLICY HAS BEEN OVERSTEPPED BY TIME AND ON WHETHER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS FOR CONSULTATION AND DECISION HAVE BEEN CRIPPLED OR HAVE JUST FALLEN INTO DISUSE, THE STATEMENT SAID. \"IN ANY CASE, WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE? THE STATE- MENT ADDED. SOME SAY IT SHOULD BE THE POLITICAL COMPROMISES UNDERWAY WHILE OTHERS SPEAK, AFTER THE FALL OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES, OF REGIONAL GUARANTEES INSTEAD. WHATEVER THE CASE MAY BE, ALL THESE MATTERS CAN BE DISCUSSED. BUT WHAT IS CRYSTAL-CLEAR IS THAT THERE CAN BE NO SOLID POLITICAL SOLUTION UNLESS COUPLED WITH AN ADEQUATE BALANCE OF FORCES BEARING CLEAR-OUT FEATURES AND AN UNEQUIVOCAL POLITICAL STRATEGY TO GO ALONG WITH AN AUTONOMOUS DECISION FREED FROM ALL TRUSTEESHIPS. \"THE RESTORATION OF THE DECISION AND THE SOCIAL CENTRALIZATION OF IT CAN, ALONE, PROVIDE THE PROPER FRAME FOR ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSION LIKELY TO LEAD US TO THE KIND OF PEACE ASPIRED TO, FOR WE REJECT THE PEACE RESULTING FROM SUBMITTING TO OTHER PEOPLE\'S WILL. \"THE CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT HAS PROVIDED THE ANSWER TO ALL THESE QUERIES. THIS MOVEMENT ACTUALLY CONSTITUTES THE ORGANIZED EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF THE BASE OF ALL CHRISTIAN IN- STITUTIONS IN RECUPERATING THE DECISION AND THE INITIATIVE, AND THERE CANNOT BE, FROM THIS DAY FORWARD, NO RELIANCE BUT ON THE AUTONOMOUS DECISION AND NO GUARANTEE BUT THROUGH POLICIES THAT INCARNATE THIS DECISION. \"FROM THIS DAY FORWARD, THE SECURITY OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY WILL NOT BE DEPENDING ANYMORE ON THE CHANGES OF INTERNATIONAL OR REGIONAL POLICIES AND THERE WILL BE NO POLITICAL WILL LINKED TO THE MOODS AND DISPOSITIONS THAT GOVERN POLITICAL INTERCOURSE IN THIS TORMENTED COUNTRY. \"FROM THIS DAY FORWARD, THERE WILL BE NO CHRISTIAN SOCIETY WITH A CRIPPLED WILL AND KEPT DEPRIVED OF POLICYMAKING AT HOME AND ON THE REGIONAL PLANE AS WELL, AND RULED BY VIOLENT WARRING STRATEGIES. \"THE BASIS FOR AN OBJECTIVE COOPERATION WITH A REALITY OF THE KIND WE HAVE DEPICTED IS CLEAR AND CAN BE DEFINED, IN BRIEF, AS FOLLOWS: \"EXTREMISM CANNOT BE DETERRED OTHERWISE THAN BY STEADFASTNESS, AND HEGEMONY AND DISCRIMINATORY PHENOMENA CANNOT BE HANDLED BUT THROUGH CLEAR POLITICAL WILLS AND IDEAS AND ADEQUATE EXECUTIVE INSTRUMENTS. \"ONLY WHEN THE CHRISTIAN FREEDOM OF DECISION IS RESTORED AND THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF IT CLEARLY DEFINED CAN NEGOTIATION AND INTERCOURSE WITH ALL SIDES BECOME POSSIBLE, ON THE HOME FRONT AND ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL. OTHERWISE, WE WOULD BE ENGAGED INTO A DANGEROUS TURNING POINT LIKELY TO WIPE OUT WHAT IS LEFT OF OUR ENERGIES, OUR CREDIBILITY AND OUR EFFICIENCY. \"THE CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT CONSIDERS THAT THE SETTING UP OF NEW BASES FOR DEALINGS AND DIALOGUE HAS BECOME AN INDISPENSIBLE PRE- REQUISITE FOR LIBERATING THE LEBANESE INDEPENDENT DECISION WHICH, ALONE, IS CAPABLE OF ALLOWING US TO FACE SUCCESSFULLY THE SECOND DECADE OF OUR BITTER STRUGGLE. TO ACHIEVE THIS, WE MUST: \"FIRSTLY, RESHUFFLE THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND IN- STITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY; \"SECONDLY, REBUILD THE SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE CHRISTIANS ON NEW FOUNDATIONS BASED UPON: A) AN INSTITUTIONAL AND CENTRAL CHRISTIAN INDEPENDENT DECISION; B) A CO-ORDINATING, CONSULTATIVE AND EXECUTIVE FRAMEWORK GROUPING THE VARIOUS SOCIAL AND CHURCH LEADERSHIPS; C) ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRATEGIES OF A COMPLEMENTARY NATURE AIMED OVERRUNNING ALL STANDING DIFFICULTIES. AND THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL THIS IS THE CORRECTION OF THE STRUCTURES AS TO ENSURE THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCY; D)LEGAL INSTITUTIONS ACTUALLY PERFORMING THEIR NATIONAL OVERALL REPRESENTATIVE ROLE; E) AN ETHNIC AND CULTURAL IDENTITY WITH CLEAR- CUT FEATURES AND CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL BALANCED STRATEGIES. \"CHRISTIAN LEBANESE, \"WE ARE A PEOPLE WHOSE ENTITY IS BASED UPON RESPECT AND COMMITMENT TOWARDS ALL CAUSES INVOLVING THE FATE OF MAN OR HIS DIGNITY AND WHEREVER MAN\'S LIBERTIES ARE JEOPARDIZED OR UNSECURE. \"THERE CAN BE NO HAZARDS IN CHRISTIANITY BUT DECISIONS INSPIRED BY THE HOLY GOSPEL, BY JESUS-CHRIST\'S OWN WORDS: SPEAK ALWAYS THE TRUTH AND BE STRAIGHT- FORWARD: NO FOR NO AND YEST FOR YES\". END TEXT. BARTHOLOMEW "	Success: CSV parsed	null	4,713
40	3/15/1985 17:52	85BEIRUT1646	Embassy Beirut	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "85BEIRUT1635" ]	O 151752Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2218 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 01646 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, LE, US SUBJECT: JA\'JA\'S \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT\": RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., MOTIVES, AND OBJECTIVES REF: BEIRUT 1635 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. POLOFF MET MARCH 15 WITH LONGTIME CONTACT NAOUM FARAH, DIRECTOR OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE LEBANESE FORCES AND NOW AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN JA\'JA\'S \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT.\" FARAH, WHO UNTIL EARLY MARCH WAS ALSO THE OFFICIAL LF SPOKESMAN, REQUESTED THE MEETING. ----------------------- RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. ----------------------- 3. FARAH STATED AT THE OUTSET THAT THE LEBANESE FORCES (WHICH HE CONSIDERS SYNONYMOUS FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES WITH JA\'JA\'S \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT\") HAD BEEN \"BOTHERED\" BY THE USG STATEMENT ON MARCH 13 CHARACTERIZING EVENTS OF THAT DAY IN EAST BEIRUT AS A \"NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT.\" HE ALSO EXPRESSED DISMAY OVER STATEMENTS ORIGINATING IN WASHINGTON THAT AMERICAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL WERE BEING EVACUATED BECAUSE OF EVENTS IN EAST BEIRUT. SUCH STATEMENTS, HE SAID, GIVE A FALSE IMPRESSION OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MOVEMENT. 4. WHILE HE SAID THE MOVEMENT FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF \"LA LEGALITE,\" HE COULD NOT CONSIDER RECENT EVENTS A \"NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT. TO THE CONTRARY, HE SAID, WHAT IS HAPPENING IS \"VERY HEALTHY FOR THE CHRISTIANS AND FOR THE WEST, STARTING WITH THE U.S.\" \"WE HOPE,\" FARAH CONTINUED, \"THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT CONTINUE TO TAKE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING A HOSTILE POSITION TOWARDS THIS MOVEMENT, A POSITION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE THE FUTURE OF OUR RECIPROCAL RELATIONS.\" \"WE WANT TO ENSURE,\" HE SAID, \"THAT OUR RELATIONS ARE EXCELLENT WITH THE U.S., BECAUSE WE CONSIDER THAT WE ARE FIGHTING THE SAME FIGHT, CONFRONTING THE SAME ENEMY.\" 5. POLOFF RESPONDED THAT, AS FARAH WAS ALREADY AWARE FROM THE DEPARTMENT\'S STATEMENT AND FROM CONVERSATIONS EMBOFFS HAD ALREADY HAD WITH MEMBERS OF THE \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT,\" THE U.S. CONSIDERED THE EVENTS OF THIS WEEK A NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE THEY DIVIDED THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AND UNDERCUT THE PRESIDENT PRECISELY WHEN THEY NEEDED TO BE STRONG AND UNITED TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL REFORMS. ---------------------- MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES ---------------------- 6. FARAH INTERRUPTED TO \"ASSURE THE U.S. OFFICIALLY\" THAT THE MOVEMENT (A) WAS NOT AN ATTEMPTED COUP D\'ETAT, (B) WAS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST THE PRESIDENCY OR THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF (\"WE HAVE NOT ASKED HIM TO RESIGN.\"), AND (C) IS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE AND AGAINST BLOODSHED. FARAH ADDED THAT THE MOVEMENT HAD CALLED FOR, SINCE YESTERDAY, MARCH 14R THE REOPENING OF THE DOG RIVER TUNNEL AND THE BRIDGES WHICH HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY THE \"FOLKS FROM THE METN,\" I.E., PHALANGE MILITIAMEN LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT. FARAH CLAIMED THAT THESE LATTER FORCES HAD TURNED OVER THESE CHOKE POINTS TO THE LAF AND THAT WITHIN A FEW HOURS TRAFFIC COULD FLOW FREELY AGAIN. 7. AS FOR THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THE \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT,\" FARAH SAID THAT FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS TRIED TO PLAY SIMULTANEOUSLY TWO INCOMPATIBLE ROLES: FIRST THAT OF PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, I.E., OF ALL LEBANESE REGARDLESS OF THEIR CONFESSIONAL AFFILIATION, AND SECOND THAT OF LEADER OF THE CHRISTIANS. THESE TWO ROLES ARE INCOMPATIBLE, FARAH EXPLAINED, BECAUSE, AS CHIEF OF STATE, GEMAYEL IS OBLIGED TO MAKE CERTAIN CONCESSIONS THAT HE SHOULD NOT MAKE AS LEADER OF THE CHRISTIANS. 8. FARAH CITED THE SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF THE MARCH 9-10 BIKFAYYA TALKS WHERE GEMAYEL \"FACED FOUR ENEMIES: KHADDAM KARAMI, BARRI, AND JUMBLATT,\" AND WHERE HE MADE CONCESSION WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE FOR HIM TO MAKE AS THE CHRISTIAN LEADER. THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN, FARAH SAID, A SEPARATE CHRISTIAN REPRESENTATIVE PRESENT SO THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD HAVE PLAYED THE OVERARCHING ROLE OF CHIEF OF STATE. 9. FURTHERMORE, FARAH CLAIMED, GEMAYEL\'S PLAYING THESE TWO INCOMPATIBLE ROLES HAS STYMIED THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WITHIN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, HE SAID, NO ONE IN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY HAS DARED TO SPEAK THEIR MIND. 10. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT,\" FARAH STATED, IS TO REMEDY THIS SITUATION BY THE FORMATION OF A COUNCIL COMPRISING REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL LEBANESE CHRISTIAN GROUPS, INCLUDING BOTH POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS. VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE LEBANESE FORCES WOULD BE REPRESENTED ON THE COUNCIL. THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT BE MERELY CONSULTATIVE, FARAH STRESSED, BUT ALSO \"DECISIONAL.\" THE COUNCIL WOULD FORMULATE CHRISTIAN POLICIES,AND A REPRESENTATIVE SELECTED BY THE COUNCIL WOULD PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MUSLIMS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE CHIEF OF STATE. 11. FARAH THEN SET FORTH THREE STEPS WHICH GEMAYEL MUST NOT/NOT TAKE: (A) HE MUST NOT ATTEMPT TO USE THE LAF AGAINST THE MOVEMENT BOTH BECAUSE THE LAF WOULD NOT FOLLOW HIS ORDERS AND BECAUSE THE LAF WOULD DISINTEGRATE AND MUCH OF ITS EQUIPMENT WOULD FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE LF MILITIA. (FARAH CLAIMED THAT GEMAYEL HAD ACTUALLY CALLED ON THE ARMY TO INTERVENE EARLY ON MARCH 13 BUT THAT THE ARMY LEADERSHIP HAD REFUSED.) (B) HE MUST NOT PUSH THE PHALANGE PARTY TO USE WHAT REMAINS OF ITS METN-BASED MILITIA AGAINST THE LF BECAUSE THE LF WILL EASILY CRUSH THEM. AND (C) HE MUST NOT EVEN THINK OF ASKING SYRIAN FORCES TO INTERVENE, BECAUSE IF ONE SYRIAN SHELL STRIKES THE CHRISTIAN REGION GEMAYEL WILL LOSE ALL CREDIBILITY AND THE \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT\" WILL SIMPLY GAIN SUPPORT 12. AS A FOOTNOTE, FARAH ADDED THAT THE RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY THE MARONITE PATRIARCH HAD ALREADY MET SEVERAL TIMES WITH JA\'JA\' AND OTHER FIGURES IN THE MOVEMENT (INCLUDING FARAH) AND THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE COMMITTEE FOUND THE MOVEMENT\'S MOTIVES TO BE WELL-FOUNDED AND REASONABLE. RECALLING WHAT POLOFF HAD SAID (PARA. 5) ABOUT THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF DIVISIONS WITHIN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AT THIS TIME, FARAH SAID THAT HE AND MANY OTHERS IN THE MOVEMENT HOPED THAT THE ULTIMATE RESULT WOULD BE POSITIVE, I.E., A MORE UNIFIED CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, SURE OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH IT IS HEADED, AND SOLIDLY BEHIND THE PRESIDENT. HE CONCLUDED BY ASKING FOR U.S. \"UNDERSTANDING AND PATIENCE.\" 13. COMMENT. FARAH WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO SET FORTH CLEARLY THE MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE \"CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT.\" AWARE OF THE TOUGH REPUTATION (TO SAY THE LEAST) OF THE MOVEMENT\'S LEADERS, HE EVIDENTLY WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY HAD WIDE BACKING WITHIN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY , THAT THE MOVEMENT WAS PROCEEDING RATIONALLY AND REASONABLY, AND THAT IT DESERVED U.S. UNDER- STANDING IF NOT SUPPORT. BARTHOLOMEW " "41","3/16/1985 8:23","85STATE80724","Secretary of State","SECRET","","R 160823Z MAR 85 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY DOHA AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ","S E C R E T STATE 080724 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: IR, PINT, PEPR SUBJECT: THE IRANIAN SUCCESSION 1. (S ENTIRE TEXT). 2. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS, PREPARED BY INR/NESA IN FEBRUARY 1985, MAY BE OF BACKGROUND INTEREST TO ADDRESSEE POSTS. T H E I R A N I A N S U C C E S S I O N A N D I T S C O N S E Q U E N C E S 3. IT IS OBVIOUSLY NOT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT PRECISELY HOW EVENTS WILL UNFOLD IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS FOLLOWING KHOMEINI\'S DEATH. BUT THE CLERICAL GROUP NOW IN POWER IS SO ENTRENCHED THAT IT COULD DOMINATE FOR SOME YEARS. AT BEST, THERE COULD BE A GRADUAL SOFTENING OF THE REGIME\'S VIEW OF THE US. BUT INCREASING INSTABILITY AND SOVIET PRESSURE ARE MORE LIKELY TO KEEP THE US IN THE POSITION OF THE MAJOR ENEMY OF IRAN. OVER THE LONGER RUN, WE THINK A SINGLE STRONG LEADER WILL EMERGE. IF HE COMES FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD MILITIA, AS NOW APPEARS THE BEST BET, HE WILL SHARE MUCH OF THE OUTLOOK OF THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP. THAT WOULD MAKE HIM DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO WORK WITH, THOUGH HE MIGHT NOT HAVE KHOMEINI\'S DEDICATION TO PURSUING THE WAR WITH IRAQ. 4. PROBABLE SUCCESSION SCENARIO: MOST LIKELY IS A RELATIVELY SMOOTH INITIAL TRANSITION TO THE IMMEDIATE POST-KHOMEINI ERA. THE CLERICS ARE PREPARED TO MOVE QUICKLY TO MAINTAIN CONTINUITY AND CONTROL. A COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO MAKE THE CHOICE OF SUCCESSOR HAS BEEN ELECTED AND MEETS SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR. IT SEEMS INCLINED TO SETTLE ON AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI, A CHOICE WE BELIEVE WILL BE ENDORSED IN KHOMEINI\'S SEALED WILL. MONTAZERI WOULD NOT BY ANY MEANS HAVE UNQUESTIONED COMMAND. INDEED, THE INITIAL IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE A COLLEGIAL AFFAIR BECAUSE NO SINGLE IRANIAN LEADER WILL BE ABLE TO REPLACE KHOMEINI. 5. THE MAIN IMMEDIATE CHALLENGE TO THIS SUCCESSION SCENARIO WOULD COME FROM THE JOCKEYING FOR POWER ALREADY APPARENT BETWEEN FACTIONS INSIDE THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP CADRE. SHOULD SUCH RIVALS AS PRESIDENT ALI KHAMENEI AND MAJLES LEADER ALI AKBAR RAFSANJANI CLASH, THAT WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO SERIOUS DISORDER. 6. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY WILL BE PRESENTED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD, THE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS FUNCTIONED AS THE REGIME\'S PRAETORIAN GUARD. EVEN KHOMEINI HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIT THE GUARD SMOOTHLY INTO THE CURRENT SOCIAL OR GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE. AND SHOULD THE GUARD THROW ITS CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT BEHIND ONE FIGURE, HIS PRIMACY WOULD BE GIVEN A STRONG BOOST. 7. THE LONGER TERM: WHILE NON-CLERICAL ELEMENTS WILL HAVE A HARD TIME COMPETING IN THIS ARENA FOR A LONG TIME TO COME, THE CLERICS HAVE NOT INSTITUTIONALIZED CONTROL IN ANY DURABLE WAY. THE INSTABILITY PROVOKED BY INFIGHTING AMONG VARIOUS CLERICAL FACTIONS IS LIKELY TO BE INCREASED BY ECONOMIC TROUBLES AND OTHER STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES (E.G., CONTINUED MIGRATION TO THE CITIES). 8. WE THUS REGARD A POSTKHOMEINI CLERICAL REGIME AS ESSENTIALLY TRANSITIONAL. THE CHANCES SEEM GOOD THAT IT WILL GIVE WAY SOONER OR LATER TO A SINGLE STRONG LEADER. ASSUMING THAT THERE WILL BE NO MAJOR OUTSIDE INTERVENTION TO DEFLECT THIS NATURAL COURSE OF EVENTS, THE TRANSITION MANEUVERING COULD BE LENGTHY. THAT WOULD OPEN OPPORTUNITIES TO A BROADER RANGE OF PLAYERS. 9. IN THE END, HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT THE CHANCES FAVOR THE EMERGENCE OF A \"MAN ON HORSEBACK.\" WE WOULD EXPECT HIM TO ACT IN THE NAME OF ISLAM AND CLAIM TO DEFEND THE FRUITS OF THE REVOLUTION. AT PRESENT, THE MOST LIKELY INSTITUTION TO PRODUCE SUCH A FIGURE IS THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD. IF THE TRANSITION IS LONG ENOUGH, HOWEVER, SOMEONE COULD EMERGE FROM THE REGULAR MILITARY, DESPITE EFFORTS TO PREVENT ANY POPULAR HERO FROM USING THE WAR WITH IRAQ TO CATAPULT INTO PROMINENCE. AS YET WE ARE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL CANDIDATES. 10. POSSIBLE SOVIET ROLE: ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE ASSETS AND CAN BRING SOME PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE SUCCESSION SITUATION, WE DO NOT BELIEV THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO EXERT A DETERMINING INFLUENCE OVER THE COURSE OF EVENTS. THE TUDEH PARTY HAS BEEN CRIPPLED THROUGH ARRESTS AND EXECUTIONS, THOUGH ITS PRINCIPAL LEADERS ARE STILL ALIVE IN IRANIAN JAILS. WHILE THE SOVIETS MAY BE ENCOURAGING THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PARTY ORGANIZATION, THE PARTY HAS NEVER ENJOYED BROAD APPEAL. SIMILARLY, SOVIET ASSETS AMONG THE MINORITIES WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO INFLUENCE THE NATIONAL SCENE IN IRAN. 11. THE USSR CAN USE ITS CONTROL OVER LAND ROUTES TO IRAN, ABOUT 20 PERCENT OF WHICH PASS THROUGH SOVIET TERRITORY, TO EXERT PRESSURE. AND IT MIGHT BE ABLE TO MANIPULATE ARMS SALES, IF BY THAT TIME THE SOVIETS HAD MANAGED TO ESTABLISH A MAJOR SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. BUT PRESSING IN THIS WAY WOULD BE RISKY AND THE SOVIETS PROBABLY WOULD NOT MAKE AN ALL-OUT PUSH IN THIS DIRECTION. 12. WE DO NOT EXPECT A SOVIET MILITARY INVASION OF IRAN. A LIMITED STRIKE INTO THE BORDER PROVINCE OF AZERBAIJAN WOULD BE POSSIBLE IF IRAN WERE IN CHAOS AND APPEARED TO BE FRAGMENTING. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY ACT ONLY IF A US MILITARY RESPONSE APPEARED UNLIKELY. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY MIGHT ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY AZERBAIJAN IF THEY BELIEVED THE US WERE PREPARING TO SEIZE PORTIONS OF SOUTHERN IRAN. THE USSR MIGHT LAUNCH A PREEMPTIVE INVASION IF IT SUSPECTED US PREPARATIONS EITHER TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF PRO-AMERICAN ELEMENTS OR TO SECURE IRANIAN OIL FIELDS. 13. ALL THESE CONTINGENCIES APPEAR EXTREMELY DISTANT. THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO ANTICIPATE THAT THEY WOULD FACE A US MILITARY RESPONSE AS WELL AS DIFFICULT LOGISTICAL AND TERRAIN PROBLEMS. MOREOVER, THE SOVIET LEADERS PROBABLY PROJECT THAT IRANIAN RESISTANCE WOULD BE ON THE ORDER OF THEIR AFGHAN EXPERIENCE AND THAT MAJOR RESOURCES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PACIFY A COUNTRY AS LARGE AND POPULOUS AS IRAN. 14. OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE US? THE US WILL PROBABLY HAVE LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-KHOMEINI PERIOD. LEADING POLITICAL FIGURES APPARENTLY STILL BELIEVE THAT THE US HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE REVOLUTION AND ITS RESULTS. AS LONG AS WE APPEAR TO BE TILTING TOWARD IRAQ AND ARE ISRAEL\'S CLOSEST SUPPORTER, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO CHANGE THAT OPINION. IN ADDITION, THE REGIME SEES ITSELF LOCKED IN A STRUGGLE WITH THE US FOR CONTROL OF THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD. THUS THEY IDENTIFY THE US AS THE PRIMARY ENEMY TO BE DEFEATED IN THE EFFORT TO LIBERATE THE ISLAMIC WORLD FROM THE GRIP OF WESTERN CULTURAL VALUES. 15. THESE PERCEPTIONS PUT THE US IN A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT POSITION AS IRAN MOVES INTO THE POST-KHOMEINI ERA. ANY SUCCESSOR REGIME SEEMS DESTINED TO MAINTAIN ITSELF IN POWER IN THE NAME OF ISLAM AND THE REVOLUTION. THUS IT WILL HAVE A BUILT-IN ANTI-AMERICAN BIAS. IRAN MIGHT GROW LESS HOSTILE TO THE US OVER TIME IF WE WERE NOT SEEN AS WORKING AGAINST THE REGIME IN TEHRAN, E.G., BY ENCOURAGING THE CUT-OFF OF ARMS TO IRAN. BUT THIS WOULD BE A SLOW PROCESS AT BEST, AND IT COULD BE SET BACK BY EVENTS OVER WHICH WE WOULD HAVE NO CONTROL. 16. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: KHOMEINI\'S DEATH WOULD REMOVE ONE OF THE STAUNCHEST ADVOCATES IN IRAN OF WAR TO THE BITTER END. YET THE CLERICS ARE BY AND LARGE UNITED ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR, UNLESS IRAN CAN EMERGE WITH HONOR. THAT WOULD INCLINE MOST OF THEM TO INSIST ON THE OUSTER OF IRAQI PRESIDENT SADAM HUSSEIN AS A PRECONDITION FOR ENDING HOSTILITIES. 17. NONETHELESS, THE SUCCESSOR REGIME, ONCE IT FELT MORE OR LESS SOLIDLY IN CONTROL AT HOME, MIGHT BECOME MORE FLEXIBLE IN ITS ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR. TACTICS FOR FIGHTING AND TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE AMONG SEVERAL ISSUES THAT WILL DIVIDE THE REGIME LOYALISTS. OPPONENTS OF THE WAR ARE LIKELY TO BLAME ITS ADVOCATES FOR WEAKENING THE REGIME\'S BASE OF SUPPORT, FOR THE LARGE CASUALTIES, AND FOR DIVERSION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES. THE WAR\'S PROPONENTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WILL CHARGE THAT ITS OPPONENTS LACK REVOLUTIONARY ISLAMIC FERVOR AND ARE NOT ADHERING TO KHOMEINI\'S WISHES. 18. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, WE BELIVE THAT THE CHANCES OF ENDING THE WAR WILL RISE SOMEWHAT AFTER KHOMEINI DEPARTS. BUT IRAN\'S WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PEACE IS BY NO MEANS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. SHULTZ " "42","3/16/1985 14:02","85AMMAN2676","Embassy Amman","CONFIDENTIAL","","P 161402Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2603 INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY TUNIS AMCONSUL JERUSALEM ","C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 02676 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, KPAL, PREF, JO SUBJECT: JORDAN\'S REFUGEE CAMPS: ARAFAT SHINES AGAIN 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) - 2. UNRWA\'S JORDAN FIELD DIRECTOR HALLQVIST SAID HE AND THE CAMP DIRECTORS HAVE DETECTED A STRIKING TRANSFORMATION IN ATTITUDES TOWARD ARAFAT AND THE PLO AMONG PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE WEEKS FOLLOWING KING HUSSEIN\'S FEBRUARY 19 ADDRESS. IN THE LATTER HALF OF 1985, THE PLO\'S IMAGE IN THE CAMPS SANK TO A LOW EBB WITH RESIDENTS COMPLAINING ABOUT PLO INTERNECINE RIVALRY AND CORRUPTION, ARAFAT\'S WEAK LEADERSHIP AND DOUBLETALK, AND, PARTICULARLY, THE DRYING UP OF PLO MONEY (FOR SCHOLOARSHIPS, WIDOWS\' PENSIONS, PERSONAL LOANS, ETC.). THE DEPRESSED FORTUNES OF THE PLO WERE VISIBLE IN MANY WAYS: FATAH ACTIVISTS AMONG THE REFUGEES KEPT A LOW PROFILE, TWO UNRWA UNIONS OUSTED THEIR PRO-FATAH CHAIRMEN, AND THE NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS TO PLO OFFICES DROPPED TO A TRICKLE. AT THE SAME TIME, KING HUSSEIN GAINED RESPECT FOR HIS PEACE EFFORTS. REGARD FOR HASHEMITE RULE VIVIDLY MANIFESTED ITSELF IN NOVEMBER 1985 WHEN CROWN PRINCE HASSAN PAID AN UNANNOUNCED OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE AMMAN NEW CAMP (POLITICALLY THE MOST ACTIVE REFUGEE CAMP) THE DAY ARAFAT ARRIVED IN AMMAN. HASSAN QUICKLY ATTRACTED A LARGE AND FRIENDLY CROWD (ALBEIT WITH THE HELP OF THE EVER PRESENT SECURITY FORCES). CAMP NOTABLES AT THE TIME PLEDGED SUPPORT FOR THE HASHEMITES, POINTEDLY IGNORING MENTION OF THE PLO, AND RESIDENTS SPOKE WARMLY ABOUT THE VISIT FOR WEEKS AFTERWARD. - 3. THIS MOOD HAS CHANGED MARKEDLY. CAMP RESIDENTS INITIALLY WERE INDIFFERENT TO THE KING\'S SUSPENSION OF RELATIONS WITH THE PLO. THE ANTI-PALESTINIAN OUTBURST OF MANY EAST BANKERS HOWEVER AFFECTED THE EMOTIONS OF CAMP REFUGEES AS WELL AS OTHER PALESTINIANS. REFUGEES ALSO RESENTED THEIR ENFORCED APPEARANCES AT THE PALACE TO DEMONSTRATE \"SUPPORT\" FOR THE KING. SOME CAMP NOTABLES SAID SECURITY OFFICERS CAME TO THEIR HOMES DEMANDING THEIR ATTENDANCE EVEN BEFORE THE KING\'S SPEECH WAS BROADCAST. FURTHERMORE, CAMP RESIDENTS HAVE NOT MISSED HUSSEIN\'S LACK OF SUPPORT FROM THE ARAB WORLD FOLLOWING HIS SPEECH AND HAVE ALSO NOTED AN APPARENT LACK OF RESULTS IN THE KING\'S EFFORTS WITH SYRIA: ASSAD HAS YET TO VISIT AMMAN. A SENSE HAS DEVELOPED OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS THAT HUSSEIN HAS LOST ARAB BACKING, THAT HE HAS WRONGED ARAFAT, AND THAT HE HAS TRIED TO EXPLOIT THE PALESTINIANS. - 4. HALLQVIST VISITED DOZENS OF NOTABLES AT EACH OF THE CAMPS DURING THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS. ALMOST ALL EXPRESSED ADMIRATION AND SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT, SOMETHING ONE DID NOT HEAR A MONTH AGO. \"ARAFAT IS OUR LEADER,\" MOST SAID SIMPLY. HALLQVIST ASKED A NOTABLE IN IRBID WHAT HOPE FOR PEACE HE COULD EXPECT FROM ARAFAT. \"THERE IS NO HOPE FOR PEACE IN THIS GENERATION, BUT ARAFAT IS RIGHTLY EXPRESSING OUR JUST CAUSE,\" HE WAS TOLD. - 5. COMMENT: THE SHIFT IN ATTITUDES IN THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS MIRRORS, TO A GREAT EXTENT, THE SHIFT IN THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY AT LARGE. IN SUM, HUSSEIN\'S IMPLICIT CHALLENGE TO PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM CAUSED THE PALESTINIANS IN THE CAMPS TO CIRCLE THE WAGONS AROUND ARAFAT, DESPITE THEIR EARLIER IRRITATION WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE PLO\'S PERFORMANCE. BOEKER " "43","3/16/1985 15:08","85BEIRUT1653","Embassy Beirut","SECRET","","O 161508Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2224 AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY RIYADH NIACT IMMEDIATE ","S E C R E T BEIRUT 01653 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, LE, SY SUBJECT: SYRIA RATTLES ITS SABER 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT. 2. MOD SOURCES HAVE INFORMED EMBASSY OF THE FOLLOWING: SYRIAN LINES IN THE NORTH HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT CHANGED. HOWEVER, REDISPOSITION OF UNITS HAS TAKEN PLACE TO INCLUDE POSITIONING OF TWO STALIN MULTIPLE 36 TWO ROCKET LAUNCHERS AND A PLATOON (5) OF TANKS ON KEY TERRAIN FEATURE (OVERLOOKING VILLAGE OF IBRIE WHICH FACES THE CAZA OF JUBAYL (BYBLOS) WHICH IS JA\'JA\'S TURF.) ADDITIONALLY, WHAT APPEARS TO BE SYRIAN ARMORED BATTALION (20- 25 TANKS) HAS TAKEN UP POSITIONS BETWEEN BATROUN AND SHIKA. 3,000 TROOPS OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY ALSO HAVE MOVED INTO POSITIONS AROUND BISHRI, WHICH IS HOME VILLAGE OF JA\'JA\', AND THEY ARE FORTIFYING THESE POSITIONS. 3. COMMENT: ALL REDISPOSITIONS ARE WITHIN EXISTING SYRIAN LINES. THAT SAID, THEY SEND A CLEAR AND OBVIOUS SIGNAL. WE HAVE NO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF THIS INFORMATION. BUT IF THE SYRIANS USE FORCE AGAINST THE DISSIDENTS IT WILL HAVE DEVASTATING IMPACT ON THE ENTIRE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AND COULD WELL FORCE THEM TO RALLY ROUND THE FLAG CARRIED BY THE JA JA GROUP. WE WOULD ALSO BE BLAMED BY SOME--CITING OUR \"DEFACTO ALLIANCE\" WITH THE SYRIANS AGAINST THE DISSIDENTS--AND SUBJECTED TO APPEALS TO INTERCEDE WITH THE SYRIANS. 4. SYRIA MAY, INDEED, BE ONLY RATTLING ITS SABER AT THIS POINT. WASHINGTON AND DAMASCUS MIGHT NONETHELESS CONSIDER APPROACHING SARG TO CITE REPORTS OF SYRIAN REDISPOSITIONS AND TO SAY THAT CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IS WORKING POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE INTERNAL DISPUTE AND SYRIAN USE OF FORCE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND DAMAGING FOR UNITY AND STABILITY OF LEBANON. END COMMENT. 5. DAO REPORT IRR 6 857 0135 85 CONTAINS FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT. BARTHOLOMEW " "44","3/17/1985 10:48","85BEIRUT1668","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","85BEIRUT164\|85BEIRUT1653\|85DAMASCUS1787","O 171048Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2237 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 01668 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LE SUBJECT: SYRIAN EXERTS PRESSURE ON LEBANESE FORCE DISSIDENTS REFS: (A) DAMASCUS 1787, (B) BEIRUT 1653, (C) BEIRUT 164 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SYRIA CONTINUES TO EXERT POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE FORCES. STATEMENTS FROM DAMASCUS BY SYRIAN AND LEBANESE LEADERS HINT AT RETALIATION IF THE REVOLT CONTINUES. AFTER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD, FORMER PRESIDENT SULEIMAN FRANJIEH MET ON MARCH 16 WITH MINISTERS BARRI AND JUMBLATT IN DAMASCUS. AFTERWARD, THEY ISSUED A STATEMENT INCLUDING A VEILED THREAT: \"THE ACTION UNDERTAKEN IN CERTAIN REGIONS OF LEBANON BY A GROUP WITH SUSPECTED TIES TO ISRAEL AND SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES THREATENS THE UNITY, PEACE, AND EXISTENCE OF LEBANON AND COULD LEAD TO RENEWED CIVIL WAR.\" THIS IS ONLY THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF MENACING STATEMENTS ISSUING FROM THE SYRIAN CAPITAL. 3. ON THE MILITARY FRONT, THE SITUATION DE- SCRIBED IN REFTEL B CONTINUES. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF ANY INTENTION TO ENGAGE LF UNITS AT MADFOUN. TO THE CONTRARY, L\'ORIENT- LE JOUR REPORTS PM KARAMI SAYING PRIVATELY THAT SYRIAN FORCES WOULD NOT INTERVENE WITHOUT AN OFFICIAL GOL REQUEST. 4. JA\' JA\' AND HIS DISSIDENTS ARE RESPONDING TO THIS SYRIAN INTIMIDATION. THEY SHOW GREAT CONCERN AT SYRIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS (SEPTEL). IN ADDITION, THE CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT (CDM) EMERGENCY COUNCIL STATED ON MARCH 16, FOR THE THIRD CONSECUTIVE DAY, ITS AVERSION TO THE USE OF FORCE AND ITS PREFERENCE FOR A POLITICAL ROLE. IT ALSO DECLARED ITS WILLINGNESS TO OPEN CONTACTS WITH THE SYRIANS AND ALL OTHER CONCERNED PARTIES. COMMAND COUNCIL MEMBER KARIM PAKRADOUNI HAS NOW HAD TWO CONVERSATIONS WITH SYRIAN FIRST VP KHADDAM IN WHICH HE DENIED ANY CDM TIES TO ISRAEL. THE MOVEMENT SEEMS TO BE MAKING THE MAXIMUM EFFORT TO ALLEVIATE SYRIAN CONCERNS. 5. IN RESPONSE TO PM KARAMI\'S MARCH 15 BLAST AT THE DISSIDENTS (SEPTEL), THE JA\'JA\' FORCES HAVE PROPOSED THE FORMATION OF A CHRISTIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL TO SERVE AS A FORUM FOR UNIQUELY CHRISTIAN VOICES. THIS IS AN IDEA WHICH HAS BEEN DUSTED OFF AT INTERVALS SINCE 1981. ONLY TIME WILL TELL IF IT IS ONCE AGAIN A NON-STARTER. 6. THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND REMAINS TENSE BUT QUIET. TRAFFIC CONTINUES UNIMPEDED ALONG THE COASTAL HIGHWAY FROM BEIRUT AS FAR NORTH AS MADFOUN. AT MADFOUN, HOWEVER, WHILE NORTH- BOUND TRAFFIC IS PERMITTED THROUGH, TRAFFIC FROM TRIPOLI SOUTH TOWARD BEIRUT IS HALTED AND TURNED BACK. BARTHOLOMEW " "45","3/18/1985 14:30","85BEIRUT1676","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 181430Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2246 AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 01676 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LE SUBJECT: CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT RESPONDS TO CONTINUING SYRIA PRESSURE REF: FBIS NICOSIA 17 MARCH 85 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT. 2. THE FOCUS OF SYRIAN PRESSURE ON DISSIDENT CHRISTIANS HAS SHIFTED TO THE POLITICAL ARENA AND THE USE OF LEBANESE MUSLIM LEADERS. SYRIAN VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM HAS CANCELLED HIS MARCH 18 VISIT TO BEIRUT. THE WEEKLY WEDNESDAY MEETING OF THE LEBANESE CABINET HAS ALSO BEEN POSTPONED BECAUSE MINISTERS JUMBLATT AND BARRI WOULD NOT ATTEND. JUMBLATT IS IN MOSCOW, WHILE BARRI CLAIMS THAT THE ROAD TO BAABDA IS UNSAFE. THE IMPLICATION IS THAT THE ROAD WILL NOT BE SAFE UNTIL THE CHRISTIAN DISSIDENTS ARE BROUGHT INTO LINE. IN A SPEECH IN MUKHTARA SUNDAY TO COMMEMORATE THE EIGHTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ASSASSINATION OF KAMEL JUMBLATT, WALID JUMBLATT URGED HIS SUPPORTERS TO REASON FOR A POSSIBLE NEW ROUND OF FIGHTING. HE THREATENED TO \"BREAK THE NECKS\" OF THE CHRISTIAN REBELS. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR LATE TODAY (3/18), BARRI IS EXPECTED TO STEP UP THE POLITICAL PRESSURE AGAINST JA\'JA\"S CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT (CDM). 3. IN THE FACE OF THIS CONTINUING PRESSURE, RECONCILIATION EFFORTS CONTINUE WITHIN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. A TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH JOSEPH AL-HASLEM, FORMER MINISTER AND PHALANGE POLITICAL ALLY MICHEL AL-MURR, AND CDM EMERGENCY COMMITTEE MEMBER KARIM PAKRADOUNI HAS BEEN MEETING TO DRAFT A POLITICAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FACTIONS. L\'ORIENT-LE JOUR REPORTS THAT THIS COMMITTEE HAS SUCCEEDED IN HAMMERING OUT THE OUTLINES OF AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS: - KEEPING CURRENT LEADERS IN PLACE - RESTRUCTURING THE PHALANGE PARTY - CLARIFYING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PHALANGE AND THE LF - MAINTAINING THE AUTONOMY OF THE LF - PUSHING FOR THE RAPID CREATION OF A CHRISTIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT HAVE NOT BEEN RELEASED PENDING THE MARCH 18 MEETING OF THE PHALANGE PARTY POLITICAL BUREAU. 4. IN A MARCH 17 PRESS CONFERENCE HELD IN JOUNIEH, PAKRADOUNI TRIED TO PRESENT THE CDM IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD ALLAY SYRIAN CONCERNS. REFTEL PROVIDES THE TEXT OF THE CONFERENCE. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAJOR POINTS: A. CDM\'S MAJOR PRINCIPLES ARE 1) SUPPORT FOR THE UNITY OF LEBANON AND ITS FULL LIBERATION; 2) SUPPORT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW FORMULA FOR MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS; AND 3) ACTION TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. B. CDM\'S \"UPPERMOST OBJECTIVE\" IS THE SPEEDY ELECTION OF A NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL TO SERVE AS A CHRISTIAN PARLIAMENT. C. CDM HAS RECEIVED NO AID FROM ISRAEL. HOWEVER, PAKRADOUNI QUALIFIED THIS DENIAL BY ADDING, \"THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP HAS NOT YET DECIDED ITS POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL.\" D. CDM DOES NOT INTEND TO HARM THE PRESIDENT OR THE PRESIDENCY. HE STATED, \"WE WANT THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC TO REMAIN ABOVE PARTY AND SECTARIAN DISPUTES. WE WANT HIM TO BE THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC-OF ALL LEBANON- AND WE DO NOT WANT HIM TO BE MERELY THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHRISTIANS OR OF MILITIAS.\" E. CDM IS A \"COUP\" WITHIN THE LF AND THE PHALANGE PARTY AIMED AT MAKING THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY MORE DEMOCRATIC. F. CDM SEEKS DIRECT MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN NEGOTIATIONS, ESPECIALLY WITH MINISTERS BARRI AND JUMBLATT, AIMING TOWARD A \"PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE CHARTER.\" G. CONTACTS WITH THE SYRIANS WILL CONTINUE. PAKRADOUNI WILL MAKE A THIRD CALL TO SYRIAN VP KHADDAM. FURTHER, HE STATED THAT HIS \"COMMUNICATIONS WITH SYRIAN OFFICIALS PERMIT ME TO SAY THAT THERE WILL BE NO SYRIAN INCURSION INTO OUR AREAS.\" H. CDM OPPOSES THE REMOVAL OF THE BARBARA CHECKPOINT. 5. COMMENT: IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE CDM ORIGINALLY CRITICIZED PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FOR DEALING WITH THE SYRIANS AND FOR MAKING CONCESSIONS AS PRESIDENT THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE MADE AS A STRICTLY CHRISTIAN LEADER. NOW, FACED WITH THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF THEIR SITUATION, THE CDM LEADERSHIP IS BOTH DEALING DIRECTLY WITH THE SYRIANS AND ENCOURAGING PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO REMAIN ABOVE THE SECTARIAN FRAY. END COMMENT. 6. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HAS ALSO SURFACED CONCERNING THE STATUS OF TITULAR LF COMMANDER FUAD ABU NADER. IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, PAKRADOUNI ASSERTED THAT, \"FUAD ABU NADER IS STILL THE COMMANDER OF THE LEBANESE FORCES. HE HAS SUPPORTED IN AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT THE POLICY OF THE UPRISING WITHIN THE LEBANESE FORCES. A TEMPORARY COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP CALLED THE \'EMERGENCY COMMITTEE\' HAS BEEN FORMED. WE WILL SOON ANNOUNCE A NEW LEADERSHIP FOR THIS COMMITTEE.\" ABU NADER IS THUS STILL FUNCTIONING AS A LEADER OF THE LF, THOUGH THE DEGREE OF HIS PRESENT INFLUENCE AND HIS FUTURE PROSPECTS REMAIN UNCLEAR. BARTHOLOMEW "	Success: CSV parsed	null	4,855
46	3/18/1985 18:23	85BEIRUT1683	Embassy Beirut	SECRET	[]	O 181823Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2249 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 01683 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, LE SUBJECT: SOLVING THE CHRISTIAN CRISIS: THE PHALANGE VIEW 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR CALLED ON MINISTER OF PTT JOSEPH HASHEM MARCH 18. HASHEM IS A PHALANGE PARTY LEADER AND CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. HE IS ON THE COMMITTEE OF THREE (WITH KARIM PAKKRADOUNI REPRESENTING THE DISSIDENTS AND MICHEL MURR AS THE THIRD MAN WITH LINKS BETWEEN BOTH SIDES) THAT HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH HAMMERING OUT A SOLUTION. HASHEM SAID HE HAD JUST LEFT A PHALANGE POLITICAL BUREAU MEETING TO MEET WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND WOULD SHORTLY BE GOING INTO A MEETING OF THE THREE-MAN COMMITTEE TO FINISH A COMMUNIQUE WHICH WOULD \"REASSURE EVERYONE.\" THE CHIEF ELEMENT OF THE COMPROMISE APPEARS TO BE A RESTRUCTURING\" OF THE PHALANGE AND THE LF WHICH WOULD GIVE THE LF DISSIDENTS MORE OF A VOICE AND MORE INDEPENDENCE. HASHEM SAID THAT THE USG HAD CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AND APPRECIATED WHAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN SAYING. AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL SOLUTION BUT NOTED IT SHOULD NOT COME AT PRICE OF WEAKENING THE POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT, OR THE COHESION OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, AND THE COMMITTMENT TO REALISM AND FLEXIBILITY IN THE POLITICAL REFORM PROCESS. END SUMMARY. 3. HASHEM ARGUED THAT THERE WERE NO MAJOR POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WITH THE DISSIDENTS, WITNESS THEIR OWN CONTACTS WITH SYRIA (A REFERENCE TO PAKRADOUNI\'S DISCUSSIONS WITH KHADDAM OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS.) HE SAID THE PHALANGE PARTY STRUCTURE HAD NOT BEEN REVAMPED FOR TEN YEARS AND IT WAS NORMAL TO THINK OF RESTRUCTURING IT NOW IN A WAY THAT WOULD GIVE THE DISSIDENTS MORE PARTICIPATION AND POSITION, POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND FINANCIAL. THIS WAS THE FOCUSS OF THE CURRENT COMPROMISE EFFORT. THERE WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE A \"NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL\" WHICH WOULD BE A BROADENED LEBANESE FRONT REPRESENTING ALL CHRISTIAN GROUPS. IT WOULD BE ADVISORY AND NOT \"PARLIAMENTARY\" (AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT UNDERCUT THE PRESIDENT\'S AUTHORITY OR SMACK OF AN INDEPENDENT CHRISTIAN \"CANTON\".) HASHEM SAID THE CHIEF CONCERN WAS THAT THE LEBANESE FORCE MOVEMENT THREATENED TO UNDERCUT THE PRESIDENT, TRIGGER ADVERSE REACTIONS FROM THE LEBANESE MOSLEMS AND FROM SYRIA, AND UNDERMINE THE EFFORTS AT REACHING POLITICAL ACCOMODATION. HE KNEW THE USG SHARED THESE CONCERNS AND THE AMBASSADOR WAS MAKING THIS CLEAR TO \"ALL SIDES.\" 4. HASHEM SAID HE THOUGHT CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE THREE-MAN COMMITTEE. HE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE JUST NOW IN THE SESSION OF THE PHALANGE POLITICAL BUREAU WHICH HE HAD LEFT TO MEET WITH THE AMBASSADOR. HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH MURR AND PAKRADOUNI UPON LEAVING THE MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND THOUGHT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH A COMMUNIQUE WHICH WOULD \"REASSURE EVERYONE.\" 5. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT SINCE HASHEM WAS SO WELL AWARE OF THE USG VIEWS ON THE SITUATION HE WOULD NOT REPEAT THEM IN DETAIL. HE HOPED THAT HASHEM WAS RIGHT THAT THE LF DISSIDENTS DID NOT DIFFER GREATLY FROM THE MAIN POLITICAL LINES THE PRESIDENT AND THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY WERE ON. THAT SAID, MUCH OF WHAT THEY SAID IN THE PAST, AND INDEED NOW, RAISED QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THEY WOULD SHOW THE REALISM AND FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE NATION\'S DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS STARTING WITH THE CHRISTIAN PRESIDENCY, WORK POLITICAL REFORMS WITH THE MOSLEMS, PRESERVE THE WELL-BEING OF THE CHRISTIANS, AND CONTAIN SYRIAN INFLUENCE. IF THE COMPROMISES BEING WORKED ON IN THE THREE-MAN COMMITTEE BEGAN A PROCESS WHICH WOULD UNDERCUT THESE OBJECTIVES, THEN IT WOULD MEAN A PYRRHIC VICTORY FOR THE CHRISTIANS AND FOR LEBANON. 6. HASHEM SAID THAT HE FELT THINGS WERE ON TRACT TOWARD A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD ASSURE EVERYONE (INCLUDING THE MOSLEMS AND SYRIA) THAT LEBANON\'S \"POLITICAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL LINE\" WILL BE MAINTAINED. HE SAID HE WAS NEVERTHELESS CONCERNED THAT SOME INDIVIDUALS AMONG THE LF DISSIDENTS ESPECIALLY IDENTIFIED WITH ISRAEL COULD OBSTRUCT THE PROCESS. HE THOUGHT THE USG COULD HELP HEAD THIS OFF BY GETTING THE RIGHT WORD TO THESE IN- DIVIDUALS AND TO THE ISRAELIS. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT A MAJOR FACTOR IN EITHER THE GENESIS OR THE DIRECTION OF THE LF DISSIDENT MOVEMENT. DAVID KINCHE HAD YESTERDAY MADE THIS PUBLIC AND UNDERSCORED THE LIMITS OF THE ISRAELI INTEREST AND ROLE IN WHAT WAS HAPPENING INSIDE THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. IN FACT, THE ISRAELIS HAVE NO INTEREST IN SIGNIFICANTLY \"RE-ENGAGING\" IN LEBANON BY PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN THIS FRACAS -- OR ITS CONSEQUENCES. THE ISRAELIS ARE ON THEIR WAY OUT OF LEBANON, AND NOT ON THEIR WAY BACK IN (HASHEM NODDED AGREEMENT TO THIS LAST STATEMENT.) 7. HASHEM CLOSED CONVERSATION BY REFERRING TO AMBASSADOR\'S UPCOMING MEETING WITH KARIM PAKRADOUNI (ANNOUNCED OVER THE LF CONTROLLED VOL.) HE REITERATED THAT THE U.S. HAS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. HE, THEREFORE, THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE AMBASSADOR MAKE CLEAR IN ANY CONTACTS WITH THE DISSIDENTS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT UNDERMINE LEBANON\'S \"POLITICAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL LINE\", AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE NO SUPPORT FROM THE OUTSIDE, FROM EITHER THE U.S. OR OTHERS IF THEY DO. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD MADE THE USG VIEW CLEAR IN ALL HIS CONTACTS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. 8. COMMENTS: HASHEM WAS OBVIOUSLY TIRED FROM THE UNENDING SERIES OF LATE-NIGHT MEETINGS THAT HE AND ALL OTHER ACTORS IN THE MELEE HAVE BEEN LIVING THROUGH. HE DID NOT APPEAR SPECIFICALLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE POLITICAL COMPROMISE THAT IS SHAPING UP, AND CERTAINLY DID NOT CONVEY THE IMAGE OF A MAN READY TO CLAIM SUCCESS IN PUTTING THE GENI BACK IN THE BOTTLE. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE WHAT PAKRADOUNI HAS TO SAY IN HIS MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR LATER TODAY. END COMMENT. BARTHOLOMEW " "47","3/19/1985 17:52","85LONDON6332","Embassy London","UNCLASSIFIED","","O 191752Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9116 INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE ","UNCLAS LONDON 06332 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PREL, UNSC, LE, IS, XF SUBJECT: EVENING STANDARD ARTICLE ON US CAPTIVES IN LEBANON REF: RAPHEL/STANTON TELCON 31985 1. PARAGRAPH 2 CONTAINS ARTICLE FROM THE STANDARD OF MARCH 19, 1985 ENTITLED \"TORTURE ORDEAL OF KIDNAPPED US DIPLOMAT\". THE ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN BY THEODORE LEVITE IN TEL AVIV. 2. BEGIN TEXT: AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT KIDNAPPED BY LEBANESE EXTREMISTS IS BEING PARADED AROUND THE COUNTRY IN AN OPEN TRUCK AND PUBLICLY TORTURED AND HUMILIATED. THE MAN SAID BY THE KIDNAPPERS TO BE THE HEAD OF THE CIA IN BEIRUT, WAS SEIZED LAST MARCH BY THE FANATICAL SHI\'ITE HIZBOLLAH ORGANIZATION. THE CIA CARAVAN--AS THE KIDNAPPERS CALL IT--GOES FROM ONE SHI\'ITE VILLAGE TO ANOTHER IN LEBANONS BEKA\'A VALLEY ATTRACTING HUGE JEERING CROWDS WHILE THE PRIZE HOSTAGE IS FORCED TO TAKE PART IN THE \"SHOW\". SHI\'ITE SOURCES IN SOUTH LEBANON REPORTING THE STORY POINT OUT THAT HIZBOLLAH IS TOTALLY CONTROLLED BY IRAN AND ACTS ONLY ON ITS DIRECT ORDERS. THE ORGANIZATION HAS ADMITTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WEEK- END KIDNAPPING OF TWO BRITONS AND THE ASSOCIATED PRESS BUREAU CHIEF IN BEIRUT MR. TERRY ANDERSON. -- THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE CAUSED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HURRIEDLY TO EVACUATE THE REMAINING AMERICAN DIPLOMATS FROM BEIRUT TO CYPRUS. THE HIZBOLLAH GROUP IS BELIEVED TO BE CURRENTLY HOLDING FIVE AMERICANS, TWO BRITONS, AND SEVERAL OTHER FOREIGNERS. UNITED NATIONS SOURCES IN SOUTH LEBANON POINT OUT THAT IT IS THE SHI\'ITE FANATICS WHO PRESENT THEIR HOSTAGE AS A CIA CHIEF--SOMETHING THE AMERICANS HAVE NEVER ADMITTED BEYOND CONFIRMING THAT ONE OF THEIR DIPLOMATS IN BEIRUT IS MISSING, BELIEVED TO BE HELD HOSTAGE. THE KIDNAPPED AMERICAN IS THOUGHT TO BE MR. WILLIAM BUCKLEY, A POLITICAL OFFICER AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT. HE WAS SEIZED IN WEST BEIRUT NEAR HIS EMBASSY WHEN HE WAS FORCED INTO A WHITE CAR AND DRIVEN AWAY AT GUN-POINT. A VIDEO FILM RELEASED IN JANUARY SHOWED HIM AND TWO OTHER KIDNAPPED AMERICANS, MR. JEREMY LEVIN AND MR. BENJAMIN WEIR. -- MEANWHILE ISRAEL WAS PREPARING A TOUGH NEW DEFENCE LINE ON ITS BORDER WITH LEBANON TODAY, AIMED AT PREVENTING TERRORIST INCURSIONS AFTER THE ARMY WITHDRAWS. MILITARY CHIEFS SAY THE WITHDRAWAL COULD COME AS QUICKLY AS JUNE DESPITE OFFICIAL ESTIMATES THAT ISRAELI SOLDIERS WILL BE OUT OF LEBANON BY SEPTEMBER. ARMY ENGINEERS ARE WORKING DAY AND NIGHT IN THE NEW DEFENCE LINE, MOST OF THE DETAILS OF WHICH ARE HIGHLY SECRET. ONE OFFICER SAID, \"WE\'RE NOT BUILDING A GREAT WALL OF CHINA, BUT OUR AIM IS TO ENSURE THAT NO MADMEN DRIVING A CAR BOMB WILL BE ABLE TO GET INTO ISRAEL.\" SPORADIC FIGHTING ERUPTED TODAY BETWEEN THE LEBANESE ARMY AND THE RIGHT-WING CHRISTIAN MILITIAMEN NEAR THE SOUTHERN CITY OF SIDON AFTER SEVERAL HOURS OF CLASHES IN THE AREA YESTERDAY. END TEXT. 3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PRICE " "48","3/20/1985 13:07","85BEIRUT1725","Embassy Beirut","UNCLASSIFIED","","R 201307Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2276 INFO AMEMBASSY BERN ","UNCLAS BEIRUT 01725 E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR TAGS: PTER, PREL, LE SUBJECT: FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD 17 MARCH STATEMENT 1. AP PROVIDED EMBASSY WITH FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD STATEMENT AS TELEPHONED MARCH 17 TO REUTERS AND AFP. 2. BEGIN TEXT: \"THE ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION IN THE NAME OF GOD THE ALL MERCIFUL. THE PUNISHMENT OF THOSE IS THE CURSE OF GOD, THE ANGELS AND ALL PEOPLE. THE DETENTION OF TERRY ANDERSON, BRIAN LEVICK AND JERRY (GEOFFRY?) NASH COMES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST AMERICA AND ITS AGENTS. WE ARE DEFINITE THAT ISLAMIC BEIRUT IS FULL OF AGENTS FROM ALL SIDES AND ACCORDINGLY WE ARE WORKING DAY AND NIGHT TO PURGE OUR REGION OF ANY SUBVERSIVE ELEMENT OF THE MOSSAD, CIA OR ALLIED INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. WE ADDRESS A FINAL WARNING TO FOREIGN NATIONALS RESIDING IN OUR ISLAMIC REGIONS TO RESPECT OUR HOSPITALITY AND NOT TO EXPLOIT THEIR PRESENCE AMONG US TO UNDERTAKE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST US. ASSUMING THE PROFESSION OF A JOURNALIST, MERCHANT, INDUSTRIALIST, SCIENTIST AND RELIGIOUS MAN WILL FROM NOW ON BE OF NO AVAIL TO SPIES STAYING AMONG US. THEY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED, AND THEIR PUNISHMENT IS WELL KNOWN. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE LEARNED THAT SWITZERLAND IS PLANNING TO BUY WEAPONS AND PILOTLESS RECONNAISSANCE PLANES FROM THE ZIONIST STATE. WE WARN BERNE AGAINST MAKING SUCH A STEP AS IT WILL REMOVE FROM IT ITS NEUTRAL CHARACTER AND THREATEN ITS INTERESTS, ESTABLISHMENTS AND NATIONALS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAMIC AND WESTERN WORLD.\" \"WE HAVE DELAYED RELEASING THIS STATEMENT UNTIL THE THREE WERE TAKEN OUTSIDE BEIRUT.\" END TEXT. 3. INDIVIDUAL TAKING CALL SAID IT WAS FROM THE \"USUAL\" MAN WHO CALLED, SPEAKING LEBANESE ACCENTED ARABIC, ABOUT 1900 ON MARCH 17. BARTHOLOMEW " "49","3/30/1985 8:31","85BEIRUT1952","Embassy Beirut","SECRET","","R 300831Z MAR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2440 INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE ","S E C R E T BEIRUT 01952 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, LE SUBJECT: JA\'JA\'-PHALANGE STALEMATE DRAGGING OUT 1. S-ENTIRE TEXT. 2. PHALANGE POLITBURO MEMBER ALFRED MAHDI, WHO REMAINS PERSONALLY CLOSE TU JA\'JA\', 29 MARCH PROVIDED CHARGE WHAT WE SENSE IS ACCURATE WRAP-UP OF CURRENT STATE OF PLAY BETWEEN JA\'JA\' FORCES AND PHALANGE. 3. MAHDI SAID CURRENT INTERMINABLE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT REORGANIZED PHALANGE PARTY, ENLARGED LEBANESE FRONT, AND NEW CHRISTIAN COUNCIL REPRESENT DESIRE OF BOTH CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT (CDM) AND PHALANGE TO STRING OUT NEGOTIATIONS. 4. PHALANGE SEES TIME AS BEING ON ITS SIDE AS IT ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT DISAFFECTION AND SPLITS IN CDM RESULTING FROM GROWING AWARENESS OF LACK OF SPECIFIC REALISTIC POLICIES AND OF DANGERS CDM HAS CREATED OF SYRIAN INTERVENTION AND WEAKENED CHRISTIAN UNIT. 5. CDM SEES TIME ON ITS SIDE AS IT ATTEMPTS TO SEDUCE REMAINING GEMAYEL BACKERS AMONG LF IN METN, TO REASSURE SYRIANS WHILE OPENING UP DIRECT CONTACT WITH THEM (NUMEROUS SOURCES REPORT HOBEIKA HAS REGULAR CONTACT WITH RIFFAT), AND TO STRENGTHEN ITS APPEAL AT GRASSROOTS LEVEL. (WITNESS JA\'JA\'S SFEECH TO STUDENTS BEIRUT). 6. MAHDI BELIEVES THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR THIS SPARRING AND STALLING AND THAT TWO SIDES MUST NOW BEGIN TO GRAPPLE WITH REAL PROBLEMS AND SEEK GENUINE SOLUTIONS. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT SEEN GEMAYEL SINCE MARCH 14, HE BELIEVES GEMAYEL SHARES HIS VIEW THAT TWO SIDES MUST SERIOUSLY PURSUE RESOLUTION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES. IF NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE TO DRAG ON UNCONCLUSIVELY, MAHDI SAID, ALL DANGERS PREDICTED BY BOTH SIDES WILL COME TRUE -- SYRIAN INTERVENTION, WEAKENED AND DIVIDED CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, SHARP MUSLIM REACTION, ETC. IN ADDITION, MAHDI SAID INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS SITUATION IN SOUTH, CUTTING OFF OF NORTH, AND DEGRADATION OF SECURITY IN WEST BEIRUT, CREATES BACKDROP OF EVENTS WHICH REQUIRES THAT RESOLUTION OF THIS INTERNAL CHRISTIAN QUARREL COME RAPIDLY. 7. COMMENT: MAHDI\'S COMMENTS EXPLAIN IN PART LIMITED PROGRESS MURR/HASHIM/PAKRADUNI COMMITTEE HAS MADE IN LAST WEEK, AND OFFER LITTLE OPTIMISM FOR NEAR TERM PROGRESS. LYNE " "50","4/1/1985 11:50","85BEIRUT1974","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","85BEIRUT1961","O 011150Z APR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2456 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 01974 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IS, LE, SY, US SUBJECT: FURTHER DETERIORATION IN SOUTH LEBANON REF: BEIRUT 1961 1. (U) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE SIDON AREA CONTINUED ON MARCH 30-31 CAUSING NUMEROUS CASUALTIES. ACCORDING TO MOST REPORTS REACHING BEIRUT, THE FIGHTING, WHICH FOLLOWS RECENT LF-LAF CLASHES IN THE AREA (REFTEL), INCLUDED THE STRONG, DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF ARMED PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS FOR THE FIRST TIME. 2. (U) WIDELY PORTRAYED HERE AS PART OF AN ISRAELI PLAN TO REDISTRIBUTE THE POPULATION OF SOUTH LEBANON AND TO FORM A PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN BORDER SECURITY STRIP, THE CLASHES IN SIDON HAVE PREOCCUPIED LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS OVER THE WEEKEND. PRIME MINISTER KARAMI CALLED INDIRECTLY ON THE U.S. TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO HALT THE ALLEGED ISRAELI PLAN. SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF GENERAL KHOLI IS EXPECTED IN BEIRUT TODAY, APRIL 1, TO DISCUSS RECENT POLITICAL AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 2. (U) FIGHTING INTENSIFIED IN THE SIDON AREA ON MARCH 30-31 BETWEEN LF MILITIAMEN AND LAF UNITS. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HOWEVER, THE LAF\'S ROLE WAS ECLIPSED WHEN PALESTINIAN UNITS BASED IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS TOOK A STRONG, ACTIVE ROLE IN THE FIGHTING AGAINST THE LF. 3. U) ON MARCH 30, THE LF REPORTEDLY BEGAN HEAVY, ALMOST CONTINUOUS SHELLING OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS AT AYN AL-HILWAH AND MIYAH MIYAH AND OF OTHER RESIDENTIAL AREAS IN SIDON. PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIAN FORCES, BACKED BY OTHER MUSLIM MILITIAS, RESPONDED AND HEAVY FIGHTING ENSUED. SIMULTANEOUSLY, CLASHES BETWEEN THE LF AND LAF WERE REPORTED ALONG A LINE INCLUDING KANAYA, KAHAYA, HLALIYAH, AND BRAMIYAH. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF AMAL UNITS TAKING PART IN THE FIGHTING IN SIDON, BUT WE HAVE NO DETAILED INFORMATION. THE MARCH 30 CASUALTY TOLL AMOUNTED TO TWENTY-EIGHT KILLED AND FORTY WOUNDED, MOSTLY CIVILIANS. 4. (U) ON MARCH 31, THE FIGHTING CONTINUED, WITH THE MOST INTENSIVE ACTION CENTERED AROUND THE AYN AL-HILWAH REFUGEE CAMP. ACCORDING TO FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS CITED IN THE LOCAL PRESS, THE CAMP CAME UNDER HEAVY SHELLING FROM LF ARTILLERY POSITIONS NEAR JEZZIN. HEAVY FIGHTING WAS ALSO REPORTED BETWEEN LF UNITS AND LAF POSITONS ON MAR ELIAS HILL. THE MARCH 31 CASUALTY TOLL AMOUNTED TO FIVE KILLED AND FIFTEEN WOUNDED. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS FLEEING THE CAMPS FOR SIDON ITSELF AND OF SUNNI AND CHRISTIAN RESIDENTS OF SIDON MOVING NORTHWARD TO BEIRUT. 5. (U) ELSEWHERE IN THE SOUTH, ISRAELI UNITS REPORTEDLY CROSSED BACK INTO PREVIOUSLY EVACUATED TERRITORY FOR THE SIXTH TIME AS PART OF A DRAGNET OPERATION IN THE IQLIM AL-TIFFAH REGION SOUTH OF SIDON. LENGTHY LOCAL PRESS REPORTS INDICATE TWENTY-THREE PERSONS KILLED AND FORTY-FIVE PERSONS WOUNDED, MOSTLY IN THE VILLAGE OF JBAA. 6. (LOU) IN THE ONLY OTHER SIGNIFICANT FIGHTING OVER THE WEEKEND, LAF UNITS EXCHANGED ARTILLERY FIRE WITH PSP MILITIAMEN ON MARCH 30 ALONG THE SUQ AL-GHARB/AYTAT RIDGELINE FRONT SOUTHEAST OF BEIRUT. TWO LAF SOLDIERS WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED. WHEN THE SHELLING SPILLED OVER ONTO THE EAST-BEIRUT RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF BAABDA, HAZIMIYAH, AND MKALLAS, SEVERAL SHELLS HIT JUST OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER OF THE AMBASSADOR\'S RESIDENCE AT YARZE. EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAD ALREADY TAKEN REFUGE IN THE SHELTER. 7. (U) EFFORTS TO HALT THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON PREOCCUPIED LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS THROUGHOUT THE WEEKEND. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, FOLLOWING A MEETING ON MARCH 30, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, PRIME MINISTER KARAMI, AND SENIOR LAF OFFICERS DECIDED TO REINFORCE LEBANESE ARMY UNITS IN THE SOUTH, IN PART WITH EQUIPMENT NOW BEING DELIVERED FROM THE U.S. MINISTERS HOSS AND BARRI, WHO TRAVELED TO DAMASCUS MARCH 31 TO MEET WITH SARG VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM AND DRUZE LEADER JUMBLATT, HAVE DEMANDED SUCH A REINFORCEMENT OF LAF UNITS IN THE SOUTH FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. 8. (U) FOLLOWING THE MARCH 30 MEETING, PRIME MINISTER KARAMI ACCUSED ISRAEL OF PROVOKING THE VIOLENCE IN SIDON \"IN THE HOPE OF OBTAINING A NEW DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION (ON A CONFESSIONAL BASIS) AND EVENTUALLY ESTABLISHING A BUFFER ZONE (ALONG THE BORDER STRIP).\" STATING THAT THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH MUST BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT, KARAMI SAID THAT THE GOL WOULD UNDERTAKE CONTACTS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. 9. (U) NOTING THAT \"THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR CAN ACT TO CLEAN UP THE SITUATION,\" KARAMI ADDED THAT THE GOL HAD NOT/NOT BEEN INFORMED OF A VISIT TO LEBANON BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY DURING THE LATTER\'S FORTHCOMING TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST. 10. (U) SHIITE AMAL LEADER NABIH BARRI DENOUNCED THE INTENSIFICATION OF FIGHTING IN SIDON IN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME WORDS AS KARAMI. \"ISRAEL,\" HE SAID, \"AIMS AT PROVOKING A NEW DEMOGRAPHIC REDISTRIBUTION AND TO RESHAPE ITS FRONTIER WITH LEBANON SO THAT THE CHRISTIANS IN SIDON AND JEZZIN ARE MOVED TO THE BORDER ZONE AND THAT THE MUSLIMS, MORE PRECISELY THE SHIITES, ARE FORCED BACK INTO THE INTERIOR OF LEBANON.\" \"IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT,\" BARRI ADDED, \"THAT ONE CAN UNDERSTAND THE RECENT EVENTS IN SIDON AND ORDERS WHICH WERE GIVEN TO THE \'INTIFADA\' (I.E., JA\'JA\'S CHRISTIAN DECISION MOVEMENT)...\" 11. (U) IN A MARCH 31 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SARG PRESIDENT ASSAD, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AGREED TO RECEIVE A SYRIAN ENVOY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN SIDON AS WELL AS RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF GENERAL KHOLI IS EXPECTED TO MEET WITH GEMAYEL TODAY, APRIL 1. 12. (C) COMMENT. THE CONTRADICTORY AND TENDENTIOUS REPORTS REACHING BEIRUT ABOUT THE FIGHTING IN SIDON ARE DIFFICULT TO UNRAVEL AND EVALUATE. PALESTINIAN UNITS DO APPEAR TO BE TAKING AN ACTIVE PART IN THE CLASHES. IN SHORT, THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH APPEARS TO BE DETERIORATING, AS EVERYONE HAD FEARED, INTO A HEIGHTENED LEBANESE/ISRAELI CONFLICT AND BITTER INTERCOMMUNAL CLASHES WITH PALESTINIAN INVOLVEMENT. LYNE " "51","4/2/1985 13:47","85BEIRUT1997","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","85BEIRUT1974","O 021347Z APR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2472 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 01997 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SREF, IS, LE, SY SUBJECT: DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON REF: BEIRUT 1974 1. (C) SUMMARY. ON APRIL 1, FIGHTING CONTINUED BETWEEN LF, LAF, AND PALESTINIAN FORCES IN SIDON. CASUALTIES WERE LOWER, BUT THE EXODUS OF CIVILIANS CONTINUED. VISITING SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF KHOLI REPORTEDLY PROMISED SYRIAN MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR USE BY THE LAF IN THE SOUTH, AND LAF COMMANDER AOUN TRAVELED TO DAMASCUS TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS. RECENTLY DELIVERED, U.S.-ORIGIN APC\'S ARE ALSO TO BE SENT TO SIDON TO REINFORCE LAF UNITS THERE. END SUMMARY. ----------------- FIGHTING IN SIDON ----------------- 2. (U) ON MORNING OF APRIL 1, FIGHTING CONTINUED IN THE SIDON AREA BETWEEN LF MILITIAMEN AND PALESTINIAN FORCES AND THEIR ALLIES IN THE VICINITY OF THE AYN AL-HILWAH AND MIYAH MIYAH REFUGEE CAMPS. FIGHTING ALSO ERUPTED AGAIN BETWEEN THE LF AND LAF ALONG THE KAYAHA/KANAYA/MAR ELIAS FRONT. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE SHELLING SPREAD TO OTHER AREAS OF SIDON INCLUDING THE PORT, WHICH BECAME THE TARGET OF LF SHELLING FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE RECENT FIGHTING. THESE SAME UNCONFIRMED REPORTS INDICATED THAT AN ISRAELI NAVAL VESSEL APPEARED OFF THE COAST OF SIDON AND FIRED AT LEAST ONE SHELL ON AYN AL-HILWAH. 3. (U) FOLLOWING A LULL IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON, FIGHTING AGAIN ERUPTED AT ABOUT 1700 HOURS, REPORTEDLY WITH LF TANK POSITIONS OVERLOOKING THE CITY SHELLING THE REFUGEE CAMPS, DOWNTOWN SIDON, HAY TAAMIR, AND LAF POSITIONS ON MAR ELIAS HILL NORTHEAST OF THE CITY. 4. (U) INITIAL CASUALTY FIGURES INDICATE TWO DEATHS AND TEN INJURIES, I.E., CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN THE CASUALTY TOLL OVER THE MARCH 30-31 WEEKEND. ------------- REFUGEE FLOWS ------------- 5. (U) AN UNWRA SOURCE QUOTED IN THE BEIRUT PRESS PROVIDED DETAILED FIGURES ON THE OUTFLOW OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES FROM THE AYN AL-HILWAH AND MIYAH MIYAH CAMPS IN SIDON TO UNWRA CAMPS ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON. OF A TOTAL OF 215 FAMILIES FLEEING SIDON, 187 HAVE COME TO CAMPS IN THE BEIRUT AREA, OF WHICH 76 TO SHATILA, 108 TO BURJ BRAJNAH, AND THREE TO MAR ELIAS. THE TWENTY-EIGHT OTHER REFUGEE FAMILIES MOVED TO CAMPS AROUND TRIPOLI. IN ADDITION, AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF REFUGEES HAVE RESETTLED IN THE RAWCHAH AND AYN MURAYSA NEIGHBORHOODS OF WEST BEIRUT. THE UNWRA SOURCE PLACED THE NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN CASUALTIES IN SIDON SINCE MARCH 29 AT THIRTY-ONE KILLED AND ABOUT 100 INJURED. ---------------------------------------- KHOLI VISIT; MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR SOUTH ---------------------------------------- 6. (U) ON APRIL 1, SARG PRESIDENT ASSAD DISPATCHED SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF MAJOR GENERAL MUHAMMAD KHOLI TO BEIRUT TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND OTHER SENIOR GOL OFFICIALS. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT IN A LETTER CARRIED BY KHOLI, ASSAD LINKED THE DETERIORATING SITUATION AROUND SIDON WITH \"PARTITIONIST PROJECTS\" ALLEGEDLY UNDERTAKEN BY LF LEADER JA\'JA\' WITH ISRAELI BACKING. ACCORDING TO THESE REPORTS, ASSAD AGREED TO PROVIDE LEBANON WITH UNSPECIFIED ARMS AND OTHER MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR USE AROUND SIDON. 7. (U) LATER ON APRIL 1, GENERAL MICHEL AOUN MADE A HASTY TRIP TO DAMASCUS, HIS FIRST SINCE BECOMING LAF COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN JULY 1984. HE MET THERE WITH SYRIAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF HIKMAT SHIHABI AND DEFENSE MINISTER TLASS, REPORTEDLY TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THE SYRIAN ARMS SUPPLIES. 8. (C) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS CONFIRMED BY OMC, THE LAF PLANS TO REINFORCE ITS PRESENCE IN SIDON WITH TWENTY-EIGHT OF THE THIRTY RECENTLY DELIVERED, U.S.-ORIGIN M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE LAF WILL ALSO SEND TO SIDON A BATALLION OF THE 1ST BRIGADE PRESENTLY STATIONED IN THE BIQA\'. ---------------- MUSLIM REACTIONS ---------------- 9. (U) MUSLIM RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY ACCUSED THE CHRISTIAN LF MILITIA OF PROVOKING THE FIGHTING IN SIDON AT ISRAEL\'S INSTIGATION AS PART OF AN ALLEGED SCHEME TO PARTITION LEBANON INTO SECTARIAN MINI-STATES. 10. (U) ON APRIL 1, SUNNI RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LEADERS INCLUDING EDUCATION MINISTER SALIM AL-HUSS MET AT DAR AL-FATWA, THE SEAT OF THE SUNNI MUFTI OF THE REPUBLIC, TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN SIDON. THEY ISSUED A STATEMENT WHICH (A) URGED THE GOL TO HONOR ITS POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO REINFORCE, WITH ADDITIONAL MEN AND EQUIPMENT, LAF UNITS IN SIDON AND ELSEWHERE IN THE SOUTH; (B) REQUESTED THE GOL TO MOBILIZE ALL FORCES TO HALT THE MASSACRES IN SIDON, ITS EASTERN SUBURBS, AND THE REFUGEE CAMPS; (C) WARNED AGAINST THE SPREAD OF VIOLENCE TO THE IQLIM AL-KHARRUB, THE WESTERN BIQA\', AND RASHAYA, AND TO THE COUNTRY AT LARGE; AND (D) URGED ALL LEBANESE POLITICAL AND FACTIONAL LEADERS TO \"ADOPT A RESPONSIBLE HISTORIC STAND THAT WILL CHECK THE GROUP INVOLVED IN THE ISRAELI CONSPIRATORIAL AND PARTITIONIST DESIGN.\" 10. (U) SHIITE AMAL LEADER NABIH BARRI REJECTED RECENT PROPOSALS FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE SOUTH, STATING THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD ONLY \"COVER THE (GOL\'S) FAILURES AND INACTION.\" BARRI CLAIMED THAT THE LF-LAF CLASHES WOULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED IF THE (PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM) LAF UNITS IN THE SOUTH HAD BEEN REINFORCED AS AGREED. ------------------ CHRISTIAN REACTION ------------------ 11. (U) FOLLOWING THE APRIL 1 MEETING OF THE LEBANESE FORCES \"EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,\" KARIM PAKRADUNI ACCUSED ISRAEL OF INCITING VIOLENCE AMONG LOCAL MILITIAS IN SIDON IN ORDER TO DIVERT THEIR ENERGIES AND THEREBY ENSURE ITS OWN SECURITY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE ACCUSED THE PALESTINIANS OF PROVOKING COMMUNAL DISCORD IN SIDON IN ORDER TO REESTABLISH THEIR HEGEMONY IN SOUTH LEBANON. THE SOUTH, HE SAID, IS THE LAST PART OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THE PALESTINIANS CAN ACT FOLLOWING THEIR LOSSES IN BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI. 12. (U) PAKRADUNI STATED THAT THE LF HAD PROPOSED A PLAN TO CREATE A WIDE NO MAN\'S LAND BETWEEN THE COMPETING FORCES IN SIDON, THEREBY ENDING HOSTILITIES, PREVENTING THE INVASION OR INFILTRATION OF ANY GROUP, AND AVOIDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NARROW DEMARCATION LINE SIMILAR TO THE \"GREEN-LINE\" BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BEIRUT. TO BUTTRESS THIS MILITARY PLAN POLITICALLY, PAKRADUNI CALLED FOR A MEETING OF SIDON\'S POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND ALL THE PROTAGONISTS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN THE CONFLICT. 13. (U) MEANWHILE, FORMER PRESIDENT CAMILLE CHAMOUN STATED THAT ONLY THE LAF CAN ENSURE THE SECURITY OF SIDON, SINCE IT IS \"THE ONLY FORCE WHICH ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF ALL THE INHABITANTS OF THE REGION.\" LYNE " "52","4/4/1985 14:34","85BEIRUT2048","Embassy Beirut","SECRET","","R 041434Z APR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2509 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ","S E C R E T BEIRUT 02048 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, ECON, LE SUBJECT: LEBANESE FORCES FINANCES 1. S-ENTIRE TEXT. 2. LEBANESE FORCES OFFICIAL WHO REMAINS LOYAL TO DEPOSED CHIEF FUAD ABU NADER CONTENDS THAT PART OF REBEL LEADER JA\'JA\'S APPEAL TO RANK AND FILE IS HIS PROMISES THAT ECONOMY MOVES INTRODUCED BY ABU NADER WOULD END. HE OBSERVES, HOWEVER, THAT PROMISES WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR JA\'JA\' TO KEEP. 3. ACCORDING TO THIS OFFICIAL, LF OPERATING EXPENSES ALONE AMOUNT TO 26 MILLION POUNDS A MONTH, MOSTLY STRAIGHT SALARY PAYMENTS. THIS FIGURE PROVIDED NOTHING FOR AMMUNITION REPLACEMENT (BADLY NEEDED), SPARE PARTS FOR EQUIPMENT (BADLY NEEDED -- ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL LF TANKS COULDN\'T MOVE INTO ACTION NOW WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT REPAIR), UNIFORMS,TRAINING, ETC. 4. OFFICIAL SAID INCOME SIDE WILL PRESENT JA\'JA\' WITH DIFFICULT PROBLEM, BEFORE UPRISING, OFFICIAL SAID,INCOME 5. OFFICIAL NOTED THAT LF HAD RE-OPENED NIGHT OPERATIONS AT FIFTH BASIN AT BEIRUT PORT TWELVE DAYS BEFORE UPRISING BECAUSE OF NEED FOR FUNDS, SO JA\'JA\' WILL CONTINUE TO BENEFIT FROM THIS SOURCE. ON OTHER HAND, HE SAID, WITH SYRIANS OPENING ROADBLOCK AT MADFOUN BRIDGE, LF REVENUES FROM BARBARA CHECKPOINT HAVE DISAPPEARED; HE OPINED THAT JA\'JA\' MIGHT GO AS FAR AS TO OFFER UP CLOSING OF BARBARAH CHECKPOINT AS PEACE OFFERING TO SYRIA NOW THAT SYRIAN ACTION HAS MADE IT FINANCIALLY IRRELEVANT. EVEN ASSUMING LF TIGHTENS UP TAXATION IN AREAS UNDER ITS CONTROL AND PERHAPS EXPAND FIFTH BASIN OPERATIONS, IT WILL STILL LEAVE THEM, HE ESTIMATED, MINIMUM OF 6 MILLION POUNDS SHORT EACH MONTH. 6. OFFICIAL OBSERVED THAT EFFECTIVENESS OF DEA OPERATIONS MADE EXPORTATION OF HASHISH AN UNPROFITABLE OPTION. 7. ANOTHER OPTION WOULD BE CONTRIBUTIONS BY KEY LF REBEL FINANCIAL ANGELS; HE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY PIERRE ASHKAR AND MICHEL MURR BUT HE QUESTIONED HOW LONG THEY WOULD WANT TO PICK UP THE DIFFERENCE. REMAINING OPTION WOULD BE ONE LF WAS MOVING TOWARD BEFORE UPRISING: COMBINATION OF ECONOMY MOVES AND OF SELLING MILITARY RESOURCES ON CIVILIAN ECONOMY. MOVES IN THAT DIRECTION HAD BEGUN PRIOR TO MARCH 12 UPRISING, SPECIFICALLY IN COMPUTER AREA, WHERE OFFICIAL SAID LF HAS MOST SOPHISTICATED OPERATION IN COUNTRY; AND IN VEHICLE MAINTENANCE. BARTHOLOMEW " "53","4/11/1985 14:23","85CAIRO9867","Embassy Cairo","CONFIDENTIAL","85CAIRO6360","R 111423Z APR 85 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5835 INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 09867 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, SOCI, EG SUBJECT: ISLAMIC SHARIA DEBATE--WORDS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER STALL REF: CAIRO 6360 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. - 2. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE MAY DEBATE IN THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY ON ISLAMIC SHARIA WILL PRODUCE NO IMMEDIATE RESULTS, ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SOURCES, INCLUDING THE OPPOSITION. IT IS LIKELY TO LAUNCH A REVIEW PROCESS LASTING SEVERAL YEARS TO ENSURE THAT EXISTING LEGISLATION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHARIA. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE OPPOSITION NEW WAFD PARTY AND OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ARE ON BOARD ABOUT THIS PROCESS, AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE TACIT COMPROMISES BETWEEN THE GOVERNING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP) AND WAFD ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF SHARIA ISSUES. ALTHOUGH MAJOR POLITICAL FORCES HAVE APPARENTLY ESTABLISHED A \"DETENTE\" OVER SHARIA, HOWEVER, ISLAMIC DEMAGOGUERY AND VIOLENCE BY UNDERGROUND ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS ARE DANGERS THAT WILL PERSIST EVEN AS THE SHARIA PROCESS ROLLS FORWARD IN THE UNCERTAIN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE COUNTRY. END SUMMARY. - 3. SINCE OUR RECENT REPORT ON THE COMING PEOPLES ASSEMBLY DEBATE OF ISLAMIC SHARIA (KORANIC LAW) IN MAY (SEE REF A), IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT THIS DEBATE WILL PRODUCE NO IMMEDIATE RESULTS. ACCORDING TO A RANGE OF WELL-PLACED SOURCES, THE ASSEMBLY DISCUSSIONS WILL LEAD TO A LAW-BY-LAW REVIEW OF EXISTING LEGISLATION TO ENSURE THAT EACH AND EVERY LAW IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHARIA PROVISIONS. THIS PROCESS IS EXPECTED TO TAKE AT LEAST SEVERAL YEARS. LEADING ELEMENTS OF THE NEW WAFD PARTY, AND OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD NOW ALLIED TO IT, HAVE CONFIRMED PRIVATELY TO US THEIR UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF THIS DELIBERATE PROCESS. THEIR AGREEMENT, ADDED TO THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY\'S DOMINATION IN THE ASSEMBLY, ROBS THE COMING DEBATE OF SOME OF ITS DRAMA AND DECREASES THE CHANGES OF NEGATIVE SIDE EFFECTS. - 4. THIS SCENARIO REFLECTS THE TACTICS OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK, ABLY SUPPORTED BY HIS SPEAKER OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, RIFAAT EL MAHGOUB; THEY ARE WILLING TO LET ISLAMIC SENTIMENT BE EXPRESSED FREELY, BUT NOT TO THE POINT OF THREATENING THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO. GOVERN- MENT AND NDP CIRCLES HAVE BEEN SPREADING THE WORD QUIETLY BUT FIRMLY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NO INTENTION OF LETTING THE SHARIA ISSUE GET OUT OF CONTROL. COMMENTING IN A PRESS INTERVIEW ON A DEMAND BY GAD AL-HAQ, THE GRAND SHEIKH OF AL-AZHAR (WHO OCCUPIES THE MOST PROMINENT ISLAMIC POST IN EGYPT), FOR THE APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC SHARIA, MUBARAK STATED THAT EGYPTIAN LAWS \"DO NOT CONFLICT IN ANY WAY WITH THE ISLAMIC RELIGION AND ARE 99 PERCENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ISLAMIC SHARIA.\" MUBARAK DID NOT GET INTO THE SPECIFICS OF THE REMAINING \"ONE PERCENT,\" OR THE EXTENT OF CHANGES IN LAWS REGARDING SUCH MATTERS AS BANKING PRACTICES OR ISLAMIC PUNISHMENTS. (WE HEAR FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT \"TINKERING\" WITH EGYPTIAN LEGISLATION WILL FOCUS IN THE BANKING AREA, WITH THE SUBSTITUTION OF \"FEES\" AND \"SHARED OWNERSHIP\" FOR INTEREST; ISLAMIC PUNISHMENTS ARE SAID TO BE OUT OF THE QUESTION.) MUBARAK\'S POINT, OF COURSE, IS THAT NOTHING MUCH NEEDS TO BE ALTERED. - 5. THIS VIEWPOINT IS DRAMATICALLY OPPOSED TO THAT OF SHARIA PROPONENTS, WHO WOULD LIKE NOTHING MORE THAN TO THROW OUT THE ENTIRE EGYPTIAN LEGAL SYSTEM--WITH ALL OF ITS FOREIGN ACCRETIONS--AND REPLACE IT WITH \"THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ISLAMIC SHARIA.\" ACCORDING TO THE ORIGINATOR OF THIS \"99 PERCENT\" REASONING, STATE SECURITY COURT CHIEF JUSTICE SAID AL-ASHMAWY, MUBARAK\'S ADOPTION OF HIS STAND SHOWS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS ABSOLUTELY DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW \"THE SHEIKHS\" TO GAIN CONTROL OF EGYPTIAN LAW. - 6. AL-ASHMAWY ALSO TOLD US THAT HIS ARGUMENTS AGAINST \"FULL SHARIA\" HAVE RECENTLY WON SUPPORT IN THE WAFD PARTY AS IT PREPARES FOR THE ASSEMBLY DEBATE. HE MENTIONED THE NAMES OF MUMTAZ NASSAR AND WAHEED RAAFAT, TWO SENIOR PARTY FIGURES AND BOTH LEGAL EXPERTS, SUGGESTING AN INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE DELIBERATE PACE OF VERY LIMITED LEGAL CHANGE. MUMTAZ NASSAR, WAFD LEADER IN THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, RECENTLY TOLD US HIMSELF THAT THE WAFD AGREES WITH THE LENGTHY TIMETABLE FOR SHARIA REVIEW. PRAISING PRESIDENT MUBARAK\'S \"DEMOCRATIC\" APPROACH (COMPARED TO THAT OF SADAT AND NASSER), NASSAR IMPLIED THAT ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISES BETWEEN THE WAFD AND THE NDP ARE ALREADY IN SIGHT OVER THE QUESTION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM AND ISLAMIC SHARIA. - 7. COMMENT. WE SENSE A CERTAIN SATISFACTION IN GOVERNMENT AND SECULAR POLITICAL CIRCLES OVER PROSPECTIVE SUCCESS IN CONTAINING THE SHARIA DEBATE, WITH THE WAFD AND MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADERSHIP EVIDENTLY ON BOARD. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ROOM FOR COMPLACENCY. HAVING A KIND OF DETENTE BETWEEN THE MAJOR LICENSED POLITICAL ORGANI- ZATIONS DOES NOT RULE OUT ISLAMIC DEMAGOGUERY OR VIOLENCE INSTIGATED BY EXTREMIST ISLAMIC GROUPS. - 8. ADDED COMMENT. SHARIA PROPONENTS HAVE BEEN THROUGH THIS BEFORE. SADAT\'S RESPONSE TO THEIR DEMANDS WAS TO ESTABLISH COMMITTEES AND LET THEM DRAFT LAWS, A PROCESS WHICH LASTED FIVE YEARS AND ENDED WITH NO LEGISLATION BEING PASSED. NOW, IT SEEMS WE ARE TO SEE A REVERSE PROCESS: MORE COMMITTEES TO STUDY EXISTING LAWS AND AGAIN, LITTLE REAL CHANGE IN THE LEGAL STATUS QUO. THE GOVERNMENT CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE THE MOST OF MARGINAL ISLAMIC IMPROVEMENTS TO CURRENT LAW, SO AS TO PREVENT THE SHARIA ISSUE FROM STRIKING AN ISLAMIC SPARK AMONG THE MUSLIM MASSES. THIS MAY MEAN A POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AND LEGAL STRUCTURE WITH MARGINALLY MORE ISLAMIC COLORA- TION. END COMMENT. VELIOTES " "54","4/17/1985 13:56","85LAGOS4304","Consulate Lagos","UNCLASSIFIED","","P 171356Z APR 85 FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1747 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY COTONOU AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA AMEMBASSY NIAMEY AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY TUNIS AMCONSUL KADUNA USIA WASHDC 7334 ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 04304 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PROP LY NI SUBJECT: QADHAFI INTERVIEW IN LAGOS NEWSPAPER 1. ALMOST AS LOCAL EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN LEADER COLONEL QADHAFI\'S CURRENT DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, THE INDEPENDENT LAGOS DAILY, THE GUARDIAN, PUBLISHED ON APRIL 15, 1985, THE FOLLOWING EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH HIM, BYLINED BY YEMI OGUNBIYI. IT CLAIMED THAT THE INTERVIEW WAS QADHAFI\'S \"FIRST WITH AN AFRICAN NEWSPAPER HOUSE OUTSIDE THE ARAB WORLD AND, INDEED, HIS FIRST WITH ANY NEWSPAPER IN SEVERAL YEARS.\" IT INCLUDED A PICTURE OF QADHAFI TALKING WITH THE ARTICLE\'S AUTHOR AND GUARDIAN PUBLISHER MR. ALEX IBRU, REPORTEDLY AT SALAHADDIN MILITARY BARRACKS IN BENGHAZI. QADHAFI SPOKE IN ARABIC AND USED AN INTERPRETER. THE INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE \"BARELY TEN DAYS BEFORE OUSTED PRESIDENT JAAFAR JIMEIRY LEFT FOR A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEARCH OF AID.\" QADHAFI WAS CHARACTERIZED AS LUKEWARM TOWARD NIGERIA. - 2. BEGIN TEXT: - GADDAFI DEFENDS LIBYA\'S DYNAMIC FOREIGN POLICY - - IN A RARE NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW, THE LEADER OF THE SOCIALIST PEOPLE\'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA, COLONEL MUAMMAR AL GADDAFI, HAS DENIED THAT HIS SEEMINGLY MILI- TANT AND AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA IS A CAMOUFLAGE FOR ANY EXPANSIONIST AMBITION. - SPEAKING IN AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH THE GUARDIAN AT THE SALAHADDIN MILITARY BARRACKS IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA, COL. GADDAFI ANSWERED A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS FORCEFUL STYLE OF POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY. - - IN THE PROCESS, HE STOUTLY DEFENDED HIS DIPLOMATIC ROLE AS A LIBERATING ONE FOR THE CAUSE OF ARAB AND AFRICAN UNITY AND WAS VERY CRITICAL OF THOSE WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS \"FOREIGN ENEMIES\" WHO WERE DETERMINED TO PORTRAY HIS IMAGE IN VERY BAD LIGHT. - - \"LET ME STATE FROM THE OUTSET THAT THE ROLE WE SEE OURSELVES AS PLAYING, NOT ONLY IN AFRICA BUT ALSO IN THE THIRD WORLD, IS A LIBERATING ONE. BUT OUR ENEMIES DO NOT SEE THIS ROLE AS A LIBERATING ONE. THEY HAVE THEIR OWN DELIBERATE MISINTERPRETATION WHICH IS QUITE MISLEADING.\" - THE SON OF A BEDUIN ARAB, COL. GADDAFI, 43, CAME TO POWER ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1969, WHEN HE AND A GROUP OF FREE OFFICERS OVERTHREW KING IDRIS IN A BLOODLESS COUP. THERE- AFTER, THEY DEDICATED THEMSELVES TO TRANSFORMING THIS LARGE COUNTRY OF A THREE MILLION PEOPLE \"FROM A BACKWARD STATE INTO A MODERN NATION.\" - EASILY ONE OF THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL LEADERS IN THE WORLD TODAY, GADDAFI HAS EARNED FOR HIMSELF THE EMINENT, IF SOMETIMES PROBLEMATIC REPUTATION OF BEING ONE OF THE MOST ACKNOWLEDGED LEADERS IN THE ARAB WORLD. - THE GUARDIAN INTERVIEW WAS HIS FIRST WITH AN AFRICAN NEWSPAPER HOUSE OUTSIDE THE ARAB WORLD AND, INDEED, HIS FIRST WITH ANY NEWSPAPER IN SEVERAL YEARS. - OF THE GUARDIAN, HE HAD THIS TO SAY: \"I HAVE A GREAT OPINION OF YOUR PAPER AND IT DESERVES ALL THE SUPPORT AND PRAISE THAT IT IS RECEIVING. FOR, INDEED, WE NEED REAL AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES WHICH CAN SPEAK UP FOR AFRICA. IT IS SAD ENOUGH THAT AFRICANS GET TO READ ABOUT THEMSELVES ONLY FROM EUROPEAN OR THE AMERICAN MEDIA. I AM PLEASED THAT I CAN MEET WITH YOU AND THAT WE CAN EXCHANGE VIEWS.\" - SPEAKING VERY QUIETLY IN ARABIC THROUGH AN INTERPRETER, HIS PLACID FACE BETRAYING AN OUTWARD CALM WHICH JARS SHARPLY WITH HIS CONTROVERSIAL REPUTATION, COL. GADDAFI SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ON THE PROBLEMS OF ARAB UNITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR A LARGER AFRICAN UNDERSTANDING AND ACCORD. - REPORTEDLY, HE DEFENDED HIS SUPPORT FOR MANY REGIMES IN AFRICA AND SAW SUCH SUPPORT AS VALID WITHIN THE TOTAL FRAMEWORK OF AN AFRICAN SOLIDARITY AND UNITY. - - \"ALL THE EFFORTS TO UNITE WITH EGYPT, SUDAN, SYRIA, ETHIOPIA AND CHAD WHICH YOU REFERRED TO, WERE ATTEMPTS TO UNITE THE ARAB WORLD AS ONE NATION. THE ARABS AS A WHOLE ARE LIKE ONE NATION. THEY SPEAK THE SAME LANGUAGE, HAVE THE SAME ORIGINS AND ABOUT 98 PER CENT HAVE AND PRACTISE ONE FAITH. AND FOR US, THE UNITY OF THE ARAB WORLD IS ONE STEP TOWARDS THE TOTAL UNITY OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT.\" - COL. GADDAFI WAS VERY CRITICAL OF MOST ARAB COUNTRIES WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS REACTIONARY, ESPECIALLY FOR BEING LY DEPENDENT ON WESTERN COUNTRIES FOR THEIR SURVIVAL. - \"UNFORTUNATELY, TOO, THERE ARE QUITE A NUMBER OF NON- ARAB COUNTRIES IN AFRICA WHO ASLO BEHAVE IN SIMILAR MANNER, WHO ARE FOREVER HOPING AND BELIEVING THAT THE WEST WILL BAIL THEM OUT OF THEIR OWN BANKRUPT AND CORRUPT POLICIES. BUT THE REALITY IS THAT THEIR VERY DEPENDENCE ON THE WEST SHORTENS THEIR LIVES (EXCLAMATION POINT)\" - THE INTERVIEW WAS HELD BARELY 10 DAYS BEFORE OUSTED PRESIDENT JAAFAR NIMEIRY OF SUDAN LEFT FOR A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEARCH OF AID BEFORE HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY OVERTHROWN. - BUT COL. GADDAFI SAVED HIS SEVEREST ATTACKS FOR THOSE WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS ZIONISTS AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. - INSISTING THAT ARABS MUST NOT BE MADE TO BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF HITLER\'S CRIMES, HE REITERATED HIS NOW FAMILIAR CALL, PRESUMABLY ON THE STATE OF ISRAEL, TO RETURN ALL ARAB LANDS. - ON HIS RELATIONS WITH NIGERIA, HE WAS FAR MORE LUKEWARM AND GUARDED IN HIS REACTIONS. - \"OUR RELATIONS CAN BE BETTER THAN THEY ARE NOW,\" HE SAID. - HIS TEPID RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION OF RELATIONS WITH NIGERIA MAY NOT BE UNCONNECTED, POLITICAL OBSERVERS BE- LIEVE, WITH LIBYA\'S ROLE IN CHAD, NIGERIA\'S NORTH-EASTERN NEIGHBOUR. - - BUT HE DEFENDED THE INTERVENTION OF LIBYA IN CHAD ALL THE SAME, ARGUING THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF LIBYA TO HAVE AN UNSTABLE CHAD, SINCE IT ALSO SHARES BORDERS WITH LIBYA. - PRESSED WHETHER HE KEPT TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM CHAD REACHED WITH FRANCE, HE RETORTED: \"OF COURSE, WE HONOURED THE AGREEMENT. WE WITHDREW OUR TROOPS. THERE WERE RUMOURS, POSSIBLY BEING PUT OUT BY AMERICANS, TO THE EFFECT THAT WE HAD NOT WITH- DRAWN OUR TROOPS. OBVIOUSLY, FRANCE IS LOOKING FOR AN EXCUSE TO COME BACK TO CHAD.\" - END TEXT. - SMITH " "55","4/18/1985 17:56","85BEIRUT2325","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","85BEIRUT2279\|85BEIRUT2287","O 181756Z APR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2708 INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 02325 CAIRO ALSO FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LE, SY SUBJECT: POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF WEST BEIRUT FIGHTING REF: (A) BEIRUT 2279, (B) BEIRUT 2287 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. FOLLOWING MAJOR FIGHTING ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16-17, A TENSE CALM NOW PREVAILS IN WEST BEIRUT. SHIITE AMAL MOVEMENT LEADER NABIH BARRI EMERGED AS THE PRIME VICTOR IN THE INTRAMUSLIM FIGHTING. STATEMENTS MADE BY THE VARIOUS LEADERS TRACK WITH OUR ANALYSIS (REFTEL A) THAT THE FIGHTING REFLECTED TWO MAJOR CONFLICTS: LEBANESE SHIA VS. LEBANESE SUNNI AND LEBANESE SHIA VS. PALESTINIANS. THE AMAL MOVEMENT, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE DRUZE PSP AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE \"NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT,\" HAS DEALT A SEVERE BLOW TO THE SUNNI MURABITUN MILITIA AND HAS COME OUT OF THE AFFAIR WITH ITS POSITION AS THE STRONGEST POLITICAL AND MILITARY FORCE IN WEST BEIRUT CONFIRMED AND ENHANCED. 3. THE SYRIAN ROLE REMAINS UNCLEAR, BUT MANY HERE SPECULATE THAT DAMASCUS MUST HAVE CONDONED THE AMAL/PSP MOVE AGAINST THE MURABITUN AND ITS PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIAN ALLIES AND MAY HAVE, IN FACT, ACTIVELY SUPPORTED THE CLASH. 4. IN HIS RESIGNATION STATEMENT, PRIME MINISTER RASHID KARAMI EXPRESSED DESPAIR OVER THE APRIL 16-17 FIGHTING, POINTED AN ACCUSING FIGURE AT DAMASCUS, AND ASKED FOR SYRIA TO HELP RESOLVE THE ENSUING CRISIS. IT IS TOO SOON TO MAKE ANY FIRM PREDICTIONS AS TO WHO THE NEXT PRIME MINISTER MAY BE OR WHAT FORM THE NEW CABINET MAY TAKE, BUT WE SET FORTH BELOW SOME OF THE RELEVANT FACTORS. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. ------------------------------- AMAL, BACKED BY PSP, VICTORIOUS ------------------------------- 5. THE DUST IS NOW SETTLING IN WEST BEIRUT AFTER VERY HEAVY FIGHTING OCCURRED ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16-17, RESULTING IN APPROXIMATELY THIRTY PERSONS KILLED AND ONE HUNDRED WOUNDED. BEIRUT AIRPORT REMAINS OPERATIONAL, AND THE GREEN LINE IS PARTIALLY OPEN, BUT SPORADIC SNIPING CONTINUES IN VARIOUS AREAS OF WEST BEIRUT. 6. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, STATEMENTS BY KEY LEADERS CONFIRMED OUR EARLIER ANALYSIS THAT THE EVENTS OF APRIL 16-17 REFLECTED A SHIA-SUNNI CONFLICT. THE SHIITE AMAL MILITIA, BACKED BY THE DRUZE PSP, HIT HARD AT THE SUNNI MURABITUN MILITIA, REPORTEDLY TAKING CONTROL OF ALL SIGNIFICANT MURABITUN POSITIONS, INCLUDING THE \"VOICE OF ARAB LEBANON\" RADIO STATION LOCATED IN THE ABDUL NASR MOSQUE. 7. THE REACTION OF SUNNI LEADERS HAS BEEN STRONG. PRIME MINISTER KARAMI RESIGNED (SEE BELOW), AND THE GRAND MUFTI OF THE REPUBLIC, SHEIKH HASSAN KHALID, STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE SHIA FOR STRIKING AGAINST TRADITIONALLY SUNNI WEST BEIRUT. \"IT IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEIRUT TO BE STRUCK AND HUMILIATED AND ITS AUTHORITY SEIZED BY THOSE VERY PEOPLE THAT IT PROTECTED AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT...BY THOSE THAT IT WELCOMED AND HONORED AND WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME AND HONOR.\" THE MUFTI ADDED THAT THE SUNNIS WOULD NOT PERMIT THE INHABITANTS OF WEST BEIRUT TO BE \"STRUCK AS IF THEY HAD BECOME ISRAELI AGENTS.\" EXPRESSING SOLIDARITY WITH PRIME MINISTER KARAMI, FORMER PM TAKIADDIN SOLH STRONGLY REGRETTED THE FIGHTING WHICH \"OPPOSED PARTIES STRUGGLING FOR A COMMON CAUSE...WHO SHOULD DIRECT THEIR WEAPONS EXCLUSIVELY AGAINST THE ISRAELI ENEMY.\" 8. AMAL LEADER NABIH BARRI RESPONDED VEHEMENTLY TO THE MUFTI\'S NOTION THAT THE SHIA WERE GUESTS IN TRADITIONALLY SUNNI WEST BEIRUT. \"BEIRUT IS MY CITY AND MY CAPTIAL,\" HE SAID, \"WE WILL NOT ACCEPT CANTONS THAT DEFINE US AS FOREIGNERS WHEN WE ARE PEOPLE OF THE HOUSE.\" SUPPORTING BARRI\'S STATEMENT, THE DRUZE PSP SAID IT \"COULD NOT UNDERSTAND...HOW HE (THE MUFTI) COULD QUALIFY CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF WEST BEIRUT (I.E., THE SHIA) AS INTRUDERS. ...THOSE WHO DEFEND WITH THEIR BLOOD THE CAPITAL AGAINST FASCIST-PHALANGE AGRESSION, THOSE WHO STRUGGLE SO THAT BEIRUT WILL REMAIN ARAB AND FREE CANNOT BE CALLED INTRUDERS.\" 9. IN THE SECOND INSTANCE, THE APRIL 16-17 FIGHTING WAS A SHIA-PALESTINIAN SET-TO. THE SHIA, BACKED BY THE DRUZE, STRUCK HARD NOT ONLY AT THE SUNNI MURABITUN BUT ALSO AT THE PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE MURABITUN. THEIR SUCCESS IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, WAS LESS OVERWHELMING, IN PART BECAUSE THE PALESTINIANS APPARENTLY DID NOT \"RISE TO THE BAIT\" AND PARTICIPATE IN THE FIGHTING WITH ALL THEIR FORCE. SINCE THE FIGHTING, AMAL AND PSP HAVE REPORTEDLY ESTABLISHED CHECKPOINTS AROUND THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS, TIGHTENING CONTROL OVER THE INFLUX OF ARMS. 10. IN A MAJOR PUBLIC STATEMENT, AMAL HIT HARD AT THE PALESTINIANS. BARRI CALLED THE FIGHTING A \"NIGHTMARE\" IN WHICH HIS AMAL MILITIA CONFRONTED \"AN UPRISING CAREFULLY PLANNED BY ARAB HANDS EXPLOITING SECTARIAN IDEAS, FOREIGNERS, INTRUDERS, AND GUESTS IN BEIRUT.\" BARRI ASKED RHETORICALLY \"WHY SOME OUTSIDERS (I.E., THE PALESTINIANS) ARE CONSIDERED AS GUESTS, EVEN IF THEY COME FROM ANOTHER REGION AND ANOTHER CONFESSION, WHILE THE REAL GUESTS IN BEIRUT (I.E., THE SHIA), WHO HAD THE HONOR OF LIBERATING THE CITY FROM THE CHAINS OF MAY 17 AND THE AGENTS OF ISRAEL, ARE NOT WELL LOOKED UPON...\" 11. ON THE GROUND, THE VICTORS HAVE MOVED TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR GAINS. LEADERS OF AMAL, PSP, AND THE SMALLER MEMBERS OF THE LEFTIST \"NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT\" (SYRIAN SOCIALIST NATIONAL PARTY, LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY, SYRIAN ARAB BAATH PARTY) MET AT BARRI\'S WEST BEIRUT RESIDENCE ON APRIL 17 AND ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN ORDER IN WEST BEIRUT (A THROW-BACK TO AN IDEA FIRST FIELDED AFTER THE FEBRUARY 6, 1984, FIGHTING AND DROPPED AFTER STIFF SUNNI RESISTANCE). THIS GROUP PLANS TO SET UP AN OPERATIONS ROOM AND A BUREAU OF CITIZENS AFFAIRS. IT SAYS IT WILL ALSO COMMAND A JOINT \"STRIKE FORCE\" INITIALLY COMPRISING 300 MEN, TO BE DOUBLED TO 600, DRAWN IN EQUAL NUMBERS FROM AMAL, THE PSP, AND THE JUNIOR MEMBERS OF THE NDF. ACCORDING TO THE BEIRUT DAILY, \"LE REVEIL,\" WEST BEIRUT NEIGHBORHOODS HAVE BEEN PARCELED OUT AMONG THESE GROUPS. AMAL IS REPORTEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN TARIQ AL-JADIDAH, FAKAHANI, MAZRAH, AND KARAKAS; THE PSP IN RAS BEIRUT, HAMRA, AYN AL-MURAYSA, MINAT AL-HISN, MUSAYTIBAH, AND RAWSHAH; AND THE VARIOUS SMALLER GROUPS UNDER THE EGIS OF THE PSP IN SMALL, TOKEN SECTIONS OF TERRITORY. 12. NOTABLY ABSENT FROM REPRESENTATION ON THE UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND OR IN THE DIVISION OF SPOILS IS ANY SUNNI MUSLIM GROUP. LACK OF GOL OR LAF PARTICIPATION GOES WITHOUT SAYING. MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, NABIH BARRI HAS ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AS THE STRONGMAN OF WEST BEIRUT. THROUGH THE FORMATION OF THE UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND AND THE ANNOUNCED FORMATION OF A \"POLITICAL HIGH COMMAND,\" THE SHIITE AMAL MOVEMENT WITH ITS ALLIES IS CONSOLIDATING AND FORMALIZING ITS CONTROL OF WEST BEIRUT. THIS WILL BE A BITTER PILL FOR THE SUNNI COMMUNITY TO SWALLOW. ----------- SYRIAN ROLE ----------- 13. THERE AS BEEN MUCH SPECULATION AND LITTLE CONCRETE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE ROLE THAT SYRIA MAY HAVE PLAYED IN THE APRIL 16-17 FIGHTING. AS WE ANTICIPATED (REFTEL A), THE FACT THAT NABIH BARRI HAD JUST RETURNED FROM DAMACUS BEFORE THE FIGHTING HAS FUELED SPECULATION THAT SYRIA CONDONED AND PERHAPS ACTIVELY SUPPORTED THE MOVE AGAINST THE MURABITUN AND, ESPECIALLY, AGAINST THE PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS. ACCORDING TO THIS LINE OF REASONING, SYRIA MAY NEXT UNLEASH AMAL AND THE PSP AGAINST THE PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS IN THE BEIRUT SOUTHERN SUBURBS AND IN SIDON. IN ANY EVENT, SYRIA IS CERTAINLY WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS HERE CLOSELY AND IS APPARENTLY NOT UNHAPPY WITH THE COURSE THEY HAVE TAKEN SO FAR. 14. IN HIS RESIGNATION STATEMENT (REFTEL B.), PRIME MINISTER KARAMI EXPRESSED DEEP DESPAIR OVER THE VIOLENCE IN WEST BEIRUT. HE OBLIQUELY BUT CLEARLY BLAMED SYRIA FOR THE \"GRAVE AND SERIOUS\" EVENTS AND CALLED ON IT TO HELP SORT OUT THE CRISIS. ON APRIL 18, KARAMI DEPARTED FOR DAMASCUS TO MEET WITH SARG LEADERS. ---------------------------- REPLACING THE PRIME MINISTER ---------------------------- 15. THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS LATEST BATTLE IN WEST BEIRUT WAS TO FORCE THE RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER KARAMI WHO, CONFRONTED WITH BARRI\'S SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON SUNNI INTERESTS, HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RESIGN. THE SELECTION OF A NEW SUNNI PRIME MINISTER IS SUBJECT TO A NUMBER OF RESTRAINTS. FOREMOST IS THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF ANY SUNNI NOTABLE AGREEING TO REPLACE THE DESPAIRING KARAMI UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITIONS. KARAMI CLEARLY FELT HUMILIATED BY THE EVENTS OF APRIL 16-17; NO SELF-RESPECTING SUNNI WOULD OVERTLY ATTEMPT TO PROFIT BY THE \"EFFENDI\'S\" DISCOMFITURE. SECONDLY, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE A SUNNI LEADER TO PRESIDE OVER A CABINET WITH AN UNREPENTANT BARRI AND JUMBLATT PRESENT. FINALLY, SYRIA\'S APPROVAL OF THE NEW PRIME MINISTER WILL BE REQUIRED. NOT KNOWING SYRIA\'S EXACT ROLE AND INTENTIONS IN THE EVENTS IN THE WEST, THE PROSPECTIVE SUNNI CANDIDATES WILL BE WARY. 16. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE CAN FORESEE ONE FORM WHICH A POSSIBLE SOLUTION MIGHT TAKE. FOR EXAMPLE, A MEETING OF SUNNI RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL NOTABLES AT THE DAR AL-FATWA, THE SEAT OF THE GRAND MUFTI, MIGHT ISSUE A SET OF CONDITIONS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE MET BEFORE A SUNNI COULD ACCEPT THE PREMIERSHIP. THIS WOULD ALLOW THE NEW PRIME MINISTER TO CLAIM THE BACKING OF THE SUNNI COMMUNITY FOR NEW TERMS FOR HIS PARTICIPATION, THUS MORE OR LESS TURNING THE PAGE ON KARAMI\'S RESIGNATION. WE CANNOT PRECLUDE THAT, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, KARAMI HIMSELF MIGHT NOT BE REINCARNATED. 17. POSSIBLE PRECONDITIONS (APART FROM CONCILIATORY STATEMENTS AND GESTURES FROM AMAL AND THE PSP) INCLUDE AN AGREEMENT THAT BARRI AND JUMBLATT WOULD PARTICIPATE IN CABINET MEETINGS, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY PLAN FOR THE SUNNI HEARTLANDS OF WEST BEIRUT, SIDON, AND POSSIBLY TRIPOLI. ANY OF THE ABOVE CONCESSIONS WOULD BE HARD TO EXTRACT FROM THE SHIA, WHO ARE RIDING HIGH AT PRESENT. THUS THE CABINET CRISIS MIGHT BECOME A DRAWN-OUT AFFAIR. ------------------------ FORMING A NEW GOVERNMENT ------------------------ 18. AS FOR THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT, WE SEE TWO PRIMARY OPTIONS. THE FIRST, A SMALL CABINET MUCH LIKE THE OUTGOING \"NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT,\" APPEARS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. BASICALLY THE SAME PERSONALITIES WOULD BE INVOLVED, AND THE SAME ANIMOSITIES WOULD REAPPEAR. IN SUM, THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE KARAMI GOVERNMENT ARE PROBABLY TOO DEEP TO BE SIMPLY PAPERED OVER, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE RISE OF SHIA POWER VIS-A-VIS THEIR SUNNI CORELIGIONISTS. THE SECOND, AN ENLARGED GOVERNMENT, RUMORS OF WHICH HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, MIGHT PROVE A MORE FEASIBLE OPTION. IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD POINT OUT THE REPUTATION OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER TAKIADDIN SOLH AS A CONCILIATOR PRESIDING OVER LARGE GOVERNMENTS (THOUGH AGAIN, WE RECALL KARAMI\'S PHOENIX-LIKE QUALITIES). BARTHOLOMEW " "56","4/22/1985 14:48","85BEIRUT2370","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","85BEIRUT2330\|85TELAVIV6070","O 221448Z APR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2743 INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 02370 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LE SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON: THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL CONTINUES WHILE NEW EFFORTS ARE MADE TO BRING PEACE TO SIDON REFS: (A) BEIRUT 2330, (B) TEL AVIV 6070 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. ISRAEL REPORTEDLY CONTINUES CONTACTS AIMED AT USING INDIGENOUS FORCES TO MAINTAIN BORDER SECURITY AFTER THE JUNE 1 WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS, THE ISRAELIS HAVE REACHED A COMPROMISE WITH THE DRUZE OF THE HASBAYA REGION WHEREBY THE DRUZE INHABITANTS WILL FORM A \"CIVIL GUARD,\" BUT WILL NOT HAVE DIRECT TIES TO THE ASL OR ANY OTHER ISRAELI-BACKED ORGANIZATION. IF THESE REPORTS ARE TRUE, THIS DEAL REPRESENTS A VICTORY FOR THE LOCAL DRUZE WHO HAVE ALLEGEDLY BEEN RESISTING ISRAELI PRESSURE (WHICH INCLUDED A BLOCKADE OF THE VILLAGES OF AKA KAMA AND MIMAS) TO RECRUIT THEM INTO THE ASL. 3. IN THE JAZZIN AREA, LOCAL PRESS REPORTS THAT EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO ESTABLISH A 300-400 MAN CHRISTIAN FORCE INDEPENDENT OF THE ASL. THESE REPORTS SUPPORT OTHER INFORMATION THE EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED CONCERNING A DEAL ALLEGEDLY STRUCK BETWEEN WALID JUMBLATT AND THE CHRISTIANS OF JAZZIN CONCERNING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR JAZZIN AND THE IQLIM AL-KHARRUB. DETAILS WERE REPORTEDLY HAMMERED OUT AT A MEETING HELD LAST WEEK IN MUKHTARA ATTENDED BY JUMBLATT, JEAN AZIZ, JAZZIN DEPUTY EDMOND RIZK, AND AN UNIDENTIFIED ISRAELI OFFICER. AT THIS MEETING, JUMBLATT REPORTEDLY ACCEPTED THE FORMATION OF THIS CHRISTIAN FORCE, PROVIDED IT HAD NO OVERT CONNECTION WITH THE ASL; HE ALSO APPARENTLY SAID HE WOULD NOT ATTACK THE CHRISTIANS OF THE JAZZIN AREA OR THE IQLIM AL-KHARRUB AND OFFERED TO OPEN THE CHUF ROAD TO CHRISTIAN TRAFFIC IF THE COASTAL ROADS WERE CLOSED TO THEM. IN RETURN, JUMBLATT ASKED FOR AN OPEN ROAD FROM THE CHUF TO THE DRUZE VILLAGES OF HASBAYA AND ROSHAYYA IN THE SOUTH, AND REMOVAL OF LF ELEMENTS FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA. 4. IN SIDON, THE TWO AXES OF CONFRONTATION REMAINED ACTIVE OVER THE WEEKEND. ONE FRONT PITS LF FIGHTERS IN THE VILLAGES OF ABRA, HLALIYAH, AND QAYYA (SOUTHEAST OF SIDON) AGAINST SUNNI AND PALESTINIAN MILITIAMEN SUPPORTED BY THE LAF\'S SUNNI TAWEED 98TH BRIGADE FROM TRIPOLI LOCATED ON THE HILL OF MAR ELIAS. ON THE OTHER FRONT, ALSO LOCATED IN THE EASTERN SUBURBS, LF MILITIAMEN BASED IN THE VILLAGES OF MIYAH MIYAH, MAGHDUSHEH, AND DARB AL-SIM CONFRONT THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS OF MIYAH MIYAH AND AYN AL-HILWAH. ON FRIDAY AND SATURDAY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, 155 MM SHELLS FELL ON THE LAF\'S ZGHAYB BARRACKS IN CENTRAL SIDON. LOCAL PRESS REPORTS CASUALTY FIGURES AS HIGH AS 26 KILLED AND WOUNDED IN WEEKEND FIGHTING. 5. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, SIDON DEPUTY NAZIH BIZRI, CLAIMING TO HAVE LOST ANY HOPE FOR LAF REINFORCEMENT OR LF WITHDRAWAL, CALLED APRIL 19 ON THE CITIZENS OF SIDON TO TAKE UP ARMS IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE. USAMA SAAD, VP OF THE \"NASSERITE POPULAR ORGANIZATION,\" WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED BIZRI TO DAMASCUS EARLIER IN THE WEEK, ALSO CALLED UPON THE AREA\'S CHRISTIAN VILLAGERS \"TO FORCE THE LF FROM THEIR VILLAGES SO THEY DON\'T BECOME THE TARGETS OF A MILITARY SOLUTION.\" 6. IN CONTRAST TO THE INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC EMANATING FROM SIDON\'S MUSLIMS, THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY SEEMS INTENT ON DAMPING DOWN THE LEVEL OF TENSION. FOLLOWING A VISIT TO ISRAEL (REF B) DURING WHICH HE WAS REPORTEDLY WARNED BY THE ISRAELIS NOT TO MAKE TROUBLE IN SIDON, AND AFTER A WEEKEND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH FORMER PRESIDENT CAMILLE CHAMOUN, SAMIR JA\'JA\' HELD A MORNING PRESS CONFERENCE ON APRIL 22 TO ANNOUNCE LF MEASURES AIMED AT DEFUSING THE CRISIS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT SEEN THE TEXT OF JA\'JA\'S STATEMENT, WE UNDERSTAND THESE TO INCLUDE: -- A. A UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE EFFECTIVE 1600 LOCAL TIME ON APRIL 22; -- B. A WITHDRAWAL OF NON-INDIGENOUS LF FORCES FROM THE SIDON AREA BEGINNING 1100 LOCAL TIME ON APRIL 23. THIS WITHDRAWAL IS IN ORDER TO \"GIVE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT A CHANCE TO UNDERTAKE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES.\" (MILITIAMEN NATIVE TO THE AREA WILL REMAIN); -- C. A CALL FOR THE PRESIDENT, PM, GOVERNMENT, AND LAF COMMAND TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY VIOLATIONS. JA\'JA\' FURTHER STATED HIS HOPE THAT THESE MEASURES WOULD CONSTITUTE A FIRST STEP TOWARD A SETTLEMENT AND CALL FORTH PEACE INITIATIVES FROM THE OTHER PARTIES INVOLVED. HE INVITED JOURNALISTS TO WITNESS TOMORROW\'S WITHDRAWAL. 7. ON THE MILITARY LEVEL, THE QUADRIPARTITE MILITARY COMMISSION IS REPORTED BY THE PRESS TO BE WORKING FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL LAF UNIT TO SIDON. NO DETAILS OF ARMAMENT OR CONFESSIONAL COMPOSITION ARE AVAILABLE. IN ANY EVENT, PAST HISTORY INDICATES THAT IT CANNOT BE DEPLOYED IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRIOR POLITICAL AGREEMENT. 8. ONE USUALLY WELL INFORMED LOCAL PRESS SOURCE TELLS US THAT SYRIA IS TRYING TO PUT IN PLACE A SCENARIO WHEREBY SUNNIS OF SIDON CAN CLAIM VICTORY OVER THE LF AS A SOP FOR RECENT SUNNI LOSSES IN WEST BEIRUT. THE PRICE OF SUCH A DEAL, HOWEVER, IS ALLEGED TO BE RENUNCIATION BY SUNNIS OF THEIR LINKS WITH PRO-ARAFAT PLO PALESTINIANS AND ACCEPTANCE OF RELIANCE UPON DRUZE AND ABU MUSA PALESTINIANS IN THEIR STEAD. THE ALTERNA- TIVE, ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, IS FOR DRUZE, ABU MUSA MILITIA, AND AMAL TO ADMINISTER THE SAME LESSON IN SIDON THAT THEY DID IN WEST BEIRUT. 9. IN TYRE, ISRAELI FORCES CONTINUE THEIR PREPARATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL. IDF SPOKESMEN HAVE ANNOUNCED A WITHDRAWAL DATE OF APRIL 24, BUT ACTIVITIES ON THE GROUND INDICATE IT MAY OCCUR UP TO 24 HOURS EARLIER. ALL BUILDINGS AND INSTALLATIONS OF POTENTIAL USE TO THE RESISTANCE ARE BEING DYNAMITED, THERE IS AS YET NO WORD ON POSSIBLE LAF DEPLOYMENT AFTER THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. BARTHOLOMEW " "57","4/23/1985 9:33","85ISLAMABAD8251","Embassy Islamabad","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 230933Z APR 85 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7658 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 08251 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, IR, PK, SU SUBJECT: PAKISTAN SEES SIGNS OF UPTURN IN IRAN-SOVIET - TIES 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. - 2. SUMMARY: FOREIGN SECRETARY NAIK SUMMARIZED HIS AMBASSADOR\'S APPRAISAL OF UPTURN IN IRAN-SOVIET TIES. THE AMBASSADOR ASSERTS IRANIAN RATIONALE IS BASICALLY PRAGMATIC AND ASSERTS TREND WILL CONTINUE. END SUMMARY. 3. RESPONDING TO MY EARLIER REQUEST FOR GOP THINKING ON THE MEANING OF THE APRIL 5 VISIT TO MOSCOW OF IRANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER HOSSEIN ARDEBILI, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY APRIL 19 SUMMARIZED FOR POLCOUNSELOR AND ME A CABLE JUST RECEIVED. WE SHOULD PROTECT THE SOURCE COMPLETELY. THE SIGNS OF AN UPTURN ---------------------- 4. EARLY IN 1984, THE GOI HAD INDICATED ITS INTENTION TO TRY THE TUDEH PARTY LEADERS, SENT LOW LEVEL OFFICIALS TO THE SOVIET REVOLUTIONARY DAY CELEBRATIONS, AND LIMITED SOVIET DIPLOMATS\' CONTACTS. ALL THIS LEFT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN VOICING GLOOMY AND NEGATIVE PROGNOSIS FOR RELATIONS. - 5. THE SOVIET PATIENCE NOW SEEMS TO BE BEARING FRUIT AS: -- THE IRANIANS POSTPONED THE TUDEH TRIALS (IN NOVEMBER); -- RAFSANJANI ATTENDED AND SPOKE PROFUSELY AT THE 10-DAY DAWN(SIC) CELEBRATION; AND -- THE IRANIAN PRESS HAS STARTED TO CAST THE SOVIETS IN A MORE FAVORABLE LIGHT. MOST RECENTLY A PROMINENT COLUMNIST QUESTIONED THE GOVERNMENT\'S RATIONALE FOR NOT HAVING CONSULTED WITH THE SOVIETS DURING RECENT DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHES MADE WHEN THE WAR INTENSIFIED (WHY NOT INCLUDE THE NUMBER ONE SUPERPOWER--OUR STRONG NEIGHBOR?). - WHAT IRAN WANTS --------------- 6. IN CONTEXT OF AN INCREASINGLY COSTLY WAR, THE AMBASSADOR CONCLUDES IRAN SEEKS: -- TO EASE ITS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, E.G., WITH POSSIBILITY OF GAS SALES TO THE SOVIETS; -- SECURE LINES OF COMMUNICATION--THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME UNCERTAINTY OVER THE TURKISH LOC; AND -- ESTABLISH ALTERNATIVE AIR ROUTES--THE IRAQI THREAT HAS CUT MOST OF IRAN AIR\'S WESTWARD SERVICE, AND THE SOVIETS HAVE OFFERED A NEW ROUTE TO FRANKFURT VIA MOSCOW. 7. THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR SEES A NUMBER OF TANGIBLE INDICATORS ALREADY REFLECTING BENEFITS OF INCREASED ECONOMIC COOPERATION: -- THE SOVIETS ARE HELPING BUILD POWER GENERATORS, AND SEEKING TO EXPAND THIS AREA OF COOPERATION. -- TWO-WAY TRADE IN 1985 SHOULD EXCEED $2 BILLION. -- A JOINT MINISTERIAL MEETING WILL BE HELD IN MAY-JUNE, AND EXPERTS WILL MEET IN MOSCOW IN MAY TO LOOK AT OTHER STEPS FOR ENHANCING ECONOMIC RELATIONS. - ARDEBILI VISIT -------------- 8. PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR SURMISES THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE REITERATED OPPOSITION TO THE WAR\'S CONTINUATION. HE BELIEVES THE IRANIAN SIDE LIKELY ONLY LISTENED. THE IRANIANS WOULD HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ--WHETHER SOVIETS TAKE NOTE WILL PROBABLY DEPEND ON SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN\'S POST-WAR INTENTIONS. THE SOVIETS WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO SEE IRAN TOO STRONG. 9. THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR SEES THESE CURRENT MOVES AS A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE. IRAN FEELS INCREASINGLY ISOLATED. ITS REMAINING ARAB SUPPORTERS, E.G., SYRIA AND LIBYA, ARE SOVIET FRIENDS. AMBASSADOR ASSERTS MANY IRANIANS WOULD PREFER BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., BUT THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY TIDE IS STILL FLOWING TOO STRONG, THE U.S. IS NOT READY FOR SUCH MOVES, AND IN ANY CASE IS TOO DISTANT. RUSSIA ON THE OTHER HAND IS A POWERFUL NEIGHBOR WHICH CAN DO IMMEDIATE GOOD OR EVIL. - 10. NAIK, EXTENDING THE POINT MADE ABOUT THE U.S., NOTED THAT THE IRANIAN DELEGATION AT THE RECENT ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (ECO) COMMITTEE MEETINGS HAD EXPANDED THE CONSENSUS TO GET TECHNICAL COOPERATION (IF NECESSARY) FROM \"WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES.\" PAKISTAN AND TURKEY HAD INITIALLY PROMOTED THE IDEA OF \"REST OF THE WORLD\" OUT OF CONCERN THAT IRAN WOULD BALK AT A GROUPING THAT INCLUDED THE U.S.-- INSTEAD THE IRANIANS EXPLICITLY EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES FORMULATION. 11. COMMENT: NO DOUBT THE GOP IS WATCHING THESE DEVELOPMENTS WITH CONSIDERABLE CONCERN. THEY UNDERSTAND OUR CONCERNS ABOUT IRANIAN STATE TERRORISM BUT WOULD WELCOME U.S. MOVES TO EASE IRAN\'S ISOLATION. SHORT OF THAT THEY HOPE WE SHOW UNDERSTANDING AND PATIENCE AS THEY WORK TO HELP KEEP IRAN FROM FALLING UNDER SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET SWAY WITH ALL THAT WOULD MEAN FOR PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. CERTAINLY THE LONG-TERM RISKS FOR OUR INTERESTS DEMAND WE TAKE SUCH AN ATTITUDE. HINTON " "58","4/25/1985 14:13","85BEIRUT2434","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","85BEIRUT2408","O 251413Z APR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2792 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 02434 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LE SUBJECT: LF COMPLETES WITHDRAWAL FROM SIDON, AND ISRAELIS LEAVE THE WEST BIQA\' REFERENCE: BEIRUT 2408 1.(U) LOCAL PRESS REPORTS THE COMPLETION ON APRIL 24 OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF 450 LF MILITIAMEN FROM THE SIDON AREA TO EAST BEIRUT. HOWEVER, THESE REPORTS CONTINUE, LAF UNITS HAVE STILL NOT OCCUPIED THE FORMER LF POSITIONS EAST OF THE CITY, AND SPORADIC EXCHANGES OF FIRE CONTINUE TO MAR THE CEASE-FIRE. LF MILITIAMEN NATIVE TO THE AREA ARE SAID TO REMAIN ARMED AND IN UNIFORM. SCATTERED FIGHTING WAS REPORTED ON BOTH MAIN AXES OF CONFRONTATION WITH LF FIGHTERS IN QAYAA EXCHANGING FIRE WITH THE LAF, AND PALESTINIANS FROM THE MIYAH MIYAH CAMP FIRING MORTAR ROUNDS INTO THE VILLAGE OF MIYAH MIYAH. LF OFFICIALS DENY THAT THE CHRISTIANS RETURNED FIRE, BUT THE PALESTINIANS CLAIM NINE WERE WOUNDED BY CHRISTIAN FIRE. THE CITY REMAINS TENSE. 2.(U) PRESS REPORTS ALSO DESCRIBE THE APRIL 24 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WESTERN BIQA\', JABAL BARUK, AND JAZZIN. THE NEW ISRAELI FRONT LINE THUS STRETCHES FROM THE COAST EAST ALONG THE LITANI RIVER, THEN NORTHEASTERLY TO KFAR HUNA, AND EAST AGAIN TO MT. HERMON. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE REPORTEDLY DISMANTLED THEIR POSITIONS IN AND AROUND TYRE, THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT YET LEFT THE CITY. AS THEY LEFT THE WESTERN BIQA\', THEY DROPPED LEAFLETS WARNING THE LOCAL INHABITANTS AGAINST COOPERATING WITH THE SHIA RESISTANCE FIGHTERS: \"WE MUST REMIND YOU THAT THE ISRAELI FORCES WILL NOT HESITATE TO DEAL FIRMLY AND WITHOUT MERCY WITH THOSE WHO COOPERATE WITH TERRORISM.\" 3.(U) OF THE NEWLY EVACUATED AREAS, ONLY THE WEST BIQA\' HAS BEEN OCCUPIED BY THE LAF, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. THERE, UNITS OF THE SHIA FIRST BRIGADE WERE WARMLY GREETED BY AREA RESIDENTS. PSP FORCES, HOWEVER, OCCUPIED THE STRATEGIC HILL OF JABAL BARUK, ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS HAD DISMANTLED THEIR INSTALLATIONS BEFORE DEPARTING. THE SITUATION IN JAZZIN, REPORTED REFTEL, REMAINS UNCLEAR. 4.(C) COMMENT. EMBASSY CONTACTS HAVE LONG INDICATED THAT PSP LEADER WALID JUMBLATT INTENDED TO OCCUPY JABAL BARUK ONCE THE ISRAELIS LEFT. IT IS UNLIKELY HE WILL BE CONVINCED TO YIELD THIS STRATEGIC POSITION TO AN LAF FORCE HE DOES NOT CONTROL. END COMMENT. BARTHOLOMEW " "59","4/27/1985 11:37","85BEIRUT2486","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","85BEIRUT2456","O 271137Z APR 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2820 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 02486 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LE SUBJECT: FALLOUT FROM SIDON REF: BEIRUT 2456 1. C-ENTIRE TEXT. 2. CONFUSION CONTINUES ABOUT EXACT SITUATION IN VILLAGES EAST OF SIDON (REFTEL) WITH BEIRUT PARTIES PLAYING USUAL ROLES IN GREEK CHORUS ON SIDELINES. PALESTINIAN AND FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIM FORCES APPARENTLY CONTINUE TO OCCUPY SEVEN CHRISTIAN TOWNS THEY SEIZED EAST OF SIDON. REPORTS FILTER IN ABOUT SOME 25,000 TO 75,000 CHRISTIAN REFUGEES FROM REGION FLEEING TO EITHER JEZZIN OR BEIRUT. 3. MEANWHILE, ESLEWHERE: - ASL COMMANDER LAHAD REPORTEDLY ISSUED STATEMENT 26 APRIL THREATENING TO SHELL SIDON UNLESS PALESTINIANS AND MUSLIM MILITIA CEASE OFFENSIVE. HE ALSO IS QUOTED AS WARNING LAF AGAINST SENDING TROOPS TO JEZZIN \"BEFORE BRINGING THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SIDON UNDER CONTROL AND FORCING THE PALESTINIANS BACK INTO THEIR CAMPS.\" - PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TELEPHONED SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD TO BRIEF HIM ON DEVELOPMENTS IN SIDON; TWO LEADERS AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. - CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS MET 26 FRIDAY AND DEPLORED SITUATION IN SIDON, CALLED ON FRIENDLY COUNTRIES (\"PARTICULARLY SYRIA\"), \"ALL FREE NATIONS\", AND POPE TO HELP. OTHER CHRISTIAN LEADERS, LED BY CAMILLE CHAMOUN, ISSUED SIMILAR STATEMENTS - GEMAYEL, PARLIAMENT SPEAKER HUSSEINI, AND PM KARAMI MET 26 APRIL TO REVIEW SITUATION. KARAMI AFTER MEETING COMMENTED IN PART THAT RECENT ATTACKS IN SIDON WERE \"REACTIONS WHICH EXPOSED OUR BROTHERS...TO WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THEIR BROTHERS IN SIDON\", COMMENT WHICH SPARKED SHARP CHRISTIAN REACTION AGAINST WHAT THEY VIEWED AS EXAMPLE OF KARAMI\'S LACK OF CONCERN FOR CHRISTIANS WOES. REMAINDER OF KARAMI\'S REMARKS AND THOSE OF HUSSEINI AND OTHER MUSLIM LEADERS WERE DUTIFULLY SOLEMN. - SIDON DEPUTY NAZIH BIZRI ISSUED A STATEMENT CONGRATULATING THE INHABITANTS OF SIDON FOR THEIR, \"VICTORY AGAINST THE LEBANESE FORCES AND THE AGENTS OF ISRAEL.\" ACCORDING TO BIZRI, \"WHAT HAS COME TO PASS IS THE WORK OF SIDONIANS,\" NOT OF ARAFAT PALESTINIANS. HE CALLED THE EXODUS OF CHRISTIAN VILLAGERS AN \"ISRAELI PLOT,\" AND CALLED ON THE REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES. - JA\'JA\'S CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE IN EAST BEIRUT FOR APRIL 27 AS A PROTEST AGAINST SIDON EVENTS, A CALL IN WHICH THE PHALANGE PARTY JOINED 26 APRIL, HAS PROVED SUCCESSFUL, WITH ONLY OCCASIONAL GAS STATIONS, BAKERIES, MOM AND POP CORNER GROCERY STORES, PHARMACIES, AND SIDEWALK NEWSTANDS OPERATING. - CHRISTIAN STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS 26 APRIL NUMBERING AN ESTIMATED 500 STUDENTS, MOSTLY FROM THE SOUTH, MARCHED ON THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO CRITICIZE THE FAILURE OF LAF TO DEPLOY TO PROTECT THE VILLAGES AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE LEBANESE FORCES. DELEGATIONS OF DEMONSTRATORS MET WITH LAF COMMANDER GENERAL A\'OUN. THE ONLY LAF REACTION THUS FAR HAS BEEN A CALL BY GENERAL A\'OUN FOR LAF SOLDIERS IN THE SIDON REGION TO REPORT TO THEIR UNITS. - ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION BY SOUTHERNERS RESIDING IN BEIRUT OCCURRED 26 APRIL ON THE AUTOSTRADE NORTHEAST OF THE CAPITAL, WITH DEMONSTRATORS BLOCKING ROADS, BURNING TIRES, AND FIRING IN THE AIR. OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS IN EAST BEIRUT ARE REPORTEDLY SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 27. - APPARENTLY AS THE RESULT OF AMAL LEADER BARRI WORKING WITH CHRISTIAN LEADERS, AMAL HAS REPORTEDLY DEPLOYED IN STRENGTH OUTSIDE THE CHRISTIAN VILLAGE OF MAGHDUSHAH (POP. 8000) NEAR MIYAH MIYAH TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO THE VILLAGE AGAINST ADVANCING PALESTINIAN/MUSLIM FORCES. MAGHDUSHAH REMAINS CALM AND SECURE 27 APRIL. 4. COMMENT. ESTIMATES OF NUMBERS OF REFUGEES APPEAR EXAGGERATED, AS DO LOCAL STORIES OF \"PALESTINIAN HORDES LOOTING AND BURNING.\" NONETHELESS, THIS PERSPECTIVE REFLECTS DEEP CHRISTIAN ANXIETY OVER THE SIDON EVENTS. THE MAIN TARGETS FOR CHRISTIAN REACTION ARE LAF, FOR ITS FAILURE TO DEPLOY AS AGREED TO REPLACE DEPARTING LF FORCES, AND MUSLIM LEADERS FOR \"FAILING TO KEEP THEIR WORD\" TO PROTECT CHRISTIANS IN THE SOUTH AS AGREED ALSO AS THE PRICE OF LF PULLOUT. BARRI\'S AMAL GETS GRUDGING CREDIT FOR DEPLOYING OUTSIDE MAGHDUSHAH. 5. LAF DEPLOYMENT AWAITS \"POLITICAL COVER\" WHICH A\'OUN TRIES TO INSIST ON BEFORE ACTING. SATURDAY, APRIL 27, IS FULL OF MEETINGS, CONSULTATIONS, TRAVELS, ETC., TRYING TO SET UP BACKSTAGE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SUCH COVER. 6. SOME CHRISTIANS INTERPRET THE ABSENCE OF \"POLITICAL COVER\" FOR LAF DEPLOYMENT AS A REFLECTION OF AN AGREEMENT TO COMPENSATE THE SUNNIS IN SIDON FOR WHAT THEY LOST IN WEST BEIRUT. THE MAIN WINNER THUS FAR, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE THE ARAFATI PLO, WHICH HAS EXPANDED ITS CONTROL AND STRENGTHENED ITS POSITION AROUND THE CAMPS, A RESULT WHICH PRESUMABLY WILL NOT WARM ASSAD\'S HEART. 7. THE PHALANGE\'S JOINING IN THE CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE IN PROTEST AGAINST THE SIDON EVENTS AND GOVERNMENT/LAF INACTION MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO PORTRAY BEIRUT DEMONSTRATIONS AS LF-INTIFIDA ALONE DEFENDING CHRISTIAN INTERESTS, BUT FASTER REACTION WOULD HAVE GAINED THEM MORE CREDIT. END COMMENT. BARTHOLOMEW " "60","5/7/1985 10:26","85BEIRUT2659","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 071026Z MAY 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2947 INFO AMEMBASSY KKU CUS PRIORITY 0965 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 02659 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LE SUBJECT: INTENSE FIGHTING ALONG BEIRUT\'S GREEN LINE 1. C-ENTIRE TEXT. 2. THE NIGHT OF MAY 6-7 WITNESSED SOME OF THE HEAVIEST GREEN LINE FIGHTING SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JULY 4, 1984, BEIRUT SECURITY PLAN. AS ALWAYS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO RECONSTRUCT THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS. HOWEVER IT APPEARS THAT THE FIGHTING BEGAN AS AN EXCHANGE OF SHELLING (TANKS, ROCKETS, AND ARTILLERY BY BOTH SIDES), THEN ESCALATED INTO BLIND SHELLING OF RESIDENTIAL AREAS IN BOTH EAST AND WEST BEIRUT. THE HEAVIEST FIGHTING WAS APPARENTLY CONCENTRATED IN THE PORT AND RAS AL-NABAH AREAS, WITH SHELLS HITTING THE EASTERN RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS OF ASHRAFIYAH AND SIN AL-FIL, AS WELL AS VARIOUS WEST BEIRUT NEIGHBORHOODS. SCATTERED ROUNDS ALSO FELL IN THE GENERAL AREA OF AWKAR, RABIYAH, AND NACCACHE, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE AREAS WERE SPECIFICALLY TARGETED. 3. ALTHOUGH EXACT FIGURES ARE UNAVAILABLE, IT IS CLEAR THAT CASUALTIES WERE HEAVIER THAN IS USUAL IN GREEN LINE FIGHTING. EMBASSY SOURCES REPORT SEEING UP TO TWENTY-FIVE BODIES IN THE PORT AREA, AND THE LAF REPORTS LOSING ONE KILLED AND TWELVE INJURED. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE PSP AND AMAL REQUESTED A CEASE-FIRE FOR 1600 HOURS LOCAL TIME IN ORDER TO RETRIEVE THE DEAD AND WOUNDED FROM THE NO-MAN\'S LAND SEPARATING THE WARRING FACTIONS. THE RIZK TOWER IN EAST BEIRUT WAS HIT BY A TANK ROUND, DESTROYING GOL REPEATER EQUIPMENT AND DAMAGING THE ANTENNA OF A GOVERNMENT TELEVISION STATION. 4. AUB SOURCES INDICATED THAT THE UNIVERSITY SUFFERED ONLY LIGHT DAMAGE, ALTHOUGH ONE STUDENT SUFFERED INJURIES REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION. SCHOOL IS OPEN TODAY, MAY 7, BUT ATTENDANCE IS SPARSE. THIS SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE PREVAILING ATTITUDE AMONG AMERICAN CITIZENS IN WEST BEIRUT IS ONE OF \"DEPRESSION.\" THEY SEE NO DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE THREAT, SUCH AS OF THE LF OR LAF CROSSING THE GREEN LINE TO ATTACK WEST BEIRUT, BUT RECENT EVENTS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A FEELING OF HOPELESSNESS ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE OF LEBANON. THIS SOURCE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH AUB AMCIT FACULTY MEMBERS ARE NOT PLANNING TO LEAVE BEIRUT NOW IN RESPONSE TO A PERCEIVED THREAT, MANY ARE PLANNING ON LEAVING LEBANON AFTER THE END OF THE TERM IN LATE JUNE, EITHER BY NOT RENEWING THEIR CONTRACTS OR BY TAKING A YEAR\'S SABBATICAL. 5. THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND REMAINS TENSE MAY 7, WITH MOST STORES REPORTEDLY CLOSED IN MUCH OF WEST BEIRUT AND THE ASHRAFIYAH SECTION OF EAST BEIRUT. THOSE SHOPS THAT ARE OPEN ARE MOSTLY OF THE MOM AND POP FOOD STORE VARIETY. THE SITUATION APPROACHES NORMAL IN EASTERN AREAS FURTHER FROM THE GREEN LINE. ALL GREEN LINE CROSSINGS ARE OFFICIALLY CLOSED. 6. COMMENT. IT IS STILL TOO SOON TO TELL IF RECENT OUTBREAKS REPRESENT SPONTANEOUS OUTBURSTS OR ARE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. WE EXPECT THE SHARP FIGHTING ALONG THE GREEN LINE TO CONTINUE. HOWEVER, DESPITE UNSUBSTANTIATED RUMORS OF TROOP MOVEMENTS AND FEARS OF IMPENDING CLASHES, SUQ AL-GHARB HAS REMAINED CURIOUSLY QUIET. END COMMENT. BARTHOLOMEW NOTE BY OC/T: HEADING AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW. " "61","5/17/1985 20:17","85LIMA5526","Embassy Lima","CONFIDENTIAL","85LIMA5476","O 172017Z MAY 85 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3881 INFO DIA WASHDC AMEMBASSY LA PAZ AMEMBASSY QUITO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN USIA WASHDC 4160 AMEMBASSY PANAMA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 05526 TERREP DIA FOR IR BRANCH, PANAMA FOR ADS CLARKE E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PTER, PREL, PE SUBJECT: SENDERO CELEBRATES FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF \"ARMED STRUGGLE\" REF: LIMA 5476 1. IN MOST IMPRESSIVE SERIES OF COORDINATED ATTACKS IN LIMA SINCE JULY, 1984, TERRORISTS, PRESUMED TO BE SENDERISTAS CELEBRATING FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THEIR MAY 18, 1980 \"DECLARATION OF WAR\" ON GOP, STRUCK AT VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC AND BUSINESS TARGETS IN LIMA AREA NIGHT OF MAY 16. IN ADDITION TO DYNAMITE CHARGES THROWN AT RESIDENCE OF U.S. AMBASSADOR AND AT PERUVIAN-NORTH AMERICAN CULTURIAL INSTITUTE (IPNCA) (REFTEL), 3 CHARGES DESTROYED MAIN DOOR AND PART OF ENCLOSURE WALL OF CHINESE (PRC) EMBASSY IN SAN ISIDRO. PRESS REPORTS THAT BOMBS WERE ALSO THROWN AT REAR OF SOVIET EMBASSY IN SAN ISIDRO HAVE BEEN DENIED BY PERUVIAN POLICE. REPORTED ATTACKS ON CUBAN AND ISRAELI EMBASSIES HAVE ALSO BEEN DISPROVED (IN ISRAELI CASE, BY EMBOFF CALLING ISRAELI EMBASSY). IN ALL INCIDENTS INVOLVING DIPLOMATIC CHARGES, DAMAGE WAS MINOR; ONE EMPLOYEE OF PRC EMBASSY WAS REPORTED TO BE SLIGHTLY WOUNDED BY FLYING GLASS. - 2. ACCORDING TO OUTLINE OF EVENTS REPORTED IN PRESS, SERIES OF ATTACKS BEGAN ABOUT 2100, WHEN PARTIAL BLACKOUT OCCURRED IN PORTIONS OF LIMA DUE TO DYNAMITING OF AT LEAST TWO ELECTRICAL TOWERS, AT MATUCANA AND HUINCO, IN MANTARO VALLEY POWER GRID. PORTIONS OF MIRAFLORES, SAN ISIDRO AND CENTRAL LIMA WERE AMONG AREAS AFFECTED, AND BROWN-OUTS OCCURRED SPORADICALLY IN REST OF CITY. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, SHOOTING OCCURRED AND DYNAMITE WAS THROWN AT TWO PERUVIAN MARINE POSTS, IN UPPER-CLASS SUBURB OF CHACARILLA DEL ESTANQUE, AND IN JICARILLA, IN SUBURB OF SAN MARTIN DE PORRES. IN BOTH CASES, SHOOTING RESULTED BETWEEN POLICE AND SUBVERSIVES, WITH TWO POLICEMEN KILLED. WE SUSPECT THAT REPORTED GUN- BATTLES SAID TO HAVE OCCURRED AT MINISTRY OF WAR AND AT 79TH GUARDIA CIVIL STATION IN CHACARILLA WERE DUE TO NERVOUS GUARDS FIRING IN AIR. AT LEAST SIX SUSPECTS WERE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY AT JICARILLA, SOME OF WHOM WERE CONSTRUCTION WORKERS FOUND IN NEAR-BY VAN. AT ROUGHLY SAME TIME,ANOTHER ARMED GROUP TOSSED DYNAMITE AT MUNICIPAL OFFICES AND AT BRANCH OF BANCO WEISE IN SUBURB OF VILLA MARIA DE TRIUNFO, CAUSING DAMAGE BUT NO CASUALTIES. DYNAMITE CHARGES WERE ALSO TOSSED AT TODOS SUPERMARKET IN MONTERRICO AND AT OFFICES OF UTILITY ELECTROLIMA IN SUBURB OF SAN JUAN DE LURIGANCHO, CAUSING MAJOR DAMAGE AT BOTH SITES. SCATTERED EXPLOSIONS WERE REPORTED AT OTHER LOCATIONS, INCLUDING SAN MARCOS UNIVERSITY AND PLAZA DE ITALIA. FINALLY, SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS ILLUMINATED LARGE HAMMER AND SICKLE DISPLAYS ON HILLS ABOVE WORKING-CLASS SUBURBS OF EL AGUSTINO AND VILLA EL SALVADOR. IN LATTER CASE, POLICE ARRIVED AT SITE QUICKLY AND ARRESTED AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF PERSONS TRYING TO FLEE THE AREA. - 3. AT OUTSET OF WAVE OF ATTACKS, POLICE RUSHED REINFORCEMENTS TO HOMES OF MEMBERS OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS BOARD (JNE), WHO HAVE BEEN RECEIVING TELEPHONE DEATH THREATS FOR LAST TWO WEEKS. AT HOME OF JNE SECRETARY GENERAL OSWALDO CORPANCHO, POLICE REPORTED THAT A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD BEEN APPROACHING HOUSE FROM DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS PILED INTO SAME CAR AND FLED WHEN POLICE ARRIVED. - 4. COMMENT: VARIETY AND COORDINATION OF ATTACKS SUGGESTS THAT, AFTER A PERIOD OF RELATIVE QUIESENCE, SENDERO LUMINOSO HAS AGAIN REPLENISHED ITS RANKS AND REGAINED ATTACK CAPABILITY IN LIMA, IN SPITE OF ARRESTS OF VARIOUS KEY MEMBERS. POLICE ARE UNANIMOUS IN ATTRIBUTING ATTACKS TO CELEBRATION OF FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF \"DECLARATION OF WAR.\" SL HAS PREVIOUSLY CELEBRATED SIMILAR ANNIVERSARIES WITH SPECTACULAR ATTACKS. ACTUAL ANNIVERSARY, OF COURSE, IS TOMORROW AND MORE VIOLENCE MAY WELL TAKE PLACE. EMBASSY IS TAKING ADDITIONAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS (SEPTEL). JORDAN " "62","5/22/1985 8:55","85DAMASCUS3204","Embassy Damascus","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 220855Z MAY 85 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1369 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY AMMAN POUCH AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY CAIRO ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 03204 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINR, PREL, IR, IZ, SY, TU, UR SUBJECT: IRANIANS IN DAMASCUS AND NOTES FROM TEHRAN 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. A RECENT VISIT OF FAMILY FRIENDS FROM TEHRAN FILLED IN SOME GAPS IN OUR INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF IRANIAN TOURIST-PILGRIM FLIGHTS TO DAMASCUS AND PRODUCED SOME COMMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN. THE FLIGHTS OF JUMBO JETS FROM TEHRAN, WHICH USED TO BRING 2,500 IRANIANS TO DAMASCUS EACH WEEK, WERE INTERRUPTED IN MARCH WHEN IRAQ WARNED AIRLINES TO AVOID IRANIAN AIRSPACE. FLIGHTS FROM TEHRAN HAVE GRADUALLY RESUMED DURING THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT SYRIAN AIR WILL ALSO SOON HAVE PLANES ON THE TEHRAN RUN. IRANIAN AIR FLIGHTS PROCEED FROM TEHRAN TO MESHED AND NORTH INTO THE SOVIET UNION AND OVER TURKEY TO SYRIA -- FOUR HOURS IN ALL. SEATS FROM TEHRAN ARE NOW EXTREMELY SCARCE WITH FAMILIES OF MARTYRS HAVING PRIORITY. FOR SOME REASON -- POSSIBLY NEW FLIGHTS -- SEATS ARE NOW AVAILABLE FOR THE RETURN FROM DAMASCUS TO TEHRAN. 3. EACH IRANIAN BEFORE LEAVING IRAN IS ALLOWED TO EXCHANGE AT THE OFFICIAL RATE THE EQUIVALENT OF $100 FOR WHICH HE RECEIVES CASH THAT MUST BE EXCHANGED FOR SYRIAN CURRENCY AT THE AIRPORT ON ARRIVAL. HAVING PAID THE EQUIVALENT IN TEHRAN, HE IS GIVEN A VOUCHER FOR AN ADDITIONAL $400 AT THE TOURIST RATE, WHICH CAN BE PICKED UP AT THE SEMIRAMIS HOTEL IN DAMASCUS. BUS TRANSPORTATION FROM TEHRAN TAKES FOUR DAYS, ONE OF WHICH IS SPENT ON FRONTIER FORMALITIES. 4. IRANIAN TOURISTS OFTEN SUPPLEMENT THEIR CASH BY BRING- ING GOODS WITH THEM FROM TEHRAN. THE CAVIAR SUPPLY HAS BEEN CUT DOWN, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF RECENT RESTRICTIONS AT TEHRAN AIRPORT WHERE PURCHASES BY RELIGIOUS PILGRIMS ARE CONSIDERED INAPPROPRIATE. IRANIAN VISITORS SHOP IN DAMASCUS FOR SOUVENIRS AND ITEMS NOT AVAILABLE IN TEHRAN. 5. RELIGIOUS DUTIES CONSIST OF VISITING THE SHRINE IN THE OMAYYAD MOSQUE IN DAMASCUS WHERE HUSSEIN\'S HEAD IS BURIED. MORE IMPORTANT FOR MOST IS THE VISIT TO THE DAMASCUS SUBURB WHERE SIT ZAYNAB, SISTER OF HUSSEIN AND HASSAN, IS BURIED. ACCORDING TO TRADITION, ZAYNAB WAS BROUGHT TO DAMASCUS AT THE SAME TIME AS HUSSEIN\'S HEAD. HER SHRINE IS SELDOM MENTIONED IN TOURIST LITERATURE AND WAS, UNTIL THE IRANIAN INFLUX, SCARCELY EVER VISITED. HOWEVER, SINCE IRAN IS THE RESTING PLACE OF ONLY ONE OF THE TWELVE IMANS AND IRAQ, RICH IN SHI\'A REMAINS, IS OUT OF BOUNDS, SIT ZAYNAB\'S TOMB HAS ACQUIRED A NEW PROMINENCE. 6. ALTHOUGH A SIMILAR SHRINE IN IRAN OR IRAQ WOULD NOT BE OPEN TO NON-MOSLEMS, SYRIAN TOLERANCE PREVAILS HERE, WITH THE ONLY WARNING IN ENGLISH BEING: \"MAKE UP LADIES ARE NOT ALLOWED TO ENTER.\" BLACK CHADORS ARE AVAILABLE AT THE OUTER GATE WHERE THERE IS NO ENTRY FEE. THE ARCHITECTURAL STYLE IS PERSIAN, BUT THE MODERN SQUARE TILES WILL NEED MANY YEARS TO DEVELOP CHARACTER. THE INNER SANCTUM IS IN THE IRANIAN TRADITION, HEAVILY DECORATED WITH MIRRORED CEILING AND SILVER GRILL AROUND THE TOMB. THE SCENE INSIDE THE ENCLOSURE COULD BE FROM AN ORIENTALIST PAINTING, WITH WOMEN IN CHADORS AND MEN IN TURBANS AND LONG GARMENTS. THERE WERE ONLY A FEW PERSONS WHO LOOKED LIKE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS IN MILITARY UNIFORM DURING OUR VISIT ON A SATURDAY DURING NOON PRAYERS. THERE ARE NO PICTURES OF KHOMEINI ANYWHERE TO BE SEEN IN THE SHRINE AREA OR THE NEARBY STREETS. THIS COULD HARDLY BE ACCIDENTAL AND PROBABLY REFLECTS A SYRIAN REQUIREMENT. (ASAD\'S PICTURE IS ALSO ABSENT.) 7. COMMENTS BY OUR PROFESSIONAL AND MERCHANT CLASS VISITORS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN AGREED WITH OTHER RECENT REPORTS REGARDING A GROWING MALAISE AS THE PUBLIC AWAITS THE END OF THE KHOMEINI ERA. WHETHER RUMOR OR FACT, OUR FRIENDS REPORTED FREQUENT MANIFESTATIONS OF ANTI-REGIME FEELING, INCLUDING WALL SLOGANS AND BOMBINGS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN REPORTED IN THE MEDIA. THEY ALSO SPOKE OF CONSIDERABLE USE OF ALCOHOL AMONG THE PUBLIC, WITH OPIUM THE PREFERRED DRUG OF THE CLERGY. MONTAZERI, WHO IS REPORTEDLY A HEAVY USER, IS DISMISSED AS A NOBODY. PREDICTIONS RE KHOMENEI\'S SUCCESSOR CENTER ON RAFSANJANI. OPPOSITION TO THE WAR IS ALSO REPORTEDLY STRONG AND GROWING STRONGER. THOUGH OUR VISITORS DID NOT SEEM TO BELIEVE CLERICAL RULE HAD A LONG-TERM FUTURE IN IRAN, THEY COULD NOT SUGGEST WHEN OR HOW THE RETURN TO A MORE TRADITIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT WOULD OCCUR. THE ONLY POSITIVE THING THEY HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE KHOMEINI REGIME WAS THAT IT HAD, FOR THE TIME BEING, SUBDUED THE TUDEH PARTY. EAGLETON " "63","5/23/1985 15:26","85KADUNA653","Consulate Kaduna","UNCLASSIFIED","","R 231526Z MAY 85 FM AMCONSUL KADUNA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7986 AMEMBASSY LAGOS INFO AMEMBASSY NIAMEY ","UNCLAS KADUNA 0653 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PINS, PROP, SCOM, NI, IT SUBJECT: IRAN TO PUBLISH HAUSA LANGUAGE MAGAZINE 1. IRAN WILL SOON BEGIN PUBLICATION OF A NEWS MAGAZINE IN THE HAUSA LANGUAGE, ACCORDING TO THE MAY 23 ISSUE OF GASKIYA TA FI KWABO, THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED HAUSA NEWSPAPER. THE MAGAZINE IS TO BE CALLED \"SAKON SAURA\", WHICH ROUGHLY TRANSLATES TO \"THE OTHER MESSAGE\". 2. THE UNATTRIBUTED NEWS REPORT SAYS THE MAGAZINE WAS CONCEIVED AS A MEANS OF PROPAGATING IRAN\'S SHI\'ITE MANIFESTO. IT WILL FEATURE INFORMATION ABOUT THE IRAN- IRAQ WAR, THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE IRANIAN STATE, AND THE WORLDWIDE WAR AGAINST UNBELIEVERS. IT PROMISES TO EXPOSE \"ISRAEL\'S SECRETS AND AMERICA\'S OPPRESSIVE TENDENCIES\" AND TO DESCRIBE IRAN\'S STRUGGLE TO STOP THEM. NO DATE FOR THE BEGINNING OF PUBLICATION WAS GIVEN, NOR WERE ANY DETAILS PROVIDED ON THE MAGAZINE\'S DISTRIBUTION POLICY. 3. COMMENT: IF THIS REPORT IS TRUE, THE NEW MAGAZINE WILL REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT NEW ATTEMPT BY IRAN TO GAIN INFLUENCE AMONG NIGERIA\'S MUSLIM POPULATION OF SOME FIFTY MILLION. PRESUMABLY, THE MAGAZINE WOULD ALSO FIND AN AUDIENCE IN NIGER. NONE OF THE LEADING ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN NIGERIA HAVE SHOWN ANY INCLINATION TO EMBRACE IRAN\'S BRAND OF SHI\'ITE FUNDAMENTALISM, AND MOST MAINSTREAM ISLAMIC LEADERS--FROM BOTH THE MAJOR FACTIONS-- FIND KHOMEINI ABHORRENT. ONLY THE MOST MILITANT MUSLIM UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HAVE SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN IRANIAN PROPAGANDA, AND THEIR NUMBERS ARE VERY SMALL. THE FMG, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT MAITATSINE TROUBLES, IS VERY WARY OF ANY EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINTS AND WOULD BE LIKELY TO MONITOR THE CONTENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE MAGAZINE VERY CLOSELY. RACKMALES " "64","5/27/1985 8:59","85RIYADH4906","Embassy Riyadh","SECRET//NOFORN","","R 270859Z MAY 85 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4001 INFO SECDEF WASHDC AMCONSUL DHAHRAN AMCONSUL JEDDAH DIA WASHDC JCS WASHDC USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ-2/CCJ-3/CCJ-5/POLAD// ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 12 RIYADH 04906 NOFORN E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KPRP, MCAP, MASS, SA SUBJECT: THE ROLE OF SAUDI PRINCES IN UNIFORM 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY. THE PRESENCE OF A NUMBER OF SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE MILITARY--WE CAN IDENTIFY MORE THAN 25 AND THERE ARE CLEARLY OTHERS--HAS LONG BEEN A SUBJECT OF INTEREST. ALSO THE FOCUS OF CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION HAS BEEN THE ROYAL FAMILY\'S WELL CALCULATED EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN CAREFUL CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY, TO PRECLUDE ITS BECOMING A THREAT TO THE REGIME. THESE EFFORTS HAVE BEEN COMPLICATED IN RECENT YEARS BY THE OFTEN CONTRADICTORY DEMANDS FOR AN EFFICIENT, WELL EQUIPPED FORCE TO RESPOND TO REAL THREATS. A KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER THE PRINCELY PRESENCE IN THE MILITARY IS PART OF THE ROYAL FAMILY CONTROL MECHANISM. BUT THERE ARE ALSO OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE ROYAL PRESENCE IN THE MILITARY: IF NOT THERE AS PART OF A CONCERTED EFFORT TO MAINTAIN ROYAL CONTROL, WHAT ARE THE ATTRACTIONS OF THE MILITARY FOR PRINCES WHO APPEAR TO HAVE NO SHORTAGE OF CAREER CHOICES? WHAT IMPACT DO PRINCES IN UNIFORM HAVE ON MILITARY EFFICIENCY AND UNIT MORALE GIVEN THEIR SPECIAL STATUS? THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF A GENERALLY CONCEIVED PLAN TO MAINTAIN PRINCELY CONTROL OF THE MILITARY, SPECIFICALLY IN THE PLACEMENT OF THE MOST SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY IN POSITIONS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER ALL UNIFORMED ELEMENTS--DEFENSE, NATIONAL GUARD AND INTERIOR, INCLUDING ITS PARA- MILITARY FORCES. GOING FURTHER, THE PREPONDERANCE OF PRINCELY PRESENCE IN THE LAND AND AIR FORCES, THE TWO STRONGEST ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY, AND THE EY POSITIONS HELD BY CERTAIN OF THE UNIFORMED PRINCES, SUGGESTS A BROADER DESIGN FOR ROYAL PRESENCE AND CONTROL. BUT THERE ARE COUNTER SIGNALS, PROBABLY MOST IMPORTANT BEING REAL QUESTIONS AS TO HOW EFFECTIVE SUCH CONTROL MIGHT BE, GIVEN THE DIVERSITY OF INTERESTS WITHIN THE ROYAL FAMILY. JUNIOR PRINCES IN MANY CASES HAVE VERY LITTLE REASON TO FEAR THE IMPOSITION OF DIRECT CONTROLS FROM THE KING. OVERALL, IT IS OUR JUDGEMENT THAT THERE IS MORE APPEARANCE THAN REALITY TO THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY PRINCES, BELOW THE VERY TOP LEVELS, BEING CAREFULLY PLACED WITH THE AIM OF ENHANCING FAMILY CONTROL. THIS JUDGEMENT IS REINFORCED BY OTHER SOLID ALTERNATIVE REASONS FOR PRINCES TO JOIN THE MILITARY: GLAMOUR AND EXCITEMENT, THE HISTORICALLY HONORABLE STATUS OF MILITARY SERVICE, BUSINESS SPIN-OFFS FROM THE LARGE MILITARY BUDGET, AND EVEN USE OF THE MILITARY AS A STEPPING STONE FOR BIGGER THINGS. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE DEGREE TO WHICH PRINCES EXERT A STABILIZING EFFECT IN THE MILITARY, THEIR MERE PRESENCE SHOULD BE OF SOME BENEFIT TO THE REGIME. HAVING PRINCES IN THE ARMED FORCES, REGARDLESS OF THEIR MOTIVES FOR BEING THERE, DOES PROVIDE A CERTAIN DEGREE OF INFLUENCE AND OVERSIGHT. AS FOR THE IMPACT OF UNIFORMED PRINCES ON MILITARY MORALE AND EFFICIENCY, THIS CUTS BOTH WAYS. CLEARLY, THEY DO COMMAND SPECIAL TREATMENT AND ARE LESS BOUND BY MILITARY DISCIPLINE, WITH RESULTING RESENTMENT. BUT SPECIAL TREATMENT IS NOT LIMITED TO PRINCES IN THE MILITARY; STRICT MILITARY DISCIPLINE IS NOT IN THE OVERALL SAUDI TRADITION; AND A NUMBER OF THE MILITARY PRINCES MORE THAN BALANCE THE NEGATIVES WITH THE HIGH QUALITY OF THEIR MILITARY ABILITY. END SUMMARY. 3. INTRODUCTION. WHEN WE SPEAK OF MILITARY FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA, WE ARE SPEAKING ABOUT FORCES UNDER THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION (MODA), THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD (SANG) AS WELL AS THE SECURITY FORCES, FRONTIER FORCES AND COAST GUARD ELEMENTS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (MOI). HOWEVER, FOR PURPOSES OF DISCUSSING THE ROLE OF PRINCES IN THE MILITARY, THIS REPORT IS CONFINED TO THE TWO MORE CLASSICAL MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION AND THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT DRAWS HEAVILY ON THE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE ELEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA, CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL WHO DEAL WITH THE ARMED FORCES AS WELL AS THE EXPERIENCES OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY MEANINGFUL EFFORT TO PLUMB THE SAUDI PUBLIC OR MILITARY CONCERNING THEIR OWN, PERSONAL FEELINGS. SOCIAL PRESSURE, CULTURAL BIAS, FEAR OF REPRISAL AND PLAIN DISTRUST OF FOREIGNERS ARE POWERFUL IMPEDIMENTS TO DIRECT INFORMATION GATHERING. WE RECOGNIZE THEREFORE THAT OUR LIST OF PRINCES IS NOT COMPLETE, THAT THERE ARE PROBABLY OTHER FACTORS WE MAY NOT HAVE GIVEN THEIR PROPER EMPHASES, AND THAT SUBJECTIVITY MUST ENTER INTO OUR JUDGEMENTS. HOWEVER, NOTWITHSTANDING THESE DISADVANTAGES, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS REPORT PRESENTS THE BEST PICTURE AVAILABLE OF THE ROLE OF PRINCES IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN ARMED FORCES AND REPRESENTS A STARTING POINT ON THIS USEFUL SUBJECT. 4. THE PRESENCE OF MORE THAN 25 UNIFORMED PRINCES IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN ARMED FORCES RAISES A NUMBER OF INTERESTING QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ROLE PLAYED BY THESE ROYAL OFFSPRING. HOW THESE PRINCES AFFECT THE STABILITY OF THE MILITARY AS WELL AS THEIR INFLUENCE ON ITS EFFICIENCY AND CREDIBILITY AS A FIGHTING FORCE ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS. IS ROYAL MILITARY SERVICE THE RESULT, TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE, OF AN ORCHESTRATED PLAN BY THE ROYAL FAMILY TO MAINTAIN A DIVERSIFIED PRESENCE IN AND CHECK ON THE MILITARY? WHY WOULD A PRINCE, WHO SUPPOSEDLY HAS EVERYTHING HE COULD POSSIBLY WANT, JOIN THE MILITARY? HOW ENCUMBERED BY MILITARY DISCIPLINE IS HE? WHAT IS THE EFFECT ON UNIT MORALE AND DISCIPLINE WHEN A PRINCE JOINS THE OUTFIT? DO THESE PRINCES HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE OVER MILITARY DECISION MAKING? IF SO, HOW FAR DOES THEIR AUTHORITY EXTEND INTO POLICY MAKING? DO THEY \"ROUGH IT\" OR ARE THEY A PRIVILEGED LOT RELATIVELY EXEMPT FROM UNDERGOING HARDSHIP? 5. THE SAUDIS ARE EXTREMELY SECRETIVE ABOUT THEIR ROYAL AFFAIRS, AS THEY ARE ABOUT THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, AND IT IS THEREFORE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE EXACTLY HOW MANY PRINCES ARE IN MILITARY SERVICE. THE FOLLOWING LIST NOTES THOSE WHOSE DUTIES HAVE BROUGHT THEM TO THE MISSION\'S ATTENTION OR WHO WERE INTRODUCED IN CHANCE MEETINGS. ONE FURTHER DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING WHO IS OR IS NOT A PRINCE IS THE COMMONALITY OF NAMES. WHILE SOME ARE RELATED CLOSELY ENOUGH TO ABDUL AZIZ FOR THEIR ANCESTRY TO BE APPARENT, EACH GENERATION ADDS ANOTHER LAYER OF NAMES, CAUSING FAMILY ORIGIN TO BE INCREASINGLY OBSCURED TO OUTSIDERS. SOME PREVIOUSLY KNOWN OFFICERS HAVE DROPPED OUT OF SIGHT. THIS LIST IS THEREFORE NOT ALL INCLUSIVE. BESIDES THE UNIFORMED PRINCES CONTAINED IN THE LIST, THERE ARE ALSO A LARGE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN PRINCES IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY IN ALL THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS. - - MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION --------------------------------------------- ------------ - -SAUDI ARABIAN LAND FORCES (SALF)------------------------ - NAME RANK/POSITION (IF KNOWN) AHMED B. SALMAN B. ABDUL AZIZ BADR B. FAHD AL SAUD AL KABIR LTC, MODA STAFF BANDAR B. FAHD B. KHALID B. - MUHAMMED B. ABDUL RAHMAN COL. DIR. AL KLHARJ - ORDNANCE FACTORY FAYSAL B. MUHAMMED B. SAUD - AL KABIR BG, CDR SALF AVIATION FAYSAL B. JALAWI CPT, MILITARY POLICE FAYSAL B. MUSAID B. ABDUL RAHMAN CPT MILITARY POLICE KHALID B. BANDAR B. ABDUL AZIZ G-3 ARMOR CORPS MUHAMMED B. NASSIR B. ABDUL - AZIZ COL. DEP CDR. INFANTRY SULTAN B. FAHD B. ABDUL AZIZ MAJ. POS. UKN. (KING\'S - SON) TURKI B. ABDULLAH AL FAYSAL B. - ABDUL AZIZ TURKI B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED - B. ABDUL RAHMAN MAJ, CDR OF MP BN - CENTRAL REGION FAHD B. BADR B. ABDUL AZIZ LT, AIRBORNE BDE -ROYAL SAUDI AIR FORCE (RSAF)---------------------------- ABDUL RAHMAN B. FAHD AL FAYSAL - AL FARHAN LTC, BASE CDR, TABUK BANDAR B. FAYSAL B. ABDUL AZIZ COL, DIR. AIR - INSPECTIONS BANDAR B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED AL - SAUD AL KABIR F-15 PILOT FAYSAL B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED - B. ABDUL RAHMAN MANSUR B. BANDAR B. ABDUL AZIZ LTC, F-15 WING CDR, - DHAHRAN MUHAMMED B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED - B. ABDUL RAHMAN TURKI B. NASSIR B. ABDUL AZIZ COL. BASE CDR, DHAHRAN - -ROYAL SAUDI NAVAL FORCES (RSNF)--------------------- - FAHD B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED CAPTAIN - B. ABDUL RAHMAN DEPUTY CDR, RSNF - -ROYAL SAUDI AIR DEFENSE FORCES (RSADF)-------------- - KHALID B. SULTAN B. ABDUL AZIZ BG, DEP CDR, RSADF, - SON OF MIN DEF KHALID B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED - B. ABDUL RAHMAN - --------------------------------------------- -------- - SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD - MITIEB B. ABDULLAH B. - ABDUL AZIZ COL, CDR, SANG MILITARY TURKI B. ABDULLAH B. MOHAMMED AL SAUD AL KABIR MAJOR, S-3, 3D CAB, - 1ST BDE, SANG FAYSAL B. MISHARI B. ABDUL AZIZ 1LT, ASST. S-3, 3D CAB. - 1ST BDE, SANG - - (CAB-COMBINED ARMS BN.) --------------------------------------------- --------- - -FORMER OFFICER PRINCES OF NOTE--------------------- BANDAR B. FAHD B. SAAD II BUSINESS FAHD B. ABDULLAH B. MUHAMMED DEPUTY MINISTER FOR - AL SAUD AL KABIR CIVIL AVIATION AFFAIRS FAYSAL B. MISHAL B.A.A. BUSINESS MUQRIN B.A.A. GOVERNOR OF HAIL SAUD B. ABDULLAH B. FAYSAL B.A.A. BUSINESS FAYSAL B. BANDAR B.A.A. DEP. GOV. OF ASIR BANDAR B. SULTAN AMB. TO USA MUHAMMED B. SAAD B.A.A. VICE GOV. OF QASSIM - PROVINCE ABDUL RAHMAN AL FAYSAL -B. ABDUL AZIZ FORMER ARMOR PROJECT - CDR., RETIRED FOR . HEALTH REASONS. -FORMER OFFICER PRINCES OUT OF CONTACT--------------- ABDUL MALIK B. MUHAMMED AL -AL SHAYKH LAST KNOWN RANK. MAJ., - SALF KHALID B. BANDAR B. -ABDUL AZIZ MAJOR, SALF (?) KHALID B. FAYSAL B. TURKI -B. ABDUL AZIZ MAJOR, HAWK BN - RSADF (?) AHMED B. NASSIR B. ABDUL AZIZ MAJ. RSAF (?) FAHD B. ABDUL RAHMAN B. ABDUL -AZIZ RSAF INTEL OFFICER (?) MISH\'ALB. SAUD B. ABDUL AZIZ (?) SA\'AD B. FAHD B. MUHAMMED PROBABLY TABUK AIR -B. ABDUL AZIZ BASE BANDAR B. FAHD B. MUHAMMED B. ABDUL AZIZ BANDAR AL THUNAYAN AL SAUD CPT, SANG (?) SA\'AD B. SAUD B. ABDUL RAHMAN LT, SANG (?) TURKI AL THUNAYAN AL SAUD LT, SANG (?) 6. IT IS INEVITABLE THAT, WITH THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY NOW ESTIMATED TO NUMBER MORE THAN 5,000 MALE MEMBERS, SOME OF THESE PRINCES SHOULD FIND THEIR WAY INTO THE ARMED FORCES. IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE SENIOR PRINCES; THEY ARE THE MINISTERS AND SENIOR FUNCTIONARIES AT THE VERY TOP OF THE VARIOUS MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, ENSURING POLITICAL CONTROL AND RESPONSIVENESS. MORE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND IS THE PLACE AND PURPOSE OF JUNIOR PRINCES IN MILITARY SERVICE, THOSE IN UNIFORM AND STARTING, AT LEAST, AS JUNIOR OFFICERS. SINCE THE LOYALTY OF ITS ARMED FORCES HAS A CLEAR IMPACT ON THE STABILITY OF AL SAUD RULE, AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE \"ROYAL CONNECTION\" WITH MILITARY SERVICE IS USEFUL IN JUDGING HOW THE ROYAL FAMILY FEELS ABOUT AND DEALS WITH ITS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, AND HOW NON-ROYAL OFFICERS VIEW THEIR AL SAUD COMRADES IN ARMS. END INTRODUCTION. 7. THE AL SAUD MONARCHY IS HIGHLY CONSCIOUS OF THE UTILITY OF A MODERN MILITARY FORCE AND HAS SPENT BILLIONS IN AN EFFORT TO CREATE ONE. A WELL-TRAINED AND SUPERBLY-EQUIPPED MILITARY FORCE IS NOT ONLY VITAL TO THE DEFENSE OF THE FRONTIERS, RESOURCES AND RULING REGIME IN SAUDI ARABIA AGAINST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION BUT IS ALSO USEFUL AS A SYMBOL OF SAUDI NATIONALISM-- FOSTERING POPULAR ATTACHMENT TO THE AL SAUD DYNASTY, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OLDER FOCAL POINTS OF LOYALTY AND MOTIVATION SUCH AS ARAB LINEAGE OR ISLAMIC FAITH. HOWEVER, THE AL SAUD DYNASTS HAVE SEEN MUSLIM MONARCHIES FALL TO COUPS D\'ETAT MOUNTED BY MILITARY OFFICERS. THE HISTORY OF THE REGION OFFERS MANY EXAMPLES, SUCH AS EGYPT, IRAQ, AND LIBYA, IN WHICH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRY, STRENGTHENED AND MODERNIZED, HAVE OVERTHROWN THE MONARCHIAL REGIME THEY WERE ESTABLISHED TO DEFEND. THUS THE SURVIVAL OF THE REGIME REQUIRES THAT CIVILIANS--READ MEMBERS OF THE RULING FAMILY--MAINTAIN TIGHT CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THE REGIME HAS PUT THIS FAMILIAR PRINCIPLE INTO PRACTICE BY ENSURING THAT FAMILY MEMBERS SIT FIRMLY AT THE APEX OF EVERY MILITARY OR QUASI-MILITARY COMMAND PYRAMID--WHETHER IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION (MODA), THE NATIONAL GUARD, OR THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR. 8. GIVEN THESE SAME CONCERNS IT IS ALSO NOT SURPRISING THAT, UNTIL FAIRLY RECENTLY, THE RULERS OF SAUDI ARABIA DID VERY LITTLE TO IMPROVE THEIR ARMED FORCES EITHER QUANTITATIVELY OR QUALITATIVELY. THEY WERE CONTENT TO ALLOW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ONLY A MODEST MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION (MODA) AND MAINTAINED ONLY AN ANTIQUATED NATIONAL GUARD. BUT THIS VIEW BEGAN TO CHANGE IN THE EARLY SIXTIES. IN THE FACE OF WHAT THEY VIEWED AS NASSIRITE AGGRESSION FROM THE YEMEN, THE AL SAUD WERE FORCED TO RECOGNIZE THE VULNERABILITY OF THEIR OWN REGIME TO OUTSIDE MILITARY THREATS. THEY BEGAN A MODEST ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE THEIR DEFENSE FORCES AND NATIONAL GUARD WHICH (WITH THE HELP OF NEW OIL WEALTH) BECAME A MAJOR EFFORT TO EXPAND AND UPGRADE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY. VAST BUILDING PROJECTS AND THE ACQUISITION OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY HAVE BEEN A MAJOR SAG PREOCCUPATION FROM 1974 TO THE PRESENT. 9. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS LIMITED SAUDI PARTICIPATION IN FIGHTING IN THE GOLAN IN 1973, IT WAS THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ WHICH FORCED THE SAG TO COME TO TERMS WITH SOME OF THE REALITIES OF MODERN COMBAT. ALL THE NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE WORLD IS OF LITTLE VALUE WITHOUT A COHESIVE OFFICER CORPS CAPABLE OF MAKING QUICK, SOPHISTICATED USE OF THEIR WEAPONRY. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS IS PRECISELY THE SORT OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION BEST SUITED, AND HENCE MORE LIKELY, TO SEEK POWER IN ITS OWN RIGHT. THE AL SAUD HAVE ACCEPTED THE NEED TO DEVELOP THE COMMAND, CONTROL, COORDINATION AND STAFFING MECHANISMS NEEDED TO OPERATE A MODERN MILITARY FORCE. PEACE SHIELD, THE SAUDIS\' MULTIBILLION DOLLAR C3 PROGRAM FOR AIR DEFENSE, MAY EVENTUALLY LINK THE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, RSAF AND ROYAL SAUDI NAVY, BUT THIS PROGRAM DOES NOT BEGIN TO TACKLE THE QUESTION OF COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONAL CONTROL. IT ADDRESSES WHAT UNQUESTIONABLY IS THE GREATEST CURRENT THREAT PERCEIVED BY THE SAUDI REGIME, THAT OF AN AIR ATTACK AGAINST THEIR PETRO- INDUSTRIAL-DESALINATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTATION EVEN OF THIS PROGRAM HAS BEEN SLOW AND A SYSTEM WHICH INTEGRATES ALL THE MILITARY SERVICES, LET ALONE MODA AND THE SANG, IS A LONG WAY OFF. FURTHER STEPS FACILITIATING MILITARY COORDINATION BETWEEN SERVICES AND ITS TRANSFER OUT OF THE HANDS OF PRINCELY AUTHORITY AND INTO THOSE OF A MILITARY GENERAL STAFF DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE IN THE CARDS. 10. WARY THAT A STRONG, COHESIVE MILITARY MIGHT POSE A THREAT TO THEIR RULE, THE AL SAUD TREAT EVERY BRANCH OF THE MILITARY AS A SEPARATE ENTITY WITH ITS OWN EQUIPMENT, GARRISON AND DISTINCT LINES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL. THUS THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE ARE HAMPERED BY INCOMPATIBILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, MUTUAL DISTRUST SOMETIMES BORDERING ON DISDAIN. THE NATIONAL GUARD AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION HAVE BUT LIMITED CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER, LITTLE CHANCE AT INTEROPERABILITY, AND NO PROVISIONS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS EXCEPT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE BROADEST MISSION STATEMENTS. ARMY FORCES ARE ALL GARRISONED WELL AWAY FROM THE CAPITAL. THE ONLY GROUND FORCES NEAR RIYADH BELONG TO THE NATIONAL GUARD. RIYADH AIRBASE HAS NO FIGHTER SQUADRONS. IT IS A FAIR ASSESSMENT TO SAY THAT THE SAUDI REGIME HAS TRIED TO ACHIEVE A DELICATE BALANCE, HAVING THE MILITARY CAPABILITY AND EFFICIENCY TO MEET POTENTIAL EXTERNAL THREATS, BUT NOT SO MUCH AS TO ENDANGER THE ROYAL FAMILY\'S OWN DOMESTIC POSITION. 11. BUT ARE THE PRINCES IN THE MILITARY AN ELEMENT OF THE SAME CONTROL PROCESS? DOES THEIR PRESENCE HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE REGIME\'S SECURITY, ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ARMED FORCES, ON MILITARY MORALE? DO SENIOR PRINCES WITH MINISTERIAL POSITIONS CAREFULLY PLACE THEIR JUNIORS IN KEY, UNIFORMED JOBS? THE COMPLEXITY OF AL SAUD FAMILY POLITICS MAKES HIGHLY SPECULATIVE ANY ATTEMPT TO INFER THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PLACE OFFICERS INTO KEY POSITIONS IN THE MILITARY SUITABLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF A WATCHDOG ROLE. MOREOVER, FAR FROM BEING A MONOLITHIC ORGANIZATION, THE AL SAUD FAMILY IS A SPRAWLING ENTITY WITH AN ARRAY OF DISCRETE AND SOMETIMES COMPETITIVE INTERESTS; COHESION AND INTERNAL CONTROL ARE A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION OF THE SENIOR-MOST PRINCES. 12. UNQUESTIONABLY, THERE ARE REASONS WHY PRINCES MIGHT PLAY A ROLE IN THE MILITARY BY DESIGN. GIVEN AN ABUNDANCE OF WELL-EDUCATED, LOYAL PRINCES, A LOGICAL MOVE FOR THE AL SAUD TO MAKE WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE SOME OF THESE YOUNG MEN TO JOIN THE MILITARY. SUCH MEN, IMBUED AS THEY ARE WITH A VESTED SELF- INTEREST IN THE REGIME, COULD SERVE AS ITS EYES AND EARS AND ALSO EXERT AN INFLUENCE ON THE REST OF THE OFFICER CORPS. CLEARLY THE TOP ECHELON OF THE SAG IS COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF PRINCES. KING FAHD BIN ABDUL AZIZ IS THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES. HE EXERCISES CONTROL OVER THE REGULAR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT THROUGH HIS FULL BROTHER, SULTAN BIN ABDUL AZIZ, MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION. WHILE THE KING IS ALSO NOMINAL CHIEF OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD, HIS HALF BROTHER, ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ, IS ITS COMMANDER. THE KING WOULD PROBABLY HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN EXERTING ARBITRARY AUTHORITY OVER ABDULLAH, ESPECIALLY IN MATTERS AFFECTING THE SANG. DECISIONS ARE OFTEN MADE WITH SENIOR FAMILY AGREEMENT. SINCE SURVIVAL OF THE REGIME IS THE AL SAUD FAMILY\'S FIRST IMPERATIVE, THERE IS LITTLE VISIBLE SIGN OF DISHARMONY. AS CROWN PRINCE AND THUS FAHD\'S PUTATIVE SUCCESSOR, STABILITY OF THE REGIME IS ALSO VERY MUCH IN ABDULLAH\'S PERSONAL INTEREST. 13. MANY SEEMINGLY INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS BELOW THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL DIRECTION LEVEL ARE HELD BY PRINCES. UNTIL RECENTLY, THE DIRECTOR OF AIR OPERATIONS FOR THE RSAF WAS A PRINCE. TWO OF THE FIGHTER BASE COMMANDERS ARE PRINCES. (A THIRD IS COMMANDED BY AN AL-SUDAIRY, ONE OF THE FAMILIES LONG ASSOCIATED WITH THE ROYAL FAMILY (SEE PARA 16). WHILE OFTEN ADDRESSED AS \"PRINCE,\" AND CLEARLY POSSESSING EXCELLENT ROYAL CONNECTIONS, EARLIER REPORTS OFFICIALLY LABELING COL AHMED BIN MUSAID AL-SUDAIRY AS A PRINCE WERE IN ERROR.) A NUMBER OF THE MILITARY POLICE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE ARMY ARE HELD BY PRINCES AS WELL. THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE NAVY IS A PRINCE. IN THE SANG, THE MOST POLITICIZED OF THE SERVICES, WE FIND NOT ONLY THE TOP TWO POSITIONS HELD BY CIVILIANS BUT ALSO CIVILIAN PRINCES IN KEY ROLES AS THE SANG COMMANDERS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCE, ABDULLAH\'S SON KHALID, THE EASTERN PROVINCE, MISHARI BIN SAUD,AS WELL AS OTHERS IN MORE REMOVED FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS. 14. MOST PRINCES IN UNIFORM ARE OFFICERS IN THE RSAF AND THE ARMY (SAUDI ARABIAN LAND FORCES, OR SALF), THE TWO ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES MOST CAPABLE OF MOUNTING A THREAT TO AL SAUD RULE. PRINCES ARE MORE COMMON IN THE OFFICER RANKS OF THESE TWO ORGANIZATIONS THAN IN ALL THE OTHERS (NAVY, SANG, MOI QUASI- MILITARY FORCES). IF PRINCES ARE IN THE ARMED FORCES TO FULFILL AN OVERSIGHT ROLE, THEY ARE CERTAINLY IN THE RIGHT BRANCHES OF THE SERVICE. 15. BUT IF THERE ARE THESE INDICATIONS SUPPORTING THE CONCEPT OF DIRECTED ROYAL PLACEMENT IN THE MILITARY, THERE IS MUCH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ALSO TENDING TO SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT THE PRESENCE AND PLACEMENT OF PRINCES IN THE MILITARY REFLECTS INDIVIDUAL INCLINATION AND AMBITION AS MUCH AS-- OR MORE THAN--THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PUTATIVE PROTECTION PLAN ELABORATED BY THE AL SAUD. PRINCES FREELY REFUSE ASSIGNMENTS AND APPEAR TO BE FREE TO LEAVE THE SERVICE IF THEY DESIRE TO DO SO. THE AL SAUD LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT PUSHING PRINCES TOO FAR TOO FAST AS WELL. PROMOTIONS INTO THE GENERAL OFFICER RANKS HAVE ONLY RECENTLY BEEN MADE. BREAKING THE PROMOTION ICE WAS COL. FAHD B. ABDULLAH, FORMER RSAF DIRECTOR OF AIR OPERATIONS, WHO BECAME SAUDI ARABIA\'S FIRST PRINCE TO BE PROMOTED THROUGH THE OFFICER RANKS TO BRIGADIER GENERAL IN JANUARY 1984. THIS PROMOTION WAS LATER FOLLOWED BY THE PROMOTIONS OF COL. FAYSAL B. MUHAMMED, SALF AVIATION CHIEF, AND KHALID B. SULTAN, DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE RSADF. 16. THERE IS ALSO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ROYAL CONTROL IS REALLY FURTHERED THROUGH A PRINCELY PRESENCE. ABDUL AZIZ FATHERED 45 ACKNOWLEDGED SONS FROM AT LEAST 22 WIVES. THE SURVIVORS AMONG THESE SONS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR OWN OFFSPRING, HAVE, OVER THE YEARS, ESTABLISHED INFORMAL BLOCKS COMPOSED GENERALLY OF GROUPINGS OF FULL-BROTHERS BUT ALSO INCLUDING HALF-BROTHER ALLIES. TO THESE MUST BE ADDED THE SONS OF ABDUL AZIZ\'S RELATIVES WHOSE FAMILIES CONSTITUTE THE AL SAUD CADET BRANCHES, AND THE CHILDREN OF LONG TIME ASSOCIATES NOW MARRIED INTO THE GREATER FAMILY. THESE LATTER GROUPS ARE IN AN AMBIGUOUS, AMBIVALENT POSITION: WHILE MANY AL SHAYKH AND AL SUDAIRY DAUGHTERS CONTINUE TO MARRY YOUNG SCIONS OF THE AL SAUD, MALE MEMBERS OF THESE FAMILIES OFTEN EXHIBIT--AND SOMETIMES ARE REMINDED BY THE AL SAUD--THAT THEIR LINEAGE IS DISTANT. THIS DIVERSIFICATION OF FAMILY GROUPINGS, WITH THEIR CONCOMITANT LOYALTIES, COMPLICATES THE ROYAL PRESENCE IN THE ARMED FORCES AND REFLECTS AMONG THE UNIFORMED PRINCES A DIVERSITY OF ROLES, INTERESTS AND ASPIRATIONS. THIS DIVERSITY IMPOSES LIMITS TO THE DEGREE OF CONTROL AVAILABLE TO THE SENIOR PRINCES THROUGH THE PRESENCE OF PRINCES IN THE MILITARY. IT IS SIMILARLY FLAWED EVEN AS AN INFORMATION/ INTELLIGENCE CONDUIT. OFFICER PRINCES ARE OFTEN ABLE TO AVOID SUBJUGATING THEIR PERSONAL GOALS AND AMBITIONS TO THE DESIRES OF THEIR MORE REMOVED UNCLES AND COUSINS. 17. CONTROL AMONG THE SENIOR PRINCES IS COMPLICATED ENOUGH (SEE PARA 12). IT IS EVEN MORE SO AMONG THE JUNIORS. THE PRINCES ALL APPEAR TO BE LOYAL TO THE REGIME. WHILE THERE MAY BE A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT SELF-INTERESTS AMONG THEM, ALL THE PRINCES ARE DEPENDENT ON THE MONARCHY FOR THEIR STATION IN LIFE. COMPLICATIONS BEGIN WHEN WE EXAMINE THE MAKEUP OF THE ROYAL FAMILY AND SEE THAT WHILE MANY BEAR THE TITLE OF PRINCE, ALL PRINCES ARE NOT EQUAL. THIS LACK OF EQUALITY OFTEN BRINGS WITH IT A WIDE RANGE OF PRIORITIES IN LIFE. SOME PRINCES, MOSTLY FROM THE MORE DISTANT BRANCHES OF THE FAMILY, ARE LESS CONCERNED WITH POWER POLITICS AND MORE WITH JUST PLAIN UPWARD MOBILITY. UNABLE TO ASPIRE TO THE HIGHEST OFFICES IN THE LAND, THESE PRINCES HOLD A WIDE VARIETY OF OTHER ASPIRATIONS AND AMBITIONS. FIRST PRIORITY FOR THESE MEN CAN BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS, THE SECURING OF A CONTRACT, THE PURCHASE OF NEW EQUIPMENT OR THE OPENING OF A NEW BRANCH OFFICE, JUST AS MUCH AS THE SECURING OF A MILITARY PROMOTION OR NEW, BETTER POSITION. THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE FAIRLY TOLERANT OF THIS ATTITUDE. 18. IN SUM, WE CAN SAY THAT AT THE VERY TOP OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND--THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL--PRINCES HAVE BEEN GIVEN ABSOLUTE CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES AND OPERATE THOSE FORCES VERY MUCH WITH THE SURVIVAL OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE REGIME IN MIND. AS WE GO FARTHER DOWN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, WE FIND A NUMBER OF PRINCES WHOSE REASON FOR BEING THERE IS MUCH MORE OBSCURE. HOWEVER, IF THEY ARE NOT SPENDING A GREAT DEAL OF TIME LOOKING AFTER THE INTERESTS OF THE REGIME, THEY AT LEAST GIVE OUTSIDERS THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY MIGHT BE. THUS THE REGIME PROBABLY PROFITS MORE FROM THE PERCEPTION THAN THE REALITY, AND MORE SO AMONG THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY THAN INSIDERS. ALTHOUGH SOME PRINCES ARE IN POSITIONS FROM WHERE THEY CAN OVERSEE THE GOINGS ON IN THE MILITARY, THERE ARE ENOUGH KEY POSITIONS FILLED BY COMMONERS AND, SIMILARLY, ENOUGH POSITIONS FILLED BY PRINCES WHERE THERE IS RELATIVELY LITTLE CONTROL OR OVERSIGHT TO CAST DOUBT THAT THE AL SAUD MAKE ANYTHING MORE THAN A HALF-HEARTED ATTEMPT TO POSITION THEIR TRUSTED SONS IN KEY JOBS. SELECTIONS APPEAR TO BE BASED ON THE PRINCES\' INDIVIDUAL DESIRES, AND THE AVAILABILITY OF POSITIONS AT A GIVEN TIME. 19. IF PRINCES ARE NOT IN THE MILITARY TO ACT PRIMARILY AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REGIME, WHY THEN ARE THEY THERE? FIRST OF ALL, THERE ARE NOT MANY JOBS THAT A PRINCE WILL ACCEPT. WHILE SOME OF THE OLDER, MORE RETIRING PRINCES ARE CONTENT WITH THE WORLD OF BUSINESS AND FINANCE, THIS IS NOT THE CASE WITH MANY OF THE YOUNGER, WESTERN EDUCATED AND MORE WORLDLY MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY. FOR SOME, THERE IS SIMPLY NO MOTIVATION TO SPEND LONG HOURS TENDING AFTER FAMILY BUSINESS INTERESTS. FOR OTHERS, DEALING DIRECTLY IN BUSINESS IS DEMEANING. FOR STILL OTHERS, THERE IS A YEARNING FOR BIGGER, MORE IMPORTANT TASKS. 20. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, MILITARY SERVICE HAS BEEN AN ACCEPTABLE OCCUPATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE NOBILITY. DEFENSE OF THE FAITH AND THE NATION, HONOR AND GLORY, PRIDE AND ALL THE OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF MILITARY SERVICE PERMIT PRINCES TO JOIN THE ARMED FORCES ALONG WITH THEIR COMMONER COUNTRYMEN. WHILE THE PREPONDERANCE OF PRINCES ARE IN THE SALF AND RSAF, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF REASONS WHY THIS SHOULD BE THE CASE. IN A COUNTRY WITH LITTLE IN THE WAY OF EXCITING DIVERSIONS, FLYING AN F-15 OR AN F-5 WITH THE POTENTIAL OF ENGAGING IN AERIAL COMBAT IS VERY STIMULATING. VIRTUALLY ALL THE PRINCES IN THE RSAF ARE PILOTS. TWO FIGHTER BASES ARE COMMANDED BY PRINCES. THEIR ACCESS TO THE BEST EDUCATION, THEIR LEADERSHIP ADVANTAGES AND THE BASIC ABILITY OF MANY OF THE RSAF PRINCES ALL MAKE THEIR APPOINTMENT TO LEADERSHIP POSITIONS A LOGICAL OUTCOME OF SERVICE. 21. SERVICE IN THE LAND FORCES GROWS OUT OF A LONG TRADITION OF GROUND COMBAT. THE VIEW AMONG THE BEDOUIN OF SAUDI ARABIA IS THAT SERVICE IN THE \"GROUND GAINING ARMS\" OF THE MILITARY, WHETHER FOR DEFENSE, OR IN OLDER TIMES FOR THE HONOR IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ACQUIRE IN THE ONCE PERENNIAL RAIDING, IS THE MOST HONORED FORM OF MILITARY SERVICE. IF MANY OF THE MORE EDUCATED, COSMOPOLITAN SAUDIS, PRINCES AND COMMONERS, ARE FINDING THE OTHER BRANCHES OF SERVICE--AIR FORCE, NAVY AND AIR DEFENSE--EQUALLY ATTRACTIVE, FAMILY AND SOCIAL PRESSURE STILL FORCE MANY OF THOSE WHO DO ENTER MILITARY SERVICE TO ENTER THE LAND FORCES AND SANG. RELUCTANT AS SOME MAY BE TO JOIN, SERVICE IN THE SANG CAN AMOUNT TO A FAMILY OBLIGATION FOR FAVORS GIVEN OR EXPECTED IN THE FUTURE. AT THE SAME TIME, SANG OFFICERS AUTOMATICALLY INCUR A DEBT OF LOYALTY TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH. THIS REQUIREMENT PROBABLY KEEPS PRINCES WHOSE FAMILY LOYALTIES ARE TO OTHER SECTORS OF THE FAMILY, OUT OF THE SANG. 22. JOINING THE ARMED FORCES CARRIES WITH IT A NUMBER OF OBVIOUS BENEFITS. A NUMBER OF PRINCES HAVE USED MILITARY SERVICE TO ESTABLISH THEIR CREDENTIALS AS CAPABLE LEADERS AND HAVE GONE ON TO OTHER CAREERS IN GOVERNMENT. OTHERS SEEM INCLINED TO GO FROM THE MILITARY INTO BUSINESS HAVING MADE LUCRATIVE CONTACTS OR BEGUN THEIR FORTUNES IN OTHER WAYS WHILE IN THE SERVICE. OTHERS STAY IN THE SERVICE BALANCING MILITARY DUTY WITH PRIVATE ENTERPRISE. HOWEVER, ONE FACT STANDS OUT ABOVE ALL THE REST--MILITARY SERVICE IS NO BAR TO GETTING WEALTHY. MANY OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN HAVE AMASSED GREAT FORTUNES THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF MILITARY SERVICE. UNTIL RECENTLY, MODA WAS A SEEMINGLY INEXHAUSTIBLE SOURCE OF CONTRACTS, PROJECTS, PROCUREMENT ACTIONS AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES. WITH NO ENFORCEMENT OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS AGAINST PRINCES, MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY, TOGETHER WITH THEIR CIVILIAN RELATIVES, TAPPED THIS VAST RESERVE OF FUNDS. FOR PRINCES, THE INSIDE TRACK PROVIDED BY THEIR FAMILY CONNECTION HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO OUTSHINE ALL THEIR NON-ROYAL COLLEAGUES. THE HIGHER IN RANK, THE BIGGER THE OPPORTUNITIES. 23. SOME OFFICERS, SUCH AS COL TURKI BIN NASSIR, BASE COMMANDER AT DHAHRAN AND SON OF NASSIR BIN ABDUL AZIZ, HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THEIR BUSINESS ACTIVITIES. AMONG HIS INTERESTS ARE SEVERAL BUSINESSES IN WHICH THE F-15 SQUADRON COMMANDER LTC MANSOUR BIN BANDAR, ANOTHER PRINCE, IS HIS PARTNER. OTHER PRINCES, SUCH AS THE FORMER RSAF DIRECTOR OF AIR OPERATIONS, BG FAHD BIN ABDULLAH BIN MUHAMMED BIN SAUD AL KABIR, AND HIS YOUNGER UNCLE, BG FAYSAL BIN MUHAMMED BIN SAUD AL KABIR, CONDUCT BUSINESS THROUGH RELATIVES OR OTHER SURROGATES OUTSIDE THE MILITARY. WHILE FAYSAL, HEAD OF ARMY AVIATION, APPEARS TO OWN ONLY A TRAFFIC LIGHT COMPANY, IN REALITY HE IS TIED THROUGH HIS BROTHERS INTO MANY ESTABLISHMENTS DIRECTLY RELATED NOT ONLY TO ARMY AVIATION BUT ALSO OTHER MILITARY AREAS FROM WHICH HE TOO IS PROFITING. LTC MANSOUR BIN BANDAR, THE COMMANDER OF THE F-15 SQUADRON AT THE DHAHRAN AIR BASE, RECENTLY DECLINED A TRANSFER WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE HIM BASE COMMANDER IN TAIF. THE REPORTED REASON FOR THIS REFUSAL WAS THE REQUIREMENT TO GIVE UP PERSONAL CONTROL OF HIS BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE. 24. MINDEF SULTAN\'S SON, BG KHALID BIN SULTAN, IS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE ROYAL SAUDI AIR DEFENSE FORCES. IN HIS ROLE AS DEPUTY COMMANDER, KHALID HAS PROFITED SMARTLY FROM THE VARIOUS WEAPONS DEALS HE HAS HELPED ENGINEER. REPORTEDLY, BOTH KHALID AND HIS FATHER OBTAINED HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED DEAL TO PURCHASE SHAHINE MISSILES FROM THE FRENCH. OTHER PRINCES HAVE PROFITED BY WRITING THE SPECIFICATIONS NEEDED FOR A PARTICULAR WEAPON OR SERVICE TO FIT A PARTICULAR COMPANY\'S OFFER OR THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR COMPETITIVE RUNOFFS. OFTEN, AS FOR EXAMPLE IN THE CASE OF A LARGE FOOD SERVICE COMPANY SUPPORTING MODA, THE OWNER CAN BESTOW THE CONTRACT ON HIMSELF, IN THIS CASE, VICE DEFENSE MINISTER ABDUL RAHMAN. INSIDE TRADING IS A COMMON PRACTICE. SINCE THERE ARE NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST WORRIES, THE PRINCES OFTEN ACT WITH IMPUNITY. A NUMBER OF PRINCES ARE MANEUVERING ACTIVELY FOR A PIECE OF THE PEACE SHIELD OFFSET PACKAGE. SOME HAVE ARRANGED THE PLACEMENT OF PERSONAL EMPLOYEES WITH COMPANIES THEY THOUGHT WOULD GET A PIECE OF THE ACTION. 25. DESPITE AL SAUD PREOCCUPATION WITH IT, MONEY IS NOT THE ONLY ATTRACTION FOUND IN MILITARY SERVICE. WHILE SOME PRINCES DEVOTE THEMSELVES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO SELF ENRICHMENT, AND OTHERS, LIKE THE SAUD AL KABIR, CONTENT THEMSELVES WITH MONEY AS A HANDSOME SIDELINE TO THEIR MILITARY CAREERS, OTHERS HAVE HIGHER ASPIRATIONS. THE MILITARY CAN BE A STEPPING STONE TO BIGGER THINGS. IT IS CLEARLY NOT A DISADVANTAGE. AMONG THE MOST OBVIOUS EXAMPLES ARE THAT OF BANDAR BIN SULTAN, ANOTHER SON OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND MITIEB BIN ABDULLAH, SON OF THE CROWN PRINCE. BANDAR WAS DOUBTLESS A BUSINESSMAN WHEN HE WAS IN UNIFORM. FOR THAT MATTER, HE STILL IS INVOLVED IN BUSINESSES HE HAD WHEN F-15 COMMANDER IN DHAHRAN. HOWEVER, HE IS ALSO A VERY AMBITIOUS MAN WHO ASPIRES TO DOING GREAT THINGS FOR HIS COUNTRY. BANDAR WAS QUICK TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY THE ARMS SALE DEBATE IN THE U.S. IN THE EARLY 80\'S. HE QUICKLY BECAME AN ARTICULATE SPOKESMAN FOR HIS COUNTRY\'S MILITARY POLICY NEEDS. HIS FAMILY CREDENTIALS AND POLITICAL ACUMEN ENABLED HIM TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE KING\'S EAR AND HIS PERSONAL CHARM AND ABILITY EARNED HIM THE KING\'S ATTENTION. NOW AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES AND SOMETIMES MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATOR FOR THE KING, BANDAR IS RUMORED TO BE HEADING FOR AN EVEN LARGER FOREIGN POLICY ROLE. ABDULLAH\'S SON, MITIEB, IS ALSO A VERY AMBITIOUS MAN. USING HIS POSITION AS SON OF THE SANG COMMANDER, MITIEB HAS QUICKLY RISEN IN RANK, FAR FASTER THAN ANYONE ELSE IN THE ORGANIZATION. HE ANSWERS ONLY TO HIS FATHER AND PERHAPS HIS FATHER\'S MOST SENIOR ADVISOR. MITIEB IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE MILITARY LIFE, HOWEVER. REPORTEDLY, HE IS ANXIOUS FOR A ROLE SIMILAR TO THAT OF BANDAR. IF AND WHEN HIS FATHER BECOMES KING, MITIEB MAY WELL GET HIS WISH. SOME OTHERS WHO HAVE MOVED ON ARE LISTED IN LAST SECTION OF LIST PROVIDED IN PARA 4. THE VERY FACT THAT A NUMBER OF PRINCES HAVE MOVED ON FROM APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL MILITARY CAREERS TENDS TO FAVOR THE VIEW THAT THE ROYAL FAMILY IS NOT THAT CONCERNED WITH THE PRINCELY PRESENCE IN THE MILITARY. 26. REGARDLESS OF THEIR REASON FOR BEING THERE, THE FINAL KEY QUESTION IS: WHAT IMPACT DOES THE ROYAL CONNECTION HAVE ON THE ARMED FORCES? COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PRINCES AND THEIR COMMONER COLLEAGUES ARE ESTABLISHED BY PRINCE SULTAN AND PRINCE ABDULLAH. IN THE SANG, NONE OF THE PRINCES APPEAR TO ANSWER TO ANYONE BUT THE CROWN PRINCE OR HIS MOST SENIOR DEPUTY. HOWEVER, THE SANG IS SMALL, IS MORE ABDULLAH\'S PRIVATE DOMAIN, AND ITS UNIQUE TRIBAL ORIENTATION MAKES THE PLACE OF PRINCES (ESPECIALLY PRINCES RELATED TO ABDULLAH) MORE SECURE. IN MODA, PRINCES ARE USUALLY IN A POSITION TO TAKE ORDERS FROM COMMONERS. OFFICIAL POLICY SAYS THEY ARE TO BE TREATED ACCORDING TO THEIR RANK. BUT THE REAL RELATIONSHIP IS UNCLEAR. A PRINCE HAS DIRECT ACCESS TO THE TOP, EITHER PERSONALLY OR THROUGH HIS FAMILY. THE HIGHER THE PRINCE, THE EASIER IT IS FOR HIM TO GET HIS OWN WAY IN A DISPUTE. WE DO NOT HEAR, HOWEVER, OF MANY DISPUTES WHICH REQUIRE ROYAL SETTLEMENT FROM ABOVE. WE KNOW OF RIVALRIES BUT NOT OPEN INSUBORDINATION. IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY PRINCE WHO CANNOT GET ALONG IN MODA IS QUIETLY MOVED OUT. WHILE STORIES ABOUND AS TO THE ACTUAL REASON, BG FAHD BIN ABDULLAH\'S RECENT RETIREMENT WAS REPORTEDLY DUE IN PART TO THE PERSONAL POWER HE HAD ACQUIRED OVER RECENT YEARS, POWER WHICH SOMETIMES APPEARED TO EXCEED THAT OF HIS NOMINAL BOSS, THE RSAF COMMANDER. (WHETHER OR NOT THIS PROMPTED HIS PROMOTION/REMOVAL IS UNCLEAR. MOST OBSERVERS AGREE HIS COMING IS AT LEAST A BENEFIT TO CIVIL AVIATION AND A TECHNICAL PROMOTION.) 27. BUT TIGHT MILITARY DISCIPLINE IS NOT REALLY IN THE SAUDI TRADITION--FOR COMMONERS AS WELL AS ROYALTY. SAUDI SOCIETY REMAINS CLOSE TO THE STRONG BEDOUIN ETHIC OF FIERCE PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE AND STRONG, FAMILY/CLAN ORIENTED LOYALTY. WHILE NOT OBVIOUS, EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING HAS ITS PLACE IN THE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE. LOYALTY IS FIRST TO ONE\'S FATHER AND THEN TO A LESSER DEGREE, TO OTHER PERSONS, INSTITUTIONS AND PURSUITS. IN THE ARMED FORCES, THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE REDUCTION OF WHAT ARE ELSEWHERE STRICT MILITARY REGULATIONS INTO THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE, LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR. WESTERN CONCEPTS OF MILILARY DISCIPLINE AS APPLIED IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN ARMED FORCES ARE LIBERAL, AND TO OUTSIDERS OFTEN SEEM PATENTLY INEFFECTIVE. SOLDIERS ON GUARD DUTY CAN BE SEEN WITHOUT LACES IN THEIR SHOES OR OUT OF PROPER UNIFORM IN SOME OTHER WAY. ALTHOUGH FORBIDDEN BY REGULATIONS, SOLDIERS AND SAILORS CAN STILL BE SEEN LEAVING THEIR OFFICES AT 2:00 PM (DAY\'S END) AND GETTING INTO THEIR TAXI CABS TO BEGIN A SECOND OCCUPATION. 28. DESPITE OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY, WITH NO EQUALITY BETWEEN PRINCES AND OFFICERS OF EQUAL RANK, LARGE DISPARITY IN PAY AND ALLOWANCES (PRINCES GET A ROYAL STIPEND OF AROUND USD 120,000 PER YEAR, DEPENDING ON PLACE IN THE FAMILY), AND A VAST ARRAY OF PREREQUISITES SUCH AS FREE USE OF GOVERNMENT OWNED AIRCRAFT, HOMES, ETC., IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THEY ARE RELATIVELY ISOLATED FROM THEIR COMMONER COLLEAGUES WITHIN THE MILITARY. PRINCES ASSOCIATE VERY LITTLE OUTSIDE THEIR OWN CIRCLES, BUT THIS INDEED IS THE CASE WITH FAMILIES IN THE REST OF SAUDI SOCIETY. HOWEVER, WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE ARMED FORCES IS THAT THE BONDS OF COMRADESHIP ARE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT. WHILE PRINCES HAVE, THROUGH THEIR PERSONAL CONNECTIONS, THE ABILITY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON BEHALF OF THEIR UNITS, INFLUENCE IS THE WAY VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING IS MOVED IN THE SAUDI BUREAUCRACY AND NOT MUCH CREDIT IS GIVEN FOR DOING SOMETHING WHICH IS EXPECTED. THE PRESENCE OF A PRINCE IN THE UNIT IS THEREFORE NOT NECESSARILY A BOON TO MORALE. 29. THE MISSION IS AWARE OF COMPLAINTS AMONG COMMONER OFFICERS ABOUT THE OBVIOUS PRIVILEGES AND EXCESSIVE GREED OF ROYAL FAMILY MEMBERS. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN QUIET GRUMBLING ABOUT EXCESSIVE ADVANCEMENT, SUCH AS IN THE CASE OF CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH\'S SON MITIEB. WHILE OFFICERS WILL MOST GENERALLY WITHHOLD THEIR COMMENTS FROM FOREIGNERS, THE FACT THAT A FEW HAVE BEEN WILLING TO SPEAK IS PROBABLY INDICATIVE OF WIDER, PRIVATE ATTITUDES IN THE OFFICER CORPS. (THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR COMPLAINTS SUCH AS THESE AND THEREFORE, IF THEY ARE WIDESPREAD, THEY ARE PROBABLY VOICED ONLY AMONG CONFIDANTS. WE KNOW OF CASES IN WHICH OFFICERS WITH OUTSPOKEN OPINIONS HAVE BEEN MOVED TO ATTACHE POSITIONS OUT OF THE COUNTRY, BEEN GIVEN RETIREMENT, OR BEEN SECONDED TO NON-MILITARY, GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.) PERHAPS THE EVIDENCE OF CAUTION OF MOVING PRINCES TO THE MOST SENIOR POSITIONS INDICATES SOME ROYAL FAMILY AWARENESS OF THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF OFFICER CORPS MORALE IF THEIR OWN ARE PUSHED TOO FAR. THE SANG APPEARS TO BE LESS AFFECTED THAN MODA AND MORE RELAXED ABOUT THE PRINCELY ROLE. 30. OVERALL, PRINCES DO NOT APPEAR TO HELP OR HARM THE CAPABILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES. WHILE IT IS DEBATABLE HOW MUCH THEIR EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES AFFECT MORALE, THEIR ABILITY TO CUT THROUGH RED TAPE AND FACILITATE MATTERS ON BEHALF OF THEIR UNITS SHOULD HELP OFFSET AT LEAST ANY NEGATIVE FEELINGS. WHILE SOME MAY COME IN FOR CRITICISM, THE PROVEN ABILITY OF OTHERS HAS CERTAINLY BEEN RECOGNIZED AND LEADERS SUCH AS COL. MITIEB, OVERALL, ARE RESPECTED BY THEIR COLLEAGUES AND SUBORDINATES. HOWEVER, THE FINANCIAL ADVANTAGES WHICH ONCE FELL TO EVERYONE WITH A LITTLE IMAGINATION ARE DWINDLING FAST. SOON, THE CASE MAY BE THAT ONLY PRINCES WILL HAVE THE CLOUT, ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND OPERATING LATITUDE TO MAKE IT RICH. IF THIS OCCURS, THEIR PLACE IN THE MILITARY MAY BECOME MORE CONTROVERSIAL. 31. THE MERE PRESENCE OF PRINCES IN THE ARMED FORCES PROVIDES SOME DEGREE OF STABILITY TO THE AL SAUD REGIME. REGARDLESS OF THEIR MOTIVES IN ENTERING THE MILITARY, THEIR OVERSIGHT CAPABILITY AND INFLUENCE ON EVENTS IN THE MILITARY MUST INEVITABLY HAVE SOME EFFECT ON UNIT PERSONNEL. AND INEVITABLY, EVEN IF LINKS TO THE SENIOR PRINCES ARE WEAK, THERE MUST BE SOME FEEDBACK ON MILITARY ATTITUDES FROM THE PRINCELY PRESENCE. WHETHER OR NOT A PRINCE IMPROVES OR DETRACTS FROM THE MORALE OR CAPABILITY OF HIS UNIT IS MORE OR LESS DEPENDENT ON HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PROFESSION AND HIS PERSONAL INTERESTS. HOWEVER, HIS PRIMARY BENEFIT TO THE REGIME, WHETHER BY DESIGN OR NOT, IS THE ROYAL PRESENCE HIS ASSIGNMENT BRINGS. SUDDARTH " "65","6/5/1985 11:18","85KADUNA709","Consulate Kaduna","CONFIDENTIAL","85LAGOS6244","R 051118Z JUN 85 FM AMCONSUL KADUNA TO AMEMBASSY LAGOS SECSTATE WASHDC 7998 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L KADUNA 0709 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: ECON, SOCI, SREF, NI SUBJECT: REPORTS OF STARVATION IN NIGERIA REF: LAGOS 06244 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT 2. CONGEN HAS LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT REFTEL REPORT OF DROUGHT-RELATED STARVATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SITUATION IN SOME AREAS IS VERY SERIOUS, AND WE WOULD, THEREFORE, NOT BE SURPRISED TO FIND SCATTERED INCIDENCES OF STARVATION. HOWEVER, NONE OF OUR SOURCES IN THE AREA HAVE REPORTED IT TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM, AND WE DOUBT IT EXISTS ON ANY LARGE SCALE. 3. THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS FOOD SHORTAGES IN SOME AREAS IS SUBSTANTIATED BY THE REPEATED PLEAS BY THE NORTHERN GOVERNORS FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE--INCLUDING FOOD AID--FOR DROUGHT VICTIMS IN THEIR STATES. MUCH OF THE U.S.--PURCHASED MAIZE WHICH RECENTLY ARRIVED IN LAGOS IS EVIDENTLY INTENDED FOR THIS PURPOSE. IF THE AMERICAN GRAIN ACTUALLY FINDS ITS WAY TO THOSE MOST IN NEED, THE SITUATION SHOULD BE ALLEVIATED SOMEWHAT. LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES AND THE SIMPLE INABILITY OF THE NEEDIEST PEOPLE TO PAY FOR FOODSTOCKS MAY, IN FACT, BE THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO ANY OCCURRENCES OF STARVATION THAT EXIST. 4. ARGUING AGAINST REPORTS OF WIDESPREAD STARVATION IS THE RELAXED ATTITUDE OF THE FMG TOWARD ALIEN DROUGHT REFUGEES IN NIGERIA. NO EFFORTS WERE MADE TO EVICT THESE PEOPLE DURING THE RECENT EXPULSION EXERCISE, AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER MAGORO STATED LAST WEEK THAT NIGERIA IS ACCOMMODATING 250,000 ALIEN DROUGHT REFUGEES ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. IF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF NIGERIANS WERE THREATENED WITH STARVATION, THE FMG WOULD LIKELY HAVE A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE TO SO LARGE A GROUP OF ALIENS COMPETING FOR AVAILABLE FOOD SUPPLIES. ANDRESEN " "66","6/11/1985 13:04","85RIYADH5400","Embassy Riyadh","CONFIDENTIAL","","P 111304Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4280 AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMCONSUL JEDDAH AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY TUNIS USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 05400 LONDON FOR RAPHEL PARIS FOR WINN CENTCOM FOR POLAD LOWRIE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, SA, SY, LE, PLO SUBJECT: SAUD IN TUNIS: SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT REF: FBIS LD 82248 1. (U) IN JUNE 10 \"ASHARQ AL-AWSAT\" INTERVIEW IN TUNIS, FON MIN SAUD AL-FAISAL TALKED ABOUT THE ARAB LEAGUE FOREIGN MINISTERS\' MEETING ON LEBANON. REFERRING TO KING FAHD\'S PREVIOUS EXPRESSION OF DISGUST AND DISMAY AT EVENTS AT THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN LEBANON, HE SAID HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPRESS HOPE THAT ALL STATES WOULD WORK TO HALT BLOODSHED AND BRING ABOUT RECONCILIATION. HE ASSERTED THAT MEETING HAD REACHED A RESOLUTION TO END THE BLOODSHED AND HOPED THE LEBANESE GOVERN- MENT WOULD COOPERATE IN IMPLEMENTING IT. HE ADDED THAT ALL LEBANESE PARTIES HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. - 2. (U) IN JUNE 10 EDITORIAL, \"AL-RIYADH\" IS IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF THE MEETING BY NOTING THAT THE RESOLUTION PRODUCED WAS THE MINIMUM EXPECTED. IT IMPLIED DISAPPROVAL OF INEFFECTIVE CONCILIATORY RESOLUTIONS AND OF THE ARAB WORLD FOR NOT DOING MORE TO PREVENT THE PALESTINIANS FROM BECOMING VICTIMS. \"AL-NADWA,\" THE MOST VOCALLY PRO-PALESTINIAN OF THE SAUDI PAPERS, MENTIONED IN JUNE 8 EDITORIAL THAT SOME STATES WILL BOYCOTT THE MEETING HELD TO DISCUSS THE WAR OF THE CAMPS \"WAGED BY THE AMAL MILITIAS.\" IT ALSO CALLED FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION AND FOR THE COUNCIL TO STAND FIRMLY AGAINST THE ATTACKS. JUNE 9 \"AL-NADWA\" EDITORIAL IS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF NABIH BERRI. - 3. (U) KING FAHD HIMSELF SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED ANOTHER STATEMENT ON THE PALESTINIAN SITUATION IN LEBANON. JUNE 11 PRESS REPORTS THAT AT CON- CLUSION OF EVENING CABINET MEETING JUNE 10, AT WHICH SAUD REPORTED ON THE RESULTS OF THE TUNIS MEETING, MIN INFO ALI SHAIR READ A STATEMENT IN WHICH THE KING AFFIRMED SAUDI ARABIA\'S CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE LEBANON CAMPS. FURTHER, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD ATTEND ANY ARAB MEETING WHICH WOULD SERVE THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND FIND SOLUTIONS TO STOP THE KILLING IN LEBANON. - 4. (C) COMMENT: SAUD\'S REMARKS PUT THE SAUDIS\' CALL TO END THE BLOODSHED ONCE MORE ON RECORD. MORE IMPORTANTLY, SAUD\'S PRESENCE AT THE MEETING AND SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION SHOW SAUDI ARABIA ONCE MORE SUPPORTING THE LEADERSHIP ROLE OF ARAFAT DESPITE SYRIAN OPPOSITION. (WE NOTE FROM REFTEL SAUD CONFERRED WITH ARAFAT IN TUNIS.) ALTHOUGH NO EDITORIALS MENTIONED SYRIA BY NAME, ONLY THE AMAL AND BERRI, UNHAPPINESS WITH SYRIA IS PROBABLY NOT FAR BELOW THE SURFACE. INDEED, WE HAVE HEARD THAT ASAD HAS BEEN ROUNDLY CRITICIZED BY PALESTINIANS AND SAUDIS ON THE LOCAL MAJLIS CIRCUIT FOR NOT RESTRAINING THE SHI\'ITE ATTACKS AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS. END COMMENT. 5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SUDDARTH " "67","6/12/1985 14:31","85RIYADH5470","Embassy Riyadh","SECRET","84RIYADH7002","R 121431Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4322 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 RIYADH 05470 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KPRP, PREL, MOPS, ENRG, IR, SA SUBJECT: SAUDI POLICY TOWARD IRAN REF: 84 RIYADH 7002 1. S - ENTIRE TEXT 2. SUMMARY: EVENTS AND PASSAGE OF TIME HAVE COM- BINED TO MITIGATE SAUDI FEARS AND HOPES REGARDING IRAN. MORE CONFIDENT NOW THAT IRAQ WILL NOT BE DEFEATED, THAT THERE IS LESS DANGER OF A DIRECT IRANIAN ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA, THAT THE LIKELI- HOOD OF EFFECTIVE IRANIAN-INSPIRED SUBVERSION IN SAUDI ARABIA IS NOW SMALL, AND THAT THE DANGER OF SUBVERSION IN OTHER GULF COUNTRIES IS PROBABLY CONTAINABLE, THE SAG HAS GROWN COMFORTABLE WITH THE IRAQI STRATEGY OF ATTEMPTING TO FORCE IRAN TOWARD THE NEGOTIATING TABLE THROUGH MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE THAT, OVER TIME, MAY CONVINCE THE IRANIANS THAT THEY HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE. THE SAG DISTRUSTS IRAN AS MUCH AS THE IRAQIS DO AND DOES NOT BEAR THE DIRECT BURDEN OF CONTAINING ITS REVOLUTION; THUS SAUDI PATIENCE IS IN FACT GREATER THAN THAT OF IRAQ. THE SAG FULLY ACCEPTS IRAQ\'S ANALYSES OF THE WAR AND THE SITUATION IN IRAN AND IS GIVING IRAQ FULL DIPLOMATIC BACKING, INCLUDING IN ITS RECENT CONTACTS WITH IRAN. THE MESSAGE THE SAG IS SENDING IRAN IS THAT THE SAUDIS CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM IRAQ WHILE THE CONFLICT LASTS, BUT THAT THEY WISH TO REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH IRAN AND HOPE FOR A COOPERATIVE RELA- TIONSHIP ONCE IRAN CEASES TO PURSUE ITS GOALS ABROAD BY MILITARY MEANS. THE CHIEF SAG POLICY- MAKERS, IN THIS AS IN OTHER FIELDS, ARE PROBABLY FAHD, ABDULLAH, SULTAN, AND NAIF, AND THERE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES AMONG THEM. THEY RECOGNIZE THE FUNDAMENTAL, THEOLOGICAL HOSTILITY OF THE IRANIAN REGIME AND UNDERSTAND THAT UNTIL THE REVOLUTION HAS BEEN BLUNTED AND ITS NATURE SIGNIFI- CANTLY TRANSFORMED, IT WILL REPRESENT A THREAT TO THE AL SAUD. THEY RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO BE FIRM IN DEFENSE OF WHAT IS THEIRS, LEST IRAN ESCALATE ITS THREATS, AS SHOWN IN LAST SUMMER\'S SHOOTDOWN OF AT LEAST ONE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT AND SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF RSAF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. THEY HAVE NOT ABANDONED THEIR TRADITIONAL CAUTION, HOWEVER, AND CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY INTEND NO AGGRESSIVE THREAT TO IRAN, AS SHOWN IN THEIR CONCILIATORY STANCE AFTER THE AIRCRAFT SHOOTDOWN. THEY ARE ACUTELY AWARE, TOO, OF THE LONG-TERM NEED FOR A DECENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN, AND HOPE THAT OVER TIME THE REVOLUTION WILL MODERATE AND SHARED INTERESTS WILL ASSERT THEMSELVES. END SUMMARY. 3. A NUMBER OF FACTORS HAVE SHIFTED, EITHER WITH EVENTS OR THE MERE PASSAGE OF TIME, SINCE OUR LAST OVERALL LOOK AT SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS (REFTEL). THE NET RESULT HAS BEEN INCREASED SAUDI CONFIDENCE AND LESS SHARP SAUDI SWINGS BETWEEN FEARS AND HOPES. PRINCIPAL CHANGES INCLUDE: (A) CONTINUING CON- FIRMATION OF IRAQI ABILITY TO HOLD THE IRANIANS ON THE GROUND; (B) THE GROWING RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE AND NAVY; (C) THE \"SANCTIFYING\" OF A BROAD RSAF AIR DEFENSE ZONE IMPLICIT IN THE ABSENCE OF IRANIAN ATTACKS IN THE NORTHERN GULF SINCE THE SAUDI SHOOTDOWN LAST JUNE OF AN IRANIAN F-4 OR TWO (THOUGH IRAN MAY BE MOUNTING A NEW TEST ON THIS FRONT); (D) DEVELOPMENT OF SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT ALLEGED \"FAVORABLE TRENDS\" IN IRAN, FOLLOWING GREATER EXPERIENCE WITH IRANIAN PLOYS DESIGNED TO DISTANCE GCC COUNTRIES FROM IRAQ OR TO GAIN GREATER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT OR SYMPATHY BY APPEARING \"REASONABLE\" ON SUCH HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS AS BOMBING CITIES (WHILE REFUSING TO DISCUSS A GENERAL SETTLEMENT); (E) THE DULLING OF THE ALLURE OF IRAN\'S REVOLUTION AS THE STALEMATE CONTINUES AND APPEARS INCREASINGLY UNFAVORABLE TO IRAN; (F) THE APPOINTMENT OF A DYNAMIC NEW RULING-FAMILY GOVERNOR IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE; (G) THE APPARENT FIRMING OF KUWAITI RESOLVE (BUT INCREASED CONCERN ABOUT THE UAE AND, PERHAPS, OMAN); AND (H) THE CHANGING FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP AS COMPLETION OF IRAQ\'S MAJOR NEW/EXPANDED PIPELINES NEARS. --------------- FEARS AND HOPES --------------- 4. IT HAS NOT BEEN LONG SINCE A LITTLE BAD NEWS-- AN IRANIAN OFFENSIVE OR A FEW IRANIAN OR IRAQI ATTACKS ON SHIPPING--WOULD SEND THE SAG INTO A MOMENTARY NEAR-PANIC, IN WHICH IT WOULD RAISE SUCH QUESTIONS AS WHAT \"MILITARY MOVES\" THE USG MIGHT MAKE TO HELP ASSURE SECURITY IN THE GULF. THIS IS NO LONGER TRUE. THE SAUDIS, REPORTEDLY ALONG WITH OTHER GCC OFFICIALS ATTENDING THE MARCH 1985 GCC MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, CERTAINLY EXPERIENCED UNEASY MOMENTS DURING THE RECENT IRANIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE HAWAIZAH MARSHES, AND HAD THE IRAQIS BROKEN, WOULD HAVE SEEN THEMSELVES BACK IN THE BAD OLD DAYS OF 1982-83, WITH THEIR WORST FEARS ALL BUT REALIZED. AS THE IRAQIS DID NOT BREAK, HOWEVER, SUCH FEARS HAVE RECEDED AND THE BASIS FOR SAUDI CONFIDENCE HAS BEEN REAFFIRMED. 5. THE SAUDIS\' \"WORST FEARS,\" OF COURSE, ENTAIL A VISION OF A TRIUMPHANT REVOLUTIONARY IRAN LOOMING MENACINGLY OVER KUWAIT AND OVER SAUDI ARABIA ITSELF. ITS OTHER FEARS INCLUDE A DIRECT IRANIAN ATTACK OF SOME SORT, AN ESCALATION THAT WOULD DRAW SAUDI ARABIA OR SMALLER GULF COUNTRIES INTO THE WAR, IRANIAN-DIRECTED SUBVERSION AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA, AND IRANIAN-DIRECTED SUBVERSION AGAINST ONE OR MORE OF THE SMALLER GULF STATES. ALL OF THESE FEARS HAVE DIMINISHED, WITH THE PARTIAL EXCEPTION OF FEARS ABOUT SUBVERSION. 6. THE RISK OF ESCALATION, TOO, HAS GROWN LESS FEARSOME. IRAN HAS RESPECTED THE SAUDI-DECLARED AIR DEFENSE ZONES SINCE SAUDI F-15\'S SHOOT DOWN AN IRANIAN F-4 LAST JUNE. THIS FACT HAS EASED SAUDI FEARS AND INCREASED SAUDI CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO DETER DIRECT IRANIAN ATTACKS. THIS REMAINS TRUE DESPITE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOMEWHAT MYSTERIOUS JUNE 1 ATTACK ON THE CONTAINER VESSEL \"ORIENTAL IMPORTER\" IN THE NORTHERN GULF, AND SPECULATION IN INDUSTRY CIRCLES THAT IF THE ATTACK REPRESENTS A NEW TURN IN IRANIAN TACTICS, IT MAY BRING A NEW CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IRANIAN AIRCRAFT AND THE RSAF. THE SAUDIS HAVE SEEN NUMEROUS UPS AND DOWNS IN THE TANKER WAR, AND HAVE SEEN THE TANKER WAR ATTACKS SETTLE INTO A PATTERN OF IRAQI ATTACKS SOUTH OF KHARG AND IRANIAN REPRISALS EAST OF QATAR, OUTSIDE THE ZONE COVERED BY RSAF CAPS. IN THESE ZONES ATTACK FREQUENCY MAY WAX AND WANE, BUT THE SAG NO LONGER GREATLY FEARS THAT THESE ATTACKS WILL ESCALATE OR SPREAD THE CONFLICT. IT HAS ALSO SEEN THAT THE EFFECTS ON AVAILABILITY OF VESSELS IN THE GULF AND ON INSURANCE RATES ARE FAR LESS DRASTIC THAN PREVIOUSLY FEARED. THE SAG WAS ANNOYED AND PUZZLED BY IRAQI ATTACKS IN MARCH IN THE VICINITY OF RAS TANURA LIGHT, BUT APPARENTLY TOOK THIS UP WITH BAGHDAD AND WAS SATISFIED WITH THE RESPONSE. IF IRAN DOES MOUNT FURTHER ATTACKS IN THE AREA OF THE ATTACK ON THE \"ORIENTAL IMPORTER,\" WE BELIEVE THE RSAF WOULD AGAIN ATTEMPT TO RESPOND, AND THAT A SUCCESSFUL RESPONSE WOULD PROBABLY BRING A HALT IN THE NEW IRANIAN ATTACKS. IF THE RSAF SHOULD INITIALLY FAIL, OF COURSE, THE GULF COULD SEE SOME TENSE DAYS. 7. IRANIAN-DIRECTED OR INSPIRED SUBVERSION AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA, WHILE IT REPRESENTS A POSSIBILITY THAT WILL NEVER BE TREATED LIGHTLY HERE, NEVERTHELESS NO LONGER AMOUNTS TO A BUGABOO, THOUGHTS OF WHICH AWAKEN SAUDI LEADERS AT NIGHT. THE FIRM, NOT TO SAY BRUTAL, HANDLING OF THE 1979 DISTURBANCES IN QATIF AND AL-HASA, CONTINUING CLOSE SURVEILLANCE OF THE SHI\'A, CLEAR WARNINGS OF THE REACTION THAT MAY BE ANTICIPATED TO FUTURE DISTURBANCES, SOME- TIME TRAVEL CONTROLS ON SHI\'A, AND OCCASIONAL ARRESTS ALL GIVE SAUDI AUTHORITIES CONFIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE THE SITUATION WELL IN HAND. THE STICK BEING HIGHLY VISIBLE, THE SAG HAS BROUGHT FORTH A FEW CARROTS OF LATE, DEVOTING SOME RESOURCES TO IMPROVING THE LOT OF THE EASTERN PROVINCE SHI\'A. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT NEW EASTERN PROVINCE AMIR MUHAMMAD IBN FAHD, HAVING MADE AN EARLY AND FAVORABLY RECEIVED OPENING TO THE SHI\'A, WILL ATTEMPT TO COME UP WITH MORE CARROTS. NEITHER STICKS NOR CARROTS HAVE GREAT MEANING, OF COURSE, TO SHI\'A IN LOVE WITH MARTYRDOM, BUT EVIDENCE IS LACKING THAT MORE THAN A FEW IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE SHARE THIS DEGREE OF FANATICISM WITH THEIR IRANIAN CO-RELIGIONISTS. THE SAG SUSPECTS, OF COURSE, A DIRECT OR INDIRECT IRANIAN HAND IN THE TWO RECENT EXPLOSIONS IN RIYADH, AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF SUCH INCIDENTS ON THE SENSE OF SECURITY THAT IS CONSIDERED, BY SAUDIS AND EXPATRIATES ALIKE, A MAJOR BENEFIT OF (OR COMPENSATION FOR) LIFE IN SAUDI ARABIA. - 8. THE ANNUAL HAJJ OF COURSE PROVIDES THE OTHER SOURCE OF SAUDI ANXIETY ABOUT IRANIAN TROUBLEMAKING. THE SAUDIS GAINED MUCH CONFIDENCE LAST YEAR WHEN THEY HANDLED 150,000 IRANIAN PILGRIMS WITH CON- SIDERABLE SUCCESS. THE SINGLE MAJOR INCIDENT, A FRACAS BETWEEN IRANIAN AND IRAQI PILGRIMS, WAS HANDLED WITH DESPATCH, AND THE SAUDIS FIRMLY REJECTED IRAN\'S PROTEST AND OFFERED THEIR OWN PUBLIC ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS. NEVERTHELESS, HAJJ SECURITY DEEPLY CONCERNS THE SAG, AND IT IS MAKING PREPARATIONS TO HANDLE THE PROBLEMS THAT ARE ANTICIPATED. NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE SIZE OF THIS YEAR\'S IRANIAN HAJJ INFLUX HAVE, ACCORDING TO SIRO, BEEN CONCLUDED, AND THE NUMBER OF IRANIAN PILGRIMS AGAIN SET AT 150,000. SAUDI SECURITY OFFICIALS UNDOUBTEDLY URGED THAT THE NUMBERS BE KEPT DOWN. THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE DECIDED TO SEEK, THROUGH AGREEING TO RECEIVE A LARGER NUMBER, IMPLICITLY TO PUT THE LIE TO IRANIAN CHARGES THAT THE AL SAUD ARE UNWORTHY CUSTODIANS OF THE HOLY CITIES. WERE A PROMINENT CLERIC TO AGREE TO HEAD THE OFFICIAL IRANIAN DELEGATION, THAT MESSAGE WOULD BE UNDERSCORED. 9. THE POSSIBILITY OF IRANIAN SHENANIGANS IN THE SMALL STATES OF THE GULF CONTINUES TO HAUNT THE SAUDI OFFICIAL PSYCHE. THERE WAS GREAT CONCERN HERE, OF COURSE, ABOUT THE BAHRAIN PLOT DISCOVERED IN DECEMBER OF 1982, AND ALSO ABOUT THE PLOT IN QATAR IN THE SUMMER OF 1983 (THOUGH THERE WERE SUGGESTIONS, AS WE RECALL, THAT THAT MAY HAVE INVOLVED LIBYAN ADVENTURISM). CONTINUING CONCERN ABOUT THE STEADFASTNESS OF THE KUWAITI AUTHORITIES HAS BEEN ASSUAGED SOMEWHAT BY KUWAIT\'S RESPONSE TO THE DECEMBER 1983 BOMBINGS AND THE HIJACKING LATE LAST YEAR, AND BY WHAT IS PERCEIVED HERE AS KUWAIT\'S GENERALLY FIRMER SECURITY POLICY, INCLUDING ITS INCREASED INTEREST IN GCC MILITARY COOPERATION. (SIRO NOTES THAT THE SAG ADVISED THE GOK EITHER TO EXECUTE THE PRISONERS IT HELD IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECEMBER 1983 BOMBINGS OR TO LET THEM GO, TO AVOID FUTURE PROBLEMS.) IRAN IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE IMPLICATED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN THE RECENT ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF THE AMIR OF KUWAIT. THE SAG LEADERSHIP SEEMED SHOCKED BY THIS ATTEMPT, GUT IN RETROSPECT APPEARS RELIEVED THAT THE SHOCK ADMINISTERED TO KUWAIT\'S BODY POLITIC IS PROVING A SALUTARY ONE, FURTHER FIRING KUWAITI DETERMINATION TO STRENGTHEN ITS SECURITY. THE SAG APPEARS SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT THE POLITICAL DRIFT IN THE UAE AND THE INCREASED IRANIAN ACTIVITY THERE. 10. SAUDI HOPES CONCERNING POSSIBLE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, NEVER GREAT, ARE NOW VERY MODEST INDEED. THE SAUDIS HAVE EXPERIENCED OCCASIONAL SURGES OF HOPE ABOUT APPEARANCES OF RELATIVE MODERATION AND REASONABLENESS IN IRAN, AND THE NEED TO NURTURE ANY SEEDS OF SUCH MODERA- TION. THIS OCCURRED, FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER LAVASANI\'S VISIT LAST SUMMER. BUT THESE HOPES HAVE TURNED TO DUST. THE SAUDIS SAW IRAN APPEAR TO STIMULATE A GCC INITIATIVE LAST SUMMER AND THEN HOLD BACK. THEY ALSO SAW JAPAN STIMULATED BY IRANIAN OFFICIALS TO TAKE A SPECIFIC INITIATIVE WHICH IRAN THEN REBUFFED. THE IRAQIS PREDICTED THIS FAILURE. THE SAUDIS FIRST BELIEVED THE IRAQI ANALYSIS AND THEN SAW IT CONFIRMED. IT IS NOT THAT THE SAUDIS SEE NO SIGNS OF MODERATION IN IRAN, BUT RATHER THAT THEY NOW SHARE THE IRAQI ANALYSIS THAT THAT MODERATION CAN ONLY EXPAND UNDER PRESSURE, MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE THAT OVER TIME MAY CONVINCE THE IMMODERATE MAJORITY OF IRANIAN LEADERS THAT THEIR INTRANSIGENCE IS LEADING ONLY TO INCREASING FAILURE: PRESSURE, IN OTHER WORDS, THAT IN TIME MAY PROVE THE MODERATES CORRECT. FURTHERMORE, THE SAUDIS UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS A VERY LONG ROAD INDEED FROM IRAN\'S PRESENT FUNDAMENTAL, THEOLOGICAL HOSTILITY TO THE AL SAUD REGIME TO A DEGREE OF MODERATION THAT WOULD MAKE IRAN A TOLERABLY SAFE NEIGHBOR. THUS, THEY SUFFER LITTLE TEMPTATION TO GRASP AT STRAWS. 11. THE SAG, WE BELIEVE, NOW SHARES ALL BUT TOTALLY THE IRAQI ANALYSIS OF THE IRANIAN SITUATION AND OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT SITUATION FOR BOTH IRAQI AND SAUDI POLICY. WE DETECT NO DAYLIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, BETWEEN SAUD\'S LINE ON THE WAR AND THAT OF TARIQ AZIZ. THE FORMER HAS IN RECENT MONTHS PRESSED FOR CONTINUED AND INCREASED U.S. EFFORTS TO STANCH ARMS FLOW TO IRAN AND HAS MADE SUCH EFFORTS HIMSELF. HE HAS ALSO BRUSHED ASIDE EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATION ARISING FROM THE SHIPPING WAR, ARGUING THAT THE IRAQIS MUST KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON IRAN. -------- PATIENCE -------- 12. WITH THIS LOWERING OF HOPES AND FEARS, SAUDI POLICY TOWARD IRAN IS CHARACTERIZED BY GREATER PATIENCE. THE IRAQIS HAVE CONVINCED THE SAG THAT PATIENT APPLICATION OF PRESSURE IS THE ONLY WAY TO END THE WAR. IN THIS SITUATION, WITH THE IRAQIS BEARING THE DIRECT BURDEN, SAUDI PATIENCE--A DOMINANT CHARACTER TRAIT FROM EARLY TIMES--HAS COME TO THE FORE. THE SAG DOES NOT SEE THE WAR AS RISK-FREE, OF COURSE, AND WOULD PREFER TO SEE IT EDGE TOWARD NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. EVEN A SMALL POSSIBILITY OF CONFLAGRATION, AFTER ALL, DISCOMFITS SAUDIS INTENSELY. STILL, AS THE THREAT APPEARS TO BE CONTAINED AND TO BE LOSING FORCE, THE SAUDIS CAN RAISE THEIR HEADS AND SEE THAT ALL IS NOT GRIM. A SOLUTION IS ESSENTIAL, BUT THE SAG IS NOT EAGER, FOR EXAMPLE, TO SEE AN EARLY RETURN OF LARGE VOLUMES OF IRANIAN AND IRAQI OIL TO THE WORLD MARKET. WE BELIEVE THE SAUDIS SEE GRADUAL MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE AS PREFERABLE TO AN EARLY FRAGILE SETTLEMEN1 OR TO CONFLICT CONTINUED AT THE CURRENT LEVEL. AN IRAQ FREE OF THE WAR WITH IRAN, FURTHERMORE, COULD REPRESENT A GREATER THREAT TO THE SAUDIS AND THEIR GCC BRETHREN. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE SAG WOULD CONCUR IN EMBASSY BAGHDAD\'S INSIGHT THAT IRAQ IS NOT LIKELY TO SEEK TO ASSERT INFLUENCE THROUGH A RETURN TO SUBVERSION OR TERRORISM, SINCE IRAN WOULD BE THE MORE LIKELY BENEFICIARY OF INSTABILITY IN THE GULF STATES. --- OIL --- 13. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SAUDI OIL POLICY IS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY CONCERN FOR ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAN, NOR THAT SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE ENERGY FIELD ARE CURRENTLY A VITAL OR MAJOR COMPONENT OF OVERALL RELATIONS. WHILE THE PRICE OF OIL USED TO BE (OR AT LEAST APPEAR TO BE) A BONE OF CONTENTION BETWEEN SAUDIS AND IRANIANS, BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION, THIS IS NOW A MINOR THEME. SAUDI ACCEPTANCE OF MOST OF THE BURDEN OF THE CURRENT SLACK MARKET APPEARS TO HAVE EARNED A MEASURE OF GRUDGING IRANIAN APPRECIATION, DESPITE OCCASIONAL IRANIAN GRUMBLING ABOUT LOWER PRICES AND ABOUT SAUDI RELUCTANCE TO CARRY THE WHOLE BURDEN. THE SAUDIS, HOWEVER, FOLLOW THIS POLICY NOT TO EARN IRANIAN KUDOS, BUT BECAUSE THEY PERCEIVE IT AS THE LEAST DAMAGING IN TERMS OF THEIR OWN CONCERNS ABOUT SHORT- AND LONG-TERM REVENUES AND ABOUT THE PRESERVATION OF OPEC. IT IS A MEASURE OF THE LOW PROFILE OF OIL POLICY IN BILATERAL RELATIONS THAT DURING HIS MAY 8 VISIT TO RIYADH, IRANIAN MINISTER FOR OIL AND OLYMPICS GHAFURI-FARD MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD AND WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SULTAN, BUT DID NOT MEET WITH YAMANI. IRAN IS DOUBTLESS ANGERED AND FRUSTRATED BY SAUDI ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ IN THE FORM OF OIL EXPORTED ON IRAQI ACCOUNT AND PERMISSION TO BUILD AN OIL PIPELINE CONNECTING IRAQ\'S SOUTHERN FIELDS TO THE SAUDI EAST-WEST PIPELINE, WHICH MAY IN TIME CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER WEAKENING OF THE MARKET. HOWEVER, GIVEN IRAN\'S FUNDAMENTAL HOSTILITY TO THE SAUDI MONARCHY, IRANIAN IRRITATION IN THIS RESPECT IS A MARGINAL CONSIDERATION THAT APPEARS TO HAVE HAD LITTLE VISIBLE EFFECT ON EITHER SAUDI OR IRANIAN ACTIONS. IN SUM, SAUDI OIL POLICY IS NOT DICTATED BY CONCERN ABOUT EARNING THE GRATITUDE OR THE HOSTILITY OF IRAN, BUT RATHER BY CONSIDERA- TIONS INVOLVING THE WELFARE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN WHICH SAUDI ARABIA HAS INVESTED HEAVILY, AND BY THE PERCEIVED NECESSITY OF AIDING IRAQ. FURTHERMORE, THE SAG FULLY UNDERSTANDS THAT THE BASIC HOSTILITY OF THE CURRENT IRANIAN REGIME HAS ROOTS DEEPER THAN PASSING CONSIDERATIONS OF OIL POLICY. ------ POLICY ------ 14. THE PRESCRIPTION THAT THE SAUDIS SEE IN ALL THIS FOR SAG POLICY TOWARD IRAN IS NOT ONE OF ACTIVISM. THE MESSAGE THEY WISH TO SEND TO IRAN IS THAT THEY (AND OTHER GCC STATES) CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM IRAQ WHILE THE WAR LASTS, BUT THAT THEY ARE ALWAYS READY TO TALK AND WILL BE READY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AFTER THE WAR ENDS. THE SAUDIS HAVE A SMALL EMBASSY IN TEHRAN--THREE TO FOUR OFFICERS AND THEIR WELL-REGARDED CHARGE, MARWAN AL-ROUMI. IRAN HAS ITS SMALL EMBASSY--A CHARGE AND THREE OFFICERS, CLOSELY WATCHED--IN JEDDAH. SIRO REPORTS THAT IRAN HAS NOW OBTAINED AN EMBASSY BUILDING IN RIYADH, WHERE IT HAS STATIONED AT LEAST ONE PERSON SO FAR. HIGH-LEVEL IRANIAN EMISSARIES ARE WELCOMED; SAUD PROMPTLY AGREED TO VISIT TEHRAN, WHEN IRAN OFFERED TO RECEIVE HIM PUBLICLY, AND HE ISSUED A RECIPROCAL INVITATION WHICH VELAYATI HAS NOW ACCEPTED. SAG POLICYMAKERS WITH REGARD TO IRAN AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, AS ON ALL OTHER SUBJECTS VITAL TO SAUDI ARABIA, ARE THE KING, CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH, PRINCE SULTAN, AND PRINCE NAIF. WE HAVE SEEN NO CLEAR EVIDENCE OF IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES OF VIEW AMONG THE FOUR OF THEM. THEY APPEAR TO BE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE BASIC HOSTILITY OF THE IRANIAN REGIME AND THE THREAT IT CONTINUES TO CONSTITUTE FOR THE AL SAUD. THEY APPEAR AGREED ON THE NEED TO BE FIRM BUT NOT FOOLHARDY TOWARD IRAN, AS DEMONSTRATED IN LAST SUMMER\'S SHOOTDOWN OF AT LEAST ONE IRANIAN F-4, FOLLOWED BY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RSAF\'S RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND A CONCILIATORY STANCE TOWARD IRAN. THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS IN THE PAST THAT CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH MAY FLIRT WITH THE IRANIAN EXILE OPPOSITION, BUT THIS WOULD APPEAR LITTLE MORE THAN KEEPING IN TOUCH. 15. THE SAUDIS WOULD OF COURSE WISH, ON BEHALF ALSO OF THEIR GCC ALLIES, TO DISCUSS A BROAD RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT--NOT LIMITED MEASURES SUCH AS A HALT TO BOMBING CITIES OR TANKERS. THE SAG STANDS READY--PREFERABLY THROUGH THE GCC OR THE OIC--TO PROMOTE MEDIATION WHENEVER THERE ARE CLEAR SIGNS THAT IRANIAN INTRANSIGENCE HAS ABATED SUFFICIENTLY TO OFFER SERIOUS HOPE OF PROGRESS. THEY ARE ALSO ACTIVE, OF COURSE, IN URGING OTHERS TO WITHHOLD ARMS FROM IRAN OR TO PRESS IRAN TO MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATION. IN THE MEANTIME, THEY WILL CONTINUE SUPPORTING IRAQ FINANCIALLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY, WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEY WISH TO SEE IRAN EMERGE FROM THE CONFLICT INTACT AND VIABLE, AND THEY MAY BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE RESOURCES TOWARD RECONSTRUCTION, IF THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A SETTLEMENT. SAUDIS WILL NEVER LIKE OR TRUST THE IRANIANS--THEY DID NOT DO SO EVEN BEFORE THE REVOLU- TION WHEN AT LEAST THEY BELIEVED THERE WERE MAJOR SHARED INTERESTS--BUT THEY REMAIN ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE LONG-TERM NEED TO LIVE WITH THEIR LARGE AND UNRULY NEIGHBOR, AND ARE CONFIDENT THAT, FOR THE MOMENT, THEY HAVE FOUND THE BEST FORMULA FOR MOVING MATTERS, HOWEVER SLOWLY, IN THAT DIRECTION. 16. A NUMBER OF FACTORS IN AND ASPECTS OF CURRENT SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS MERIT SPECIAL MENTION, AT LEAST IN PASSING: -- LEBANON: SAG REACTION TO THE GROWTH OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN LEBANON HAS BEEN FUNDAMENTALLY ONE OF CONCERN, TEMPERED BY A MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE THAT SYRIA COULD AND WOULD KEEP THE SITUATION FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND. EMOTIONAL REACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL SAUDIS, UP TO AND INCLUDING HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, HAVE BEEN SHARP AND CON- FLICTING. THE SPECTACLE OF THE \"LEBANESE NATIONAL RESISTANCE\" DRIVING THE ISRAELIS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON HAS ACCELERATED PULSES AND SWELLED BREASTS AND THE \"BRIDE OF THE SOUTH\" WAS EMBRACED HERE AS A TRUE MUSLIM (BUT NOL \"SHI\'A\") AND ARAB HEROINE. AT THE SAME TIME THE GROWING POWER OF LEBANON\'S SHI\'A AND HIZBALLAH/ISLAMIC JIHAD TERRORISM HAS BRED DISQUIET, WHILE IN RECENT DAYS, AMAL\'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS HAS ENGAGED SAUDI SYMPATHIES FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND REIGNITED SMOLDERING SAUDI DISLIKE AND DISTRUST OF THE SHI\'A. THE RETURN OF KIDNAPPED SAUDI CONSUL FARRASH AND THE EXPLOSION OF TWO BOMBS IN RIYADH AS FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD VISITED TEHRAN ARE INEVITABLY READ HERE, CORRECTLY OR INCORRECTLY, AS A CRUDE ATTEMPT TO SEND A MESSAGE ABOUT IRAN\'S ABILITIES TO REWARD OR PUNISH. IN SHORT, IRAN IN LEBANON IS A SOURCE OF CONTINUING BUT CURRENTLY CONFUSED CONCERN HERE. -- SYRIA: SYRIA\'S CONTINUED DIPLOMATIC AND LOGIS- TICAL SUPPORT FOR IRAN REMAINS A MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM FOR THE SAUDIS AND THEIR GCC ALLIES. SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE DESPITE REPEATED SAUDI ENTREATIES, NOTABLY BY CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH, CONTINUES TO MAKE A MOCKERY OF THE IDEAL OF ARAB UNITY; TO ADD TO THE BURDENS IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA BEAR AS THEY CONFRONT REVOLUTIONARY IRAN; AND THROUGH THE SUPPLY OF ARMS (POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SCUD MISSILES), TO PROLONG THE WAR. ALTHOUGH THE GREATEST IMPEDIMENT TO CONVENING THE LONG-OVERDUE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING IN RIYADH IS THE DISPUTE OVER THE LEGITIMACY OF ARAFAT\'S LEADER- SHIP OF THE PLO (AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE SAUDIS AND SYRIANS ARE ALSO IN OPPOSITE CAMPS), SYRIAN SUSTENANCE OF THE IRANIAN WAR EFFORT ALSO PRE- CLUDES THE HOLDING OF A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT. THE REPEATED POSTPONEMENTS HAVE BEEN POLITICALLY AWKWARD FOR THE SAUDIS AND PERSONALLY EMBARRASSING TO KING FAHD; ARAB DISARRAY DUE IN PART TO THE SYRIAN STANCE TOWARD THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR HAS, FINALLY, FURTHER COMPLICATED ARAB EFFORTS TO ELABORATE A COMMON STAND VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL, BUILDING ON THE FEZ PRINCIPLES. -- DIPLOMACY/MEDIATION: THE SAG CONTINUES TO SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE ALL MEDIATION EFFORTS, DESPITE ITS REALISTIC APPRECIATION THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PROVE FUTILE UNTIL IRAN FINDS ITSELF UNABLE TO ESCAPE THE CONCLUSION THAT IT MUST SEEK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. IN PARTICULAR, THE SAG CONTINUES IN A LOW-KEY MANNER TO ENCOURAGE AND PARTICIPATE IN EFFORTS OF THE OIC, THE GCC AND THE ARAB LEAGUE, AS IT CONTINUES TO CULTIVATE RELATIONS AND MAINTAIN A LIMITED DIALOGUE ON THE WAR WITH NATIONS IT SEES AS POSSIBLE MEDIATORS WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT, PRINCIPALLY TURKEY, PAKISTAN, SYRIA AND ALGERIA. SAUDI ARABIA AND ITS GULF ALLIES HAVE FOUND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RECEPTIVE TO THEIR EFFORTS TO STIGMATIZE AND ISOLATE IRAN BECAUSE OF ITS PROSECUTION OF THE WAR BUT HAVE RESIDUAL DOUBTS ABOUT MEDIATION BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WHO AT LEAST UNTIL HIS GULF SWING AND VISIT TO TEHRAN WAS SEEN AS UNCONCERNED ABOUT ENDING THE WAR AND BIASSED TOWARD TEHRAN. -- PROPAGANDA: AN FSN WHO HAS BEEN MONITORING ARABIC-LANGUAGE BROADCASTS FROM IRAN REPORTS THAT IRANIAN PROPAGANDA HAS CONTINUED UNABATED IN RECENT WEEKS, WITH NON-STOP ATTACKS ON GULF REGIMES AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR IRAQ, ON THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT OF HOSNI MUBARAK, ON KING HUSSEIN, ON THE U.S. AND ON ISRAEL. ATTACKS ON THE SAG, HOWEVER, DROPPED OFF SHARPLY DURING AND AFTER FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD\'S MAY 18-20 VISIT TO TEHRAN AND CONTINUE TO BE HELD IN ABEYANCE. WE BELIEVE AN FBIS READING ON IRANIAN PROPAGANDA WOULD BE USEFUL, BUT OUR FSN\'S READING SEEMS TO US CONSISTENT WITH IRAN\'S CURRENT EFFORT TO VEIL THE UNCOMPROMISING IDEOLOGY THAT HOLDS SWAY THERE WITH DIPLOMATIC CIVILITY AND MERELY VERBAL FLEXIBILITY. -- RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES, ELITE AND POPULAR: AT THE LEVEL OF THE ULEMA AND OTHER ISLAMICALLY- EDUCATED SAUDIS, WE PERCEIVE A DIVISION OF THOUGHT AND FEELING BETWEEN REGARDING THE IRANIANS AND OTHER SHI\'A AS BROTHER MUSLIMS, WITH WHOM THE TIES OF SHARED VALUES ARE STRONGER THAN THEIR DIFFERENCES, AND A DEEPER AND STRONGER STRAIN OF SUSPICION BASED ON THE PERCEPTION THAT SHI\'A BELIEFS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY HERETICAL, ALMOST NOT TRULY MONOTHEISTIC, AND THAT THEY CONTAIN IN FACT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRAINS DEEPLY HOSTILE TO SUNNI ARAB SOCIETIES. SUCH SENTIMENTS ARE SHARED IN CRUDER FORM AT MORE POPULAR LEVELS AND ARE OF COURSE MIRRORED ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE GULF. THE RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL ANTIPATHIES INVOLVED ARE NEVER FAR FROM THE SURFACE AND WILL NOT DISAPPEAR. IN SAUDI ARABIA THEY ARE, OF COURSE, SOMETIMES EXACERBATED BY THE ALWAYS UNCOMFORTABLE, AT TIMES TENSE, RELATIONS BETWEEN SUNNIS AND THE DISCRIMINATED- AGAINST ARAB SHI\'A MINORITY. -- THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN: CONIINUING SAUDI CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS KEEPS ALIVE SAUDI DISQUIET ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF IRAN-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT; AND ALTHOUGH SAUDI AFGHAN POLICY FOCUSES ON PAKISTAN AND THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN, THE SAG COULD BE EXPECTED TO BECOME CONCERNED AT ANY HINT THAT IRAN MIGHT DISCOMFIT AFGHAN REFUGEES OR HINDER THE RESISTANCE IN ORDER TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES WITH THE USSR. FOR THE MOMENT, WE BELIEVE, THE SAG IS REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THE SAME POWERFUL IDEOLOGY THAT LEADS IRAN TO REJECT A NEGOTIATED PEACE WILL PREVENT ANY SIGNIFICANT SACRIFICE OF MUJAHIDEEN INTERESTS TO AN ACCOMMO- DATION WITH THE USSR. IF, HOWEVER, A GROWING PERCEPTION BY IRAN OF A FAILURE OF ITS WAR EFFORT FORCES GRADUAL MODIFICATION OF IRANIAN POLICY IN MORE PRAGMATIC DIRECTIONS, SUCH AS GREATER RECEP- TIVENESS TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, A POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECT COULD BE A MORE PRAGMATIC, ACCOMMODATIONIST IRANIAN POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH COULD SIGNIFY A PERIOD OF GREATER RISK FOR THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN. -- TRADE: SAUDI-IRANIAN TRADE, UNSURPRISINGLY, REMAINS MINISCULE. SAUDI IMPORTS FROM IRAN IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1984 AMOUNTED TO SR54.6 MILLION, ALMOST ALL ACCOUNTED FOR BY CARPETS, NUTS, AND DRIED FRUITS. SAUDI EXPORTS TO IRAN WERE SR51.5 MILLION IN 1980, UP TO SR43.8 MILLION IN 1981 AND DOWN AGAIN TO SR22.6 MILLION IN 1982, THE LAST YEAR FOR WHICH THE SAG PUBLISHED FIGURES FOR EXPORTS TO IRAN. IN 1981 AND 1982, SAUDI EXPORTS TO IRAN CONSISTED PRINCIPALLY OF UREA AND OTHER NITROGEN FERTILIZERS. AN END TO THE WAR WOULD PROBABLY MEAN AN INCREASE IN TWO-WAY TRADE, BUT PROBABLY NOT A DRAMATIC ONE. 17. CONCLUSION: IF THE GULF WAR IS RESOLVED IN TIME BY NEGOTIATION OR SETTLES INTO A LONG-TERM, LOW-VIOLENCE STALEMATE, SOME ABATEMENT OF IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR AND SOME ADJUSTMENT OF IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY WILL PROBABLY HAVE ACCOM- PANIED SUCH DEVELOPMENTS. IF THIS OCCURS, LONG- TERM PROSPECTS FOR CIVIL RELATIONS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN MAY NOT BE BAD. THE TWO STATES HAVE SOME PERMANENT COMMON INTERESTS THAT MAY REASSERT THEMSELVES ONCE IRANIANS NO LONGER SEE POLITICS PRIMARILY AS THEOLOGY. AFTER A PERIOD OF FLIRTATION WITH STATISM IN IRAN, BOTH REGIMES BASICALLY FAVOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE. TRADE AND EVEN INVESTMENT COULD GROW. BOTH STATES HAVE ABUNDANT OIL RESERVES AND A CONCERN OR INTEREST IN MAINTAINING OPEC SOLIDARITY. BOTH STATES, TOO, WILL CONTINUE TO SHARE AN INTEREST IN PREVENTING IRAQ FROM BECOMING TOO POWERFUL. (THIS OVER TIME COULD DEVELOP INTO A SHARED INTEREST IN MAINTAINING A THREE-WAY BALANCE OF POWER AMONG IRAQ, IRAN AND THE GCC.) BOTH STATES, OBVIOUSLY FOR VERY DIFFERENT REASONS, HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT SUPERPOWER INVOLVE- MENT IN GULF AFFAIRS (ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS CLEARLY DO NOT OBJECT TO THE MODEST \"OVER THE HORIZON\" U.S. NAVY PRESENCE AND THAT REPRESENTED BY THE SHIPS OF COMIDEASTFOR). FINALLY, BOTH STATES SHARE AN ANTIPATHY FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND DESIRE TO MAKE THE PRICE IT IS PAYING IN AFGHANISTAN AS HIGH AS POSSIBLE. IF THE IRANIAN URGE TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS BY MILITARY MEANS DECLINES AND IF IRANIAN IDEOLOGY MODERATES IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FRUSTRATION, THEN SUCH SHARED VIEWS AND INTERESTS MAY AGAIN COME TO THE FORE. THIS IS CLEARLY A SAUDI HOPE, AND A POSSIBILITY THE SAG STRONGLY DESIRES TO KEEP ALIVE, EVEN AS IT EMPHASIZES ITS PREEMINENT SHORT-TERM GOAL OF HELPING AVOID AN IRAQI DEFEAT. END CONCLUSION. SUDDARTH " "68","6/12/1985 16:53","85TELAVIV8792","Embassy Tel Aviv","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 121653Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0184 INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY HELSINKI AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY CANBERRA AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN USMISSION USUN NEW YORK ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 08792 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, LE, IS SUBJECT: ISRAEL\'S POLICY ON SOUTHERN LEBANON 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL KIMCHE BRIEFED AMBAS- SADORS FROM UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND UNIFIL CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES JUNE 12 ON SOUTHERN LEBANON. KIMCHE REITERATED ISRAELI POLICY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON LEADING UP TO THE WITHDRAWAL, THEN EMPHASIZED THAT ISRAEL WAS NOW OUT OF LEBANON AND, THEREFORE, NO LONGER IN CONTROL. AS A RE- SULT, ALTHOUGH ISRAEL WAS TRYING TO BE HELPFUL, ISRAEL FELT THAT UNIFIL MUST WORK OUT THE PROBLEM OF THE FINNISH HOSTAGES WITH THE SLA DIRECTLY. IF ISRAEL SOUGHT TO CONTROL EVENTS AND FORCE LAHAD TO RELEASE THE FINNISH SOLDIERS, ISRAEL WOULD, IN EFFECT, BE BACK IN LEBANON. THERE WOULD BE NO MORE SLA AND LAHAD WOULD BE FINISHED. SEVERAL AMBASSADORS SAID THEIR GOVERNMENTS CONSIDER ISRAEL TO REMAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE UNIFIL SOLDIERS, AND MADE STRONG STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE AGAINST THE HOLDING OF HOSTAGES. END SUMMARY. - 3. MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE INVITED THE AMBAS- SADORS AND CHARGES FROM THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER STATES AND THE CONTRIBUTORS TO UNIFIL TO A BRIEFING JUNE 12 ON ISRAEL\'S POLICY IN SOUTH LEBANON. THE BRIEFING INVITATION WAS STIMULATED BY THE PRESENT CRISIS BETWEEN UNIFIL AND THE SOUTH LEBANESE ARMY. KIMCHE SOUGHT TO PLACE THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE BROAD CONTEXT OF ISRAELI POLICY. - 4. ISRAELI POLICY ON SOUTHERN LEBANON - ---------------------------------- KIMCHE OPENED BY NOTING THAT THERE IS A CABINET DECISION ON SOUTHERN LEBANON THAT CONTINUES TO BE THE BASIS OF ISRAELI ACTIONS, UNTIL THERE IS A CABINET DECISION TO CHANGE IT. THE DECISION INCLUDES THE FOLLOW- ING ELEMENTS: A) THE IDF IS REDEPLOYED ALONG THE INTER- NATIONAL FRONTIER, AND NO IDF UNITS WILL REMAIN IN LEBANON ON A REGULAR OR PERMANENT BASIS. B) THE IDF RE- TAINS FREEDOM OF ACTION AGAINST TERRORISTS BEFORE, DURING OR AFTER THEIR ACTIVITIES AGAINST ISRAEL. C) A SECURITY ZONE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, WITH ISRAELI LIAISON WITH LOCAL FORCES WHICH ARE DEDICATED AGAINST TERRORISM. D) IF THE LOCAL FORCES ARE ATTACKED THE IDF MAY RESPOND TO PROTECT THEM. - 5. ISRAEL\'S RELATIONS WITH THE SLA - ------------------------------- KIMCHE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS HELPED AND CONTINUES TO HELP THE SOUTH LEBANON (SLA), BUT NO LONGER CONTROLS THE SECURITY ZONE. HE SAID THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SLA IS ONE OF LIAISON AND ADVICE, BUT IT DOES NOT PERMIT ISRAEL TO GIVE ORDERS, AND THE SLA IS NOT A DE FACTO ISRAELI FORCE. THE SLA IS LEBANESE, COMMANDED BY A LEBANESE GENERAL, AND IT BEHAVES AS THE LEBANESE BEHAVE, NOT AS ISRAELIS WOULD. THIS MEANS THAT THE SLA OFTEN ACTS IN A MANNER WHICH IS DISTASTEFUL TO ISRAEL. - 6. THE \"UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT\" WITH UNIFIL - -------------------------------------- KIMCHE SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DEPLORES \"THE UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT\", AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT SETTLED. HE SAID ISRAEL HAS GIVEN THE FOLLOWING ADVICE TO THE SLA: A) NOT TO HARM ANY OF THE HOSTAGES; HE SAID THE SLA HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO DO NO HARM TO THE FINNISH SOLDIERS, AND THIS IS BEING OBSERVED. B) ISRAEL HAS ADVISED LAHAD TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TALKS WITH UNIFIL. HE SAID THAT THE ISSUE MUST BE RESOLVED BY UNIFIL AND THE SLA DIRECTLY. ON NO ACCOUNT, HE EMPHASIZED, SHOUL ISRAEL BE A DIRECT PARTY. ISRAEL IS OUT OF LEBANON; IF IT WERE TO DEAL DIRECTLY THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT ISRAEL IS STILL IN. KIMCHE VOLUNTEERED THAT IT IS TRUE THAT ISRAEL STILL HAS LIAISON OFFICERS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT HE ASSERTED THAT THE NUMBERS ARE FEWER THAN THOSE WHICH WERE ACCEPTED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN WELCOMED BY MANY STATES INCLUDING EGYPT. - 7. THE UNIFIL-SLA MEETING - ---------------------- KIMCHE SAID THAT THE MEETING BETWEEN GENERALS LAHAD AND PONS IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. HE SAID THEY DIS- CUSSED THE RELEASE OF THE CAPTIVES; THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THOUGHT THEY SHOULD HAVE MET FROM THE VERY BEGIN- NING, BUT THIS MEETING AT LEAST WAS HELD IN A GOOD ATMOSPHERE. THE GIST OF THE MEETING WAS: LAHAD ASKED UNIFIL FOR THE ELEVEN SLA TROOPS TO BE BROUGHT TO A NEUTRAL PLACE WHERE IT COULD BE DETERMINED WHETHER THEY HAD IN FACT DEFECTED OR HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND TURNED OVER TO AMAL. HE SAID THAT IF THE ELEVEN STATE THAT THEY HAD DEFECTED, THE FINNS WILL BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY BY LAHAD. IT HAD ALSO BEEN AGREED DURING THE MEETING TO APPOINT LIAISON OFFICERS BETWEEN GENERALS PONS AND LAHAD, AND UNIFIL HAD SECURED THE RIGHT TO VISIT THE FINNISH SOLDIERS EVERY THREE OR FOUR DAYS. KIMCHE SAID, OF COURSE HE HOPED THE PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED BEFORE THAT TIME LIMIT. KIMCHE CONCLUDED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO UNIFIL TO BRING THE ELEVEN TO A NEUTRAL SPOT, PERHAPS NAQURA. - 8. GENERAL REMARKS - --------------- KIMCHE OFFERED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL REMARKS: SINCE THERE IS NO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON, ISRAEL UNDER- STANDS THE NEED FOR UNIFIL TO HAVE RELATIONS WITH THE AMAL MILITIAS. IN FACT HE SAID THIS IS A POSITIVE THING. IN THE PAST UNIFIL HAD SAID THAT IT COULD DEAL ONLY WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. BUT SINCE THAT PROVED IMPRACTICAL, AND UNIFIL IS NOW DEALING WITH AMAL, IT SHOULD ALSO DEAL WITH THE SLA. HE SAID THIS NOW SEEMS TO BE IN PROGRESS. ISRAEL, HE SAID, WOULD LIKE A STRONG CEN- TRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON, AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE LIAISON WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY. BUT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE, AND THERE IS LITTLE HOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE FORESEEABL FUTURE. KIMCHE THEN DESCRIBED THE INTERFACTIONAL FIGHTING WITHIN LEBANON, NOTING THAT IT APPEARS THAT ALL FACTIONS ARE NOW FIGHTING WITH ALL OTHERS, FOLLOWING A RECENT REPORT OF A SHIA-DRUZE CONFLICT THIS MORNING. - 9. JAZZIN - ------ KIMCHE SAID THAT JAZZIN COULD BE THE NEW FLASHPOINT. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAD NEVER TOLD OR ADVISED THE SLA TO GO TO JAZZIN, AND FURTHER ADVISED THE SLA THAT IF IT DECIDED TO GO TO JAZZIN, ISRAEL WOULD NOT HELP THE SLA BECAUSE JAZZIN IS OUTSIDE THE SECURITY ZONE. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAD PROPOSED TO UNIFIL THAT IT DEPLOY TO JAZZIN, SINCE IT HAD FORCES CLOSE BY. HE SAID THE GOI WOULD WELCOME A UNIFIL DEPLOY- MENT TO JAZZIN AND WOULD ADVISE THE SLA TO WITHDRAW IN THAT CASE. THE UN SECRETARY HAD THOUGHT THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA AND TRIED IT OUT WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. GEMAYEL ALSO, ACCORDING TO KIMCHE, THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD IDEA BUT DECLINED TO REQUEST A UNIFIL PRESENCE IN JAZZIN BECAUSE HE KNEW HE COULDN\'T GAIN THE SUPPORT OF EITHER SYRIA OR HIS OWN PRIME MINISTER. HE SAID THIS ALSO DEMONSTRATES THE WEAKNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. - 10. THE FINNS VERSUS THE SLA ----------------------------- KIMCHE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE FACTS. HE SAID THE INVESTIGATION WAS UNDERWAY, BUT IT APPEARED THAT THE UN STILL BELIEVES THAT THE ELEVEN SLA TROOPS DEFECTED. THE GOI, HE SAID, IS SKEPTICAL; IT BELIEVES THEY WERE ABDUCTED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS WHICH KIMCHE ADMITTED WERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL: A) ALL OF THE ELEVEN LEFT THEIR FAMILIES BEHIND. KNOWING THAT THE SLA IS NOT A GENTLE FORCE, THEY WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN AFRAID FOR THEIR FAMILIES IF THEY HAD VOLUNTARILY DEFECTED. B) SHORTLY AFTER THE SLA ELEVEN WERE MOVED TO TYRE, AMAL LEADER NABIH BERRI SAID THAT HE WOULD EXCHANGE THE ELEVEN PRISONERS FOR THE SHIA PRISONERS HELD IN ISRAEL. KIMCHE SAID IT WOULD BE RARE INDEED TO OFFER TO EXCHANGE DEFECTORS FOR OTHER PRISONERS. C) HE THEN SHOWED A TV FILM MADE BY A SYRIAN CREW JUST AFTER THE ELEVEN REACHED TYRE. THE CAPTIVES WERE SHOWN BEING HELD UNDER ARMED GUARD, SULLEN, APPARENTLY FEARFUL, AND RESPONDING TO ORDERS BY THEIR GUARDS. KIMCHE SAID THIS APPEARED NOT TO BE THE DEMEANOR OF PERSONS WHO HAD VOLUNTARILY DEFECTED. - 11. KIMCHE CONCLUDED THIS SESSION BY NOTING THAT ISRAEL MAY NEVER KNOW THE TRUTH, BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAE WANTS THE FINNS RELEASED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE SAID THAT ALL THAT ISRAEL WANTS IS PEACE ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER. 12. AMBASSADORS\' COMMENTS -------------------------- THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THERE WAS A PRESS REPORT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WOULD CONTEMPLATE A MOVE OF UNIFIL TO THE BORDER UNDER AN ARRANGEMENT AGREED TO WITH THE SLA. KIMCHE SAID THE UN HAD PRESENTED SOME IDEAS TO THE GOI ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT TO THE BORDER WITH THE DE FACTO COOPERATION OF THE SLA. NO DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED, AND THE SUBJECT WAS NOT THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED IN THE RABIN/URQUHART MEETING YESTERDAY. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE MEANTIME, UNTIL SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT IS WORKED OUT, ISRAELI POLICY, AS DETERMINED BY THE CABINET, REMAINS. HE ADDED HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY IDEAS FOR STRENGTHENING THE STABILITY OF THE BORDER AREA. - 13. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE EC-10 HAD MET AND HAD MADE A GENERAL STATEMENT ON LEBANON. HE SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN CONSIDERED THE INCIDENT VERY SERIOUS. THEIR OPINION WAS THAT EVERY MEASURE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO FREE ALL HOSTAGES. AMBASSADOR TALIANI ADDED A PERSONAL NOTE SAYING THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO ACCEPT ISRAELI DISCLAIMERS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT ISRAEL HAD ARMED AND EQUIPPED AND CONTINUED TO PAY THE SLA. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT GIVING ASSISTANCE DOES NOT MEAN CONTROL. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, THE 3,000 SOVIET ADVISERS IN SYRIA DO NOT MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION CONTROLS SYRIA. HE SAID IF ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR\'S PREMISE, THE IDF WOULD BE DOOMED TO STAY IN LEBANON IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONTROL. - 14. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR STATED THE STRONG DESIRE OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO HAVE THE FINNISH TROOPS RELEASED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE ADDED THAT HE FELT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS A STRONG RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RELEASE. 15. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR INTERVENED AGAIN TO NOTE THAT IT WAS A VERY DANGEROUS PRECEDENT TO ACCEPT THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES. HE SAID HIS MAJESTY\'S GOVERNMENT WAS VERY EXERCISED OVER THE HOSTAGE ISSUE. HE SAID ANY ACTION THAT ENCOURAGES THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES IS BAD BOTH IN THIS CASE AND IN THE GENERAL SENSE. KIMCHE SAID HE AGREED THAT ANY TAKING OF HOSTAGES IS BAD. HE CONCEDED THAT PERHAPS ISRAEL COULD SEND IN ITS TROOPS TO FORCE THEIR RELEASE. BUT IF THE IDF DID GO IN, IT WOULD MEAN THE END OF THE SLA, AND THE GOI WOULD HAVE TO BE BACK IN LEBANON TO STAY. HE SAID ISRAEL HAS GIVEN STRONG ADVICE TO LAHAD THAT IT WAS WRONG TO HOLD HOSTAGES. BUT HE ADDED THAT THE ELEVEN SLA TROOPS MAY ALSO BE AS MUCH HOSTAGE AS THE FINNS. HE SAID THEREFORE THE ONLY LINE OF ATTACK IS TO FOLLOW UP ON THE LAHAD PROPOSAL. HE THEN URGED THE CONTRIBUTORS TO UNIFUL TO PRESS THE UN TO HAVE THE AMAL BRING THE ELEVEN TROOPS TO THE NEUTRAL ZONE SO IT COULD DETERMINE IF THEY WERE VOLUNTARILY DEFECTORS OR IN FACT CAPTIVES. 16. THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, BUT ADDED THAT THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF LIAISON OFFICERS LEAVES THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CONSIDERABLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT PRESENT. HE SAID THE HOSTAGES SHOULD BE RELEASED WITHOUT CONDITIONS IMMEDIATELY. - 17. COMMENT - THIS WAS THE THIRD OF A SERIES OF MEETINGS THAT KIMCHE HAS HAD WITH THIS GROUP ON LEBANON. KIMCHE STATED THE CASE WITH CLARITY AND PRECISION, BUT HIS AUDIENCE WAS NOT CONVINCED. CONCERNING THE HOSTAGES, HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT ISRAEL COULD BE EITHER IN LEBANON OR OUT, AND IF OUT, ISRAEL COULD NOT FORCE LAHAD TO DO WHAT HE DIDN\'T WANT TO DO. BEHIND THIS DENIAL OF CONTROL OF LAHAD IS KIMCHE\'S CONVICTION THAT TO TRY TO FORCE LAHAD WOULD MEAN THE END OF LAHAD AND LAHAD\'S FORCES CLEARLY THIS IS A CARD WHICH ISRAEL HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO PLAY. IT IS ALSO CLEAR, AS KIMCHE IMPLIED SEVERAL TIMES, THAT ISRAELI POLICY ON SOUTHERN LEBANON IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION SHIFTS. BUT ISRAEL IS STILL COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING LAHAD IN GENERAL AND IN HIS CONFRONTATION WITH UNIFIL, AND IS UNWILLING TO FACE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SLA. IF THE SLA SHOULD CRUMBLE, THE PERES GOVERNMENT\'S LEBANON WITH- DRAWAL DECISION, UP TO NOW A VERY POPULAR ONE, COULD SPRING AGAIN INTO THE CENTER OF POLITICAL CONTRO- VERSY HERE. CERTAINLY SHARON AND HIS ALLIES WOULD MAKE THE MOST OF IT TO WEAKEN THE PERES GOVERNMENT AND FURTHER INHIBIT ITS ABILITY TO MOVE FORWARD ON EITHER THE EGYPTIAN FRONT OR THE PEACE PROCESS ISSUES NOW UNDER DISCUSSION. 18. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLATEN " "69","6/13/1985 12:22","85DAMASCUS3741","Embassy Damascus","SECRET","","O 131222Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1657 INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK DIA WASHINGTON DC CIA WASHDC ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 03741 TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, KPAL, KPRP, JO, IS, LE, IS, SY SUBJECT: SYRIA AND TERRORISM 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: SYRIA CONSIDERS ITSELF A TRUE CONFRONTATION STATE--EVERYTHING THAT CONTRIBUTES TO DEFEATING THE ENEMY IS POSITIVE. THE \"STRUGGLE\" PROVIDES A GUIDE FOR CHOOSING THE TARGET AND LEGITIMIZES THE MEANS, INCLUDING TERRORISM, WHICH IS VIEWED AS COST-EFFECTIVE. SYRIA IS HOST TO PLENTY OF WILLING HELPERS, PRIMARILY LARGE NUMBERS OF DISAFFECTED AND RADICALIZED PALESTINIANS, BUT ALSO KURDS AND ARMENIANS. AS LONG AS COMMON FOES ARE TARGETED, SYRIA TOLERATES TERRORIST ACTIONS BY OTHERS. RETALIATION AGAINST SYRIA WOULD HAVE PROBLEMATIC EFFECTS, AND PROBABLY WOULD NOT DETER FUTURE TERRORISM. END SUMMARY. 3. SYRIA HAS A RECORD OF SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM AND A HISTORY OF HARBORING GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTS. SYRIA HAS ALSO BEEN A VICTIM OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF TERRORIST ACTIONS. SYRIA CONSIDERS ITSELF A CONFRONTATION STATE IN THE PURE SENSE-- IT IS AT WAR WITH ISRAEL AND EVERYTHING THAT CONTRIBUTES TO THE EFFORT TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY IS POSITIVE. SPECIFIC TERRORIST OPERATIONS WILL B MOUNTED OR NOT, ACCORDING TO THIS CRITERION. 4. OTHER ARAB STATES WHOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL IS NOT JURIDICALLY ONE OF PEACE DO NOT CONDONE OR PROMOTE TERRORISM. IN THIS MESSAGE WE EXAMINE SOME ASPECTS OF SYRIA THAT MAKE IT DIFFERENT. --------------------------- WHAT MAKES SYRIA DIFFERENT? --------------------------- 5. THE BA\'THI, MINORITY GOVERNMENT OF HAFIZ AL-ASAD IS BUILT UPON AN IDEOLOGY THAT INCREASINGLY HAS COME TO FOCUS ON THE ISSUE OF SYRIA\'S ROLE IN CONFRONTING THE \"ZIONIST ENEMY,\" ISRAEL. SYRIA PERCEIVES THAT IT STANDS ALONE AMONG THE STATES NEIGHBORING ISRAEL IN PROMOTING \"REAL\" CONFRONTATION, SINCE JORDAN AND EGYPT HAVE FALLEN FROM GRACE INTO \"CAPITULATIONISM,\" LEBANON HAS TURNED INWARD, AND IRAQ HAS SHIFTED TOWARDS THE ARAB RIGHT. SYRIA\'S REGIONAL ISOLATION--AS A RADICAL STATE WITH TIES TO IRAN AND LIBYA--ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO THE STRONG SENSE OF UNIQUENESS FELT BY THE SYRIAN LEADER- SHIP. GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY ARE ADDITIONAL FACTORS: SYRIA IS STRATEGICALLY PLACED ON THE CROSSROADS OF THE LEVANT WITH ACCESS TO AND VULNERABILITY FROM MANY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. DEMOGRAPHICALLY, SYRIA\'S POPULATION IS HETEROGENOUS, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS, KURDS, AND ARMENIANS. THERE ARE A LOT OF PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN SYRIA WHO HAVE GRIEVANCES AGAINST SOMEBODY ELSE, SOMEWHERE ELSE. 6. WHAT REALLY DISTINGUISHES SYRIA, HOWEVER, IS ITS CANDID ASSESSMENT THAT TERRORISM IS COST EFFECTIVE. IN PART, THIS IS A FUNCTION OF THE DETERRENTS TO ANY DIRECT MILITARY ACTION POSED BY SUPERIOR ISRAELI FORCES OR ARAB OPINION. SYRIA IS ALSO NOT THE FIRST REGIME TO HAVE DISCOVERED THAT ONE EFFECTIVE WAY OF DEALING WITH POLITICAL OPPOSITION IS TO EXTINGUISH IT. ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH WE CANNOT ASSESS PRECISELY IS THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY BE DIRECTED FROM SYRIA. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS NOT FAR FETCHED TO CONCEIVE OF A SOVIET ROLE IN PROMOTING INSURGENT ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE KURDS AGAINST TURKEY OR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES INVOLVING OTHER GROUPS AGAINST EUROPEAN TARGETS. (THE SOVIETS HERE STOUTLY MAINTAIN THEIR OPPOSITION TO, AND NON-INVOLVEMENT IN, ANY SUCH ACTIVITIES.) 7. SYRIA DOES NOT LABEL THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ISRAELI ENEMY AS \"TERRORISM.\" INDEED, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS WITH MOST AVERAGE SYRIANS THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAEL; IT IS CONSIDERED AN OXYMORON, I.E., IF AMERICANS FOUGHT TO LIBERATE THEIR LAND FROM BRITISH OCCUPIERS, THEN LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS ARE ALSO FREEDOM FIGHTERS, NOT TERRORISTS. MOREOVER, SYRIA DEFINES THE \"NATIONAL RESISTANCE\" BROADLY, SO THAT MODERATE ARABS BECOME LEGITIMATE TARGETS. BUT THE OBJNCTIVES ARE ALWAYS THE SAME--UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE ARABS ARE UNITED AND STRONG, SYRIA MUST WEAKEN THE ENEMY, DISCOURAGE INDEPENDENT ARAB INITIATIVES, AND BLOCK A MODERATE CONSENSUS. 8. THE TOOLS ARE AVAILABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS NO SHORTAGE OF DISAFFECTED, RADICAL PALESTINIANS WHO ARE PREPARED TO ACT NOT ONLY AGAINST THE ISRAELIS BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, AGAINST THE JORDANIANS AND MODERATE PALESTINIANS. THERE ARE WILLING RECRUITS HERE AND ELSEWHERE FOR MANY OF THE ACTIONS WHICH COMMONLY ARE LABELED SYRIAN-SPONSORED BUT WHICH IN FACT ARE CONDUCTED WITHOUT EXPLICIT SYRIAN APPROVAL. SINCE SYRIA DOES NOT GENERALLY OBJECT TO TARGETTING A COMMON FOE, IT MIGHT, THEREFORE, BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO CALL THESE TERRORIST ACTIONS SYRIAN-TOLERATED. --------- TARGETS --------- 9. ALMOST ANY TARGET IS \"LEGITIMATE.\" HOWEVER, THE PROBABILITY OF A TERRORIST ACT, AS WELL AS ITS LINKAGE TO SYRIA, RISES WITH THE DEGREE OF THE TARGET\'S ASSOCIATION WITH ISRAEL OR A PEACE PROCESS THAT DOES NOT HAVE SYRIAN APPROVAL. THUS, SYRIA PROBABLY AT WORST TOLERATES AND AT BEST IS NOT ABLE TO CONTROL TERRORISM SUCH AS THAT BY ARMENIANS OR KURDS AGAINST TURKS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT COOPERATES ACTIVELY IN TERRORISM DIRECTED AGAINST JORDAN, WHEN THE PEACE PROCESS SHOWS LIFE. SOMETIMES SYRIA\'S HAND IS QUITE DIRECT, AS IN THE CASES OF ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATIONS OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FIGURES ABROAD AND IN ATTACKS AGAINST IRAQI CITIZENS AND FACILITIES. MORE OFTEN, \"FRIENDS\" DO THE DIRTY WORK. THUS, THE CRAZY-QUILT OF PALESTINIAN GROUPS IN DAMASCUS ALL OCCASIONALLY GET THEIR CHANCE AT THE JORDANIANS, FATAH, OR THE ISRAELIS. -------------- RETALIATION -------------- 10. SINCE THE IDEA OF RETALIATION FOR A TERRORIST ACT HAS OCCURRED TO ALL AT SOME POINT, IT IS WORTH CONSIDER- ING IN THE CASE OF SYRIA. OBVIOUSLY, THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY IS IN ESTABLISHING SYRIAN COMPLICITY. THAT ASIDE, RETALIATION WOULD MEET HERE WITH A CONTRADICTORY RANGE OF EMOTIONS: IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN TYPICALLY MIDDLE EAST FASHION, BUT IT WOULD NOT DETER, BECAUSE FOR THOSE WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE TERRORIST ACTIONS THI CAUSE AND THEIR DEDICATION TO IT ARE PARAMOUNT. MORE- OVER, FAILURE OF A RETALIATORY ACTION COULD BE DISASTROUS. U.S. POLICY WOULD HAVE TO BE PERCEIVED TO BE DIRECT, ACCURATE, AND EFFECTIVE. (THE IMAGE OF U.S. ABILITY TO RESPOND IS THREATENED BY OUR PRESUMED ASSOCIA- TION WITH EVENTS SUCH AS THE BIR AL-ABID CAR BOMBING IN WEST BEIRUT, NOT TO MENTION THE DECEMBER 1983 AIR STRIKE IN THE BIQA\' WHICH RESULTED IN CAPTURE OF A U.S. FLYER.) FINALLY, RETALIATION IS A FAVORITE ISRAELI POLICY WHICH MOST TERRORIST ANALYSTS ACKNOWLEDGE HAS NEVER WORKED. THE U.S. COULD END UP ADDING TO THE PROBLEM BY FURTHER ALIENATING ARAB OPINION. 11. WE HAVE NOT TOUCHED UPON THE QUESTION OF PREEMPTION BECAUSE IN OUR VIEW, GIVEN SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, PREEMPTION WOULD SEEM TO BE LOGICAL AND NECESSARY IF IT IS POSSIBLE. 12. FINALLY, IRANIAN- AND LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM, WHICH TAINTS SYRIA BY ASSOCIATION, IS NOT NECESSARILY APPROVED OR EVEN CONDONED BY SYRIA. A GOOD EXAMPLE IS HOSTAGE-TAKING IN LEBANON. THERE IS LITTLE SYRIA CAN DO TO PREVENT SUCH ACTIONS WITHOUT PAYING A HIGH PRICE IN OTHER NATIONAL INTERESTS. SYRIA COULD DO MUCH MORE, WE BELIEVE, TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF HOSTAGES AFTER THEY ARE TAKEN, BUT PREVENTION OF INDIVIDUAL TERRORIST ACTS SUCH AS THOSE OCCURRING NOW IN BEIRUT, IS PROBABLY NOT POSSIBLE FOR SYRIA. 13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GLASPIE " "70","6/14/1985 10:06","85BEIRUT3493","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 141006Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3506 AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ROME NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TUNIS NIACT IMMEDIATE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 03493 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, EAIR, LE, US SUBJECT: HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 847: SITUATION AS OF 0945 ZULU REFS: MCDONALD/OPSCENTER TACSAT TELCONS 6/14/85 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. AT 1153 LOCAL (0853 Z), HIJACKED TWA FLIGHT 847 FROM ATHENS TO ROME LANDED AT BEIRUT AIRPORT. HIJACKERS THREATENED TO KILL AN AMCIT CURRENTLY BEING HELD IN COCKPIT IF AIRCRAFT DID NOT RECEIVE 40,000 LB OF FUEL. MONITORED COCKPIT/TOWER RADIO CONVERSATIONS INDICATE THAT HIJACKERS ARE BEATING PASSENGERS AND PILOT. ACCORDING TO VOICE OF LEBANON RADIO, A PSP OFFICIAL IS REPORTEDLY AT AIRPORT TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIJACKERS. AT 0910 ZULU, AIRCRAFT APPROACHED TERMINAL BUILDING; PLANE THEN MOVED TO FUEL HYRDRANT AND, ACCORDING TO ASSISTANT AIRPORT MANAGER, REFUELING BEGAN AT 0912 Z. 3. ACCORDING TO \"VOICE OF LEBANON\" RADIO AND MFA, THE HIJACKERS BELONG TO THE \"MUSA SADR (EL-HUSAYN) SUICIDE BRIGADE.\" THIS IS THE SAME SHIA GROUP THAT CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ALIA HIJACKING JUNE 11-12. THEY ARE SAID TO BE THREE IN NUMBER AND TO BE ARMED WITH THREE MACHINE GUNS AND FIVE HAND GRENADES. AT LEAST ONE OF THE HIJACKERS REPORTEDLY SPEAKS WITH A LEBANESE ACCENT CHARACTERISTIC OF THE BIQA\' VALLEY. 4. EMBASSY HAS ESTABLISHED VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE AIRCRAFT FROM THE AMBASSADOR\'S RESIDENCE IN YARZE. EMBASSY IS ALSO MONITORING AIRCRAFT/CONTROL TOWER COMMUNICATIONS. 5. MFA INFORMED US BEFORE PLANE TOUCHED DOWN THAT GOL (PRIME MINISTER KARAMI AND INTERIOR MINISTER SKAFF) HAD TAKEN DECISION NOT TO ALLOW THE PLANE TO LAND. WE OBSERVED, HOWEVER, NO ATTEMPTS TO BLOCK THE RUNWAY. NEITHER THE GOL NOR THE AIRPORT AUTHORITIES HAVE CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT. DE FACTO CONTROL LIES IN THE HANDS OF THE PSP, AMAL, AND OTHER MILITIAS PRESENT AT THE AIRPORT. WHILE AIRBORNE, ONE OF THE HIJACKERS REPORTEDLY PULLED THE PIN FROM A GRENADE, AND THE PILOT SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO FORCE A LANDING WITH OR WITHOUT GOL PERMISSION. TRANSPORATION MINISTER JUMBLATT REPORTEDLY ORDERED THAT THE PLANE BE ALLOWED TO LAND WHEN HE LEARNED IT WAS SHORT OF FUEL. 6. THE HIJACKERS HAVE NOT MADE KNOWN ANY DEMANDS OTHER THAN TO REQUEST FUEL. 7. AMBASSADOR IS URGENTLY ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT AMAL AND PSP LEADERS AND MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES OFFICIALS IN AN ATTEMPT TO HALT THE BEATING AND TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE PASSENGERS SHOULD THEY BE DEPLANED HERE. WE DO NOT WANT THE AMCIT PASSENGERS TO BE REMOVED FROM THE AIRPORT FOR ANOTHER LOCATION IN WEST BEIRUT, BUT RATHER PLACED ON THE NEXT AVAILABLE OUTBOUND FLIGHT. BARTHOLOMEW " "71","6/14/1985 10:30","85BEIRUT3494","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","85BEIRUT3493","O 141030Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS FLASH SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3507 AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATEPROI AMEMBASSY ROME NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TUNIS NIACT IMMEDIATE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 03494 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, EAIR, LE, US SUBJECT: HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 847: SITUATION AS OF 1030ZULU REF: BEIRUT 3493 (NOTAL) 1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. HIJACKED TWA FLIGHT 847 DEPARTED BEIRUT, DESTINATION ALGIERS. WHEELS UP 1031ZULU. 3. AVAILABLE DETAILS TO FOLLOW. BARTHOLOMEW " "72","6/14/1985 10:43","85BEIRUT3495","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","85BEIRUT3494","O 141043Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS FLASH SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3508 AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ROME NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TUNIS NIACT IMMEDIATE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 03495 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, EAIR, LE, US, AG SUBJECT: HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 847: SITREP AS OF 1045ZULU REF: BEIRUT 3494 1. C-ENTIRE TEXT. 2. PILOT OF HIJACKED AIRCRAFT REPORTED VIA RADIO THAT HIS ETA ALGIERS IS 1437ZULU. 3. TWENTY-FIVE (25) WOMEN AND CHILDREN REPORTEDLY RELEASED IN BEIRUT, NATIONALITY UNKNOWN. DETAILS TO FOLLOW. BARTHOLOMEW " "73","6/17/1985 22:13","85STATE184826","Secretary of State","UNCLASSIFIED","","O 172213Z JUN 85 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS AMEMBASSY COLOMBO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN AMEMBASSY DHAKA AMCONSUL DHAHRAN AMCONSUL KARACHI AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY LISBON AMEMBASSY MADRID AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE USMISSION USUN NEW YORK ","UNCLAS STATE 184826 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INFORM CONSULS, PASS PAO\'S, CENTCOM FOR POLAD LOWRIE E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: OPRC, PTER, LE SUBJECT: BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON TWA HIJACKING MONDAY, JUNE 17, 1985, 1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON TWA HIJACKING ON JUNE 17 GIVEN BY ROBERT OAKLEY: BEGIN TEXT: SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: I\'M GOING TO HAVE TO BE VERY, VERY BRIEF BECAUSE WE HAVE IMPORTANT THINGS TO DO, AND I\'VE GOT SOME OTHER MEETINGS TO GO TO. AND, OBVIOUSLY, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO GET THESE PEOPLE LOOSE, WHICH ALSO WILL HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT HOW MUCH I CAN RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS. LET ME OPEN BY REPEATING THE STATEMENT WHICH YOU ALL HAVE HEARD FREQUENTLY, INCLUDING FROM LARRY SPEAKES THIS MORNING: WE DO NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS TO TERRORISTS. WE DO NOT ASK OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO DO SO -- ISRAEL, KUWAIT, WHOEVER THEY MAY BE. WE ARE CONTINUING OUR INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF ALL THE PASSENGERS TAKEN HOSTAGE IN LAST FRIDAY\'S HIJACKING. WE\'RE GRATEFUL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ALGERIA FOR THEIR EXTENSIVE EFFORTS WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN THE RELEASE OF 87 OF THE HOSTAGES. DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD YESTERDAY AND RESUMED THIS MORNING BETWEEN THE HIJACKERS AND LEBANESE JUSTICE MINISTER NABIH BERRI, WHO IS ALSO THE HEAD OF THE SHI\'A AMAL GROUP. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BUD MCFARLANE HAS BEEN IN TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH MINISTER BERRI. OUR AMBASSADOR TO BEIRUT, REG BARTHOLOMEW, HAS ALSO BEEN IN FREQUENT TOUCH WITH MINISTER BARRI, AND OTHER RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE INFLUENCE. THE PURPOSE OF THESE CONTACTS IS TO OBTAIN THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ALL THE REMAINING PRISONERS; THOSE WHO WERE TAKEN OFF THE PLANE EARLIER, THOSE WHO APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN OFF THE PLANE LAST NIGHT, ALL THE REMAINING PRISONERS WHO HAVEN\'T ALREADY BEEN RELEASED WHO WERE ON THAT PLANE WHEN IT WAS HIJACKED. WE\'VE ALSO BEEN IN CONTACT WITH A VARIETY OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE IN SECURING THE SAFE RELEASE OF ALL THE HOSTAGES. WE HOPE THIS TRAGIC SITUATION WILL BE RESOLVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BY THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. ITS CONTINUATION DOES NO ONE ANY GOOD. THE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF THIS ACT OF TERRORISM ARE SUFFERING NEEDLESSLY AS ARE THEIR FAMILIES. THE HIJACKERS ARE NOT GETTING SYMPATHY FOR THEIR DEMANDS. INDEED, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE HIJACKING, AND THE WAY IN WHICH THEY HAVE LINKED THE RELEASE OF THE FORMER ANSAR PRISONERS, MAY DELAY THE PREVIOUSLY PLANNED RELEASE OF THESE PRISONERS, AS STATED BY ISRAEL. WELL, THAT\'S MY STATEMENT. I\'LL BE HAPPY TO TRY TO ANSWER SOME QUESTIONS. Q. HOW MANY HOSTAGES ARE THERE NOW, INCLUDING THE CREW, AND DO YOU KNOW WHERE THEY ARE? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: WE DO NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHERE THEY ARE. I\'LL HAVE TO GET YOU THE PRECISE FIGURE ON THE NUMBER OF HOSTAGES. Q. YOU\'VE MENTIONED ONE THING -- THE PRISONERS THAT WERE TAKEN OFF THE PLANE FRIDAY, AND THOSE, YOU SAID, APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN OFF TODAY. DO WE NOT KNOW FOR SURE THAT THEY ARE IN NABIH BERRI\'S -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: WE THINK THAT THEY HAVE BEEN TAKEN OFF THE PLANE. WE HAVE NO INDEPE DENT CONFIRMATION, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IS TRUE. THERE\'S BEEN NO ACTIVITY ON BOARD THE PLANE, AND WE THINK THEY\'RE OFF. WE CAN\'T SAY FOR SURE THAT THEY\'RE ALL OFF. I\'LL JUST SAY IT\'S A QUESTION OF NOT HAVING INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION. WE BELIEVE THEY\'RE OFF. Q. WHAT DOES BERRI TELL YOU ABOUT THAT, BECAUSE THEY\'RE SUPPOSED TO BE UNDER HIS CONTROL, ARE THEY NOT? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: BARRY SAYS THEY\'RE UNDER HIS CONTROL. Q. IF THEY ARE, HOW DOES THIS COMPLICATE THINGS? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: EXCUSE ME? Q. IF THEY ARE OFF THE PLANE, IF ALL THE PRISONERS OR ALL THE HOSTAGES ARE OFF THE PLANE, FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, HOW DOES THIS COMPLICATE THINGS OR DOES IT COMPLICATE THINGS? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THE QUESTION IS NOT SO MUCH WHERE THEY ARE. THE QUESTION IS, ARE THEY GOING TO BE RELEASED? IF BERRI HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM, THIS IS FINE. IT\'S NICE TO SEE SOMEONE IN A POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY STEP FORWARD AND ACCEPT IT. OUR POSITION IS, THAT BEING THE CASE THE PRISONERS -- THE HOSTAGES SHOULD BE RELEASED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE; NOT BEING HELD UP FOR SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATION, CONCESSIONS, TRADE OR HAGGLING. Q. IS IT YOUR INFORMATION THAT BERRI KNEW ABOUT THIS OPERATION BEFORE IT STARTED, OR WAS HE PART OF THE PLANNING OF IT? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THOSE OF WHO HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THIS THING, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF YOU WHO HAVE BEEN OUT TO BEIRUT AT ONE TIME OR OTHER, KNOW JUST HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO SAY WHO KNEW WHAT, WHEN, I JUST CAN\'T ANSWER THAT QUESTION. Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE ONES WHO WERE TAKEN OFF THE PLANE IN ITS SECOND STOP IN BEIRUT AND THOSE WHO APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN OFF LAST NIGHT ARE NOW TOGETHER? DO YOU HAVE ANY INDICATION FROM BERRI THAT THEY\'VE BEEN REUNITED? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: WE DON\'T KNOW EXCEPT BERRI\'S STATEMENT, THAT HE IS ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OF THEM. WHETHER THEY\'RE ALL PHYSICALLY TOGETHER OR NOT, I COULDN\'T TELL YOU. Q. WHAT ABOUT THE ONES THAT WERE THERE PREVIOUSLY, THE NINE OR - SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THERE\'S NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN PUT TOGETHER WITH THE PEOPLE WHO WERE ON THE TWA FLIGHT. SO FAR THE - THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION OF THE DAWA PRISONERS IN KUWAIT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PEOPLE WHO WERE ON THE TWA FLIGHT. Q. WHEN THE ISRAELIS TRANSFERRED THOSE DETAINEES, THE LEBANESE SHI\'ITES, TO ISRAEL, WE INFORMED THEM THAT THEY WERE IN VIOLATION, I THINK, OF INTERNATIONAL LAW -- I THINK THE FOURTH GENEVA PROTOCOL. WHAT WOULD BE SO WRONG WITH JUST REMINDING THEM AGAIN THAT THEY ARE HOLDING THOSE DETAINEES IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: OUR POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED. THAT THEY WERE TRANSFERRED FROM ISRAEL TO LEBANON. IT WAS SOMETHING THAT WE OPPOSED AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY REASON TO LINK THESE TWO QUESTIONS. INDEED, WE OPPOSE SUCH LINKAGE. AND, AS I\'VE SAID, THE PRACTICAL EFFECT IS GOING TO BE, WE THINK, TO DELAY THE RELEASE WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD PREVIOUSLY PLANNED. Q. IF WE WON\'T ASK THE ISRAELIS TO LET THEM GO, AND THE ISRAELIS WON\'T LET THEM GO UNTIL WE ASK THEM TO DO IT, DON\'T THE HOSTAGES SUFFER IN THE MEANTIME WHILE WE TRY AND WORK OUT A FACE-SAVING COMPROMISE BETWEEN THESE TWO POSITIONS? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: WELL, OUR POSITION, AS I SAID, IS QUITE CLEAR AND WE\'RE NOT CHANGING IT. Q. TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ARE THE PEOPLE -- Q. HAD WE KNOWN BEFORE THE HIJACKING THAT THE ISRAELIS PLANNED TO RELEASE THESE SHI\'ITE PRISONERS? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THE ISRAELIS HAVE CONSISTENTLY SAID THAT THEY INTENDED TO RELEASE THESE FORMER PRISONERS OF THE ANSAR CAMP OVER TIME, AS THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IMPROVES. Q. TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ARE ALL THE REMAINING HOSTAGES AMERICAN? AMAL WAS SAYING THERE WERE FOUR GREEK CITIZENS WITH THEM. DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA ON THE NATIONALITY BREAKDOWN? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I\'LL HAVE TO GET THAT FOR YOU. WE DO HAVE THAT INFORMATION SOMEWHERE AND WE CAN GET IT. Q. IN THE COURSE OF YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH BERRI, DOES HE SAY, DOES HE REPEAT THE DEMANDS OF THE HIJACKERS? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: WE\'RE NOT NEGOTIATING WITH BERRI. I BELIEVE THAT HE HAS POINTED OUT THE DEMANDS OF THE HIJACKERS, AT LEAST; WHETHER HE HAS ENDORSED THEM OR NOT, I\'M NOT QUITE SURE. BUT OUR POSITION ON THAT REMAINS VERY CLEAR. Q. WELL IF I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU\'RE SAYING THAT IF BERRI HAS CONTROL OF THESE PEOPLE, THEN IT WOULD BE WITHIN HIS POWER TO RELEASE THEM, RIGHT? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: BERRI - Q. SO IF HE DOES NOT RELEASE THEM, HE IS MAKING DEMANDS UPON THE UNITED STATES, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. COULD YOU CITE WHAT THOSE DEMANDS ARE? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THE ONLY DEMANDS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE, SO FAR AS I KNOW, ARE FOR THE RELEASE OF THE FORMER ANSAR PRISONERS, AND OUR ANSWER IS VERY CLEAR, \"WE DON\'T GIVE IN TO TERRORIST DEMANDS.\" ON THE OTHER HAND, AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT, THERE WAS A TIMETABLE FOR THEIR RELEASE. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE TWO THINGS HAVE BEEN PUT TOGETHER AND THEY SHOULDN\'T BE PUT TOGETHER. THE PRISONERS SHOULD BE RELEASED AT ONCE. Q. TO CLARIFY THAT, ARE YOU SAYING THAT BERRI SPECIFICALLY HAS ASKED FOR THE RELEASE OF THE 766 HIMSELF? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THAT I\'LL HAVE TO CHECK. Q. HAVE YOU ASKED BERRI -- SINCE HE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY -- HAVE YOU ASKED HIM SPECIFICALLY TO PLEASE GET THE PRISONERS RELEASED? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THAT WAS THE THRUST OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MCFARLANE AND BERRI. Q. AND WHAT DID BERRI REPLY TO THAT, SINCE HE SAYS HE HAS RESPONSIBILITY? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I CAN\'T GET INTO THE DETAILS OF THE CONVERSATION, BUT THAT INDEED OBVIOUSLY THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN RELEASED. Q. IS IT CLEAR TO YOU THROUGH TALKS WITH MR. BERRI THAT HE IS TALKING TO YOU IN HIS CAPACITY AS A LEADER OF AMAL, OR IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: SO FAR AS I KNOW, HE HASN\'T MADE THE DISTINCTION. FORTUNATELY, IN TERMS OF ACCEPTING SOME RESPONSIBILITY, HE HAS BOTH POSITIONS, SO HE IS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SHI\'A COMMUNITY. AND LET ME REMIND YOU, THE SHI\'A A COMMUNITY HAS SUFFERED ENORMOUSLY OVER MANY YEARS OF VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT AND DEPRIVATION. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND REFORM AMONG THE LEBANESE COMMUNITIES, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE ALL OF THEM WITH EQUITABLE POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION. SO NABIH BERRI, AS A RESPONSIBLE LEADER OF THE SHI\'A COMMUNITY, HAS OUR APPRECIATION. NABIH BERRI, AS SOMEONE WHO HAS ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE PRISONERS, HAS DONE SOMETHING WE CONSIDER TO BE POSITIVE. BUT NOW WE CALL UPON HIM, AS WE HAVE, TO BRING ABOUT THEIR RELEASE. Q. THE SITUATION, IN LIGHT OF YOUR ANSWERS IN THE LAST FEW QUESTIONS, SEEM TO HAVE CHANGED -- IT\'S NO LONGER A HIJACKING; IT IS A SITUATION IN WHICH A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL IS CLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POSSESSION OR THE CARE-TAKING OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES. HAS THIS CHANGED THE SITUATION IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT\'S VIEW?YOU\'RE NOW DEALING WITH ANOTHER GOVERNMENT THAT HAS CONTROL OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES. IS THIS IN ANY WAY SIMILAR TO THE GOVERNMENT-TO\"GOVERNMENT SITUATION THAT OCCURRED IN IRAN? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THIS GETS BACK TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION, WHICH I COULDN\'T ANSWER, IS THE WAY IN WHICH NABIH BERRI IS SPEAKING AS A LEADER OF THE SHI\'A COMMUNITY OR AS A MEMBER OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT? AND IT\'S A VERY INTERESTING SITUATION. I CAN\'T SPEAK TO WHAT DEGREE HE\'S SPEAKING AS ONE; TO WHAT DEGREE HE\'S SPEAKING AS ANOTHER. BUT YOU ALL UNDERSTAND THE VERY LIMITED CONTROL WHICH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AS AN INSTITUTION, HAS OVER WEST BEIRUT. Q. DO YOU KNOW WHETHER BERRI ACTUALLY DOES HAVE CONTROL OVER THE HOSTAGES? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: NO. Q. IN LIGHT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST 24 HOURS, WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOURSELF AS \"MORE OPTIMISTIC\" OR \"LESS OPTIMISTIC\" ABOUT GETTING THESE HOSTAGES SAFELY RELEASED? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I WOULD DESCRIBE MYSELF AS NEITHER. I HAVEN\'T BEEN MORE OR LESS. AND ALL WE CAN DO IS WORK AT IT WITHOUT MAKING ANY VALUE JUDGMENTS UNTIL THEY\'RE RELEASED. THEN -- Q. THIS CHANGE MEANS NOTHING IN TERMS OF IT BEING MORE LIKELY THAT THESE PEOPLE WILL BE RELEASED SAFELY? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: ONE CAN DEDUCE A WHOLE HOST OF ARGUMENTS POINTING BOTH WAYS, PLUSES AND MINUSES, IF YOU WILL. YOU MIGHT SAY THAT THEY ARE SAFER AT THE MOMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEANS THAT THEIR RELEASE IS MORE LIKELY. Q. WHAT\'S THE DIFFERENCE IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI RELEASE OF A BUNCH OF CONVICTED TERRORISTS AND GANGSTERS A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO AND THIS OPERATION? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THAT\'S SOMETHING YOU\'LL HAVE TO ASK THE ISRAELIS, NOT ME. Q. SIR, CAN I GO BACK TO MY QUESTION ABOUT MR. BERRI\'S CONTROL FOR A MOMENT? Q. SIR, COULD YOU TELL ME IF THE UNITED STATES OPPOSES HAVING ISRAEL RELEASE THESE PRISONERS WHILE AMERICAN HOSTAGES ARE STILL BEING HELD? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: OUR POSITION, I THINK, IS VERY CLEAR. WE DO NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS TO TERRORISTS. WE DO NOT ENCOURAGE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO DO SO. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT PREVIOUSLY HAD A PLAN FOR THE RELEASE OF THE TERRORIST -- NOT OF THE TERRORISTS, BUT OF THE PEOPLE FROM THE FORMER ANSAR CAMP. Q. DOES -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: WHAT IT DOES, WE WILL SEE. Q. DOES THAT MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES OPPOSE HAVING ISRAEL RELEASE THESE PRISONERS WHILE THE HOSTAGES ARE -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: NO. I DIDN\'T SAY THAT. I JUST REPEATED OUR POSITION. Q. COULD YOU SAY IF THE UNITED STATES DOES OPPOSE IT, SIR? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: OUR POSITION IS VERY CLEAR. WE DO NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS WITH TERRORISTS. WE DON\'T ENCOURAGE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO DO SO. Q. BUT IF THE ISRAELIS WERE INDEPENDENTLY TO DECIDE NOW TO RELEASE THOSE HOSTAGES, WOULD YOU OPPOSE THAT? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: IF THEY WERE TO INDEPENDENTLY DECIDE TO DO SO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR PLAN PREVIOUSLY, IT WOULD PRODUCE PERHAPS A DIFFERENT SITUATION, IF IT WERE NOT LINKED TO THE QUESTION OF THE TERRORISTS. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE HIJACKERS SHOULD DROP THEIR DEMANDS FOR -- WHICH INCLUDE THE LINKAGE HERE. Q. HAVE WE TOLD BERRI THAT THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION IS TO DELAY THE RETURN OF THE PRISONERS IN ISRAEL? DID WE ACTUALLY TELL HIM THAT? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: IF YOU LISTENED TO THE (SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL) BACKGROUNDER THIS MORNING, HE TALKS ABOUT THAT. HE SAYS THAT IF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION WERE TO BE CLEARED UP, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ISRAELIS TO PROCEED ON THEIR PREVIOUSLY PLANNED RELEASE OF THE LEBANESE PRISONERS. Q. BUT DID WE TELL BERRI THIS? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: (SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL) WAS TALKING ABOUT MCFARLANE\'S CONVERSATION WITH BERRI. Q. YOU, A FEW MINUTES AGO, TALKED ABOUT THE PLUSES AND MINUSES OF THE NEW SITUATION. DOESN\'T THE FACT THAT THEY\'RE OFF THE PLANE AND SOME PLACE THAT WE DON\'T KNOW WHERE THEY ARE, MEAN THAT THEY COULD BE SUSTAINED FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME, SEPARATED PERHAPS -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: MY COMMENT, I SAID IN SOME WAYS THEY MAY BE SAFER, IN OTHER WAYS IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THEIR RELEASE IS MORE IMMINENT. BUT YOU COULD TURN IT THE OTHER WAY AROUND AND SAY THAT NABIH BERRI AS A RESPONSIBLE LEADER OF THE SHI\'A COMMUNITY AS WELL AS A MINISTER HAS ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY. THEREFORE, IF HE IS WILLING TO EXERCISE THAT RESPONSIBILITY, THIS COULD LEAD TO THEIR EARLY RELEASE RATHER THAN DEALING WITH A BUNCH OF HIJACKERS WHO HAVE NO SUCH PERSON IN A POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY. THAT\'S WHY I SAID YOU GOT PLUSES AND MINUSES. Q. FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE AS A COUNTER-TERRORIST OFFICIAL -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I DON\'T WANT TO GET IN ANY SORT OF VALUE JUDGMENTS. Q. WELL, WHAT IS EFFECTIVELY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BERRI HOLDING AMERICAN PASSENGERS AS HOSTAGES TO CERTAIN POLITICAL DEMANDS AND THE ORIGINAL HIJACKERS HOLDING THE AMERICAN PASSENGERS HOSTAGE -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: OUR POSITION -- Q. -- TO THE SAME DEMAND? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: MARVIN, OUR POSITION IS EXACTLY THE SAME. WE WANT THEM RELEASED AT ONCE, NO CONDITIONS ASKED. Q. YOU ARE AT THE SAME TIME REFERRING TO BERRI AS A RESPONSIBLE SHI\'ITE LEADER. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: YES. Q. HOW RESPONSIBLE IS HE IF HE IS IN FACT, IN EFFECT, PERFORMING THE SAME FUNCTION AS THE ORIGINAL HIJACKERS? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: MARVIN, THAT\'S WHY WE HAVE SAID, IN OUR VIEW RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT MERELY TO KEEP THEM SAFE BUT TO RELEASE THEM AT ONCE. Q. AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE \"- Q. THEN DOES THE PRESIDENT\'S THREAT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES FOR THE UNSAFETY OF THOSE HOLDING THEM STILL HOLD? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THAT\'S A SUBJECT THAT I REALLY CAN\'T COMMENT ON, GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SITUATION WE\'RE IN. Q. HAVE YOU MADE CLEAR TO MR. BERRI THAT WE WANT ALL OF THE HOSTAGES RELEASED, AND WHAT DO YOU MEAN, WITHOUT DISTINCTION BETWEEN OFFICIALS, NON-OFFICIALS, MILITARY, NON-MILITARY, JEW, NON-JEW? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: YES. Q. AND SO THAT INCLUDES THE SIX OR EIGHT THAT WERE TAKEN OFF THE PLANE - SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: INDEED. Q. - FRIDAY NIGHT. IT DOES NOT - Q. MR. -- Q. BUT JUST TO UNDERSTAND YOU CORRECTLY, IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE SEVEN AMERICANS WHO ARE -- STILL REMAIN HOSTAGE IN SOME OTHER PART OF LEBANON? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: BERRI HAS CLAIMED NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BERRI, WITH ALL OF THE RESPONSIBLE OR INFLUENTIAL, IF YOU WANT TO PUT IT THAT WAY, LEADERS IN LEBANON ON THE SUBJECT OF THE OTHER HOSTAGES OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. BUT THAT IS SEPARATE FROM THIS, ALTHOUGH HE IS ONE OF THE PEOPLE THAT WE\'VE TALKED TO ABOUT THIS ABOUT THE OTHER PROBLEM. Q. WHAT ROLE SYRIA PLAYS SINCE THEY ARE KNOWN FOR THEIR GOOD RELATIONS WITH NABIH BERRI? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I DON\'T WANT TO COMMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYRIA AND NABIH BERRI -- Q. HAVE YOU BEEN ABLE TO -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- EXCEPT THAT WE THINK, REFERRING TO PRESIDENT ASSAD\'S STATEMENT, PUBLIC STATEMENT OF LAST WEEK, HE HAS TALKED ABOUT HIS VIEWS ON THE HOSTAGES, ON THE WHOLE IDEA OF HOSTAGE-TAKING AND KIDNAPPING AND TERRORISM, WHERE HE SAYS HE OPPOSES IT. MR. DJEREJIAN: WE\'RE GOING TO TAKE TWO MORE QUESTIONS. Q. HAVE YOU BEEN ABLE TO PRECISELY DEFINE THE AFFILIATION OF THE HIJACKERS? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: NO. Q. JUST A MINOR CLARIFICATION: DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT BERRI HAS INFLUENCE OVER THE SIX TO TEN PEOPLE THAT WERE INITIALLY REMOVED OFF THE PLANE? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: BERRI HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OF THEM. THEREFORE, WE DO BELIEVE THAT BERRI HAS INFLUENCE. CONTROL, INFLUENCE. THE DEGREE OF CONTROL, THE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE, IS SOMETHING THAT\'S VERY HARD TO SAY. Q. HOW MUCH BERRI HAS INFLUENCE ON THE HIJACKERS? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: EXCUSE ME? Q. HOW MUCH BERRI HAS INFLUENCE ON THE HIJACKERS? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: THAT\'S WHAT I SAID. HOW MUCH IS HARD TO TELL. END TEXT. SHULTZ " "74","6/24/1985 11:32","85DUBLIN2469","Embassy Dublin","UNCLASSIFIED","","O 241132Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3998 INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY AMCONSUL MONTREAL PRIORITY AMCONSUL BOMBAY PRIORITY AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY DEPTRANS WASHDC PRIORITY ","UNCLAS DUBLIN 02469 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: EAIR, ICAO, CA, EI, IN, VI SUBJECT: BOEING 747 CRASH OFF IRISH COAST 1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON JUNE 23, AT 0813 A BOEING 747 JET (AIR INDIA 182) ENROUTE FROM MONTREAL TO BOMBAY WITH 325 PASSENGERS AND CREW ON BOARD CRASHED SOME 80 MILES OFF THE IRISH COAST. THERE ARE NO KNOWN SURVIVORS. RECOVERY OPERATIONS CONTINUE. END SUMMARY. 2. ON JUNE 24 THE IRISH DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SENT THE FOLLOWING NOTICE TO THE U.S. EMBASSY. QUOTE: THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REGRETS TO HAVE TO INFORM THE EMBASSY AS FOLLOWS: A BOEING 747 AIRCRAFT OF AIR INDIA, COUNTRY OF MANU- FACTURE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WAS LOST ON 23 JUNE 1985 AT 0713 HOURS GMT (UTC), AT 51 DEGREES N 12.05 DEGREES W. THE AIRCRAFT WAS FLIGHT AI 182 FROM MONTREAL TO LONDON. THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE (325) PERSONS WERE ABOARD. THE REGISTRATION NUMBER WAS VTEFO. BODIES AND RECOVERAGE HAVE BEEN OBSERVED. AS OF THE PRESENT TIME, 1900 HOURS, 23 JUNE, APPROXIMATELY 60 BODIES HAVE BEEN RECOVERED AND ARE BEING LANDED IN IRELAND AT CORK. NO SURVIVORS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED. THE PRESENT NOTE IS SENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ICAO, AND IS BASED ON CURRENT INFORMATION. UNQUOTE. 3. MEDIA REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE BOEING 747 (AIR INDIA 182) FLYING FROM MONTREAL TO NEW DELHI AND BOMBAY WITH A PLANNED REFUELING STOP AT LONDON\'S HEATHROW AIRPORT, AT 0800 HOURS ON JUNE 23 ENTERED THE SHANNON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AREA. AT 0813 THE PLANE DISAPPEARED FROM THE RADAR SCREEN. AIR INDIA 182 CRASHED INTO THE ATLANTIC APPROXIMATELY 80 MILES SOUTHWEST OF THE KERRY COAST. TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT OF THESE WERE CANADIAN CITIZENS AND THE REMAINDER WERE PRESUMABLY INDIAN CITIZENS. (WE HAVE CHECKED WITH DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WHICH HAS A MANIFEST OF THE PASSENGERS ON BOARD AI 182, AND BOTH INDICATE THAT NO US CITIZENS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN ON BOARD THE CRAFT). 4. THERE HAD BEEN NO INDICATION OF CONCERN FROM THE AIRCRAFT PRIOR TO ITS DISAPPEARANCE FROM THE RADAR SCREEN. THE PLANE\'S WREAKAGE WAS SPREAD OVER A FOUR TO FIVE MILE AREA. FOLLOWING THE CRASH THE SHANNON MARINE RESCUE CENTER INITIATED AN INTERNATIONAL RESCUE MISSION IN COOPERATION WITH THE IRISH AIR CORPS, RAF, AND US ARMY ELEMENTS. THESE RESCUE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT JUNE 23 UNTIL 11:00 P.M. AT NIGHT RECOVERING BODIES. AS OF MONDAY, JUNE 24, SOME 70 BODIES HAD BEEN RECOVERED AND TRANSPORTED TO TEMPORARY MORTUARY FACILITIES IN THE CORK AREA. 5. IRISH AND INDIAN AIR SAFETY OFFICIALS ARE NOW INVESTI- GATING THE AIRCRAFT DISASTER WITH MOST EXPERTS ALLEGING A BOMB AS THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE. BOYLE " "75","6/24/1985 18:38","85OTTAWA4824","Embassy Ottawa","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 241838Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3173 INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY DUBLIN AMEMBASSY TOKYO ","C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 04824 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, EI, IN SUBJECT: AIRLINE BOMBINGS 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. AMBASSADOR ROBINSON OPENED HIS CALL TODAY ON DR. FRED DOUCET, SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR FOR THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER, WITH AN EXPRESSION OF U.S. SYMPATHY AND CONCERN OVER THE TRAGIC AIRLINE INCIDENTS THIS PAST WEEKEND. (THE AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON OTHER SUBJECTS TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.) REPORTS ON THE EXPLOSION OF THE AIR INDIA BOEING 747 OFF THE COAST OF IRELAND, THE GREATEST LOSS OF CANADIAN LIVES IN COMMERCIAL FLYING HISTORY, AND THE EXPLOSION OF A BOMB HIDDEN IN THE LUGGAGE OF A CP AIR FLIGHT TO TOKYO, DOMINATE TODAY\'S CANADIAN PRESS. - 3. DR. DOUCET EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE AMBASSADOR\' STATEMENT OF CONCERN IN BEHALF OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HE MADE THREE POINTS IN RESPONSE. FIRST, HE SAID THAT \"THE TARGETS FOR THE BOMBINGS WERE NOT CLEAR AND CLEAN,\" GIVEN THE VARIED BACKGROUND OF THE PASSENGERS. THE GOC CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY SIKH TERRORISTS, IF THEY ARE IN FACT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INCIDENTS, WOULD HAVE CHOSEN THIS UNTARGETTED MEANS TO MAKE A POLITICAL POINT. SECOND, DOUCET SAID THAT \"SOMETHING MUST HAVE BEEN ORCHESTRATED\" SINCE IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT TWO SUCH INCIDENTS COULD TAKE PLACE BY COINCIDENCE WITHIN TWELVE HOURS. THIRD, HE SAID THAT ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE DOES POINT TO USE OF A BOMB ON AIR INDIA 182. - 4. WHEN ASKED BY THE ECONOMIC MINISTER-COUNSELOR WHAT TH GOC PLANS TO DO IN FOLLOWING UP ON THESE APPARENT TERRORIST ACTS, DR. DOUCET SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD PROBABLY CONVENE A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE CANADIAN CABINET FOR LATER TODAY. (THE PRIME MINISTER IS NOW AT HIS SUMMER RESIDENCE ABOUT 20 MINUTES OUTSIDE OTTAWA.) ACCORDING TO DOUCET, PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY WILL PROBABLY USE THAT CABINET MEETING TO REVIEW THE EVENTS OF THE WEEKEND AND OPTIONS FOR ACTION. HE SAID THAT MULRONEY MIGHT ISSUE A STRONG STATEMENT, INDICATING THAT, AS DOUCET PUT IT, \"CANADA WILL NOT TAKE THIS KIND OF ATTACK SITTING DOWN\" AND THAT THE GOC WILL TAKE STERN ACTION. WHAT ACTION, DOUCET DID NOT AND COULD NOT INDICATE. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD SEEK TO REASSURE THE CANADIAN PUBLIC THAT THE GOC HAS TIGHTENED AIRPORT SECURITY AND THAT CANADIANS SHOULD MAINTAIN THEIR TRAVEL PLANS. - 5. DR. DOUCET CALLED THE ECONOMIC MINISTER-COUNSELOR SUBSEQUENTLY EARLY AFTERNOON, JUNE 24, TO CONFIRM THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL INDEED MEET WITH KEY MINISTERS TODAY AT 3 P.M. AND MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT AT 4 P.M. HE ADDED THAT PRECISE INFORMATION ON THE CAUSE OF THE APPARENT EXPLOSION ABOARD AIR INDIA 182 REMAINS SKETCHY, BUT THAT THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FATE OF THAT AIRLINE AND THE BOMB EXPLODED AT TOKYO\'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. ROBINSON " "76","6/27/1985 2:06","85STATE196513","Secretary of State","SECRET","","O 270206Z JUN 85 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LONDONIMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE ","S E C R E T STATE 196513 TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER SUBJECT: IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT. 2. THE FOLLOWING SIRO ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM IS BEING SENT AS A PART OF A PACKAGE OF INTELLIGENCE TO REINFORCE THE VICE PRESIDENT\'S PRESENTATION ON TERRORISM DURING HIS TALKS WITH HOST COUNTRIES. OTHER ANALYSES DEAL WITH LIBYA AND BEIRUT AND WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPTEL. ADDRESSEE MISSIONS AND SIRO SHOULD COORDINATE BEST MEANS TO COMMUNICATE CONTENTS OF THESE STUDIES TO RESPONSIBLE, INTERESTED AGENCIES OF HOST GOVERNMENTS AT APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL. REACTIONS SHOULD BE REPORTED IN TERREP EXCLUSIVE CHANNELS AS WELL AS OTHERS. 3. QUOTE: UPDATE ON IRANIAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM: 23 JUNE 1985. IRANIAN-BACKED TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ALMOST 30 ATTACKS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1984. IRAQ, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO BE THE PRIMARY TARGETS. WHILE MOST OF THE RECENT INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO IRANIAN-BACKED GROUPS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT IRANIAN OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY IS CONTINUING IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. . IRAQ HAS SUFFERED SEVEN OR EIGHT TERRORIST ATTACKS AT THE HANDS OF IRANIAN-SPONSORED GROUPS, INCLUDING THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF FOUR IRAQI DIPLOMATS\' CARS IN ATHENS LAST DECEMBER. A GREEK BOMB DISPOSAL EXPERT WAS KILLED IN ONE OF THESE INCIDENTS. . THERE WERE ALSO THREE OR FOUR ATTACKS INSIDE IRAQ, INCLUDING TWO BOMBINGS IN PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN\'S HOMETOWN OF TIKRIT. . IRAN TRAINS AND FINANCES SEVERAL IRAQI DISSIDENT GROUPS, SUCH AS THE ISLAMIC ACTION ORGANIZATION THAT CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE BOMBINGS IN ATHENS, THAT ARE DEDICATED TO OVERTHROWING IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN. IF IRAN SUFFERS FURTHER SETBACKS IN ITS WAR WITH IRAQ, TEHRAN MAY ACCELERATE ITS EFFORT TO HIT IRAQI TARGETS WHEREVER THEY ARE VULNERABLE. 4. THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE HAVE BEEN THE MAIN FOCUS OF IRANIAN-SPONSORED TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN LEBANON. OVER THE PAST 10 MONTHS, THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT PRO-IRANIAN SHI\'AS IN LEBANON HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR AT LEAST 19 INCIDENTS, INCLUDING EIGHT ATTACKS AGAINST US AND SIX AGAINST FRENCH TARGETS: . THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO REMOVE ANY REASONABLE DOUBTS OF IRANIAN COLLUSION WITH LEBANESE SHI\'A TERRORISTS WHO CARRIED OUT THE BOMB ATTACKS ON THE US MARINE BARRACKS, THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND THE FRENCH MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN BEIRUT IN L983. THE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE TERRORISTS AND IRAN ARE THE SHAYKH ABDALLAH BARRACKS IN THE BAQA\' VALLEY, CONTROLLED BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD, AND THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS, PARTICULARLY AMBASSADOR MUTASHAMIPUR. . ISLAMIC JIHAD CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR KIDNAPPING FOUR PRIVATE US CITIZENS, AND PRO-IRANIAN SHIAS ALMOST CERTAINLY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR ABDUCTING ANOTHER AMERICAN ON 9 JUNE. HIZBALLAH ELEMENTS NOW HOLD SEVEN AMERICANS SOMEWHERE IN LEBANON. . RADICAL SHIA TERRORISTS PROBABLY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF THREE MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH OBSERVER FORCE IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, THE KIDNAPPING OF THREE FRENCH DIPLOMATS IN MARCH--TWO OF WHOM ARE STILL BEING HELD BY THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC JIHAD (HIZBALLAH), TOGETHER WITH THE SEVEN AMERICANS--AND THE ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING OF A FRENCH JOURNALIST IN APRIL. ISLAMIC JIHAD PUBLICLY CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THREE OF THESE INCIDENTS. . RADICAL SHIAS MAY HAVE KIDNAPPED TWO BRITISH CITIZENS IN WEST BEIRUT ON 14 AND 15 MARCH. THE TWO WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED, PERHAPS BECAUSE THEIR CAPTORS REALIZED THEY WERE NOT AMERICAN. A BRITISH PROFESSOR AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN BEIRUT WAS KIDNAPPED IN MAY, PROBABLY BECAUSE HE WAS MISTAKEN FOR AN AMERICAN. HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND DEAD. . THE RADICAL SHIA GROUPS IN LEBANON--FUNDED, SUPPLIED, AND TRAINED BY IRAN--ARE DEDICATED TO BRINGING ABOUT AN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN LEBANON. THEY CONSIDER THE ELIMINATION OF ANY WESTERN, PARTICULARLY AMERICAN, PRESENCE IN LEBANON (SUCH AS THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT AND CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS PRESBYTERIAN MISSIONARIES--AND THE CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICE) TO BE BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD ACHIEVING THEIR GOAL. IN ADDITION, IRAN HAS ENCOURAGED ATTACKS AGAINST FRENCH TARGETS BECAUSE OF FRANCE\'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ. PRO-IRANIAN TERRORISTS CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN WESTERN EUROPE, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN NO ATTACKS OTHER THAN THE FOUR BOMBINGS IN ATHENS SINCE SEPTEMBER. EVIDENCE INDICATES IRAN USES ITS NETWORK OF DIPLOMATIC AND CULTURAL MISSIONS TO SUPPORT THESE TERRORIST OPERATIONS. . LAST NOVEMBER, SEVEN PRO-IRANIAN LEBANESE SHIA WERE ARRESTED IN LADISPOLI, ITALY FOR PLANNING A CAR BOMB ATTACK AGAINST THE US EMBASSY IN ROME. . IN FEBRUARY, TWO IRANIANS WERE CONVICTED IN SPAIN FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN A PLOT TO HIJACK A SAUDI AIRLINER. . IN MARCH, SEVERAL IRANIANS WERE EXPELLED FROM FRANCE FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. . FRAGMENTARY EVIDENCE SUGGESTS IRAN CONTINUES TO TRACK ANTI-KHOMEINI EXILES IN EUROPE. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS COULD OCCUR AT ANY TIME. . THE TWO HIJACKERS OF TWA FLIGHT 847 THAT LEFT ATHENS ON 14 JUNE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF HIZBALLAH, BUT THEIR COMMUNIQUES CLEARLY INDICATED THE INFLUENCE OF IRANIAN PROPAGANDA. HIZBALLAH ELEMENTS IN LEBANON SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK CONTROL OF THE HIJACKING, HOWEVER, AND NOW HOLD INDEPENDENTLY OF AMAL SOME OF THE REMAINING AMERICAN PASSENGERS. THE HIZBALLAH MAY ALSO BE ABLE TO BLOCK ANY DECISION BY AMAL TO RELEASE THE AMERICAN PASSENGERS UNDER THE LATTER\'S CONTROL. THE HIJACKING OF TWA 847 AND THE FATE OF ITS PASSENGERS HAS BECOME ENMESHED IN AN INTERNAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN HIZBALLAH AND AMAL FOR DOMINANT INFLUENCE AMONG THE SHIA COMMUNITY. HIZBALLAH IS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH TEHRAN ON THIS QUESTION. THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STRUGGLE FOR TEHRAN, SYRIA, ISRAEL AND THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST ARE OBVIOUS, AND COULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. IRAN CONTINUES TO TRAIN AND PROVIDE OTHER SUPPORT TO DISSIDENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, ASIA AND AFRICA. TERRORIST ATTACKS COULD BE ENCOURAGED BY IRAN AT ANY TIME. . SHIA DISSIDENTS FROM SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, AND BAHRAIN ARE RECEIVING MILITARY TRAINING IN IRAN AND SOME HAVE RETURNED HOME TO UNDERTAKE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY. RECENT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN BAHRAIN, TWO BOMBINGS CLAIMED BY ISLAMIC JIHAD IN SAUDI ARABIA IN MAY, AND THE SUICIDE CAR BOMB ATTACK ON THE AMIR OF KUWAIT INDICATE AN INCREASING THREAT FROM IRANIAN-TRAINED TERRORISTS AGAINST MODERATE ARAB REGIMES. THIS THREAT COULD IMPACT DIRECTLY UPON THE VITAL INTERESTS OF WESTERN EUROPE, SUCH AS ACCESS TO OIL AND PEACE PROCESS. . IRAN IS INVOLVED IN AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY AMONG MUSLIM POPULATIONS IN COUNTRIES AS DIVERSE AS NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, INDONESIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES. MANY ELEMENTS OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING SEVERAL SENIOR OFFICIALS, ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY. FOR EXAMPLE, DIRECT LINKS BETWEEN TEHRAN AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ABROAD ARE MAINTAINED THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE PASDARAN (REVOLUTIONARY GUARD). SO LONG AS THE CHARACTER OF THE CURRENT REGIME REMAINS THE SAME, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IRAN\'S POLICY OF SPONSORING TERRORISM WILL CHANGE. WE ARE THEREFORE FACING A LONGTERM PROBLEM OF HOW TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF IRANIAN TERRORIST POLICIES, PERSUADE IRAN TO ABANDON THEM, PROTECT MODERATE ARAB REGIMES AND PREVENT TERRORISM FROM SPILLING OVER INTO WESTERN EUROPE. THERE ARE THREE AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY FOR WESTERN ACTION: . FIND WAYS TO MAKE TEHRAN PAY A PRICE FOR ITS CONTINUED SUPPORT OF TERRORISM; . STRENGTHEN THE ABILITY AND WILL OF OTHER STATES TO RESIST IRANIAN TERRORISM; . TRY TO ENCOURAGE SYRIA, AFTER THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, TO EXERT ITSELF MORE FORCEFULLY IN CURTAILING IRANIAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM BASED IN LEBANON. UNLESS RAPID DECISIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION CAN BE TAKEN SO AS TO STEM THE GROWING RADICAL SHIA CANCER, STRONGLY INFLUENCED AND DIRECTED FROM TEHRAN, IT IS LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE A STILL MORE RAPID SPREAD OF RADICALISM INTO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, TOGETHER WITH AN INCREASED SPILLOVER INTO WESTERN EUROPE AND OTHER COUNTRIES. ARMACOST " "77","6/27/1985 10:29","85DAMASCUS4001","Embassy Damascus","CONFIDENTIAL","85DAMASCUS3787\|85DAMASCUS3952","P 271029Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1801 INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY TUNIS USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK DIA WASHINGTON DC ","C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 04001 E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, SY, LY, IR SUBJECT: ASAD CONGRATULATES QADHAFI ON RUPTURE WITH IRAQ REF: A) DAMASCUS 3952, B) DAMASCUS 3787 - 1. (U) THE SYRIAN PRESS CARRIES AS SEPARATE ITEMS JUNE 27 ASAD\'S TELEPHQNE CALL TO QADHAFI ON JUNE 26 AND THE NEWS OF LIBYA\'S APPEAL FOR THE EXPULSION OF IRAQ FROM THE ARAB LEAGUE AND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION. TRIPOLI RADIO (FBIS LD262238) ELUCIDATES THAT, IN HIS CALL, ASAD \"DENOUNCED\" IRAQ\'S SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH LIBYA AND CONFIRMED SYRIA\'S SUPPORT FOR LIBYA. 2. (C) COMMENT: FROM ASAD\'S PERSPECTIVE, QADHAFI HAS COME BACK TO HIS SENSES, AND DONE SO IN AN EVEN BETTER WAY THAN COULD HAVE BEEN HOPED FOR ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO. TURAYKI\'S TRIP TO BAGHDAD, ON THE HEELS OF COMING TO DAMASCUS, MUST HAVE GIVEN THE SYRIANS SOME PAUSE. BUT ANY SYRIAN CONCERN HAS BEEN MORE THAN WASHED AWAY IN A FLOOD OF IRAQI-LIBYAN RECRIMINATIONS. THE RAMADAN WAR OF THE CAMPS, AS THE SYRIANS PORTRAY IT, HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULY CONCLUDED; IN ANY EVENT, QADHAFI IS NO LONGER TALKING ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN PREDICAMENT IN LEBANON IN WAYS THAT COME CLOSE TO ATTACKING SYRIA DIRECTLY. WHILE LEBANON WILL CONTINUE TO BE A PROBLEM FOR SYRIA, LIBYA, AND IRAN, THERE IS EVERY PROSPECT THAT THEY WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO SEE EYE TO EYE ON IRAQ AND THE ARAB- ISRAELI CONFLICT. 3. (U) BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GLAGPIE " "78","6/30/1985 7:58","85ALEXANDRIA524","Consulate Alexandria","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 300758Z JUN 85 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5350 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO ","C O N F I D E N T I A L ALEXANDRIA 00524 DEPT FOR S/IL AND NEA/RA - HOLLY E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ELAB, EG SUBJECT: LABOR STRIKES IN ALEXANDRIA 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY. AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF A GENERALLY CALM LABOR SCENE IN EGYPT, ALEXANDRIA SECURITY OFFICE HAS CORROBORATED AN OPPOSITION PRESS REPORT THAT A LABOR STRIKE HAD OCCURRED AT A FACTORY IN THE ALEXANDRIA SUBURB OF ABU KIR. HOWEVER, THE SOURCE PROFESSED IGNORANCE CONCERNING THE OPPOSITION JOURNAL\'S ALLEGATION OF A SECOND WORK STOPPAGE IN THE ALEXANDRIA AREA, INVOLVING A DEFENSE PLANT. END SUMMARY. 3. BACKGROUND: TRANQUIL LABOR SCENE. SINCE THE FLARE- UP OF WORKER VIOLENCE AT THE DELTA TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CENTER OF KAFFAR AL-DAWWAR LAST SEPTEMBER, THE EGYPTIAN LABOR SCENE, TO ALL APPEARANCES, HAS BEEN GENERALLY CALM. IN THE INTERVENING MONTHS, OUR TRADE UNION CONTACTS--ALWAYS RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF LABOR UNREST--HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSURED US THAT ALL IS QUIET ON THE LABOR FRONT, PROTRAYING WORKERS\' RELATIONS WITH BOTH MANAGEMENT AND THE GOE AS HARMONIOUS. REFLECT- ING THE PLACID LABOR SITUATION IS THE FACT THAT OF LATE, THE OPPOSITION PRESS HAS OMITTED ANY MENTION OF STRIKES OR OTHER SIGNIFICANT LABOR TROUBLE. IN THE PAST, ONE OPPOSITION PAPER IN PARTICULAR, THE LEFTIST NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST GROUPING PARTY\'S (NPUG) WEEKLY, AL-AHALI, HAD OCCASIONALLY ALLEGED THIS OCCURRENCE OF STRIKES AND SIMILAR LABOR DIFFICULTIES. AS FOR THE \"NATIONAL,\" PLO-GOE MEDIA, THEY AVOID DISCUSSION OF LABOR TROUBLE ALTOGETHER. - 4. STRIKES IN ALEXANDRIA AREA. ON JUNE 19, HOWEVER, AL-AHALI BROKE ITS UNUSUAL SILENCE IN A BRIEF, PAGE-ONE STORY, WHERE IT REPORTED THAT NATIONAL SECURITY POLICE RECENTLY STORMED TWO FACTORIES IN THE ALEXANDRIA AREA TO BREAK UP MASS MEETINGS OF STRIKING WORKERS. (COMMENT: THE PAPER GAVE NO SPECIFIC DATES FOR THE INCIDENTS. END COMMENT.) ACCORDING TO THE PAPER, IN BOTH INCIDENTS, ONE INVOLVING THE ABU KIR ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES\' COMPANY AND THE OTHER THE \"MOHARREM BEY DEFENSE PLANT,\" POLICE EVICTED THE STRIKERS AND THEN CLOSED THE FACTORIES. AL-AHALI\'S ACCOUNT MADE NO REFERENCE TO ANY ARRESTS OR INJURIES RESULTING FROM THE POLICE INTERVENTION. WORKERS STRUCK THE ABU KIR PLANT, SAID AL-AHALI, OVER MANAGEMENT\'S FAILURE, SINCE LAST JANUARY, TO PAY MONTHLY PRODUCTION BONUSES. THE PAPER SAID NOTHING ABOUT WORKERS\' GRIEVANCES AT THE DEFENSE PLANT. 5. SECURITY OFFICIAL\'S CORROBORATION. IN JUNE 24 MEETING WITH PSO, ALEXANDRIA SECURITY OFFICIAL CONFIRMED THE OCCURRENCE OF A STRIKE AT THE ABU KIR FACTORY OVER THE NON-PAYMENT OF WORKERS\' BONUSES. THE OFFICIAL PROVIDED FEW DETAILS ON THE EVENT AND DOWNPLAYED ITS SIGNIFICANCE, PORTRAYING IT AS A RARE AND ISOLATED CASE OF WORKERS EXPRESSING THEIR UNHAPPINESS OVER A FACTORY-SPECIFIC, BREAD-AND-BUTTER ISSUE. THE SOURCE APPEARED TO IMPLY THAT POLICE HAD INTERVENED TO HALT THE WORKERS\' PROTEST, BUT WOULD NOT CONFIRM WHETHER THE INCIDENT HAD RESULTED IN ANY ARRESTS OR INJURIES. 6. DEFENSE PLANT. PERHAPS INDICATIVE OF EGYPTIANS\' SENSITIVITY AND SECRECY REGARDING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY, THE SECURITY OFFICIAL DENIED HAVING ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECOND REPORTED INCIDENT, AT THE MOHARREM BEY FACTORY. WHEN PSO MENTIONED AL-AHALI\'S STORY, THE OFFICIAL REMARKED CALMLY \"I DON\'T KNOW WHAT YOU\'RE TALKING ABOUT\" AND THEN CHANGED THE SUBJECT. 7. COMMENT: AT THIS JUNCTURE, WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH CREDENCE TO GIVE TO AL-AHALI\'S REPORT OF LABOR TROUBLE AT THE MOHARREM BEY DEFENSE PLANT. WHILE THE PAPER\'S REPORTING OFTEN LACKS OBJECTIVITY AND ACCURACY, LABOR TROUBLE IN SUCH MILITARY-RUN (BUT CIVILIAN-MANNED) FACTORIES IS NOT UNKNOWN; IN APRIL 1984, FOR EXAMPLE, VARIOUS SOURCES CONFIRMED THE OUTBREAK OF A STRIKE--BROKE UP BY POLICE--AT A DEFENSE PLANT NEAR CAIRO. IN ADDITION TO THIS PRECEDENT, THE SECURITY OFFICIAL UNHESITATINGLY CONFIRMED AL-AHALI\'S REPORT OF THE OTHER STRIKE, AT THE ABU KIR SITE. WE WILL PURSUE THE AL-AHALI STORY WITH OUR CONTACTS AND REPORT FURTHER AS WARRANTED. END COMMENT. COOK " "79","6/30/1985 11:24","85ALEXANDRIA535","Consulate Alexandria","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 301124Z JUN 85 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5363 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALEXANDRIA 00535 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINR, PGOV, PINS, EG SUBJECT: LETTER FROM ALEXANDRIA: RAMADAN I 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY: THIS IS THE FIRST MESSAGE IN A TWO-PART SERIES WHICH DISCUSSES THE JUST-COMPLETED MONTH OF RAMADAN, AND THE ENSUING FEAST PERIOD, IN THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA. ALTHOUGH THE MONTH PASSED WITH THE TRADITIONAL GAIETY, THIS YEAR THE MUSLIM HOLY MONTH OF DAYTIME FASTING WAS CELE- BRATED AGAINST A BACKDROP OF APPARENT RISING FUNDAMEN- TALISM, CHALLENGES TO THE PUBLIC ORDER, AND THE CONTINUING SAGA OF THE \"TRIAL BY PRESS\" OF ALEXANDRIA\'S GOVERNOR. END SUMMARY. 3. RAMADAN, WHICH LASTED FROM MAY 20 TO JUNE 17 IN EGYPT, WAS CELEBRATED IN TRADITIONAL FASHION IN ALEXANDRIA. BUT THIS YEAR, UNLIKE LAST, IT WAS AGAINST A BACKDROP OF GROWING FUNDAMENTALISM AND SECURITY CONCERNS; WORSENING QUALITY OF LIFE, AND A DETERIORATING URBAN ENVIRONMENT; AND MORE THAN A WHIFF OF POLITICAL SCANDAL, DUE TO THE ONGOING INVESTIGATION OF GOVERNOR MA\'1\"\'S STEWARDSHIP OF THE CITY (FOR BACKGROUND ON LATTER, SEE ALEXANDRIA 435). FOR ALL THE GAIETIZ OF THE SEASON, ONE SENSED THAT SOME OF IT WAS PROBABLY FORCED: MANY OF THE ALEXANDRIANS WE KNOW ARE WORRIED, BOTH ABOUT THEIR COUNTRY AND THEIR CITY. RAMADAN--WHEN THE ADVANCE GUARD ARRIVES OF THE 1.5 MILLION CAIRENES WHO EVENTUALLY SPEND THE SUMMER IN ALEXANDRIA-- TURNED OUT TO BE A GOOD TIME TO REFLECT ON LIFE IN THIS CITY, AND TO COLLECT COMMENTS FROM OUR CONTACTS ABOUT ISSUES WHICH CONCERN THEM. - - 4. IFTARS: \"IFTAR\" (OR, BREAKFAST), THE MEAL WHICH BREAKS THE FAST AT SUNSET, IS A TIME OF RESPLENDENT FEASTS IN ALEXANDRIA. THE REPORTING OFFICER DID NOT ATTEND ANY AT WHICH THERE WAS LESS THAN FIVE TIMES THE AMOUNT OF FOOD NECESSARY FOR THE NUMBER OF GUESTS PRESENT. SOME OF THE FOODS ARE TRADITIONAL--FOR EXAMPLE, EGYPTIANS OF ALL CLASSES ACTUALLY BREAK THE FAST WITH \"FUL\" (RED BEANS)--INCLUDING IMPORTED ITEMS, SUCH AS THE APRICOT PASTE (FROM SYRIA)WHICH IS USED TO MAKE THE RAMADAN-ONLY DRINK, AMAR-EL-DINE. THE PASTRY \"KUNAFA\" IS MADE ON TURNING GRILLS, PLACED OUTSIDE ON SIDEWALKS DURING RAMADAN, AND IS OFFERED AT EVERY IFTAR. WHILE THE MEATS MAY VARY, SHRIMP IS NOT A TRADITIONAL RAMADAN FOOD AND PRICES IN ALEXANDRIA, KNOWN THROUGHOUT EGYPT FOR THIS DELICACY, ACTUALLY PLUMMET DURING THIS TIME. (ONE HOTEL MANAGER OF OUR ACQUAINTANCE STOCKS UP,AND FREEZES, SHRIMP FOR THE ENTIRE SUMMER DURING RAMADAN.) WHILE IFTARS IN ALEXANDRIA ARE MORE SOCIAL, THAN RELIGIOUS, OCCASIONS, THIS YEAR WE ATTENDED OUR FIRST HOME IFTAR WHICH HAD A SHAYKH PRESENT TO LEAD THE TWO EVENING PRAYERS ON PRAYER RUGS ESPECIALLY LAID OUT ON THE LAWN OF THE HOST\'S VILLA FOR THE OCCASION. COMMENT: IT IS PROBABLY WORTH NOTING, IF ONLY IN PASSING, THAT NOT ALL OF THE VEILED WOMEN PRESENT, EITHER THIS YEAR, OR LAST YEAR AT SIMILAR FUNCTION, JOINED IN THE PRAYERS. IN ADDITION TO EXTREMELY HEAVY RELIGIOUS PROGRAMMING DURING RAMADAN, EGYPTIAN TELEVISION ALSO RUNS SPECIAL VIEWER PARTICIPATION GAME SHOWS AND SERIALS IN THE EVENINGS. LARGE COLOR TELEVISIONS ARE EVEN BROUGHT OUT OF DOORS FOR GARDEN IFTARS. BOTH YEARS, THE SERIAL WON OUT OVER THE LAST EVENING PRAYER FOR AT LEAST A FEW OF THE VEILED FEMALES. END COMMENT. 5. IFTAR CONVERSATIONS: -- (A) VEILS: ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO SCIENTIFIC DATA, THERE WAS VISIBLY A SHARP INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF VEILED FEMALES IN ALEXANDRIA DURING THIS RAMADAN. FEMALE, MUSLIM STAFF MEMBERS OF THE CONGEN (NONE OF WHOM IS VEILED) HAVE EVEN COME TO US TO EXPRESS CONCERN. THIS ISSUE--PERHAPS CODE TO DISCUSS DEEPER WORRIES ABOUT THE RISE OF FUNDA- MENTALISM-- WAS DISCUSSED REPEATEDLY BY OUR CONTACTS DURING RAMADAN. (COMMENT: \"VEILS\", AS USED BY OUR CONTACTS, AND IN THIS MESSAGE, DESCRIBES THE CURRENT EGYPTIAN FASHION OF COVERED HEAD, HAIR AND THROAT--BUT WITH FACE STILL VISIBLE, UNLIKE IN THE GULF--ACCOMPANIED BY LONG SLEEVE BLOUSES AND FLOOR LENGTH SKIRTS. END COMMENT.) WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE (MODERATE) CHIEF JUSTICE OF EGYPT ADDRESSED THE BLUE-RIBBON EASTERN ALEXANDRIA ROTARY CLUB DURING ONE RAMADAN IFTAR. THE SUBJECT OF VEILS APPARENTLY CAME UP DURING THE DISCUSSION, AND HE ASSERTED THAT THE KORAN DOES NOT CALL FOR VEILING. HE WAS HEATEDLY DENOUNCED FROM THE FLOOR TO THE DEGREE THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THIS ROTARY (COMPRISED MOSTLY OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR BUSINESS LEADERSHIP OF ALEXANDRIA) FELT OBLIGED TO STAND UP AND DEMAND APOLOGIES FROM THEIR FELLOW ROTARIANS. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT BUSINESSMEN IN EGYPT, MOHAMED RAGAB, IS A MEMBER OF THIS ROTARY. HIS WIFE ADOPTED THE VEIL DURING RAMADAN--AND THAT HAS PRO- VOKED MUCH COMMENTARY AMONG THE CITY\'S ELITE (WHOSE WIVES ARE GENERALLY UNVEILED). COMMENT: IN A COUNTRY WHERE FELLAHIN WOMEN TRADITIONALLY COVER THEIR HAIR WITH A SCARF, AND WHERE URBAN WIDOWS, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE POOR, OFTEN ADOPT HEAD COVERING, \"VEILS\" ARE NOT UNKNOWN. WE ARE TOLD, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE NOT TRADITIONAL AMONG EDUCATED, URBAN FEMALES. SOME OF OUR CONTACTS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN THAT SO MANY YOUNG WOMEN ARE ADOPTING VEILS. THIS, IN FACT, IS WHERE THE SHARP RISE IN HEAD COVERINGS HAS OCCURRED. BASED ON OUR TRAVELS IN THE DELTA, IT REMAINS AN URBAN PHENOMENON. END COMMENT. -- (B) GOVERNOR MA\'AZ\'S PROBLEMS: THE PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE (SEE ALEXANDRIA 435) FINISHED ITS WORK IN ALEXANDRIA DURING RAMADAN. THE REPORT IS SLATED TO BE PUBLISHED IN EARLY JULY, BUT ALREADY THE PRESS IS REPORTING THAT THE COMMITTEE IS \"SPLIT\"--NOT ON HIS GUILT, BUT ON WHETHER TO REFER HIS CASE TO THE REGULAR COURTS OR THE SOCIALIST PROSECUTOR. MEANWHILE, THE NDP MEMBER OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY WHO STARTED THE AFFAIR, GEBRIL MOHAMED, IS SEEN CARRYING SHEAVES OF PAPERS AROUND TOWN (PRESS REPORTS NOTE THAT HE HAS AN ADDITIONAL 39 CHARGES TO OFFER TO THE COMMITTEE) CLAIMING THIS CASE WILL BE \"THE EGYPTIAN WATERGATE.\" EARLY DURING THE INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSER SAID THAT HIS LIFE WAS IN DANGER (THE WINDSHIELD WAS MYSTERIOUSLY BROKEN ON HIS CAR, FOLLOWING WHICH HE HAS TAKEN TO PARKING IT OVERNIGHT ON THE GROUNDS OF THE NDP PARTY HEADQUARTERS)--CERTAINLY AN EXAGGERATION, BUT CALCULATED TO GARNER EVEN MORE PUBLICITY FOR HIS CAUSE. THERE IS CONTINUED EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE INVESTIGATION IN THE \"WAFD\" AND MOST OTHER NATIONAL PRINT MEDIA. DURING RAMADAN, THE GOVERNOR GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO THE NEWS MAGAZINE \"OCTOBER\" CONCERNING HIS PERSONAL REAL ESTATE DEALS IN THE NEARBY BEACH RESORT OF AGAMI: HE LIED, AND THE \"WAFD\" SUBSEQUENTLY PUBLISHED PHOTOCOPIES OF THE SALE AND TAX RECORDS. ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS NOT SPOKEN OUT PUBLICLY ON THIS ISSUE, GOVERNOR MA\'AZ WAS NOTABLY ABSENT FROM THE LIST OF GOVERNORS WHO RECEIVED AWARDS FROM THE PRESIDENT AT THE JUST-CONCLUDED CONFERENCE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CAIRO. WE HAVE RECENTLY LEARNED THAT WHEN THE PRESIDENT CAME TO ALEXANDRIA MAY 13 TO INAUGURATE VARIOUS PROJECTS, INCLUDING THE USAID TELEPHONE PROJECT, HE TOLD THE GOVERNOR ON ARRIVAL AT THE AIRPORT THAT \"IF WHAT THEY SAY ABOUT YOU IN THE PRESS IS TRUE, THE CASE WILL GO TO THE COURTS.\" COMMENT: WE CONTINUE TO BE INTRIGUED BY HOW THE PRESIDENT HANDLES THE CASES OF SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS PUBLICLY ACCUSED OF CORRUPTION. IN BOTH THE MOUSTAPHA EL SAID CASE, AND NOW APPARENTLY WITH GOVERNOR MA\'AZ, HE PERMITS A \"TRIAL BY PRESS\" AND THEN LETS THE COURTS TAKE OVER. FOR LESSER LIGHTS (EG. THE RECENT NUMEROUS FIRINGS AND FORCED RETIREMENTS IN THE CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION (SEE FORTHCOMING SEPTEL), THE RECKONING DAY ARRIVES MORE SWIFTLY. WE WONDER IF THIS OTHERWISE ADMIRABLE LOYALTY TO HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS--FOR EXAMPLE, NOT SUSPENDING THEM DURING THE PRESS ATTACKS--MIGHT BE MISPLACED? END COMMENT. AS ALEXANDRIANS ARE WELL-KNOWN FOR BEING (IF OUR READERS WILL PERMIT) ALEXANDRIA-CENTRIC, THIS ISSUE, ABOVE ALL OTHERS, DOMINATED RAMADAN CONVER- SATIONS HERE. THE GOVERNOR HAS VERY FEW DEFENDERS AMONG THE ALEXANDRIA ELITE, WHOSE PRIME INTEREST NOW, APPEARS TO BE SPECULATING ON HOW THE GOVERNOR\'S RIGHT HAND MAN (AND WIDELY VIEWED AS CORRUPT, UNLIKE THE GOVERNOR), GOVERNORATE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHAKER ABDEL SALAAM, HAS MANAGED TO KEEP HIS NAME OUT OF THIS INVESTIGATION. -- (C) NOT DISCUSSED: WE WERE STRUCK BY THE LACK OF CONVERSATION ON THE FATE OF THE PERSONAL STATUS LAW, AS IT HAS APPARENTLY GALVANIZED CAIRO (SEE CAIRO 16094, PLUS NEWS REPORTS ON THE SAME SUBJECT). IF THE SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED, WE HAD TO RAISE IT. WE DID--ON TWO OCCASIONS DURING RAMADAN. ONE EGYPTIAN WOMAN (AND FORMER WIFE OF A SYRIAN VICE FOREIGN MINISTER) SAID THAT SHE HAD VISITED THE NDP ALEX HEADQUARTERS TO TRY TO GET \"SOMETHING\" STARTED AMONG THE WOMEN IN ALEXANDRIA, TO FORCE THE GOE TO DEVELOP LEGISLATION TO REPLACE THE \"JIHAN SADAT LAW\" STRUCK DOWN BY THE COURTS MAY 4. SHE REPORTED THAT HER REMARKS WERE RECEIVED WITH HOSTILITY BY THE THREE FEMALE PARTY WORKERS WITH WHOM SHE SPOKE, WHO ASSERTED THAT THE JIHAN SADAT LAW WAS \"CONTRARY\" TO ISLAM. OUR FRIEND, WHO RELATED THIS AT A TABLE WITH THREE WELL-EDUCATED FEMALE FAMILY MEMBERS PRESENT, SUMMARIZED HER VIEWS THUS: \"SYRIAN WOMEN WOULD NEVER PUT UP WITH THIS. EGYPTIAN WOMEN ARE UNSOPHISTICATED.\" (THE OTHERS PRESENT LET THE REMARK STAND.) -- ONE MEMBER OF THE SAME FAMILY DECIDED TO ASK FOR A DIVORCE IN MAY, WHEREUPON HER HUSBAND PROMPTLY ASKED HER TO LEAVE THE CAIRO APARTMENT WHICH HAD BEEN PURCHASED FOR THE YOUNG COUPLE BY THE GIRL\'S FAMILY. THESE KINDS OF STORIES PROMPTED NDP ALEX PARTY CHIEF, MOHAMED ABDELLAH, IN A LATER CONVERSATION, TO TERM THE GOE\'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO PASS A PERSONAL STATUS LAW (SEE CAIRO 16752) THE \"FLAT ACT.\" THAT, HE ASSERTED, IS THE REAL ISSUE. EGYPTIAN WOMEN ARE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT SECOND MARRIAGES OF THEIR HUSBANDS (RARE AMONG EDUCATED--AND POLITICIZED--EGYPTIANS, IN ANY EVENT), THAN IN SUDDENLY FINDING THEMSELVES HOMELESS IN A COUNTRY WHERE THE HOUSING CRISIS IS ACUTE, AND GROWING WORSE. COMMENT: EVEN THE EXPECTED LARGE RETURN OF EGYPTIANS FROM THE GULF WILL AGGRAVATE THE HOUSING PROBLEM IN ALEXANDRIA: MANY WOMEN, INCLUDING SOME ON THE CONSULATE STAFF, ARE RESIDING, WITH THEIR CHILDREN, IN THEIR PARENTS\' HOME DURING THEIR HUSBANDS\' LENGTHY ABSENCES IN THE GULF. THESE PROFESSIONAL COUPLES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO AVOID FACING THE HOUSING CRUNCH-- THUS FAR. END COMMENT. 6. FASTING: WE KNOW SEVERAL PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN IN ALEXANDRIA WHO HAVE STARTED FASTING ONLY IN THE PAST FEW YEARS. EVERYONE WE KNOW, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, WHO NORMALLY IMBIBES ALCOHOL, GIVES IT UP FOR THE MONTH, AS WELL AS CIGARETTES DURING THE FASTING HOURS (THE LATTER IS PROBABLY MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE HEAVY SMOKING EGYPTIANS). THE GOE DECREE REGARDING THE SALE OF ALCOHOL DURING RAMADAN--IN GENERAL, IT IS ONLY SOLD IN \"TOURISTIC\" HOTELS OR RESTAURANTS, AND THEN ONLY TO FOREIGNERS--WAS SEVERELY ENFORCED IN ALEXANDRIA THIS YEAR. THE GREEK CONSUL GENERAL INVITED A VISITING DELEGATION FROM GREECE TO DINE AT A LOCAL RESTAURANT, OWNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE ALEXANDRIA GREEK COMMUNITY. THE RESTAURANT HAS A RAMADAN ALCOHOL PERMIT. DURING THE MEAL, A GENERAL INTELLIGENCE(MUKHABARAT) OFFICER CAME INTO THE RESTAURANT, OBSERVED THE WINE BEING SERVED TO THE GREEKS, AND ORDERED THE GREEK OWNER TO APPEAR AT MUKHABARAT HEADQUARTERS THE NEXT DAY. DURING THEIR MEETING, THE RESTAURANT OWNER WAS TOLD THAT, EVEN WITH A PERMIT, IF HE SERVED ALCOHOL DURING RAMADAN, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WOULD FIND \"OTHER\" WAYS TO PUT \"PRESSURE\" ON HIM. THE RAMADA, CURRENTLY ALEXANDRIA\'S BEST HOTEL, VOLUNTARILY DID NOT SERVE ALCOHOL DURING RAMADAN, BUT HAD A SMALL BAR DISCREETLY SET UP IN AN UPSTAIRS SUITE FOR FOREIGNERS. THE MANAGER TOLD US THAT, IN THE CURRENT CLIMATE, HE FELT HIS DECISION WAS \"GOOD FOR BUSINESS.\" 7. QUALITY OF LIFE--AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES: THE CITY\'S GROWING PROBLEMS WITH PROVIDING SERVICES FOR ITS 3 MILLION INHABITANTS BECOME AGGRAVATED DURING RAMADAN, DUE BOTH TO THE INFLUX OF VISITORS DURING THE FEAST FITLOWING RAMADAN, AND TO THE DEPLORABLE WORK HABITS OF FASTING CITY EMPLOYEES. ELECTRICAL AND WATER OUTAGES WERE FREQUENT DURING RAMADAN, AND GARBAGE PICK-UP, A CONTINUING, MAJOR PROBLEM HERE, ALMOST STOPPED TOWARD THE END OF MONTH (AND THROUGHOUT THE SIX-DAY FEAST AT THE END OF RAMADAN). THAT, COMBINED WITH HOT WEATHER AND BAD TEMPERS PRODUCED BY THE FASTING, PROBABLY LED TO THE NUMEROUS CIVIL DISTURBANCES, LARGE AND SMALL, THE CITY WITNESSED DURING THE MONTH. AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS ARE FREQUENT, AS ARE STREET FIGHTS OVER THE SLIGHTEST SCRAPE: ONE CONGEN OFFICER REPORTED SEEING TWO STREET BRAWLS WITHIN ONE BLOCK. THERE WERE ALSO SEVERAL MAJOR INCIDENTS BEFORE THE END OF THE MONTH, ATTRIBUTABLE TO \"RAMADAN CONDITIONS\" BY MOST ACCOUNTS: (A) COPTIC-MUSLIM BRAWL: DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE, THERE WAS A MAJOR FIGHT BETWEEN COPTS AND MUSLIMS AT A WHOLESALE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE MARKET IN THE NOUZA AREA OF ALEXANDRIA. WE HAVE HAD TWO VERSIONS FROM POLICE SOURCES AS TO HOW IT STARTED: ONE ALLEGES THAT A COPTIC MERCHANT OR CUSTOMER WAS MAKING A\"SHOW\" OF EATING AND SMOKING IN FRONT OF FASTING MUSLIMS. ANOTHER VERSION SAYS THAT THERE WAS A SIMPLE DISPUTE, BUT WHEN THE TWO CONTENDERS REALIZED THAT ONE WAS COPTIC AND THE OTHER MUSLIM, A MELEE BEGAN, WITH BYSTANDERS JOINING IN. OUR STATE SECURITY SOURCES CONFIRM THAT THERE WERE 15 ARRESTS AND 4 HOSPITALIZED; TWO CARS WERE BURNED AND ONE HOUSE OR SHOP DESTROYED. COMMENT: AS COPTIC CONTACTS HAVE NOT APPROACHED US ON THIS INCIDENT, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS NOT RELIGIOUSLY-INSPIRED AND SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS \"SECTARIAN STRIFE\"--BUT MERELY AN EXPLOSION OF TEMPERS AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS. END COMMENT. - - (B) MURDER IN LABAN: THERE IS A TRADITION IN ALEXANDRIA OF FOOTBALL GAMES IN THE STREETS DURING RAMADAN, EVEN MAJOR THOROUGHFARES (MAKING TRAFFIC EVEN MORE OF A BLOOD SPORT), IN THE LAST HOUR BEFORE THE \"MEDFAA\"--THE CANNON WHICH IS FIRED TO SIGNAL THE END OF THE FASTING PERIOD. IN THE WORKING CLASS DISTRICT OF LABAN, MEMBER OF THE GOE\'S ELITE CENTRAL SECURITY FORCES, UNABLE TO GET A GAME STOPPED IN FRONT OF HIS ABODE, TOOK HIS GUN AND SHOT ONE OF THE PLAYERS. WHEN THE YOUNG MAN DIDN\'T DIE IMMEDIATELY, HE SHOT HIM A SECOND TIME, WITH THE HORRIFIED FATHER STANDING BY, ACCORDING TO OUR POLICE SOURCES. THE CSF MEMBER IS NOW IN PRISON, BUT TEMPERS ARE RAW IN LABAN. (C) KNIFE FIGHT IN MANCHIA: OUR INFORMATION IS SKETCHIER ON THIS INCPQENT, BUT IT APGEARS THAT ZEALOUS CUSTOMS POLICE, IN A VERY INFREQUENT APPLICATION OF LAW 119 (1978)--WHICH ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE PROFITS ON IMPORTED ITEMS AMONG THE IMPORTER, WHOLESALER AND RETAILER--VISITED SHOPOWNERS TO LOOK AT THEIR BOOKS. THE MANCHIA SHOPS WERE FULL OF IMPORTED ITEMS AS RAMADAN, WHEN SALES APPROACH THOSE AT CHRISTMASTIME IN THE U.S., IS THE TIME WHEN RETAILERS MAKE A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF THEIR YEARLY PROFITS. THE CUSTOMS POLICE DEPARTED, BUT WHEN THEY RETURNED THE SHOPOWNERS WERE WAITING FOR THEM WITH KNIVES. ALTHOUGH NO ONE WAS KILLED, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WERE QUITE A FEW INJURED DURING THE ENSUING KNIFE FIGHT. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THESE THREE INCIDENTS SHOULD PROPERLY BE LABELLED \"CIVIL DISTURBANCES,\" ALEXANDRIA\'S SECURITY FORCES WERE ON A STATE OF ALERT (ALL LEAVES CANCELLED) THROUGHOUT THE FEAST WHICH FOLLOWS RAMADAN. THE CITY EXPECTED VIOLENCE, OR AT LEAST PROHIBITED MARCHES, BY MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS DURING THE SIX-DAY BAIRAM HOLIDAY, PARTICULARLY THE FIRST MORNING. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE LEARNED OF NO VIOLENCE, THERE WERE, INDEED, FUNDAMENTALIST ACTIVITIES (INCLUDING SOME IN CONTRAVENTION OF GOE DECREES) AND THOSE WILL BE ADDED IN THE SECOND MESSAGE IN THIS SERIES. END COMMENT. COOK "	Success: CSV parsed	null	5,571
80	7/1/1985 12:58	85MOSCOW8814	Embassy Moscow	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "85MOSCOW8415" ]	R 011258Z JUL 85 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2098 INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY PARIS USMISSION USNATO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD ","C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 08814 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, UR, IR SUBJECT: (C) DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN: A SOVIET VIEW REF: MOSCOW 08415 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.) . SUMMARY ------- 2. A WELL-INFORMED SOVIET OBSERVER OF EVENTS IN IRAN RECENTLY DISCUSSED WITH US THE UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING FUTURE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TEHRAN. WHILE ASSERTING THAT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH IRAN WOULD CONTINUE, OUR INTERLOCUTOR CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT THERE IS NO CONSENSUS IN MOSCOW ON THE LIKELY SUCCESS OF SUCH EFFORTS. END SUMMARY. 3. EMBOFF RECENTLY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE\'S DEPARTMENT FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND TURKEY, YURIY GANKOVSKIY (PROTECT). WHILE GANKOVSKIY IS NOT A POLICY-MAKER, HE IS ONE OF THE BEST INFORMED AND MOST THOUGHTFUL SOVIET ANALYSTS ON IRAN, AS WELL AS A REPUTED MFA ADVISER. . 4. IRAN/IRAQ WAR: GANKOVSKIY WITHOUT PROMPTING VOLUNTEER- ED THAT IRAN WAS CLEARLY RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. HE ASSERTED THAT THE SAUDIS AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WERE READY TO MEET IRANIAN DEMANDS FOR CASH PAYMENTS TO OFFSET WAR DAMAGES. HOWEVER, GANKOVSKIY SAW LITTLE PROSPECT FOR AN END TO THE WAR BECAUSE THE AUTHORITIES IN TEHRAN REMAIN DETERMINED TO BRING DOWN SADDAM HUSAYN. . 5. FUTURE POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN IRAN: GANKOVSKIY DISCOUNTED A BID BY THE IRANIAN MILITARY EITHER TO OVER- THROW KHOMEINI OR TAKE POWER FOLLOWING HIS DEATH. HE ATTRIBUTED THE MILITARY\'S RELUCTANCE TO MAKE A BID FOR POW- ER TO THE OFFICER CORPS\' PREOCCUPATION WITH THE WAR, THE STRENGTH OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, AND THE DECIMATION OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY\'S BEST OFFICERS IN SUCCESSIVE WAVES OF REPRESSION. GANKOVSKIY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE REPRESSION HAD TAKEN A HEAVY TOLL AMONG THE \"LEFT\" OPPOSITION, WHICH WAS FURTHER WEAKENED BY LACK OF UNITY. HE CONCLUDED THAT, EVEN AFTER KHOMEINI\'S DEATH, THERE WOULD BE \"NO SOLUTION ON THE LEFT\" FOR IRAN. INTERESTING- LY, GANKOVSKIY WOULD NOT RULE OUT A COMEBACK BY THE WESTERN-ORIENTED IRANIAN \"BOURGEOISIE.\" WHILE THEY WERE IN EXILE NOW, IRAN HAD A LONG HISTORY OF EXILES WHO HAD MADE STARTLING POLITICAL COMEBACKS. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, GANKOVSKIY SAID THAT KHOMEINI\'S SUCCESSOR WOULD MOST LIKELY COME FROM AMONG THOSE POLITICAL FIGURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRENT REGIME AND THAT RAFSANJANI SEEMED THE BEST BET FOR THE PRESENT. . 6. EMBOFF ASKED GANKOVSKIY WHETHER THERE WERE NOT TWO BROAD LINES IN SOVIET THINKING ABOUT RELATIONS WITH IRAN. SOME SOVIETS SEEMED TO ADVOCATE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE CURRENT REGIME, WHILE OTHERS SEEMED DEEPLY SKEPTICAL THAT EFFORTS TO COOPERATE WITH THE TEHRAN AUTHORITIES WOULD SERVE SOVIET INTERESTS (REF- TEL). GANKOVSKIY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE NOT TWO LINES, BUT \"TWENTY LINES\" IN SOVIET THINKING ABOUT IRAN. DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES IN OPINION, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TRY TO WORK OUT A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH A COUNTRY WITH WHICH IT SHARED A LONG BORDER. . 7. COMMENT: WHILE MUCH OF WHAT GANKOVSKIY HAD TO SAY IS STANDARD, HIS COMMENTS SUGGEST CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY AMONG KNOWLEDGEABLE SOVIETS ABOUT IRAN\'S LONG-TERM COURSE. WHILE HE WAS CAREFUL TO ASSERT SOVIET INTEREST IN IMPROVE- MENT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN, GANKOVSKIY CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT THERE IS NO CONSENSUS AMONG SOVIET ANALYSTS ABOUT THE LIKELY SUCCESS OF SUCH AN EFFORT. HARTMAN "	Success: CSV parsed	null	11,338
81	7/2/1985 11:26	85ALEXANDRIA547	Consulate Alexandria	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "85ALEXANDRIA524" ]	R 021126Z JUL 85 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5370 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO ","C O N F I D E N T I A L ALEXANDRIA 00547 DEPT FOR S/IL AND NEA/RA - HOLLY DEPT PLS PASS DEPT OF LABOR E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ELAB, EG SUBJECT: MORE ON LABOR STRIKE IN ALEXANDRIA REF: ALEXANDRIA 524 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SINCE SUBMISSION OF REFTEL, ANOTHER LOCAL SECURITY OFFICIAL HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT A LABOR STRIKE OCCURRED IN MID-JUNE AT THE NEARBY ABU KIR ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES FACTORY, RESULTING IN AUTHORITIES\' CLOSING IT FOR TWO DAYS--JUNE 19-20. THE OFFICIAL CONFIRMED THAT POLICE INTERVENED TO BREAK UP THE STRIKE, BUT LIKE THE SECURITY CONTACT CITED IN REFTEL, SAID HE KNEW NOTHING OF ARRESTS OR INJURIES. INTERESTINGLY, THE LATTER SOURCE INDICATED THAT CONTRARY TO OUR UNDERSTANDING, THE ABU KIR FACTORY IS RUN BY THE MILITARY, ALTHOUGH THE WORKERS ARE CIVILIAN. WHILE DENYING THE OCCURRENCE OF A SECOND STRIKE, AT THE MOHARREM BEY DEFENSE PLANT, HE DID SAY THAT, AS PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, FOLLOWING THE ABU KIR INCIDENT, SECURITY POLICE WERE DEPLOYED AROUND THE MOHARREM BEY FACILITY. 3. IN ADDITION TO THE NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST GROUPING PARTY\'S WEEKLY, AL-AHALI, ANOTHER OPPOSITION JOURNAL, THE SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY\'S ASH-SHAAB, ALSO REPORTED ON ALEXANDRIA\'S LABOR TROUBLE. ACCORDING TO ASH-SHAAB, IT WAS AT THE INSTRUCTION OF THE GOE\'S MINISTER OF STATE FOR MILITARY PRODUCTION, GAMAL IBRAHIM, THAT THE ABU KIR PLANT WAS CLOSED FOR TWO DAYS, IN REACTION TO THE STRIKE OVER NON-PAYMENT OF WORKERS\' BONUSES. - 4. WITH OUR SECURITY SOURCES REPORTING THAT ALL IS NOW BACK TO NORMAL AT THE ABU KIR FACTORY, THE OPPOSITION PRESS ALSO SEEMS TO CONSIDER THE MATTER CLOSED: NEITHER ASH-SHAAB NOR AL-AHALI CONTAINED A FOLLOW-UP STORY ON THE INCIDENT IN THEIR LATEST EDITIONS, JUNE 25 AND 26, RESPECTIVELY. 5. COMMENT: THE INCIDENT AT THE ABU KIR FACTORY SEEMS TO FIT THE PATTERN OF THE FEW LABOR STRIKES THAT OCCUR IN EGYPT: A BRIEF FLARE-UP OF WORKER UNREST, CONFINED TO A SPECIFIC FACTORY, AND FOCUSED ON BREAD-AND-BUTTER ISSUES. WHAT IS NOT TYPICAL ABOUT THIS STRIKE IS THAT IT APPARENTLY INVOLVED THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY, WHICH WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE B BWPID RESPONSE BY THE AUTHORITIES--AT BOTH THE ABU KIR AND MOHARREM BEY SITES. END COMMENT. COOK "	Success: CSV parsed	null	11,433
82	7/2/1985 11:28	85ALEXANDRIA548	Consulate Alexandria	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "84ALEXANDRIA329", "85ALEXANDRIA535" ]	R 021128Z JUL 85 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5371 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALEXANDRIA 00548 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINR, PGOV, PINS, EG SUBJECT: LETTER FROM ALEXANDRIA: RAMADAN II REF: ALEXANDRIA 535 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY: THE BAIRAM FEAST, WHICH FOLLOWS RAMADAN, LASTED THREE DAYS IN EGYPT, FOLLOWED BY A WEEK-END. EARLY NEGOTIATIONS, BETWEEN ALEXANDRIA SECURITY FORCES AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, MANAGED TO AVERT VIOLENCE ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE FEAST. HOWEVER, THE LETTER, IF NOT THE SPIRIT, OF THE GOE BAN ON RELIGIOUS DEMONSTRATIONS WAS REPEATEDLY VIOLATED IN ALEXANDRIA, AND RIOT POLICE WERE DEPLOYED TO ENSURE ORDER. MUSLIM BROTHER (AND MEMBER OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, REPRESENTING THE WAFD PARTY) MOHAMED EL MARAGHI WAS THE LEADING ACTOR IN THE FUNDA- MENTALIST EVENTS IN ALEXANDRIA. END SUMMARY. 3. THE MONTH OF RAMADAN WAS AN UNEASY TIME IN ALEXANDRIA (SEE REFTEL), A CITY WHICH HAS A HISTORY OF FUNDAMENTALIST VIOLENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS IN ALEXANDRIA THAT THE MUSLIM BROTHERS ATTEMPTED TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT NASSER IN 1954. SHAYKH HAFEZ SALAAMA\'S CALL, IN CAIRO, FOR A \"GREEN\" MARCH IN SUPPORT OF THE RAPID IMPLEMEN- TATION OF SHARIA, OR KORANIC, LAW IN EGYPT (SEE CAIRO 15351, 15780 AND 15793), AND THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR\'S SUBSEQUENT JUNE 12 DECREE BANNING PUBLIC MARCHES, UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE ATMOSPHERE IN ALEXANDRIA: ALL LEAVES FOR SECURITY OFFICERS FOR THE DURATION OF THE FEAST AFTER RAMADAN WERE CANCELLED, AND POLICE WERE PUT ON ALERT STATUS. WHILE THE MINISTER\'S DECREE, IN FACT, WAS VIOLATED IN ALEXANDRIA, INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE FUNDAMENTALISTS AND THE SECRET POLICE--AS WELL AS THE MASSIVE STREET PRESENCE OF RIOT POLICE ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE FEAST--MANAGED TO AVERT VIOLENCE. THIS IS A SUBJECT ON WHICH IT WILL BE FOREVER DIFFICULT FOR FOREIGNERS TO MAKE TOO MANY INQUIRIES IN EGYPT. WHAT FOLLOWS IS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE EITHER TO OBSERVE, OR TO OBTAIN FROM SECURITY AND OTHER SOURCES. OUR CONTACT WITH FUNDAMENTALIST CLERICS IN ALEXANDRIA REMAINS LIMITED. 4. PRAYERS IN THE STADIUM: DURING PRESIDENT SADAT\'S TIME THERE WERE INAUGURATED,IN CAIRO AND IN ALEXANDRIA, MASSIVE MORNING PRAYER SESSIONS IN PUBLIC STADIA ON TBE FIRST DAY OF THE BAIRAM FEAST WHICH FOLLOWS RAMADAN. THIS YEAR IN ALEXANDRIA, STATE SECURITY AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERS, LED BY MOHAMED AL MARAGHI, UNDERTOOK EARLY DISCUSSIONS ON HOW THESE PRAYERS WOULD PROCEED. STATE SECURITY FELT, PROBABLY, CORRECTLY, THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE EVENT WOULD BE DECIDED LARGELY BY THE TONE SET BY THE SHAYKH LEADING THE PRAYERS. THEY PROPOSED THAT THE GOE MINISTRY OF THE AWQAF REPRESENTATIVE IN ALEXANDRIA (TECHNICALLY THE SENIOR IMAM IN THE CITY) LEAD THE PRAYERS. THE MB\'S INSISTED ON SHAYKH MEHALAWI--A CHARISMATIC SHAYKH WHO BECAME A PARTICULAR TARGET OF PRESIDENT SADAT IN THE FORMER PRESIDENT\'S LAST MONTHS. (SHAYKH MEHALAWI WAS JAILED BY SADAT AND WE HAD HEARD NOTHING ELSE ABOUT HIM UNTIL HE CAME INTO THE CONSULATE GENERAL LAST YEAR, ESCORTED BY A BRIGADIER FROM STATE SECURITY, TO OBTAIN A VISA FOR TRAVEL TO THE U.S. SEE 84 ALEXANDRIA 329.) THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, ACCORDING TO OUR ALEXANDRIA SECURITY SOURCES, CONTINUED TO INSIST ON THE GOVERNMENT MAN. THEREFORE, THE STADIUM PRAYER NEVER TOOK PLACE. 5. PRAYERS AT SIDI GABER: SIDI GABER IS A PUBLIC SQUARE LOCATED ON AVENUE EL HORREYA, THE CITY\'S MAIN THOROUGH- FARE, IN THE CITY\'S AFFLUENT EASTERN SUBURBS. THERE IS A SMALL MOSQUE LOCATED NEXT TO THE SUBURBAN TRAIN STATION ON THE SQUARE. OUR STATE SECURITY CONTACTS TELL US THAT THE MUSLIM BROTHERS CHOSE THIS MOSQUE FOR THEIR MORNING PRAYERS JUNE 18. OTHERS HAVE TOLD US THAT THIS IS THE TRADITIONAL PLACE FROM WHICH THE BAIRAM MARCH TO THE CITY STADIUM BEGINS, AND THAT THE SHAYKH AT THE NEARBY MOSQUE IS A MB (SHAYKH MEHALAWI TRADITIONALLY HOLDS FORTH AT THE IBRAHIM MOSQUE, WHICH IS LOCATED DOWNTOWN AT RAMLEH STATION). WHATEVER THE REASON FOR THE SITE SELECTION--VICE ONE OF THE MAJOR MOSQUES DOWNTOWN-- SUNRISE ON THE FIRST DAY OF BAIRAM SAW APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN THOUSAND FUNDAMENTALISTS GATHERED IN THE STREET, SURROUNDED BY AN ESTIMATED ONE THOUSAND POLICE IN FULL RIOT GEAR, COMPLETE WITH SHIELDS AND BATONS. COMMENT: BOTH THOSE FIGURES COME FROM POLICE SOURCES. AN EGYPTIAN BUSINESSMAN, AND CONGEN CONTACT, WHO HAPPENED TO BE IN THE AREA AT THE TIME, HOWEVER, TELLS US THAT THERE WERE \"AT LEAST\" THREE THOUSAND RIOT POLICE. \"I BECAME VERY SCARED,\" HE SAID. END COMMENT. TRAFFIC (WHICH IS LIGHT AT THAT EARLY HOUR) WAS TOTALLY BLOCKED, BUT THERE WAS NO VIOLENCE, ACCORDING TO BOTH WESTERN OBSERVERS AND STATE SECURITY SOURCES. THE CONSULATE GENERAL\'S POLITICAL ASSISTANT (A MUSLIM) LIVES ON THE SQUARE, AND REPORTED BEING \"FRIGHTENED\" BY WHAT SHE OBSERVED, INCLUDING NUMEROUS WOMEN IN FULL VEIL--THE ENTIRE FACE COVERED (AS IN THE GULF). SHE FURTHER REPORTED THAT THE PRAYER WAS EXTREMELY WELL-ORGANIZED, WITH LEADERS DRESSED IN DISTINGUISHING GARB. IT APPEARS THAT THERE WERE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE SCENE, BETWEEN SECURITY OFFICIALS AND ORGANIZERS, AND THAT THOSE PARTICIPATING DID NOT ATTEMPT TO MARCH, BUT DISPERSED IN AN ORDERLY FASHION AFTER THE PRAYER AND SERMON. SHE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE SERMON, BY MB MOHAMED EL MARAGHI, CONTAINED DENUNCIATIONS OF THE GOE, CALLED \"TYRANNICAL\" AT ONE POINT. BY APPARENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE FUNDAMENTALIST ORGANIZERS, THE CROWD WAS ENJOINED BY THE SPEAKER NOT TO RESPOND TO VARIOUS, REPEATED JIBES HE MADE AT THE GOVERNMENT. REITERATING HER POINT ABOUT THEIR DISCIPLINE, OUR OBSERVER NOTED THAT THE GROUP OBEYED THIS REQUEST, ALBEIT WITH RELUCTANCE. COMMENT: MUSLIM BROTHER MOHAMED EL MARAGHI WAS ELECTED TO THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY (WAFD) IN THE HUY EHOIR ELECTIONS, REPRESENTING ALEXAN- DRIAACXDCENTRAL DISTRICT. WE HAVEKMET WITHRWIM ONCE (SEE ALEX QIIN PARA 21). END COMMENT. 6. SMALLER MARCHES. THERE WERE UNDOUBTEDLY SMALLER MARCHES, TRADITIONAL ON THE FIRST DAY OF BAIRAM, AT OTHER LOCATIONS (WE SUSPECT THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO PROHIBIT ONLY \"GREEN\" MARCHES)-- IN CONTRAVENTION OF MINISTER ROUCHDY\'S DECREE. ONE OCCURRED IN FRONT OF THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE, AND INCLUDED APPROXIMATELY A HUNDRED MEN (ONLY), MOST IN TYPICAL MB DRESS--WHITE GALLEBEYA, SKULL CAP--AND BEARDED, CHANTING THE TRADITIONAL BAIRAM PRAYER. THE SECURITY FORCES STATIONED AT THE RESIDENCE DID NOT INTERFERE AS THE MEN MARCHED PAST IN A HIGHLY-DISCIPLINED, ALMOST MILITARY FASHION. WE EARLIER REPORTED A DEMONSTRA- TION ON JUNE 17, THE LAST DAY OF RAMADAN, IN FRONT OF THE POLICE STATION IN THE WORKING CLASS DISTRICT OF MOHARREM BEY (SEE CAIRO 16037, PARA 8). THIFDMARCH, OF APPRTMIMALELY 300#$034 9, , WE HAVE SINCE LEARNED WAS NOT A \"GREEN\" 76-4:#, BUT A TACTIC USED TO FORCE EYEN GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT PUBLIC PRAYERS THE FIRST DAY OF BAIRAM. WE HAVE HEARD OF SIMILAR DEMONSTRATIONS AT OTHER POLICE STATIONS AROUND THE CITY, FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. 7. POLICE-MUSLIM BROTHER \"COOPERATION:\" AS WE BELIEVE IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE EVENTS IN ALEXANDRIA, THE SECURITY FORCES ARE IN DIALOGUE WITH MB LEADERS HERE: THE NEGOTIATIONS ATNSTATE SECURITY, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE CONDUCTED DIRECTLY BETWEEN GENERAL ABDEL HADI SAYED AND MOHAMED EL MARAGHI. WE ALSO SURMISE THAT THE FORCES COUNTED ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROWESS, AND THE WELL-KNOWN DISCIPLINE, OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD TO HELP THEM KEEP ORDER. WE NEVERTHELESS FIND THIS COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOE AND A STILL-BANNED ORGANIZATION CURIOUS. IN CONVERSATIONS ON THIS RATHER FINE POINT WITH EGYPTIAN CONTACTS WE HAVE HEARD TWO COMPLEMENTARY RATIONALES FOR THIS COOPERATION. ALEX NDP PARTY CHIEF, MOHAMED ABDELLAH, IN COMMENTS REMINISCENT OF REMARKS ONE HEARS ABOUT THE CPUSA, INDICATED THAT THE MB MOVEMENT IN EGYPT IS THOROUGHLY PENETRATED, CONSISTS LARGELY OF OLDER FUNDAMENTALISTS AND IS NEITHER A DYNAMIC, NOR A DANGEROUS FORCE IN THE COUNTRY. THE BUSINESSMAN QUOTED ABOVE (PARA 5), WHO HAS GOOD CONTACTS INSIDE THE SECURITY SERVICES, CLAIMS THAT THE MB\'S ARE \"QUIET\" NOW (RELATIVE TO PAST TIMES, ONE PRESUMES). HE FURTHER REPORTS THAT IT IS IN GOE INTEREST TO KEEP THE ORGANI- ZATION BANNED, AS THAT ALLOWS THE SECURITY FORCES TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TABS ON THE MOVEMENT. COMMENT: WE HAVE HEARD RUMORS THAT THE BAN ON THE BROTHERHOOD MIGHT BE LIFTED--BUT ALSO WORRIES EXPRESSED THAT THAT WOULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL TO BOTH THE RADICAL MUSLIMS AND THE GENERAL POPULATION. WE IMAGINE THAT THE SECURITY CONCERNS NOTED HERE MUST WEIGH HEAVILY IN GOE CALCULA- TIONS ON THIS ISSUE. END COMMENT. 8. \"ISLAMIC GROUPS:\" WHAT DOES CONCERN THESE SAME TWO SOURCES IS \"AL-GAMIAT AL-ISLAMIYYA\" (ISLAMIC GROUPS), THE SHADOWY, RADICAL UNDERGROUND GROUPS WHICH OPERATE ON A CELL SYSTEM, ACCORDING TO ABDELLAH. ABDELLAH SAYS THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT KNOW WHO THEY ARE, OR WHO LEADS THEM. THE BUSINESSMAN SAYS THAT IT IS THESE GROUPS WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, PUT THEIR FEMALES INTO FULL-FACE VEILS, AS NOTED ABOVE. HE ALSO CLAIMS THAT THE GROUPS ARE COMPOSED OF THE URBAN POOR, UNABLE TO COMPETE IN THE DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT OF CONTEMPORARY EGYPT. 9. COMMENT: WE DO NOT WANT TO EXAGGERATE THE IMPORTANCE OF A GATHERING OF FIFTEEN THOUSAND PEOPLE IN A CITY OF THREE MILLION. (THE ONLY MEDIA COVERAGE OF THIS EVENT WAS IN AN OPPOSITION NEWSPAPER, WHICH ALSO PUBLISHED TWO PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE GATHERING. A COPY HAS BEEN POUCHED TO INR AND NEA/EGY). NOR CAN WE EXPLAIN WHY SUCH A MASSIVE DEFIANCE OF MINISTRY ROUCHDY\'S DECREE OCCURRED ONLY IN ALEXANDRIA, NOT IN CAIRO (OR ELSEWHERE IN EGYPT, TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE). WE SURMISE THAT, AT LEAST AS REGARDS ALEXANDRIA, THE SECURITY FORCES CAME TO BELIEVE THAT A CONTROLLED GATHERING--EVEN ONE WHICH COMPLETELY BLOCKED ALEXANDRIA\'S MAIN STREET--WAS PREFERABLE TO A POTENTIALLY VIOLENT, UNCONTROLLED EVENT, WHATEVER THE LEGAL TECHNICALITIES. IN THIS REGARD, THE MB\'S BOTH SERVED GOE PURPOSES AND PROVIDED A VENUE FOR AL-GAMIAT AL-ISLAMIYYA--WHICH THEY WOULD HPXVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN THEMSELVES FROM THE GOVERNMENT. DESPITE THE EARLY HOUR OF THE SIDI GABER GATHERING, THE FACT OF ITS OCCURRENCE IS KNOWN THROUGHOUT THE CITY, AND HAS PROVOKED WORRIED COMMENTS FROM SOME OF OUR CONTACTS--USUALLY ALONG THE LINES THAT, \"THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CRACK-DOWN ON THESE PEOPLE.\" WITHIN THE LIMITS OF RATHER SEVERE PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS, WE SHALL ATTEMPT TO EXPAND OUR REPORTING ON FUNDAMENTALISM IN EGYPT\'S SECOND CITY. END COMMENT. COOK "	Success: CSV parsed	null	11,495
83	7/4/1985 3:13	85TOKYO13642	Embassy Tokyo	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "85TOKYO13620" ]	O 040313Z JUL 85 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3106 INFO GULF-WAR COLLECTIVE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 13642 TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O. 12356:OADR TAGS: PTER, PREL SUBJECT: RAFSANJANI CONDEMN\'S HIJACKINGS AND SUPER- POWER TERRORISM REF: TOKYO 13620 (NOTAL) 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT). 2. ACCORDING TO THE TOKYO PRESS JULY 4, IRANIAN MAJLIS SPEAKER RAFSANJANI TOLD REPORTERS AT A JULY 3 PRESS CONFERENCE THAT IRAN CONDEMNS HIJACKINGS AND ANY OTHER TERRORIST ACTS. AT THE SAME TIME, RAFSANJANI IS QUOTED AS CONDEMNING ABOVE ALL THE ROOT CAUSE OF TERRORISM WHICH, HE SAID, HINGES UPON THE ACTIONS OF THE SUPER- POWERS AND SOME OTHER STATES. RAFSANJANI REPORTEDLY SAID IT WAS WRONG TO CONDEMN THE TWA HIJACKERS WITHOUT CONDEMING ISRAEL FOR DETAINING OVER SEVEN HUNDRED LEBANESE. HE ALSO ACCUSED FRANCE OF SUPPORTING IRANIAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISTS, WHO HE SAID ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MANY DEATHS OF IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OTHERS. RAFSANJANI REPORTEDLY ADDED THAT, IF THESE MAJOR ACTS OF TERRORISM DISAPPEAR, MINOR TERRORISM WILL ALSO END. 3. IN AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH THE \"DAILY YOMIURI\" JULY 3, RAFSANJANI REPORTEDLY CLAIMED THAT U.S. EFFORTS TO RETALIATE FOR THE TWA HIJACKING, SUCH AS ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST MEA, WOULD NEVER PROVIDE A FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTION TO END TERRORISM. THUS, HE SAID AS LONG AS THE U.S. CARRIES OUT \"BIGGER TERRORISM\" AGAINST SMALL STATES, SUCH AS LEBANON AND IRAN, OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES COULD NOT BE BROUGHT TO AN END. 4. ON IRAN\'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., RAFSANJANI SAID NO IMPROVEMENT COULD BE POSSIBLE UNTIL THE U.S. \"ACKNOWLEDGES ITS PAST MISDEEDS\". HE ADDED THAT NO RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. WAS POSSIBLE SO LONG AS PRESIDENT REAGAN REMAINS IN OFFICE. 5. COMMENT: EMBASSY WILL RECEIVE MOFA READ-OUT ON RAFSANJANI\'S DISCUSSIONS HERE FOLLOWING RAFSANJANI\'S DEPARTURE JULY 5. MANSFIELD "	Success: CSV parsed	null	11,711
84	7/5/1985 11:00	85BEIRUT4000	Embassy Beirut	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	P 051100Z JUL 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3889 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 04000 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, EAIR, LE SUBJECT: GOL ANNOUNCES SECURITY PLAN FOR BEIRUT AIRPORT, AND MEASURES AGAINST U.S. EFFORTS TO SHUT DOWN BIA 1. (U) AMIDST MUCH FANFARE, LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAVE SET OUT THE FIRST STEPS OF WHAT IS ULTIMATELY INTENDED TO BE A NEW SECURITY PLAN FOR BEIRUT AIRPORT. THE PLAN WAS REPORTEDLY DRAWN UP AT A MEETING HELD AT THE AIRPORT ON JULY 3 WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY AIRPORT SECURITY OFFICIALS AND MILITIA REPRESENTATIVES, AND IS THEORETICALLY TO BE IMPLEMENTED WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS. 2. (U) IN A SEPARATE BUT RELATED DEVELOPMENT, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, AT A JULY 4 MEETING AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE ATTENDED BY A WHO\'S WHO OF THE LEBANESE MILITARY, INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, CUSTOMS, AND AVIATION SECTORS (AS WELL AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY), INSTRUCTED THE PARTICIPANTS TO DRAW UP A SIX- PRONGED CAMPAIGN TO COUNTER THE U.S. MOVES TO SHUT DOWN THE AIRPORT. 3. (U) UNDER THE SECURITY PLAN, ARMED MILITIAMEN WOULD BE BARRED FROM THE AIRPORT, ALL UNAUTHORIZED ENTRANCES TO THE TWO RUNWAYS WOULD BE CLOSED OFF, AND CARS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO APPROACH THE MAIN TERMINAL BUILDING. BEIRUT TELEVISION THURSDAY EVENING SHOWED FOOTAGE OF DIRT BERMS BEING CON- STRUCTED TO BLOCK TWO DIRT ROADS LEADING TO THE RUNWAYS, AND MEMBERS OF THE LAF SIXTH BRIGADE RIGOROUSLY SEARCHING PASSENGERS BOARDING MEA FLIGHTS AT THE AIRPORT. THE PRESS QUOTES AIRPORT SECURITY PERSONNEL AS SAYING THAT THE PLAN WILL BE OBSERVED BY ALL PARTIES DUE TO A HIGH LEVEL \"POLITICAL DECISION.\" 4. (U) CONTROVERSY OVER THE SECURITY PLAN HAS ALREADY BROKEN OUT. GEN. YASSIN SWAYD, THE HEAD OF THE AIRPORT SECURITY APPARATUS, WHO SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION SEVERAL MONTHS AGO TO PROTEST THE CHAOS AT THE AIRPORT, ANNOUNCED THURSDAY THAT HE WILL NOT RETURN TO HIS JOB. (THE GOL HAS NOT ACCEPTED HIS RESIGNATION.) SWAYD, WHO ATTENDED THE THURSDAY MEETING AT BA\'ABDA, PROTESTED THAT IN SPITE OF PRESS REPORTS THAT MEMBERS OF THE AIRPORT\'S SECURITY APPARATUS ATTENDED THE WEDNESDAY NIGHT MEETING AT WHICH THE SECURITY PLAN WAS DRAWN UP, THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. MOREOVER, HE SAID, \"THE SITUATION AT THE AIRPORT WILL REMAIN AS IT IS UNTIL THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT FORCES TAKE REAL CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT.\" 5. (U) THE SIX-PRONGED PLAN ORDERED BY THE PRESIDENT TO COUNTER THE U.S. MEASURES INVOLVES A SERIES OF \"LOCAL, ARAB, AND INTERNATIONAL MOVES TO EXPLAIN LEBANON\'S POSITION, AND THE MEASURES THAT LEBANON MIGHT TAKE TO PROTECT ITS RIGHTS AND TO PREVENT THE DAMAGE THAT MIGHT BE CAUSED TO ITS ECONOMY, NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION.\" THE PLAN WOULD INVOLVE A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE, WHILE TASK FORCES HAVE BEEN CREATED IN THE AREAS OF DIPLOMACY, POLITICS, SECURITY, INFORMATION, CIVIL AVIATION, AND \"ELECTRONIC FACILITIES.\" A MILITARY SECURITY COMMITTEE, HEADED BY ARMY COMMANDER GEN. \'AWN, WAS CHARGED WITH DRAFTING A SECURITY PLAN (APPARENTLY SEPARATE FROM THAT ALREADY DRAWN UP) TO CONTROL THE SITUATION INSIDE AND AROUND THE AIRPORT. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. MAHMUD TAY ABU DARGHAM WILL CHAIR A COMMITTEE \"TO ENSURE SECURITY BASED ON A POLITICAL AGREEMENT,\" MFA SYG TURK WILL HEAD THE COMMITTEE ON A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE. THE SIX TASK FORCES ARE SCHEDULED TO MEET AGAIN ON TUESDAY, JULY 16. 6. (C) COMMENT: THE JADED LEBANESE HAVE LONG BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO HAVING SECURITY CONCERNS ADDRESSED BY YET ANOTHER \"SECURITY PLAN.\" THE GOL HAS OUTDONE ITSELF IN SPADES THIS TIME, WITH THE HAPLESS GEN. DARGHAM HAVING DRAWN THE UNENVIABLE TASK OF RESOLVING THE KEY PROBLEM OF ENSURING SECURITY BASED ON A POLITICAL AGREEMENT--A GOAL WHICH HAS ELUDED THE LEBANESE FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS OF CIVIL WAR. BARTHOLOMEW "	Success: CSV parsed	null	11,765
85	7/11/1985 16:33	85BEIRUT4123	Embassy Beirut	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "85STATE209885" ]	O 111633Z JUL 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3969 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 04123 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, EAIR, LE, US SUBJECT: TWA 847 HIJACKING: DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO GOL REF: STATE 209885 1. C-ENTIRE TEXT. 2. DCM 11 JULY DELIVERED DIPLOMATIC NOTE CONTAINED REFTEL ON TWA 847 HIJACKING TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY GENERAL FUAD TURK. 3. TURK RESPONDED THAT THE GOL WAS ALREADY TAKING STEPS TO BRING TO JUSTICE THESE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIJACKING AND TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SECURITY AT BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (BIA). TURK SAID THAT THOSE TWO ISSUES HAD BEEN THE KEY THEMES IN HIS JULY 9 REPORT TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AT THE PALACE ON BIA SITUATION; HE REFERRED TC THEM AS \"INDISPENSABLE MEASURES\". 4. HE SAID THAT AFTER PRESENTATION OF HIS REPORT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS INSTRUCTED THE CHIEF JUSTICE TO INSTRUCT THE PROCUREUR GENERAL TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY LEGAL ACTIONS TO BRING THE HIJACKERS TO JUSTICE. TURK STRESSED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE ENTIRE GOL IS TAKING THIS ISSUE SERIOUSLY AND THAT THE PRESIDENT\'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE HAD BEEN\"VERY FIRM\". 5. TURK THEN TURNED TO SECURITY MEASURES AT BIA. HE STRESSED GOL AGREED WITH USG THAT IT WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO TAKE STEPS TO INSURE THAT EVENTS SUCH AS THE HIJACKING DO NOT AND CANNOT HAPPEN AGAIN. 6. TURK SAID THAT IN THE AREA OF \"TECHNICAL MEASURES,\" SUCH AS THE INTRODUCTION OF IMPROVED RADAR, REORGANIZED CONTROL TOWER, AND IMPROVED AND INCREASED SECURITY DEVICES AND LUGGAGE INSPECTION, GEMAYEL HAS PUT THE HEAD OF THE COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION (CDR) MALEK SALEM IN CHARGE OF COORDINATING THE GOL EFFORT. 7. IN THE AREA OF BROADER SECURITY MEASURES, TURK SAID THAT ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL DARGHAM HAS BEEN CHARGED BY GEMAYEL AND PRIME MINISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER KARAMI TO CONTACT THE MILITIAS CONCERNED TO ENSURE THAT BIA IS SEPARATED FROM OTHER MILITARY/POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND IS BROUGHT UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES, I.E., THE ARMY AND THE ISF. HE NOTED THAT DARGHAM HAD TO AWAIT THE RETURN OF BARRI FROM DAMASCUS TO BEGIN SECURITY CONVERSATION WITH AMAL. 8. AS FOR THE SECURITY PLAN FOR THE ROAD TO THE AIRPORT, TURK SAID LAF CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL AOUN HAS BEEN PUT IN CHARGE OF SECURING THE ROAD AND HAS PUT FORTH A PLAN TO DEPLOY THE ARMY ALONG THE THREE ROADS LEADING TO THE AIRPORT. TURK SAID A\'OUN IS PURSUING THE NECESSARY POLITICAL CONTACTS TO ENABLE HIM TO IMPLEMENT HIS PLAN. 9. TURK CONCLUDED BY ASSURING DCM THAT GOL IS TAKING THIS ISSUE VERY SERIOUSLY. 10. COMMENT: TURK IS NOT IN INNER DECISION-MAKING CIRCLE, BUT IS TAKING A PROMINENT LEAD IN THE GOL\'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO LINE UP SUPPORT TO KEEP BIA OPEN. TURK FIT DCM IN BETWEEN OTHER ALREADY SCHEDULED APPOINTMENTS AND THERE WAS NO TIME FOR DISCUSSION. TURK SUGGESTED THAT HE AND DCM MEET NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS ISSUES FURTHER. DCM AGREED. BARTHOLOMEW "	Success: CSV parsed	null	11,861
86	7/16/1985 11:58	85ATHENS12991	Embassy Athens	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "85STATE200090" ]	O 161158Z JUL 85 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1909 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 12991 DEPT FOR INR/GI/T E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: P\'ER, GR SUBJECT: TERRORIST UPDATE REF: STATE 200090 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO REFTEL: - A. ON AUGUST 5, 1973, TWO TERRORISTS SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS BELONGING TO AHMAD ABD AL GHAFFUR\'S GROUP OF FATAH DISSIDENTS ATTACKED HE CROWDED TRANSIT LOUNGE OF THE ATHENS INTERNA\'IONAL AIRPORT WITH GRENADES AND GUNFIRE, ILLING FIVE PERSONS AND INJURING 55 OTHERS. THEY WERE CAPTURED, TRIED AND SENTENCED TO DEATH BY A GREEK COURT IN JANUARY 1974. THEIR SENTENCES WERE COMMUTED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN APRIL 1974, AND GREECE EXPELLED THEM TO LIBYA IN MAY 1974. THE \'WO GUNMEN WERE APPARENTLY FREED BY LIBYA, SINCE ONE OF THEM WAS WITH ABD AL GHAFFUR WHEN HE WAS KILLED IN BEIRUT ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1974. - B. ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1974, A TWA JET BOUND FROM TEL AVIV FOR NEW YORK WITH 88 PERSONS ABOARD CRASHED IN THE IONIAN SEA OFF GREECE. THERE WERE NO SURVIVORS. THE ORGANIZATION OF ARAB NATIONALIST YOUTH FOR \'HE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED A STATEMENT IN BEIRUT SAYING THA\' A MEMBER OF THEIR ORGANIZATION WHO WAS ON THE FLIGHT EXPLODED A CHARGE HE WAS CARRYING AROUND HIS WAIST, CAUSING HIS OWN DEATH AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PLANE. ON JANUARY 11, 1975, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD INVES\'IGATORS EXAMINED A RELATIVELY SMALL QUANTITY OF DEBRIS RECOVERED AFTER THE PLANE SANK IN 10,800 FEET OF WATER, SAID LABORATORY TESTS SHOWED CONCLUSIVELY THAT A HIGH-EXPLOSIVE BOMB IN A REAR CARGO COMPARTMENT CAUSED THE CRASH. WE ARE AWARE OF NO EVIDENCE LINKING THE CRASH TO GREECE OTHER THAN \'HE FACT THAT IT OCCURED IN THE IONIAN SEA. - C. ON DECEMBER 23, 1975, RICHARD S. WELCH WAS ASSASSINATED BY GUNMEN OUTSIDE HIS RESIDENCE IN THE SUBURB OF PSYCHIKO NORTH OF ATHENS. A GROUP CALLING ITSELF \"17 NOVEMBER\" SUBSEQUENTLY CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ASSASSINATION. SINCE THEN, \"17 NOVEMBER\" HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF FOUR GREEK POLICE OFFICIALS, A CONSERVATIVE NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER AND, ON NOVEMBER 15, 1983, THE ASSASSINATION OF USN CAPTAIN GEORGE TSANTES. \"17 NOVEMBER\" ALSO CLAIMED RESPONSIBILI\'Y FOR THE A\'\'FMPTED ASSASSINATION OF JUSMAGG COURIER M/SGT JUDD ON APRIL 3, 1984. THE GOG INVESTIGATION OF \"17 NOVEMBER\" CONTINUES. NO ARRESTS HAVE BEEN MADE. WE HAVE NO NEW INFORMATION TO ADD TO THE SUBS\'ANTIAL REPORTING WE HAVE PROVIDED THE DEPAR\'MENT ON \"17 NOVEMBER.\" 3. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS HAVE OCCURRED IN GREECE: - A. A GROUP CALLING ITSELF THE \"REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE\'S S\'RUGGLE\" (ELA) HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILI\'Y FOR SOME 250 BOMBINGS SINCE IT FIRS\' APPEARED IN 1974. ITS TARGETS HAVE INCLUDED MULTINA\'IONAL FIRMS, POLICE STATIONS AND THE CARS OF FOREIGN, INCLUDING AMERICAN, DIPLOMATS. ELA ALSO RECLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR TWO BOMBS AT THE AMBASSADOR\'S RESIDENCE IN 1982. ON MAY 15, 1985, CHRIS\'OS \'SOUTSOUVIS, A TERRORIST SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN CONNECTED WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF GREEK PUBLIC PROSECUTOR GEORGIOS THEOFANOPOULOS ON APRIL 1, 1985, WAS KILLED IN A SHOOT-OUT WITH POLICE. INVESTIGATORS ESTABLISHED THAU\'SOUVIS BELONGED TO ELA FROM 1976 TO 1980. THE POG INVESTIGATION OF ELA CONTINUES. NO ARRESTS HAVE BEEN MADE THUS FAR. - B. ON FEBRUARY 2, 1985, A BOMB EXPLODED AT A BAR IN GLYFADA FREQUENTED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, INJURING 55 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS. NO GROUP CREDITABLY CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMBING. THE GOG HAS FILED CHARGES AGAINST UNKNOWN PERSONS, A COMMON PRACTICE IN GREECE WHEN A SUSPECT\'S IDENTITY REMAINS UNDETERMINED. - C. ON JUNE 14, 1985, TWA FLIGHT 847 FROM ATHENS TO NEW YORK CARRYING 153 PASSENGERS AND CREW WAS HIJACKED SHORTLY AFTER ITS TAKE-OFF FROM ATHENS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BY SAMIR SOLWAN AND GOLAB AL-HOBBI, TWO SHI\'ITE LEBANESE TERRORISTS BELIEVED TO BELONG TO HEZBOLLAH. A THIRD ACCOMPLICE, ALI A\'WA, WHO WAS UNABLE TO BOARD THE FLIGHT IN ATHENS, WAS CAPTURED BY GREEK AUTHORITIES AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXCHANGED FOR A NUMBER OF PASSENGERS WHILE THE PLANE WAS IN ALGIERS. ON JUNE 15, USN DIVER ROBERT STETHEM WAS BRU\'ALLY MURDERED BY THE HIJACKERS AND HIS BODY DUMPED ON \'HE TARMAC AT BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THE REMAINING PASSENGERS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED GREEK AUTHORITIES ARE CONTINUING THEIR INVESTIGATION AS TO HOW THE HANDGUN AND HAND GRENADES USED BY THE TERRORISTS WERE SMUGGLED ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT. - D. ON JULY 1, 1985, A CAR BOMB EXPLODED IN THE PARKING LOT ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE APOLLON PALACE HOTEL, THE U.S. AIR FORCE CLUB IN KAVOURI, A SEASIDE SUBURB OF ATHENS. FORTUNATELY, NO ONE WAS INJURED. TWO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS -- ELA \"ANTI-IMPERIALIST ANTI-AMERICAN STRUGGLE GROUP\" -- CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMBING. THE GOG INVESTIGATION CONTINUES, WITH NO ARRESTS THUS FAR. 4. WE ARE AWARE OF NO EVIDENCE OF MATERIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED TO LOCAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS BY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES OR NON-INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS. STEARNS "	Success: CSV parsed	null	11,939
87	7/17/1985 10:07	85BEIRUT4218	Embassy Beirut	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O 171007Z JUL 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4037 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 04218 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, LE SUBJECT: RENEWED CLASHES IN TRIPOLI 1.(U) BEIRUT PRESS REPORTS CONTINUING CLASHES BETWEEN SUNNI FUNDAMENTALIST \"ISLAMIC MEETING\" FORCES AND PRO-SYRIAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC (ADP) PARTY MILITIAMEN IN TRIPOLI. ACCORDING TO THESE ACCOUNTS, DURING THE JULY 15 FIGHTING ELEMENTS OF THE LAF SECOND BRIGADE (CHARGED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPOLI SECURITY PLAN) FOUGHT SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH THE SUNNI FUNDAMENTALISTS AGAINST THE ADP. IF THESE REPORTS ARE CORRECT, THE LAF MAY HAVE COMPROMISED ITS ABILITY TO PLAY ITS ASSIGNED ROLE AS IMPARTIAL ARBITER IN THE CONTINUING DISPUTES. 2.(U) ACCORDING TO THESE ACCOUNTS, SYRIAN EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THIS MOST RECENT OUTBREAK ARE TAKING TWO FORMS. ADP AND TAWHID LEADERS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN SUMMONED BY SYRIAN VP KHADDAM TO DAMASCUS FOR TALKS TO TAKE PLACE THE WEEK OF JULY 22. SYRIAN MILITARY OBSERVERS ARE ALSO EXPECTED IN TRIPOLI ITSELF TO SUPERVISE THE CURRENT CEASE-FIRE. 3.(C) COMMENT. THE SYRIANS HAVE CONSISTENTLY USED THE ADP TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE SUNNI FUNDAMENTALISTS, MOST OF WHOM ARE ARAFAT SUPPORTERS, AND MANY OF WHOM ARE FORMER FATAH MEMBERS WHO JOINED TAWHID WHEN ARAFAT WAS FORCED OUT OF TRIPOLI. THE SYRIANS ARE APPARENTLY CONTENT AT THIS POINT TO LET THE CONFLICT SIMMER WHILE WORKING TO AVOID AN OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE WHICH THEY COULD NOT CONTROL. END COMMENT. BARTHOLOMEW "	Success: CSV parsed	null	12,076
88	7/25/1985 13:13	85BEIRUT4372	Embassy Beirut	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "85DAMASCUS4580" ]	P 251313Z JUL 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4143 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 04372 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KPAL, SY, LE SUBJECT: SIDON: ANOTHER \"WAR OF THE CAMPS\" IN THE OFFING? REF: DAMASCUS 4580 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. SIX WEEKS AFTER ISRAEL ANNOUNCED THE COMPLETION OF ITS MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH LEBANON, THAT REGION REMAINS TENSE AND UNSETTLED. ALTHOUGH RELIABLE, FIRST-HAND REPORTS ARE SPARSE, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE SITUATIONS CONTINUE TO PREVAIL IN SIDON AND JAZZIN. TROUBLES LINGER ALONG THE BORDER STRIP BUT APPEAR TO HAVE DIMINISHED. 3. IN SIDON, INCREASED FEARS OF AN OPEN CONFLICT INVOLVING PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS, THE PNSF, AMAL, LOCAL MUSLIM MILITIAS, AND PERHAPS THE PSP HAVE LED TO SYRIAN-SPONSORED EFFORTS TO HEAD OFF ANY SUCH SHOWDOWN AND TO AVERT ANOTHER \"WAR OF THE CAMPS.\" MEANWHILE, SYRIA IS REPORTEDLY BOLSTERING THE AMAL MILITIA WITH ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF DOUBTS ABOUT THE STEADFASTNESS OF ITS OTHER ALLIES. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 4. THE LOCAL PRESS AND MOST OF OUR LEBANESE POLITICAL CONTACTS ARE REPLETE WITH STORIES THAT TENSIONS ARE ESCALATING IN SIDON. THESE STORIES ARISE, IN PART, FROM REPORTS THAT PLO LEADER ARAFAT IS REINFORCING HIS LOYALISTS IN THE THE AYN AL-HILWAH AND MIYAH MIYAH REFUGEE CAMPS AND IN SIDON PROPER WITH ADDITIONAL MEN AND MATERIEL. ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT CONFIRM OR QUANTIFY THESE REINFORCEMENTS, THE LEADERS OF SIDON ARE, WE HEAR, EXTREMELY EDGY\" ABOUT THE ESCALATING TENSIONS THERE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A FLARE-UP SIMILAR TO THE \"WAR OF THE CAMPS\" IN BEIRUT. 5. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS REPORTS, IN EARLY JULY, SYRIAN TROOPS IN EASTERN LEBANON FORCED THE PRO-ARAFAT \"BADR BATTALION\" OF THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ARMY OUT OF THE BIQA\', WHERE IT HAD BEEN SINCE 1982, AND BACK TO JORDAN. THE PRESS ALSO CITED REPORTS FROM CAIRO THAT ARAFAT HAD PERSUADED THE GOE TO ALLOW HIM TO TRANSFER A PLA UNIT, THE AYN JALUT BRIGADE, FROM EGYPT TO SOUTH LEBANON. ON JULY 18, MUSTAFA SA\'AD\'S \"POPULAR NASSERITE ORGANIZATION\" CLAIMED TO HAVE INTERCEPTED TWO SHIPMENTS OF ARMS DESTINED FOR THE CAMPS AND TO HAVE CAPTURED THE SMUGGLERS, WHO WERE IDENTIFIED AS FOUR PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS BEARING JORDANIAN PASSPORTS. IN A \"RADIO MONTE CARLO\" INTERVIEW, SIDON MP NAZIH BIZRI SAID THE TWO CONTAINERS OF ARMS HAD BEEN SENT FROM JORDAN VIA THE NORTHERN LEBANESE PORT OF TRIPOLI. MOST RECENTLY, ON JULY 23, AN ISRAELI NAVAL VESSEL FIRED ON AND SET ABLAZE A HONDURAN-REGISTERED FREIGHTER IN SIDON HARBOR. ALTHOUGH RELIABLE DETAILS ARE SPARSE, THE CARGO VESSEL WAS EVIDENTLY SUSPECTED OF CARRYING ARMS; ITS MOVEMENTS WERE DESCRIBED BY ISRAELI RADIO AS \"SUSPICIOUS.\" 6. ON THE GROUND, THE RECENT ESCALATION OF TENSIONS IN SIDON HAS SO FAR BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY STILL RELATIVELY MINOR SHIA VS. PALESTINIAN CLASHES. (WE HAVE SEEN NO RECENT REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT CLASHES BETWEEN LEBANESE SHIA AND SUNNI IN SIDON, THOUGH ANIMOSITIES BETWEEN THEM RUN HIGH.) AMAL AND PNSF FIGHTERS CLASHED BRIEFLY ON JULY 15 WHEN THE LATTER ATTEMPTED TO REOCCUPY PREVIOUSLY EVACUATED POSITIONS NEAR AYN AL-HILWAH CAMP. OTHER AMAL-PALESTINIAN CLASHES OCCURRED THE SAME DAY NEAR BA\'LABAKK AND ON JULY 21 AT THE BURJ AL-BURAJINAH CAMP IN BEIRUT. ON THE NIGHT OF JULY 22-23, SHIITE-PALESTINIAN TENSIONS ALSO SURFACED IN TYRE, WHERE AMAL FORCES ENCIRCLED BASS REFUGEE CAMP, FOLLOWING THE SHOOTING OF AN AMAL MILITIAMAN. 7. FACED WITH PERSISTENT SHIITE-PALESTINIAN AND BROADER SHIITE-SUNNI TENSIONS IN VARIOUS AREAS OF LEBANON, SYRIA APPEARS TO BE GOING TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO PUSH ITS ALLIES --- BOTH LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN --- TO AVERT A REPETITION IN SIDON OF A BEIRUT-STYLE \"WAR OF THE CAMPS.\" 8. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE SYRIAN-SPONSORED CONFERENCE OF JULY 8-9, LEBANESE MUSLIM LEADERS DECLARED THEY WOULD NOT TOLERATE THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRE-1982 SITUATION IN LEBANON, WHEN THE PLO WAS VIRTUALLY A STATE WITHIN A STATE. THEY SPECIFICALLY SAID THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW THE \"SEDITION\" WHICH HAD PREVAILED IN BEIRUT AND ITS PALESTINIAN CAMPS TO EXTEND TO SIDON. 9. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE DAMASCUS CONFERENCE, AND REPORTEDLY WITH SYRIAN VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM\'S BACKING, PRO-SYRIAN PARTIES ANNOUNCED A PLAN TO FORM A \"NATIONAL ALLIANCE FRONT,\" ONE OF WHOSE OBJECTIVES WOULD BE TO AVOID FRICTIONS IN SIDON. THE FRONT WOULD INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, NABIH BARRI\'S AMAL MOVEMENT, WALID JUMBLATT\'S \"NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT,\" AND THE \"NATIONAL POLITICAL COUNCIL\" OF SIDON, WHICH IS CHAIRED BY NAZIH BIZRI AND INCLUDES MUSTAFA SA\'AD\'S \"POPULAR NASSERITE ORGANIZATION.\" 10. CONCOMITANTLY, SYRIA HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN TRYING TO ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE AMAL AND THE PNSF. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, KHADDAM ARRANGED A MEETING IN DAMASCUS ON JULY 9 BETWEEN BARRI AND PNSF LEADERS WHICH JUMBLATT ALSO ATTENDED. ON JULY 12, THE MAIN PRO-SYRIAN GROUPS IN SIDON --- AMAL, THE NATIONAL POLITICAL COUNCIL, THE POPULAR NASSERITE ORGANIZATION, AND THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY --- AND THE PNSF ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT GIVING ARAFAT\'S SUPPORTERS IN SIDON ONE WEEK TO LEAVE THE CITY. THE STATEMENT SPECIFICALLY BRANDED FOUR INDIVIDUALS AS \"SYMBOLS OF ARAFAT\'S CAPITULATIONIST POLICY\": ABDEL AZIZ ABU FADAH, RAJI AL NAJMAH, HUSSEIN AL HAIBI, AND MOEMEN. 11. MOST RECENTLY, ON JULY 22-24, SYRIAN VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM HOSTED A LARGE MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PNSF, THE NATIONAL POLITICAL COUNCIL OF SIDON, AMAL, AND THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT. ACCORDING TO BANNER REPORTS IN THE BEIRUT PRESS, THIS DAMASCUS MEETING RESULTED IN THE APPROVAL OF A PNSF PROPOSAL TO FORM A MIXED COMMITTEE TO \"REDEFINE ON PAPER\" LEBANESE- PALESTINIAN RELATIONS. AS FOR SIDON ITSELF, THE CONFEREES ADOPTED A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR (A) THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARMED PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS FROM THE CITY AND A PROMISE NOT TO ORGANIZE NIGHT PATROLS IN THE SUBURBS; (B) THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMAL MILITIAMEN FROM THE SECTOR EXTENDING FROM RMAYLAH TO THE NORTHERN ENTRANCE OF SIDON; (C) THE NDF TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING ORDER IN THE CITY AND CONTROLING ACCESS ROADS, UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THREE SYRIAN ARMY OFFICERS; AND (D) A \"POLITICAL CONTROL COMMISSION\" CHAIRED BY KHALID JUMBLATT AND COMPRISING NAZIH BIZRI, ANWAR FATAYRI, INAAM RAAD, AND USSAMA SA\'AD. 12. THE MAJOR QUESTION WHICH REMAINS UNANSWERED IS WHAT THE LINE-UP WILL BE WHEN AND IF SERIOUS FIGHTING ERUPTS IN SIDON. AS NOTED ABOVE, SYRIA IS APPARENTLY PUSHING HARD FOR ITS LEBANESE ALLIES --- BE THEY SHIA, SUNNI, OR DRUZE --- AND THE PNSF TO STAND FIRM AGAINST THE PRO-ARAFAT PALETINIANS. WE AND MANY OBSERVERS HERE, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT FIGHTING WOULD MOST LIKELY ERUPT BETWEEN AMAL AND THE ARAFATISTS AND THAT THE PNSF FORCES WOULD QUICKLY JOIN IN SUPPORT OF THEIR PALESTINIAN BRETHREN AGAINST THE LEBANESE SHIA. THIS SCENARIO WOULD MIRROR THAT OF THE \"WAR OF THE CAMPS\" IN BEIRUT IN WHICH PRO AND ANTI-ARAFATISTS COMBINED FORCES AGAINST THE SHIA. 13. THE ROLE OF THE SIDONESE SUNNI MILITIAS IS LESS PREDICTABLE. WOULD THEY FIGHT AS LEBANESE, I.E., WITH THE SHIA AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS? WOULD THEY FIGHT AS SUNNI, I.E., WITH THE PALESTINIANS AGAINST THE SHIA? OR WOULD THEY TRY TO REMAIN NEUTRAL? WE AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT, FOR NOW, BIZRI AND SA\'AD HAVE PERHAPS SEIZED UPON AN ANTI-ARAFATIST STANCE AS A LOW-COST WAY TO PLEASE THE SYRIANS. ONCE FIGHTING BEGINS, HOWEVER, WE ARE FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT THE SUNNI WILL CONTINUE THIS LINE. SHIITE-SUNNI TENSIONS IN SIDON, AS IN WEST BEIRUT, RUN HIGH, AND WE RECALL THAT DURING THE \"WAR OF THE CAMPS\" THE REMNANTS OF THE SUNNI MURABITUN MILITIA JOINED WITH THE PALESTINIANS TO MAKE NIGHTTIME RAIDS ON AMAL AND PREDOMINANTLY SHIITE LAF 6TH BRIGADE POSITIONS. 14. THE PSP REMAINS ANOTHER WILD CARD. AS THE \"WAR OF THE CAMPS\" IN BEIRUT PROCEEDED, THE DRUZE-SHIA ALLIANCE BECAME INCREASINGLY STRAINED, AND, AS FIGHTING IN WEST BEIRUT EARLIER THIS MONTH DEMONSTRATED, TENSION BETWEEN AMAL AND THE PSP CONTINUES TO RUN VERY HIGH. AN ADDITIONAL COMPLICATING FACTOR IS THAT ABOUT TWO THOUSAND SUNNI MILITIAMEN HAVE REPORTEDLY JOINED THE PSP SINCE THE DEFEAT OF THE MURABITUN MILITIA IN APRIL. 15. FACED WITH THE PROSPECT THAT THE SUPPOSEDLY PRO-SYRIAN PNSF, POPULAR NASSERITE ORGANIZATION, AND PSP MAY, IN FACT, SIDE WITH THE PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS OR AT LEAST AGAINST AMAL, SYRIA HAS REPORTEDLY BEGUN TO REINFORCE THE AMAL MILITIA WITH ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING (SEE DATT SEPTEL). DURING THE APRIL 16-17 \"BATTLE OF BEIRUT\" AND THEN THE \"WAR OF THE CAMPS,\" THE AMAL MILITIA\'S WEAKNESSES AND LIMITATIONS WERE EXPOSED. SYRIA IS NOW APPARENTLY TRYING TO BOLSTER THE STRENGTH OF ITS MOST RELIABLE ALLY. LYNE " "89","8/19/1985 15:47","85BEIRUT4802","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 191547Z AUG 85 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4425 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 04802 E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL TAGS: PTER PGOV LE SUBJECT: A BAD WEEK FOR BEIRUT 1.(U) SUMMARY. THE WEEK AUGUST 11-18 WITNESSED THE WORST OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE IN BEIRUT SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYRIAN SECURITY PLAN FOR WEST BEIRUT. TWO MASSIVE CAR BOMBS ROCKED EAST BEIRUT ON AUGUST 14 AND 17, AND SHELLING ACROSS THE GREENLINE INTENSIFIED UNTIL A FRAGILE CEASEFIRE WAS PUT BACK IN PLACE ON AUGUST 15. OTHER VIOLENCE WAS REPORTED IN ZAHLE, NEAR THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS, AND IN TYRE. MEANWHILE THE INABILITY OF THE CABINET TO MEET SYMBOLIZED THE CONTINUED STALL IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. END SUMMARY. 2.(U) EARLY IN THE WEEK BLIND SHELLING ACROSS THE GREEN LINE RESUMED, CULMINATING IN A SIX HOUR EXCHANGE OF HEAVY ARTILLERY AND ROCKET FIRE ON AUGUST 15 THAT ENDED FINALLY AT THE FOURTH ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A CEASE- FIRE. INTERMITTENT SHELLING HAS SINCE OCCURED, BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. A WEDNESDAY NOON CAR BOMB IN SADD AL BASHURIYAH CAUSED 13 DEATHS. 3.(U) SATURDAY\'S CAR BOMB, OUTSIDE A BUSY SUPERMARKET ON THE MAIN COASTAL ROAD IN ANTILYAS, CAUSED 67 DEATHS AND 122 WOUNDED. MOST OF THE DEATHS WERE CAUSED BY THE FIRE THAT TRAPPED SHOPPERS AND EMPLOYEES INSIDE THE BOMBED BUILDING, BUT THE BLAST ITSELF, ESTIMATED AT THE FORCE OF 1,000 KILOS OF TNT, WAS POWERFUL ENOUGH TO HURL FIVE BODIES ACROSS THE COASTAL HIGHWAY AND INTO THE SEA. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS AGENCY \"MARKAZIA\" RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMB HAS BEEN CLAIMED BY A GROUP CALLING ITSELF \"THE RED HAND - BRIGADE OF SADR.\" 4. (U) DURING THE WEEK ZAHLE HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO EARLY MORNING ATTACKS THAT HAVE CAUSED ONLY MATERIAL DAMAGE. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, LF LEADER ELIE HOBAYKA AGREED AT A FRIDAY MEETING WITH A LOCAL GREEK CATHOLIC DELEGATION TO CLOSE PHALANGE OFFICES IN THE CITY AND TO WITHDRAW LF MILITIAMEN. 5. (U) IN OTHER EVENTS THERE WAS AN ATTACK ON AMAL OFFICES IN TYRE ON AUGUST 15. LEBANESE STATE TV REPORTED FIRST THAT THIS ATTACK HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY HIZBALLAH FORCES TO PROTEST AMAL RESTRICTIONS ON HIZBALLAH ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH AND THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE FIRE COULD HAVE COME FROM A ISRAELI PATROL VESSEL. ON AUGUST 17 THERE WAS A CLASH USING AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND RPG\'S BETWEEN AMAL AND PLO FORCES OUTSIDE THE SABRA CAMP. PALESTINIANS CLAIMED THAT AMAL WAS HOLDING MOUSTAPHA DIAB, AKA ABOUL FATEH, HEAD OF THE ARAFAT FORCES IN LEBANON. AN AUTHORIZED AMAL SPOKESMAN SAID THAT AMAL WAS NOT NOW HOLDING ANY PALESTINIANS. 6. (U) THE WEEK ALSO FAILED TO REGISTER ANY FORWARD PROGRESS IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. IN FACT AFTER THE ANTILYAS CAR BOMB PRIME MINISTER KARAME WAS QUOTED AS SAYING HE \"DIDN\'T KNOW WHAT TO DO, WHETHER TO RESIGN OR TO CONTINUE ON.\" SHIITE CABINET MINISTERS USAYRAN AND BARRI, AFTER ANNOUNCING THAT THEY WOULD ATTEND A MEETING OF MUSLIM CABINET MINISTERS ON AUGUST 19, STATED THAT \"IT IS TIME THAT THE SECURITY CONDITION IMPROVES AND THAT SYRIA CONTRIBUTES TO AN IMPROVEMENT ON THE GROUND.\" FOR ITS PART THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE LF ISSUED A STATEMENT \"PROMISING TO TAKE REVENGE FOR INNOCENT VICTIMS AND TO UNDERTAKE A RESPONSE AT A LEVEL COMMEN- SURATE WITH THE CRIME.\" 7. (C) COMMENT. LAST WEEK\'S EVENTS HAD NO POSITIVE ASPECT. LITTLE IS EXPECTED TO COME FROM TODAY\'S MEETING OF MUSLIM CABINET MINISTERS, FROM WHICH THE TRAVELING WALID JUMBLATT WILL BE ABSENT. ON THE CHRISTIAN SIDE CONSULTATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE IN PREPARATION FOR FRANJIYYAH\'S RELEASE ON SEPT. 1 OF HIS PROPOSALS FOR REFORM. ON THE SECURITY FRONT THERE ARE TOO MANY FLASHPOINTS - ALONG THE SOUTHERN BORDER STRIP, NEAR THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS, ALONG THE GREEN LINE, IN ZAHLE OR IN TRIPOLI, TO PREDICT A QUIET WEEK AHEAD. BARTHOLOMEW " "90","9/3/1985 15:07","85ALEXANDRIA817","Consulate Alexandria","CONFIDENTIAL","85ALEXANDRIA435\|85ALEXANDRIA535\|85ALEXANDRIA771","R 031507Z SEP 85 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5491 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ALEXANDRIA 00817 PLEASE PASS USAID E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PINR, EG SUBJECT: ALEXANDRIA: A \"DEEPLY DIVIDED\" CITY REFS: (A) ALEXANDRIA 435 - (B) ALEXANDRIA 535 - (C) ALEXANDRIA 771 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY. THE JULY 2 PRESENTATION, TO THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, OF THE PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON ALEXANDRIA GOVERNOR FAWZI MA\'AZ\'S CONDUCT OF OFFICE DID NOT STOP THE DEBATE. INDEED, NEW CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES HAVE EMERGED DURING THE SUMMER WHICH INDICATE THAT THIS ISSUE IS FAR FROM DEAD. IN RESPONSE TO HIS TROUBLES, THE GOVERNOR HAD REMOVED TWO OF ALEXANDRIA\'S TOP POLITICAL OFFICIALS, LEAVING THE CITY WITH AN EMBATTLED GOVERNOR AND TWO NEWCOMERS TO COPE WITH ALEXANDRIA\'S MOUNTING PROBLEMS. HE HAS ALSO SUED WAFD PARTY AND NEWSPAPER LEADERSHIP FOR LIBEL. WHILE THERE AREN\'T TOO MANY HEROES IN THIS STORY, THE EMERGING POLITICAL ROLE OF MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, YOUSSEF WALLY, IS WORTH NOTING. END SUMMARY. - - 3. POLITICS, THIS SUMMER, IN THE VERY POLITICAL CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, HAVE REVOLVED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AROUND THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNOR FAWZI MA\'AZ (REFS A AND B). WHILE THE GOE APPARENTLY ELECTED TO CUBBY-HOLE THE REPORT PRODUCED BY THE PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE (REF A), THIS WAS NOT ACHIEVED WITHOUT A SOMEWHAT TUMULTUOUS LAST DAY OF PARLIAMENT-- AND AT LEAST SOME DAMAGE, WE HEAR, TO THE REPUTATION OF PEOPLES ASSEMBLY SPEAKER, RIFAAT AL MAHGOUB. ALTHOUGH NO PUBLISHED ACCOUNT TELLS US WHAT HAPPENED TO THE REPORT (SOME BELIEVE IT WAS REFERRED TO THE MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT; OTHERS THINK THE REPORT, AND ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS, WENT TO THE SOCIALIST PROSECUTOR), THE GOVERNMENT IS PERCEIVED AS HAVING TAKEN NO ACTION IN THE MA\'AZ CASE, AND ATTACKS IN THE WEEKLY \"WAFD\" HAVE CONTINUED UNABATED. THE GOVERNOR HAS ENMESHED HIMSELF FURTHER BY GIVING INTERVIEWS WHICH, FAR FROM EXONERATING HIM, HAVE NOT ONLY KEPT THE DEBATE ALIVE, BUT PROVIDED NEW AMMUNITION FOR CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES. -- NEAR THE END OF THE SUMMER, AND BECAUSE OF PERCEIVED WRONG ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE SEWAGE DEBATE HAS RESURFACED, BOTH IN ALEXANDRIA AND IN THE COLUMNS OF ALL NATIONAL DAILIES. THIS PROUD CITY IS NOT ONLY BEING HELD UP TO NATIONAL RIDICULE, BUT THE APPARENT DRIFT AND INDECISIVENESS--ON BOTH THE MA\'AZ CASE AND THE SEWAGE OUTFALL QUESTION--HAVE LEFT BOTH OBSERVERS AND PARTICIPANTS WITH THE IMPRESSION OF \"A WEAK GOVERNMENT\"--IN THE WORDS OF ONE OF MA\'AZ\'S FELLOW GOVERNORS. 4. THE LAST DAY OF PARLIAMENT: BY ALL ACCOUNT, THE LAST DAY OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, JULY 2, WAS A LIVELY OR \"MELODRAMATIC\" (IN THE WORDS OF \"AL SHAAB\" JULY 9) OCCASION. THE 41-PAGE REPORT ON GOVERNOR MA\'AZ WAS DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS ONLY THAT MORNING. TWO NDP AND TWO WAFD MEMBERS WERE ALLOWED BRIEFLY TO DISCUSS THE SANITIZED (ACCORDING TO THE \"WAFD,\" JULY 18) REPORT. THE LAST SESSION OF PARLIAMENT, HEAVILY MANAGED BY SPEAKER RIFAAT AL MAGHOUB, LASTED ONLY TWO HOURS AND 20 MINUTES AND SAW THE PASSAGE OF 6 NEW LAWS AND THE APPROVAL OF 14 REPORTS. THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL ITEM WAS NOT EVEN ON THE AGENDA: AT THE REQUEST GOVERNOR MA\'AZ, THE NDP MOVED TO LIFT THE PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY OF \"WAFD\" EDITOR, AND PA MEMBER FOR PORT SAID, MOUSTAPHA SHERDY. IN ALEXANDRIA, WE UNDERSTAND THAT GOVERNOR MA\'AZ HOSTED AN INFORMAL RECEPTION IN HIS OFFICE THAT DAY TO CELEBRATE THE EVENTS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE IN CAIRO. COMMENT: ANOTHER LOCAL ECHO OF CAIRO\'S DRAMATIC EVENTS WAS THAT MA\'AZ SENT HIS SECRETARY TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL THAT DAY TO PROCURE A VISA FOR HIS SON: \"HE PROBABLY IS ASKING FOR THIS NOW, BECAUSE HE WON\'T BE AROUND MUCH LONGER,\" COMMENTED HIS SECRETARY. END COMMENT. 5. LIFTING SHERDY\'S PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY: BY MOST ACCOUNTS, INCLUDING NDP, THE SUCCESSFUL ACTION TO LIFT SHERDY\'S IMMUNITY (PROPOSED BY MA\'AZ DEFENDER FAROUK GARANA, SEE PARA 7), WAS EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY. IT PROVOKED A WAFD BOYCOTT OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK\'S TRADITIONAL TEA ON THE LAST DAY OF PARLIAMENT, A ONE DAY RESIGNATION FROM THE WAFD LEADERSHIP BY FOUAD SERAG EL DIN, AND A FIRESTORM IN NATIONAL PRESS, MOST NOTABLY IN THE \"WAFD,\" WHICH INTER ALIA, CHALLENGED THE GOE TO SHOW ON TELEVISION THE COMPLETE FOOTAGE OF THE LAST DAY OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY (A CHALLENGE NOT YET TAKEN UP). AN UNREPENTANT SHERDY HELD FORTH IN A PAGE ONE EDITORIAL IN THE JULY 11 EDITION OF THE \"WAFD,\" DECRYING MAGHOUB\'S MANAGEMENT OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY AND ATTACKING THE SPEAKER IN STRONG LANGUAGE: \"THE DOG AT THE CENTER OF POWER... KNOWS HE IS NOTHING BUT A MERE CORPSE SITTING IN THE (SPEAKER\'S) CHAIR... WHOSE PEN DISCHARGES NOTHING BUT PUS. I WOULD LIKE TO TELL HIM THAT MY FEELING TOWARDS HIM NOW IS THE FEELING OF PITY.\" THE SAME EDITORIAL ALSO (AND FINALLY) GOT TO THE HEART OF WAFD CHARGES AGAINST MA\'AZ: \"MA\'AZ SHOULD NOT SLIP AWAY FROM PUNISHMENT (BUT) MA\'AZ IS NOT THE ONLY PROBLEM. THE BIG PROBLEM IS THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IN EGYPT. THE \'WAFD\' BELIEVES DEEPLY THAT THE CAMPAIGN WE ARE STARTING IN ALEXANDRIA SHOULD TEACH THE REST (OF THE COUNTRY) A GOOD LESSON.\" COUNTER-ATTACKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT, MOUSSA SABRY (AL AKHBAR, JULY 14)WROTE A PAEAN OF PRAISE FOR MA\'AZ, REMINDED HIS READERS THAT SHERDY LIVED \"IN THE GULF COUNTRIES FOR 12 YEARS,\" AND ACCUSED SHERDY OF THINKING THAT \"THE PEN IS A CLEAVER IN THE HAND OF A BUTCHER.\" SABRY\'S EDITORIAL WAS ENTITLED \"CHAOS.\" MA\'AZ AND ALEXANDRIA\'S LOCAL POPULAR COUNCIL PRESIDENT, EZZAT KADDOUS (REF A) SUBSEQUENTLY BROUGHT LIBEL SUITS AGAINST WAFD PARTY LEADER FOUAD SERAG EL DIN, AND THREE \"WAFD\" NEWSPAPER STAFFERS, SHERDY, BADAWI AND THE NEWSPAPER\'S CARTOONIST. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE.FIRST SITTING OF THE TRIAL WILL BE IN THE GIZA DISTRICT COURT OCTOBER 8. BECAUSE SOME HARSH FEELINGS, REGARDING THE JULY 2 SESSION OF THE PA, REMAIN, MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THE GOE WILL WANT TO COMPLETE (OR OTHERWISE GET PAST) THIS LIBEL CASE BEFORE PARLIAMENT RECONVENES IN NOVEMBER. 6. MA\'AZ, \"ATTEMPTING TO SAVE HIMSELF\": MA\'AZ SPENT THE REMAINDER OF THE MONTH OF JULY GIVING INTERVIEWS IN GOE-SPONSORED DAILIES AND MASS- CIRCULATION MAGAZINES ATTEMPTING TO EXCULPATE HIMSELF FROM THE CORRUPTION CHARGES: THE THRUST OF THE ATTACKS AGAINST HIM HAD MOVED FROM POOR MANAGEMENT CHOICES REGARDING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (REF A) TO PROFITEERING ON LAND DEALS. AFTER THREE TIMES, IN THE COURSE OF THESE INTERVIEWS, ATTEMPTING TO SHIFT BLAME TO A FORMER GOVERNOR FOR PROFITEERING ON BEDOUIN LAND IN THE BEACH RESORT AREA OF AGAMI, THE SON OF KAMAL EL DIB (GOVERNOR OF ALEXANDRIA UNDER NASSER AND SADAT) STRUCK BACK. THE GOE-SPONSORED PRESS DECLINED TO PUBLISH HIS STATEMENT, BUT ON AUGUST 28, THE \"WAFD\" CARRIED A BANNER HEADLINE STORY, WHICH INCLUDED A PHOTOCOPY OF A DEED SIGNED BY MA\'AZ. COMMENT: MOUFID EL DIB, THE SON OF THE FORMER GOVERNOR, TOLD US THAT HE IGNORED THE FIRST MA\'AZ CHARGE, BUT AS THE GOVERNOR EMBELLISHED THE STORY THROUGHOUT THE S, HE FELT THAT HIS DECEASED FATHER\'S HONOR, INDEED THAT OF THE WHOLE FAMILY, WAS AT STAKE. HE ALSO TOLD US THAT THE GOE OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF \"STATE\" (BEDOUIN) LAND IN AGAMI (THROUGH WHO MA\'AZ CONDUCTED HIS LAND DEALS) WAS RECENTLY REMOVED FROM HIS POST. TO GIVE AN IDEA OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROFITEERING, EL DIB REPORTED THAT MA\'AZ (WHILE STILL A POLICE OFFICER) HAD PAID THE STATE 173 PIASTERS PER SQUARE METER FOR THE LAND, BUT THAT EL DIB--NOT HIS FATHER-- HAD BOUGHT IT FROM MA\'AZ AT LE 200 PER SQUARE METER. END COMMENT. WHILE SPEAKING PUBLICLY ABOUT THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM, MA\'AZ MOVED QUIETLY BEHIND THE SCENES TO RID HIMSELF OF TWO OF ALEXANDRIA\'S POLITICAL BARONS--MEN WHOM HE BELIEVED, ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACTS, HAD NOT SUPPORTED HIM SUFFICIENTLY IN HIS TIME OF NEED. IN SO DOING, HE HAS REMOVED FROM THE LOCAL SCENE TWO OF THE MOST DYNAMIC, WELL-KNOWN NATIONALLY, AND (BY MOST ACCOUNTS) EFFECTIVE, POLITICAL LEADERS IN ALEXANDRIA: ALEXANDRIA$S SECRETARY GENERAL (NUMBER TWO PERSON IN THE GOVERNORATE AFTER MA\'AZ HIMSELF), SHAKER ABDEL SALAAM, AND LOCAL NDP PARTY HEAD, MOHAMED ABDELLAH. 7. NDP PARTY LEADERSHIP: A SMALL PAGE ONE ANNOUNCEMENT, IN \"AL AHRAM\" AUGUST 12, INFORMED READERS THAT MAHMOUD DAOUD, HEAD OF EGYPT\'S COTTON BOARD AND MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE UNDER SADAT, HAD REPLACED MOHAMED ABDELLAH AS NDP PARTY CHIEF IN ALEXANDRIA. WHILE THE BUSY ABDELLAH, CHAIRMAN OF THE PA FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, AND PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION LEADER FOR ALEXANDRIA, HAD FOUR TIMES ATTEMPTED TO SUBMIT HIS RESIGNATION FROM THE ALEX PARTY POST, HE WAS ACTUALLY FIRED BY SOBHI ABDEL HAKIM, SHURA COUNCIL SPEAKER AND SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE NDP. AT (WE ARE TOLD) MA\'AZ\'S INSTIGATION, A TEN-PERSON DELEGATION COMPRISED OF PA AND SHURA COUNCIL MEMBERS FROM ALEXANDRIA, AND LED BY PA MEMBER (AND MA\'AZ ALLY) FAROUK GARANA, SOUGHT A MEETING WITH SOBHI TO COMPLAIN ABOUT ABDELLAH\'S NUMEROUS ABSENCES FROM ALEXANDRIA, AND PARTY DRIFT HERE. MUCH OF THE SESSION HARKED BACK TO THE TUMULTUOUS MEETING AT NDP ALEX HEADQUARTERS IN APRIL (REF A). ABDELLAH, IN TRUE ALEXANDRIAN FAS MANAGED TO HAVE SEVERAL SUPPORTERS INCLUDED IN THE DELEGATION--WHO SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN THE STEPS ABDELLAH HAD TAKEN SINCE THAT TIME TO HEAL PARTY WOUNDS, AND MA\'AZ\'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH ABDELLAH. THE FACT OF ABDELLAH\'S FREQUENT ABSENCES FROM ALEXANDRIA, HOWEVER, COULD NOT BE DISPUTED, AS HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM PA TRIPS TO BOTH THE PRC AND THE USSR (REF C). ABDELLAH MAINTAINS HE WAS CONSULTED ON HIS OWN OUSTER AND WAS GIVEN THE COURTESY OF A PRIORI VETOES ON THREE POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS (NOTABLY, GARANA). MOST ACCOUNTS HOLD THAT IT WAS ACTUALLY YOUSSEF WALLY, GOE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NDP, WHO SUGGESTED DAOUD AS THE NEW PARTY LEADER FOR ALEXANDRIA--NOT ABDELLAH, AS ABDELLAH NOW TRIES TO CLAIM. ACCORDING TO DAOUD, HIS COURTESY CALL ON NDP CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT MUBARAK, REVOLVED LESS AROUND ALEXANDRIA\'S MOUNTING PROBLEMS, THAN AROUND MUBARAK\'S HORTATORY (AND SOMEWHAT MISPLACED, GIVEN THE MOODS IN ALEXANDRIA) COMMENTS TO DAOUD TO BREATHE LIFE BACK INTO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN ALEXANDRIA. AT DINNER THE WEEK OF HIS SELECTION, THE SOMEWHAT ELDERLY DAOUD ACKNOWLEDGED THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS HE FACES HERE, AND SAID HIS FIRST PRIORITY MUST BE TO HEAL THE WOUNDS IN THIS \"DEEPLY DIVIDED CITY.\" 8. THE SECRETARY GENERALSHIP: THE FORMER CLOSENESS OF FAWZI MA\'AZ AND SHAKER ABDEL SALAAM (BOTH POLICE GENERALS) CANNOT BE EXAGGERATED. THEY APPEARED EVERYWHERE TOGETHER AND ALL THE CITY\'S PROBLEMS WERE ADDRESSED, IN A FASHION, BY MA\'AZ NAMING SHAKER TO HEAD A\"STUDY COMMITTEE.\" SHAKER EVEN GAINED NATIONAL PROMINENCE AS HEAD OF THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR USAID\'S SUCCESSFUL NEIGHBORHOOD URBAN SERVICES (NUS) PROJECT IN THE THREE URBAN GOVERNORATES OF CAIRO, GIZA AND ALEXANDRIA. SHAKER\'S DOOR AT THE GOVERNORATE WAS ALWAYS OPEN TO CALLERS, WHEREAS THE ALOOF MA\'AZ HOLDS ONLY TST PERFUNCTORY (AND GENERALLY NON-SUBSTANTIVE) COURTESY SESSIONS WITH VISITORS. WE HAD EARLIER SPECULATED ON (WHAT WAS VIEWED LOCALLY AS) THE NEAR MIRACLE THAT SHAKER\'S NAME WAS NEVER ASSOCIATED WITH THAT OF MA\'AZ IN THE NUMEROUS \"WAFD\" ARTICLES, ALTHOUGH SHAKER WAS PERCEIVED LOCALLY AS HEAVILY INVOLVED IN PRIVATE BUSINESS DEALS, WHEREAS MA\'AZ (UNTIL RECENTLY) WAS NOT. WE ALSO RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS ALEXANDRIANS THAT SHAKER WAS QUIETLY BETRAYING THE GOVERNOR, IN AN ATTEMPT TO SAVE HIMSELF; THESE SAME SOURCES REPORTED THAT THEY HAD TOLD THE GOVERNOR THE SAME THING. ALTHOUGH THE ACTUAL CAUSE FOR SHAKER\'S SUDDEN TRANSFER TO THE MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CAIRO REMAINS UNKNOWN, IT IS CLEAR THAT HE WAS PUT OUT TO PASTURE BY MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (AND ANOTHER FORMER POLICE GENERAL) ABU BASHA--AT THE REQUEST OF MA\'AZ. ALLEGEDLY FURIOUS AT HIS TRANSFER TO THE NON-POSITION OF \"SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE MINISTER,\" SHAKER REPORTEDLY HAS RESIGNED FROM THE GOVERNMENT. COMMENT: MA\'AZ APPEARS DETERMINED TO KEEP UP APPEARANCES IN THE MIDST OF THIS TURMOIL: IN A MEETING WITH VISITING USG OFFICIALS AUGUST 21, MA\'AZ POINTEDLY TOLD US THAT SHAKER HAD RECEIVED A \"BIG PROMOTION.\" THE SAME DAY, THE GOVERNOR LED THE DELEGATION TO THE FUNERAL IN ALEXANDRIA OF SHAKER\'S MOTHER. END COMMENT. ACCORDING TO ABDELLAH, A DISHEARTENED, AND INCREASINGLY ISOLATED, MA\'AZ TOLD THE MINISTER TO \"NAME ANYONE\" TO REPLACE SHAKER--A HIGHLY UNUSUAL POSITION FOR ANY SENIOR MANAGER REGARDING THE SELECTION OF HIS DEPUTY. BUT, THAT IS WHAT THE MINISTER DID: FAYEZ OSMAN, FORMER HEAD OF THE EASTERN ALEXANDRIA DISTRICT, IS ALEXANDRIA\'S NEW SECRETARY GENERAL. A FORMER ARMY OFFICER WHO LOST HIS RIGHT HAND IN THE 1956 WAR, THE CONGENIAL AND LOW-KEY OSMAN IS DUE FOR RETIREMENT IN A YEAR OR SO. THIS LEAVES THIS TROUBLED CITY WITH AN EMBATTLED AND ISOLATED GOVERNOR, A CARETAKER SECRETARY-GENERAL--AND A POLITICALLY AWARE LOCAL POPULATION DRAWING UNFORTUNATE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT ITS CENTRAL NMENT. 9. \"MASSIVE\" POLICE TRANSFERS: WHILE EVERYONE LOCALLY ASSOCIATES THE EARLY AUGUST TRANSFER OUT OF ALEXANDRIA OF 132 POLICE OFFICERS (\"THE LARGEST SHAKEUP IN POLICE ANNALS\" ACCORDING TO THE \"WAFD,\" AUGUST 22, AND CONFIRMED BY LOCAL SOURCES) WITH THE GOVERNOR\'S PROBLEMS, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO ESTABLISH ANY DIRECT LINK--OTHER THAN THE OBVIOUS ONE THAT, AS A RESPECTED FORMER POLICE GENERAL, MA\'AZ MUST HAVE BEEN CONSULTED. HOWEVER, RUMORS ALSO ABOUND THAT HIS CLOSEST ALLIES IN THE POLICE FORCE WERE AMONG THOSE TRANSFERRED. A GOVERNOR OF ANOTHER DELTA GOVERNORATE HAS EVEN MADE THE PRIVATE SUGGESTION THAT THE ACTIVIST MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, AHMED ROUCHDY, WAS PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION ON \"THE MESS IN ALEXANDRIA,\" EVEN IF THE MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ABU BASHA, WAS (OR COULD) NOT. A FINAL TWIST TO THE SPECULATION IS THAT THE MOI WAS UNHAPPY WITH HOW THE SECURITY FORCES IN ALEXANDRIA WERE COPING WITH THE FUNDAMENTALISTS\' CHALLENGE HERE (SEE ALEX 546 AND 587). COMMENT: WE EARLIER REPORTED ON THE REMARKABLE DIFFERENCE IN BEHAVIOR OF BOTH THE FUNDAMENTALISTS AND THE SECURITY FORCES AT THE RECENT KURBAN BAIRAM, AS COMPARED TO THE RAMADAN BAIRAM (ALEX 799). END COMMENT. 10. HOW MUCH LONGER WILL MA\'AZ REMAIN? WHILE THERE ARE SOME LOCAL NOTABLES WHO CONTINUE TO DEFEND MA\'AZ (USUALLY HARKING BACK TO HIS ACKNOWLEDGED EXCELLENCE AS A POLICE GENERAL), THERE IS A GENERALIZED LOCAL SENTIMENT THAT HE MUST GO: HE HAS BEEN TOO DEBASED BY THE MONTHS- LONG CAMPAIGN IN THE \"WAFD\" (ON WHICH THE GOE HAS BEEN PUBLICLY SILENT) AND PERCEIVED INACTION ON THE CITY\'S MOUNTING PROBLEMS (LED BY GARBAGE AND SEWAGE QUESTIONS), TO BE ABLE TO LEAD THIS RATHER RAMBUNCTIOUS CITY. PRESIDENT MUBARAK\'S POSITION ON THE MA\'AZ TROUBLES REMAINS SOMEWHAT OPAQUE: WHILE WE HAVE HAD REPORTS (REF B) THAT HE INTENDS TO LET THE GO TO TRIAL, HIS REMARKS EARLIER THIS SUMMER TO THE AMBASSADOR TENDED TO INDICATE THAT HE CONTINUES TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN MA\'AZ. SINCE THAT TIME, HOWEVER, NEW CHARGES HAVE EMERGED (SUCH AS IN PARA 6), PLUS-- AND IMPORTANTLY-- THE PRESIDENT HAS SPENT THE SUMMER IN ALEXANDRIA. WHILE HE HAS NOT BEEN SEEN SOCIALLY, MRS. MUBARAK HAS BEEN VISIBLE AT (AND KNOWN TO HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT) THE CITY\'S BEACHES, AND IN AGAMI. AT THIS POINT, DECENCY WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE THAT MA\'AZ BE PERMITTED HIS DAY IN COURT (PARA 4), BUT WE SUSPECT THAT HE WILL BE REMOVED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, PROBABLY IN A CAMOUFLAGED TRANSFER OF SEVERAL GOVERNORS. IF HE IS NOT, THE GOE, AND SPECIFICALLY PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WILL FACE INCREASING CHARGES OF NEGLIGENCE OF EGYPT\'S SECOND CITY, AND LOUDER COMPLAINTS THAN WHAT WE ARE ALREADY HEARING THAT MA\'AZ IS BEING PROTECTED BECAUSE HE IS FROM MENOUFIA (REF A), AND HAS FAMILY TIES TO MUBARAK\'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, ZAKI. 11. A FEW (INTERIM) CONCLUSIONS: -- WHILE TEMPERS ARE RISING HERE, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO THE SEWAGE ISSUE, THE GOE HAS PROBABLY DISCOUNTED SOME OF THE GRIPES AS THEY COME FROM A CITY WHICH TRADITIONALLY IS ON DIFFICULT TERMS WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE IMPRESSION OF WEAKNESS, OR NEGLIGENCE, OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REMAINS. AND, ALEXANDRIA\'S PROBLEMS--FOLLOWING THE ANNUAL SUMMER SOJOURN HERE OF THE POLITICAL AND JOURNALISTIC LEADERSHIP OF CAIRO--CAN NO LONGER BE CALLED \"LOCAL.\" INDEED, ALEXANDRIA AND ITS PROBLEMS, HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY FEATURED IN THE COLUMNS THIS SUMMER OF ALL THE NATIONAL DAILIES AND HAVE APPEARED, AS WELL WE UNDERSTAND, IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARABIC LANGUAGE MEDIA. -- THE POLITICAL CHANGES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED HERE (PARAS 7-8), PARTIALLY AS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNOR\'S PROBLEMS, HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE: APPARENT WEAK MEN HAVE REPLACED STRONG, NATIONAL FIGURES. WHILE DAOUD HAS BEEN AN EFFECTIVE LEADER OF THE COTTON INDUSTRY, HE HAD A MIXED REPUTATION AS MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE. LOCALLY, HE IS KNS INTELLIGENT, BUT A HEAVY DRINKER, AND SOMEONE POOR ENOUGH (UNLIKE ABDELLAH) TO BE TEMPTED BY PATRONAGE HE WILL NOW CONTROL. THE NEW SECRETARY GENERAL WILL LIKELY BE NON-CORRUPT, BUT NOT DYNAMIC ENOUGH TO DEAL WITH THE CITY\'S MOUNTING PROBLEMS, WHILE MA\'AZ CONCENTRATES ON HIS LEGAL DEFENSES. -- AS IS ITS WONT, THIS CITY HAS ALSO HAD AN IMPACT ON THE REPUTATION OF SEVERAL NATIONAL LEADERS. DUE NOT ONLY TO HIS MANAGEMENT OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, BUT TO HIS PERSISTENT REPUTATION LOCALLY AS A NASSERIST, RIFAAT AL MAGHOUB IS VIEWED IN ALEXANDRIA AS ALMOST OUT OF THE RUNNING TO REPLACE KAMAL HASSAN ALI AS PRIME MINISTER. ON THE OTHER HAND, YOUSSEF WALLY, WHOSE ROLE IN KING-MAKING IS KNOWN (IN ADDITION TO SELECTING ABDELLAH\'S REPLACEMENT, WALLY IS ALLEGED PERSONALLY TO HAVE PICKED THE NEW GOVERNOR OF DAMIETTA, AS WELL AS SEVERAL OF THE MINISTERS IN MUBARAK\'S CURRENT CABINET) AND HE IS NOW VIEWED LOCALLY AS THE FRONT RUNNER AMONG THOSE LIKELY TO BECOME PM. ADDITIONALLY, WALLY IS GENUINELY POPULAR IN THE AGRICULTURAL DELTA. FINALLY, AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, THE OTHERWISE POPULAR KAMAL HASSAN ALI, HAS NOT EARNED ANY KUDOS HERE THIS SUMMER--EITHER FOR HIS LACK OF ACTION ON THE MA\'AZ CASE, OR FOR HIS MIS- HANDLING OF THE CITY\'S SEWAGE PROBLEMS. THAT TOPIC WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPTEL ABOUT THE TROUBLED SUMMER IN THIS CITY. COOK " "91","10/2/1985 15:12","85KADUNA1154","Consulate Kaduna","UNCLASSIFIED","","R 021512Z OCT 85 FM AMCONSUL KADUNA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8120 INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS ","UNCLAS KADUNA 1154 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PGOV, NI SUBJECT: 25TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS IN KADUNA 1. CEREMONIES MARKING NIGERIA\'S 25TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION AT KADUNA\'S MURTALA MOHAMMED SQUARE WERE LOW-KEY AND ATTENDED BY A CROWD ESTIMATED BY THE PRESS AT 20,000. WEATHER CONDITIONS WERE IDEAL--PLEASANT TEMPERATURES AND OVERCAST, BUT NONTHREATENING, SKIES. HEADING THE LIST OF DIGNITARIES WERE A DELEGATION OF TRADITIONAL CHIEFS, LED BY THE EMIRS OF ZARIA AND KATSINA, AND HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS, INCLUDING AFRC MEMBER AIR VICE MARSHAL MOHAMMED YAHAYA AND NDA COMMANDANT MAJOR GENERAL PAUL TARFA. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE WERE STATE COMMISSIONERS, POLICE OFFICIALS, AND TOP MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY. DIGINITARIES, INCLUDING THE OFFICIAL HOST, KADUNA GOVERNOR MAJOR ABUBAKAR UMAR, ARRIVED ON TIME AND WITH LITTLE FANFARE. THE CEREMONIES WENT OFF WITH NO NOTABLE HITCHES AND WERE COMPLETED WELL AHEAD OF SCHEDULE, ACTUALLY CLOSING AN HOUR EARLIER THAN ADVERTISED. 2. THE CROWD WAS GENERALLY WELL-BEHAVED AND NOT PARTICULARLY ENTHUSIASTIC. ONLY THE DESCENT OF THREE PARACHUTISTS, THE OCCASIONAL BASHING OF PICKPOCKETS BY POLICE, AND THE HIGHSTEPPING ANTICS OF EXUBERANT YOUNGSTERS ON PARADE WERE ABLE TO GENERATE MUCH CROWD INTEREST. GOVERNOR UMAR\'S SPEECH, THE ONLY ONE ON THE AGENDA, WAS BRIEF AND DELIVERED IN A STRONG, CLEAR VOICE. THE SPEECH WAS A REPEAT OF PRESIDENGIDA\'S EARLIER REMARKS BUT WAS NOT IDENTIFIED AS SUCH. IT WAS GREETED BY POLITE APPLAUSE FROM THE AUDIENCE. 3. GOVERNOR UMAR HOSTED A LATE AFTERNOON GARDEN PARTY AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE, DISTINGUISHED PRIMARILY BY THE CASUAL NATURE OF THE GATHERING (NO SPEECHES) AND BY ITS BREVITY (THE NIGERIAN ANTHEM WAS PLAYED AT 5:45 PM, SIGNALLING THE END OF THE EVENT, FIFTEEN MINUTES BEFORE THE ALLOTTED HOUR WAS UP). THE GARDEN PARTY WAS WELL ATTENDED BY NOTABLES, INCLUDING FOUR EMIRS, SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS, AND SELECTED RETIRED OFFICIALS. GOVERNOR UMAR APPEARED CONFIDENT AND AT EASE IN HIS ROLE AS HOST. 4. COMMENT. THE STREAMLINING OF THE CEREMONIES WAS THE ONLY NOTABLE DIFFERENCE FROM OTHER SUCH OCCASIONS WE HAVE SEEN HERE UNDER THE PREVIOUS REGIME. CROWD SIZE AND THE LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION BY NOTABLES WERE TYPICAL FOR EVENTS OF THIS TYPE. THE REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SPEECHES AND THE LENGTH OF THE FESTIVITIES WAS A BLESSED RELIEF MUCH APPRECIATED BY ALL, MOST ASSUREDLY INCLUDING THE CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES IN ATTENDANCE. THE EVENT WAS NOTABLE FOR ITS LACK OF TRADITIONAL DANCERS AND SINGERS; MILITARY DRILLS, MARCHING YOUTHS AND MARTIAL MUSIC PROVIDED THE BULK OF THE ENTERTAINMENT. THE USUAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED VERSIONS OF MAJOR SPEECHES IN BOTH ENGLISH AND HAUSA WAS ALSO DISCARDED. THESE MINOR CHANGES PROBABLY REFLECT EQUALLY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION\'S DEDICATION TO AN AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND THE SHORT LEADTIME AVAILABLE TO PREPARE FOR THIS YEAR\'S CELEBRATIONS. END COMMENT. LEE " "92","10/9/1985 12:39","85KADUNA1207","Consulate Kaduna","UNCLASSIFIED","","R 091239Z OCT 85 FM AMCONSUL KADUNA TO AMEMBASSY LAGOS SECSTATE WASHDC 8129 ","UNCLAS KADUNA 1207 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: ECON, EIND, ELAB, EPET, EAGR, NI SUBJECT: NORTHERN NIGERIA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY 1. SUMMARY. PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEW GOVERMENT\'S POLICIES REMAINS TENTATIVE IN THE NORTH. MOST CONSUMER GOODS ARE IN GOOD SUPPLY, AND PRICES ARE GENERALLY LOWER THAN A YEAR AGO. DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING RAW MATERIALS HAS LED TO PLANT CLOSURES TEMPORARILY IDLING MANY WORKERS, BUT EMPLOYMENT LEVELS GENERALLY HAVE REMAINED STEADY. THE AGRICULTURAL PICTURE IS STILL BRIGHT, ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF FACTORS MAY REDUCE THE HOPED-FOR RECORD HARVEST. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A BRIEF WALKOUT AT THE KADUNA PEUGEOT PLANT, THE LABOR SCENE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUITE. END SUMMARY. 2. THIS IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REPORTS AIMED AT GAUGING PUBLIC REACTION TO THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY\'S RESPONSE TO ITS POLICIES. THIS INITIAL REPORT FOCUSES PRIMARILY ON KADUNA, BUT FUTURE REPORTS WILL INCLUDE THE ENTIRE NORTH AND THE SCOPE WILL BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS AND REACTIONS. 3. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE ECONOMY THE GENERAL PUBLIC CONTINUES TO TAKE A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT\'S ECONOMIC POLICIES. KADUNA\'S NEW GOVERNOR SEEMS KEENLY AWARE OF THE DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE HAVES AND THE HAVENOTS, AND THE BASIC ECONOMIC NEEDS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC SERTAIN TO BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN DETERMINING WHAT FUTURE ROAD TO FOLLOW. WHILE POPULAR SENTIMENT HAD TURNED AGAINST THE FMG IN THE LATTER STAGES OF THE BUHARI REGIME, THE PUBLIC SEEMS WILLING TO GIVE THE NEW GOVERNMENT THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT. EVEN THE RECENT BANNING OF RICE AND MAIZE IMPORTS, A MOVE WHICH COULD CAUSE HARDSHIP FOR SOME PEOPLE, HAS RAISED NO PUBLIC OUTCRY. 4. MARKET SURVEY --AVAILABILITY OF GOODS: MOST CONSUMER ITEMS ARE IN GOOD SUPPLY IN KADUNA. AUTOMOBILE SPARE PARTS ARE OCCASIONALLY AT A PREMIUM, BUT THE SITUATION IS MUCH IMPROVED FROM A YEAR AGO. TIRES THEN AVAILABLE FOR NAIRA 300 (APPROX. USDOL 330) CAN NOW BE FOUND FOR LESS THAN NAIRA 100. PETROLEUM PRODUCTS WERE BRIEFLY SCARCE DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER, EVIDENTLY DUE TO PANIC BUYING WHEN THE PUBLIC LEARNED THAT THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (NNPC) REFINERY WOULD BE CLOSING TEMPORARILY FOR ITS REGULAR ANNUAL MAINTENANCE. DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SOLVED, AND THE SITUATION HAS RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE EXPECTED GOOD HARVEST SHOULD KEEP FOOD SUPPLIES PLENTIFUL IN THE MARKETPLACE. --PRICES: PRICES ARE GENERALLY LOWER THAN LAST YEAR FOR MOST ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES, AGAIN REFLECTING THE GOOD HARVEST. GRAIN PRODUCTS ARE SELLING AT PRICES 25 TO 50 PERCENT BELOW LAST OCTOBER\'S LEVELS. PRICES, HOWEVER, ARE SUBJECT TO FLUCTUATION DUE TO A VARIETY OF CHANGING ECONOMIC FACTORS. THE PRICE OF RICE MORE THAN DOUBLED IN KADUNA\'S CENTRAL MARKET AFTER THE OCTOBER 1ST ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IMPORTATION WOULD BE BANNED, BUT MAIZE PRICES REMAIN STEADY EVEN THOUGH ITS IMPORTATION HS ALSO BEEN BANNED. GROUNDNUT OIL PRICES JUMPED AFTER PRESS REPORTS THAT A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE CROP WILL BE LOST TO ROSETTE DISEASE. HERE IN KADUNA, BEAN PRICES ALSO HAVE LEAPED DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS, EVIDENTLY DUE TO HEAVY INSECT INFION ON LOCAL FARMS. PRICES FOR NON-FOOD ITEMS, SUCH AS LAUNDRY DETERGENT, ARE AS MUCH AS 25 PERCENT LESS THAN 1984 LEVELS. 5. EMPLOYMENT THE TEMPORARY CLOSURE OF THE PEUGEOT ASSEMBLY PLANT IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER WAS THE MAJOR EMPLOYMENT NEWS IN KADUNA RECENTLY. THE SIX WEEKS OF FORCED LEAVE IDLED MORE THAN 4,000 WORKERS, BUT THE PLANT HAS NOW RESUMED PRODUCTION. DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING RAW MATERIALS FROM ABROAD CONTINUES TO BE A PROBLEM FOR MAJOR INDUSTRIAL CONCERNS IN THE NORTH. PRESS REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THE STEYR TRUCK PLANT IN BAUCHI MAY ALSO SOON BE FORCED TO CLOSE TEMPORARILY FOR THE SAME REASON. NO MAJOR RETRENCHMENT EXERCISES HAVE OCCURRED RECENTLY. THE NEW STATE GOVERNORS HAVE TALKED ABOUT REDUCING THE NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANTS, BUT THEY HAVE ALSO PROPOSED SETTING UP ALTERNATE EMPLOYMENT SCHEMES, PRIMARILY FARMING PROJECTS, TO ABSORB THE DISPLACED GOVERNMENT WORKERS. 6. AGRICULTURE RAINS THROUGHOUT THE NORTH HAVE BEEN EXCELLENT THIS YEAR, BUT EARLIER PREDICTIONS FOR A BUMPER HARVEST MAY HAVE BEEN PREMATURE. WHILE CROP PRODUCTION WILL CERTAINLY BE BETTER THAN MOST PREVIOUS YEARS, A NUMBER OF FACTORS WILL REDUCE HOPED-FOR RECORD CROPS. IRONICALLY, FLOODING CAUSED BY TOO MUCH RAIN IN AREAS HIT LAST YEAR BY DROUGHT HAS DESTROYED MANY CROPS, AND PEST INFESTATION AND DISEASE HAVE STRUCK ELSEWHERE. ONCE THE HARVEST IS IN, STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SEEM LIKELY TO BECOME PROBLEMS. 7. NEW INDUSTRY UNIPETROL WILL BE INAUGURATING A NEW MOTOR OIL/LUBRICANT FACILITY IN KADUNA ON OCTOBER 15. THE PLANT, LOCATED ON THE NNPC REFINERY COMPLEX, IS HIGHLY AUTOMATED WITH LARGELY FRENCH-MADE EQUIPMENT. IT WILL SUPPLY OILS AND LUBRICANTS FOR MUCH OF THE NORTH, GETTING VOST OF ITS RAW MATERIALS DIRECTLY FROM THE REFINERY; SOME ADDITIVES WILL BE IMPORTED FROM FRANCE. THE FACILITY WILL ADD ONLY ABOUT 20 JO LOCAL EMPLOYMENT ROLLS. 8. LABOR THE LABOR SCENE GENERALLY HAS BEEN QUITE IN THE NORTH. THE ONLY NOTABLE RUMBLINGS WERE AT KADUNA\'S PEUGEOT ASSEMBLY PLANT OCTOBER 4 WHEN WORKERS WALKED OUT AFTER LEARNING OF COMPANY PLANS TO DEDUCT 15 DAYS\' PAY FROM UPCOMING MONTHLY SALARIES TO MAKE UP FOR DAYS LOST DURING THE SIX WEEKS OF FORCED LEAVE IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. LEE " "93","10/15/1985 21:02","85STATE317062","Secretary of State","UNCLASSIFIED","85STATE106685","R 152102Z OCT 85 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS INFO SECDEF WASHDC 0000 ","UNCLAS STATE 317062 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: MARR, PBTS, XX SUBJECT: STATUS OF MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND VESSELS REF: STATE 106685 (110517Z MAY 77) 1. REFERENCE (A) SUMMARIZED U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE REGARDING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STATUS OF VESSELS EMPLOYED BY THE U.S. NAVY\'S MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND (MSC). RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC SEALIFT PROGRAM NECESSITATE A REVISION OF THE POLICIES PROMULGATED IN REFERENCE (A), WHICH IS HEREBY CANCELLED. 2. THE VESSELS OPERATED BY THE MSC ARE THOSE OWNED BY THE USG, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET; THOSE BAREBOAT CHARTERED TO THE USG; AND THOSE TIME OR VOYAGE CHARTERED TO THE USG. SHIPS DESIGNATED UNITED STATES NAVAL SHIPS (USNS) ARE EITHER OWNED BY OR BAREBOAT CHARTERED TO THE US NAVY. MSC BAREBOAT CHARTERED VESSELS ARE PRIVATELY OWNED AND ARE MANNED EITHER BY U.S. GOVERNMENT CIVIL SERVICE CREWS OR BY CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES. THE PHYSICAL APPEARANCE OF BAREBOAT CHARTERED SHIPS, EITHER BY PAINTING OR BY STACK MARKINGS, IS USUALLY THE SAME AS U.S. GOVERNMENT OWNED USNS. PRIVATELY OWNED AND OPERATED VESSELS CHARTERED BY MSC FOR A PERIOD OF TIME OR FOR A SPECIFIED VOYAGE OR VOYAGES ARE USUALLY MANNED BY CIVILIAN PRIVATE SECTOR CREWS EMPLOYED BY A COMMERCIAL OPERATOR, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND USED EXCLUSIVELY TO TRANSPORT U.S. GOVERNMENT NON-COMMERCIAL CARGO. THEY DO NOT, HOWEVER, BEAR DISTINCTIVE U.S. GOVERNMENT MARKINGS. 3. UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, ALL VESSELS OWNED OR OPERATED BY A STATE AND USED ON GOVERNMENT NON-COMMERCIAL SERVICE ARE ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. THIS MEANS SUCH VESSELS ARE, INTER ALIA, IMMUNE FROM ARREST AND SEARCH, WHETHER IN FOREIGN INTERNAL OR TERRITORIAL WATERS OR ON THE HIGH SEAS; IMMUNE FROM ALL FOREIGN TAXATION; EXEMPT FROM ANY FOREIGN STATE REGULATION REQUIRING FLYING THE FLAG OF SUCH FOREIGN STATE EITHER IN ITS PORTS OR WHILE PASSING THROUGH ITS TERRITORIAL SEA; AND ENTITLED TO EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH VESSELS WITH RESPECT TO ACTS PERFORMED ON BOARD . THESE SHIPS, HOWEVER, ARE EXPECTED TO COMPLY VOLUNTARILY WITH THE LAWS OF THE HOST STATE WITH REGARD TO ORDER IN THE PORTS, CASTING ANCHOR, SANITATION AND QUARANTINE, ETC. ALL VESSELS IN THE SERVICE OF MSC, WHETHER USG OWNED, BAREBOAT CHARTERED, TIME OR VOYAGE CHARTERED, ARE IN EXCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT NON-COMMERCIAL SERVICE. EACH OF THESE VESSELS IS ENTITLED TO FULL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. 4. IN THE PAST, FULL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY HAS BEEN CLAIMED (AND HAS GENERALLY BEEN ACCORDED) FOR USNS VESSELS ONLY. AS A MATTER OF POLICY THE USG DID NOT CLAIM FULL SOVEREIGN IMMUNE STATUS FOR TIME AND VOYAGE CHARTERED VESSELS ALTHOUGH AS A JURIDICAL MATTER OUR POSITION HAS BEEN THAT SUCH VESSELS ARE ENTITLED TO FULL IMMUNITY. THIS WAS DONE PRINCIPALLY TO AVOID NUMEROUS REQUESTS FOR DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE AND TO AVOID CONFUSION BY FOREIGN STATES WHEN THOSE VESSELS ENTERED THEIR PORTS. WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, IMMUNITIES CLAIMED FOR SUCH VESSELS HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO FREEDOM FROM ARREST AND IMMUNITY FROM TAXATION, AND HAVE BEEN ARRANGED ON A BILATERAL BASIS. 5. FOR THE LAST FEW YEARS, MSC HAS BEEN BRINGING ON LINE THE AFLOAT PREPOSITIONING FORCE (APF), MOST OF WHICH IS TIME CHARTERED. IN THE CASE OF THE APF, THE POLICY NOTED ABOVE IS NOT SATISFACTORY. APF VESSELS ARE LOADED ENTIRELY WITH COMBAT EQUIPMENT, FUEL AND COMBAT SUPPORT SUPPLIES. THE CONTENTS OF THEIR CARGO IS THEREFORE SENSITIVE AND CANNOT BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION BY FOREIGN AUTHORITIES. APF SHIPS ARE EXPECTED TO CALL ONLY AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF PORTS AND NOT TO MAKE PORT CALLS AS FREQUENTLY AS, E.G., TANKERS OR GENERAL PURPOSE DRY CARGO CARRIERS. IN VIEW OF THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE AFLOAT PREPOSITIONING FORCE, IT IS THE POLICY OF THE USG THAT ALL AFLOAT PREPOSITIONING FORCE VESSELS, INCLUDING TIME CHARTERED VESSELS, MUST BE AFFORDED THE FULL SOVEREIGN PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CURRENTLY CLAIMED FOR AND ACCORDED USNS VESSELS. WITH RESPECT TO MSC VOYAGE CHARTERED VESSELS AND MSC TIME CHARTERED VESSELS NOT A PART OF THE AFLOAT PREPOSITIONING FORCE, USG GENERAL POLICY IS TO CONTINUE TO CLAIM IMMUNITY ONLY FROM ARREST AND TAXATION. CIRCUMSTANCES MAY ARISE WHICH NECESSITATE ASSERTIONS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR TIME OR VOYAGE CHARTERED VESSELS IN ADDITION TO THOSE IN THE APF. WHEN SUCH CASES HAVE ARISEN IN THE PAST, SPECIFIC GUIDANCE HAS BEEN PROVIDED AT THE TIME. THIS PROCEDURE WILL CONTINUE. 6. REQUEST ALL POSTS TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO INSURE HOST GOVERNMENTS ARE AWARE, WHEN APPROPRIATE, OF THE STATUS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS AND ASSIST IN ASSURING RECOGNITION OF THIS STATUS. POSTS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT AFLOAT PREPOSITIONING FORCE TIME CHARTERED MSC SHIPS WILL REQUIRE DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR PORT CALLS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. THE REQUEST FOR DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE WILL EXPLICITLY IDENTIFY THESE VESSELS AS AFLOAT PREPOSITIONING FORCE SHIPS OF MSC. THEY MAY NOT BE PAINTED DISTINCTIVELY OR BEAR THE MSC LOGO. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR POSTS TO IMPRESS UPON THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS THE STATUS OF SUCH SHIPS IN THE EVENT OF PORT CALLS OR OTHER OPERATIONS IN HOST GOVERNMENT TERRITORIAL SEAS AND INTERNAL WATERS. THE LIST OF SHIPS CURRENTLY IN THE APF IS AVAILABLE FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OP-42). ARMACOST " "94","10/21/1985 21:21","85TELAVIV15214","Embassy Tel Aviv","UNCLASSIFIED","","R 212121Z OCT 85 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3137 INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 TEL AVIV 15214 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, IS, US SUBJECT: ISRAELI WHITE PAPER ON PLO OUTLOOK AND GOALS 1. THE GOI HAS LAUNCHED AN EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN TO DOCUMENT THE GOALS AND METHODS OF THE PLO. MFA SOURCES HAVE PROVIDED US WITH A PAPER ON \"THE PLO\'S OUTLOOK AND GOALS IN THE WAKE OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT\" WHICH IS BEING MADE PUBLIC AS PART OF THAT CAMPAIGN. THE TEXT IS BELOW IN PARA 2. KEY POINTS (SUPPORTED BY QUOTATIONS FROM PLO SOURCES) ARE: - -- ARAFAT\'S GOALS IN THE FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT ARE DESCRIBED AS: - -- PREVENTING HUSSEIN FROM ENTERING THE PEACE PROCESS ON HIS OWN. - -- PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A RETURN OF THE PLO TO JORDAN. - -- ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. RECOGNITION WITHOUT ACCEPTANCE OF 242 AND 338. -- - -- THE FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT \"DOES NOT DEVIATE FROM PLO POLICY\". - -- THE PLO\'S GOAL REMAINS \"THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL\". - -- \"THE ARMED STRUGGLE\" REMAINS CENTRAL TO PLO POLICY. - -- THE PLO REJECTS JORDANIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT. - -- THE PLO SEES \"LAND FOR PEACE\" AS ONE STAGE, LEADING TO THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. 2. BEGIN TEXT: \"CHAPTER 1: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION - THE PLO\'S OUTLOOK AND GOALS IN THE WAKE OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT (11 FEB 1985) --------------------------------------------- -------- THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT AND ITS MEANING AS VIEWED BY THE PLO 1. ARAFAT SIGNED THE AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN FOR THREE PRIMARY REASONS: A. TO ENSURE THAT HUSSEIN WOULD NOT ENTER INTO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL; B. TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A PLO PRESENCE IN JORDAN, FROM WHENCE THE ORGANIZATION WAS EXPELLED IN 1970. C. TO WIN US RECOGNITION, WITHOUT HAVING TO ACCEPT THE US\' PRECONDITIONS, NAMELY, ACCEPTING UN RESOLUTION 242 AND RECOGNIZING ISRAEL\'S RIGHT TO EXIST, AND TO ACHIEVE US AGREEMENT TO THE CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT WHICH THE PLO WILL HAVE A STATUS EQUAL TO THAT OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS. THE EXPULSION OF THE TERRORISTS FROM LEBANON, INITIALLY BY THE IDF AND LATER BY SYRIA, BROUGHT THE PLO TO ONE OF THE LOWEST POINTS IN ITS HISTORY; NOT ONLY WERE PLO MEMBERS DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT WHEN ARAFAT WANTED TO CONVENE THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, HE HAD A DIFFICULT TIME FINDING AN ARAB COUNTRY WILLING TO HOST IT AND, IN THE END, ONLY JORDAN AGREED TO DO SO. FOR ARAFAT, THE AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN THEREFORE MEANS FIRST AND FOREMOST THE RETURN OF THE TERRORISTS TO JORDAN AND THE GRADUAL STRENGTHENING OF THEIR PRESENCE THERE, WITH THE INTENTION BEING THAT JORDAN SERVE AS A BASE FOR INCREASED TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAELI TARGETS, FOR THE INCITEMENT OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE TERRITORIES AGAINST ISRAELI RULE, AND FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE PLO\'S POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. IN HIS BOOK, \'THE JORDANIAN AGREEMENT\', WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN AMMAN IN JULY 1985, KHALED AL-HASSAN, HEAD OF THE INFORMATION DIVISION OF \'FATAH\', SPEAKS OF THIS GOAL: - \'THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE RETURN OF THE PLO TO AN AREA WHICH BORDERS ON THE HOMELAND, AND TO AN ESCALATION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE, WHICH IS ONE OF THE FIXED PRINCIPLES OF THE PALESTINIAN ACTION STRATEGY. THE ONLY POSSIBLE PLACE IS JORDAN, SINCE THE BORDERS OF EGYPT, SYRIA, AND LEBANON HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR REASONS WHICH THERE IS NO NEED TO GO INTO. THE RETURN TO JORDAN IS A STRATEGIC INTEREST AND NEED OF BOTH PALESTINE AND JORDAN. THE RETURN TO JORDAN NECESSITATES AN AGREEMENT TO ORDER RELATIONS (BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES??)\'. 2. THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT CONTAINS NEITHER CONCESSIONS NOR MODERATION ON BASIC PLO POSITIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT DEVIATE FROM PLO POLICY AS APPROVED BY THE ORGANIZATION\'S AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS - AND ESPECIALLY THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL - AND AS ENSHRINED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMITS. INDEED, A STATEMENT WHICH THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ISSUED ON 18 FEBRUARY 1985, AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT, SAID THE FOLLOWING: - \'THE JOINT ACTIVITY OF JORDAN AND THE PLO IS BASED ON PALESTINIAN LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, ESPECIALLY AT ITS 16TH AND 17TH SESSIONS, ON ARAB LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMITS, IN PARTICULAR RABAT AND FEZ, AND ON INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE UN.\' SINCE THIS STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED, SIMILAR DECISIONS HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY A NUMBER OF PLO AND \'FATAH\' INSTITUTIONS. 3. THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT HAS NOT PRODUCED ANY CHANGE IN THE PLO\'S STRATEGIC AIM, WHICH REMAINS THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A \'DEMOCRATIC, SECULAR\' STATE ON ISRAEL\'S RUINS, WITH THE ACHIEVING OF THIS AIM BEING CARRIED OUT IN STAGES. EVIDENCE FOR THIS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DECLARATIONS OF THE AL-HASSAN BROTHERS, CONFIDANTS OF ARAFAT: A. HANI AL-HASSAN, ARAFAT\'S POLITICAL ADVISOR: \'AS LONG AS THE PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC STATE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED ON ALL OF PALESTINE, THERE CAN BE NO ABSOLUTE AND FINAL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. I AM SPEAKING ALSO OF THOSE LANDS WHICH WERE PALESTINIAN BEFORE 1948, FROM THE RIVER TO THE SEA; THIS IS THE STRATEGIC GOAL. CLEARLY, SUCH A GOAL IS NOT ATTAINED ALL AT ONCE, BUT RATHER IN STAGES.\' (AL-SAYAD, 15.4). B. KHALED AL-HASSAN: \'THE CONFLICT IS LONG AND ALL-ENCOMPASSING, AND ITS OUTCOME WILL BE DETERMINED ONLY BY THE ELIMINATION OF EITHER ARAB NATIONALISM, OR ZIONISM. THERE IS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THESE TWO MOVEMENTS, WHICH CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF ONE OF THEM. HOWEVER, SINCE WE SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF QUICKLY ACHIEVING THE FINAL AIM, WE OPERATE THROUGH THE POLICY OF STAGES, UPON WHICH THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL DECIDED IN 1974\' (AL-ANBA, KUWAIT, 24.5). -- 4. THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT HAS PRODUCED NO CHANGE IN THE PLO\'S VIEW OF TERROR, WHICH IT REFERS TO S THE \'ARMED STRUGGLE\'. FOR EXAMPLE: - 1. HANI AL-HASSAN: \'THE ARMED STRUGGLE SOWS, AND THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE REAPS, AND HE WHO SOWS NOT, REAPS NOT\' (RADIO MONTE CARLO, 16.3). - 2. NABIL SHA\'AT MEMBER OF THE \'FATAH\' CENTRAL COMMITTEE: \'SOLELY POLITICAL SOLUTIONS CANNOT BE SOUGHT WITHOUT CONTINUING ARMED STRUGGLE\' (ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 18.8). B. MOREOVER, THE \'ARMED STRUGGLE\' IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE; IT MUST BE CONTINUED, EVEN ESCALATED AS, FOR EXAMPLE: - 1. ABU JIHAD, HEAD OF THE MILITARY ARM OF \'FATAH\' AND RESPONSIBLE FOR WEST BANK AFFAIRS: \'THE CONDUCT OF SEA WARFARE BY PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IS AN EXPRESSION OF THE FIRM DECISION TO CONTINUE AND ESCALTE THIS ARMED STRUGGLE, WHATEVER THE DIFFICULTIES MAY BE . . . POLITICAL ACTIVITY WAS NEVER AN OBSTACLE TO THE CONTINUATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY, BUT RATHER A MEANS TO ADVANCE AND DEVELOP IT\' (AL-ANBA, 24.2). - 2. AHMAD ABD AL-RAHMAN, ARAFAT\'S SPOKESMAN: \'THE REVOLUTIONARY MARCH WILL CONTINUE, DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES, IN ORDER THAT THE ARMED STRUGGLE ADVANCE WITH RANKS UNIFIED, AS THE ARMED STRUGGLE IS THE ONLY WAY TO PALESTINE. THERE IS NO OTHER ROUTE TO PALESTINE EXCEPT FOR ARMED STRUGGLE\' (FILASTIN ATH-THAWRA, 16.3). - 3. THE FATAH \'REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL\': \'ARMED STRUGGLE IS THE PRIMARY FORM OF THE PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE TO REALIZE NATIONAL GOALS. ON THE BASIS OF THIS STRUGGLE, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HEREBY DECIDES TO APPROVE THE PLAN, WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY THE CENTRL COMMITTEE, TO ESCALATE THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN THE OCCUPIED LAND\' (CONCLUDING STATEMENT AT THE END OF DISCUSSIONS IN TUNIS, 6.4). - 4. HANI AL-HASSAN: \'THE FUTURE WILL IN THE END PROVE THAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF CONTINUING THE ARMED STRUGGLE, BECAUSE IF WE ARE NOT, THAN NEITHER SHALL WE BE SUITABLE CLAIMANTS TO REPRESENT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE\' (ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 16.4). - 5. ARAFAT: \'THE MOST RECENT GUERILLA ACTION, WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT OFF THE COAST OF PALESTINE (SINKING OF THE ATAVARIUS ???) WAS NOT THE LAST, RATHER IT CONSTITUTES THE BEGINNING OF A SERIES OF ADDITIONAL ACTIONS WHICH WILL HURT ISRAEL\' (AL-RAI AL-\'AM, 25.4). - 6. KHALED AL-HASSAN: \'WHAT IS NEEDED TODAY IS A CHANGE IN THE SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF MILITARY ACTION INSIDE ISRAEL. I AM NOT CALLING FOR SIMPLY ANOTHER SUICIDE ACTION, RATHER, AN ACTION WHICH WILL HAVE A VERY MAJOR IMPACT ON THE ENEMY FROM THE MATERIAL, MORALE, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY POINTS OF VIEW\' (AL-ANBA, 12.6). - 7. THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF \'FATAH\': \'STEPS MUST BE TAKEN WHICH CAN LEAD TO THE CREATION OF SUITABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE PALESTINIAN ARMED STRUGGLE, IN ALL ITS FORMS, IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS\' (DECISION AT THE CLOSE OF THEIR MEETING, 23.9). 5. THE JORDANIANS, AND IN THEIR WAKE THE AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS, INTERPRETED THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT AS A PLO CONCESSION ON SEVERAL CENTRAL POINTS: - A. ITS APPARENT ACCEPTANCE OF UN RESOLUTION 242. - B. ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF \'LAND FOR PEACE\'. - C. ITS ABANDONING THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. - D. ITS CONCEDING THE RIGHT TO SOLE REPRESENTATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THE PLO REJECTS THESE JORDANIAN INTERPRETATIONS AND INSISTS THAT NO CHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE IN ITS POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES. FOLLOWING ARE THE CLAIMS AND COUNTER-CLAIMS: - A. UN RESOLUTION 242 - (1) THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT DETERMINES IN SECTION 1: \'LAND IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE, AS CITED IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.\' - (2) IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE ON 31.5, KING HUSSEIN SAID: \'THE PALESTINIANS ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 . . . AS A BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT.\' - (3) HOWEVER, THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, IN ITS APPROVING OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT (18.2), REJECTED RESOLUTION 242. - (4) ARAFAT HIMSELF CONDITIONED THE ACCEPTANCE OF 242 ON AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIANS\' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (INTERVIEW WITH THE \'WASHINGTON POST\', 15.5). WHEN ASKED (BY A CORRESPONDENT FROM THE \'WALL STREET JOURNAL\', 7.6), TO REITERATE KING HUSSEIN\'S STATEMENTS ((2) ABOVE), HE RESPONDED: \'NO, NO I WON\'T REPEAT IT. I\'M NOT A MONKEY. I GIVE MY OWN POLITICAL DECLARATIONS\'. - (5) THE PLO DOES NOT ACCEPT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CLAUSE OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT AS REFERRING EXPLICITLY TO 242, BUT RATHER TO ALL UN AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS DEALING WITH THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, COLLECTIVELY. THUS, FOR INSTANCE, KHALED AL-HASSAN, SAID: \'THE REJECTION OF 242 AS THE ONLY BASIS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION MOST DEFINITELY STILL EXISTS. BUT RESOLUTION 242, WHEN TAKEN TOGETHER WITH A SERIES OF OTHER DECISIONS, IS NOT TO BE REJECTED . . . ALL THESE DECISIONS TOGETHER MEAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, AND RECOGNITION OF THE PLO\' (AL-ANB, 11.6). B. \'LAND FOR PEACE\' (1) IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (19.3), TAHER AL-MASRI, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, SAID: \'THE IMPORTANCE OF THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT IS THAT IT OBLIGATES, PUBLICLY, THE PLO, FOR THE FIRST TIME, TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF \'LAND FOR PEACE\'. (2) HOWEVER, THE PLO\'S INTERPRETATION OF \'LAND FOR PEACE\' IS DIFFERENT THAN THE JORDANIAN INTERPRETATION. ABU JIHAD SAID THE FOLLOWING IN KUWAIT (18.5): \'THE PLO\'S FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH TO THE \'LAND FOR PEACE\' QUESTION IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF JORDAN\'. (3) THE PLO DOES NOT SEE THE FORMULATION \'LAND FOR PEACE\' AS SIGNIFYING AN EXCHANGE - MAKING PEACE WITH ISRAEL IN RETURN FOR GETTING BACK THE TERRITORIES - RATHER AS PART OF THE \'THEORY OF STAGES\', THAT IS TO SY THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ON ALL LAND FROM WHICH ISRAEL WITHDRAWS, AS A STEP TOWARD THE CREATION OF A SECULAR-DEMOCRATIC-PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE ENTIRE TERRITORY. THE PLO VIEWS THE FORMULATION \'LAND FOR PEACE\' AS PARALLELLING DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND THE FEZ SUMMIT. THUS, ARAFAT SAID: \'LAND FOR PEACE - ON THIS THERE IS ARAB AGREEMENT AT FEZ\' (ROZ AL-YUSUF, 12.5). KHALID AL HASSAN SAID THE FOLLOWING: \'EVERYONE WHO ACCEPTED THE DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, AND THE THEORY OF STAGES, AND ALL WHO ACCEPTED THE FEZ DECISIONS, WHICH WERE APPROVED BY BY THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), CANNOT OPPOSE THE SENTENCE \'LAND FOR PEACE\', AS AT ITS HEART IS THE \'THEORY OF STAGES\'\' (AL-ANBA, 12.6). C. AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE -- (1) THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT STATES (CLAUSE 3): \'THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD EXERCISE THEIR INALIABLE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, WHEN THE JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS MANAGE TO ACHIEVE THIS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN ARAB CONFEDERATION THAT IS INTENDED TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO STATES OF JORDAN AND PALESTINE.\' -- (2) THE JORDANIANS PRESENT THIS CONFEDERATION NOT AS COMPRISING TWO INDEPENDENT STATES, RATHER AS A FEDERATION HAVING ONE SOVEREIGN, ONE ARMY, AND ONE GOVERNMENT, WHICH IN FACT MEANS THE PLO\'S GIVING UP THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. -- (3) IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (19.3), JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TAHER AL-MASRI SAID: \'THE MEANING OF THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT IS THAT THE PLO NO LONGER DEMANDS AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE\'. -- (4) HOWEVER, THE PLO PRESENTS THE CONFEDERATION AS BEING COMPOSED OF TWO INDEPENDENT STATES, WITH THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE HAVING TO COME INTO BEING \'BEFORE\' THE ESTABLISIMENT OF THE CONFEDERATION. THUS, KHALED AL-HASSAN SAID: \'THE CONFEDERATION WILL BE BETWEEN TWO SOVEREIGN STATES. A PALESTINIAN STATE WILL BE ESTABLISHED \'BEFORE\' THE CONFEDERATION, EVEN IF THE CONFEDERATION IS ESTABLISHED FIVE MINUTES AFTER INDEPENDENCE\' (COTIDIENNE DE PARIS, 25.3). -- (5) THE PLO LEADERS EMPHASIZE THAT IN ADDITION TO THE AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN, HUSSEIN SENT A \'MEMORANDUM OF CLARIFICATION\' ON 4.3, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE \'PALESTINIAN PEOPLE\'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION RESIDES IN A UNITED STATE OF PALESTINE HAVING A CONFEDERAL CONNECTION TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN\'. -- (6) THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER\'S DECLARATION THAT THE PLO GAVE UP THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE (SEE ABOVE, (3)), WHICH HE REPEATED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON (5.6), DURING HUSSEIN\'S VISIT TO THE US, PRODUCED ANGRY REACTIONS FROM THE PLO: - (A) ABU IYAD: \'ACCORDING TO THE KING\'S DECISIONS, AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE MUST FIRST BE DECLARED, AND ONLY AFTERWARDS WILL THE CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN BE ESTABLISHED\' (REUTER, 6.6). - (B) KADDOUMI: \'THE PALESTINIANS MUST REALIZE THEIR RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION, AND ONLY AFTERWARDS WILL THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE DECIDE IF IT IS INTERESTED IN CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN\' (IN STOCKHOLM, 6.6). - (C) HANI AL-HASSAN: \'THE AMMAN AGREEMENT IS EXCEEDINGLY CLEAR; IT SPEAKS OF ARAB CONFEDERAL UNION BETWEEN TWO STATES -- JORDAN AND PALESTINE\' (AL-BIYADER AL-SIYASI, 15.6). D. PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION (1) THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT STATES IN CLAUSE 5: \'PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, TO BE ATTENDED BY THE FIVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBER-STATES AND ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, INCLUDING THE PLO, WHICH IS THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE\'S SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE WITHIN A JOINT DELEGATION -- A JOINT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION.\' (2) SOME SAW THE REFERENCE TO A JOINT DELEGATION AS A DEVIATION FROM THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT (1974), WHICH GRANTED THE PLO SOLE RIGHT TO REPRESENT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. (3) BUT THE PLO REJECTS THIS REASONING AND INSISTS THAT IT ALONE HAS THE RIGHT TO REPRESENT THE PALESTINIANS. THE \'FATAH\' CENTRAL COMMITTEE\'S \'MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING\' (20.3) SAID AS FOLLOWS: \'THE PLO, AS A SOLE AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, IS THE BODY RECOGNIZED BY THE ARABS AND THE WORLD AS HAVING SOLE LEGITIMACY TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT GRANTING POWER OF ATTORNEY, OR AGREEMENT, OR PERMISSION TO ANY OTHER PARTY TO PARTICIPATE WITH IT IN REPRESENTING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN ALL MATTERS.\" END TEXT. FLATEN " "95","10/31/1985 14:21","85LONDON24287","Embassy London","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 311421Z OCT 85 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7937 INFO CSCE COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY DUBLIN AMCONSUL BELFAST POUCH AMCONSUL EDINBUGH POUCH ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 LONDON 24287 E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: SOCI, PINS, UK SUBJECT: URBAN VIOLENCE IN BRITAIN -- THE CHALLENGE OF A RACIAL UNDERCLASS WORRIES THIS CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY. DEPRESSED AREAS IN SEVERAL OF THE U.K.\'S INNER CITIES ERUPTED IN RIOTS IN THE PAST MONTH. THE BRITISH SEE MANY OF THEIR DOMESTIC WOES THROWN INTO HIGH RELIEF BY THE RIOTS AND THE SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL DEBATE ABOUT CAUSE, EFFECT, AND WHO IS TO BLAME. THE RIOTS HAVE HIGHLIGHTED: --- THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC MALAISE IN BRITAIN, WITH A HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND A NEAR-COLLAPSE OF THE SMOKE-STACK INDUSTRIES IN THE NORTH OF ENGLAND; --- RACIAL TENSION BETWEEN WHITE BRITAIN AND THE BLACK AND ASIAN POPULATIONS WHO HAVE SETTLED IN THE U.K. SINCE THE 1950\'S; --- PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL DISADVANTAGE IN AREAS OF THE INNER CITY, WHICH EXTEND TO HOUSING, EDUCATION, INCOME, AND EMPLOYMENT; --- A VIGOROUS NEW DRUG CRACKDOWN WHICH IS INADVERTENTLY THREATENING THE UNEASY BALANCE BETWEEN POLICE AND COMMUNITIES IN MANY INNER CITY AREAS; --- THE PROBLEM OF POLICING THE MULTI-ETHNIC INNER CITIES EFFECTIVELY AND SENSITIVELY WITH A NEARLY ALL-WHITE POLICE FORCE WHICH IS FACING NUMEROUS POLITICAL PRESSURES AT PRESENT; --- THE LACK OF AN AGREED RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM ON THE PART OF BRITAIN\'S NATIONAL POLITICAL LEADERS. ALL THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE RIOTS ARE AND HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN THE U.S., AND IN GREATER MEASURE, AND THE RIOT DESTRUCTION HERE IS ON A MUCH SMALLER SCALE THAN IT WAS IN THE U.S. URBAN UPHEAVALS OF TWO DECADES AGO. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE (EEO LEGISLATION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, GIVING MINORITIES GREATER AVENUES FOR POLITICAL EXPRESSION) RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN SOCIETAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICS IN THE U.S. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE BRITISH POLITICAL SYSTEM WILL PROVE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO MEET THE CHALLENGE THIS UNREST POSES. WITH THE AUTUMN CHILL COMING, THE RIOTS MAY HAVE ABATED, BUT WHEN THE WEATHER GETS WARM AGAIN, IF NOT BEFORE, THERE COULD BE A REPEAT OF THESE INCIDENTS. END SUMMARY ARE THEY DEPRESSED BECAUSE THEY\'RE DEPRIVED? -------------------------------------------- 3. HEADLINES IN THE U.K. IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE RECORDED CLASHES BETWEEN RIOTERS AND POLICE, THE KNIFING TO DEATH OF ONE POLICEMAN, AND CROWDS OF YOUTHS PELTING BRICKS, STONES, AND MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AT RIOT-SHIELDED POLICE IN THE DEPRESSED AREAS OF LONDON, BIRMINGHAM, LIVERPOOL, AND LEICESTER. FOUR YEARS AGO, AFTER SIMILAR SCENES IN THE BRIXTON NEIGHBORHOOD OF LONDON, LORD SCARMAN, THE JUDGE WHO HEADED A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, FOUND THAT THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE RIOTS WERE: UNEMPLOYMENT, POOR HOUSING, LACK OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROSPECTS FOR YOUTHS, POOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE POLICE, AND AN INCREASINGLY LARGE NUMBER OF BLACKS WHO FELT ANGRY AND ALIENATED FROM A SOCIETY WHICH THEY PERCEIVED AS RACIST AND HOSTILE. 4. THE RIOT AREAS ARE SHARPLY MORE ETHNIC AND YOUNGER THAN THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE. THE OVERALL PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES HEADED BY A WEST INDIAN, INDIAN, OR PAKISTANI IN BRITAIN IS 4.7 PERCENT, BUT IN THE HANDSWORTH AREA OF BIRMINGHAM, THE FIGURE IS 53.1 PERCENT. THERE IS ALSO A CONCENTRATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE RIOT AREAS; THE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION THAT IS BETWEEN 16 AND 24 IN HANDSWORTH IS CLOSE TO 40 PERCENT, WHEREAS IN BRITAIN AS A WHOLE IT IS ABOUT HALF THAT. 5. MUCH OF THE SITUATION IN THE INNER CITIES WHICH SCARMAN POINTED TO AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RIOTS OF 1981 HAS NOT CHANGED. IN FACT, THE PAST FEW YEARS HAVE SEEN THIS PICTURE GROW BLEAKER. UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES IN HANDSWORTH STAND AT OVER 30 PERCENT, AND IN TOXTETH IN LIVERPOOL, ANOTHER RIOT SITE, AT 47 PERCENT. 6. THE INNER CITIES HAVE THE HIGHEST NATIONAL RATES OF MENTAL HOSPITAL ADMISSION IN BRITAIN, THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF SINGLE-PARENT HOMES (TWICE THE NATIONAL AVERAGE) AND THE MOST HOUSES DECLARED UNFIT FOR HUMAN HABITATION. FOR MANY THE PROSPECTS FOR ESCAPING UNEMPLOYMENT SEEM INCREASINGLY NON-EXISTENT; THE RATIO OF VACANCIES LISTED TO PEOPLE UNEMPLOYED WAS 1 TO 8 IN THE INNER CITIES IN THE DAYS OF THE FIRST BRIXTON DISTURBANCES, BUT THE FIGURE IS NOW 1 TO 491, ACCORDING TO A SEPTEMBER ARTICLE IN THE LONDON TIMES. JUNE FIGURES IN TOXTETH WERE 10,000 INQUIRIES FOR 126 VACANCIES. IS THERE AN UNDERCLASS? ------------------------ 7. A CRUMBLING INFRASTRUCTURE, HARD-CORE UNEMPLOYMENT, AND DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOCIAL FABRIC IN THE INNER CITIES IS NOT A NEW PROBLEM IN BRITAIN: DICKENS DESCRIBED THE SQUALOR, OVER-CROWDING, AND POVERTY IN BRITAIN\'S CITIES OVER A CENTURY AGO. WHAT HAS CHANGED IS THAT THE PEOPLE AFFECTED ARE INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO BE MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS. PARTICIPANTS IN THE RECENT RIOTS WERE BOTH BLACK AND WHITE, AND STILL MANY OF THE POOREST PEOPLE IN BRITAIN ARE WHITE, BUT THE NUMBER OF MINORITIES WHO ARE \"AT THE BOTTOM OF THE HEAP\" IS VASTLY OUT OF PROPORTION TO THEIR TOTAL NUMBERS IN THE POPULATION. 8. NATIONWIDE, THERE ARE STRIKING DIFFERENCES IN THE EXPERIENCES OF WHITES AND MINORITIES IN HOUSING, EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME. A STUDY RELEASED LAST MONTH BY THE POLICY STUDY INSTITUTE, A WELL-RESPECTED GROUP, REVEALED THAT BLACKS AND ASIANS IN BRITAIN ARE ON AVERAGE FOUR TIMES AS LIKELY AS WHITES TO BE PASSED OVER FOR JOBS FOR WHICH THEY APPLY, A STATISTIC WHICH CANNOT BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATION OR TRAINING. WITH COMPARABLE EDUCATION, THE SAME DIFFERENCE PERTAINS. AMONG PEOPLE WITH ONE OR MORE \"O\" LEVELS (ABOUT THE EQUIVALENT OF A U.S. HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA) THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IS 9 PERCENT FOR WHITES, 18 PERCENT FOR ASIANS, AND 25 PERCENT FOR BLACKS. THE PROSPECTS FOR THOSE WITHOUT THESE QUALIFICATIONS, AND IN AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN HIT HARDEST ECONOMICALLY, ARE EVEN BLEAKER. 9. BIRMINGHAM, THE SECOND LARGEST CITY IN BRITAIN AND UNTIL 15 YEARS AGO THE SECOND WEALTHIEST WHEN MEASURED BY AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME, IS NOW THE POOREST CITY IN THE U.K. IT LOST 1/3 OF ITS MANUFACTURING JOBS BETWEEN 1978 AND 1984, ACCORDING TO THE FINANCIAL TIMES REGIONAL SURVEY. IN THAT SORT OF ECONOMIC CLIMATE, BREAKING INTO THE JOB MARKET IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, AND OF THOSE WHO LEFT SCHOOL AT 16 LAST SUMMER, ONLY 18 PERCENT OF WHITES, 16 PERCENT OF ASIANS, AND 5 PERCENT OF BLACKS HAD FOUND WORK AT THE END OF 6 MONTHS, ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT. 10. LIVERPOOL SIMILARLY HAS DECLINED DRASTICALLY IN RECENT YEARS. ACCORDING TO A SERIAL CASE STUDY OF THE AREA PUBLISHED IN THE GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER, THERE WERE 11,000 DOCKWORKERS EMPLOYED IN THE PORT OF LIVERPOOL IN 1972, BUT TODAY THERE ARE FEWER THAN 2,000. INDUSTRIAL PLANTS IN TOXTETH EMPLOYED 22,000 THAT YEAR, BUT NOW EMPLOY 2,000. UNEMPLOYMENT FOR LIVERPOOL AS A WHOLE IS 21 PERCENT, BUT IN CERTAIN POCKETS SUCH AS TOXTETH, THE RATE IS AT 70 PERCENT FOR ADULTS AND 96 PERCENT FOR YOUTHS. FOUR-FIFTHS OF TOXTETH\'S CITIZENS RECEIVE SOME WELFARE BENEFITS. CLEARLY IT IS NOT ONLY NON-WHITES WHO FACE MAJOR OBSTACLES, BUT IT IS THE NON-WHITES WHO ARE MOST APT TO FIND THEMSELVES STYMIED AS MEMBERS OF AN ECONOMIC AND RACIAL UNDERCLASS. 11. DIFFERENCES IN HOUSING BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES ARE STRIKING. ACCORDING TO THE POLICY STUDIES INSTITUTE\'S COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY \"BLACK AND WHITE BRITAIN\", BLACK HOUSEHOLDS ARE TWICE AS LIKELY AS WHITES TO SHARE A DWELLING. FOUR TIMES AS MANY ASIANS AND THREE TIMES AS MANY WEST INDIANS AS WHITES LIVE IN OVERCROWDED CONDITIONS, DEFINED AS TWO OR MORE PEOPLE TO A BEDROOM. OVER HALF THE PAKISTANI-HEADED FAMILIES IN BRITAIN LIVE IN HOUSES WITHOUT HOT WATER, INDOOR TOILETS, AND BATHS, WHEREAS THE FIGURE FOR WHITES IS 17 PERCENT. 12. THERE ARE DEEP DIFFERENCES IN THE MEASURED EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT LEVELS OF WHITES AND MINORITIES. CHILDREN OF WEST INDIAN PARENTS ARE FOUR TIMES AS LIKELY AS WHITE CHILDREN TO BE CLASSIFIED AS EDUCATIONALLY SUBNORMAL. AND FEW BLACK YOUNGSTERS GO BEYOND SECONDARY EDUCATION. THE PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO ONE ANALYST, IS NOT SO MUCH OUTRIGHT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE BLACK CHILDREN AS \"WELL-MEANING LOW EXPECTATION\" ON THE PART OF TEACHERS. TEACHERS DECIDE SUBCONSCIOUSLY THAT THE CHILDREN ARE LIKELY TO BE FAILURES AND GIVE UP ON THEM, LEAVING THEM TO MARK TIME IN REMEDIAL EDUCATION UNTIL THEY CAN LEAVE SCHOOL AT 16. 13. THE AVERAGE WAGE FOR BLACKS IN BRITAIN REMAINS 20 POUNDS LESS PER WEEK THAN FOR WHITES. ASIANS EARN 18 POUNDS LESS, ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, AND THIS STARTS FROM THE LOW NATIONAL AVERAGE FOR WHITES OF ONLY 139 POUNDS PER WEEK. 14. FROM BEHIND THESE STATISTICS EMERGES A PICTURE OF AN ALIENATED THIRD-WORLD NATION WITHIN BRITAIN, AN UNDER-CLASS OF THE DEPRIVED, THE HOPELESS, AND THE DISPOSSESSED, IN LARGE PART BUT BY NO MEANS ENTIRELY MADE UP OF MINORITES. WHO ARE THE RACIAL MINORITIES? ------------------------------- 15. UNTIL RECENTLY, MOST IN THE U.K. BELIEVED THEY LIVED IN A RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETY. BRITONS LOOKED ON RELATIVELY COMPLACENTLY WHILE AMERICA STRUGGLED WITH RACIAL ISSUES IN THE 1960\'S: \"WE DON\'T HAVE SUCH TROUBLES HERE\". THE ONE ACERBIC EXCEPTION CAME IN 1968, WHEN ENOCH POWELL, A CONSERVATIVE M.P., MADE A NOTORIOUS SPEECH IN WHICH HE PREDICTED \"RIVERS OF BLOOD\" IN THE STREETS IF THE TIDE OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS WAS NOT STEMMED. HOWEVER CRUDELY AND UNACCEPTABLY TO MOST OF HIS AUDIENCE, HE HAD PUT HIS FINGER ON A PROBLEM; BRITAIN APPEARS UNPREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE PROFOUND CHANGE IN THE COMPLEXION OF ITS SOCIETY WHICH HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN INFLUX OF IMMIGRANTS. THEY CAME FROM THE COMMONWEALTH AT FIRST, AND WERE FOLLOWED BY IMMIGRANTS RECRUITED FROM THE CARIBBEAN TO FILL WORLD WAR II LABOR SHORTAGES. IMMIGRATION GREW AS TROUBLES AFFLICTED ONE POST-COLONIAL TERRITORY AFTER ANOTHER IN THE 50\'S AND 60\'S. THOSE WHO WANTED TO MOVE COULD USE THEIR COMMONWEALTH PASSPORTS, A POSSIBILITY WHICH WAS REDUCED BY CHANGES IN THE LAW IN THE LAST DECADE. 16. STILL, THERE ARE ONLY ONE MILLION BLACKS AND BROWNS IN BRITAIN, OUT OF A POPULATION OF 54 MILLION, AND BY NOW HALF OF THESE ARE BRITISH-BORN. BUT THEIR OUTSIDER STATUS PERSISTS. THEY ARE STILL DISPROPORTIONATELY STUCK AT THE THE LOWER END OF THE PAY SCALE, IN SHIFTWORK AND PART-TIME WORK. OF THOSE IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN IN THE U.K. WHO HAVE FOUND WORK, 50 PERCENT ARE ESTIMATED TO BE OVERQUALIFIED EDUCATIONALLY FOR THE WORK THEY DO, ACCORDING TO THE BOOK \"STAYING POWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK PEOPLE IN BRITAIN\", BY PETER FRYER. 17. BRITAIN HAS ALWAYS BEEN A STRATIFIED SOCIETY, WITH EACH NEW GENERATION INHERITING THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES THAT PRESERVED THE CLASS STRUCTURE AND ITS OWN PLACE WITHIN IT. AS SUCH IT WAS ILL-PREPARED TO IMPORT AND ASSIMILATE MILLIONS WHO WERE OUTSIDE OF THIS FAMILIAR WORLD ORDER, AND WHO IN MANY CASES HAD THEIR OWN CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND DID NOT ASPIRE TO SLIDE HORIZONTALLY INTO THE BRITISH SYSTEM. MANY BRITONS FEAR THE CONFUSING CHANGES THAT THE IMMIGRANTS HAVE HELPED BRING INTO THEIR FORMERLY BOUNDED AND ORDERLY WORLD. THEY VIEW THE NEW-COMERS WITH SUSPICION AND WORSE. 18. POPULAR PRESS REPORTING OF THE RECENT RIOTS HAS REFLECTED THE RABBLE-ROUSING RACISM WHICH IS STILL EASY DISCOURSE IN MODERN BRITAIN. TABLOIDS DESCRIBE THE \"ZULU-STYLE WAR CRIES\" OF THE RIOTERS AND RE-CYCLE THE COMMENTS OF WHITES CALLING THEM \"BARBARIANS\" AND \"ANIMALS\". BUT LIFE IS NOT SO SIMPLE; AT LEAST A QUARTER OF THE YOUTHS IN THE MOB AT TOTTENHAM, AND ONE HALF OF THOSE WHO APPEARED BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE SUBSEQUENTLY, WERE ESTIMATED TO BE WHITE. BOTH BLACK AND WHITE YOUTHS ARE NOW CHARGED WITH THE MURDER OF THE POLICE CONSTABLE AT TOTTENHAM. THE PUBLIC HOUSING NEAR MOST OF THE RIOT LOCALES IS MORE INTEGRATED THAN WAS THE CASE IN THE U.S. IN THE 60\'S; BROADWATER FARMS, THE PUBLIC HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AT THE CENTER OF THE RIOTS IN LONDON\'S TOTTENHAM AREA, HOLDS APPROXIMATELY A 50/50 RACIAL MIX. 19. IN ADDITION TO THE DIFFICULTY THE LARGER WHITE POPULATION IS HAVING IN ABSORBING IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS (THERE IS NO \'MELTING POT\' TRADITION IN BRITAIN), THERE ARE TENSIONS BETWEEN RACIAL GROUPS AMONG THE IMMIGRANTS. THE TWO GROUPS WHICH HAVE IMMIGRATED IN THE LARGEST NUMBERS ARE ASIANS (PRIMARILY INDIANS AND PAKISTANIS) AND AFRO- CARRIBEANS. THE BLACK IMMIGRANTS ARE SAID TO RESENT THE RELATIVELY MORE PROSPEROUS ASIANS. THE ASIANS, WHO TEND TO BE THE ONLY SHOPKEEPERS LEFT IN THE INNER CITIES, HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY HARD HIT BY THE LOOTING AND BURNING THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE DURING THE RIOTS. THE ONLY TWO CIVILIAN FATALITIES AS THE RESULT OF THE RIOTING HAVE BEEN TWO ASIAN BROTHERS, KILLED WHEN THEIR STORE IN HANDSWORTH WAS BURNED TO THE GROUND AFTER THEY WERE LOCKED IN. PRESS ACCOUNTS NOTED THAT THEIR STORE WAS THE PLACE THAT MOST OF THE LOCAL RESIDENTS CASHED THEIR WELFARE CHECKS, AND THUS TO SOME OF THE RIOTERS THE STORE MAY HAVE SYMBOLIZED THE SYSTEM AGAINST WHICH THEY WERE LASHING OUT. 20. IT IS PERHAPS POSSIBLE TO OVERSTATE THE RIVALRY BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS IN BRITAIN. THIS RIVALRY DOES HAVE PARALLELS IN U.S. CITIES, SUCH AS THE RESENTMENT CERTAIN BLACKS EXPRESSED AGAINST CUBANS IN THE MIAMI RIOTS, AND IT HAS SIMILAR CAUSES. 21. BLACKS COMPLAIN THAT THEY ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE GIVEN WHAT FEW FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CITIES. (SINCE 1981 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOCATED ONLY 200,000 POUNDS FOR THIS PURPOSE TO THE RIOT AREA OF HANDSWORTH, IN SPITE OF THE SCARMAN REPORT, WHICH EMPHASIZED HOW EFFECTIVE SUCH GRANTS WOULD BE IN REHABILITATING THE RIOT AREAS.) THESE COMPLAINTS ARE SUPPORTED BY STATISTICS; OVER 50 PERCENT OF APPLICATIONS FOR GRANTS FOR SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT (INNER CITY PARTNERSHIPS) WERE SUBMITTED BY BLACKS, BUT THEY ULTIMATELY RECEIVED ONLY 13 PERCENT OF THE GRANTS. ASIAN BUSINESSES FOUNDED WITH THESE GRANTS ARE ALMOST INVARIABLY FAMILY OPERATED AND RARELY EMPLOY BLACKS. 22. THERE IS LITTLE IN THE WAY OF A BLACK MIDDLE CLASS IN BRITAIN. THE ONLY ROLE MODELS THAT BLACK PEOPLE HAVE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT ARE MUSICIANS, SPORTS FIGURES, AND A HANDFUL OF T.V. JOURNALISTS, AS THERE ARE NO NATIONAL LEADERS, NO MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, AND ONLY ONE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEADER WHO IS BLACK (AND EVEN HE WAS NOT ELECTED DIRECTLY IN THE STYLE OF U.S. MAYORS). ASIANS, BY CONTRAST, DO HAVE ROLE MODELS IN BUSINESS AND COMMERCE, AND THEY HAVE THEIR OWN RELIGIOUS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. THUS, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT FULLY ACCEPTED INTO BRITISH SOCIETY, ON THE WHOLE ASIANS ARE \"PART OF THE SYSTEM\", AS ONE OBSERVER PUT IT. THE POLICE: ARE THEY THE PROBLEM OR THE ANSWER? --------------------------------------------- - 23. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE, AND THE RISING PRESSURES ON THEM TO RESPOND TO SUCCESSIVE SOCIETAL CHALLENGES IS WORRISOME TO MANY HERE. FIRST IRA TERRORISM, THEN POLICING THE MINERS\' STRIKE, AND NOW THE INNER CITY STRIFE HAVE STRETCHED THEM DANGEROUSLY THIN. MEANWHILE, THE POLICE FORCES WHICH ARE NOW BEING ASKED TO CONTAIN THE URBAN UPHEAVALS ARE OFTEN LESS THAN ONE PER CENT BLACK OR ASIAN (OVERALL, 700 MINORITY POLICE OUT OF A FORCE OF 120,000, ACCORDING TO NEWSPAPER SOURCES. LAST YEAR, HOWEVER, OF 1208 TRAINEES IN THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE, 36 BELONGED TO MINORITY GROUPS, A HIGHER PERCENTAGE THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS AND ABOUT IN PROPORTION TO POPULATION. A WELL-PUBLICIZED STUDY PREPARED BY THE INSTITUTE FOR RACE RELATIONS FOR THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND PUBLISHED IN 1979, CHARACTERIZED MANY OF THE POLICE IN BRITAIN AS RACIALLY INSENSITIVE, AND ALLEGED THAT MANY OF THEM USE DEROGATORY LANGUAGE WHEN REFERRING TO MINORITIES, THAT THEY STEREOTYPE BLACKS AS PIMPS AND LAYABOUTS, AND THAT THEY CONSISTENTLY APPLY MORE PRESSURE AND AGGRESSION IN ENCOUNTERS WITH BLACK CI\|IZENS THAN THEY WOULD WITH WHITES. THE NEGATIVE IMAGE OF THE POLICE THAT THIS STUDY HELPED CREATE IS ONE FACTOR THAT MAKES THE PRESENT RECRUITMENT OF MINORITIES INTO THE POLICE SO DIFFICULT. 24. A RECENT BBC TELEVISION PROGRAM COMPARED THIS SITUATION TO THAT IN THE NEW YORK POLICE FORCE, IN WHICH 40 PERCENT OF LAST YEAR\'S TRAINEES WERE BLACK, AS A RESULT OF INTENSIVE RECRUITMENT EFFORTS AND, MORE PROFOUNDLY, A RETHINKING OF THE ROLE AND RELEVANCE OF THE POLICE IN THE CITIES. NOTHING ON THIS SCALE IS CONTEMPLATED HERE, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN SOME HALF-HEARTED ATTEMPTS TO BOOST RECRUITMENT OF MINORITIES, AND THE HOME SECRETARY HAS NOW URGED THE METROPOLITAN POLICE TO HIRE MORE BLACKS. 25. ONE MUST ALSO NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE POLICE FORCE HAS BEEN THE ONLY INSTITUTION TO TAKE THE 1981 SCARMAN REPORT TO HEART, AND REAL CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THEN. POLICE NOW TAKE TRAINING IN CULTURAL SENSITIVITY AND RACE RELATIONS, AND THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY POLICING (GETTING THE POLICEMAN COMFORTABLE AND FAMILIAR WITH THE PEOPLE ON HIS BEAT, AND THE PEOPLE USED TO THE PRESENCE OF THE POLICE) HAVE MADE PROGRESS IN IMPROVING THE CLIMATE ON THE STREETS. PERHAPS IT IS IRONIC THEN, THAT IT WAS POLICE ACTIONS IN TWO INSTANCES WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE SPARKED THE RIOTS. THE FIRST WAS THE ACCIDENTAL SHOOTING IN SEPTEMBER OF A MIDDLE-AGED BLACK WOMAN, OCCASIONED WHEN POLICE BROKE DOWN THE DOOR OF HER HOUSE AND BURST IN, LOOKING FOR HER SON ON A WEAPONS CHARGE. THE SHOOTING HAS LEFT HER A PARAPLEGIC, AND HAS FOCUSSED RESENTMENT AGAINST WHAT IS SEEN AS POLICE HEAVY-HANDEDNESS. THIS INCIDENT WAS FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY THE DEATH OF A BLACK WOMAN DURING A SEARCH OF HER HOME. ALTHOUGH SHE DIED OF HEART FAILURE, HER FAMILY HAS CHARGED THAT THE POLICE WHO WERE CONDUCTING THE SEARCH DELIBERATELY IGNORED HER PLEAS FOR MEDICAL ATTENTION AND ALLOWED HER TO DIE UNNECESSARILY FOR WANT OF AN AMBULANCE. 26. POLICE HEAVY-HANDEDNESS IS CITED REPEATEDLY AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE RIOTS. TWO SOCIOLOGISTS WHO EXPLORED THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IN THE INNER CITIES IN A MONOGRAPH PUBLISHED THIS SUMMER CONCLUDED THAT THE POLICE WERE IN FACT CONSTANTLY MAKING THEIR PRESENCE FELT TO YOUTHS IN THE HANDSWORTH AREA, BY FREQUENTLY STOPPING THEM AND QUESTIONING THEM. THE AVERAGE RATE AT WHICH YOUTHS WERE STOPPED FOR QUESTIONING WAS FIVE TIMES PER YEAR, FOR BOTH BLACKS AND WHITES. WHAT WAS PARTICULARLY STRIKING WAS THAT ALTHOUGH THEY WERE STOPPED AT THE SAME RATE, BLACK YOUNGSTERS DISTRUSTED THE POLICE MUCH MORE, AND THEIR ATTITUDES WERE FAR MORE OFTEN HOSTILE. IT IS INEVITABLE THAT POLICE WILL HAVE TO BE ACTIVE IN NEIGHBORHOODS WITH HIGH CRIME RATES AND A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF YOUTH (THOSE STATISTICALLY MOST LIKELY TO COMMIT CRIMES). IT IS JUST AS INEVITABLE THAT ENCOUNTERS UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WILL CREATE STRAINS. BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT MANY BLACKS ARE LASHING OUT AT THE POLICE, WHO SYMBOLIZE A SYSTEM WHICH THEY FEEL IS HOSTILE TO THEIR INTEREST. 27. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE RIOTS HAS BEEN TO CALL FOR MORE SWEEPING POLICE POWER, AND AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF TEAR GAS AND PLASTIC BULLETS IN RIOT CONTROL (THE SAME PLASTIC BULLETS WHOSE USE IS BEING SO HOTLY CONTESTED IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WHERE THEY HAVE ON SOME RARE OCCASIONS CAUSED DEATH). THE CONSERVATIVES, AS THE \"LAW AND ORDER\" PARTY, HAVE MADE THEIR PRINCIPAL RALLYING CRY FOR DEALING WITH THE RIOTS A PLEDGE FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE POLICE, UNDER PRESSURE FROM THEIR RIGHT AND MUCH OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN BRITAIN, THE \"DECENT WORKING PEOPLE.\" 28. NONETHELESS, THE POLICE HAVE REACTED IN FRUSTRATION TO THE CHARGES THAT HAVE BEEN LEVELED AGAINST THEM. IN AN EMOTIONALLY CHARGED GATHERING LAST WEEK, THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE METROPOLITAN BRANCH OF THE POLICE FEDERATION, THE RANK AND FILE ACCUSED THEIR LEADERS OF COWARDICE, SAYING THAT THEY WERE AFRAID OF MAKING TOUGH DECISIONS FOR FEAR OF POLITICAL OR PROMOTIONAL CONSEQUENCES. THE POLICE ON THE BEAT COMPLAIN THAT THE BRAKES ARE PUT ON THEM BY THEIR SENIOR OFFICERS AND BY LOCAL POLITICIANS. IN TOTTENHAM, THE FIRST RIOT IN THE U.K. MAINLAND IN WHICH GUNS WERE USED AGAINST THE POLICE, AND WHERE ONE POLICEMAN WAS KILLED AND 163 INJURED, THE POLICE WERE RESTRAINED FROM GOING INTO THE AREA EARLY ON TO MAKE ARRESTS. THIS, POLICE CLAIM, WAS BUT A CONTINUATION OF AN OFFICIAL \"HANDS-OFF\" POLICY WHICH HAS FRUSTRATED THEM SINCE ITS INCEPTION AFTER SCARMAN, AND WHICH THEY BELIEVE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HIGH CASUALTY RATE THAT FOLLOWED. 29. AT THE MEETING LAST WEEK, JOHN NEWMAN, A CONSTABLE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE METROPOLITAN BRANCH OF THE POLICE FEDERATION, DEMANDED AND WAS GRANTED A \"THOROUGH REVIEW OF POLICY AND TACTICS\" BY METROPOLITAN COMMISSIONER SIR KENNETH NEWMAN. 30. MINORITY AND OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THE POLICE ONLY WANT STUDIES OF THE ISSUES THAT SUIT THEM, AND NOTE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE POLICE HAVE REFUSED TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO THE TRIGGERING INCIDENTS OF TWO OF THE RIOTS. THE POLITICS OF RACE --------------------- 31. THE THEME OF HOME SECRETARY HURD\'S SPEECH AT THE ANNUAL CONSERVATIVE CONFERENCE IN EARLY OCTOBER, DIRECTED AT MINORITIES, WAS PARAPHRASABLE AS \"YOU HAVE THE RIGHTS, NOW EXERCISE SOME RESPONSIBILITY\". THE REALITY SEEMS TO BE THAT THESE RIGHTS APPEAR ALL TOO THEORETICAL, AT BEST, TO MOST OF BRITAIN\'S MINORITIES. 32. MINORITY VOTERS, ESPECIALLY CARIBBEAN BLACKS, HAVE VOTED FOR THE LABOR PARTY SO CONSISTENTLY THAT THE CONSERVATIVES AND THE ALLIANCE HAVE LARGELY WRITTEN THEM OFF, AND LABOR HAS TAKEN THEM FOR GRANTED. 33. THERE ARE SOME STIRRINGS OF CHANGE. LABOR IS GROPING WITH PLANS TO GIVE BLACKS SPECIAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE PARTY STRUCTURE, A NUMBER OF ETHNIC ASIANS ARE TENDING TOWARDS THE ALLIANCE, AND SOME SUCCESSFUL BLACK AND ASIAN BUSINESSMEN FLIRT WITH THE TORIES. MEANWHILE, LEGISLATION ON THE U.S. MODEL ALLOWING GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW CONTRACTS FROM FIRMS THAT DO NOT EMPLOY A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF MINORITIES WAS RECENTLY PROPOSED BY THE HOME OFFICE. THIS PROPOSAL IS CONTROVERSIAL AND UNLIKELY TO BECOME LAW BECAUSE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH MEASURES. NEVERTHELESS, THE RIOTS MAY HAVE FORCED THE PROBLEMS OF RACIAL MINORITIES BACK NEAR THE TOP OF THE AGENDA. ONE JOURNALIST INTERVIEWING AN ANGRY YOUTH ON THE STREETS OF HANDSWORTH CALLED THE RIOTS POINTLESS, BUT THE YOUNG MAN COUNTERED \"OH, YEAH? HOW DO YOU FIGURE THAT? SOMETHING WILL BE DONE.\" AND HE MAY BE RIGHT. PARTY POLITICS: TOO LITTLE DONE, AND THAT TOO LATE --------------------------------------------- ----- 34. THE BROAD REACTION AMONG CONSERVATIVES TO THE RECENT RIOTS WAS SPLIT: THE HARD-LINE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS RESISTED CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS LINKING POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION WITH THE URBAN UPHEAVALS AND DESCRIBED THE RIOTS AS MERE \"CRIMINAL OPPORTUNISM\". THIS POSITION WAS PORTRAYED BY THE OPPOSITION AS A SELF-INTERESTED ATTEMPT BY THE TORIES TO WRIGGLE FREE OF THEIR PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRITAIN\'S CONTINUING ECONOMIC DOLDRUMS AND THEIR RESULTS. OTHER MORE LIBERAL TORIES PARTIALLY CONCURRED WITH THESE SENTIMENTS; THEY CLAIMED THAT THE RIOTS PROVED WHAT THEY HAD BEEN SAYING, I.E. THAT THE GOVERNMENT\'S PRIORITIES HAD TO BE RE-EXAMINED AND THE HARD LINE REVISED. PRIME MINISTER THATCHER\'S ARGUMENT THAT THE WORKINGS OF AN UNFETTERED FREE MARKET WILL, IF LEFT ALONE, CREATE JOBS TO RENEW BRITAIN HAS BEEN RIDICULED BY THE OPPOSITION PARTIES, WHICH ASSERT THAT UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES THREATEN BRITAIN\'S CITIES WITH HOSTILITY AND ALIENATION THAT LAISSEZ-FAIRE ECONOMICS CANNOT RESOLVE. MRS. THATCHER\'S RESPONSE TO THE RIOTS WAS TO PLEDGE MORE EQUIPMENT AND MANPOWER FOR THE POLICE, BUT HOME SECRETARY HURD HAS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RIOT CAUSES MUST BE TREATED TOO. THE OPPOSITION HAS OFFERED NO CONCRETE SOLUTIONS OTHER THAN THE PRESERVATION AND ENHANCEMENT OF THE WELFARE STATE, WHILE ALLIANCE AND LABOR LEADERS MUST WELCOME THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT CURRENTLY IN POWER AND HAVING TO DEFEND THEIR OWN RECORDS IN THE GLARE OF THE BURNING CITIES. 35. THE CONSERVATIVES STRESS THE SIGNS OF ECONOMIC UPTURN THAT OCCASIONALLY ARISE, SUCH AS NEW FIRMS TAKING UP RESIDENCE IN BIRMINGHAM AND LIVERPOOL. THE FIRMS WHICH THEY ARE REFERRING TO DO HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON ECONOMIC STATISTICS, BUT IN GENERAL ARE HIGH-TECH, CAPITAL-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES THAT EMPLOY RELATIVELY FEW PEOPLE AND THOSE, HIGHLY SKILLED, ACCORDING TO A CONGRESS OF BRITISH INDUSTRIES STUDY. THUS THEY HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE INNER CITY UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS. 36. THE TORIES HAVE MADE THE REINING-IN OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING ONE OF THEIR PRIME TECHNIQUES FOR REDUCING TOTAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING. IN PARTICULAR PUBLIC SECTOR CAPITAL BUDGETS HAVE BEEN SEVERELY CUT FROM 3.6 BILLION POUNDS IN 1979 TO 2.2 BILLION POUNDS IN 1986. WHEN COMBINED WITH THE SALE OF COUNCIL HOUSING TO ITS TENANTS, THE PUBLIC HOUSING STOCK HAS BEEN REDUCED BY ONE-THIRD DURING A PERIOD IN WHICH FUNDS FOR HOUSING RENOVATIONS HAVE NOT INCREASED IN REAL TERMS. SCARMAN\'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN HOUSING HAVE BEEN ALMOST ENTIRELY IGNORED. 37. EDUCATIONAL REFORMS SUGGESTED BY SCARMAN INCLUDED MORE AND BETTER NURSERY EDUCATION, MORE TRAINING OF TEACHERS IN THE NEEDS OF MINORITY CHILDREN, PROGRAMS TO TEACH ENGLISH TO IMMIGRANTS, AND BETTER LINKS BETWEEN PARENTS AND SCHOOLS. NONE OF THESE HAS BEEN FUNDED. IN FACT, ACCORDING TO THE FINANCIAL TIMES, DESPITE A STATIC NURSERY-AGE POPULATION IN BRITAIN, THE OVERALL CAPITAL SPENDING FOR NURSERY EDUCATION HAS FALLEN FROM 41 POUNDS PER CAPITA TO 24 POUNDS SINCE 1981. 38. SCARMAN RECOMMENDED THAT \"POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION\" MIGHT BE NEEDED TO REDRESS THE EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATIONAL GAPS BETWEEN WHITES AND MINORITIES. (POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION IS BETTER KNOWN IN THE U.S. AS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION.) NO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ACTION RESULTED FROM THESE SUGGESTIONS, ALTHOUGH PROGRAMS WERE ADOPTED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN SOME AREAS. WHAT ABOUT THE ROLE OF BRITAIN\'S NEW DRUGS CRACKDOWN? 39. SEVERAL PAPERS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT EFFORTS AFTER THE LAST RIOTS TO FORGE LINKS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY BY INCREASING POLICEMEN\'S SENSITIVITY TO THE COMMUNITIES THEY PATROL HAVE RESULTED IN THE POLICE GOING \"SOFT ON CRIME.\" FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLICE ARE IN A DELICATE POSITION WHEN THEY ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE ANTI-MARIJUANA LAWS IN AFRO-CARIBBEAN COMMUNITIES, WHERE RASTAFARIANS SEE MARIJUANA AS AN IMPORTANT RITUAL SUBSTANCE. INTERFERENCE WITH THIS TRADITION IS LIKELY TO BRING TROUBLE DOWN UPON THE HEAD OF THE OFFICER WHO IS SO BOLD AS TO STEP IN. AT THE VERY LEAST HE INVITES CHARGES OF CULTURAL INSENSITIVITY. MEANWHILE, IN MANY AREAS DRUG SALES HAVE BECOME THE ONLY RELIABLE SOURCE OF INCOME AND ADVANCEMENT FOR YOUNG BLACK GO-GETTERS. 40. IN THE PAST YEAR, HOWEVER, THE U.K HAS FOCUSSED ON THE DAMAGE WHICH DRUG USAGE AND ITS ATTENDANT CORRUPTION CAUSE, MINDFUL OF U.S. PROBLEMS, AND IT IS ADOPTING IN A WHOLESALE FASHION U.S. ANTI-DRUG TECHNIQUES. AS PART OF AN OVERALL POLICY WHICH INCLUDES LONGER SENTENCES FOR DRUG DEALERS, AND NEW TECHNIQUES TO SEIZE PROFITS FROM DRUG SALES, THE POLICE HAVE BEEN PRESSED TO CRACK DOWN ON DRUGS, AND THIS NEW DRUGS OFFENSIVE MAY HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE SPARKS THAT FINALLY KINDLED THE TINDERBOX CITIES. BIRMINGHAM\'S RIOTS WERE PRECEDED BY TWO MAJOR RAIDS RIGHT IN THE NEIGHBORHOODS WHICH WERE SOON TO BE THE SCENE OF THE DISTURBANCES. THE HOME OFFICE HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACKNOWLEDGE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DRUGS SWEEP AND THE ERUPTION OF THE RIOTS, BUT A BRIGHT LABOR M.P. FROM BIRMINGHAM TOLD US, WITHOUT IN ANY WAY IMPLYING THAT DRUG DEALERS CAN BE ALLOWED FREEDOM TO OPERATE, THAT HE KNOWS THE CONNECTION IS EXPLICIT. THUS, IT APPEARS THAT THE POLICE ARE CAUGHT ON THE FRONT LINES ENFORCING A NEWLY VIGOROUS AND GENERALLY POPULAR ANTI-DRUGS POLICY, BUT ARE ALSO TRYING TO CATCH UP WITH THE IMPACT THAT IT AND OTHER SOCIAL PROBLEMS ARE HAVING ON BRITAIN\'S CITIES. CONCLUSION ---------- 41. THE RIOTS MAY HAVE FORCED BRITAIN\'S POLITICAL LEADERS TO EXAMINE THEMSELVES AND DETERMINE SUBSEQUENT ACTION TO REDRESS SOME VERY REAL AND THUS FAR INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS. BUT IN THE MEANTIME WE ARE LIKELY TO SEE MORE RIOTING AHEAD, WHICH WILL PUT EXTRA STRAINS ON THIS CAUTIOUS, SLOW-TO-CHANGE SOCIETY. WHILE THE ONSET OF WINTER MAY INHIBIT STREET VIOLENCE, SPRING CANNOT BE FAR BEHIND. SEITZ " "96","11/7/1985 21:35","85VANCOUVER2152","Consulate Vancouver","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 072135Z NOV 85 FM AMCONSUL VANCOUVER TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2975 INFO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMCONSUL CALGARY AMCONSUL MONTREAL AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMCONSUL TORONTO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI ","C O N F I D E N T I A L VANCOUVER 2152 OTTAWA PLS POUCH HALIFAX AND WINNIPEG E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, PINS, MOPS, IN, CA SUBJECT: MAJOR POLICE ACTION AGAINST SIKHS IN VANCOUVER 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. THE RCMP AND VANCOUVER POLICE CARRIED OUT A SERIES OF ARRESTS AND COORDINATED SEARCHES OF THE HOMES OF MILITANT SIKHS HERE IN VANCOUVER NOVEMBER 6. THE RCMP ARRESTS OF TALWINDER SINGH PARMAR AND INDERJIT SINGH REYAT WERE IN CONNECTION WITH THE NARITA AIRPORT EXPLOSION LAST JUNE. THE VANCOUVER POLICE RAIDS WERE NOT RELATED TO THE NARITA BOMBING, BUT TO A NUMBER OF RECENT ATTACKS BY MILITANT SIKHS ON MORE MODERATE SIKHS HERE IN VANCOUVER. 3. PRESS REPORTS HERE PORTRAY THE ARREST OF PARMAR AND REYAT AS BEING RELATED BOTH TO THE NARITA AIRPORT BOMBING AND THE ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS LOSS OF AIR INDIA FLIGHT 182 OVER THE ATLANTIC. PRESS REPORTS STATE THAT THE RCMP ARE CONVINCED THEY HAVE PROOF THAT AIR INDIA FLIGHT 182 WAS DESTROYED BY A BOMB, AND THAT THE TWO INCIDENTS WERE LINKED, AND WERE ENGINEERED FROM THE VANCOUVER AREA. APPARENTLY THE PRESS ACCOUNTS ARE SOMEWHAT EXAGGERATED. 4. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER DONALD WILSON, ACTING IN CHARGE OF THE RCMP IN BRITISH COLUMBIA TELLS ME THAT THE EVIDENCE THAT THE RCMP HAS AGAINST PARMAR AND REYAT RELATES ONLY TO THE NARITA AIRPORT BOMBING. HE DID NOT SEEM OVERLY CONFIDENT THAT THE EVIDENCE WILL BE ENOUGH TO BRING CHARGES, BUT HE HOPES SO. COMMISSIONER WILSON SAYS THAT THIS IS \"JUST ABOUT OUR LAST SHOT.\" 5. THE RAIDS BY THE VANCOUVER POLICE ON THE HOMES OF PROMINENT SIKH MILITANTS WERE RELATED TO A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IN RECENT WEEKS IN WHICH THE MILITANTS HAVE ATTACKED MORE MODERATE SIKHS IN AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE SIKH COMMUNITY IN VANCOUVER. VIOLENT INTIMIDATION TACTICS HAVE REPORTEDLY FORCED MEMBERS OF A SIKH TEMPLE IN THE VANCOUVER SUBURB OF SURREY TO ACCEPT A \"COMPROMISE\" ACCORD THAT GIVES CONTROL TO THE FUNDAMENTALISTS. MANMOHAN SINGH, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE MILITANT INTERNATIONAL SIKH YOUTH FEDERATION, ASSERTS THAT THE FUNDAMENTALISTS NOW CONTROL THE SIKH TEMPLES IN ABBOTSFORD, SURREY, AND NEW WESTMINISTER, AND THE ROSS STREET TEMPLE IN VANCOUVER. HE SAID THAT VOTING REGULATIONS AT THE OTHER VANCOUVER TEMPLE, ON SKEENA STREET, HAVE PREVENTED THE ISYF FROM GAINING CONTROL THERE. SEVERAL SIKH MODERATES IN VANCOUVER HAVE RECENTLY BEEN THE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT ATTACKS BY RADICAL SIKHS. AND THE MILITANTS HAVE DISRUPTED A TEMPLE ELECTION IN NEW WESTMINISTER. 6. THE MAIN MILITANT SIKH GROUPS IN VANCOUVER ARE THE BABAR KHALSA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SIKH YOUTH FEDERATION. THE BABAR KHALSA WAS FOUNDED AND IS HEADED BY TALWINDER SINGH PARMAR. A FORMER MEMBER, SURJAN SINGH GILL, ESTABLISHED THE CONSULATE OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF KHALISTAN IN VANCOUVER. THE INTERNATIONAL SIKH YOUTH FEDERATION IS HEADED BY SATINDERPAL GILL, BUT ITS MAIN SPOKESMAN APPEARS TO BE MANMOHAN SINGH, ONE OF THOSE WHOSE HOME WAS RAIDED BY THE POLICE. POLICE FOUND A NUMBER OF WEAPONS AT HIS HOME. OTHER MILITANT SIKHS WHO WERE QUESTIONED OR HAD THEIR HOMES SEARCHED WERE SODHI SINGH SODHI (ISYF); SURJAN SINGH GILL (FORMER MEMBER OF BABAR KALSA); SANGAT SINGH PAWA; AMARJIT SINGH PAWA; AND HARDIAL SINGH JOHAL. OGG " "97","11/24/1985 11:15","85BAGHDAD3988","Embassy Baghdad","SECRET","85STATE323960","P 241115Z NOV 85 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9731 AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 3988 FOR MANAMA POLITICAL OFFICERS\' MEETING NEW DELHI FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY LONDON FOR RAPHEL PARIS FOR WINN E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: MOPS, PREL, IZ, IR, XF SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE OR EXPANSION REF: STATE 323960 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: THE GULF WAR WILL LIKELY BUT NOT NECESSARILY REMAIN STALEMATED. IRAQ DOMINATES IN EVERY MAJOR WEAPONS CATEGORY AND HAS CONSTRUCTED FORMIDABLE DEFENSES. YET, ALL IS NOT WELL. THE IRANIANS CONTINUE TO MAKE INROADS EVEN WHILE PAYING DEARLY FOR THEM. OVER TIME THE WILL OF IRAQI FORCES TO RESIST COULD BECOME INCREASINGLY BRITTLE. THE STAKES INVOLVED FOR WESTERN INTERESTS ARE TOO VITAL TO PERMIT COMPLACENCY. AN IRANIAN VICTORY WOULD REDRAW THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS THE GEOGRAPHIC MAP. THE DANGER IS NOT THAT IRAQ\'S ACTIONS WILL SPARK A WIDER WAR BUT THAT IT WILL OVERESTIMATE ITS ABILITIES TO SUSTAIN A DETERMINED DEFENSE. IN ANY CASE, IRAN WILL NOT NOW ATTEMPT A FRONTAL ASSAULT ON OTHER GULF ARAB STATES BUT WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE POLICIES DESIGNED TO DESTABILIZE THEIR RULING REGIMES OR AT MINIMUM INTIMIDATE THEM INTO STRICT NEUTRALITY. FINALLY, FEARS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL GAIN ADVANTAGES IN IRAN AT OUR EXPENSE ARE GROSSLY EXAGGERATED GIVEN THE DIVERGENT POLICIES OF THE TWO STATES AND THVIR ANTITHETICAL INTERESTS. END SUMMARY. 3. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR HAS ESSENTIALLY BEEN A BLOODY STALEMATE FOR THE LAST THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS WITH IRANIAN SOLDIERS PAYING A TERRIBLE PRICE TO ACHIEVE MINOR TACTICAL GAINS. GIVEN IRAN\'S GROSS INFERIORITY IN THE FULL RANGE OF MODERN WEAPONRY AND IRAQ\'S FORMIDABLE, IF LARGELY STATIC, DEFENSIVE LINES, THE STALEMATE SHOULD CONTINUE. HOWEVER, WARS ARE NOT ENTIRELY PREDICTABLE. INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATION AND UNIT ESPIRIT STILL COUNT FOR A GREAT DEAL. IN THESE CATEGORIES, IRAN\'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND RAG- TAG BASIJ CLEARLY HOLD SWAY. MOREOVER, THE IRAQI POLITICAL LEADER- SHIP\'S DETERMINATION TO MINIMIZE CASUALTIES AND TO USE ITS VAST AIR SUPERIORITY SPARINGLY LEAVE THE INITIATIVE TO IRAN\'S FORCES -- A SITUATION THAT CERTAINLY MUST DEMORALIZE AT LEAST SOME OF THE MORE PROFESSIONAL OFFICEERS AND NON-COMS IN IRAQ\'S ARMY. EVEN MORE PUZZLING IS THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES\' APPARENT WILLING- NESS TO ALLOW THEIR ADVERSARIES TO BUILD CAUSEWAYS AND PONTOON BRIDGES THROUGHOUT THE VAST HUWAYZAH MARSHES WITH ONLY SPORADIC HARRASSMENT FROM H&I FIRE OR AIR STRIKES. MILITARY ATTACHES AND ADVISERS IN BAGHDAD ARE AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN IRAQ\'S PASSIVITY AND VIOLATION OF SOME BASIC RULES OF WARFARE. 4. NEVERTHELESS, THOSE WHO MEET WITH IRAQI COMMANDERS AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS FIND THEM EXUDING CONFIDENCE. AND, PERHAPS, NOT WITHOUT REASON. MASSIVE IRANIAN OFFENSIVES HAVE BEEN BROKEN TIME AND TIME AGAIN. WHERE IRAQI LINES HAVE BEEN BREACHED, THE IRANIANS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO EXPLOIT IT BECAUSE OF INADEQUACIES IN PLANNING, MOBILITY, AIR, ARMOR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT AND LOGISTICS. INDEED, THESE FACTORS RATHER THAN IRAQI PROWESS MAKE A CONTINUED STALEMATE LIKELY. 5. TO CONTEMPLATE AN IRANIAN VICTORY REQUIRES THE SUPPOSITION THAT IRAQI FORCES AFTER SUFFERING A MAJOR, BUT INDECISIVE, BATTLEFIELD REVERSE, PANIC AND A GENERAL ROUT BEGINS SOMEWHAT ON THE ORDER OF WHAT HAPPENED TO ARVN TROOPS IN 1975. ALTHOUGH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WITH GOOD INTERIOR LINES OF DEFENSE COULD BE EXPECTED TO RUSH IN FRESH TROOPS TO CONTAIN THE DAMAGE, THE FACT IS THAT FEW FOREIGNERS HAVE ANY REAL KNOWLEDGE OF HOW IRAQI TROOPS WOULD HANDLE SUCH A REVERSE. WE BELIEVE THAT WHILE A COLLAPSE CANNOT BE RULED OUT, IT REMAINS IMPROBABLE FOR THE NEAR- TERM. 6. YET, THE STAKES IN THIS WAR ARE SUCH THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD GUARD AGAINST COMPLACENCY. EVEN IF ONE ASSIGNS THE IRANIANS ONLY A 10-15 PERCENT POSSIBILITY OF VICTORY, THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD CERTAINLY BE CATESTROPHIC. 7. FEW DOUBT THAT KHOMEINI WANTS HIS INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM TO PREVAIL THROUGHOUT THE REGION OR THAT HE WOULD BE SATISFIED TO DOMINATE IRAQ. EVEN NOW THE IRANIANS ARE SEEKING TO UNDERMINE SEVERAL GULF REGIMES, MOST NOTABLY IN BAHRAIN AND KUWAIT. THE SAUDI RULING FAMILY IS THE OBJECT OF SCORN IN TEHRAN AND THEIR RIGHT TO ACT AS SOLE GUARDIANS OF THE HOLY PLACES HAS BEEN CALLED INTO QUESTION. IRANIAN FEELINGS TOWARD KING HUSSEIN AS A CRONY OF THE SHAH AND MORE RECENTLY AS AN ALLY OF IRAQ HARDLY NEED MENTIONING. DESPITE REPORTED ISRAELI AID FOR IRAN EARLIER IN THE WAR AND THEIR MUTUAL ANTIPATHY FOR IRAQ, ISRAEL AND ITS RULE OVER JERUSALEM SERVE AS POWERFUL SYMBOLS THROUGH WHICH IRANIAN PROPAGANDA TRIES TO ROUSE ARAB AND NON-ARAB MUSLIMS ALIKE. THE ACTIONS OF IRANIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS IN LEBANON SUCH AS HIZBALLAH AND ISLAMIC AMAL WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE THAT IRANIAN VITUPERATION DIRECTED AT ISRAEL IS MORE THAN RHETORICAL. 8. EVEN A VICTORIOUS IRAN WITH LESSER AMBITIONS AT MINIMUM COULD EXPECT TO DOMINATE OIL POLICY IN THE REGION AND FORCE A CHOICE AMONG GULF RULERS BETWEEN DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM THE U.S. OR EMBRACING US A NEVER BEFORE. BOTH SCENARIOS ARE INHERENTLY DANGEROUS AND UNSTABLE. 9. IF THIS ANALYSIS IS VALID, THEN IRAQ NEEDS BOLSTERING AND FEARS THAT ITS ACTIONS AGAINST KHARG OR IRAN\'S INTERIOR WOULD SPREAD THE WAR, WHILE UNDERSTANDABLE, SHOULD BE SUBORDINATED TO REDUCING FURTHER THE ODDS THAT IT MIGHT LOSE. IN TRUTH IRAQ WAS TOO BOLD IN STARTING THIS WAR AND IS TOO TIMID IN PROSECUTING IT. 10. THE LONGER THE WAR DRAGS ON, THE MORE LIKELY AN IRAQI COLLAPSE BECOMES. A KHOMEINI-LED IRAN WILL NOT WIND DOWN OR END THE WAR UNLESS NO OTHER VIABLE OPTION EXISTS. THIS REQUIRES IRAN BE DENIED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE INCOME AND ARMS. THE IRANIANS ARE NOT GOING TO SPREAD THE WAR BY MAKING A SUSTAINED FRONTAL ASSAULT AGAINST THE GULF STATES, REALIZING ALL TOO WELL WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE. RATHER, THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO SEEK SUBVERSIVE ASSETS THROUGHOUT THE GULF REGION WHILE PROBING PRESSURE POINTS AND PRACTICING GENERAL INTIMIDATION. 11. FINALLY, FEARS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE INROADS INTO IRAN WOULD SEEM GROSSLY EXAGGERATED. THE SOVIET UNION, NOT THE U.S., IS IRAQ\'S PRINCIPAL ARMS SUPPLIER; THE ENEMY OF THE MUJAHIDIN IN AFGHANISTAN; THE BACKER OF THE TUDEH PARTY; AND THE RULERS OF 40 MILLION MUSLIMS INSIDE ITS OWN BORDERS. THE SOVIETS HAVE HARDLY RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO RECENT IRANIAN OVERTURES LARGELY BECAUSE THE IDEOLOGY OF IRAN\'S RULING CLERICS PREVENTS THEM FROM MAKING THE SOVIETS A SUFFICIENTLY ATTRACTIVE OFFER TO SWITCH SIDES.-/ NEWTON " "98","12/2/1985 7:40","85BANDARSERIBEGAWAN1399","Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan","CONFIDENTIAL","85BANDARSERIBEGAWAN1379","P 020740Z DEC 85 FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1170 INFO AMEMBASSY BANDKOK AMEMBASSY JAKARTA AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR AMEMBASSY MANILA AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 1399 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV XX SUBJECT: SULTAN OF BRUNEI STRIKES TWO MORE RAPID BLOWS AT ISLAMIZATION REF: BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 1379 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT 2. AS REPORTED REFTEL THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI BOYCOTTED ACTIVITIES MARKING THE PROPHET\'S BIRTHDAY ON NOV 25 IN ANGER AT THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE HAVING INTRODUCED SEPARATION OF THE SEXES AT THE CELEBRATION. EVEN THOUGH THE DECISION TO SEPARATE THE SEXES WAS REVERSED, NO MEMBER OF THE ROYAL FAMILY PARTICIPATED. WHILE THE SHOCK WAVES FROM THIS CONTRETEMPS WERE STILL REVERBERATING AROUND BRUNEI THE SULTAN TOOK TWO MORE STEPS TO UNDO INNOVATIONS INTRODUCED BY ISLAMIC CONSERVATIVES. 3. ON NOV 27, WITHOUT ANY PRIOR WARNING, NEWSCASTERS ON RADIO TELEVISION BRUNEI (RTB) APPEARED WITHOUT HEAD COVERING. THE PRACTICE OF HAVING NEWSCASTERS WEAR HEAD COVERING, THE WOMEN TIGHT-FITTING SCARVES THAT FASTEN UNDER THE CHIN AND MEN THE TRADITIONAL MALAY SONGKOK, WAS GRADUALLY INTRODUCED OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS; AND IT HAD BEEN ABOUT A YEAR SINCE ANY FEMALE APPEARED ON THE TELEVISION NEWS WITH UNCOVERED HEAD. SINCE NOV 27 HEAD COVERINGS HAVE COMPLETELY DISAPPEARED, AND IT IS NOW WIDELY KNOWN THAT A WRITTEN ORDER BANNING HEAD COVERING WAS ISSUED BY PRINCE JEFRI, WHO AS MINISTER OF CULTURE, YOUTH AND SPORTS IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TELEVISION, AND THAT THE ORDER HAD BEEN CLEARED WITH THE SULTAN. (THE ORDER ALMOST CERTAINLY ORIGINATED WITH THE SULTAN). 4. NEXT, ON NOV 30, IT WAS ANNOUNCED ONT HE EVENING TELEVISION NEWS THAT, BY COMMAND OF THE SULTAN AND EFFECTIVE THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE BRUNEI GOVERNMENT OFFICE OF INFORMATION WAS ABOLISHED AS A SEPARATE ENTITY AND ITS FUNCTIONS TRANSFERRED TO A JOINT BROADCASTING/INFORMATION DEPARTMENT TO BE HEADED BY RTB DIRECTOR PENGIRAN BADARRUDIN AND THAT THE LIKE-NAMED PEHIN BADARRUDIN, HEAD OF THE INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, WAS TRANS- FERRED BACK TO THE RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT. THUS BROADCASTING AND INFORMATION WERE RESTORED TO THE SITUATION THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THE FORMATION OF A SEPARATE INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, WHICH UNDER PEHIN BADARRUDIN WAS WELL KNOWN FOR ITS VIGOROUS DISSEMINATION OF RELIGIOUSLY CONSERVATIVE VIEWPOINTS, WITH THE DEPARTMENT EDITED GOVERNMENT INFORMATION BULLETIN HAVING BECOME A MOUTHPIECE FOR THE MUFTI OF BRUNEI. THE INFORMATION FUNCTION NOW COMES UNDER THE CONTROL OF A MAN WHO IS ANATHEMA TO RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES. 5. COMMENT: IF THERE WAS DOUBT IN ANYONE\'S MIND THAT THE SULTAN\'S INTENT WAS TO STRIKE A BLOW AT CREEPING ISLAMIZATION, THAT DOUBT HAS NOW BEEN DISPELLED. BY MOVING QUICKLY TO UNDO TWO OF THE MOST VISIBLE SIGNS OF ISLAMIZATION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE HUMILIATION OF THE ORGANIZERS OF THE PROPHET\'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS, INCLUDING MOST NOTABLY MINISTER OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION ABDUL AZIZ, THE SULTAN CAUGHT THE PROPONENTS OF ISLAMIZATION AT A WEEK MOMENT. THE EMBASSY REGARDS THIS AS A WELL EXECUTED MANEUVER ON THE SULTAN\'S PART, IF SUCCESSFUL, A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT FOR BRUNEI. THERE MAY STILL, OF COURSE, BE SOME REACTION, WHICH COUL CENTER AROUND THE SULTAN\'S FATHER WHEN HE RETURNS FROM MEDICAL TREATMENT IN ENGLAND; BUT THE STATE OF THE SERI BEGAWAN\'S PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH MAKE IT QUESTIONABLE THAT HE COULD LEAD A SUSTAINED CAMPAIGN IN FAVOR OF GREATER ISLAMIZATION. 6. THE ADVOCATES OF ISLAMIC FUNDEMENTALISM IN BRUNEI, INSPIRED BY EXAMPLES FROM ELSEWHERE IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD, APPARENTLY FORGOT IN THEIR ZEAL TO SERVE GOD THAT THEY HAD NEGLECTED TO CONSULT CAESAR. KING " "99","12/6/1985 1:40","85STATE371963","Secretary of State","SECRET","","O 060140Z DEC 85 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE ","S E C R E T STATE 371963 TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER SUBJECT: ABU NIDAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 1. SECRET -ENTIRE TEXT 2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ABU NIDAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION PREPARED BY THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: ABU NIDAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION BACKGROUND: THE ABU NIDAL GROUP IS AMONG THE MOST DANGEROUS AND RUTHLESS OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. IT IS PROBABLY THE BEST ORGANIZED AND MOST EFFECTIVE OF THE RADICAL PALESTINIAN TERRORIST GROUPS, CAREFULLY PLANNING ITS OPERATIONS AND KEEPING ITS INFORMATION TIGHTLY COMPARTMENTED. FOR THE PAST FEW YEARS, THE ORGANIZATION HAS CONCENTRATED ON JORDANIAN AND PRO-ARAFAT PLO TARGETS, BUT THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT IT IS AGAIN BROADENING ITS OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE. THE ORGANIZATION HAS A NUMBER OF COVER NAMES INCLUDING BLACK JUNE, NO LONGER USED, AND THE FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. MORE RECENTLY, IT HAS BEGUN USING THE NAME ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES WHEN STAGING ATTACKS AGAINST GULF TARGETS AND EGYPT. IT ALSO CALLS ITSELF BLACK SEPTEMBER IN ATTACKS AGAINST JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN TARGETS, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MUSLIMS (ROSM) IN ATTACKS AGAINST BRITISH TARGETS. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP WAS FORMED IN 1974 FROM ELEMENTS WHICH BROKE AWAY FROM ARAFAT\'S FATAH ORGANIZATION AFTER HE ANNOUNCED A BAN ON PLO INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OUTSIDE ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE GROUP IS HEADED BY SABRI AL-BANNA WHO GOES BY THE NAME OF ABU NIDAL. UNLIKE MANY TERRORIST GROUPS, HOWEVER, IT IS SO WELL ORGANIZED, THAT IT CAN FUNCTION WITH OR WITHOUT ITS LEADER. INDEED, BEFORE A NOVEMBER 19, L985 INTERVIEW FROM LIBYA, ABU NIDAL WAS WIDELY RUMORED TO BE DEAD. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP ALSO APPEARS TO BE LESS DEPENDENT ON OUTSIDE FINANCING THAN OTHER GROUPS, IN PART BECAUSE OF ITS ABILITY TO GENERATE INCOME ON ITS OWN. THE GROUP IS COMMITTED TO THE USE OF VIOLENCE TO DESTROY DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO RECONCILE ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES. IT ALSO CALLS FOR THE OVERTHROW OF ALL CONSERVATIVE AND MODERATE ARAB REGIMES AS WELL AS FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF MODERATE ELEMENTS IN THE PLO, NOTABLY ARAFAT\'S FATAH ORGANIZATION. IT CONTENDS THAT BOTH INTER-ARAB AND INTRA-PALESTINIAN TERRORISM ARE NEEDED TO CREATE AN ALL EMBRACING ARAB REVOLUTION WHICH WILL IN TURN LIBERATE PALESTINE. TO FURTHER ITS REVOLUTIONARY AIMS, IT WILL ALSO STRIKE AT EUROPEAN AND OTHER TARGETS IF IT BELIEVES THAT THERE IS ANY TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IN DOING SO. MEMBERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATION PROBABLY NUMBERS SEVERAL HUNDRED. IT HAS CELLS THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND EUROPE. OPERATIONAL GROUPS ARE SMALL, NUMBERING ONE TO THREE, EACH WITH GOOD OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND GOOD COMPARTMENTALIZATION. OPERATIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY CAREFULLY COLLECTED, ON-TARGET INTELLIGENCE. THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION ALSO MAKES USE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN STUDENTS STUDYING ABROAD, SOMETIMES INVOLVING THEM IN OPERATIONS AFTER ONLY PERFUNCTORY TRAINING. LINKAGES TO OTHER GROUPS AND STATES: THE ABU NIDAL GROUP IS IN MANY WAYS A ROGUE ORGANIZATION. WHILE MAINTAINING ITS RADICAL PALESTINIAN OUTLOOK, IT HAS LINKED UP WITH VARIOUS ARAB PATRONS, PRESUMABLY FOR FINANCIAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AS MUCH AS, IF NOT MORE THAN, FOR IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY. WHEN FIRST ORGANIZED, THE GROUP CAME UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF IRAQ. WHEN SADDAM HUSAYN FINALLY EXPELLED ABU NIDAL AND THE REMNANTS OF HIS GROUP IN MID-1983, HE MOVED TO SYRIA. SINCE THEN, THE ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS AGAINST JORDAN, MODERATE PALESTINIANS AND ARAFAT\'S MAINLINE PLO, PRESUMABLY WITH THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE. IN RECENT MONTHS, ABU NIDAL HAS SHOWN SIGNS OF BECOMING MORE CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH QADHAFI. THOUGH THE GROUP STILL MAINTAINS A HEADQUARTERS IN DAMASCUS (AND POSSIBLY ONE IN THE BIQA\'\'VALLEY), ABU NIDAL HIMSELF IS APPARENTLY CURRENTLY RESIDING IN LIBYA. HE HAS GRANTED SEVERAL INTERVIEWS FROM LIBYA AND HAS SPOKEN HIGHLY OF QADHAFI IN THEM. LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ABU NIDAL GROUP AND OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS IS MORE DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN. THE GROUP IS VERY TIGHTLY ORGANIZED AND CONTROLLED AND, FOR SECURITY REASONS, DOES NOT APPEAR TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS. THIS DOES NOT RULE OUT NON-OPERATIONAL COOPERATION WHEN THE GROUP BELIEVES THERE IS SUFFICIENT TACTICAL ADVANTAGE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS ADMITTED IN AN INTERVIEW TO GROWING COOPERATION WITH EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE IRA. CURRENT OPERATIONS: THE ABU NIDAL GROUP HAS REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO OPERATE IN ANY COUNTRY IT CHOOSES AND HAS SHOWN NO SIGNS OF ESCHEWING OPERATIONS IN COUNTRIES SYMPATHETIC TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, PARTICULARLY IN ITS ANTI-ARAFAT OPERATIONS. THE ORGANIZATION HAS STAGED ATTACKS IN 18 COUNTRIES ON THREE CONTINENTS, AND HAS CONDUCTED OVER 60 TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE LAST EIGHT YEARS, 30 SINCE 1984 AND 11 SINCE JULY OF THIS YEAR. IN RECENT INTERVIEWS, NOTABLY ONE IN DER SPIEGEL, LAST MONTH, ABU NIDAL HIMSELF HAS MADE THREATS AGAINST MANY COUNTRIES AND WORLD LEADERS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT MUBARAK, PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND PRESIDENT REAGAN. HIS TIRADES AGAINST JEWS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY VIRULENT. ESPECIALLY SINCE 1984, ABU NIDAL HAS CONCENTRATED ON JORDANIANS AND PRO-ARAFAT PLO OFFICIALS. THESE ATTACKS WERE PROVOKED IN LARGE MEASURE BY THE JORDANIAN AGREEMENT TO HOST THE PNC MEETING IN NOVEMBER 1984 AND BY KING HUSSEIN\'S FEBRUARY ACCORD WITH ARAFAT TO RESTART THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS. THE ATTACKS ON JORDANIANS IN 1985 HAVE INCLUDED: -- NOVEMBER 24 ASSASSINATION OF A PALESTINIAN IN AMMAN BY THREE ABU NIDAL AGENTS. - THE MURDER OF A JORDANIAN PUBLISHER IN ATHENS IN SEPTEMBER. -- A PLOT TO ASSASSINATE THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO GREECE BY A PALESTINIAN ARRESTED BY GREEK POLICE IN AUGUST. -- AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON A JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT ON AUGUST 5, BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN INITIATED BY ABU NIDAL. - THE MURDER OF A JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT IN TURKEY ON JULY 24. -- ON JULY 1, A BOMB EXPLODED AT THE BRITISH AIR TICKET OFFICE IN MADRID ALSO DAMAGING THE TWA OFFICE UPSTAIRS. NEARBY, THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE WAS HIT BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE AND TWO GRENADES WHICH DID NOT EXPLODE. IN ALL, ONE WAS KILLED AND 24 WERE WOUNDED. -- AMAN CLAIMING TO BE WITH BLACK SEPTEMBER FIRED A ROCKET AT THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN ROME IN APRIL. -- AN ABU NIDAL ROCKET ATTACK ON A JORDANIAN AIRLINER TAKING OFF FROM ATHENS IN APRIL. THE ROCKET HIT THE PLANE BUT DID NOT EXPLODE. -- IN DECEMBER, THE JORDANIAN DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION IN BUCHAREST WAS KILLED GETTING INTO HIS CAR. THE GROUP HAS ALSO TARGETED BRITISH INTERESTS. ROSM CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MARCH 1985 KIDNAPPING OF A BRITISH JOURNALIST IN LEBANON AND THE ASSASSINATION OF BRITISH DIPLOMATS IN INDIA AND GREECE IN 1984. THE PURPOSE OF THESE ATTACKS IS PROBABLY TO FORCE THE UK TO RELEASE ABU NIDAL MEMBERS IMPRISONED FOR THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON IN JUNE 1982. BASED ON THE STYLE OF ABU NIDAL ATTACKS, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE GROUP IS WILLING TO CAUSE INDISCRIMINATE CASUALTIES. APART FROM THE ASSASSINATION OF PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS, ABU NIDAL OPERATIONS IN 1985 RESULTED IN NINE DEATHS AND 201 WOUNDED AMONG INNOCENT BYSTANDERS NOT COUNTING THE VICTIMS IN THE EGYPT AIR TRAGEDY. HAD THE JORDANIAN AIRLINER HIT BY AN ABU NIDAL ROCKET TAKING OFF FROM ATHENS AIRPORT CRASHED, THE NUMBER COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH HIGHER. IN 1983, 111 DIED IN THE CRASH OF A GULF AIRLINES JET ON WHICH AN ABU NIDAL BOMB EXPLODED. TWO THIRDS OF THE GROUP\'S 19 ATTACKS THIS YEAR HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN WESTERN EUROPE. EUROPEAN CITIZENS HAVE INCREASINGLY BECOME CASUALTIES AND INTERESTS OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE INCREASINGLY DAMAGED BY THESE ACTIONS. THE GROUP\'S ABILITY TO MOVE AT WILL IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THEIR ACTIVITIES HARDER TO TRACE. TO FACILITATE TRAVEL, THE ORGANIZATION HAS A RECORD OF USING MOROCCAN AND OTHER NORTH AFRICAN TRAVEL DOCUMENTS INCLUDING THOSE PRODUCED BY ITS OWN FORGING OPERATION. SOME COUNTRIES SUCH AS YUGOSLAVIA HAVE BEEN MORE PERMISSIVE THAN OTHERS IN ALLOWING ABU NIDAL MEMBERS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, APPARENTLY HOPING THAT THIS WILL BUY THEM A MODICUM OF IMMUNITY FROM TERRORIST ACTS. THERE IS GROWING RECOGNITION THAT THIS IS A DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION. NEVERTHELESS, TAKING LEGAL ACTION IS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT. IN OCTOBER, AN ALLEGED HIGH RANKING ABU NIDAL FIGURE USING SPAIN AS A BASE WAS ACQUITTED BY A SPANISH COURT OF BEING A MEMBER OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. AMONG THE ATTACKS INVOLVING INNOCENT BYSTANDERS ARE: -- THE NOVEMBER 23 EGYPT AIR HIJACKING TO MALTA WHICH TOOK 60 LIVES. THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES, A COVER NAME FOR ABU NIDAL, CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE HIJACKING, AND THERE IS CORROBORATING EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS AN ABU NIDAL OPERATION. THE ACT ALSO BORE THE SIGNATURE OF THE ABU NIDAL GROUP. -- THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ARRESTED IN NOVEMBER A 12-MAN TEAM OF ABU NIDAL TERRORISTS INTENDING TO ATTACK THE ISRAELI CONSULATE IN ISTANBUL. -- ON SEPTEMBER 30, A BOMB EXPLODED NEAR THE EL AL OFFICE IN AMSTERDAM, CLAIMED BY ABU NIDAL (FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL). -- ABU NIDAL BOMBED THE BRITISH AIR OFFICE IN ROME IN SEPTEMBER INJURING 15 PERSONS, MANY OF THEM PASSERSBY. -- BRITAIN ARRESTED TWO ABU NIDAL OPERATIVES IN SEPTEMBER WHO INTENDED TO ATTACK AN UNIDENTIFIED TARGET. -- ABU NIDAL MEMBERS THREW GRENADES AT ROME\'S CAFE DE PARIS IN SEPTEMBER, INJURING 38 TOURISTS, AMONG THEM GERMANS, BRITONS, ITALIANS, ARGENTINIANS, BRAZILIANS AND AMERICANS. -- A JULY INCIDENT IN COPENHAGEN INVOLVING A SYNAGOGUE AND THE NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES OFFICE, AND ONE IN AMSTERDAM ON SEPTEMBER 30 INVOLVING THE EL AL OFFICE HAVE NOT BEEN DIRECTLY TIED TO ANY GROUP, BUT THERE IS SUSPICION THAT ABU NIDAL WAS INVOLVED. -- THE GROUP BOMBED TWO HOTELS IN ATHENS, ONE IN SEPTEMBER WHICH INJURED 19 PERSONS, MOSTLY BRITISH, AND ONE IN AUGUST, WHICH INJURED 13 BRITISH. -- THE BOMBING OF TWO RESTAURANTS IN KUWAIT IN JULY, MOST PROBABLY BY ABU NIDAL, KILLED EIGHT PERSONS AND INJURING 89 OTHERS. -- THE ATTACKS ON THE AIRLINE OFFICES IN MADRID KILLING ONE AND WOUNDING 24. -- THE ROCKET AGAINST A JORDANIAN AIRILNER IN APRIL. FUTURE TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS: THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON JORDANIAN AND PRO-ARAFAT PLO TARGETS. EVEN IF THE SYRIANS FOR TACTICAL REASONS SHOULD CURTAIL THEIR SUPPORT OF THE ABU NIDAL GROUP\'S OPERATIONS AGAINST JORDAN AND PRO-ARAFAT PLO, THE ACTIVITIES ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE. ABU NIDAL HIMSELF, UNDER DEATH SENTENCE BY THE PLO SINCE 1974 FOR PLOTTING AGAINST THE LIFE OF ARAFAT, AND THOSE UNDER HIM ARE CARRYING ON WHAT AMOUNTS TO A PERSONAL VENDETTA. THE ADDITION OF LIBYAN SUPPORT PRESENTS AN EVEN BROADER THREAT, PARTICULARLY FOR WESTERN STATES. QADHAFI\'S PARANOIA AGAINST THE WEST AND ABU NIDAL\'S EFFICIENCY COMPRISE A DEADLY COMBINATION. INCREASINGLY, HIGH CASUALTY ATTACKS AGAINST WESTERN TARGETS ARE LIKELY. IN THE LONGER RUN, THE ABU NIDAL GROUP, DUE TO ITS EXCELLENT ORGANIZATION, ACCESS TO FUNDS AND SUPPORT, MOST RECENTLY FROM LIBYA, AND DEDICATION TO TERRORISM, CONSTITUTES ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS. ITS WIDE-SPREAD NETWORK AND RUTHLESS DISREGARD FOR THE INTERESTS AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS IT STRIKES, MAKES IT A FORMIDABLE FOE. ONLY THROUGH A COORDINATED EFFORT OF ALL THOSE COUNTRIES FOR WHICH IT POSES A POTENTIAL THREAT CAN THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION BE STOPPED. ANNEX: SIGNIFICANT ABU NIDAL INCIDENTS, 1978-1985 1985 23-27 NOVEMBER MALTA: EGYPT AIR FLIGHT 648 WAS HIJACKED FROM ATHENS TO MALTA RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF 59 LIVES. 14 NOVEMBER AMMAN: ASSASSINATION OF A PALESTINIAN, HUSSEIN AL-BITAR. THE JORDANIAN POLICE CAPTURED THREE ABU NIDEL ASSASSINS. 25 SEPTEMBER ITALY: BOMB EXPLODED AT BRITISH AIR OFFICE IN ROME, INJURING 15 CLAIMED BY REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS (ROSM). 18 SEPTEMBER GREECE: PALESTINIAN MAGAZINE PUBLISHER,MICHAEL AL-NUMARI, ASSASSINATED IN ATHENS. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 16 SEPTEMBER ITLAY: GRENADES THROWN AT THE CAFE DE PARIS IN ROME, INJURING 38 TOURISTS INCLUDING 11 AMERICANS. CLAIMED BY ROSM. . 3 SEPTEMBER GREECE: GRENADES THROWN AT GLYFADA HOTEL IN ATHENS, WOUNDING 19 ATTACK CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER AND ROSM. 30 AUGUST GREECE: PALESTINIAN ARRESTED IN ATHENS PLOTTING THE ASSASSINATION OF THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR. CLAIMED TO REMEMBER OF BLACK SEPTEMBER. 8 AUGUST GREECE: BOMB EXPLODED AT LONDON HOTEL IN ATHENS, WOUNDING 13 BRITISH TOURISTS. CLAIMED BY ROSM. 24 JULY TURKEY: FIRST SECRETARY AT THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN ANKARA ASSASSINATED BY A LONE GUNMAN. INCIDENT CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER, ISLAMIC JIHAD, AND HIZBALLAH. 21 JULY LEBANON: BOMB EXPLODED OUTSIDE THE KUWAITI AIRLINES OFFICE IN BEIRUT. CLAIMED BY ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES. 11 JULY KUWAIT: TWO POWERFUL BOMBS EXPLODED WITHIN MINUTES OF EACH OTHER KILLING 8 PEOPLE AND INJURING 89 AT TWO CROWDED CAFES ABOUT L0 KILOMETERS APART. A THIRD BOMB WAS DEFUSED AT ANOTHER CAFE. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1 JULY SPAIN: BOMB EXPLODED AT THE BRITISH AIR TICKET OFFICE IN MADRID, ALSO DAMAGING THE TWA OFFICE UPSTAIRS. THE ALIA TICKET OFFICE NEARBY HIT BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE AND TWO GRENADES THAT FAILED TO EXPLODE. ONE KILLED, 24 WOUNDED. CLAIMED BY ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED, ROSM, AND BLACK SEPTEMBER. 15 MAY LEBANON: UNRWA OFFICIAL WALSH KIDNAPPED,BUT RELEASED THE NEXT DAY. CLAIMED BY ROSM. 23 APRIL KUWAIT: AHMAD JARALLAH, A MODERATE NEWSPAPER EDITOR WAS WOUNDED IN AN ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION AS HE WAS LEAVING HIS OFFICE. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 4 APRIL GREECE: A ROCKET WAS FIRED AT A JORDANIAN AIRLINER AS IT WAS TAKING OFF FROM ATHENS AIRPORT. THE PROJECTILE HIT THE PLANE BUT DID NOT EXPLODE. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 3 APRIL ITALY: A LIGHT ANTI-TANK ROCKET WAS FIRED AT THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN ROME. THE ROCKET MISSED THE EMBASSY AND HIT AN APARTMENT ON THE SIXTH FLOOR OF THE BUILDING, BUT CAUSED NO CASUALTIES. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 26 MARCH LEBANON: ALEC COLLETT, A BRITISH JOURNALIST WORKING FOR UNRWA WAS ABDUCTED FROM HIS AUTOMOBILE IN BEIRUT. CLAIMED BY ROSM. 21 MARCH GREECE: AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW A HAND GRENADE INTO A ROYAL JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN ATHENS, INJURING THREE PEOPLE. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 21 MARCH CYPRUS: AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW TWO HAND GRENADES INTO A ROYAL JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN NICOSIA. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 21 MARCH ITALY: ATTACK ON ROYAL JORDAN AIRLINE OFFICE. TWO WOUNDED. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 1984 29 DECEMBER JORDAN: TWO UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN ASSASSINATED FAHD ALQAWASMAH, MEMBER OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND FORMER MAYOR OF HEBRON, OUTSIDE HIS HOME IN AMMAN. TWO WITNESSES TO THE SHOOTING WERE INJURED BY GUNFIRE AS THEY TRIED TO BLOCK THE ASSASSIN\'S FLEEING VEHICLE. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 14 DECEMBER ITALY: ISMAIL DARWISH, A LEADING MILITARY FIGURE IN THE FATAH MOVEMENT, WAS GUNNED DOWN ON A ROME STREET BY AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN WHO FLED ON A WAITING MOTOR SCOOTER. CLAIMED BY ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES. 4 DECEMBER ROMANIA: THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION OF THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY, AZMI AL-MUFTI, WAS SHOT AND KILLED AS HE WAS GETTING INTO HIS CAR IN BUCHAREST. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 29 NOVEMBER GREECE: AN UNIDENTIFIED GUNMAN TRIED TO ASSASSINATE THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE JORDANIAN MISSION IN ATHENS, BUT HIS GUN JAMMED. NO GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY BUT ABU NIDAL WAS SUSPECTED. 27 NOVEMBER INDIA: THE BRITISH DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER, MR.PERCY NORRIS, WAS SHOT AND KILLED AS HE WAS BEING DRIVEN FROM HIS RESIDENCE TO HIS OFFICE. ROSM CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 12 NOVEMBER AUSTRIA: AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE PARTIALLY EXPLODED AT THE IRAELI EL AL AIRLINES OFFICE. NO CASUALTIES WERE CAUSED, BUT PASSERSBY WOULD HAVE BEEN INJURED OR KILLED HAD THE DEVICE DETONATED COMPLETELY. NO GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY BUT ABU NIDAL WAS SUSPECTED. 12 NOVEMBER AUSTRIA: A SMALL EXPLOSIVE DEVICE EXPLODED IN THE ENTRANCE HALLWAY OF THE BRITISH CONSULATE. NO GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY BUT ABU NIDAL WAS SUSPECTED. 25 OCTOBER ITALY: VICE-CONSUL OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES WAS WOUNDED AND AN IRANIAN STUDENT ACCOMPANYING HIM KILLED WHEN SHOTS WERE FIRED INTO THEIR CAR IN ROME. CLAIMED BY THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES. 28 MARCH GREECE: BRITISH EMBASSY FIRST SECRETARY, MR.. KENNETH WHITTY WAS ASSASSINATED IN ATHENS BY A LONE GUNMAN WHO FIRED SHOTS INTO HIS AUTOMOBILE. ROSM CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 24 MARCH JORDAN: BOMB DEFUSED OUTSIDE THE BRITISH CONSULATE IN AMMAN. CLAIMED BY ABU NIDAL GROUP. 24 MARCH JORDAN: BOMB DEFUSED OUTSIDE THE BRITISH CULTURAL CENTER IN AMMAN. CLAIMED BY ABU NIDAL GROUP. 24 MARCH JORDAN: BOMB EXPLODED IN THE PARKING LOT OF THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL WHICH IS ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE US EMBASSY, DAMAGING TWO VEHICLES AND SLIGHTLY INJURING A USAID EMPLOYEE AND HIS DAUGHTER. A SECOND BOMB WAS DISCOVERED IN THE PARKING LOT AND DEFUSED. CLAIMED BY ABU NIDAL GROUP. 8 FEBRUARY FRANCE: UAE AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE, KHALIFAH AL-MUBARAK, ASSASSINATED BY A LONE GUNMAN. CLAIMED BY ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES AND ISLAMIC JIHAD. 1983 29 DECEMBER SPAIN: TWO JORDANIAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEES WERE ATTACKED BY A LONE GUNMAN AS THEY WERE DEPARTING FROM THEIR EMBASSY. WALID JAMAL BALKIS WAS KILLED INSTANTLY AND IBRAHIM SAMI MUHAMMAD WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. CLAIMED BY THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES. 20 DECEMBER TURKEY: A CAR BOMB INJURED ONE PERSON AND CAUSED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO AN APARTMENT BUILDING NEAR THE PLO OFFICE AND LIVING QUARTERS IN ANKARA. ABU NIDAL GROUP SUSPECTED. 19 DECEMBER TURKEY: A CAR BOMB WAS DISCOVERED IN AN ABANDONED RENTAL CAR MIDWAY BETWEEN THE FRENCH CULTURAL HOUSE AND THE CORDON HOTEL USED BY AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN IZMIR. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 7 NOVEMBER GREECE: TWO SECURITY GUARDS OF THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY WERE WOUNDED ON A CROWDED STREET IN ATHENS. ONE OF THE VICTIMS SUBSEQUENTLY DIED FROM HIS WOUNDS. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 31 OCTOBER JORDAN: A CAR BOMB CONTAINING1 00015 POUNDS OF EXPLOSIVES DETONATED OUTSIDE THE MAIN JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICERS\' CLUB IN ZARQA. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 26 OCTOBER ITALY: JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE VATICAN AND HIS DRIVER WERE WOUNDED IN AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN ROME. CLAIMED BY ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES. 25 OCTOBER INDIA: JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR WOUNDED BY AN UNKNOWN ASSAILANT IN NEW DELHI. CLAIMED BY ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES. 23 SEPTEMBER UAE: A GULF AIR BOEING 737 EN ROUTE FROM KARACHI, PAKISTAN TO ABU DHABI, CRASHED KILLING ALL111 PASSENGERS AND CREW. THE CRASH MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY A BOMB PLACED ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT. THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES AND ABU NIDAL CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 10 APRIL PORTUGAL: THE PLO OBSERVER TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIALISTS, ISAM AL-SARTAWI, WAS SHOT TO DEATH IN A HOTEL LOBBY. SARTAWI\'S SECRETARY WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK. CLAIMED BY ABU NIDAL. 1982 8 DECEMBER GREECE: THE KUWAIT AIRWAYS CORPORATION OFFICES WERE BOMBED IN ATHENS, CAUSING NO CASUALTIES. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 9 OCTOBER ITALY: A GRENADE AND MACHINE GUN ATTACK AGAINST A SYNAGOGUE IN ROME KILLED ONE CHILD AND WOUNDED10 OTHER PERSONS. 16 SEPTEMBER SPAIN: A LONE GUNMAN ASSASSINATED A FIRST SECRETARY FROM THE KUWAIT EMBASSY AND WOUNDED HIS DRIVER IN MADRID. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 16 SEPTEMBER PAKISTAN: ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF THE KUWAITI CONSUL GENERAL IN KARACHI. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 23 AUGUST KUWAIT: UAE CHARGE D\'AFFAIRES, MUHAMMAD AL-JUWAI\'ED, WAS WOUNDED IN AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT BY A LONE GUNMAN. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 23 AUGUST INDIA: THE UAE CONSUL GENERAL IN BOMBAY ESCAPED INJURY DURING AN APPARENT ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. ABU NIDAL GROUP SUSPECTED. 9 AUGUST FRANCE: TWO GUNMEN WITH GRENADES AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS ATTACKED THE JEWISH-OWNED RESTAURANT CHEZ GOLDENBERG IN PARIS, KILLING SIX AND INJURING 22. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. JULY FRANCE: THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE PLO OFFICE IN PARIS WAS ASSASSINATED. ABU NIDAL CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 5 JUNE INDIA: THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE KUWAITI EMBASSY IN NEW DELHI WAS ASSASSINATED. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. JUNE ITALY: THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE PLO OFFICE IN ROME WAS KILLED WHEN A BOMB WAS EXPLODED UNDER HIS CAR. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. JUNE ITALY: PLO ACTIVIST NAZEYK MATAR WAS SHOT BY A GROUP OF THREE OR FOUR MEN IN ROME. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 3 JUNE UK: ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF ISRAELI AMBASSADOR SHLOMO ARGOV AS HE DEPARTED THE DORCHESTER HOTEL IN LONDON. A LONE GUNMAN FIRED A POLISH-MADE SUBMACHINE GUN AT POINT-BLANK RANGE, CRITICALLY WOUNDING THE AMBASSADOR. ABU NIDAL CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 4 FEBRUARY AUSTRIA: A BOMB EXPLODED AT THE RESIDENCE OF CHIEF RABBI DR. AKIBA EISENBERG IN VIENNA, CAUSING SOME PROPERTY DAMAGE BUT NO CASUALTIES. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 1981 9 OCTOBER ITALY: SENIOR PLO OFFICIAL MAJID ABU SHARARA ASSASSINATED IN ROME. SHARARA WAS KILLED BY A BOMB PLACED UNDER THE BED OF HIS ROME HOTEL ROOM. ABU NIDAL CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 23 SEPTEMBER CYPRUS: TWO ARABS ENTERED AN ISRAELI SHIPPING FIRM IN LIMASSOL AND THREW A HAND GRENADE, INJURING FIVE EMPLOYEES. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 29 AUGUST AUSTRIA: TWO GUNMEN ARMED WITH POLISH MACHINE PISTOLS AND HAND GRENADES ATTACKED A VIENNA SYNAGOGUE AS WORSHIPPERS WERE LEAVING A SERVICE. TWO PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 20 WERE INJURED. ABU NIDAL CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1 JUNE BELGIUM: PLO REPRESENTATIVE, NA\'IM KADIR, ASSASSINATED IN BRUSSELS. ABU NIDAL GROUP SUSPECTED. 1 MAY AUSTRIA: ASSASSINATION OF HEINZ NITTEL, HEAD OF THE AUSTRIAN-ISRAELI FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY IN VIENNA. ABU NIDAL CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1980 JULY BELGIUM: ISRAELI COMMERCIAL ATTACHE ASSASSINATED IN BRUSSELS. ABU NIDAL CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 22 APRIL YUGOSLAVIA: ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF FATAH OFFICIAL SALAH KHALAF (ABU IYAD) IN BELGRADE, BUT ONLY ONE OF HIS BODYGUARDS WAS WOUNDED. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 3 MARCH SPAIN: A GUNMAN INTENDED TO ASSASSINATE A PROMINENT SPANISH JEWISH LAWYER, BUT SHOT AND KILLED ANOTHER LAWYER BY MISTAKE. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 17 JANUARY FRANCE: THE MANAGER OF AN ARAB BOOKSTORE WAS ASSASSINATED IN PARIS. ABU NIDAL CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1978 5 AUGUST PAKISTAN: FOUR GUNMEN ARMED WITH SUBMACHINE GUNS AND GRENADES, BROKE INTO THE PLO OFFICE IN ISLAMABAD AND MURDERED A RADIO OPERATOR, TWO PALESTINIAN STUDENTS, AND A PAKISTANI POLICE GUARD. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 3 AUGUST FRANCE: TWO GUNMEN INVADED THE OFFICE OF PLO REPRESENTATIVE IZZ AL-DIN AL-QALAQ AND SHOT HIM TO DEATH IN PARIS. AS THEY DEPARTED, THEY THREW A GRENADE WHICH KILLED AL-QALAQ\'S DEPUTY AND INJURED OTHERS NEARBY. BLACK JUNE AND SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 15 JUNE KUWAIT: PLO OFFICIAL \'ALI NASIR YASIM WAS FOUND SHOT TO DEATH IN FRONT OF HIS HOME. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. FEBRUARY CYPRUS: TWO GUNMEN INVADED THE HOTEL IN NICOSIA WHERE THE PRESIDIUM OF THE AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES\' SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION WAS MEETING AND KILLED ITS SECRETARY GENERAL, YUSUF AL-SIBA\'I, THE EDITOR OF THE CAIRO NEWSPAPER \"AL-AHRAM\" AND A CONFIDANT OF ANWAR SADAT. HAVING TAKEN 30 HOSTAGES, THE TERRORISTS EXCHANGED SOME OF THEM FOR AN AIRCRAFT WITH A VOLUNTEER CREW AND SAFE CONDUCT OUT OF THE COUNTRY. THEY TOOK OFF WITH 11 HOSTAGES BUT WERE REFUSED PERMISSION TO LAND BY LIBYA, KUWAIT, SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA, AND SOUTH YEMEN; DJIBOUTI ALLOWED A REFUELING STOP. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY RETURNED TO LARNACA AIRPORT AND RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT. JUST AS THE TERRORISTS WERE AGREEING TO RELEASE THEIR HOSTAGES AND SURRENDER IN EXCHANGE FOR PASSPORTS AND A NEW SAFE CONDUCT, AN EGYPTIAN COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCE CONDUCTED AN UNAUTHORIZED AND UNEXPECTED AIRBORNE ASSAULT ON LARNACA AIRPORT. FIFTEEN EGYPTIANS WERE KILLED AND16 WOUNDED AND THEIR AIRCRAFT WAS DESTROYED. SEVEN CYPRIOTS WERE WOUNDED. THE TWO TERRORISTS SURRENDERED. 4 JANUARY UK: PLO REPRESENTATIVE SA\'ID HAMMAMI WHO WAS KNOWN TO FAVOR PALESTINIAN COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAEL, WAS SHOT DEAD IN HIS OFFICE IN LONDON. ABU NIDAL SUSPECTED. 5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ " "100","12/9/1985 9:41","85KUWAIT6483","Embassy Kuwait","SECRET","85STATE371962\|85STATE371963","O 090941Z DEC 85 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY ","S E C R E T KUWAIT 06483 TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, KU SUBJECT: ABU NIDAL AND THE BITAR ASSASSINATION REF: A) STATE 371962; B) STATE 371963 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT. 2. DURING A CALL AT THE MFA ON 8 DECEMBER I PRESENTED REFTEL B ANALYSIS AND ANNEX OF THE ABU NIDAL TER- RORIST ORGANIZATION TO UNDERSECRETARY SULAIMAN MAJID AL-SHAHEEN. POINTING OUT THE VICIOUS ATTACKS PER- PETRATED BY ABU NIDAL\'S GROUP OVER THE PAST YEARS I STRESSED THE GRAVE THREAT THAT THE ORGANIZATION CON- STITUTES FOR ALL OF US, PARTICULARLY MODERATE ARAB STATES SUCH AS KUWAIT. I EMPHASIZED TO AL-SHAHEEN THAT THE USG WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO INTERDICT TERRORIST ACTS AND URGED THE GOK TO COOPERATE WITH US TO THIS END. I ASKED THE GOK TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO DENY A SAFE HAVEN AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR SUSPECTED MEMBERS OF ABU NIDAL\'S ORGANIZATION. 3. ABU NIDAL WAS OBVIOUSLY A TOPIC OF INTEREST TO AL-SHAHEEN. TURNING TO THE MOST RECENT ACT BY ABU NIDAL\'S GROUP, THE ASSASSINATION OF AL-BITAR IN AMMAN ON 14 NOVEMBER, AL-SHAHEEN INFORMED ME THAT THE PAL- ESTINIAN ASSASSINS WERE FROM KUWAIT, HAD ATTENDED BISHAR ROOMI SCHOOL, FAILED IN THEIR STUDIES, AND THEN HAD BEEN RECRUITED BY THE GROUP, PRESUMABLY OUT- SIDE OF KUWAIT. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HE NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN HAD APPROACHED THE GOK ON 7 DECEMBER WITH INFORMATION THAT DURING THE INTERROGATION OF THE TWO PALESTINIANS THEY PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT THE 1985 CAFE\' BOMBINGS IN KUWAIT. AL-SHAHEEN STATED THE GOK HAD DISPATCHED SOMEONE TO JORDAN IMMEDIATELY TO FOLLOW UP THE INVESTIGATION OF A CONNECTION BETWEEN ABU NIDAL AND THE BOMBINGS. 4. THE GOK REALIZES ALL TOO WELL THE THREAT THAT THE ABU NIDAL GROUP POSES, NOW MORE THAN EVER. SHOULD SUSPECTED TERRORISTS COME TO THEIR ATTENTION THEY MAY BE WILLING TO SHARE THEIR INFORMATION WITH US. QUAINTON " "101","12/16/1985 16:40","85THEHAGUE8873","Embassy The Hague","SECRET","85STATE371962\|85STATE371963","O 161640Z DEC 85 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0131 INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 08873 TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, NL SUBJECT: ABU NIDAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION REF: (A) STATE 371962, (B) STATE 371963, 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. SUMMARY: EMBASSY HAS DISCUSSED ISSUE OF ABU NIDAL TERRORISM (REFTELS) WITH APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIALS. THE INITIAL MFA RESPONSE INDICATED THE DUTCH RECOGNIZE THE DANGER OF ABU NIDAL GROUP AND ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN A \"POLITICAL DIALOGUE\" WITH THE US AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE JOINT ACTION. NONETHELESS, THERE IS NO CLEAR IDEA WITHIN THE MINISTRY AS TO HOW SUCH A DIALOGUE MIGHT BE STRUCTURED AND WHAT CHANNELS OF COORDINATION WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE. THE DUTCH ALSO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF OUR DEMARCHE TO PASS ON INFORMATION CONCERNING A POSSIBLE AMAL TERRORIST ACTION WHICH THE MFA RECEIVED CONFIDENTIALLY FROM TWO LIBYAN GOVERNMENT SOURCES. END SUMMARY. 3. AMBASSADOR RAISED ISSUE OF ABU NIDAL TERRORISM (REFTELS) WITH MFA DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA AFFAIRS JAN HORAK AND EMBASSY OFFICER FOLLOWED UP IN GREATER DETAIL WITH AREND HUITZING, HEAD, MFA MIDDLE EAST OFFICE, AND JOOP VAN BOSSE, HEAD, NORTH AFRICA OFFICE. WE EXPLAINED USG INTEREST IN INCREASED INTER- NATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST ABU NIDAL, DRAWING ON POINTS REF A, AND PROVIDED MFA WITH US INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ON THE SUBJECT (REF B). WE ARE ALSO PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT TO DUTCH INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES VIA SIRO LIAISON CHANNELS. 4. HUITZING AND VAN BOSSE INDICATED THAT GON IS CON- CERNED ABOUT ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION, WHICH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOMBING OF AN EL AL OFFICE IN AMSTERDAM IN SEPTEMBER. HUITZING NOTED THAT NETHERLANDS AND US ARE ALREADY EXCHANGING INFORMATION ON TERRORISM THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS AND HE DOUBTS THERE WAS MUCH NEW THE DUTCH COULD OFFER IN THIS AREA. HE DID THINK, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR A \"POLITICAL DIALOGUE\" BETWEEN THE US AND CONCERNED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO SEE WHAT CONCRETE DIPLOMATICC SECURITY MEASURES WE COULD JOINTLY TAKE TO DEAL WITH THE ABU NIDAL THREAT. 5. WE ASKED HUITZING AND VAN BOSSE IF THEY HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE BEST FORUM FOR SUCH A DIALOGUE. THE TWO MEN DISAGREED IN THEIR RESPONSES. HUITZING FAVORED DEALING WITH THE ISSUE AT NATO, WHILE VAN BOSSE THOUGHT A US DIALOGUE WITH THE EC \"TREVI\" GROUP DEALING WITH TERRORISM MIGHT BE BETTER. HUITZING\'S PREFERENCE FOR NATO SEEMED BASED ON HIS DESIRE TO GIVE PREEMINENCE TO THE POLITICAL/ DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF SUCH A DIALOGUE, WHILE VAN BOSSE FELT THE TREVI GROUP COULD BETTER DEAL WITH THE LAW ENFORCEMENT SIDE OF THE TERRORISM ISSUE. BOTH MEN AGREED THE MFA LACKS A CLEAR POINT OF CONTACT FOR COORDINATING TERRORISM POLICY COMPARABLE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT\'S M/CT. 6. WE ALSO ASKED VAN BOSSE ABOUT INFORMATION PROVIDED TO US THAT A NUMBER OF DUTCH TRAVELING TO LIBYA HAD TWO PASSPORTS, ONE OF WHICH WAS OFTEN SEIZED BY LIBYAN AUTHORITIES. VAN BOSSE CLARIFIED THAT SUCH SEIZURES USUALLY ONLY OCCUR WHEN THE LIBYANS HAVE AN UNRESOLVED COMMERCIAL OR FINANCIAL CLAIM AGAINST THE DUTCH CITIZEN IN QUESTION. THE PASSPORTS ARE ALMOST ALWAYS RETURNED EVENTUALLY BY THE LIBYANS, VAN BOSSE SAID, AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THEY HAVE BEEN USED TO FACILITATE ILLEGAL TRAVEL BY TERRORISTS. HUITZING NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE FAR EASIER FOR THE LIBYANS TO OBTAIN DUTCH PASSPORTS ON THE \"BLACK MARKET\" FROM AMONG PASSPORTS REPORTED LOST OR STOLEN WITHIN THE NETHERLANDS THAN TO ATTEMPT TO USE ONE OF THE FEW SEIZED DIRECTLY BY THEIR AUTHORITIES, SINCE THE DUTCH KEEP A CLOSE WATCH ON THOSE PASSPORTS AND WOULD BE AWARE IMMEDIATELY OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IF THEY SHOWED UP IN THE HANDS OF TERRORISTS. 7. VAN BOSSE ALSO USED THE OPPORTUNITY OF OUR DEMARCHE TO PASS TO US INFORMATION RECEIVED IN CONFI- DENCE FROM TWO DIFFERENT LIBYAN DIPLOMATS REGARDING POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIVITY. VAN BOSSE SAID THE DUTCH EMBASSY IN TRIPOLI HAD BEEN TOLD IN JULY THAT THE AMAL GROUP IN LEBANON WAS PLANNING A POSSIBLE AIR HIJACKING OF A DUTCH AND/OR LIBYAN AIRCRAFT. ACCORDING TO THE LIBYAN SOURCES, THE TERRORISTS WOULD BE USING FORGED LEBANESE OR LIBYAN PASSPORTS. VAN BOSSE ADMITTED THE INFORMATION WAS RATHER DATED, BUT HE PRESENTED IT TO US TO UNDERSCORE THE DUTCH MFA ARGUMENT THAT MAINTAINING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LIBYA CAN OCCASIONALLY YIELD VALUABLE INFORMATION OF USE TO THE WEST\'S EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM. 8. VAN BOSSE AND HUITZING CONCLUDED BY SAYING THEY WOULD BRING OUR DEMARCHE ON ABU NIDAL TO THE ATTENTION OF SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US IF THE MINISTRY HAD ANY ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON POSSIBLE FUTURE COOPERATION IN THIS AREA. 9. COMMENT: VAN BOSSE\'S AND HUITZING\'S READY UNDERSTANDING OF THE VALUE OF A STEPPED-UP WESTERN POLITICAL DIALOGUE ON TERRORISM IS ENCOURAGING. WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP TO FOMENT SIMILAR UNDERSTANDING AT SENIOR MFA LEVELS. EVEN WITH SUCH UNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER, IT WILL NOT BE EASY TO TURN WESTERN DIALOGUE INTO OUR OBJECTIVE OF JOINT OR PARALLEL PRESSURES BY THE DUTCH UPON LIBYA AND SYRIA. WHAT WE NEED AS A FIRST STEP IS TO IDENTIFY A WESTERN FORUM FOR DIALOGUE WHERE WE COULD BUILD MOMENTUM FOR JOINT ACTION IN WHICH WE COULD CATCH UP THE DUTCH AND OTHERS. BREMER " "102","12/18/1985 10:26","85DAMASCUS7872","Embassy Damascus","SECRET","85DAMASCUS7586\|85DAMASCUS7844","O 181026Z DEC 85 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3672 INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN AMEMBASSY DOHA AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMCONSUL JEDDAH AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY SANAA AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL DIA WASHINGTON DC ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 07872 LONDON FOR RAPHEL PARIS FOR WINN UNCINCCENT FOR POLAD LOWRIE E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, KPRP, SY, IR SUBJECT: SYRIA AND IRAN: ALMOST A RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE REF: A) DAMASCUS 7586, B) DAMASCUS 7844 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: BY CUTTING OFF OIL TO SYRIA, IRAN SIGNALED ITS DISPLEASURE OVER THE MOUNTING SYRIAN DEBT TO IRAN, SYRIAN POLICIES IN LEBANON, AND MOVES TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT WITH JORDAN AND IRAQ. BY ALL ACCOUNTS, HOWEVER, PM KASM\'S VISIT TO TEHRAN DECEMBER 1-3 PRODUCED AGREEMENT THAT THE OIL SHIPMENTS ARE TO BE RESUMED. THE IRANIANS CANNOT EXPECT SIGNIFICANT SYRIAN PAYMENT FOR PAST OR PRESENT DELIVERIES, BUT NOW THEY SEEM WILLING TO GO AHEAD ANYWAY. THEY APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN REASSURED ABOUT SYRIA\'S RELATIONS WITH JORDAN AND IRAQ, AND THEY MAY HAVE BECOME MORE RESIGNED TO SYRIAN POLICIES IN LEBANON. ASAD APPEARS TO HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE THREE MONTHS OF TENSION WITH IRAN WITH HIS BALANCE OF SOURCES OF AID INTACT. END SUMMARY. SYRIAN PRESSURE, IRANIAN COUNTER PRESSURE ----------------------------------------- 3. THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1985 WAS ONE OF HEIGHTENED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAN. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE RECENT RELATIONSHIP OF THOSE TWO COUNTRIES, THE FLOW OF IRANIAN OIL TO SYRIA WAS INTER- RUPTED. AT THE TIME OF THE OIL CUTOFF IN LATE AUGUST, WE BELIEVED THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS THE EFFECTIVE IRAQI BOMBINGS OF KHARG ISALND. HOWEVER, THE IRANIANS, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, WERE ABLE FAIRLY QUICKLY TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE DONE TO KHARG, WHILE THE OIL CUTOFF HAS CONTINUED UNTIL THE PRESENT. 4. IN SUM, THE IRANIANS WERE SENDING THE SYRIANS A SIGNAL. THAT SIGNAL COINCIDED WITH SIGNIFICANT SYRIAN PRESSURE AGAINST THE IRANIANS IN SEVERAL SECTORS. FIRST WERE THE PALPABLY INCREASED SYRIAN STRICTURES ON HIZBALLAH AND THE SIEGE OF THE IRANIAN-SUPPORTED FUNDAMENTALISTS IN TRIPOLI IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER, RESULTING IN A DEFEAT FOR THE FUNDAMENTALISTS (AND THUS FOR IRAN). IN THE SAME TIME PERIOD OCCURRED PRINCE \'ABDALLAH\'S MISSIONS TO DAMASCUS, AMMAN, AND BAGHDAD WHICH LED TO THE PRESENT RECONCILIATION WITH JORDAN AND A SPATE OF RUMORS OF A RECONCILIATION WITH IRAQ. THESE DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRED AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF THE MOUNTING SYRIAN DEBT TO IRAN, NOW POSSIBLY AMOUNTING TO SEVERAL BILLION DOLLARS. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS--AND STILL IS--UNDER PRESSURE FROM MEMBERS OF THE MAJLIS WHO ARE ANGERED BY SYRIAN FAILURE TO PAY ON THE DEBT; AND THE IRANIAN PRESS HAS RECENTLY HAD SOME VERY UNSAVORY THINGS TO SAY ABOUT SYRIA. THE KASM VISIT: THE HEAT IS OFF -------------------------------- 5. BY ALL ACCOUNTS THAT WE HAVE SEEN OR HEARD, THE VISIT OF SYRIAN PRIME MINISTER KASM TO IRAN DECEMBER 1-3 ALLEVIATED MANY OF THESE TENSIONS. WE HAVE NOT YET FOUND SOLID CONFIRMATION THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE RESUMED SHIPPING OIL TO SYRIA, BUT A WIDE RANGE OF INTERLOCUTORS HERE--BOTH SYRIANS AND DIPLOMATS WHO HAVE HEARD FROM THEIR EMBASSIES IN TEHRAN--HAVE BEEN IN AGREE- MENT THAT SYRIA GOT ALL OR MOST OF WHAT IT WANTED ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT. MINISTER OF ECONOMY \'IMADI, WHO TRAVELED TO TEHRAN WITH KASM, TOLD THE AUSTRALIAN DCM THAT THE IRANIANS AGREED TO RESUME OIL DELIVERIES, AND THE FRENCH DCM GOT THE SAME MESSAGE DURING A VISIT TO THE IRANIAN EMBASSY HERE. OUR JAPANESE COLLEAGUES ASSERT THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE AGREED TO A NEW ONE-YEAR SCHEME INVOLVING THE IMMEDIATE RESUMPTION OF OIL SHIPMENTS. (ACCORDING TO THE JAPANESE, THIS AGREEMENT PROVIDES 1 MILLION TONS FREE, 2 MILLION TONS FOR HARD CURRENCY, AND 2 MILLION TONS FOR BARTER. IF SO, THE IRANIANS ARE ONCE AGAIN DISINGENUOUS: IT IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THE SYRIANS WILL PAY HARD CURRENCY FOR EVEN 2 MILLION TONS, NOR DO THEY HAVE GOODS WORTH THE EQUIVALENT OF 2 MILLION TONS TO BARTER.) OUR KUWAITI COLLEAGUES ASSURE US THAT THE PORTION (THEORETICALLY) TO BE PAID FOR IN HARD CURRENCY IS TO BE DELIVERED AT \"SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER RATES\" THAN OBTAINED UNDER THE PREVIOUS AGREEMENT OF APRIL 1985. FROM SUCH REPORTS, IT APPEARS THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO GET MUCH HARD CURRENCY--WHETHER FOR THE NEW SHIPMENT OR IN PAYMENT FOR THE OLD. THE NET RESULT IS A SYRIAN VICTORY ON THE KEY DEBT/PAYMENT ISSUE. 6. MEANWHILE, ON DECEMBER 13-18 THE IRANIANS SENT THEIR MINISTER OF ISLAMIC GUIDANCE, MUHAMMAD KHATAMI, TO DAMASCUS (REF B). KHATAMI WAS FULL OF WORDS OF PRAISE FOR SYRIA, WAS WARMLY RECEIVED BY ASAD AND BY A HOST OF SYRIAN MINISTERS, SIGNED AN INFORMATION COOPERA- TIVE AGREEMENT, OPENED AN IRANIAN CULTURAL COUNCIL IN DAMASCUS, AND IN GENERAL GAVE A FURTHER REAFFIRMATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP. -------------------------------------------- THE IRANIANS MAY HAVE GIVEN UP ON SOME POINTS --------------------------------------------- 7. WE DO NOT WANT TO OVEREMPHASIZE THE POINT, BUT IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE NET RESULT OF THESE PAST THREE MONTHS OF INCREASED TENSION BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAN IS A RESOLUTION AT SOME EXPENSE TO IRAN. IF THE IRANIANS ARE RESUMING OIL SHIPMENTS AT THE PREVIOUS RATE OR NEAR TO IT, THE LOSS IS AN EXPENSIVE ONE--WORTH $1 BILLION/YEAR IN OIL. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, THE IRANIANS HAVE GIVEN UP POINTS AS WELL, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS LEBANON. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE KASM VISIT TREATED LEBANON IN A WAY TO SUGGEST THAT IRAN NOW ENDORSES SYRIAN POLICIES IN LEBANON. SINCE IT IS CLEAR THAT IRAN OPPOSES MANY OF SYRIA\'S POLICIES IN LEBANON, THIS ENDORSEMENT IS A REMARKABLE PUBLIC CONCESSION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE PUT AWAY THEIR AMBITIONS FOR A FUNDAMENTALIST SHI\'A-DOMINATED STATE IN LEBANON, ESPECIALLY SINCE IRAN\'S ALLIES THERE ARE NOT PART OF THE SYRIAN-BROKERED TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION. WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT THE SYRIANS HAD PRIVATELY MADE PROMISES TO THE IRANIANS ABOUT LEBANON. THE PUBLIC STATEMENT MAY, THEREFORE, NOT BE WORTH THE PAPER IT IS WRITTEN ON, BUT IT DOES SUGGEST THAT IRAN MAY BE A LITTLE MORE RESIGNED THAN PREVIOUSLY TO SYRIA\'S DETER- MINATION TO HAVE ITS WAY IN LEBANON. 8. AS REGARDS JORDAN AND IRAQ, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE GONE TO SOME LENGTHS TO REASSURE THE IRANIANS. NOTHING HAS COME OF \'ABDALLAH\'S EFFORTS FOR SYRIAN RECONCILIATION WITH IRAQ AS YET, AND NOTHING IN THE COMMUNIQUE EMERGING FROM TEHRAN WOULD GIVE REASON FOR OPTIMISM ABOUT SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. AS FOR JORDAN, ASAD PROBABLY AFFIRMED TO THE IRANIANS THAT HE HAS GIVEN UP NOTHING AT ALL IN THE PROCESS, I.E., THAT THE RECONCILIATION HAS INVOLVED ONLY JORDAN\'S COMING TOWARD SYRIA AND NONE OF THE REVERSE. 9. THE IRANIAN CONCESSIONS ON DEBT AND LEBANON ILLUSTRATE HOW IMPORTANT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA IS TO IRAN. THERE WAS A TIME WHEN WE PUT EMPHASIS ON THE SYRIAN CLOSURE OF THE KIRKUK-HOMS PIPELINE, BUT WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE PIPELINES, THIS IS NO LONGER A COMPELLING ARGUMENT. THE IMPORTANCE OF SYRIA TO IRAN NOW IS POLITICAL. IRAN PLACES GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE ON NOT HAVING TO CONFRONT UNITED ARAB HOSTILITY. IT ALSO VALUES SYRIAN ASSISTANCE IN IRANIAN PURCHASES OF ARMS, ALTHOUGH IRAN COULD PROBABLY FIND OTHER AVENUES TO MEET ITS MILITARY NEEDS. 10. SECOND, THE RELIGIOUS-IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT IS IMPORTANT. IRAN IS AN EVANGELIZING NATION, BOTH ON THE ISLAMIC PLANE AND, PARTICULARLY, ON THE SHI\'A PLANE. LEBANON IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THIS MISSION; AND SYRIA HOLDS THE KEY TO LEBANON. MOREOVER, SYRIA IS SYMPATHETIC WITH IRAN\'S CRUSADE AGAINST THE SUNNI OVER- LORD OF IRAQ, WHICH IS A MAJORITY SHI\'A COUNTRY. A FACTOR OF POSSIBLE IMPORTANCE IS THE SHI\'A/\'ALAWI TIE. MANY OF THE IRANIAN MULLAHS VIEW THE \'ALAWIS AS HERETICAL AND DESPICABLE; BUT WE ALSO THINK IT LIKELY THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE MULLAHS FEEL CLOSER TO THE \'ALAWIS THAN TO THE SUNNIS. FOR HIS PART, ASAD IS FIRST AND FOREMOST A SECULAR BA\'THI, BUT WE NEVER UNDERESTIMATE HOW DEEP THE ETHNIC STRAINS RUN IN SYRIA, AND WE DO NOT EXCLUDE ASAD FROM THESE PREJUDICES. THE \'ALAWIS SHARE WITH THE OTHER SYRIAN MINORITIES A HOSTILITY TOWARD THE SUNNI MAJORITY; UNDER ASAD, THEY HAVE PROCLAIMED THEMSLEVES TO BE ORTHODOX SHI\'A; AND ASAD IS THEIR LEADER, AS WELL AS--AND PERHPAS BEFORE BEING--LEADER OF THE COUNTRY. ASAD, THE CONSUMMATE BALANCER ------------------- 11. WE DOUBT THAT KASM WENT TO IRAN WITH ANY SPECIFIC THREATS, BUT IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT ASAD LET IT BE KNOWN POLITELY TO THE IRANIANS THAT HE HAD OTHER ALTERNATIVES--IN PARTICULAR, TURNING TO THE SAUDIS TO MAKE UP FOR THE CUTOFF OF IRANIAN OIL DELIVERIES. IT IS, HOWEVER, A COURSE WHICH ASAD WANTED TO AVOID. THE PRESENT SITUATION--OF HOSTILE BENE- FACTORS--IS ONE THAT SUITS ASAD PERFECTLY. WHILE NEITHER OF HIS PRINCIPAL BENEFACTORS IS HAPPY, THEY GO ON BEING GENEROUS--IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF THEIR MUTUAL ANTIPATHY. THERE IS EVERY LIKELIHOOD, FOR THE NEAR TERM, AT LEAST, THAT ASAD WILL BE ABLE TO GO ON EXTRACTING LARGESSE FROM BOTH OF THESE GOLDEN GEESE. FOR THEIR PART, THE SAUDIS APPEAR TO SEE SOME VALUE IN THE SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP TO IRAN, AS THEY HOPE THAT SYRIA WILL USE IT TO PRESSURE IRAN NOT TO ATTACK THE GULF. ------------ CONCLUSION ------------ 12. THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE SYRIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP DURING THE KASM VISIT TO TEHRAN INDICATES THAT THE TENSIONS OF THE PAST THREE MONTHS HAVE ABATED. AS WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN PREVIOUS REPORTING, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE RESILIENCY IN THE RELATIONSHIP, DESPITE THE PROFOUND DIFFERENCE IN THE TWO COUNTRIES\' CULTURES AND IDEOLOGIES. FOR IRAN, THE RELATIONSHIP RESTS ON MORE THAN LEBANON OR A PIPELINE, IMPORTANT AS THESE ARE. FOR SYRIA, THE ECONOMIC ELEMENT IS VERY IMPORTANT, AND ASAD\'S ATTACHMENT.TO IRAN MIGHT FALL BY THE WAYSIDE IF IRAN PERSISTED IN WITHHOLDING OIL (INDEED, WE STILL AWAIT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT OIL DELIVERIES HAVE RESUMED). YET, IT IS CLEAR THAT ASAD PREFERS TO HAVE IRAN AS ONE OF HIS MAJOR BENEFACTORS, HE IS CONTENT WITH THE PRESENT STATE OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (THOUGH AN IRANIAN INVASION OF KUWAIT OR A TOTAL DEFEAT OF IRAQ WOULD PRESUMABLY ALTER THIS VIEW--WHILE A \"MERE\" SUCCESS NORTH OF BASRA MIGHT NOT), AND HE SHARES WITH IRAN AN IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY TOWARD IRAQ AND ISRAEL. THE \'ALAWI-SHI\'A BOND MAY BE A FACTOR OF IMPORTANCE. 13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. EAGLETON " "103","12/19/1985 10:53","85RABAT12023","Embassy Rabat","SECRET","85RABAT11933\|85STATE371962","P 191053Z DEC 85 FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3426 INFO AMEMBASSY TUNIS AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMCONSUL TANGIER AMCONSUL CASABLANCA ","S E C R E T RABAT 12023 TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, MO SUBJECT: ABU NIDAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION REFS: (A) RABAT 11933, (B) STATE 371962, (C) STATE 371963 1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. I TOOK THE OCCASION OF A DECEMBER 17 MEETING ON OTHER SUBJECTS WITH MINISTER OF INTERIOR DRISS BASRI TO EMPHASIZE USG CONCERN OVER ACTIVITIES OF THE ABU NIDAL TERRORIST GROUP AND TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A COPY OF THE EXCELLENT ANALYSIS OF THE ABU NIDAL GROUP AND CHRONOLOGY (REF C). I EMPHASIZED OUR DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOM AND WORK TOWARD A COMMON INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO COMBAT TERRORISM. BASRI, AS IN EARLIER CONVERSATIONS, RESPONDED THAT HE WAS EAGER TO COOPERATE WITH THE USG. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE HIS STAFF PREPARE AN ANALYSIS OF ABU NIDAL ACTIVITIES TO SHARE WITH US. NASSIF " "104","12/31/1985 23:09","85STATE394785","Secretary of State","UNCLASSIFIED","","O 312309Z DEC 85 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS ","UNCLAS STATE 394785 TERREP E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, XG, XF SUBJECT: PAPER ON THE ABU NIDAL GROUP 1. HERE FOR POSTS USE WITH PRESS AND MEDIA IS AN UNCLASSIFIED PAPER ON THE ABU NIDAL GROUP WHICH WAS MADE AVAILABLE AT THE DECEMBER 31, 1985 STATE DEPARTMENT NOON PRESS BRIEFING. BEGIN TEXT. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP INTRODUCTION THE ABU NIDAL GROUP IS AMONG THE MOST DANGEROUS OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. IT IS PROBABLY THE BEST ORGANIZED AND MOST EFFECTIVE OF THE RADICAL PALESTINIAN TERRORIST GROUPS, CAREFULLY PLANNING ITS OPERATIONS AND KEEPING ITS INFORMATION TIGHTLY COMPARTMENTED. THE GROUP HAS REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO OPERATE IN ANY COUNTRY IT CHOOSES. IT HAS STAGED ATTACKS IN OVER 20 COUNTRIES ON THREE CONTINENTS, AND OPERATES THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. ABU NIDAL HAS CONDUCTED OVER 60 TERRORIST ATTACKS DURING THE LAST EIGHT YEARS--AT LEAST 30 OF THEM SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1984. TWO-THIRDS OF THE GROUP\'S NEARLY 20 ATTACKS THIS YEAR HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN WESTERN EUROPE, AS INNOCENT BYSTANDERS INCREASINGLY HAVE BECOME CASUALTIES OF THE GROUP\'S ASSAULTS: --THE SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS ON AIRLINE OFFICES IN ROME AND VIENNA ON DECEMBER 27, WHICH HAVE THE HALLMARKS OF ABU NIDAL, LEFT MORE THAN A DOZEN DEAD\' INCLUDING 5 AMERICANS. --THE EGYPT AIR HIJACKING IN LATE NOVEMBER ULTIMATELY COST THE LIVES OF 59 PASSENGERS --THE GROUP BOMBED THE BRITISH AIR OFFICE IN ROME IN SEPTEMBER INJURING 15 PERSONS, MANY OF THEM PASSERSBY. --ABU NIDAL MEMBERS THREW GRENADES AT ROME\'S CAFE DE PARIS IN SEPTEMBER, INJURING 38 TOURISTS--AMONG THEM AMERICANS, GERMANS, BRITONS, ITALIANS, ARGENTINES, AND BRAZILIANS. --THE GROUP BOMBED TWO HOTELS IN ATHENS, ONE IN SEPTEMBER THAT INJURED 19, MOSTLY BRITISH TOURISTS, AND ONE IN AUGUST THAT INJURED 13 BRITONS. --IN SPAIN, ABU NIDAL ATTACKS IN JULY AT THE BRITISH AIR OFFICE AND THE NEARBY ALIA TICKET OFFICE KILLED ONE AND WOUNDED 24 CUSTOMERS AND EMPLOYEES. --ALSO IN JULY THE GROUP WAS PROBABLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBING OF TWO RESTAURANTS IN KUWAIT, KILLING EIGHT AND INJURING ALMOST 90. --IN APRIL, AN ABU NIDAL TERRORIST FIRED A ROCKET AT A JORDANIAN AIRLINER AS IT WAS TAKING OFF FROM ATHENS AIRPORT. THE ROCKET HIT THE PLANE BUT DID NOT EXPLODE. HUNDREDS OF CASUALTIES MIGHT HAVE RESULTED HAD THE OPERATION BEEN SUCCESSFUL. THE OFFICIAL NAME OF THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION IS \"FATAH - REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL\", WHICH IT USUALLY EMPLOYS WHEN ATTACKING ISRAELI TARGETS. BUT IT HAS EMPLOYED A NUMBER OF COVER NAMES FOR ITS OPERATIONS. ORIGINALLY THE GROUP OPERATED UNDER THE NAME BLACK JUNE; MORE RECENTLY, THE GROUP HAS USED THE NAME ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES WHEN IT STAGED ATTACKS AGAINST PERSIAN GULF TARGETS. IT ALSO ACTS AS BLACK SEPTEMBER WHEN IT ATTACKS JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN TARGETS AND EMPLOYS THE NAME REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS (ROSM) AS ITS SIGNATURE FOR ATTACKS AGAINST BRITISH TARGETS. IT ADDED EGYPTIAN NOMENCLATURES WHEN IT HIJACKED THE EGYPTAIR PLANE IN NOVEMBER. BACKGROUND THE GROUP IS HEADED BY SABRI AL-BANNA (WHO USES THE NOM DE GUERRE ABU NIDAL), GREW OUT OF ELEMENTS THAT BROKE AWAY A DECADE AGO FROM PLO CHAIRMAN ARAFAT\'S FATAH ORGANIZATION. THE GROUP IS COMMITTED TO THE USE OF VIOLENCE TO DESTROY DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS DESIGNED TO RECONCILE ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE MOUNTED EARLIER THIS YEAR BY KING HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT\'S PLO. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP ALSO CALLS FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF RULING \"REACTIONARY\" REGIMES SUCH AS JORDAN, EGYPT, AND THE PERSIAN GULF STATES AND IS CRITICAL OF WHAT IT SEES AS ARAFAT\'S AND THE PLO\'S MODERATION AND LACK OF REVOLUTIONARY BASE AND ZEAL. CONSEQUENTLY THE GROUP CONTENDS THAT BOTH INTER-ARAB AND INTRA-PALESTINIAN TERRORISM ARE NEEDED TO FORCE THE ALL-EMBRACING ARAB REVOLUTION WHICH IN TURN WOULD LEAD TO THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE. THE GROUP WAS FORMED IN 1974 AFTER ARAFAT INSTITUTED A BAN ON PLO INVOLVEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OUTSIDE ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ABU NIDAL\'S RADICAL VIEWS FOUND FAVOR AT THE TIME WITH THE IRAQI REGIME, WHICH HELPED HIM CREATE THE ORGANIZATION THAT ABU NIDAL CALLED \"FATAH - THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL\" TO PROMOTE HIS CLAIM THAT HIS ORGANIZATION, RATHER THAN THE ONE LED BY ARAFAT, WAS THE LEGITIMATE FATAH. HE HAS SIMILARLY DUPLICATED OTHER FATAH ORGANIZATIONAL TITLES TO SUGGEST A PARALLEL STRUCTURE WITH THE ORIGINAL. BEGINNING IN THE EARLY 1980S, BAGHDAD SUPPRESSED ACTIVITIES OF THE ABU NIDAL GROUP OUT OF IRAQ. ELEMENTS OF THE GROUP THEN MOVED TO DAMASCUS. SINCE EARLY 1984, LIBYA BEGAN TO PROVIDE INCREASED SUPPORT TO THE GROUP AND ABU NIDAL HIMSELF AND MANY OF THE GROUPS OPERATIONS MAY HAVE MOVED THERE WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS. THE GROUP PROBABLY HAS SEVERAL HUNDRED MEMBERS ALTHOUGH AN ACCURATE COUNT IS DIFFICULT. WE BELIEVE THE GROUP HAS A NUMBER OF CELLS THROUGHOUT WESTERN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND MAKES USE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN STUDENTS STUDYING ABROAD, SOMETIMES INVOLVING THEM IN OPERATIONS AFTER ONLY PERFUNCTORY TRAINING. THESE NEW RECRUITS FOR EXAMPLE, WERE INVOLVED IN THE FIVE GRENADE ATTACKS STAGED BY THE GROUP IN 1985. CURRENT OPERATIONS AND TRENDS BASED ON THE STYLE OF ABU NIDAL ATTACKS IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE GROUP IS WILLING TO CAUSE INDISCRIMINATE CASUALTIES. APART FROM ASSASSINATIONS OF PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS, ABU NIDAL OPERATIONS THROUGH NOVEMBER 1985 RESULTED IN NEARLY 70 DEATHS AND 201 WOUNDED AMONG INNOCENT BYSTANDERS--AND THE NUMBER COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH HIGHER IF THE JORDANIAN AIRLINER ATTACK IN ATHENS HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR, 111 DIED IN THE CRASH OF A GULF AIR JET ON WHICH AN ABU NIDAL BOMB MAY HAVE EXPLODED. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP HAS CONCENTRATED ON ATTACKING JORDANIAN INTERESTS SINCE 1984. THESE ATTACKS WERE PROVOKED BY THE JORDANIAN AGREEMENT TO HOST THE PNC MEETING IN NOVEMBER 1984 AND KING HUSSEIN\'S FEBRUARY ACCORD WITH ARAFAT TO RESTART THE STALLED MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. ABU NIDAL OPERATIVES ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE ASSASSINATED FORMER WEST BANK MAYOR AND PALESTINIAN MODERATE FAHD QAWASMEH IN DECEMBER 1984 SHORTLY AFTER HIS ELECTION TO THE PLO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. THE ANTI-JORDANIAN/PLO CAMPAIGN HAS NOT ABATED. AS LONG AS JORDANIAN AND PLO EFFORTS TOWARD MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE, ATTACKS AGAINST BOTH JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN TARGETS PROBABLY WILL ALSO CONTINUE. ASIDE FROM THE ATTACK ON ALIA OFFICES IN MADRID IN JULY AND THE ATTEMPT TO DOWN A JORDANIAN AIRLINER OVER ATHENS IN APRIL, OTHER INCIDENTS INVOLVING JORDANIAN TARGETS IN 1985 HAVE INCLUDED: --THE NOVEMBER 24 ASSASSINATION OF A PALESTINIAN IN AMMAN. --THE MURDER OF A JORDANIAN PUBLISHER IN ATHENS IN SEPTEMBER --A PLOT TO ASSASSINATE THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO GREECE IN AUGUST. --THE MURDER OF A JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT IN ANKARA ON JULY 24. --A ROCKET ATTACK ON THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN ROME IN APRIL\' THE GROUP HAS ALSO TARGETED BRITISH INTERESTS. ROSM CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KIDNAPPING IN MARCH 1985 OF A BRITISH JOURNALIST IN LEBANON AND THE ASSASSINATION OF BRITISH DIPLOMATS IN INDIA AND GREECE IN 1984. THE PURPOSE OF THE ATTACKS PROBABLY IS TO FORCE THE UK TO RELEASE GROUP MEMBERS IMPRISONED FOR THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON IN JUNE 1982. EVEN BEFORE THE RECENT ATTACKS ON VIENNA AND ROME AIRPORTS, ABU NIDAL HAD BEGUN TO CONCENTRATE HIS FIELD OF OPERATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE\' ALTHOUGH HIS TARGETS HAVE BEEN HIS USUAL ENEMIES, E\'G\' BRITISH, ISRAELI, MODERATE ARAB, HE HAS BECOME VERY INDISCRIMINATE ABOUT INJURING BYSTANDERS. THE RELATIVELY RELAXED CONTROLS IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAS BEEN CONDUCIVE TO HIS OPERATIONS THERE. THE PATTERN OF CONCENTRATING HIS EFFORTS IN EUROPE HAS COINCIDED WITH THE STRENGTHENING OF HIS LINKS WITH LIBYA. THE LIKELIHOOD OF LIBYAN FINANCING, SAFEHAVEN, AND LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO HIS FUTURE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST OPERATIONS. END TEXT. WHITEHEAD " "105","1/16/1986 15:21","86AMMAN594","Embassy Amman","CONFIDENTIAL","","P 161521Z JAN 86 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1441 INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY TUNIS AMEMBASSY VIENNA AMCONSUL JERUSALEM USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 00594 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PTER, KPAL, JO, SY, XF SUBJECT: PLO OFFICIALS SAY ABU NIDAL\'S GROUP IS THE BEST SUPPLIED IN SYRIA 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. AN EMBASSY PALESTINIAN CONTACT HAS REPORTED TWO SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH PLO OFFICIALS HERE ABOUT THE ABU NIDAL PRESENCE IN DAMASCUS. BOTH OFFICIALS--OMAR SHAKA\'A, THE HEAD OF THE PLO POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OFFICE IN AMMAN AND A PROTOGEE OF FAROUK QADDUMI AND HAMADNEH FARANEH, A DFLP MEMBER WHO WAS RECENTLY ARRESTED BY GOJ OFFICIALS--THOUGHT IT CURIOUS THAT THE USG WAS REACTING SO FORCEFULLY TO SUSPECTED LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE ROME AND VIENNA TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND IGNORING SYRIA WHEN SYRIA, THEY SAID, WAS JUST AS INVOLVED AS LIBYA. ACCORDING TO BOTH MEN, ABU NIDAL\'S OPERATIONS IN DAMASCUS ARE SUPPORTED MORE LAVISHLY BY THE SYRIANS THAN THOSE OF ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN GROUP--THEY GET MORE MONEY, BETTER FACILITIES, BETTER TRAINING, AND BETTER EQUIPMENT THAN ANYBODY ELSE. COMMENT: WE CANNOT COMMENT ON THE ACCURACY OF THESE OBSERVATIONS, BUT PASS THEM ALONG AS INDICATING THE PERCEPTIONS OF PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN. GNEHM " "106","1/23/1986 9:28","86ISLAMABAD1587","Embassy Islamabad","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 230928Z JAN 86 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7608 AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY DHAKA AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMCONSUL KARACHI AMCONSUL LAHORE AMCONSUL PESHAWAR ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 01587 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PK SUBJECT: KHAMENEI\'S VISIT: RESURGENCE OF SHIA EXTREMISM? 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: THE SUCCESSFUL (FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE) VISIT OF KHAMENEI TO PAKISTAN HAS BOOSTED THE MORALE OF THE RADICAL SHIA GROUPS HERE. APPARENTLY FLUSH WITH NEW FUNDS, THE SHIAS HAVE BEGUN MAKING COMMON CAUSE WITH THE ANTI-GOP, ANTI-US OPPOSITION, PARTICULARLY OVER LIBYA. SUCH CAUSES EVOKE LITTLE PUBLIC SYMPATHY, AND THE ATTITUDES OF THE SUNNI MAJORITY -- MANY OF WHOM HAVE BEGUN TO LOOK UPON ANY SIGNS OF SHIA ASSERTIVENESS WITH SUSPICION AND DISTASTE -- WILL CONTINUE TO LIMIT THE ABILITY OF THE RADICAL SHIAS TO PURSUE SPECIFICALLY SECTARIAN GOALS. HOWEVER, SHIA EXTREMISTS WILL DOUBTLESS SEEK TO EXPLOIT ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR FANNING ANTI-AMERICANISM AMONG THE PUBLIC AT LARGE. A HEATING UP OF THE AL QUDS EPISODE WOULD TURN ALL GROUPS AGAINST US. END SUMMARY. THE KHAMENEI VISIT 2. ONE WORRISOME ASPECT OF THE RECENT VISIT OF IRANIAN PRESIDENT KHAMENEI TO PAKISTAN HAS BEEN THE APPARENT NEW LEASE ON LIFE IT HAS GIVEN TO RADICAL SHIA ORGANIZATIONS HERE. PAKISTANI SHIAS CLEARLY VIEWED THE VISIT PRIMARILY AS A SECTARIAN ONE, AND THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE WENT ALL OUT TO ENSURE KHAMENEI\'S WELCOME WAS A WARM ONE. HUGE THRONGS OF SHIAS WERE BUSED TO THE AIRPORTS IN LAHORE AND ISLAMABAD TO GREET KHAMENEI AND WELCOMING POSTERS SPRUNG UP IN THE MAJOR CITIES OF THE COUNTRY. 3. THE MONEY FOR THIS MAJOR EFFORT APPARENTLY CAME FROM TWO SOURCES: WEALTHY PAKISTANI SHIAS AND THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. THE FUNDS WERE FUNNELED PRIMARILY THROUGH TWO RADICAL SHIA ORGANIZATIONS, THE TEHRIK-E-NIFAZ-E- FIQH-E-JAFFRIA AND THE IMAMIA STUDENTS ORGANIZATION (ISO). THESE TWO ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE SECTARIAN AGITATION LAST YEAR. HOWEVER, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS -- PERHAPS INCLUDING THE FEAR OF A SUNNI BACKLASH -- THEY HAD BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET FOR THE PAST FEW MONTHS. 4. IN UTILIZING THE NEW FUNDS AVAILABLE, THE EXTREMIST SHIAS ENSURED THAT KHAMENEI\'S WELCOME TOOK ON A RADICAL, ANTI-GOP, ANTI-US TINGE. THE CROWDS CHANTED ANTI-AMERICAN SLOGANS, MANY OF THE BANNERS WERE ON AN ANTI-AMERICAN THEME, AND A LARGE NUMBER OF SHIAS AT THE DEPARTURE CEREMONY OPENLY SHOWED DISRESPECT TO PRESIDENT ZIA, SURROUNDING HIS CAR AND MAKING OBSCENE GESTURES. RENEWED SELF-CONFIDENCE 5. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE KHAMENEI VISIT, THE RADICAL SHIAS APPEAR MORE SELF-CONFIDENT THAN THEY HAVE IN MONTHS. SINCE KHAMENEI\'S DEPARTURE, THE ISO HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY ACTIVE IN SUPPORTING THE FLURRY OF ANTI-AMERICAN, PRO-LIBYAN RALLIES WHICH OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THESE RALLIES HAVE NOT STRUCK A POPULAR CHORD -- ATTENDANCE HAS ALMOST UNIFORMLY BEEN SMALL -- BUT THE AMOUNT OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORT WHICH HAS GONE INTO THEM AND THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE POPPED UP ALL OVER THE COUNTRY MAKES THIS PHENOMENON NOTEWORTHY. LIMITS 6. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RADICAL SHIA ORGANIZATIONS WILL, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO BE LIMITED BY TWO FACTORS: THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS AND FEAR OF A SUNNI BACKLASH. THE RECENT ACTIVISM OF THE RADICAL SHIAS APPEARS TO BE A MANIFESTATION NOT ONLY OF EUPHORIA FOLLOWING THE KHAMENEI VISIT, BUT ALSO OF A GREATER AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS. THE MONEY BEING SPENT NOW --MUCH OF WHICH PRESUMABLY IS LEFT-OVER FROM THE VISIT -- WILL HAVE TO BE REPLENISHED IF THE SHIAS ARE TO MAINTAIN THEIR CURRENT LEVEL OF ACTIVITY. THE ATTITUDE OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT -- THE MOST LIKELY PAYMASTER -- WILL THEN BECOME CRUCIAL -- WILL THE IRANIANS RISK ANTAGONIZING THE GOP TO PLAY THEIR OWN SECTARIAN GAMES IN PAKISTAN? 7. GIVEN THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMBALANCE -- AND THE GROWING INTOLERANCE OF SHIA \"DEMANDS\" BY THE VAST SUNNI MAJORITY, THE SHIAS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PURSUE SUCCESSFULLY A SPECIFICALLY SHIA AGENDA. INDEED, THE LEVEL OF GRUMBLING AMONGST THE SUNNIS ABOUT THE SHIAS HAS NOTICEABLY RISEN AS A RESULT OF A PERCEPTION THAT THE SHIAS \"HIJACKED\" KHAMENEI\'S VISIT FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES AND ARE -- ONCE AGAIN -- GROWING UPPITY. PRESIDENT ZIA HIMSELF IS REPORTEDLY ENRAGED BY HIS TREATMENT AT THE HANDS OF KHAMENEI\'S WELL-WISHERS AND HAS TOLD THE SECURITY FORCES TO CHECK CLOSELY INTO THE OPERATIONS --AND FUNDING -- OF THE RADICAL SHIAS. 8. PRESUMABLY, A RECOGNITION THAT THEY CAN NOT AFFORD TO GO IT ALONE AT LEAST PARTIALLY EXPLAINS WHY THE RADICAL SHIAS ARE INCREASINGLY MAKING COMMON CAUSE WITH THE EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION AND IN PARTICULAR HAVE LASHED ON TO THE LIBYAN CAUSE AS TOOL FOR AMERICAN-BASHING. 9. THE OPPOSITION ALLIANCE, THE MOVEMENT FOR THE RESTORARTION OF DEMOCRACY (MRD), HAS BEEN WILLING TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WITH THE SHIAS. IN SOME WAYS, THIS IS A NATURAL ALLIANCE OF GROUPS ON THE OUTS WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM. FOR THE MRD, HOWEVER, THE SHIAS REPRESENT A TWO-EDGED SWORD: SHIA EXTREMISTS MIGHT HIJACK THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT FOR THEIR OWN RADICAL PURPOSES, THEREBY ALIENATING MUCH OF THE MRD\'S CONSTITUENCY (MANY OF WHOM ARE FAIRLY CONSERVATIVE SUNNIS). COMMENT 10. FOR THE MOMENT, THE TACTIS OF THE RADICAL SHIAS APPEAR UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED: THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS FAIRLY FIRMLY IN THE SADDLE, AT LEAST OVER THE SHORT TERM; AND COLONEL QADDHAFI\'S CAUSE EVOKES LITTLE PUBLIC SYMPATHY -- TOO MANY PAKISTANIS CONSIDER HIM A TERRORIST. IF, HOWEVER, AN ANTI-AMERICAN CAUSE ARISES AROUND WHICH A LARGER SECTION OF THE PAKISTANI POPULACE CAN UNITE -- AND EVENTS SUCH AS RECENTLY HAPPENED AT THE AL-AQSA MOSQUE COULD PROVE TO BE SUCH A CATALYST -- THE RADICAL SHIAS WILL NO DOUBT DO ALL THEY CAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION. HINTON " "107","1/23/1986 18:30","86LONDON1567","Embassy London","SECRET","86STATE19968","O 231830Z JAN 86 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1055 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY ","S E C R E T LONDON 01567 E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: UG, PGOV, PREL SUBJECT: THE UGANDA SITUATION: LONDON VIEWS REF: STATE 19968 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. OUR FCO COLLEAGUES ARE WATCHING THE UGANDA SITUATION WITH GROWING CONCERN, AND THEIR ANALYSIS OF MUSEVENI\'S NEGATIVE ROLE VERY MUCH COINCIDES WITH OUR OWN IN REFTEL. THE FCO WAS THOROUGHLY RATTLED BY THE FIGHTING IN KAMPALA ON WEDNESDAY MORNING; HOWEVER, THE BRITISH WERE SLIGHTLY CHEERED WHEN THE KENYANS INFORMED THEM THAT MOI WILL BE MEETING WITH THE NRA IN NAIROBI ON FRIDAY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION. 3. ON THE BRITISH MILITARY ROLE, WE WERE TOLD THAT THE OPERATION IS TOTALLY ON HOLD PENDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. THE BRITISH MAJOR GENERAL WHO WOULD HEAD THE MILITARY GROUP REMAINS IN NAIROBI. 4. LONRHO CHIEF EXECUTIVE TINY ROWLAND TODAY TOLD US THAT MUSEVENI\'S GAME PLAN ON UGANDA REMAINS UNCHANGED. ACCORDING TO ROWLAND, MUSEVENI WANTS TO EDGE HIS WAY TOWARD POLITICAL DOMINANCE IN THE COUNTRY; HE IS UTTERLY CONTEMPTUOUS OF OKELLO, ETC; HE VIEWS THE NAIROBI ACCORD SIMPLY AS A REVISED FORMAT FOR CONTINUED POLITICAL CONFLICT. 5. ASKED WHETHER MUSEVENI PLANS TO TAKE KAMPALA, ROWLAND REPLIED THAT MUSEVENI HAS CONSISTENTLY TOLD HIM HE CAN TAKE KAMPALA BUT CANNOT HOLD IT. THEREFORE, HE WILL NOT ACTUALLY MOVE INTO THE CITY. THE FCO AGREES, BELIEVING THAT MUSEVENI WILL CONTINUE TO USE THE TACTIC OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE CITY AND THEN RELENTING. 6. PRESS REPORTS HERE CONTINUE TO ALLEGE THAT AN INCURSION BY ZAIRE FORCES INTO SOUTHWESTERN UGANDA HAS OCCURRED IN COOPERATION WITH FORMER AMIN TROOPS. OUR FCO CONTACTS SAY THEY ARE UNABLE TO CONFIRM THAT STORY. HOWEVER, \"SOUTH\" MAGAZINE CORRESPONDENT WILLIAM PIKE TELLS US THE REPORTS - ACCORDING TO HIS NRA FRIENDS - ARE CORRECT, AND THE OPERATION IS DESIGNED TO FORESTALL NRA MOVES AGAINST KAMPALA. (IF SO, IT WOULD APPARENTLY INDICATE AN ABOUT-FACE BY MOBUTU ON THE UGANDAN SITUATION.) 7. WE PLAN TO PURSUE THESE ISSUES IN OUR FRIDAY MEETING WITH BEN MOTOGO. PRICE " "108","1/25/1986 12:27","86KUWAIT415","Embassy Kuwait","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 251227Z JAN 86 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2776 INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN AMEMBASSY DOHA AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY RIYADH ","C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 00415 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, SY, KU, EG SUBJECT: THREAT LETTER FROM \"ISLAMIC JIHAD\" 1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) - 2. EMBASSY ON JANUARY 25 RECEIVED LETTER QUOTED BELOW, PURPORTEDLY FROM ISLAMIC JIHAD. ENVELOPE BORE EGYPTIAN STAMP AND APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN POST- MARKED IN EGYPT. DATE OF POSTMARK WAS NOT LEGIBLE. LETTER WAS APPARENTLY A PHOTOCOPY. TEXT WAS NEATLY TYPED WITHOUT TYPOS AND DRAFTED IN GOOD, CORRECTLY- SPELLED ENGLISH. SIGNATURE LINE WAS TYPED ONLY, I.E., WITH NO HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE. - 3. BEGIN TEXT: IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL TO AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS: YOU HAVE BECOME MORE FRANK AND IMPERTINENT IN DEMON- STRATING YOUR MALICIOUS HOSTILITY TOWARD MUSLIMS. YOU ARE NO LONGER SATISFIED WITH SUPPORTING AND PARTICI- PATING IN THE ISRAELI ZIONIST\'S CRIMES AGAINST MUSLIMS IN THE ARAB WORLD. NOW UNDER THE COVER OF THE HYPO- CRITICAL SLOGAN OF ANTI-TERRORISM, YOU ARE MORE FRE- QUENTLY MAKING RECOURSE TO U.S. MILITARY MIGHT TO INITIATE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE MUSLIM ARABS. WE DELCARE WITH FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT SUCH MISCHIEVOUS ACTIONS WILL NOT GO UNPUNISHED. RETRI- BUTION WILL BE UNMERCIFUL AND EVERYWHERE. THE AMERICANS WILL EXPERIENCE FOR THE FIRST TIME THE RIGHTEOUS ANGER OF THE MUSLIMS ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY. WE WILL STRIKE AT THE MOST VULNERABLE POINTS OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM. OUR THREATS ARE NOT EMPTY WORDS\| YOU HAVE ALREADY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF BEING CONVINCED OF THIS. WE BLAME YOU BEFOREHAND FOR ANY VICTIMS AMONG AMERICAN CIVILIANS. YOU MUST BE AWARE THAT OUR ACTIONS ARE A RESPONSE TO YOUR POLICY OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE MUS- LIMS. WE ACCEPT YOUR CHALLENGE\| ALLAH IS GREAT. -- ISLAMIC JIHAD END TEXT. 4. COMMENT: LETTER WAS PRESUMABLY POSTED A WEEK OR SO AGO IN CAIRO, AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT MARKEDLY CHANGES OUR SECURITY SITUATION HERE. NONETHELESS, WE WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONS. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING IF OTHER POSTS HAVE RECEIVED SIMILAR LETTERS. QUAINTON " "109","1/30/1986 11:33","86STATE29781","Secretary of State","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 301133Z JAN 86 FM SECSTATE WASHDC INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 029781 FOLLOWING STATE 029781 DTD JAN 30, 1986 SENT ACTION ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS, INFO LONDON, PARIS, BRUSSELS, BONN, TOKYO, SEOUL, CAIRO, SECDEF, DIA, CENTCOM MACDILL AFB, USEUCOM VAIHINGEN, JSOC FT BRAGG, BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 029781 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UG SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN UGANDA 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. FOLLOWING FOR POST\'S INFORMATION IS TEXT OF INFORMATION MEMO DATED 1/28/86 ON DEVELOPMENTS IN UGANDA. 3. BEGIN TEXT. SUMMARY: SOUTHERN GUERRILLAS HAVE WON THE CAPITAL AND HEARTLAND OF UGANDA AND HAVE THE MILITARY EDGE ON DISSIDENT NORTHERN TRIBES. THE NEW HEAD OF STATE IS A FERVENT NATIONALIST WHO LIKELY WILL COMBINE THIRD-WORLD RHETORIC WITH PRAGMATIC POLICIES. END SUMMARY. THE 5,000-MAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY (NRA) NOW CONTROLS THE SOUTHERN HALF OF UGANDA AND GAINS GROUND DAILY FROM FORMER GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN DISORDERLY RETREAT. LONGER TERM, NRA FORCES LIKELY WILL FACE LOW-GRADE BUSH WARFARE FROM DISSIDENT NORTHERN TRIBES. NRA\'S SUPERIOR DISCIPLINE AND ORGANIZATION, AND ITS CONTROL OVER THE CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC HEART OF UGANDA, SHOULD GIVE IT A DECISIVE EDGE. NRA ESCHEWS THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF FORMER MILITARY LEADERS AND HAS BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN THEY IN WINNING THE POPULATION\'S AFFECTIONS. ALL 170 AMERICANS IN UGANDA ARE REPORTED SAFE AND KAMPALA IS RETURNING TO NORMAL WITH RESTORATION OF POWER, WATER AND TELEPHONE, AND REOPENING OF MARKETS. IN CONTRAST TO THE BEHAVIOR OF GOVERNMENT TROOPS AFTER THE JULY 85 COUP, NRA SOLDIERS ARE REPORTED TO BE WELLDISCIPLINED AND POPULAR WITH TOWNSPEOPLE. AMBASSADOR HOUDEK HAS MET WITH NRA COMMANDER YOWERI MUSEVENI AND FEELS WE CAN WORK WITH THE NEW REGIME. MUSEVENI MAY BE A STRIDENT INTERLOCUTOR, BUT HIS GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS. MUSEVENI\'S IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IS MURKY, COMBINING FERVENT NATIONALISM, THIRD WORLD RHETORIC AND PRAGMATIC OPPORTUNISM. HE DECLARED TO THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY THAT HIS FOREIGN POLICY WOULD BE NON-ALIGNED AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL. LIKE MANY UGANDAN FACTIONS, HE HAS SOUGHT LIBYAN ASSISTANCE, BUT WAS MOTIVATED PROBABLY MORE BY OPPORTUNISM THAN IDEOLOGICAL AFFILIATION. NRA REPRESENTATIVES HAVE STRESSED TO US THEIR DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IN HIS WRITINGS, MUSEVENI HAS FAVORED ACTIVE STATE GUIDANCE OVER THE ECONOMY. BUT HE HAS ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT FREE ENTERPRISE BASED ON SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE IS THE KEY TO UGANDA\'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. MUSEVENI SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WILL WELCOME FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING PRODUCTIVE ENTERPRISES. OUR AMBASSADOR IS ANXIOUS TO RESUME THE AID PROGRAM AND ENGAGE MUSEVENI IN DIALOGUE ON UGANDA\'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION. END TEXT. 4. KAMPALA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. UNQUOTE SHULTZ " "110","2/21/1986 14:10","86MOSCOW2889","Embassy Moscow","UNCLASSIFIED","","O 211410Z FEB 86 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1025 INFO DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS AMCONSUL LENINGRAD USIA WASHDC 3599 NASA WASHDC IMMEDIATE ","UNCLAS MOSCOW 02889 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NASA FOR LIB E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: KSCA, TSPA, UR SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS ON SOVIET \"MIR\" SPACE STATION 1. DEPARTMENT HAS NO DOUBT SEEN MASSIVE PRESS COVERAGE OF LAUNCH FEBRUARY 20 OF SOVIET \"MIR\" (PEACE) SPACE STATION. PROUD OF THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENT, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE OPEN IN THEIR COVERAGE OF THE EVENT IN LINE WITH A TREND WE HAVE OBSERVED IN RECENT MONTHS. FEBRUARY 20 VREMYA NEWSCAST SHOWED, BESIDES FOOTAGE OF THE LAUNCH ITSELF, DETAILS OF THE SPACE FLIGHT CONTROL CENTER OUTSIDE MOSCOW, INCLUDING A LARGE DETAILED DIAGRAM OF THE OUTSIDE OF THE STATION. VIDEOTAPE OF THE LAUNCH SHOWS THAT THE STATION WAS LAUNCHED ON THE SOVIETS\' NEW LARGE \"PROTON\" BOOSTER. 2. INTERVIEWED DURING THE NEWSCAST, PROFESSOR AND PILOT-COSMONAUT K. FEOKTISTOV CALLED THE \"MIR\" SPACE STATION A \"NEW GENERATION\" STATION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SOVIETS INTEND TO MAN THE STATION PERMANENTLY, BUT \"NOT RIGHT AWAY.\" AFTER SHAKE-DOWN AND TESTING, A FIRST CREW WILL BE SENT UP FOR A \"NOT LENGTHY\" STAY TO CHECK THE STATION\'S SYSTEM, TO BE FOLLOWED BY A BREAK FOR FURTHER \"ADJUSTMENTS.\" AFTER THIS THE STATION WILL BE PERMANENTLY MANNED, WITH ROTATING SHIFTS. 3. ACCORDING TO A. IVAKHNOV, WRITING IN FEBRUARY 20 IZVESTIYA, THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT EXPERIMENTS AND TRANSPORTING EQUIPMENT TO THE NEW STATION REPRESENTS A CHANGE OVER THE SALYUT STATIONS. RATHER THAN TRANSPORTING EQUIPMENT TO THE STATION AND PERFORMING EXPERIMENTS INSIDE THE STATION ITSELF (WHICH MADE SALYUT RESEMBLE AN \"INSTRUMENT WAREHOUSE,\" IZVESTIYA SAYS), THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT FOR EXPERIMENTS WILL BE TRANSPORTED IN SPECIALLY OUTFITTED MODULES TO BE DOCKED WITH THE CRAFT, AND THE EXPERIMENTS CARRIED OUT IN THE MODULES THEMSELVES. \"MIR\" CAN DOCK SIX MODULES AT A TIME, AND THUS, ACCORDING TO FEOKTISTOV, WILL PERMIT \"A MUCH WIDER PROGRAM OF RESEARCH WORK.\" 4. EMBASSY DAO WILL FORWARD BY SEPTEL TECHNICAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE \"MIR\" STATION AND IS FORWARDING TO DIA VIDEO TAPE OF \"VREMYA\" COVERAGE OF THE LAUNCH. HARTMAN " "111","2/26/1986 11:00","86BEIRUT1023","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","86BEIRUT1006","P 261100Z FEB 86 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6574 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 01023 SIPDIS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PINR, LE SUBJECT: CONFLICT BETWEEN HIZBALLAH AND THE LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY REF: BEIRUT 1006 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. DURING BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF ON FEBRUARY 26, DR. JAMIL NAHMI, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PUBLIC SECURITY (SURETE GENERALE), OFFERED HIS ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT CLASHES IN WEST BEIRUT BETWEEN HIZBALLAH AND LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY(LCP) MILITIAS. 3. NAHMI FIRST NOTED THE DEEP IDEOLOGICIAL DIVIDE WHICH SEPARATES RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND COMMUNIST DOCTRINE. UNLIKE MANY OTHER OPPOSING MILITIAS IN LEBANON WHICH MAINTAIN SOME CONTACTS DESPITE THEIR ANIMOSITIES, THE IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE BETWEEN HIZBALLAH AND THE LPC WAS SO DEEP THAT IT HAD PRECLUDED ANY WORKING CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS. 4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, NAHMI SITUATED THE ORIGIN OF THE CURRENT HIZBALLAH/LPC CONFLICT IN SOUTH LEBANON. HE ASSERTED THAT OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS AMAL HAD SUCCEEDED IN REDUCING SSNP AND LPC PRESENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON AND THAT MANY COMMUNIST MILITIAMEN HAD MIGRATED TO WEST BEIRUT. SIMULTANEOUSLY, A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF HIZBALLAHI HAD ALSO COME TO WESMV BEIRUT FROM THE SOUTH. THUS, NAHMI EXPLAINED, THESE TWO FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSING MILITIAS FOUND THEMSELVES CONCENTRATED IN WEST BEIRUT, WHICH IS A RELATIVELY SMALL AREA. THIS CONCENTRATION OF FORCES IN WEST BEIRUT, THE GENERAL LAWLESSNES AND DISORDER THERE, AND THE LACK OF ADEQUATE COUNTERVAILING SECURITY FORCES HAD PROVIDED FERTILE GROUND FOR A HIZBALLAH/LPC CONFLICT. THE CLASHES HAD APPARENTLY ERUPTED AT THE STREET LEVEL AND SIMPLY ESCALATED. 5. ASKED ABOUT REPORTS (REFTEL) THAT SHIITE AND SUNNI MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS WERE COOPERATING IN WEST BEIRUT AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS, NAHMI RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS SOME \"COINCIDENCE OF OBJECTIVES\" BETWEEN PRO-IRANIAN FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS, BE THEY SHIITE OR SZNNI. THEY BOTH TOOK GUIDANCE FROM TEHRAN, WHOSE OWN RELATIONS WITH SYRIA HAVE DETERIORIATED, AND THEY BOTH HAD THEIR OWN REASONS TO OPPOSE PRO-SYRIAN LEFTIST GROUPS SUCH AS THE LCP AND THE SSNP. SUNNI FUNDAMENTALISTS SUCH AS THE TAWHIID MOVEMENT REMAINED BITTER OVER THEIR DEFEAT IN TRIPOLI LAST FALL BY SSNP XD LCP FORCES BACKED BY SYRIA. THE SHIITE FUNDAMENTALISTS SUCH AS HIZBALLAH WERE NOW DETERMINED TO OPPOSE MORE DIRECTLY PRO-SYRIAN LEFTIST GROUPS, BOTH BECAUSE OF THE RELIGIOUS-VERSUS-SECULAR IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT AND BECAUSE OF THEIR DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH SYRIA ITSELF. NAHMI PREDICTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TRADITIONAL RIFT BETWEEN SHIITE AND SUNNI FUNDAMENTALISTS WOULD QUICKLY REAPPEAR WHEN THEY NO LONGER FACED A COMMON ENEMY. 6. IN A BRIEF ASIDE, NAHMI MENTIONED THAT HE HAD MET SEPARATELY WITH PSP LEADER JUMBLATT AND AMAL LEADER BARRI OVER THE PAST TEN DAYS. HE SAID JUMBLATT SEEMED TO KNOW WERE HE STANDS WITHIN HIS COMMUNITY AND SPOKE WITH SOME CONFIDANCE AND AUTHORITY. BARRI, HOWEVER, SEEMED \"EXTREMELY ILL AT EASE\" ABOUT HIS POSITION AND ACTED AS IF HE WERE \"WALKING ON SHIFTING SANDS.\" UNFORTUNATELY, THE CONVERSATION WAS PREEMPTED AT THIS POINT, AND WE CALD NOT DRAW NAHMI M FURTHER ON HIS ASSESSMENT OF BARRI\'S POSITION WITHIN THE SHIITE COMMUNITY. 7. BIOGRAPHIC NOTE. JAMIL NAHMI HAS A DOCTORATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WAS THE DIRECTOR OF THE LEBANESE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL. A STAUNCH GEMAYEL LOYALIST, NAHMI WAS ALSO AFFILIATED WITH THE \"HOUSE OF THE FUTURE,\" THE PRESIDENT\'S THINK TANK AND PUBLISHING HOUSE. ALTHOUGH A PHALANGIST, NAHMI COMES FROM KFAR AKKA NEAR AMIUN IN NORTH LEBANON, I.E., FROM THE FRANJIYYAH HEARTLAND. BARTHOLOMEW " "112","3/4/1986 10:17","86MOGADISHU2418","Embassy Mogadishu","SECRET","","R 041017Z MAR 86 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9723 ","S E C R E T MOGADISHU 02418 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PTER, LY, SO SUBJECT: LIBYAN PRESENCE IN SOMALIA 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. THIS MORNING AT THE CEREMONY INITIATING THE AID PROJECT FOR PVOS, I TOOK THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR, AHMED SULEIMAN ABDALLAH, ASIDE. I RECALLED THAT WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER JAMA BARRE HAD MET WITH THE SECRETARY AT THE UNGA LAST FALL, JAMA BARRE HAD TOLD MR. SHULTZ THAT THE LIBYANS HAD WANTED TO BRING A STAFF OF 75 PEOPLE TO SOMALIA BUT THEY HAD BEEN TOLD THEY COULD BRING ONLY FIVE. I WAS INFORMED THAT THE FIVE HAD NOW BECOME 12, PLUS A COUPLE OF LIBYANS AT THE LIBSOMA AGRICULTURAL PROJECT. AS TO WHAT THEY WERE DOING, IT WAS CLEAR. WHEN I HAD LEFT MY EMBASSY TO COME TO THE CEREMONY, A CAR WITH LIBYAN DIPLOMATIC TAGS HAD BEEN PARKED 100 YARDS AWAY. THEY WERE OBVIOUSLY WATCHING US. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE PRESENT DOZEN BECAME 50, OR 60? 3. AHMED SULEIMAN ACTED AS IF HE HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF WHAT JAMA BARRE HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY. (INCI- DENTALLY, AHMED SULEIMAN DISLIKES JAMA BARRE, AND THIS WAS ALSO IN MY MIND.) THE MINISTER SAID THAT HE WOULD TAKE A NEW LOOK AT THE SITUATION, AND HE THANKS ME FOR MENTIONING THIS TO HIM. HE DID THINK THAT THE SOMALI SECURITY FORCES WERE COOPERATING CLOSELY WITH US. I SAID THAT INDEED THEY WERE, BUT THE MORE LIBYANS THERE WERE, THE HARDER IT WOULD BE TO WATCH THEM. I COULD REMEMBER FROM YEARS BACK THE DIFFICULTIES THAT OUR OWN PEOPLE HAD IN THE UNITED STATES, WHEN SOVIET STAFFS IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK BAGAN TO RISE. BRIDGES " "113","3/14/1986 11:49","86KAMPALA745","Embassy Kampala","CONFIDENTIAL","86STATE76433","O R 141149Z MAR 86 FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3694 INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM AMEMBASSY KIGALI AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE USIA WASHDC 2537 SECDEF WASHDC USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 00745 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SCOM UG SUBJECT: MUSEVENI\'S \"BANNING\" OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY - MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING. REF: STATE 76433 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: LOCAL, NAIROBI, AND US MEDIA HAVE CARRIED STORIES RECENTLY TO THE EFFECT THAT PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS BANNED ALL POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THESE REPORTS APPARENTLY STEM FROM OFF HAND REMARKS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT AT A MARCH 4 CEREMONY SWEARING IN NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS; THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH MUSEVENI\'S PREVIOUS STATEMENTS DISTAINING PARTISAN POLITICS, AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE A LEGAL BANNING, AS WE SEE IT. MUSEVENI\'S ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE REGARDING POLITICAL PARTIES REMAINS UNCLEAR; AS INSTITUTIONS THEY CONTINUE TO EXIST BUT ARE DISCOURAGED FROM PARTISAN ACTIVITY END SUMMARY. 3. ON TUESDAY MARCH 4 PRESIDENT MUSEVENI BRIEFED UGANDA\'S TWENTY-FOUR NEWLY APPOINTED SPECIAL DISTRICT ADMINISTRATORS (SDAS) ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. PART OF THE BRIEFING CONTAINED REMARKS ON POLITICAL PARTIES. FOLLOWING IS RELEVANT PORTION OF THE OFFICIAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION SYNOPSIS OF MUSEVENI\'S REMARKS. 4. BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED TEST: ON A SERIOUS NOTE, MR. MUSEVENI SAID THAT IT HAS COME TO HIS NOTICE THAT SOME OF THOSE UGANDANS WHO BROUGHT RUIN TO THIS BEAUTIFUL COUNTRY ARE BENT TO CAUSE TROUBLE AGAIN FOR THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA. HE HOWEVER WARNED THAT BY DOING SO THEY WILL GIVE THE NRM A WELCOME CHANCE TO CRUSH FOREVER WHAT HE CALLED THESE GOOD-FOR-NOTHING ELEMENTS. PRESIDENT MUSEVENI POINTED OUT THAT SUCH ELEMENTS HAVE ABUSED THE NRM\'S HIGH SENSE OF MAGNAMITY, AND TOTALLY MISCONCEIVED ITS GOOD MORAL SENSE FOR WEAKNESS. THE SDAS WERE CALLED UPON TO SEE THAT SUCH APPARENT MISCONCEPTION IS ERASED AND THAT SUCH BANKRUPT, AND MISGUIDED POLITICIANS ARE EXPOSED AND DENIED GROUND TO NURTURE AGAIN. MR MUSEVENI CAUTIONED THE SDAS NOT TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AGAINST NRM ALLIES WITHIN THE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT AND THOSE OUTSIDE IT. HE CHARGED THEM WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF IMPROVING THE NATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE BROAD-BASED GOVERN- MENT AND BY ALL MEANS DESIST FROM CAUSING UNWELCOME DISRUPTIONS. ON THE APPARENT PUBLIC MEETINGS AND RALLIES BEING OVERTLY OR COVERTLY CONDUCTED BY AGENTS OF THE OLD POLITICAL PARTIES, THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT VARIOUS LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE PARTIES SHOULD SUSPEND FORTHWITH SUCH MEETINGS AND RALLIES. THIS DIRECTIVE HE SAID HAS IN CONSIDERATION THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION AS IT IS OF NOW IN UGANDA AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MINIMUM POLITICAL PROGRAMME IN THIS INTERIM PERIOD MR. MUSEVENI STRESSED THAT THE SUSPENSION OF OVERT OR COVERT PARTY MEETINGS AND RALLIES DOES NOT MEAN AT ALL THAT POLITICAL PARTIES ARE BANNED BUT IT MERELY SUSPENDS POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITIES WHICH AT THE MOMENT WOULD DELAY OR COMPLETELY ARREST UGANDA FROM REGAINING STABILITY THE ONLY PUBLIC MEETINGS PERMITTED WILL BE THOSE GEARED TO ENHANCE NATIONAL UNITY AS ADVOCATED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. HE SAID UGANDANS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT NRM WAS NOT CONCEIVED TO BE A POLITICAL PARTY BUT A MOVEMENT OF ALL UGANDANS WHO GOT CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR MOTHERLAND AND TOOK ACTION TO BRING TO A STOP AND CAUSE ABOUT (SIC) CHANGE OF COURSE AWAY FROM THE ROAD LEADING TO DESTRUCTION AND DISINTEGRATION BACK TO THE ROAD OF STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT. END UNCLASSIFIED TEXT. 5. MUSEVENI\'S REMARKS WERE CARRIED ON UGANDA RADIO, AND HAVE BEEN GIVEN WIDE PLAY IN LOCAL, NAIROBI, AND U.S. MEDIA (FOR LAST SEE \"CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR\" SYNOPSIS OF REFTEL), ALL EMPHASIZING THE \"BANNING OF POLITICAL ACITIVTY \" 6. COMMENT: MUSEVENI\'S REMARKS IN FACT DO NOT GO ANY FURTHER THAN PREVIOUS STATEMENTS ON THE ISSUE OF PARTISAN POLITICS MUSEVENI HAS MADE NO SECRET THAT HE REGARDS PARTISAN POLITICS AS ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ONGOING TURMOIL IN UGANDA BECAUSE THE PARTIES ARE BASED, BY HIS LIGHTS, ON ATAVISTIC ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CLEAVAGES FOR THIS REASON MUSEVENI WOULD LIKE PARTIES TO REMAIN \"DORMANT,\" FOR THE TIME BEING. WHAT EXACTLY BEING \"DORMANT\" ENTAILS HAS NOT BEEN SPELLED OUT. UGANDA\'S FOUR PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE ALL ISSUED STATEMENTS SUPPORTING THE MUSEVENI GOVERNMENT, WHILE PRIVATELY EXPRESSING A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NRM\'S NON-PARTISAN APPROACH IT IS CLEAR THAT MUSEVENI WOULD LIKE TO DO AWAY WITH THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES, BUT TO DATE HE HAS SHOWN NO INCLINATION TO COERCE THE POPULACE INTO ACCEPTING THE NRM\'S IDEOLOGY. THE SPECIFIC OBJECT OF MUSEVENI\'S REMARKS WAS PROBABLY NOT THE LEGAL OPPOSITION, BUT RATHER A SHADOWY GUERILLA ORGANIZATION THAT IS BELIEVED, BY THE NRM AT ANY RATE, TO HAVE SPRUNG INTO EXISTENCE. UGANDAN PRESS HAS REPORTED THE ARREST OF SOME INDIVIDUALS IN BUSOGA (AREA AROUND JINJA TO THE EAST OF KAMPALA) WHO ARE SAID TO BELONG TO AN ORGANIZATION CALLED \"FORCE OBOTE BACK AGAIN\" (FOBA). GIVEN OBOTE\'S WIDESPREAD UNPOPULARITY, WE FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE ANY CREDIBLE ORGANIZATION WOULD CHOOSE SUCH A NAME, BUT MUSEVENI APPARENTLY TAKES THE THREAT SERIOUSLY ENOUGH TO HAVE MADE SOME RATHER CRANKY REMARKS TO HIS FIELD STAFF ABOUT THE PROBLEM. HOUDEK " "114","3/16/1986 8:54","86MOGADISHU2896","Embassy Mogadishu","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 160854Z MAR 86 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9986 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY ROME ","C O N F I D E N T I A L MOGADISHU 02896 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: MCAP, PINS, PREL, SO, LY, IZ, XF SUBJECT: LIBYAN AND IRAQI RECRUITING ATTRACTS SOMALI APPLICANTS 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. IN RECENT DAYS, FLIERS HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED BY THE LIBYAN EMBASSY AROUND THE CITY OF MOGADISHU WHICH SEEK RECRUITS FOR AN \"ALL-ARAB ARMY\". THE \"ARMY\" IS AIMED AT FIGHTING \"IMPERIALISM AND ZIONISM\" AND ON FREEING ARAB LANDS FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE ARABIAN GULF FROM FOREIGN DOMINATION. THE FLIERS TELL PROSPECTIVE APPLICANTS TO GO TO THE LIBYAN PEOPLE\'S BUREAU IN MOGADISHU, WHERE THEY WILL BE TREATED \"AS LIBYANS\". SIMILAR FLIERS ARE REPORTEDLY BEING PASSED AROUND BY THE IRAQI EMBASSY, AS WELL. THE LIBYAN FLIER IDENTIFIES AS PROSPECTIVE CANDIDATES THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE SOME TECHNICAL OR MILITARY TRAINING. - 3. THERE HAVE BEEN LARGE CROWDS OUTSIDE THE LIBYAN AND IRAQI MISSIONS HERE, LIKELY IN RESPONSE TO THE FLIERS. ON BOTH MARCH 12 AND 13 POLICE DISPERSED THE CROWDS, AND ON THE MORNING OF MARCH 13, THE MILITIA, WHICH IS ORGANIZED BY THE SINGLE POLITICAL PARTY HERE, WAS TAKING INTO CUSTODY THOSE PEOPLE WHO REMAINED HANGING AROUND THE LIBYAN MISSION. - 4. COMMENT: THE SOMALIS HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE GETTING ENOUGH RECRUITS TO MAN THEIR OWN ARMY, AND HAVE BEEN FORCED TO SEND PRESS GANGS PERI- ODICALLY AROUND THE CITY. THEY PROBABLY WILL LOOK ASKANCE AT SOMALIS RESPONDING FAVORABLY TO A FOR- EIGN MILITARY RECRUITMENT. SO FAR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS NOT CALLED IN EITHER THE LIBYANS OR THE IRAQIS TO COMPLAIN OF THESE RECRUITMENT EFFORTS. BRIDGES " "115","3/24/1986 10:29","86MOGADISHU3219","Embassy Mogadishu","SECRET","86MOGADISHU3124","P 241029Z MAR 86 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0186 ","S E C R E T MOGADISHU 03219 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, PINS, PREL, LY, IR, SO SUBJECT: IRANIAN AND LIBYAN TERRORISM 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. LIBYAN TERRORISM: EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR MEKKY (PROTECT SOURCE) TOLD ME MARCH 24 THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE RECENT LIBYAN PUBLIC RECRUITMENT DRIVE (MOGADISHU 3124) HAD RESULTED IN THE SUCCESSFUL RECRUITMENT OF ABOUT 40 SOMALIS, WHO LEFT MOGADISHU SUPPOSEDLY FOR DESTINATIONS IN THE GULF BUT ACTUALLY TO GO ON TO LIBYA FOR TRAINING. MEKKY\'S UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT QADHAFI WAS INTENDING TO PUT THESE AND OTHER FOREIGN RECRUITS INTO A KIND OF SUICIDE BATTA- LION TO BE TARGETTED AGAINST AMERICANS IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF OF SIDRA. (NOTE: WE WOULD APPRECITE RECEIVING ANY AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE LIBYAN IDEA BEHIND THE RECRUITMENT EFFORTS, WHICH WE GATHER WERE UNDERTAKEN BY THE LIBYANS AS FAR AFIELD AS AUSTRALIA.) MEKKY ADDED THAT EGYPTIAN INFORMATION WAS THAT OF THE 12 PRESENT MEMBERS OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE\'S BUREAU HERE, EIGHT WERE TERRORISTS. HIS FEELING WAS THAT THE LIBYANS MIGHT NOT INTEND ANY EARLY TERRORIST ACTION IN MOGADISHU, AND HE HOPED THAT THEY MIGHT BE DISSUADED FROM ACTION AGAINST HIS EMBASSY BY THE FACT THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE CHILDREN OF THE NUMBER ONE AND NUMBER TWO LIBYANS IN THE EGYPTIAN SCHOOL, PLUS THE FACT THAT A COUPLE OF THE LIBYANS HAD BEEN EDUCATED IN EGYPT. HOWEVER, HE CONTINUED, LIBYAN OFFICIALS WOULD PRESUMABLY CARRY OUT ORDERS, NO MATTER WHERE THEY HAD BEEN EDUCATED. HE SAID THAT IF THERE SHOULD BE ANY ATTACK ON HIS PEOPLE HERE, HE HAD ORDERED THAT THE LIBYAN CHILDREN BE BROUGHT FOR \"SAFEKEEPING\" DIRECT FROM THE EGYPTIAN SCHOOL TO THE EGYPTIAN CHANCERY. - 3. IRANIAN TERRORISM: MEKKY SHARED WITH ME A CAIRO REPORT THAT NORTH KOREAN INSTRUCTORS HAD BEEN CONDUCTING TERRORIST TRAINING AT A MILITARY INSTALLATION IN IRAN, AND THAT 40 SUCH IRANIAN TRAINEES, OF WHOM 11 WERE WOMEN, HAD LEFT TEHERAN EARLY ON THE MORNING OF JANUARY 15 BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR AN UNKNOWN DESTINA- TION. THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY HAD SHARED THIS INFORMA- TION WITH SOMALI SECURITY OFFICIALS ON MARCH 8; THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT ANY OF THE IRANIANS HAD COME TO SOMALIA. 4. COMMENT: RE PARA 2, THE SOMALI AUTHORITIES DID THEIR UTMOST TO COUNTER THE LIBYAN RECRUITMENT EFFORTS AND WE ARE SOMEWHAT DOUBTFUL AS MANY AS 40 RECRUITED SOMALIS HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY. NOR HAVE WE BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT AS MANY AS 8 OF THE 12 LIBYAN \"DIPLOMATS\" HERE ARE TERRORISTS. BRIDGES " "116","3/25/1986 21:56","86STATE92099","Secretary of State","CONFIDENTIAL","86BEIRUT1535","O 252156Z MAR 86 FM SECSTATE WASHDC INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 092099 FOLLOWING BEIRUT 1547 DTD 25 MAR SENT ACTION SESTATE, INFO DAMASCUS TEL AVIV TUNIS CAIRO RIYADH AMMAN ATHENS ROME PARIS LONDON, BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO: QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 01547 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, MOPS, LY, US SUBJ: CLAIM EMBASSY BEIRUT ATTACKED BECAUSE OF US-LIBYAN CLASHES REFTEL: BEIRUT 01535 (NOTAL) 1. CONYUDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT. 2. REUTERS OFFICE IN BEIRUT RECEIVED FOLLOWING TEXT ON MARCH 25: QUOTE IN REPLY TO U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA AND TO ASSERT THE PAN- ARAB ASPECT OF THE BATTLE, OUR FORCES SHELLED AT 4 P.M. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT, THE DEN OF ESPIONAGE AND CONSPIRACY FROM WHICH OUR ARAB PEOPLE IN LEBANON AND IN ALL PARTS OF THE THE ARAB WORLD SUFFER. IT WAS AN EXPRESSION OF WRATH OF THE ARAB MASSES AGAINST AMERICA AND OF DETERMINATION TO CONFRONT THE AMERICAN PRESENCE WITH ALL FORMS AND POTENTIAL AND TO ACT IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE ARAB MASSES AND REVOLUTION AND THE STRUGGLING LEADER MU\'AMMAR QADDHAFI. OUR FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO CONFRONT AMERICAN INTERESTS EVERYWHERE UNTIL THE PIRATES STOP THEIR INTRIGUES. VANGUARDS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARAB FORCES UNQUOTE 3. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO LOCAL MEDIA AT 4 P.M. A STALIN ORGAN BARRAGE OF ABOUT 40 KATUSHA ROCKETS LANDED IN THE DBAYE PORT AREA, ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS FROM THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. THE ROCKETS WERE HEARD BY EMBASSY OFFICERS BUT NOT SEEN, AS THE POINT OF IMPACT WAS NOT VISIBLE FROM EMBASSY COMPOUND. END COMMENT. BARTHOLOMEW UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD " "117","4/1/1986 10:56","86MOGADISHU3643","Embassy Mogadishu","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 011056Z APR 86 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0439 INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L MOGADISHU 03643 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, LY, SO SUBJECT: SOMALI ATTITUDE ON LIBYA 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. ON APRIL 1 MFA PERMANENT SECRETARY ADAN MET WITH AMBASSADOR BRIDGES AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT SIAD TO PRESENT SOMALI VIEWS ON THE RECENT U.S.-LIBYAN HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF OF SIDRA. AMBASSADOR NUR, STILL VISITING FROM WASHINGTON, AMERICAS DIRECTOR ELMI AND DCM WERE ALSO PRESENT. ADAN SAID THAT SOMALIA HAD JOINED THE COLLECTIVE ARAB LEAGUE POSITION ADOPTED AT TUNIS WHICH VIEWED U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA AS EXCESSIVE. THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, HAD REJECTED LIBYA\'S REQUEST FOR A SEPARATE SOMALI STATE- MENT CRITICAL OF THE U.S. TO BE ISSUED IN MOGADISHU. MOREOVER, THE MFA HAD INFORMED THE LIBYAN PEOPLE\'S BUREAU THAT THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT COUNTENANCE ANY RETALIATION AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL OR FACILITIES IN SOMALIA. THE LIBYANS WERE ASKED TO GIVE THEIR ASSURANCE THAT NO HOSTILE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST THE U.S. AND TO CONVEY THIS REQUEST TO TRIPOLI. ADAN SAID THAT THE LIBYAN PEOPLE\'S BUREAU HAD NOW PROVIDED THESE ASSURANCES TO THE MFA. 3. BRIDGES ASKED ADAN TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT SIAD OUR DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTION, BUT ALSO HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE SOMALI DECISION NOT TO ISSUE A SEPARATE STATEMENT AND FOR THE MFA DEMARCHE TO THE LIBYANS REGARDING RETALIATION. WE APPRECIATED THE EXCELLENT COOPERATION OF THE SOMALI SECURITY AUTHORITIES IN KEEPING CLOSE WATCH ON LIBYAN PERSONNEL IN SOMALIA. BRIDGES SAID HE BELIEVED THAT WE AND THE SOMALI AUTHORITIES FULLY AGREED THAT QADHAFI COULD NOT BE TRUSTED. WE WOULD THEREFORE LOOK TO CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION WITH SOMALI OFFICIALS ON THIS PROBLEM. 4. ADAN SUGGESTED THAT SOME COUNTRIES WERE TENDING TO LOOK AT WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN THE GULF OF SIDRA AS A CASE OF A POWERFUL COUNTRY TAKING A FORCEFUL STANCE AGAINST A SMALLER AND WEAKER ONE. BRIDGES SAID THAT WHILE UNDOUBTEDLY THE UNITED STATES WAS LARGER AND MORE POWERFUL THAN LIBYA, OUR ACTION WAS MOTIVATED BY OUR STRONG INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS IN THE FACE OF ANY COUNTRY\'S ILLEGAL CLAIMS, LARGE OR SMALL. BRIDGES REMINDED ADAN THAT WE HAD REACTED ONLY AFTER THE LIBYANS HAD FIRED SIX MISSILES AT OUR FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL HOURS. WHILE THE GULF OF SIDRA EXERCISES HAD ENDED, WE WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT LIBYA MIGHT SEEK TO ATTACK OUR PEOPLE OR FACILITIES ELSEWHERE. THE PROBLEM WAS COMPLICATED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE LIBYANS WOULD EMPLOY OTHERS, INCLUDING CONCEIVABLY SOMALIS, TO DO THEIR DIRTY WORK. AGAIN, WE WERE ANXIOUS TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SOMALI AUTHORITIES ON THIS. 5. AT THE END OF THE MEETING ADAN NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO DJIBOUTI FROM APRIL 2 THROUGH 6 TO ATTEND THE NEXT IGAAD (EAST AFRICA DROUGHT) MEETING, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS ROUTINE. BRIDGES " "118","4/2/1986 11:46","86DAMASCUS2090","Embassy Damascus","SECRET","86STATE98378","O 021146Z APR 86 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4824 ","S E C R E T DAMASCUS 02090 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT ADDED PARA 7) TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O.12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, SY SUBJECT: LIBYAN SUPPORTED TERRORISM REF: STATE 98378 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. FOLLOWING IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM THREAT OF LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM IN THE WAKE OF THE MARCH 24-25 EVENTS IN THE GULF OF SIDRA, PER REFTEL. 3. IN OUR VIEW, QADHAFI\'S COFFERS WILL PROBABLY BE EVEN MORE OPEN TO ABU NIDAL AND SOME OF THE DAMASCUS- BASED PALESTINIANS THAN PREVIOUSLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS IN THE GULF OF SIDRA. WHETHER THESE GROUPS WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN TERRORISM FOR THIS REASON IS DIFFICULT TO SAY. THEY HAVE THEIR OWN AGENDA, WOULD OPERATE WITH OR WITHOUT QADHAFI, AND ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY CONCERNED WITH LIBYAN ISSUES SUCH AS THE GULF OF SIDRA PER SE. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO JUDGE WHETHER LIBYANS WILL THEMSELVES BECOME MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. QADHAFI IS PROBABLY NOW MOTIVATED TO PAY A HANDSOME PRICE TO HIRED KILLERS TO GET AT AMERICANS, BUT HE WILL PRESUMABLY STILL BE CONCERNED THAT ACCOUNTABILITY NOT BE DIRECTLY TRACEABLE TO HIM. 4. WHEN ABU NIDAL COMMITS HIS NEXT OUTRAGE, WE THINK IT VERY LIKELY HE WILL CITE THE EVENTS IN THE GULF OF SIDRA AS AN EXCUSE. OTHER DAMASCUS- BASED PALESTINIAN GROUPS, MOST OF WHICH DO NOT TARGET U.S. INTERESTS, ARE LESS LIKELY TO DO SO. 5. SYRIA ALLOWS ABU NIDAL TO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE IN SYRIA AND IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED LEBANON. RECENT PUBLICITY GIVEN TO ITS CONNECTION TO ABU NIDAL HAS BEEN A CAUSE OF SOME EMBARRASSMENT, BUT NOT YET SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE SYRIA TO CLOSE THE DOOR TO ABU NIDAL. HOW MUCH SUPPORT SYRIA GIVES ABU NIDAL IS DIFFICULT TO SAY. THE SYRIAN STYLE IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM QADHAFI\'S--MORE SUBTLE, LESS PUBLIC, LESS SELF-CONGRATULATING--AND THE SYRIAN FOCUS IS NARROWER, MORE PURELY LOCAL AND LESS IDEOLOGICAL. 6. AS WAS EVIDENT IN THE MARCH 27 DEMONSTRATION IN DAMASCUS AGAINST AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE GULF OF SIDRA, SYRIAN POLICY IS TO PROTECT U.S. FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL IN SYRIA. SYRIA WANTS TO MAINTAIN DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. AND DOES NOT PERCEIVE AN INTEREST IN BEING SEEN TO DO HARM AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS HERE. DAMASCUS REMAINS ONE OF THE MORE SECURE CITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ALTHOUGH IT TOO HAS SUFFERED FROM TERRORISM (MORE BOMBS HAVE EXPLODED HERE IN THE LAST NINE MONTHS THAN IN AMMAN, FOR EXAMPLE). 7. THERE REMAINS THE POSSIBILITY THAT LIBYA MAY ATTEMPT TO STAGE AN ATTACK AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL OR FACILITIES IN DAMASCUS WITHOUT SYRIAN KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVAL. THERE ARE TWO FACTORS WHICH MITIGATE THIS: THE VIGILANCE OF THE SYRIAN SECURITY SERVICES, AND QADHAFI\'S CONCERN ABOUT THE NEGATIVE EFFECT SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD HAVE ON SYRIAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS. 8. EXCEPT FOR SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SA-5 SYSTEM, THE SYRIANS PROBABLY DERIVE SATISFACTION FROM THE GULF OF SIDRA INCIDENT. IT BROUGHT ARABS TOGETHER AGAINST THE U.S., DEFLECTED ARAB LEAGUE ATTENTION FROM THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, AND PRODUCED THE APPEARANCE OF A CLOSER USSR TIE TO THE ARABS. IT WILL NOT MAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON ALREADY COOL BILATERAL U.S.-SYRIAN TIES, EXCEPT TO ADD SOMEWHAT TO THE PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. AS ANTI-ARAB. EAGLETON " "119","4/11/1986 17:14","86MADRID4272","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","86MADRID3703\|86MADRID3838","O 111714Z APR 86 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7698 NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE INFO EUROPEAN POLADS COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY TUNIS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 04272 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MARR, SP, LY SUBJECT: SPAIN RECALLS AMBASSADOR FROM LIBYA IN - RESPONSE TO QADHAFI\'S THREATS REF: A) MADRID 3838, B) MADRID 3703 1. (U) THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED APRIL 10 THAT IT IS \"RECALLING\" ITS AMBASSADOR TO TRIPOLI FOLLOWING QADHAFI\'S RENEWED THREAT THE DAY BEFORE TO ATTACK U.S. FACILITIES IN SPAIN. 2. (C) THE MFA DESK OFFICER FOR LIBYA, JOSE MARIA VALDEMORO, TELLS US THAT AMB. PEIDRO WAS IN FACT ALREADY HERE ON VACATION WHEN THE DECISION TO RECALL HIM WAS TAKEN. MFA WILL RETAIN HIM \"A FEW EXTRA DAYS\" TO DRIVE HOME ITS MESSAGE. NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON WHEN HE MAY RETURN TO LIBYA. IN THE ABSENCE OF LIBYAN CHARGE NAKAA, THE MINISTRY CONVOKED THE PEOPLES\' BUREAU\'S NUMBER TWO ON APRIL 9 TO RECEIVE A PROTEST. IN REJECTING QADHAFI\'S THREATS, MFA NOTED THAT U.S. FACILITIES IN SPAIN ARE GOVERNED BY A BILATERAL ACCORD WHICH WOULD PREVENT THEIR USE AGAINST LIBYA. THE LIBYAN DIPLOMAT RESPONDED THAT HIS COUNTRY HAS EXPERIENCE OF U.S. BASES FROM KING IDRIS\' DAYS; THE U.S. DID NOT ASK PERMISSION FOR PROHIBITED MISSIONS THEN AND WOULD NOT DO SO IN THE CASE OF SPAIN. THE PEOPLES\' BUREAU PRESS SPOKESMAN HAS TRIED TO DOWNPLAY QADHAFI\'S THREATS, INSISTING THAT THEY ARE DIRECTED AGAINST AMERICAN BASES AND NOT SPANIARDS. THIS LINE HAS NOT PROVED CONVINCING, HOWEVER, SINCE REPORTERS HAVE NOTED THAT GOS FORCES SHARE THE BASES USED BY THE UNITED STATES. - 3. (C) COMMENT. THE TIMING OF QADHAFI\'S RENEWED THREAT WAS SOMETHING OF A PERSONAL EMBARRASSMENT FOR FOREIGN MINISTER ORDONEZ. THE LATTER HAD APPEARED IN CTFGRESS THAT SAME DAY TO ANSWER AN INTERPELLATION ABOUT THE LIBYAN MENACE TO SPAIN. ORDONEZ REPORTED THAT THE LIBYAN CHARGE HAD EXPRESSED REGRET OVER AN EARLIER QADHAFI THREAT, WHICH THE CHARGE ALLEGED HAD BEEN DISTORTED, OVERPLAYED AND TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT. THIS EPISODE HAS AGAIN DRIVEN HOME TO THE SPANISH THAT QADHAFI IS MERCURIAL AND HIS GOVERNMENT\'S ASSURANCES ARE UNRELIABLE. THAT IS NOT TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE SPANISH HAVE CONCLUDED THE ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH QADHAFI IS TO CONFRONT HIM. THE PREVAILING ATTITUDE STILL SEEMS TO BE THAT IT IS BEST NOT TO ATTRACT QADHAFI\'S ANGER. ENDERS " "120","4/11/1986 23:07","86BOGOTA5231","Embassy Bogota","CONFIDENTIAL","86BOGOTA5157","P 112307Z APR 86 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7488 INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY PANAMA AMEMBASSY QUITO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 05231 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINS, PTER, CO SUBJECT: CONTINUED FARC EXTORTION REF: BOGOTA 5157 1. (U) THE COLOMBIAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (FARC) CONTINUE TO EMPLOY EXTORTION AS A SOURCE OF INCOME. ACCORDING TO AN APRIL 11 STORY IN BOGOTA DAILY \"EL SIGLO,\" GUILLERMO OCAMPO OSPINA, FORMER CONSERVATIVE GOVERNOR OF CALDAS DEPARTMENT, DECLARED THAT HE WAS A RENEWED VICTIM OF THE FARC BEFORE THE MARCH 9 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION. HIS FIRST ENCOUNTER OCCURRED A YEAR AGO WHEN HE HAD TO RANSOM HIS KIDNAPPED BROTHER FROM THE FARC. 2. (U) THE FARC, WHO ACCOSTED OCAMPO IN EASTERN CALDAS, REPORTEDLY DEMANDED FROM HIM MONTHLY PAYMENTS OF 500,000 PESOS (2,732 DOLLARS). OCAMPO QUESTIONED WHY THE GUERRILLAS WERE EMPLOYING EXTORTION WHEN THEY WERE PARTIES TO THE PEACE PROCESS THROUGH THE UNION PATRIOTICA (UP). THE FARC MEMBERS RESPONDED THE UP WAS A POLITICAL FRONT THAT HAD NO INFLUENCE ON GUERRILLA CONDUCT. OCAMPO SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE WITH ALBERTO ROJAS PUYO, COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER OF THE PEACE COMMISSION, WITH NO APPARENT RESULT, AND ATTEMPTED WITHOUT SUCCESS TO CONTACT BRAULIO HERRERA, THE FARC MEMBER OF THE PEACE COMMISSION. 3. (C) COMMENT: THIS INCIDENT ILLUSTRATES THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE COLOMBIAN PEACE PROCESS WHICH FAVOR SUCH ACTIONS BY THE FARC. THE FARC CAN EITHER ATTRIBUTE THE EXTORTION TO ANOTHER GUERRILLA GROUP OR ALLEGEDLY DISCIPLINE ITS DISOBEDIENT UNIT. IN EITHER CIRCUMSTANCE, THE FARC CAN BOLSTER ITS IMAGE, AND THAT OF THE UP, AS FAITHFUL ADHERENTS TO THE PEACE PROCESS. AS IN ITS UPCOMING DEALINGS WITH THE PEACE COMMISSION (SEE REFTEL), THE FARC CAN CULTIVATE SUCH A POSITIVE IMAGE WHILE PROCEEDING WITH BUSINESS AS USUAL. GILLESPIE## " "121","4/17/1986 10:37","86MOGADISHU4325","Embassy Mogadishu","SECRET","86MOGADISHU4319","O 171037Z APR 86 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0796 ","S E C R E T MOGADISHU 04325 TERREP FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, SO, LY SUBJECT: SOMALI WARNING TO LIBYANS ON TERRORISM 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. WE REPORTED EARLIER THAT THE SOMALIS HAD INFORMED US THAT THEY HAD WARNED THE HEAD OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE\'S BUREAU AGAINST UNDERTAKING ANY ACTION AGAINST AMERICANS IN SOMALIA. I HAVE JUST HAD ADDITIONAL CONFIRMATION OF THIS FROM EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR MEKKY (PROTECT SOURCE), WHO SAYS THAT MFA MINISTER OF STATE HAMOUD TOLD HIM TWO DAYS BEFORE HAMOUD\'S CURRENT TRIP TO THE NEW DELHI NAM MEETING THAT HE, HAMOUD, HAD CALLED IN THE HEAD OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE\'S BUREAU. - 3. HAMOUD TOLD MEKKY THAT HE HAD TOLD THE LIBYAN THAT THE SOMALIS DID NOT LIKE THE CHARGES BEING EXCHANGED BETWEEN TRIPOLI AND WASHINGTON. THE LIBYANS SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT IT HAD TAKEN THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT A LONG TIME TO AGREE TO RESUME RELATIONS WITH LIBYA. IN THIS CONNECTION, HAMOUD SAID HE WANTED TO WARN THE LIBYANS AGAINST ANY ACTION AGAINST AMERICANS OR AMERICAN PROPERTY. IN REPLY, THE LIBYAN ASSURED HAMOUD THAT NO SUCH ACTION WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AS LONG AS HE REMAINED HEAD OF THE PEOPLE\'S BUREAU. 4. I THANKED AMBASSADOR MEKKY FOR THIS INFORMATION, WHICH I SAID CORRESPONDED WITH WHAT THE SOMALIS HAD TOLD US. I ADDED THAT (A) LIBYAN PROMISES WERE OF COURSE WORTH NOTHING, AND (B) ANY ACTION AGAINST US HERE WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT BE TAKEN BY THE LIBYANS IN PERSON, AS THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD IN FACT JUST WARNED ME (MOGADISHU 4319). BRIDGES " "122","5/1/1986 0:42","86STATE135716","Secretary of State","SECRET","","O 010042Z MAY 86 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE ","S E C R E T STATE 135716 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, PTER, LY SUBJECT: FACT SHEET: LIBYAN RELATED TERRORIST INCIDENTS (S/S 8613659) 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT 2. TO: THE SECRETARY FROM: NEA - RICHARD W. MURPHY SUBJECT - RECENT LIBYA RELATED TERRORIST INCIDENTS FOR YOUR USE AT THE TOKYO SUMMIT, THIS CABLE PROVIDES TWO LISTS OF LIBYA RELATED TERRORIST INCIDENTS. THE FIRST, AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE LIST IS A CHRONOLOGY OF ALL TERRORIST INCIDENTS WHERE WE HAVE A REASON TO BELIEVE THERE IS A LIBYAN CONNECTION, OR WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT IN RETALIATION FOR OUR STRIKE ON TRIPOLI. THE SECOND, SHORTER LIST EXTRACTS ONLY THOSE INCIDENTS FOR WHICH WE HAVE CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT OR WHERE CREDIBLE THIRD PARTIES HAVE TAKEN ACTION AGAINST LIBYA.. I. LIBYA-RELATED TERRORIST INCIDENTS -- APRIL 25: A STAFF MEMBER AT THE US EMBASSY IN SANAA WAS SHOT NEAR HIS RESIDENCE BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS. ALTHOUGH NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE HAS SO FAR BEEN OBTAINED, LIBYA REMAINS THE PRIME SUSPECT IN THE ATTACK. -- APRIL 24: A BOMB RIPPED THROUGH THE LONDON OFFICES OF BRITISH AIRWAYS, CAUSING DAMAGE BUT NO INJURIES. NO CREDIBLE CLAIMS FOR THE ATTACK WERE RECEIVED; HOWEVER, THERE WAS PRESS SPECULATIONS ABOUT LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT BECAUSE OF EARLIER LIBYAN WARNINGS THAT \"THE CIA\" WAS PLANNING BOMBING ATTACKS IN EUROPE. -- APRIL 19: A BOMB EXPLODED AT A MORMON CHURCH IN CARACAS APRIL 19, SERIOUSLY INJURING THE SUSPECTED PERPETRATOR. THE BOMBING IS BELIEVED TO BE RELATED TO THE US ATTACK ON LIBYA. -- APRIL 18: FOUR LIBYANS WERE ARRESTED ATTEMPTING TO ATTACK THE US AIR FORCE OFFICERS\' CLUB IN ANKARA. TWO OF THE SUSPECTS WERE APPROACHING THE CLUB WITH A BAG FILLED WITH GRENADES AND EXPLOSIVES AT THE TIME OF THEIR ARREST. IN ISTANBUL, A BOMB PLANTED OUTSIDE A TURKISH-AMERICAN BANK WAS DISARMED BY TURKISH SECURITY FORCES. -- APRIL 18: A VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE US EMBASSY IN ACCRA, GHANA, RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF ONE POLICEMAN. -- APRIL 17: THE BODIES OF THREE HOSTAGES, TWO BRITONS AND AN AMERICAN, WERE FOUND IN THE MOUNTAINS EAST OF BEIRUT. ON APRIL 18, FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE PUBLICLY LINKED LIBYA TO THE MURDER OF THE TWO BRITISH HOSTAGES. -- APRIL 17: FOUR ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES WERE FIRED AT THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR\'S RESIDENCE IN WEST BEIRUT. THE OMAR AL-MUKHTAR, A LIBYAN-NAMED GROUP, CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE ATTACK. -- APRIL 16: THE ITALIAN-BRITISH ASSOCIATION IN BOLOGNA WAS FIRE-BOMBED. A CALLER FOR THE \"ARMED COMMUNIST FRONT,\" AN UNKWOWN GROUP, SAID THE ATTACK WAS IN RESPONSE TO BRITAINS\'S ASSISTANCE IN THE ATTACK ON LIBYA. -- APRIL 16: AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW BOMBS AT BOTH THE MARINE HOUSE AND AT THE PERSONAL VEHICLE OF A USDAO EMPLOYEE IN TUNIS. -- APRIL 15: A COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER AT EMBASSY KHARTOUM WAS SHOT AND CRITICALLY WOUNDED IN THE HEAD WHILE DRIVING HOME. -- APRIL 9: TWO LIBYAN DIPLOMATS WERE EXPELLED FROM THE FRG FOR INVOLVEMENT IN A PLAN TO ATTACK US FACILITIES IN MUNICH. -- APRIL 5: A WEST BERLIN DISCO FREQUENTED BY US SERVICEMEN WAS BOMBED. THE OPERATION WAS PLANNED AND DIRECTED BY LIBYAN DIPLOMATS IN EAST BERLIN. -- EARLY APRIL: TWO LIBYAN DIPLOMATS EXPELLED BY THE FRENCH FOR INVOLVEMENT IN A PLAN TO ATTACK US EMBASSY PARIS. FRANCE ALSO EXPELLED TWO OTHER ARAB NATIONALS WORKING FOR LIBYAN FOR INVOLVEMENT IN A SEPARATE ANTI-US PLOT. -- MARCH 28: THE LIBYAN-NAMED OMAR AL MUKHTAR GROUP CLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY FOR ROCKET ATTACK AGAINST US EMBASSY COMPOUND IN WEST BEIRUT. -- FEBRUARY 17: THE OWNER OF AN ANTI-LIBYAN RADIO STATION WAS SHOT BY SUSPECTED LIBYAN AGENTS IN ROME. -- DECEMBER 27, 1985: ABU NIDAL ATTACKS AIRPORTS IN VIENNA AND ROME; PASSPORTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE LINK THE ATTACKS TO LIBYA. -- NOVEMBER 18, 1985: EGYPTIAN BUSINESSMAN, REPORTEDLY AN ANTI-QADHAFI EXILE, ASSASSINATED IN ATHENS. -- NOVEMBER 23, 1985: LIBYAN COMPLICITY STRONGLY SUSPECTED IN HIJACKING OF EGYPTIAN AIRLINER ENROUTE FROM ATHENS TO CAIRO. -- OCTOBER 6, 1985: IN GREECE, LIBYAN OPPOSITIONIST TOUSSEF AKEILA WAS SHOT AND BADLY WOUNDED. HIS ASSAILANT REMAINS AT LARGE. -- AUGUST 6, 1985: EGYPT--TWO EGYPTIANS ARRESTED IN PLOT TO ASSASSINATE GHAYTH SA\'ID AL-MARBURK. LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE SAID TO BE RESPONSIBLE. -- APRIL 23, 1985: LIBYAN GUNMAN KILL A MOROCCAN IN THE FRG. THE KILLER, ARRESTED AT SCENE, MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6 MURDER. -- APRIL 6, 1985: A LIBYAN GUNMAN ARRESTED AFTER KILLING AN ANTI-QADHAFI LIBYAN STUDENT AND WOUNDING TWO GERMAN PASSERBY IN BONN. APRIL 2, 1985 A LIBYAN BUSINESSMAN ASSASSINATED IN NICOSIA BY AN UNIDENTIFIED GUNMAN. II. TERRORIST INCIDENTS WITH CONFIRMED LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT -- APRIL 18: FOUR LIBYANS WERE ARRESTED ATTEMPTING TO ATTACK THE US AIR FORCE OFFICERS\' CLUB IN ANKARA. TWO OF THE SUSPECTS WERE APPROACHING THE CLUB WITH A BAG FILLED WITH GRENADES AND EXPLOSIVES AT THE TIME OF THEIR ARREST. IN ISTANBUL, A BOMB PLANTED OUTSIDE A TURKISH-AMERICAN BANK WAS DISARMED BY TURKISH SECURITY FORCES. -- APRIL 17: THE BODIES OF THREE HOSTAGES, TWO BRITONS AND AN AMERICAN, WERE FOUND IN THE MOUNTAINS EAST OF BEIRUT. ON APRIL 18, FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE PUBLICLY LINKED LIBYA TO THE MURDER OF THE TWO BRITISH HOSTAGES. -- APRIL 15: A COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER AT EMBASSY KHARTOUM WAS SHOT AND CRITICALLY WOUNDED IN THE HEAD WHILE DRIVING HOME. -- APRIL 5: A WEST BERLIN DISCO FREQUENTED BY US SERVICEMEN WAS BOMBED. THE OPERATION WAS PLANNED AND DIRECTED BY LIBYAN DIPLOMATS IN EAST BERLIN. -- EARLY APRIL: TWO LIBYAN DIPLOMATS EXPELLED BY THE FRENCH FOR INVOLVEMENT IN A PLAN TO ATTACK US EMBASSY PARIS. FRANCE ALSO EXPELLED TWO OTHER ARAB NATIONALS WORKING FOR LIBYAN FOR INVOLVEMENT IN A SEPARATE ANTI-US PLOT. -- DECEMBER 27, 1985: ABU NIDAL ATTACKS AIRPORTS IN VIENNA AND ROME; PASSPORTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE LINK THE ATTACKS TO LIBYA. DRAFTED BY: NEA/RA:SAOKI:INR/TNA:SUZANNE MCCORMICK APPROVED BY:NEA:ARAPHEL CLEARANCES: NEA/RA:WCHAMBERLIN S/CT:DLONG NEA/AFN:RDANKERT INR/TNA:MSTEINITZ DS/TAD:SSTARUFFER WHITEHEAD SECRET " "123","5/8/1986 11:50","86BAGHDAD1907","Embassy Baghdad","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 081150Z MAY 86 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 736 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 1907 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, IZ, IR, MOPS SUBJECT: IRAQI AIR FORCE BOMBS TEHRAN REFINERY 1. (U) AS REPORTED THE RAQI AIR FORCE HAS BOMBED THE TEHRAN OIL REFINERY MAY 7. MILITARY COMMUNIQUE 2216 RELEASED MAY 8 SAYS \"GROUPS OF AIRCRAFT\" FLEW TO TEHRAN AND STRUCK THE CHOSEN TARGETS: THE REFINERY\'S MAIN NOTHERN DISTILLING TOWER, AND THE CENTRAL BOILERS AND COOLING TOWER COMPLEX. THZ IRAQI AIR FORCE REPORTEDLY USED AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IN AUGUST 1982 TO PLAN THE RAID, AND THE LOCAL PAPERS MAY 8 PRINT THESE PICTURES SIDE BY SIDE WITH PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE RECENT DESTRUCTION. TAKEN FROM AN ANGLE (DIRECTLY OVERHEAD), ALL THAT IS DISCERNIBLE ARE TWO COLUMNS OF BILLOWING BLACK SMOKE; IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHAT WAS AND WASNOT HIT. 2. (U) IN A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT, AIR FORCE COMMANDER HAMID SHABAN BOASTED THAT THE BOMBING WAS \"THE FIRST OPERATION OF THIS TYPE IN ARAB HISTORY,\" BUT DID NOT ELABORATE. HE DECCARED THE AIR FORCE READY TO STRIKE THE IRANIANS WHERE AND WHEN THE PRESIDENT CHOOSES. 3. (U) WE NOTE WIRE SERVICE REPORTS FROM TEHRAN THAT INDICATE ONLY ONE BOMB WAS DROPPED, AND THAT ON A TANK FARM. IRAQI NEWSPAPERS, CONVERSELY, ARE CLAIMING \"THE REFINERY WAS REDUCED TO ASHES\" (BAGHDAD OBSERVER), \"THE REFINERY IS NOW DEBRIS AND WRECKAGE\" (QADISIYA), OR SIMPLY \"DESTROYSD\" (THAWRA). 4. (C) COMMENT: THIS ATTACK IS IN LINE WITH RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER THAT IRAQ INTENDS TO TAKE THE WAR TO THE ENEMY. AFTER A SIMILAR STRIKE AT THE ISFAHAN REFINERY MARCH 13 THE IRAQI MEDIA ALSO MADE SWEEPING CLAIMS, ALTHOUGH ULTIMATELY THE RAID WAS SHOWN TO BE LESS THAN EFFECTIVE. THIS AGAIN MAY BE THE CASE. WE CANNOT DISCERN EXACTLY WHAT SHABAN WAS REFERRING TO IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PRESIDENT, OTHER THAN, PERHAPS, MID-AIR RE- FUELING OF THE ATTACK AIRCRAFT. WHAT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IS WHETHER THE IRAQIS FOLLOW THIS RAID UP WITH FURTHER STRIKES AGAINST REFINERIES OR OTHER INSTALLATIONS IN OR ADJACENT TO TEHRAN. MOST LIKELY THE RAID IS MEANT TO GIVE THE IRAQI PUBLIC A PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST, SINCE THE IRAQIS CONSISTENTLY FAIL TO EMPLOY THE AIR FORCE IN A SUSTAINED MANNER AGAINST STRATEGIC ECONOMIC TARGETS. THE IRANIANS ARE UNLIKELY TO RETALIATE IN KIND FOR THIS ONE STRIKE, BUT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE TO HIT BAGHDAD IF THE IRAQIS KEEP IT UP.THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WILL BE WARY OF INSTIGATING A POLICY OF STRIKES AT TEHRAN, SINCE THE CONSEQUENCE SURELY WILL BE A SPATE OF DEMORALIZING SCUD MISSLE ATTACKS ON BAGHDAD. NEWTON " "124","5/12/1986 17:58","86MADRID5480","Embassy Madrid","SECRET","86MADRID5418\|86MADRID5425\|86MADRID5426","O 121758Z MAY 86 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8202 EC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY TUNIS ","S E C R E T MADRID 05480 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, PINR, PREL, SP, LY SUBJECT: QADHAFI RETALIATES AGAINST SPANISH EXPULSIONS REF: A) MADRID 5426, B) MADRID 5425, C) MADRID 5418 1. (C) LIBYA MAY 12 RESPONDED TO FRIDAY\'S EXPULSION OF ITS CONSUL GENERAL, CHARGED WITH PASSING FUNDS TO A SPANISH ARMY COLONEL ON THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC RIGHT, BY PNG\'ING THE SPANISH COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL COUNSELORS IN TRIPOLI. MFA\'S SUBDIRECTOR GENERAL FOR NORTH AFRICA TELLS US THAT THE GOS WILL NOT RETALIATE SPECIFICALLY FOR THESE EXPULSIONS; AS INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE INTO THE LIBYAN ACTIVITIES HERE, HOWEVER, MORE EXPULSIONS ARE QUITE POSSIBLE. 2. (U) AFTER THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED, WE RECEIVED A WIRE SERVICE REPORT QUOTING INTERIOR MINISTER BARRIONUEVO SAYING THAT SPAIN DID NOT PLAN ADDITIONAL LIBYAN EXPULSIONS. 3. (C) COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHERE THIS SERIES OF EXPULSIONS AND REPRISALS IS GOING TO TAKE SPANISH- LIBYAN RELATIONS. THE GOS IS DRIVEN BY TWO MUTUALLY- EXCLUSIVE DESIRES. ON THE ONE HAND, IN THIS ELECTORAL PERIOD IT WANTS TO DISCREDIT THE FAR RIGHT (WHICH IT HAS DONE BY PUBLICIZING THE COLONEL\'S CONNECTION TO QADHAFI - REF C), AND SHOW IT IS EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM (WHICH IT DID BY BAGGING THE 10-MAN \"CALL OF JESUS CHRIST\" GROUP - REF A). AT THE SAME TIME THE GOS WANTS TO AVOID BECOMING A PRINCIPAL TARGET FOR QADHAFI BY PERSERVING AS MUCH OF A RELATIONSHIP AS POSSIBLE. FOREIGN MINISTER ORDONEZ PLAYED TO THE SECOND LINE THIS WEEKEND WHEN HE REFUSED TO COMMENT ON LIBYAN ACTIVITIES HERE, SAYING \"I DON\'T WANT TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE A STATE OF RELATIONS WHICH IS PASSING THROUGH A DELICATE MOMENT.\" WE UNDERSTAND FROM OUR MFA SOURCE THAT SENIOR MINISTRY OFFICIALS MET TODAY TO DECIDE HOW TO REACT TO LIBYA\'S RETALIATION (WHICH LEAVES THE GOS EMBASSY IN TRIPOLI WITH ONLY 3 DIPLOMATS). THE DECISION TO DO NOTHING IS CONSISTENT WITH THE MINISTRY\'S LINE -- TAKEN PUBLICLY THIS WEEKEND -- THAT IT DOES NOT WANT TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH TRIPOLI. THIS STRATEGY IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF QADHAFI PLAYS ALONG. ENDERS " "125","5/27/1986 11:35","86DAMASCUS3266","Embassy Damascus","CONFIDENTIAL","86STATE165238","R 271135Z MAY 86 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5472 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 03266 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, PREL, SY, LE, IS SUBJ: TALKING ABOUT ABU NIDAL REF: STATE 165238 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT 2. THE RECENT INSTRUCTION TO ATHENS CONCERNING ABU NIDAL ACTIVITIES IN SYRIA PROMPTS US TO SUGGEST SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE USE IN DISCUSSING THIS DIFFICULT SUBJECT WITH FRIENDS AND ALLIES. 3. WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE HERE OF CONTACTS BY ABU NIDAL REPRESENTATIVES WITH SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE OR WITH ABU NIDAL OPERATIVES WHO PASS THROUGH SYRIA, SO IT IS DIFFICULT TO SUGGEST THAT THE TWO OFFICES HERE ACT AS A BASE OF SUPPORT FOR ABU NIDAL OPERATIONS. 4. HOWEVER, IN TWO OTHER IMPORTANT WAYS, ABU NIDAL FIGURES IN DAMASCUS SEEM TO WORK HAND IN GLOVE WITH THE MAIN BODY OF THIS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN LIBYA. FIRST, LOCAL EUROPEAN EMBASSIES IN DAMASCUS HAVE RECEIVED VISITS OF LOCAL ABU NIDAL OFFICIALS IN THE AFTERMATH OF ATROCITIES IN AUSTRIA, ITALY, FRANCE AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE. THE LINE IS INVARIABLY THE SAME, VERY SOFTLY BUT FIRMLY SUGGEST THAT THE DEATHS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE IS REGRETTABLE BUT THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION HAS EVERY RIGHT TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTIVITIES AGAINST ISRAELI TARGETS. THEN, IN SOME VERY CAREFUL, INDIRECT SENTENCES, THE OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID FUTURE OPERATIONS OF THIS SORT BY REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS. NO TERMS HAVE BEEN SET IN THE INSTANCES WE KNOW OF AND EXPLICIT OFFERS OF NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MADE. INSTEAD, THE DOOR IS OPENED. IT IS INTERESTING BY-PRODUCT, AND MAYBE A COINCIDENTAL ONE, THAT WITH ABU NIDAL REPS IN DAMASCUS EUROPEANS INVARIABLY ASK SYRIA TO INTERVENE WITH ABU NIDAL AND HELP THEM RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE PRESENCE OF THESE ABU NIDAL OFFICES IN DAMASCUS, THEREFORE, SERVES TO SUBTLY ENHANCE THE OPPORTUNITIES SYRIA HAS TO PLAY A DIPLOMATIC ROLE. 5. THE OTHER FUNCTION OF THESE OFFICES IS INDEED CULTURAL AND INFORMATIONAL, AS PRESIDENT ASAD HAS CLAIMED, AND IT CONSISTS OF ABU NIDAL REPS HANGING OUT IN LOCAL HOTELS AND COLLARING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND OFFICIALS. INTERVIEWS ARE OFFERED IN THE BIQA\', ALONG WITH ESCORTS AND GUARANTEES OF SAFETY. ONE CBS CREW VISITING DAMASCUS IN THE PAST WEEK SPOKE QUITE FRANKLY OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN THE SHERATON ALONG THESE LINES AND SAID THAT IF AN APPROPRIATE INTERVIEW WERE ARRANGED, THAT IS WITH AN APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL, CBS WOULD TAKE ITS CAMERA CREW IMMEDIATELY. HOWEVER, SYRIANS DO NOT NECESSARILY APPROVE THESE CONTACTS BY ABU NIDAL REPRESENTATIVES, AND HAVE ACTED QUITE HARSHLY AGAINST SOME JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE TRIED TO FOLLOW THEM UP, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT SYRIA PROVIDES ABU NIDAL WITH A PULPIT AND A STAGE WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REPRODUCE ELSEWHERE. RANSOM " "126","6/20/1986 11:02","86DAMASCUS3747","Embassy Damascus","CONFIDENTIAL","86DAMASCUS3628","O 201102Z JUN 86 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5703 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY ARAB-ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY AMCONSUL JEDDAH AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 03747 SIPDIS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PTER, ECON, SY, IR, LE, IZ, IS SUBJECT: SYRIA AND IRAN ON LEBANON: WHO THREATENS WHOM? REF: DAMASCUS 3628 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: IN ITS PRESENT SPARRING WITH IRAN, SYRIA PROBABLY DOES NOT HOLD A STRONG LEBANON CARD. IRAN NOW VIES WITH ISRAEL AS THE SECOND-MOST INFLUENTIAL FOREIGN POWER IN LEBANON, WHERE SHI\'A FUNDAMENTALISM, NATURALLY ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN, HAS BECOME WELL-INGRAINED. SYRIA COULD CAUSE IRAN SHORT-TERM DIFFICULTIES BY TERMINATING THE IRANIAN PRESENCE IN BA\'LBAKK, AND IT COULD AT GREAT COST ATTACK HIZBALLAH (JUST AS IT COULD THEORETICALLY ATTACK THE MARONITES). HOWEVER, TO DO SO WOULD NOT ONLY BE A DEPARTURE FROM SYRIA\'S POST-1978 POLICY OF KEEPING COSTS DOWN IN LEBANON, IT WOULD RISK CHANGING THE SHI\'A INTO ACTIVE ANTAGONISTS AGAINST SYRIA. THIS POTENTIALLY WOULD BE A NIGHTMARE FOR SYRIA, BOTH IN LEBANON AND WITHIN SYRIA ITSELF. END SUMMARY. 3. EVENTS SURROUNDING THE FAILURE OF THE IRAQI-SYRIA BORDER MEETING SUGGEST THAT THE IRAN-SYRIA RELATIONSHIP HAS SURVIVED A ROCKY PERIOD. THE PRINCIPAL IRRITANTS WERE SYRIA\'S ECONOMIC NEED AND THE TWO COUNTRIES\' SHARPLY DIVERGENT GOALS IN LEBANON. IF THE RELATIONSHIP SEEMS FOR THE MOMENT TO HAVE GONE BACK TO \"NORMAL,\" IT IS EVIDENTLY BECAUSE THE IRANIANS HAVE GIVEN THE SYRIANS TO BELIEVE THAT OIL SUPPLY WILL RESUME WITHOUT SERIOUS DEMAND FOR PAYMENT EITHER FOR PRESENT OR PAST SHIPMENTS. BUT WHERE DOES LEBANON FIT INTO THE EQUATION? IT SEEMS AXIOMATIC THAT FUNDAMENTALIST IRAN AND SECULAR SYRIA ARE ON A LONG-TERM COLLISION COURSE IN LEBANON AND THAT THEY HAVE NOT ALTERED THEIR GOALS IN LEBANON, AND WILL NOT DO SO. IN THE MOST RECENT SPARRING, THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER IRAN FELT CONSTRAINED BY THE PROSPECT OF A SYRIAN CLAMPDOWN AGAINST HIZBALLAH, OR--TO THE CONTRARY, AS SOME PRESS REPORTS HAVE SUGGESTED--WHETHER SYRIA FELT ALARMED OVER POSSIBLE IRAN/HIZBALLAH ACTIONS AGAINST SYRIAN INTERESTS. WHO THREATENS WHOM OVER LEBANON? 4. WE DOUBT THAT IRANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESHARATI DELIVERED BALD THREATS TO THE SYRIANS WHEN HE MADE HIS JUNE 5-15 TRIP TO SYRIA AND LEBANON. BUT WE ARE STRUCK BY THE BOLDNESS OF HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS; THE HIGH LEVEL AT WHICH HE WAS RECEIVED IN DAMASCUS BEFORE AND AFTER GOING TO LEBANON--WHERE HE ENGAGED IN A NEGOTIATING TRACK ON THE CAMPS WAR SEPARATE FROM KHADDAM\'S--; SYRIA\'S POSITIVE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAN SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE FAILURE OF THE IRAQ-SYRIA BORDER MEETING; AND INDICATORS OF SYRIAN TIMIDITY TOWARD IRAN VIS-A-VIS LEBANON. 5. OF THESE INDICATORS, WE NOTE ESPECIALLY LEBANON BA\'TH PARTY CHIEF \'ASIM QANSUH\'S REMARKS JUNE 12 (REFTEL). QANSUH WAS PROVEN WRONG ABOUT SYRIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION AT MASHGHARA--THE SYRIANS DID EVENTUALLY AND TARDILY INTERVENE--AND ONE FACTOR IN SYRIAN HESITANCY MAY HAVE BEEN CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI REACTION. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS CLEAR FROM WHAT QANSUH SAID THAT THE SYRIANS WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ON HIZBALLAH AND OFFEND IRAN. 6. IN OUR VIEW, NEITHER SYRIA NOR IRAN IS IN A POSITION IN LEBANON TO BE ABLE TO DELIVER THREATS. EACH HAS REASON TO BE ALARMED AT THE OTHER\'S ACTIVITIES AND AMBITIONS IN LEBANON, BUT THE STAKES ARE TOO HIGH ELSEWHERE--FOR SYRIA, THE PROSPECT OF VIRTUALLY FREE OIL IN LARGE QUANTITY--TO ALLOW LEBANON TO SOUR THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. 7. SYRIA HAS GIVEN IRAN A FEW KNOCKS IN LEBANON, BUT NONE OF THESE HAS BEEN LARGE ENOUGH TO HARM THE RELATION- SHIP. SYRIA CLAMPED DOWN ON IRAN\'S SUNNI ALLIES IN TRIPOLI, IT HAS ENGAGED IN OCCASIONAL ALTERCATIONS WITH HIZBALLAH, AND NOW IT HAS INTERVENED IN MASHGHARA BECAUSE OF HIZBALLAH\'S ATTACKS AGAINST ITS SSNP ALLY. BUT WHAT SYRIA HAS FAILED TO DO IS MUCH MORE IMPRESSIVE. THE IRANIAN GUARD PRESENCE IN SYRIAN-\"CONTROLLED\" LEBANON CONTINUES AS BEFORE; IRAN CONTINUES TO MOVE SUPPLIES TO HIZBALLAH VIA SYRIA, VIRTUALLY UNIMPEDED; AND THE SYRIANS HAVE BEEN LIMP AND INEFFECTUAL IN PUSHING IRAN ON THE HOSTAGES. MEANWHILE, AS HIZBALLAH HAS GAINED IN STRENGTH IN RECENT YEARS, SO HAS IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN LEBANON INCREASED MARKEDLY. IRAN NOW, WE WOULD JUDGE, VIES WITH ISRAEL AS THE SECOND-MOST INFLUENTIAL FOREIGN POWER IN LEBANON. 8. BY ALLOWING A REVOLUTIONARY GUARD PRESENCE AND GIVING THE IRANIANS EASY ACCESS SINCE 1982, SYRIA MAY HAVE ACCELERATED THE PACE OF GROWTH OF HIZBALLAH AND IRANIAN INFLUENCE. HOWEVER, THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION IS THE SINGLE MOST DYNAMIC AND ALLURING MOVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE PAST DECADE; IT WAS BOUND TO HAVE AN EXTRAORDINARY IMPACT ON THE LEBANESE SHI\'A COMMUNITY. IT IS OPEN TO QUESTION HOW MUCH SYRIA COULD HAVE DONE TO STEM THE TIDE. THERE ALWAYS WERE, AND STILL ARE, OTHER ROUTES--THAN THROUGH SYRIA--FOR IRAN TO REACH AND INFLUENCE THE HIGHLY RECEPTIVE LEBANESE SHI\'A. THE SYRIANS HAVE ACTIVELY ATTEMPTED TO COUNTERBALANCE THE IRANIANS BY GIVING SUPPORT TO NABIH BARRI, BUT WITH WHAT LONG-TERM EFFECT REMAINS TO BE SEEN. 9. SYRIANS OCCASIONALLY TELL US THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE LEBANESE SHI\'A \"WHEN THE NEED ARISES.\" HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT THEIR BOAST IS HOLLOW AND THAT THE SYRIANS WELL KNOW IT. THEY HAVE MADE THE BEST OF THE SITUATION BY MILKING THE IRANIANS--KEEPING THAT RELATIONSHIP BOTH CORDIAL AND LUCRATIVE--WHILE ATTEMPTING TO BOLSTER BARRI. THE FUTURE MUST BE WORRISOME. 10. THE REAL TEST OF WHETHER SYRIA CAN OR WILL ACT AGAINST IRAN/HIZBALLAH WILL COME IF IRAN\'S PROMISES OF CONTINUED OIL DELIVERIES PROVE FALSE. EVEN THEN, HOWEVER, WE WOULD PREDICT THAT THE SYRIANS WILL MOVE IN A GINGERLY FASHION. THE ULTIMATE PROSPECT IS OF A LEBANESE SHI\'A COMMUNITY ALIENATED FROM SYRIA AND, POSSIBLY, WITH IRANIAN SUPPORT ENERGIZED TO COMBAT SYRIA. IF SYRIA WENT TOO FAR IN ALIENATING IRAN/HIZBALLAH, IT MIGHT EVEN FACE AN ACTIVE IRANIAN/HIZBALLAH EMBRACE OF THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. THE MOST RADICAL (ALSO THE MOST DANGEROUS) ELEMENTS OF THE BROTHERHOOD ARE ANTAGONISTIC TO IRAN BECAUSE OF IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE HERETICAL ALAWI BA\'THI REGIME; IF THAT SUPPORT WERE REMOVED, THE NATURAL AFFINITY THAT IRAN HAS FOR THIS GROUP WOULD PRESUMABLY COME TO THE FORE. THE PRECEDENT FOR FUNDAMENTALIST SUNNI-SHI\'A COOPERATION HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED IN TRIPOLI. 11. IN ANY CASE, A STRONG SYRIAN MOVE AGAINST HIZBALLAH WOULD RUN AGAINST THE GRAIN OF SYRIAN POLICY IN LEBANON AS ESTABLISHED OVER THE PAST EIGHT YEARS. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1976-78) SYRIA INTERVENED DIRECTLY IN MAJOR FIGHTING, AT GREAT COST; SINCE THEN IT HAS PURSUED A LOW-COST POLICY, TRYING TO BALANCE PARTIES AGAINST EACH OTHER AND USING PROXIES IN LIMITED ENGAGEMENTS. DESPITE PREDICTIONS TO THE CONTRARY AND DESPITE THE EMBARRASSING FAILURE OF THE TRIPARTITE ACCORD, THE SYRIANS HAVE BACKED OFF FROM ATTACKING THE MARONITES. THE PROSPECT OF A FULL-SCALE ATTACK AGAINST HIZBALLAH IS EVEN MORE REMOTE. 12. HOWEVER, LIMITED ENGAGEMENTS ARE BOUND TO CONTINUE. MASHGHARA IS A CASE IN POINT. THE SYRIANS ARE ESPECIALLY NERVOUS ABOUT SOUTHERN LEBANON, BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL THERE FOR ROUSING THE ISRAELIS. THE SHI\'A OF SOUTHERN LEBANON HAVE ALSO, THUS FAR, BEEN THE LEAST RECEPTIVE TO HIZBALLAH. WITH MASHGHARA THE SYRIANS MAY BE NERVOUSLY DRAWING A LINE WHICH THEY HOPE HIZBALLAH AND IRAN WILL ACCEPT, FOR THE TIME BEING. 13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RANSOM " "127","6/21/1986 10:24","86BEIRUT33","Embassy Beirut","CONFIDENTIAL","86DAMASCUS3747","O 211024Z JUN 86 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7913 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY ARAB-ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY AMCONSUL JEDDAH AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MOSCOW ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 033 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, SY, IR, LE, IS SUBJECT: SYRIA AND IRAN IN LEBANON REFTEL: DAMASCUS 3747 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. WE READ WITH CONSIDERABLE INTEREST REFTEL ON THE JOCKEYING OF SYRIAN AND IRANIAN INTERESTS IN LEBANON. EMBASSY BEIRUT, HOWEVER, MIGHT WELL EMPHASIZE DIFFERENT POINTS IN JUDGING THE STATUS OF SYRIAN, IRANIAN, AND ISRAELI POLICY IN LEBANON. 3. WE JUDGE THAT SYRIA AND ISRAEL ARE IN A CLASS BY THEMSELVES IN TERMS OF ABILITY TO EXERCISE POWER IN LEBANON. THEY BORDER ON LEBANON; THEY CONTINUOUSLY PROJEC CONVENTIONAL MILITARY POWER INTO LEBANON; AND, THEY BOTH HAVE ESTABLISHED NETWORKS OF LEBANESE FRIENDS AND ALLIES. OF THESE THREE INGREDIENTS OF POWER IRAN HAS ONLY A LESS EXTENSIVE, BUT GROWING, NETWORK OF FRIENDS AND ALLIES. 3. WE AGREE WITH DAMASCUS REFTEL THAT THE ASPIRATIONS OF FUNDAMENTALIST IRAN AND SECULAR SYRIA IN LEBANON ARE IN CONFLICT. PRACTICALLY EVERYWHERE, HOWEVER, THE IRANIANS ARE PLAYING CATCH-UP BALL AGAINST SUBSTANTIAL SYRIAN ADVANTAGES. FOR EXAMPLE, OUR INTERPRETATION OF SEVERAL RECENT PHENOMENA WOULD BE DIFFERENT: --THE TRUCE IN THE CAMPS WAR ARRANGED BY IRANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESHARATI WAS EXCEPTIONALLY TRANSITORY; IT LASTED ONLY LONG ENOUGH TO EVACUATE A HANDFUL OF PALESTINIANS FROM THE CAMPS. GIVEN IRAN\'S LACK OF LEVERAGE OVER AMAL AND THE PALESTINIANS, THE SIGNIGICANCE OF THIS TRUCE WAS HEAVILY DISCOUNTED BEFORE IT WENT INTO EFFECT. --ALTHOUGH THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION MAY BE THE MOST DYNAMIC MOVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE PAST DECADE, IT IS OUR FIRM IMPRESSION THAT A MAJORITY OF LEBANESE SHIA CONSIDER IT TO BE MORE THREATENING THAN ALLURING. OF COURSE IT HAS ALLURE FOR THE MORE FUNDAMENTALIST ELEMENTS, BUT THEY ARE STILL A MINORITY. EVEN HIZBALLAH\'S SHAYK FADLALLAH MAINTAINS THAT IRAN\'S REVOLUTION CANNOT BE DUPLICATED IN LEBANON. --SYRIA\'S FORBEARANCE IN NOT CLAMPING DOWN ON IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON SEEMS TO BE A PRODUCT OF SYRIAN CONFIDENCE IN ITS ABILITY TO DO SO AND ITS SENSITIVITY REGARDING IRANIAN-SYRIAN TIES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY A LACK OF CAPACITY. MCNAMARA " "128","7/8/1986 23:29","86BOGOTA9347","Embassy Bogota","CONFIDENTIAL","","P 082329Z JUL 86 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9394 INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN AMEMBASSY QUITO AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY PANAMA AMEMBASSY LIMA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 09347 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KPRP, PINS, MILI, PTER, CO SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR COLOMBIA\'S GUERRILLA WAR 1. (C) SUMMARY: THE GUERRILLA WAR IN COLOMBIA IS STALEMATED: THE GUERRILLAS ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT POPULATION OR ENGAGE IN SET-PIECE BATTLES, BUT THE GOVERNMENT IS UNLIKELY TO DESTROY THEM. FIGHTING MAY INCREASE FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION OF THE BARCO ADMINISTRATION. THE GROUPS OUTSIDE THE PEACE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT, BUT THE MAIN LONG-TERM GUERRILLA THREAT IS THE FARC: WELL-ARMED, WELL-FINANCED, POLITICALLY DURABLE, AND (FOR NOW) IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES ARE HAMPERED BY PROBLEMS OF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE AND EQUIPMENT, AND WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO ENGAGE ALL COLOMBIA\'S GUERRILLA GROUPS AT ONE TIME. THE ARMED FORCES AND PRESIDENT-ELECT BARCO ARE AWARE OF THESE DEFICIENCIES AND WILL SEEK TO RECTIFY THEM. END SUMMARY. A NEW BALL GAME? ---------------- 2. (C) FROM NEW PRESIDENT A NEW APPROACH: COLOMBIA IS ABOUT TO ENTER A NEW STAGE IN ITS THIRTY-YEAR BATTLE WITH GUERRILLA INSURGENCY. VIRGILIO BARCO AS THE NEW PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT\'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GUERRILLA FORCES RANGED AGAINST IT. BARCO HAS TOLD US OF HIS INTENTION TO MAKE THE PEACE PROCESS CONFORM TO THE INTERESTS OF THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, AND REDUCE GUERRILLA MANIPULATION OF THE PROCESS. HE WILL OFFER SOME ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS, CONCENTRATED IN RURAL AREAS WHERE THE INSURGENCIES ARE STRONG. HE HAS ALSO SAID THAT HE WILL STRENGTHEN THE ARMED FORCES. HOW THE GUERRILLA FORCES WILL REACT TO BARCO\'S TWO-HANDED POLICY IS THE KEY QUESTION. 3. (C/NF) THE INSURGENT LINE-UP: THE COLOMBIAN INSURGENCY IS A COMPLEX AND CONTRADICTORY PHENOMENON. THE LARGEST OF COLOMBIA\'S GUERRILLA GROUPS, THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC), IS AT PRESENT THE LEAST ACTIVE MILITARILY DUE TO ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE FARC MAINTAINS AROUND 4,000 PERSONNEL. COLOMBIAN ARMY SOURCES INDICATE THAT THIS NUMBER INCLUDES ONLY HEAVILY ARMED FIGHTERS, WITH SOME \"FRONTS\" (LOCAL FARC UNITS, DIVIDED ON A GEOGRAPHIC BASIS) ABLE TO QUINTUPLE THEIR STRENGTH THROUGH USE OF LIGHTLY ARMED AUXILIARIES. A SEPARATE AND RECENT ESTIMATE DIVIDED FARC GUERRILLAS BETWEEN FULL AND PART-TIMERS, AND CAME UP WITH 3,500 UNDER EACH HEADING. THE FATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THIS CONSIDERABLE FORCE IS BROUGHT INTO THE SCALES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THE REMAINING INSURGENT GROUPS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY SPECTRUM -- THE M-19, NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN), POPULAR LIBERATION ARMY (EPL), AND THE MINOR GUERRILLA GROUPS HAVE LARGELY ABANDONED THE PEACE PROCESS, ALTHOUGH TWO FRONTS OF THE ELN REMAIN INSIDE. OFFICIAL COLOMBIAN ESTIMATES OF THE STRENGTH OF THE REMAINING MAJOR INSURGENT GROUPS (INCLUDING BOTH FULL AND PART-TIME GUERRILLAS) ARE AS FOLLOWS: AROUND 650 EPL, ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER OF ELN, AND OVER 1,400 M-19. WE DO NOT HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE IN ANY OF THESE ESTIMATES. WHEN COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES WISH TO LOOK SUCCESSFUL, THE NUMBERS GO DOWN; WHEN THEY TALK ABOUT NEEDING MORE RESOURCES, THE NUMBERS GO UP. IF FORCED TO CHOOSE, WE WOULD GUESS THAT ACTUAL STRENGTH IS HIGHER THAN OFFICIALLY ESTIMATED, RATHER THAN LOWER. 4. (LOU) INSURGENT GAME PLANS: THE TACTICS OF THESE GROUPS HAVE TRADITIONALLY CONSISTED OF EXTORTION, KIDNAPPING, AND AMBUSHES OF COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES. THE AVAILABLITY OF NARCO MONEY IN RECENT YEARS MAY HAVE REDUCED THE PROPORTIONATE ROLE OF EXTORTION IN TOTAL GUERRILLA FINANCING. URBAN TERRORISM REMAINS A PROBLEM, BUT POLICE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL IN HUNTING DOWN TERRORIST SAFE HOUSES. POSSIBLY AS A RESULT, M-19 AND ITS ALLIES HAVE CONCENTRATED IN RECENT MONTHS MAINLY ON RURAL OPERATIONS IN THE VALLE DEL CAUCA (CALI) AREA. AN IMPORTANT FACTOR SINCE LATE 1985 HAS BEEN THE FORMATION OF AN ALLIANCE OF ALL THE GUERRILLA GROUPS WHO ARE OUTSIDE THE PEACE PROCESS, INTO THE NATIONAL GUERRILLA COORDINADORA (CNG). THIS ORGANIZATION, WHICH HAS BEEN DOMINATED BY M-19 TO THE POINT THAT SOME GUERRILLAS HAVE THEMSELVES COMPLAINED, HAS PROBABLY ENABLED THE GUERRILLAS TO MASS LARGER NUMBERS FOR PARTICULAR ATTACKS THAN WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. SHOULD THE FARC ONE DAY LEAVE THE PEACE PROCESS AND JOIN THE CNG, POSSIBILITIES WOULD OPEN FOR EVEN LARGER-SCALE OPERATIONS. FARC: ENEMY NUMBER ONE ---------------------- 5. (C/NF) FARC -- PATIENT AND DISCIPLINED: WHETHER AS PART OF THE CNG OR OTHERWISE, THE FARC REPRESENT POTENTIALLY THE GREATEST DANGER TO THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT. UNLIKE THE OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS, THE FARC\'S DEDICATION TO A REVOLUTIONARY TRIUMPH IS TEMPERED BY PATIENCE AND DISCIPLINE. THE FARC LEADERSHIP IS TOO SOPHISTICATED TO EXPECT POWER BASED ON A SHORT-TERM MILITARY VICTORY. THIS ATTITUDE CONTRASTS WITH THAT OF THE M-19, WHICH CONCENTRATES ON SPECTACULAR, BUT ULTIMATELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, ACTIONS SUCH AS THE PALACE OF JUSTICE SEIZURE, THE ATTACK AGAINST THE CIUDAD JARDIN SUBURB OF CALI, OR THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT. THE KEY TO THE FARC\'S STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE FARC HAS USED THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE PEACE TREATY TO GAIN MORE RECRUITS, AS WELL AS INCREASED NUMBERS AND TYPES OF WEAPONS, WHILE ALSO ACQUIRING SOME POLITICAL RESPECTABILITY. FARC LEADERS HAVE DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATING THEIR CONTROL IN AREAS UNDER THEIR INFLUENCE. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF FARC ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH THE ELN AND THE EPL IN AREAS WHERE THEY COMPETE TO ENABLE JOINT OPERATIONS SUCH THAT THE FARC\'S PARTICIPATION WOULD BE COVERT. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD GIVE FARC LEADERS PLAUSIBLE DENIAL FOR TERRORIST ACTS WHILE ALLOWING THEM TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THEIR AREAS OF INFLUENCE. MEANWHILE, COLOMBIAN MILITARY SOURCES CLAIM THAT, OUT OF ANXIETY TO AVOID BREAKING THE TRUCE, PRESIDENT BETANCUR ORDERED THE ARMED FORCES NOT TO ENTER AREAS OF FARC ENCAMPMENTS. THE FARC HAS BEEN THE LEADER AMONG THE GUERRILLAS IN FORGING HIGHLY PROFITABLE LINKS WITH THE NARCO-TRAFFICKERS, WHOSE AREAS OF ACTIVITY ARE FREQUENTLY IN TRADITIONAL FARC OPERATING AREAS. IN VIEW OF THESE TANGIBLE BENEFITS, THE FARC PROBABLY DESIRES TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE PROCESS IN ITS PRESENT FORM. 6. (C/NF) FARC-UP IN CONGRESS: PERHAPS THE GREATEST BENEFIT ACHIEVED BY THE FARC IS THE MODICUM OF RESPECTABILITY DERIVING FROM ITS ENTRY INTO COLOMBIAN ELECTORAL POLITICS VIA ITS FRONT PARTY, THE PATRIOTIC UNION (UP). THOUGH THE UP\'S VOTE TOTAL WAS NOT SPECTACULAR, THE PARTY HAS INJECTED THE FARC INTO MAINSTREAM POLITICS. REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE FARC INTENDS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS SEVERAL SEATS IN CONGRESS TO PRESS FOR A UNITED OPPOSITION FRONT TO THE NEW BARCO GOVERNMENT. SUCH A FRONT WOULD FEATURE ALLIANCES WITH CONGRESSMEN FROM ANY PARTY OR BACKGROUND DISAFFECTED WITH THE LIBERAL GOVERNMENT. THE UNITED FRONT IDEA IS OVER-AMBITIOUS BUT NOT TOO FAR-FETCHED. ASSORTED LIBERALS AND NEW LIBERALS ALLIED READILY WITH THE UP IN THE MARCH LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. A \"NEW LIBERAL\" LEADER SAID BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THAT HIS PARTY WOULD SEEK TO RECOUP ITS STANDING BY ALIGNING ITSELF WITH ANY PARTY IN THE CONGRESS, INCLUDING THE UP. THE UP/FARC LEADERS HOPE THIS STRATEGY WILL EVENTUALLY MAKE THEIR GROUP THE LEADING OPPOSITION FORCE IN COLOMBIA. THEY WILL PUSH THE PUBLIC ARGUMENT THAT THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES ARE MUTUALLY COMPROMISED LOOK-ALIKES. 7. (C/NF) FARC FALLBACK TO ARMS: EVEN WHILE IT PLAYS ITS LEGAL POLITICAL \"CARD,\" THE FARC HAS NOT LOST SIGHT OF ITS AMBITION TO ACHIEVE PRIMACY AMONG COLOMBIA\'S GUERRILLA FACTIONS. THE FARC LEADERSHIP MAY BE CONSIDERING JOINING THE CNG. THE GOAL OF SUCH A MOVE WOULD MOST LIKELY BE TO DOMINATE ALL COLOMBIA\'S GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS, SUBJECT THEM TO FARC/COMMUNIST PARTY DISCIPLINE, AND LEAD THEM BACK INTO THE PEACE PROCESS. FARC LEADERS PRIVATELY ARGUE THAT ALL GROUPS COULD CONTINUE MILITARY OPERATIONS WHILE INSIDE THE PEACE PROCESS, DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM, AND THEREBY ATTAIN A MEASURE OF PROTECTION AGAINST COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT ACTIONS -- AS THE FARC HAS DONE. M-19: VIOLENCE IN A VACUUM -------------------------- 8. (C/NF) SEEKING ATTENTION, FACING ATTRITION: WHILE THE FARC POSES THE GREATEST LONG-TERM THREAT TO COLOMBIA, THE 19TH OF APRIL MOVEMENT (M-19) CONTINUES TO DOMINATE THE HEADLINES BOTH IN COLOMBIA AND ELSEWHERE. THE M-19\'S RECENT HISTORY IS REPLETE WITH GROSS MISCALCULATIONS. THE CONTINUING ATTRITION OF THE M-19\'S LEADERSHIP, REPRESENTED BY THE DEATHS OF MEN SUCH AS JAIME BATEMAN THREE YEARS AGO, IVAN MARINO OSPINA IN CALI IN AUGUST 1985, ANDRES ALMARALES IN THE PALACE OF JUSTICE SIEGE LAST NOVEMBER, AND ALVARO FAYAD IN A MARCH 1986 BOGOTA FIGHT, HAS LEFT THE MOVEMENT WITH MANY PISTOLEROS BUT FEW POLITICALLY ASTUTE CHIEFS. M-19\'S CONTINUED ATTEMPTS TO GO FOR THE ELUSIVE KNOCKOUT, WITH ACTIONS LIKE THE SEIZURE OF THE PALACE OF JUSTICE AND THE CIUDAD JARDIN ATTACK, SHOW THE UNREALITY OF ITS POLITICAL CALCULATIONS. AS A RESULT, ITS POPULAR SUPPORT -- WHICH WAS ONCE QUITE LARGE (IN A 1981 OPINION POLL, 40 PERCENT NATIONALLY EXPRESSED \"SOME SYMPATHY\" FOR M-19) -- IS DECLINING. 9. (C/NF) LEADING FROM WEAKNESS?: SEVERAL ACTIONS ATTEST TO THE M-19\'S INFLATED SENSE OF ITS CAPABILITIES. THE FORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONALIST \"AMERICAS BATTALION\" IN DECEMBER 1985 WAS AN OSTENSIBLE ATTEMPT TO FORM A NEW \"BOLIVARIAN ARMY\" TO LIBERATE ANEW THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES. BUT THE AMERICAS BATTALION HAS NOT ENJOYED MUCH SUCCESS IN ITS CHOSEN THEATER, THE CAUCA VALLEY. DESPITE THEIR WEAKNESS IN NUMBERS, THE M-19 LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO PLAN TO ESTABLISH AN ALTERNATE GOVERNMENT IN VALLE DEL CAUCA DEPARTMENT AND CONVENE A NATIONAL \"CONGRESS\" THERE IN AUGUST 1986. THE M-19 HAS SAID IT WILL NOT RPT NOT SEEK AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE BARCO REGIME, BUT WILL CONTINUE ITS OPERATIONS AS USUAL. (ATTEMPTS TO SEEK PAPAL MEDIATION, IN THE NEWS LATELY, WERE ALMOST CERTAINLY MADE WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT THEY WOULD FAIL IMMEDIATELY. THEY WERE PUBLICITY GESTURES ONLY.) PROBLEMS OF THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES -------------------------------------- 10. (C/NF) RESOURCES THINLY STRETCHED: AS IT PREPARES FOR A SITUATION WHICH MAY CHANGE CONSIDERABLY OVER THE NEXT YEAR, THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES CONFRONT SEVERAL MAJOR PROBLEMS. ONE IS A SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL: THE COLOMBIAN ARMY TOTALS ABOUT 70,000 MEN. GIVEN THE GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF THE GUERRILLA FORCES, THE INHOSPITABLE TERRAIN, THE NEED TO DEFEND MANY FIXED HIGH-VALUE TARGETS, AND THE SHORTAGE OF DEPLOYABLE FORCES, THE ARMY IS ALREADY STRETCHED THIN. SHOULD THE PEACE PROCESS UNRAVEL AND THE FARC RESUME THE ATTACK, THE ARMY WOULD BE HARD PRESSED. ONE GENERAL OFFICER SPECULATED THAT 15,000 ADDITIONAL TROOPS WOULD BE REQUIRED, SHOULD THE FARC SHIFT TO A WAR FOOTING. 11. (C/NF) SEEING THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: LACK OF INTELLIGENCE IS ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM FOR COLOMBIAN MILITARY PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH THE ARMY HAS CONDUCTED OPERATIONS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AGAINST THE AMERICAS BATTALION IN VALLE DEL CAUCA AND CAUCA DEPARTMENTS, THE LACK OF GOOD AND READILY AVAILABLE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PREVENTS A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE SITUATION. AT LEAST IN THIS THEATER, THE ARMY APPEARS BOGGED DOWN AND UNABLE TO BRING ITS CONCENTRATED STRENGTH TO BEAR. THE POLICE (MORE THAN 60,000 STRONG, AND PARA-MILITARY) ALSO PLAY A LARGE ROLE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN ALL AREAS, BUT PARTICULARLY IN THE CITIES. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION APPEARS MORE AVAILABLE IN THE CITIES, AND GUERRILLA OPERATIONS THERE HAVE BEEN HURT RECENTLY. 12. (C/NF) ARMS SHORTFALLS: QUALITY OF EQUIPMENT IS YET ANOTHER ISSUE. GOC OFFICERS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE QUALITY OF ARMS IN THE HANDS OF THE GUERRILLAS, PARTICULARLY THE FARC, ACTUALLY EXCEEDS THAT OF THE ARMY\'S WEAPONS. GIVEN THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE GUERRILLAS THROUGH EXTORTION AND NARCOTICS, THEIR ABILITY TO PURCHASE SUCH ARMS IS UNQUESTIONED. SOME COLOMBIAN OFFICERS FEEL THAT THE GAP CAN BE BEST ADDRESSED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY, STRESSING IN PARTICULAR THE USE OF MORE HELICOPTERS TO PROVIDE LIFT AND MOBILITY. THE YEAR AHEAD: DRAWING THE BATTLE LINES ---------------------------------------- 13. (C) SLIPPING STALEMATE?: THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IS IN MANY RESPECTS A STALEMATE. THE COLOMBIAN ARMY IS UNABLE TO DEFEAT THE GUERRILLAS CURRENTLY RANGED AGAINST IT. FOR THEIR PART, THE GUERRILLAS ARE UNABLE TO MAKE INROADS AGAINST THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN AREAS OF DENSE SETTLEMENT, BUT ARE EXPANDING IN SOME ISOLATED RURAL REGIONS -- PARTICULARLY WHERE THEY ALREADY HAVE TRADITIONAL SUPPORT. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT A GOVERNMENT IS LOSING WHEN MERELY KEEPING AN INSURGENCY AT BAY. THE SHIFT IN STRENGTH MAY BE GLACIAL, BUT OVER TIME THE DECAY OF THE GOVERNMENT\'S POSITION IS REAL. THERE ARE MORE GUERRILLAS ACTIVE NOW IN COLOMBIA, AND THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IS HIGHER, THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE CIVIL WAR OF THE 1950\'S -- BUT DURING THAT WAR, MOST GUERRILLAS WERE LIBERALS, NOT COMMUNISTS. THE SITUATION IS NO CAUSE FOR PANIC. THE NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS IS SMALL IN PROPORTION TO THE SIZE OF THE COUNTRY, AND COLOMBIANS CAN TOLERATE A LOT OF VIOLENCE. BUT IT CAN SCARCELY PROMOTE EASY SLUMBER FOR COLOMBIAN LEADERS. 14. (C/NF) THE COMING YEAR: AS THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION APPROACHES, ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT ANTICIPATE CHANGES IN THE PRESENT REALITY. IN PRIVATE TALKS AND IN HIS SIX-POINT PEACE PROGRAM, PRESIDENT-ELECT BARCO HAS SERVED NOTICE THAT THE PEACE PROCESS MUST AND WILL CHANGE. THE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF EXPECTS AN INEVITABLE (BUT PROBABLY GRADUAL) INCREASE IN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AFTER THE INAUGURATION, AS THE GUERRILLAS REACT TO BARCO\'S HARDER LINE. THE PAYOFF WOULD, HOPEFULLY, COME IN A YEAR OR TWO WHEN THE GUERRILLAS HAVE EITHER LAID DOWN THEIR ARMS OR BEEN DEALT WITH FORCEFULLY. BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS HAVE EXPRESSED TO US THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO MEET THIS EXPECTED UPTURN IN GUERRILLA ATTACKS. WHILE CONTINUED AND EVEN EXPANDED ACTIVITIES BY GROUPS SUCH AS THE M-19, ELN, AND EPL, SEEM INEVITABLE, THE WILD CARD REMAINS THE FARC. MANUEL MARULANDA VELEZ (AKA TIROFIJO), TOP LEADER OF THE FARC, HAS HINTED THAT THE GROUP WILL NOT ACCEPT AN ATTEMPT BY BARCO TO CHANGE THE RULES OF THE GAME. IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN THE COLOMBIAN WEEKLY \"SEMANA,\" TIROFIJO DECLARED THAT THE FARC WILL NOT ACCEPT ULTIMATUMS FROM THE BARCO GOVERNMENT, VIEWING SUCH DEMANDS AS AN ATTEMPT TO RUPTURE THE PEACE PROCESS. HE ALSO DECLARED THAT HIS GUERRILLAS WOULD NOT DEMOBILIZE UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTED THE FULL RANGE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REFORMS DEMANDED BY THE FARC. HIS STATEMENT AGREES WITH REALITY, AS WE SEE IT FOR THE FARC: WITHOUT GUNS, THE FARC WOULD BE A NEGLIGIBLE MINI-PARTY. WITHOUT GUNS, THEY WOULD HAVE NO ATTRACTION FOR NARCO MONEY. WITHOUT GUNS, THEY WOULD SWIFTLY FADE FROM PUBLIC ATTENTION. WE CONCLUDE THAT, THEREFORE, THEY WILL FIND A PRETEXT TO KEEP THE GUNS. THE SPARRING HAS BEGUN. OVER THE COURSE OF THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE AUGUST 7 INAUGURATION, WE THINK THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE GOC AND ITS GUERRILLA ENEMIES WILL GET HOTTER BEFORE IT GETS COLDER. GILLESPIE " "129","7/14/1986 18:19","86MADRID8158","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","86MADRID659\|86MADRID793","R 141819Z JUL 86 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9393 INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NATO COLLECTIVE AMCONSUL BARCELONA AMCONSUL SEVILLE AMCONSUL BILBAO POUCH ","C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 08158 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, SP SUBJECT: SHI\'IA TERRORISTS PARDONED BY SPANISH GOVERNMENT REF: A) MADRID 659, B) MADRID 793 1. (U) THE GOS JULY 12 OFFICIALLY PARDONED TWO LEBANESE SHI\'IA TERRORISTS CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO 23 YEARS IN PRISON EACH FOR A BOTCHED 1984 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST A LIBYAN DIPLOMAT IN MADRID. THE TWO, MOHAMMED RAHAL AND MUSTAFA ALI JALIL, HAVE BEEN EXPELLED FROM SPAIN AND ARE EXPECTED TO BE LEAVING FOR LEBANON AS SOON AS TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE COMPLETED. UNDER THE TERMS OF SPANISH IMMIGRATION LAW, RAHAL AND JALIL HAD TO BE PARDONED IN ORDER TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR EXPULSION AS SIMPLE UNDESIRABLES. 2. (U) THE RELEASE OF RAHAL AND JALIL WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF A 1984 KIDNAPPING OF THE SPAINISH AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT (HE WAS RELEASED AFTER BEING HELD FOR 4 HOURS) AND THE JANUARY 1986 KIDNAPPING OF A SPANISH POLICEMAN AND TWO LOCAL HIRE EMBASSY EMPLOYEES, ALSO IN BEIRUT. THE RELEASE OF RAHAL AND JALIL WAS ALSO AMONG THE ORIGINAL SET OF DEMANDS IN THE TWA 847 HIJACKING (REF A). 3. (C) IN THE MOST RECENT INCIDENT, KIDNAPPERS (REPORTEDLY RELATIVES OF THE TWO SHI\'IA GUNMEN) HELD THE SPANISH POLICEMAN AND EMBASSY EMPLOYEES FOR SEVERAL WEEKS WHILE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THEIR RELEASE WERE BEING CONDUCTED. LEBANESE JUSTICE MINISTER NABIH BERRI ACTED AS INTERMEDIARY IN THE TALKS BETWEEN THE KIDNAPPERS AND GOS INTERIOR MINISTRY SUBSECRETARY RAFAEL VERA. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH ULTIMATELY RESULTED IN THE RELEASE OF THE THREE SPANISH EMBASSY EMPLOYEES, CONTACTS AT MFA ADMITTED TO US THAT THE GOS HAD AGREED TO CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR RELEASING THE TWO TERRORISTS (REF B). AT THE TIME THE THINKING WAS THAT RAHAL AND JALIL WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO LEBANON TO FINISH OUT THEIR SENTENCES THERE. COMMENT ------- 4. (C) NO ONE HERE IS UNDER ANY ILLUSION THAT THE RELEASE OF RAHAL AND JALIL IS ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE QUID PRO QUO FOR THE RELEASE FIVE MONTHS AGO OF THE SPANISH EMBASSY HOSTAGES. FREEING THE TWO OVER A SUMMER WEEKEND WILL REDUCE PUBLIC ATTENTION ON THE GOS MANUEVER SOMEWHAT, BUT THE MOVE IS INCONSISTENT WITH GONZALEZ\' PUBLIC HARDLINE ON TERRORISM AND SETS AN UNWELCOME PRECEDENT. 5. (U) BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. ENDERS " "130","7/16/1986 9:14","86KAMPALA2314","Embassy Kampala","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 160914Z JUL 86 FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4726 INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM AMEMBASSY KIGALI AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE SECDEF WASHDC ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 02314 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL PINS PNAT PTER PGOV EPET PLO UG WI LY IR XA SX SUBJECT: MUSEVENI AND THE RADICAL MUSLIMS. 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: UGANDA\'S RELATIONS WITH LIBYA CONTINUE TO INTENSIFY. PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS MET WITH DELEGATIONS FROM THE PLO AND SAHARAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SADR); GOU HAS NORMALIZED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE LATTER ORGANIZATIONS. NRM HAS ALSO RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO FEELERS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THIS RAPPRO- CHEMENT WITH RADICAL MUSLIM STATES --AND IT IS A RAPPROCHEMENT SINCE MOST ENJOYED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE AMIN GOVERNMENT-- STEMS FROM AN NRM PERCEPTION THAT IT WILL ENHANCE ITS ATTRACTIVENESS TO POTENTIAL MUSLIM DONORS AND A FUNDAMENTAL IDENTITY OF VIEWS ON SELF- DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS. END SUMMARY. 3. THE PACE OF LIBYAN-UGANDAN RELATIONS IS INTENSIFYING. IN RECENT MONTHS THE LIBYANS HAVE SENT A TRADE DELEGATION, A FINANCIAL TEAM AND MEDICAL TEAM. GOU HAS ANNOUNCED THAT MUSEVENI HAS HELD TALKS WITH A DOCTOR MUKHTAR ALI ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP A JOINT HOLDING COMPANY TO COOPERATE WITH THE UGANDA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. THE GOU HAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT IT IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN OIL COMPANY IN COOPERATION WITH THE GOL. ON JULY 4,THE GOU ACKNOWLEDGED IT WAS RECEIVING DONATED DRUGS FROM THE GOL. 4. THE LIBYAN PEOPLES BUREAU HAS EXPANDED IN SIZE TO SIX , AND THE STAFF HAVE ADOPTED A HIGHER PROFILE ROLE IN KAMPALA. THE LIBYANS ARE LIKELY TO SOON RAISE RELATIONS TO THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL (SINCE THE 1979 WAR AGAINST AMIN THE LIBYAN MISSION HAS BEEN HEADED BY A CHARGE). 5. COMMENT: THE HOLDING COMPANY AND OIL COMPANY WILL ALLOW THE LIBYANS TO ENLARGE THEIR COMMUNITY, SOMETHING THEY WERE UNABLE TO DO DURING THE OBOTE/OKELLO PERIOD. THE UGANDANS PROBABLY BELIEVE SINCERELY-- ALBEIT NAIVELY-- THAT THEY CAN GENUINELY BENEFIT FROM LIBYAN LARGESSE AND STILL RETAIN CONTROL OF THE RELATIONSHIP. THE OIL COMPANY IS PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE AND FITS NICELY WITH NRM ECONO- MIC PLANNING. AS A LANDLOCKED COUNTRY, TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON IMPORTED POL, UGANDA HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT ITS VULNERABILITY TO BEING CUT OFF FROM POL SUPPLIES. TRADITIONALLY THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN TO TREAT THE PRIVATE OIL COMPANIES VERY WELL BY THIRD WORLD STANDARDS. THEY WERE ALLOWED TO BE PROFITABLE AND INDEPEN- DENT IN RETURN FOR GUARANTEEING UGANDA\'S SUPPLY OF POL. THE NRM DISTRUSTS THE TRADITIONAL MODUS OPERANDI AND IS IDEOLOGICALLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH WHAT IS PERCEIVED AS VULNERABILITY TO MULTINATIONAL CAPITALISM. THE GOU WOULD LIKE LIBYAN ASSISTANCE TO SET UP A GOU CONTROLLED OIL COMPANY TO GUARANTEE ITS SECURITY OF SUPPLY, MUCH AS IT HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PURCHASING A SHARE OF THE MOMBASA REFINERY FROM GOK FOR SIMILAR REASONS. ACCORDING TO AN OIL COMPANY SOURCE IN KAMPALA, THE PROPOSED COMPANY IS LIKELY TO BE A PARASTATAL OIL PROCUREMENT COMPANY OF THE TYPE COMMON IN AFRICA. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR SUCH A COMPANY TO BE PROFITABLE, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, UNLESS THE LIBYANS PROVIDE A MASSIVE SUBSIDY EITHER IN THE FORM OF ESSENTIALLY FREE OIL, OR MONETARY EQUIVALENT. END COMMENT. 6. MUSEVENI HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED A PLO DELEGATION. THIS IS PROBABLY A UNILATERAL INITIATIVE ON THE PART OF PLO TO REESTABLISH THE FAVORABLE POSITION IT HELD UNDER THE AMIN REGIME WHEN THE PLO OPERATED A FARM AND TRAINING CAMPS IN UGANDA. COMMENT: THIS IS NOT A SURPRISING DEVELOPMENT. FROM DAY ONE OF THE MUSEVENI GOVERNMENT THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WILL TREAT WITH NEITHER THE SOUTH AFRICAN OR ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS; HIS SYMPATHIES ARE CLEARLY WITH THE PALESTINIANS, WHO HE FEELS HAVE BEEN EVICTED FROM THEIR HOMELAND BY ISRAELI MILITARY MIGHT. HE BELIEVES THE PLO IS JUSTIFIED IN FIGHTING FOR ITS RIGHTS, BUT FIRMLY DRAWS THE LINE AGAINST THE USE OF TERRORIST TACTICS, ESPECIALLY ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS WHETHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF ISRAEL. HE POINTS WITH PRIDE TO THE FACT HE NEVER RESORTED TO TERRORISM DURING HIS FIVE YEAR STRUGGLE. BY ALLOWING THE PLO TO REESTABLISH ITS PRESENCE IN UGANDA, HE SIMPLY REJOINS THE RANKS OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF AFRICAN STATES. END COMMENT. 7. MUSEVENI RECENTLY RECEIVED A DELEGATION FROM THE SAHARAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SADR) AND ISSUED A PUBLIC STATE- MENT INDICATING THAT HE WOULD ESTABLISH RELATIONS IN -ACCORDANCE WITH UGANDA\'S POLICIES OF MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. ACCORDING TO AN EGYPTIAN SOURCE, THE MEETING RESULTED FROM AN INITIATIVE BY THE ALGERIANS. COMMENT: THE ACT OF RECOGNIZING THE SDAR IS MORE SIGNIFIC?NT THAN EMBRACING THE PLO, AS BY SO DOING MUSEVENI HAS TAKEN SIDES ON AN ISSUE WHERE THERE I? NO OVERWHELMING CONSENSUS IN AFRICAN AND ARAB CIRCLES. END COMMENT 8. COMMENT AND CONCLUSION: SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT MUSEVENI\'S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE RADICAL ARABS (AND PERHAPS PERSIANS) ARE IN ORDER. -- FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND LIBERATION ORGANIZATIONS, MUSEVENI\'S EMBRACE REPRESENTS THE REESTABLISHMENT OF A FORMER POSITION. THE PLO AND LIBYANS WERE REPRESENTED HERE AND WERE QUITE INFLUENTIAL DURING THE AMIN YEARS. INCIDENTALLY, THEY ARE NOT REMEM- BERED FONDLY BY THE BULK OF UGANDANS. -- MUSEVENI IS DISAPPOINTED WITH THE WESTERN DONOR RESPONSE TO HIS EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE REQUEST OF DOLS 160 MILLION; TO DATE, LESS THAN DOLS 40 MILLION HAS BEEN PLEDGED. WHILE WE HAVE NO FIRM FIGURES, IF THE LIBYANS ARE PLAYING TRUE TO FORM THEY PROBABLY ARE BRANDISHING ABOUT RATHER SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS THAT, IF DELIVERED, WOULD MAKE THEM THE MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL DONOR ON THE LOCAL SCENE. -- THERE IS AN IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT TO MUSEVENI\'S FAVORING THE RADICAL MIDDLE-EASTERNERS; THEY ARE PERCEIVED AS BEING TRULY NON-ALIGNED AND NOT DOMINATED BY EITHER WESTERN OR EASTERN BLOCS. THIS MAY BE NONSENSE, BUT THIRD WORLD SOLIDARITY IS CLEARLY EMERGING AS A MAJOR THEME OF MUSEVENI\'S IDEOLOGY. MORE IMPORTANTLY THE ARAB\'S SHARE MUSEVENI\'S COMMITMENT TO MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND HE THEIRS OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. -- INCIDENTALLY, THE STYLE OF ARAB RELATIONS IS WELL SUITED TO THE MUSEVENI REGIME, WHICH IS HIGHLY PERSONAL AND CENTERED AROUND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. TO ARRANGE LIBYAN ASSISTANCE MUSEVENI NEED ONLY TELEPHONE THE COLONEL, NOT ENGAGE IN THE SLOW PERSUASION AND BUREAUCRATIC CONCENSUS BUILDING NECESSARY FOR WESTERN ASSISTANCE. -- BY HOSTING AN EXPANDING RADICAL ARAB PRESENCE MUSEVENI IS INVITING PROBLEMS WITH A HOST OF COUNTRIES WHO HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF LIBYAN-SUPPORTED SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM, NOTABLY EGYPT, ZAIRE, KENYA AND THE WESTERN NATIONS. WHILE MUSEVENI HAS SAID HE HAS TOLD THE LIBYANS HE WOULD NOT COUNTENANCE EXTRA-LEGAL ACTIONS ON UGANDAN TERRORITY, THE LIBYANS INEVITABLY WILL CHEAT AND WILL CREATE PROBLEMS FOR MUSEVENI WITH MOBUTU AND MOI. INTERNALLY, LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MUSLIM GROUPS WILL CREATE PROBLEMS AS WELL, AND WILL WORK AGAINST MUSEVENI\'S EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE SECTARIAN- ISM AS A FACTOR IN LOCAL POLITICS. -- IN SUM, MUSEVENI IS GAMBLING THAT HE CAN STEER AND CONTROL THE RELATIONSHIP; THAT HE CAN USE THE RADICALS WITHOUT HIMSELF BEING VIOLATED. THE REAL DANGER TO AMERICANS IN UGANDA WILL COME WHEN THE LIKES OF THE LIBYANS CONCLUDE THAT THE VALUE OF THE MUSEVENI RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT OUTWEIGH THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE LOCALLY AT U.S. INTERESTS. HOUDEK " "131","7/21/1986 16:52","86STATE227611","Secretary of State","SECRET","86ISLAMABAD15582","O R 211652Z JUL 86 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE ","S E C R E T STATE 227611 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: IR, IZ, PK SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ WAR: SITUATION IN TEHRAN REF: ISLAMABAD 15582 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES VERY MUCH MFA ADDITIONAL SECRETARY KHAN\'S READOUT OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN (REFTEL). WE AGREE WITH HIS GENERAL ASSESSMENT THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT THE IRANIAN SIDE IS READY TO MOVE TOWARD MEDIATION/NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WAR. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT HE IS CORRECT THAT A MAJOR IRANIAN OFFENSIVE SHOULD BE EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, IF IT CAN BE MANAGED LOGISTICALLY. WE WERE STRUCK, HOWEVER, AND VERY INTERESTED, IN HIS COMMENTS REGARDING IRANIAN MORALE AND DECREASING SUPPORT FOR THE REVOLUTION WHICH HE OBSERVED, BOTH IN TEHRAN AND THE COUNTRYSIDE. HIS OBSERVATION ON THE MODERATE GROUP AMONG THE CLERGY WAS ALSO OF GREAT INTEREST TO US. ON DOMESTIC IRANIAN ISSUES AS WELL AS ON MATTERS OF SHIA THEOLOGY AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE CLERGY AND THE GOVERNMENT, SUCH A GROUP HAS BEEN IDENTIFIABLE FOR SOME TIME. WE HAVE NOT SEEN, HOWEVER, RECENT EVIDENCE THAT ITS DIFFERENCES WITH THE DOMINANT, MORE RADICAL GROUP EXTENDED TO OPPOSITION TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. 3. WITH THAT AS BACKGROUND, WE WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY FOLLOWING UP WITH KHAN, FOCUSSING ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: -THE CHANGED ATMOSPHERE IN TEHRAN: ON WHAT DOES HE HINGE HIS JUDGMENT THAT THE MOOD TOWARD THE REVOLUTION OR THE WAR HAS CHANGED? SPECIFICALLY, WHAT ARE HIS GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE FRUSTRATIONS NOTED REFTEL EXTEND TO LOWER CLASS SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME AND ARE THUS NOT JUST A MIDDLE CLASS PHENOMENON? DO THE PAKISTANIS BELIEVE THEY HAVE A GOOD SENSE OF POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH TEHRAN, FOR EXAMPLE? (SOUTH TEHRAN IS THE LOWER CLASS RESIDENTIAL AREA OF THE CAPITAL, WHERE MANY OF THE RECENT MIGRANTS FROM THE COUNTRY LIVE). --ON WHAT BASIS DOES HE JUDGE THAT THE MOOD \"IN THE COUNTRYSIDE\" HAS CHANGED ALONG THE LINES OF THE MOOD IN TEHRAN? HOW DOES HE MEASURE/ASSESS THAT MOOD? --THE COMPOSITION OF THE MODERATE CLERICAL GROUP INTERESTS US. WHO ARE ITS LEADERS? PROMINENT SUPPORTERS? HOW DOES KHAN KNOW THEIR VIEWS ON THE WAR (AS OPPOSED TO DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS WHICH ARE SUBJECTS OF OPEN DEBATE)? DOES HE HAVE THE SENSE THAT THIS GROUP IS GROWING IN IMPORTANCE? AND, ABOVE ALL, DOES HE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE IRANIAN VIEW OF THE WAR IS A MATTER OF POTENTIAL DEBATE OR CONCEIVABLE CHANGE OF POLICY WHILE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI REMAINS IN ACTIVE CONTROL OF THE REGIME? IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT A MIDDLE GROUND MIGHT DEVELOP (OR EXISTS) WHEREBY IRAN WOULD ACCEPT AN END TO THE WAR AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM POWER, BUT NOT THE ELIMINATION OF BAATH PARTY CONTROL OF THE STATE? SHULTZ " "132","7/22/1986 11:22","86ISLAMABAD15762","Embassy Islamabad","SECRET","86ISLAMABAD15582\|86STATE227611","O 221122Z JUL 86 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5222 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE ","S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 15762 E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: IR IZ PK SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ WAR; SITUATION IN TEHRAN REF: (A) STATE 227611 (B) ISLAMABAD 15582 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION JULY 22, ADDITIONAL SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SHAHARYAR KHAN WAS WILLING TO EXPAND ON HIS INITIAL BRIEFING AND TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS RAISED IN REF A. SHAHARYAR MADE CLEAR THAT HIS COMMENTS WERE BASED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON CONVERSATIONS HE HAD HAD WITH PAKISTANI EMBASSY OFFICIALS, BUSINESSMEN AND MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES LIVING IN TEHRAN. HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN THERE FOR ONLY FIVE DAYS AND HAD MOVED AROUND THE CITY VERY LITTLE BUT, IN GENERAL WHAT HE HAD SEEN SEEMED TO BEAR OUT WHAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD. HE ADDED THAT THE PRIVATE PAKISTANI COMMUNITY IN TEHRAN IS LARGE, HAS PRETTY GOOD ACCESS, AND HAS BEEN IN PLACE FOR A LONG TIME. 3. SHAHARYAR STATED THAT HIS INITIAL COMMENTS ON THE GROWING DISENCHANTMENT OF THE POPULATION WERE MEANT TO ENCOMPASS THE LOWER CLASSES. TO HIM, THERE WOULD BE NOTHING NEW ABOUT DISAFFECTION AMONG THE BOURGEOIS ELEMENT; WHAT IS NEW IS THAT THE LOWER CLASSES, BOTH IN TEHRAN AND THE COUNTRYSIDE ARE INVOLVED. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY THIS WAS OCCURRING, HE POINTED TO THE CONSCRIPTION OF 12-13 YEAR OLDS AS THE MAJOR FACTOR, WITH PARENTS NOT BEING WILLING TO ACCEPT THE NECESSITY OF SUCH A MOVE. 4. HE HIMSELF HAD NOT BEEN OUTSIDE TEHRAN ON THIS TRIP. HOWEVER, PAKISTAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS CAN MOVE ABOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE WITH FEWER RESTRICTIONS THAN ALMOST ANY OTHER FOREIGNERS. (AS EVIDENCE, HE RECOUNTED AN ANECDOTE IN WHICH THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR WAS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE ON TO HIS SKIING DESTINATION AFTER HIS SCANDINAVIAN COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN TURNED BACK AT A LOCA CHECKPOINT.) THESE PAKISTANI SOURCES ARE IN AGREEMENT, HE SAID, THAT THE ORDINARY PEOPLE ARE INCREASINGLY DIS- ENCHANTED WITH THE WAR. 5. ACCORDING TO SHAHARYAR, THE \"MODERATE\" CLERICAL GROUP IS LED BY RAFSANJANI, PRESIDENT KHAMENEI AND FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI. HE DOUBTED THAT THEY HAD CONVEYED THEI VIEWS ON THE WAR DIRECTLY TO ANY PAKISTANI OFFICIALS BUT SAID THAT IT WAS RELATIVELY COMMON FOR IRANIAN THIRD PARTIES TO CHARACTERIZE THEIR VIEWS TO THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE LEADERS HAD YET OPENLY DEBATED ANY DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON THE WAR WITH THE AYATOLLAH KHOMENEI NOR DID HE THINK THAT KHOMENEI WAS LIKELY TO BE PERSUADED BY SUCH A DEBATE. AS TO ANY \"MIDDLE GROUND,\" IN SHAHARYAR\'S VIEW NO ONE IN IRAN, INCLUDING KHOMENEI, WOULD SERIOUSLY HOLD OUT FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE BAATH PARTY AS A PRECONDITION FOR ENDIN THE WAR EVEN THOUGH THIS HAS BEEN A PUBLIC IRANIAN DEMAND. HE RESTATED THAT WHAT THE MODERATES ARE LOOKING AT IS A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE THE DEPARTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM POWER. 6. SHAHARYAR WAS RELUCTANT TO MAKE ANY ESTIMATE AS TO WHETHER ONE GROUP OR ANOTHER AMONG THE CLERGY IS MOVING INTO THE ASCENDANT OR ABOUT THE POSSIBLE TIME BEYOND WHICH THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD NOT ENDURE. HE DID SAY THAT HIS OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL PAKISTANI CONTACTS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT ONE YEAR WAS ABOUT AS LONG AS THE PRESENT SITUATION COULD CONTINUE WITHOUT THE GOVERNMENT DOING SOMETHING TO RELIEVE THE GENERAL DISCONTENT BUT QUICKLY ADDED THAT HE HAD HEARD TOO MANY PREDICTIONS ABOUT IRAN IN THE PAST FOR HIM TO GIVE THEM MUCH CREDENCE. 7. SHAHARYAR SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI IS ANXIOUS TO VISIT ISLAMABAD PRIOR TO THE NAM MEETING IN HARARE AND THAT DATES IN THE SECOND OR THIRD WEEK OF AUGUST HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED (BUT NOT YET NAILED DOWN). ACCORDING TO HIM, THE GOI IS CONCERNED THAT IRAQ MAY BE HAVING SOME SUCCESS IN NAM CIRCLES ON A RESOLUTION THAT IRAN WOULD FIND ONESIDED AND IS ANXIOUS TO CONSULT WITH THE GOP ON THIS ISSUE. SHAHARYAR EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO PASS ON ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT IRAN IN THE FUTURE. MCCARTHY " "133","7/23/1986 13:01","86ANKARA7641","Embassy Ankara","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 231301Z JUL 86 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3112 INFO AMCONSUL ADANA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL AMCONSUL IZMIR AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD ","C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 07641 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, ETRD, TU, IR, IZ SUBJECT: IRAN-IRAQ: IRAQI DEBT REPAYMENT AND KHOMEINI\'S AIMS IN THE REGION 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: TURKEY IS CONSIDERING THE TERMS OF REPAYMENT OF IRAQI DEBTS, THE MFA OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR IRAN AND IRAQ , ONDER OZAR, SAID RECENTLY. ACCORDING TO THE MFA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA, KHOMEINI NOT ONLY WANTS TO OUST SADDAM HUSSEIN, HE IS DETERMINED TO ESTABLISH ISLAMIC REGIMES THROUGHOUT THE REGION, INCLUDING TURKEY. PM OZAL APPARENTLY IS LESS CONCERNED. END SUMMARY. 3. DURING A RECENT CALL ON THE MFA OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR IRAN AND IRAQ, ONDER OZAR, ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, POLCOUNS ASKED WHETHER TURKEY HAD DECIDED TO EXTEND TERMS FOR REPAYMENT OF THE CURRENT IRAQI DEBT AND THE ADDITIONAL CREDITS BAGHDAD IS SEEKING. OZAR SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER OZAL\'S TOP STAFF HAD MET TO CONSIDER THE CREDIT ISSUE ON SUNDAY, JULY 13, BUT THAT HE HAD NOT YET LEARNED THE OUTCOME OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID THAT A TURKISH DELEGATION WOULD SOON BE DISCUSSING THE QUESTION IN BAGHDAD. 4. ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED PRESS REPORTS OF JULY 18, THE TWO COUNTRIES REACHED AGREEMENT ON REPAYMENT TERMS ON JULY 17. IRAQ IS TO PAY 700 MILLION DOLLARS OF THE OUTSTANDING 1.5 BILLION DOLLARS IN CASH AND THE BALANCE, DEFERRED FOR ONE YEAR, WILL BE PAID IN THE FORM OF OIL IMPORTS TO TURKEY. FYI: A HIGH LEVEL TEAM LED BY UNDER SECRETARY PAKDEMIRLI SPENT JULY 16-20 IN BAGHDAD. EMBASSY IS SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT WITH AN APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIAL FOR A READOUT. END FYI. 5. OZAR WAS SURPRISINGLY SANGUINE OVER SADDAM HUSSEIN\'S PROSPECTS FOR STAYING IN POWER FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HE NOTED THAT THE KEY ISSUE FOR BOTH WARRING STATES, BUT ESPECIALLY FOR IRAQI MORALE, WAS NOT WHAT HE CALLED THE INDECISIVE MILITARY SITUATION, BUT DOMESTIC CONDITIONS AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY. 6. OZAR\'S BOSS, MFA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA, TEOMAN SURENKOK (PLEASE PROTECT), SOUNDED LESS CONFIDENT WHEN HE TOLD POLCOUNS HIS JUDGMENT THAT KHOMEINI WOULD NOT BE CONTENT MERELY TO OUST SADDAM HUSSEIN, BUT WAS DETERMINED TO ESTABLISH A REGIME LIKE HIS OWN IN IRAQ, AND THROUGHOUT THE REGION, \"INCLUDING TURKEY.\" SURENKOK WENT ON TO SAY, \"WE HAVE TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THIS IS A DANGER FOR TURKEY, BUT HE DISAGREES.\" 7. COMMENT: THE TURKS HAVE AN INTEREST IN AVOIDING AN ALARMING VIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WAR WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE THEIR CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQ OVER CREDIT TERMS. AT THE SAME TIME THE GOT WANTS TO AVOID INDICATIONS THAT THEIR SUBSTANTIAL STAKES IN IRAQ--INCLUDING THE PIPELINE AND OVER A BILLION DOLLARS IN OUTSTANDING DEBT--MIGHT BE IN JEOPARDY. STRAUSZ-HUPE " "134","7/25/1986 5:26","86ALEXANDRIA806","Consulate Alexandria","CONFIDENTIAL","86CAIRO15935","R 250526Z JUL 86 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6000 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALEXANDRIA 00806 FOR DEPT PASS INR/OIL/B; CAIRO PLS PASS AID E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINR, EG SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ALEXANDRIA\'S NEW GOVERNOR: FIRST IMPRESSIONS REF: CAIRO 15935 1. (C) SUMMARY: IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE CHARACTER OF THE NEW MAN ON THE ALEXANDRIA HOT SEAT. INITIAL IMPRESSIONS OF GOVERNOR GAWSAQI ARE FAVORABLE, ALTHOUGH KEY CONTACTS FEEL HE HAS INSUFFICIENT GRIT AND EXPERIENCE FOR THIS VERY TOUGH JOB. OTHERS CLAIM THAT AL GAWSAQI\'S ALLEGED \"SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP\" WITH MUBARAK WILL PAY THE GOVERNORATE MANY DIVIDENDS. END SUMMARY. 2. (U) TWO WEEKS AGO, SAYYID ISMAIL AL-GAWSAQI WAS APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF ALEXANDRIA (REFTEL). THE MOVE CAME AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE (HE IS RELATIVELY UNKNOWN), AND HE WAS NEVER EVEN MENTIONED AS BEING IN CONTENTION. SINCE HIS ARRIVAL IN ALEXANDRIA, AL-GAWSAQI HAS STAYED BUSY MEETING WITH GOVERNORATE OFFICIALS AND LEADING BUSINESSMEN. REQUESTS BY FOREIGNERS FOR MEETINGS WITH HIM WERE POLITELY, BUT FIRMLY, TURNED ASIDE, UNTIL JULY 24 WHEN THE LOCAL CONSULAR CORPS WAS FORMALLY INTRODUCED TO HIM. 3. (LOU) THE AFFAIR, CEREMONIAL IN NATURE, HELD NO SUBSTANCE ALTHOUGH IT GAVE THE CONSULS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS THE GOVERNOR\'S FLUENCY IN ARABIC, FRENCH, AND ENGLISH (HE WAS APOLOGETIC ABOUT HIS ABILITY IN THE LATTER TWO BUT GETS ALONG VERY WELL IN BOTH). HE SAID ALL THE RIGHT THINGS ABOUT FRIENDSHIP AND HIS DESIRE TO SOLVE MANY OF THE PROBLEMS AFFLICTING ALEXANDRIA. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, THOSE PRESENT SHOOK HANDS WITH THE GOVERNOR AS THEY FILED OUT OF HIS OFFICE. I MANAGED TO PLACE MYSELF AT THE END OF THE LINE (HARDER THAN IT SOUNDS AMONG MY PROTOCOL CONSCIOUS COLLEAGUES) AND, AS A RESULT, WAS ABLE TO HAVE A FEW WORDS WITH HIM. GAWSAQI SAID HE VERY MUCH WANTED TO HAVE GOOD COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. HE SAID HE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO STUDY THE DETIALS OF OUR VARIOUS AID PROJECTS, BUT HE IS AWARE THAT OUR CONTRIBUTION TO ALEXANDRIA IS CONSIDERABLE. HE WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO EMPHASIZE THAT HIS DOOR IS ALWAYS OPEN TO US, AND I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS SINCERE. 4. (C) FIRST IMPRESSION: GAWSAQI COMES ACROSS AS A SINCERELY EARNEST, HONEST, AND WELL MEANING OFFICIAL. SEVERAL OF OUR CONTACTS, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT HE MAY NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EXPERIENCE, GRIT, AND \"STREET SMARTS\" TO TACKLE ALEXANDRIA\'S VARIATED SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. \"GOOD INTEN- TIONS DON\'T NECESSARILY MAKE A GOOD GOVERNOR,\" ONE KEY BUSINESSMAN REMINDED US. 5. (C) OTHERS POINT OUT THAT GAWSAQI MAY PROVE TO BE A MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNOR THAN MANY EXPECT. THE REASON: HIS ALLEGED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK. AS REPORTED REFTEL, GAWSAQI SERVED FOR A TIME IN THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE. SEVERAL SOURCES TELL US THAT MUBARAK AND GAWSAQI WORKED TOGETHER IN THE EAF ON TWO OCCASIONS. IN THE 1960\'S, DURING THE TENURE OF SIDQI MAHMUD AS AIR FORCE COMMANDER, HE WAS ALLEGEDLY EAF LEGAL ADVISOR AND SHARED AN OFFICE WITH MUBARAK WHO WAS WORKING AS AN AIDE TO THE COMMANDER (COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST I HAVE HEARD THAT MUBARAK EVER HAD SUCH A JOB, AND OUR MEAGER BIO FILES FAIL TO SHED ANY FURTHER LIGHT. PERHAPS INR/B CAN. END COMMENT.) WHETHER OR NOT THIS STORY IS APOCRYPHAL, MUBARAK KNEW GAWSAQI AGAIN AFTER HE BECAME EAF COMMANDER IN THE MID-1970\'S AND WAS APPARENTLY VERY IMPRESSED WITH HIS ABILITY. 6. (C) ANOTHER STORY WHICH IS CIRCULATING ALSO UNDERSCORES CLOSE LINKAGES BETWEEN THE TWO MEN: A FEW YEARS AGO, THE PRESIDENT APPARENTLY WANTED TO APPOINT GAWSAQI ATTORNEY GENERAL, A KEY POST IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM HERE. THE NOMINATION WAS THWARTED BY THE JUDGES REVIEWING THE NOMINATION BECAUSE THE ATTORNEY ENERAL MUST, ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN LAW, BE DRAWN FROM HE COURT OF CASSATION (ONE OF THE TWO HIGHEST COURTS). AWSAQI WAS SUBSEQUENTLY APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF BENI UQAYF. DURING A VISIT TO THIS GOVERNORATE, MUBARAK AS SUPPOSEDLY VERY IMPRESSED WITH HIS FRIEND\'S DMINISTRATION, AND ON JULY 10 HE REWARDED HIM WITH LEXANDRIA. HAMBLEY 7. (C) ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION INR CAN SHED ON GAWSAQI WOULD BE APPRECIATED. NUMEROUS PHOTOS WERE TAKEN DURING THE JULY 24 CONSULAR CORPS PRESENTATION, AND WE WILL FORWARD ONE OF THE GOVERNOR AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE A COPY. INR MAY ALSO WISH TO NOTE THAT GAWSAQI SERVED A SHORT TIME IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND MAY HAVE HAD A BRIEF POSTING IN THE U.S. HAMBLEY " "135","8/11/1986 11:49","86SOFIA3382","Embassy Sofia","CONFIDENTIAL","86SOFIA3170\|86SOFIA3356","R 111149Z AUG 86 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5906 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA DIA WASHDC","C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 03382 SIPDIS E.O. 12356: OADR TAGS: PHUM, PINR, BU, TU SUBJECT: ROUND-UP OF BULGARIAN TURKS REF: (A) SOFIA 3356, (B) SOFIA 3170 1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. EMBOFF CALLED AUGUST 8 ON TAHSIN BURCUOGLU (PROTECT), COUNSELOR (AND THIRD RANKING OFFICER) AT THE TURKISH EMBASSY IN SOFIA, TO SEEK CONFIRMATION OF AND ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON A REPORTED RECENT ROUND-UP AND ARREST OF ETHNIC-TURKISH BULGARIANS (REF A). WITHOUT REFERENCE TO REF A REPORT, EMBOFF STEERED DISCUSSION OF OTHER TOPICS (SEPTELS) AROUND TO WHETHER THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT WEEKS REGARDING BULGARIAN TURKS. IN HIS RESPONSE, BURCUOGLU MADE NO REFERENCE TO A SUDDEN WAVE OF ARRESTS. - 3. IN FURTHER CONVERSATION, BURCUOGLU DID REFER TO BULGARIAN TURKS RECENTLY RELEASED FROM BELENE ISLAND PRISON AND THEN EXILED TO KYUSTENDIL AND VRATSA (EVIDENTLY THE CASES ALSO MENTIONED BY SOURCE OF REF A). CONFIDENTIAL SIPDIS CONFIDENTIAL SIPDIS PAGE 02 SOFIA 03382 111320Z HE SAID THAT NO SPECIFIC TERM OF YEARS FOR SUCH EXILE HAD BEEN STATED. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION OF WHETHER BULGARIA WAS PURSUING A POLICY OF RESETTLING SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF ETHNIC TURKS, BURCUOGLU INDICATED HIS BELIEF THAT SUCH FORCED RESETTLEMENTS ON A LIMITED SCALE HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT SINCE EVEN BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE 1984-85 NAME-CHANGING CAMPAIGN. HE SAID THAT ON A 1985 TRIP TO VELIKO TURNOVO, HE WAS TOLD BY ETHNIC TURKISH CONTACTS THAT TWO HUNDRED FAMILIES (PROBABLY 800-1000 PEOPLE) HAD BEEN UPROOTED FROM THE TURKISH QUARTER OF THAT CITY AND RESETTLED ELSEWHERE. HE HAD BEEN SHOWN THE VACANT HOUSES OF SOME OF THE FAMILIES INVOLVED. HE ALSO REFERRED TO A MORE RECENT CASE OF A YOUNG ETHNIC TURK WHO, ALONG WITH OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS, WAS FORCIBLY RESETTLED FROM THE PLOVDIV AREA AFTER ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT THE TURKISH CONSULATE IN PLOVDIV. - 4. COMMENT. THIS EMBASSY\'S DIRECT CONTACT WITH ETHNIC TURKS WORKING INVOLUNTARILY OUTSIDE THEIR PLACE OF ORIGIN REMAINS LIMITED TO TWO CASES (REF B). THUS ALTHOUGH A POLICY OF RESETTLING ETHNIC TURKS, ESPECIALLY \"TROUBLE-MAKERS,\" IS PLAUSIBLE AND WAS INDEED THREATENED IN A 1985 INTERVIEW GIVEN BY BULGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES CHAIRMAN ANGEL BALEVSKI, WE CANNOT YET CONFIRM THAT SUCH A POLICY HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN MORE THAN POSSIBLY ISOLATED CASES. A CURRENT SERIES OF TRIPS BY EMBOFFS TO \"NON-TURKISH\" REGIONS OF BULGARIA MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO INQUIRE WHETHER ANY MOVEMENT OF ETHNIC TURKS HAS OCCURRED. 5. BIO NOTE: BURCUOGLU APPEARS TO BE IN HIS FORTIES AND SPEAKS GOOD, ALTHOUGH OCCASIONALLY LABORED, ENGLISH. HE MENTIONED THAT, DURING A PREVIOUS TOUR OF DUTY IN CONFIDENTIAL SIPDIS CONFIDENTIAL SIPDIS PAGE 03 SOFIA 03382 111320Z IRAN, HE WAS SENT BY HIS AMBASSADOR (\"BECAUSE I SPOKE SOME FARSI AND AZERI TURKISH\") ONTO THE GROUNDS OF THE US EMBASSY IN TEHRAN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE 1979 HOSTAGE SEIZURE. BECAUSE HE WAS SHOUTING \"DEATH TO AMERICA\" AND \"ALLAHU AKBAR,\" HE WAS ADMITTED TO THE EMBASSY GROUNDS AND WAS NOT HINDERED IN HIS OBSERVATIONS. RICKERT CONFIDENTIAL SIPDIS " "136","9/8/1986 14:33","86ANKARA9130","Embassy Ankara","UNCLASSIFIED","","P 081433Z SEP 86 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3869 INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY AMCONSUL IZMIR PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY ALL NATO CAPITALS EUROPEAN POLADS COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY NICOSIA HQ16THAF TORREJON AB SP//CCE// USDELMC BRUSSELS BE 39TACG INCIRLIK TU//CC/PA// TUSLOG DET 33-3 ISKENDERUN CDRSETAF/5TH VICENZA IT//AESE-GIC// USAFOS HURLBURT FLD FL/EDOD// USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT 628MAS INCIRLIK TU HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XP//PA// USNMR SHAPE BE//P10// ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 00 ANKARA 09130 USINFO FOR P/M; EU; VOA-SMITH E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, TU SUBJECT: ISTANBUL SYNAGOGUE ATTACK: PRESS COVERAGE 1. THIS MESSAGE INCLUDES USIS CURRENT MEDIA REACTION. 2. SUMMARY: IN PRESS COVERAGE, EDITORIALS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS TURKISH REACTION TO THE BOMBING OF NEVE SHALOM SYNAGOGUE IN ISTANBUL HAS BEEN ONE OF SHOCK AND HORROR - AND CAUTION. THE PRIME MINISTER \"DAMNED\" THE ATTACK AS \"BACKSTABBING,\" BUT THEN DECLARED THAT NO EVIDENCE LINKED IT TO LIBYA AND WARNED ISRAEL AGAINST RETALIATION. THE PRESS HIGHLIGHTED CONDEMNATIONS OF THE BOMBING BY THE PLO, LIBYA AND IRAN. SPECULATION IS RIFE, BUT FACTS ARE FEW AND FAR BETWEEN. END SUMMARY 3. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE ISTANBUL NEVE SHALOM SYNAGOGUE ATTACK BEGAN ON SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 7 WITH FEW FACTS OTHER THAN THOSE REPORTED IN THE WORLD PRESS. AMID BLOODY PHOTOGRAPHS OF DISMEMBERED CORPSES, PAPERS HEADLINED THEIR STORIES \"LAKE OF BLOOD,\" \"MASSACRE,\" \"MONSTROSITY,\" ETC. THE TERRORISTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS \"ARABS\" BY 17-YEAR OLD SURVIVOR GABRIEL SHAUL, WHO SAID HE HEARD THEM SPEAKING ARABIC. \"MILLIYET\" MADE THE FOLLOWING SPECULATION: \"ACCORDING TO THE INITIAL EVIDENCE, THE ATTACK ON THE SYNAGOGUE MIGHT BE AN EXTENSION OF THE EVENTS IN KARACHI. THE FACT THAT BOTH OCCURRENCES USED THE SAME METHOD OF OPERATION REINFORCES THIS OPINION. EXPERTS ON TERRORISM DISCOUNT THE POLICE\'S BELIEF THAT THE ATTACK WAS CARRIED OUT SOLELY BY TWO SUICIDE COMMANDOS.\" THE PAPER ALSO CARRIED A STATEMENT BY INTERIOR MINISTER YILDIRIM AKBULUT THAT, \"THE PRAYER HALL WAS 20 METERS BY 30. THE TYPE OF BOMB THE TERRORISTS USED HAS AN EFFECTIVE RANGE OF 50 METERS. THEREFORE I CAN SAY THAT THE TERRORISTS CERTAINLY CAME WITH THE AIM OF MOUNTING A SUICIDE ATTACK.\" ALL PAPERS NOTED THAT SATURDAY SAW THE FIRST RELIGIOUS SERVICES HELD IN THE SYNAGOGUE AFTER SIX MONTHS OF RENOVATION. 4. WITH THE FIRST NEWS CAME THE FIRST REACTIONS. AFTER AN EMERGENCY CABINET MEETING, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE ACTION. PRESIDENT KENAN EVREN STATED, \"AS A NATION WE REACT WITH PROFOUND ABHORRENCE.\" PRIME MINISTER TURGUT OZAL SENT A MESSAGE TO TURKEY\'S CHIEF RABBI DAVID ASSEO REPORTEDLY BEGINNING, \"TURKEY VIOLENTLY DAMNS (SIC) THIS BACKSTABBING ATTACK,\" AND ANNOUNCED, \"IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO DO SUCH A THING TO THOSE PRAYING IN THE HOUSE OF GOD.\" SHP CHAIRMAN ERDAL INONU CALLED THE EVENT \"HORRIBLE,\" AND WARNED THE GOVERNMENT TO \"ACT SERIOUSLY,\" AS \"CONDEMNATION IS NOT ENOUGH.\" FORMER PRIMIN ECEVIT IS QUOTED IN ALL PAPERS AS SAYING, \"JUST AS THOSE WHO CARRIED OUT THIS ACT HAVE NO RELATION TO HUMANITY, THEY ALSO HAVE NO RELATION TO ISLAM, FOR ISLAM DICTATES RESPECT FOR ALL RELIGIONS.\" 5. SUNDAY\'S \"CUMHURIYET\" INCLUDED A PAGE-1 STORY ENTITLED \"PLO CONDEMNS.\" PLO ANKARA REPRESENTATIVE ABU FIRAS RELEASED A STATEMENT FROM PLO NUMBER 2 MAN ABU IYAD CONDEMNING THE ACTION AND ADDING, \"THIS SORT OF TERRORIST ACTION BENEFITS NO ONE BUT THE ZIONISTS.\" THE PAPER ALSO CARRIED SHIMON PERES\' HOPE THAT \"THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WILL DO ALL IT MUST TO FIND THE KILLERS AND BRING THEM TO JUSTICE.\" MEANWHILE, FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS WERE QUOTED IN \"HURRIYET\" AS SAYING THAT THERE WERE THREE POSSIBLE MOTIVES FOR THE ATTACK: 1) A REACTION TO TURKEY\'S IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL; 2) THE ISLAMIC CIHAD TRYING TO SPREAD INSTABILITY; AND 3) OPPOSITION TO ARAFAT\'S SOFTENING THE PATRIARCHATE.\" OKTAY EKSI, SEPT. 8 \"HURRIYET\": THESE ACTS ARE WELL PLANNED, AND BEHIND THE PLANNERS THERE ARE GREAT POWERS. LOTS OF MONEY IS SPENT. WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONNECTION TO THIS LAST EVENT, LET ME SAY THAT JUST FOR THIS KIND OF ACTION THE CIA SPENT $500 MILLION IN 1986... THE SYNAGOGUE HAD BEEN CLOSED FOR SIX MONTHS; THE FIRST IMPORTANT PRAYER AFTER THE RENOVATION WAS THAT DAY. IN OTHER WORDS, SOMEONE HAD FOLLOWED DEVELOPMENTS AT THE SYNAGOGUE CLOSELY.\" 10. OTHER MEDIA REACTION: -- HALUK ULMAN OF HURRIYET (CIRC. 588,490 - MASS APPEAL/INDEPENDENT), \"THE LOGIC BEHIND THE MASSACRE\": \" ... IN OTHER WORDS, THE RECENT U.S. CLAMOR AGAINST LIBYA AIMS FOR \'DETERRENCE.\' BUT EVIDENTLY IT IS FAR FROM BEING SUCCESSFUL. BECAUSE, AS IT WAS DEMONSTRATED ONCE MORE, AND CONTRARY TO WHAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES, LIBYA DOES NOT HAVE THE PRESUMED LEVEL OF INFLUENCE ON MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.... ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED, THE PERPETRATORS OF BOTH THE PAN AM AND NEVE SHALOM INCIDENTS ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS BASED IN LEBANON. ONE OF THE REASONS BEHIND THE FAILURE TO CURB VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS THE EXISTENCE OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, AND THE SECOND ONE IS THE CHAOS IN LEBANON. ISRAEL HAD TRIED TO FILL THAT VOID BY INVADING SOUTHERN LEBANON AND TRYING TO ESTABLISH A PRO-ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION THERE. BUT IT FAILED, DESPITE THE SUPPORT FROM THE U.S., AND WITHDREW. LET\'S SEE WHAT THE ISRAELI REACTION WILL BE. IT WOULD NOT BE A SURPRISE IF LEBANON-ISRAEL RELATIONS BECOME MUCH MORE NOISY THAN AMERICAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS.\" -- ZAFER ATAY OF TERCUMAN (CIRC. 273,364 -CONSERVATIVE), \"THOSE BEHIND THE TERRORISM\": \" ... IRAN SUPPORTS SHIITE-ORIGINATED TERRORISM.... SYRIA IS THE GUARDIAN OF THE SEPARATIST BANDITS, ASALA, ISLAMIC JIHAD; AND ABU NIDAL.... THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT LIBYA IS ALSO IN THIS.... I WOULD LIKE TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION THAT ALL THE RECENT TERRORIST INCIDENTS HAVE A CONNECTION TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT SECTOR.\" -- TEOMAN EREL OF MILLIYET (CIRC. 255,822 -LIBERAL), \"ARE WE READY FOR THE CRISIS?\": \" .... IT SEEMS THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF THIS INHUMAN ATTACK RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM MYSTERIOUS HELPERS LIVING IN TURKEY. HOW DID THE TERRORISTS KNOW THAT THE SYNAGOGUE WOULD BE OPEN ON THE DAY OF THEIR ATTACK AFTER A LONG PERIOD OF REPAIR? ARE THERE PEOPLE WHO TRY TO COVER UP THE WHOLE INCIDENT BY SAYING THAT \'THEY COMMITTED SUICIDE, THERE WERE ONLY TWO PERSONS, AND ALSO NOTHING MORE WAS FOUND,\' OR HAVE THOSE PEOPLE WHO USED TO TELL THE STORY THAT TERRORISM WOULD ONLY COME FROM THE LEFT, THOSE WHO BLAMED INONU AND THE SHP EVEN FOR THE PKK (KURDISH SEPARATIST) TERRORISM, FOUND THEMSELVES IN A DIFFICULT POSITION NOW THAT THE NAME OF ISLAM IS INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT? ... WHILE WE ARE TRYING TO DOWNPLAY IT FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION, WE MAY FOUND OURSELVES IMMERSED IN THE \'NEW\' MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.\" - GUNERI CIVAOGLU OF GUNES (CIRC. 195,613 -POPULAR/FAMILY), \"TERROR\": \" ... IT IS WRONG TO SEE TERRORISM AND THE STRUGGLE BY THE STATE AGAINST IT AS ONLY A MATTER OF \'WEAPONS\' ... AND \'POLICE MEASURES\'. THIS KIND OF APPROACH CAN ONLY BE IN THE SCRIPTS OF COWBOY FILMS.... THIS IS A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL, BLOODY GAME, EXTENDING FROM FULL-SCALE DEMOCRACY TO ALL THE YEARNING FOR FREEDOMS ... ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, HOPES ... FOREIGN CONNECTIONS AND AGENTS IN THE EVENTS ... ARMS SMUGGLERS, MAFIA FATHERS, SECRET HANDS IN DRUG TRAFFICKING.\" -- HASAN CEMAL OF CUMHURIYET (CIRC. 112, 673 -LEFT OF CENTER), \"WHAT CAN BE DONE?\": \" ... WE SAY THAT ALL THE POLITICAL POWERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONVERGE ON THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR ON THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM; THEY SHOULD BELIEVE IN THE NECESSITY FOR SOLIDARITY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TYRANNY AND VIOLENCE; THEY SHOULD START A REAL, CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE AMONG THEMSELVES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.\" -- ERGUN BALCI OF CUMHURIYET, \"SYNAGOGUE MASSACRE\": \" ... THE ATTACKS ON PAN AM AND THE SYNAGOGUE IN ISTANBUL SEEM TO HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO LEAD TO SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTS.... THE BOMBING OF LIBYA BY THE U.S. MAY BE CONSIDERED CERTAIN IF EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFFAIR IS FOUND. AS A MATTER OF FACT, WASHINGTON DOES NOT NEED EVIDENCE LIKE THIS IF IT HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO BOMB LIBYA.... ISRAEL MAY RETALIATE AGAINST SYRIA IN SIMILAR FASHION IF IT FOUND PROOF OF SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SYNAGOGUE AFFAIR. IN PARALLEL WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS, INTENSIFICATION OF ATTEMPTS TO PUSH TURKEY INTO A CRISIS AND TO PULL TURKEY AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND PLO FURTHER APART MAY BE EXPECTED. A SERIES OF GLOOMY DEVELOPMENTS IS TAKING PLACE. AND THIS IS ONLY THE BEGINNING.\" -- MEHMET BARLAS OF MILLIYET REPORTED ON AN INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER OZAL IN A COLUMN ENTITLED \"THE AIM IS TO PULL US INTO THE MIDDLE-EASTERN CRISIS,\" IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THE FOLLOWING: \" ... IF SOME STATES SUPPORT AND INCITE TERRORISM, THIS MUST NOT BE TOLERATED. TURKEY HAS DECLARED ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT IT WILL NOT TOLERATE THE ACTIONS OF THOSE STATES--IF THERE ARE ANY--WHICH PERPETRATE TERRORISM ON TURKISH SOIL AND DIRECT IT AT TURKISH CITIZENS. FURTHERMORE, THOSE CIRCLES WHICH HOPE TO PULL TURKEY INTO THE CONFLICTS OF THE MIDDLE-EAST WILL CERTAINLY BE DISAPPOINTED.... TURKEY WILL NOT FEEL DISPLEASURE IF MORE THAN ONE STATE, IN LINE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS\' PRINCIPLES AND BASED ON THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE, CHOOSE TO ACT AGAINST THOSE STATES WHICH SUPPORT AND INCITE TERRORISM\". STRAUSZ-HUPE " "137","9/16/1986 10:43","86CAIRO21221","Embassy Cairo","SECRET","","O 161043Z SEP 86 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7648 INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 21221 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINS, PINR, EG SUBJECT: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: EAGER FOR U.S. CONTACTS, FEARFUL OF GOE 1. S-ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY. THREE STRONG IMPRESSIONS EMERGED FROM EMBOFF\'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON THE NEW MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADERSHIP SEPTEMBER 10: (1) CURRENT LEADERSHIP IS KEEN TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY; (2) AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS VERY WORRIED ABOUT AVOIDING PROBLEMS WITH THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR; AND (3) NEW SUPREME GUIDE ABUL NASR APPEARS MORE A FIGUREHEAD THAN THE REAL POWER WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP, WHO MAY BE DEPUTY MUSTAFA MASHHUR. END SUMMARY. 3. POLOFF AND POL FSN MADE FIRST OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADERSHIP SINCE DEATH LAST MAY OF PREVIOUS SUPREME GUIDE OMAR TALMASSANI, MEETING AT OFFICES PREVIOUSLY USED BY BANNED MB MAGAZINE AL-DA\'WA SEPTEMBER 10. CORDIAL BUT SHORT MEETING WAS DEVOTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO WHY THE MEETING COULD NOT TAKE PLACE AT GREATER LENGTH AS PLANNED. DEPUTY SUPREME GUIDE MUSTAFA MASHHUR HAD POSITIVELY AND PROMPTLY RESPONDED TO EMBASSY REQUEST SEPTEMBER 9 FOR THE CALL ON NEW SUPREME GUIDE MUHAMMED HAMAD ABUL NASR, BUT HAD ASKED EMBASSY TO SECURE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CLEARANCE. WISHING TO AVOID THE PRECEDENT OF REQUESTING SUCH ADVANCE CLEARANCE FOR DIPLOMATIC WORK, EMBOFF APPEARED AT THE APPOINTED TIME AND PLACE WITHOUT MININT CLEARANCE. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE CALL WAS ROUTINE COURTESY CALL. 4. MASHHUR AND ABUL NASR CORDIALLY WELCOMED POLOFF AND FSN, OFFERED THE CUSTOMARY SWEETS, AND MET WITH THEM FOR ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES. HOWEVER, IN THE PRESENCE OF A MALE SECRETARY TAKING APPARENTLY VERBATIM NOTES, MASHHUR AND ABUL NASR REPEATEDLY INSISTED ON THE NEED FOR THE EMBASSY TO SECURE WRITTEN PERMISSION FOR THE MB TO MEET WITH EMBOFFS -- INSISTING EQUALLY STRONGLY UPON THEIR WELCOME OF CONTINUED CONTACTS WITH THE EMBASSY. THEY STATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MEET EMBOFF AT LENGTH ASAP -- EVEN LATER THE SAME DAY, OR IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS -- PROVIDED THE WRITTEN PERMISSION WAS FORTHCOMING FROM THE MININT. THEY EXPLAINED THAT IN THE PAST THE GOE HAD PROVIDED VERBAL APPROVAL FOR MB CONTACTS WITH THE BRITISH EMBASSY, AND YET HAD CITED THESE CONTACTS AS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES WHEN IT FOUND THIS USEFUL AGAINST THE MB. POLOFF NOTED, TO NO AVAIL, THAT EMBASSY OFFICERS HAD HAD PERIODIC TALKS WITH TALMASSANI IN THE TWO YEARS PRECEDING HIS DEATH. MB INTERLOCUTORS CONCEDED THIS POINT, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EMBASSY MAINTAINS CONTACTS EVEN WITH POLITICAL OPPOSITION FIGURES IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF ITS WORK, AND NOTED THAT THE MB IS ALSO FREE TO MEET WITH JOURNALISTS . NONETHELESS, THEY INSISTED THAT EGYPTIAN LAW REQUIRES THE MB TO SECURE PERMISSION TO MEET REPRESENTATIVES OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE CAREFUL TO ASK THAT EMBASSY SECURE A GENERAL MININT CLEARANCE THAT WOULD PERMIT REPEATED CONTACTS WITH MORE THAN ONE EMBASSY OFFICER, SO THAT WRITTEN PERMISSION WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE OBTAINED FOR EACH MEETING. 5. POLOFF EXPRESSED FULL RESPECT FOR EGYPTIAN LAW AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD\'S CONCERNS. HE STATED HIS HOPE THAT THE ISSUE COULD BE RESOLVED QUICKLY TO PERMIT AN EARLY RETURN MEETING FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROMOTING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. BEFORE TAKING LEAVE, HE ALSO CONVEYED EMBASSY\'S RESPECT FOR THOSE PRESENT AND FOR THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN EGYPTIAN SOCIETY. MASHHUR AND ABUL NASR RESPONDED WARMLY AND AGAIN STATED THEIR WELCOME FOR CONTACTS WITH THE EMBASSY, \"BOTH AS MUSLIMS AND AS ARABS.\" 6. IMPRESSIONS FROM THIS EXCHANGE: (1) THE MB IS EAGER TO STEP UP CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY. WE CAN ONLY SURMISE THAT, APART FROM WHATEVER IDEOLOGICAL THINKING THIS DESIRE MAY REFLECT, ONE MOTIVE MAY BE TO ADD TO THE MB\'S LEGITIMACY AS A POLITICAL ENTITY. (2) THE SUCCESSOR LEADERSHIP IS MORE CONCERNED TO STAY CLEAR OF PROBLEMS WITH THE GOE. TALMASSANI HAD NOT REQUESTED PRIOR CLEARANCE, AT LEAST NOT VIA THIS EMBASSY, FOR HIS SEVERAL CONTACTS WITH EMBOFFS. A SEPARATE CONVERSATION BETWEEN POLOFF AND A JOURNALIST CONNECTED TO THE MB INDICATED THAT THE MB IS VERY CONCERNED OVER THE RECENT WELL-PUBLICIZED ARRESTS OF NON-MB FUNDAMENTALISTS. THIS APPARENT GOE CRACKDOWN ON NON-MB FUNDAMENTALISTS MAY BE ONE FACTOR BEHIND THE MB\'S UNPRECEDENTED INSISTENCE UPON MININT CLEARANCE TO MEET WITH US. (3) MB LEADERSHIP APPEARED TO LACK SELF CONFIDENCE AND COHESION. THIS MAY BE ANOTHER FACTOR BEHIND ITS CAUTION. ABUL NASR APPEARED PHYSICALLY FRAIL AND MORE A FIGUREHEAD THAN THE DOMINANT PRESENCE IN THE MEETING. HIS COMPLEXION WAS SALLOW AND HIS WESTERN BUSINESS SUIT HUNG ON HIM LOOSELY. HIS VOICE WAS RASPY AND UNSTEADY, AND HIS VERY THICK EYEGLASSES MAY INDICATE FAILING VISION. ALTHOUGH ABUL NASR SAT IN THE POSITION OF HONOR BEHIND A DESK, MASHHUR, ACROSS THE ROOM ON A COUCH, WAS THE MORE IMPOSING FIGURE. MASHHUR, APPARENTLY IN HIS MID-SIXTIES, WAS RESPECTFUL -- HE DID NOT INTERRUPT ABUL NASR -- BUT NOT DEFERENTIAL. HE CLEARLY DOMINATED THE CONVERSATION WITH STEADY VOICE AND EYECONTACT, AND THE MB NOTETAKER LOOKED REPEATEDLY TOWARD MASHHUR AS HE TRANSCRIBED THE CONVERSATION. MOREOVER, OUTER OFFICE MB STAFF COMMENTS TO POLOFF OF PROFOUND REGRET OVER LOSS OF TALMASSANI SEEMED INTENDED TO CONVEY PERCEPTIONS OF ABUL NASR\'S INADEQUACY AS A SUCCESSOR. 7. WE DO NOT INTEND TO GET IN THE MIDDLE BETWEEN THE SHAKY MB LEADERSHIP AND GOE. BEYOND ITS OWN CONCERNS, TALMASSANI\'S SUCCESSORS MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO USE US TO TEST WHETHER THE MININT IS READY TO BESTOW LEGITIMACY UPON THE MB. THROUGH CASUAL LOW KEY CONTACTS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, WE INTEND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR NORMAL DIPLOMATIC WORK HERE INCLUDES CONTACTS ACROSS THE WIDE SPECTRUM OF EGYPTIAN SOCIETY. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PURSUE CONTACTS WITH THE MB, MAKING CLEAR TO THEM ALSO THAT WE HAVE REMINDED THE MFA OF OUR GENERAL APPROACH. WISNER " "138","9/17/1986 9:51","86ANKARA9557","Embassy Ankara","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 170951Z SEP 86 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4084 INFO AMCONSUL ADANA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL AMCONSUL IZMIR AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ","C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 09557 E.O. 12356: DECL/OADR TAGS: PREL, PTER, TU, IS SUBJECT: MFA SPECULATION ON MOTIVES FOR NEVE SHALOM ATTACK 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. DURING A LUNCHEON ON SEPTEMBER 15, MFA OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR THE LEVANT AND NORTH AFRICA, SOLMAZ UNAYDIN, OBVIOUSLY STILL APPALLED AT THE WANTON SLAUGHTER, TOLD POLOFF THAT THE MFA IS AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN THE MOTIVES FOR THE NEVE SHALOM MASSACRE. CONSIDERING THE PECULIAR AWFULNESS IN MUSLIM EYES OF KILLING PEOPLE AT PRAYER, SHE SAID, IT WAS HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHAT ANY ARAB OR OTHER MUSLIM GROUP COULD HAVE HOPED TO GAIN. THE OFFICIAL ADMITTED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT SOME MILITANT GROUP COULD HAVE WISHED TO EMBROIL TURKEY IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, BUT SHE BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN ONLY A SUBSIDIARY MOTIVE. SIMILARLY, SHE ARGUED THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN PARTLY AN ATTEMPT TO SEPARATE TURKEY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR--LESS LIKELY--ISRAEL. THIS WAS NOT THE MOST PROBABLE THEORY, SHE CONTENDED, BECAUSE THE PREDICTABLE NET EFFECT WOULD HAVE BEEN WHAT IN FACT TRANSPIRED, INCREASED COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM AMONG THE THREE NATIONS, AND A GREATER IMPETUS TOWARD SIMILAR COOPERATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES. 3. MRS. UNAYDIN BELIEVES THAT IT IS MOST SIGNIFICANT THAT WITHIN ONLY A FEW DAYS BOTH TURKEY AND PAKISTAN, THE MOST STABLE AND MODERATE MUSLIM ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE REGION, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ATTACKED IN THIS WAY. SHE SPECULATED THAT THE TERRORIST ACTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO EMBARRASS THE TWO STATES, AND TO CONSTITUTE SOME SORT OF WARNING AGAINST THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS OR AGAINST ANY ACTIONS CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF MILITANT MUSLIMS. 4. WHILE SHE COULD NOT SAY WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE, UNAYDIN ASKED POLOFF WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAD ANY BETTER INFORMATION THAN TURKEY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT ABU NIDAL HAD BEEN BEHIND THE TWO EVENTS. THEY BOTH SEEMED TO BEAR HIS GROUP\'S HALLMARKS: CAREFUL PLANNING AND EXECUTION. STRAUSZ-HUPE " "139","9/20/1986 10:04","86ALEXANDRIA1048","Consulate Alexandria","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 201004Z SEP 86 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6131 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALEXANDRIA 01048 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT) E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PGOV, SOCI, PINS, PINR, EG SUBJECT: THE \"AL-AHRAR\" PARTY IN ALEXANDRIA: THE ISLAMIC RIGHT RESURGENT 1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT. - 2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: ONE OF THE MORE INTERESTING PHENOMENA WITHIN EGYPT\'S ESTABLISHED OPPOSITION PARTIES OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS HAS BEEN THE TRANSFORMATION WITHIN THE \"LIBERALS\" OR \"AL-AHRAR\" PARTY. THROUGHOUT THE 1970\'S AND EARLY 1980\'S, THE PARTY WAS PROBABLY THE MOST BOURGEOIS AND PRO-WESTERN OF THE LEGAL OPPOSITION PARTIES (IT INITIALLY EVEN SUPPORTED CAMP DAVID, SUPPORT FOR WHICH HAS SINCE BEEN ABROGATED). THE PARTY\'S WEEKLY NEWSPAPER WAS WIDELY READ IN ALEXANDRIA, ESPECIALLY PRIOR TO THE RE-PUBLICATION OF \"AL-WAFD\" NEWSPAPER WHICH NOW WINS LOCAL POPULARITY CONTESTS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR, THE PARTY HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY RADICALIZED BY A GROUP OF ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS WHO ARE EXPANDING THEIR DOMINANCE OF THE PARTY STRUCTURE. THE POST HAS RECENTLY ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH A MEMBER OF \"AL-AHRAR\'S\" POLITBURO WHO OPPOSES THE INCREASED ISLAMICIZATION AND WHO HAS DESCRIBED FOR US SOME OF THE RECENT CHANGES IN THE PARTY. THIS SOURCE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT RELIGION FOR MANY OF EGYPT\'S YOUNG PEOPLE IS ONLY A FAD, BUT SHE STILL COULD NOT CONCEAL HER CONCERN OVER WHAT HAS OCCURRED WITHIN THE \"AL-AHRAR\" PARTY. IT IS FAR TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THESE CHANGES WILL ALTER SIGNIFICANTLY THE MINUTE STANDING THE \"AL-AHRAR\" PARTY HAS ON EGYPT\'S POLITICAL MAP, ALTHOUGH ITS IMPACT HAS BEEN FELT IN ALEXANDRIA. AT A MINIMUM, THE INFUSION OF DYNAMIC, YOUNGER BLOOD INTO AN ORGANIZATION WHICH HAD ALMOST CEASED TO EXIST POLITICALLY IS CERTAIN TO INVIGORATE THE LOCAL POLITICAL PROCESS IN FUTURE POPULAR COUNCIL ELECTIONS AND TO GIVE THE SQUABBLING AND DIVIDED LOCAL NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY SOMETHING ELSE TO THINK ABOUT. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. - 3. TRADITIONALLY, THE \"AL-AHRAR\" PARTY (OR \"THE LIBERALS\") HAS ENJOYED ONLY A SMALL FOLLOWING IN ALEXANDRIA. ITS MODERATELY LEFTIST, PRO-WESTERN POLICIES HAD CONSIDERABLE APPEAL TO BUSINESSMEN, SMALL MERCHANTS, AND THE MIDDLE CLASS GENERALLY, BUT THESE SAME ELEMENTS TENDED TO SUPPORT EITHER THE RULING NDP OR THE \"WAFD\". - 4. THE POST\'S ATTENTION TO RECENT CHANGES WITHIN \"AL-AHRAR\" DEVELOPED FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SHAYKH SALAH ABU ISMAIL WAS PLANNING TO ADDRESS THE PARTY FAITHFUL IN ALEXANDRIA ON SEPTEMBER 11, A DATE WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE PERES-MUBARAK SUMMIT. FOR SEVERAL YEARS, ABU ISMAIL HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MORE ARTICULATE (AND RADICAL) PROPONENTS OF THE ISLAMIC TENDENCY IN EGYPT. ALTHOUGH HE HAS CONTINUALLY ESCHEWED VIOLENCE, HE HAS PROMOTED A VERY STRINGENT PROGRAM REGARDING ADOPTION OF THE \"SHARIA\" (ISLAMIC LAW) AND OTHER MEASURES DESIGNED TO MAKE EGYPT INTO SOME KIND OF ILL-DEFINED ISLAMIC STATE. EARLIER THIS YEAR, ABU ISMAIL AND A LARGE NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS JOINED THE \"AL-AHRAR\" PARTY. ABU ISMAIL IS, IN EFFECT, THE DRIVING FORCE IN THE PARTY BEHIND THE CHAIRMAN, MUSTAFA KAMAL MURAD. - 5. CONGEN PERSONNEL RECENTLY CONTACTED MRS. RAGAA RASHAD, AN ALEXANDRIAN LAWYER AND MEMBER OF THE PARTY\'S POLITBURO (SHE ALSO HEADS THE LIBERALS \"WOMEN\'S AFFAIRS\" DEPARTMENT). RASHAD (PLEASE PROTECT) IS A STRONG OPPONENT OF THE RECENT CHANGES IN THE PARTY. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION, SHE TALKED ABOUT ABU ISMAIL\'S SEPTEMBER 11 CONVOCATION OF THE ALEXANDRIA BRANCH OF THE PARTY AND DESCRIBED THE IMPACT OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT\'S INROADS. - 6. CONERNING THE FORMER, RASHAD DECLINED TO GIVE TOO MANY DETAILS. SHE NOTED THAT ABU ISMAIL HAD HIGHLIGHTED FOUR POINTS: (A) THE OPPOSITION BOYCOTT OF THE SHURA COUNCIL ELECTIONS THIS FALL; (B) THE IMPORTANCE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE \"SHARIA\"; (C) CONDEMNATION OF THE TORTURE OF \"ISLAMIC GAMAAT\" MEMBERS IN PRISON (NOTE: THIS IS A CONSTANT THEME IN THE OPPOSITION PRESS, AND ESPECIALLY IN \"AL-WAFD\", AS READERS OF THE CAIRO PRESS REVIEW WILL NOTE.); AND (D) \"AL-AHRAR\'S\" OPPOSITION TO THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI SUMMIT. - 7. ON THE RECENT CHANGES WITHIN THE \"AL-AHRAR\" PARTY, RASHAD ARGUED THAT MANY OF THE PARTY\'S KEY PRINCIPLES HAVE CHANGED SINCE SHAYKH ABU ISMAIL \"TOOK OVER.\" PREVIOUSLY, THE PARTY BELIEVED THAT THE \"SHARIA\" WAS ONE OF THE SOURCES FOR LEGISLATION. NOW, THE PARTY HAS DETERMINED THAT \"SHARIA\" IS THE SOLE SOURCE OF LEGISLATION. EVEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY, MUSTAFA KAMAL MURAD, HAS SEEMED TO CHANGE. RASHAD SAID THIS OCCURRED FOLLOWING A VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. MURAD (WHO WAS KNOWN IN ALEXANDRIA FOR HIS NIGHTLY BOUTS WITH JOHNNY WALKER) IS LETTING HIS BEARD GROW AND IS BECOMING VERY RELIGIOUS, ACCORDING TO RASHAD. OTHER SOURCES TELL US HE HAS BECOME VERY MORIBUND IN HIS DIRECTION OF PARTY ACTIVITIES AND SEEMS TO HAVE ABDICATED MUCH OF HIS AUTHORITY TO ABU ISMAIL AND HIS SUPPORTERS. - 8. AS FOR THE NEW PARTY MEMBERS, MRS. RASHAD SAYS THAT THE PARTY NOW SEEMS TO CONSIST OF VARIOUS SECTS OF MUSLIM GROUPS. EACH GROUP, SHE ADDED, HAS A DIFFERENT NAME, SUCH AS \"THE REJECTION OF THE FORBIDDEN AND THE REQUESTING OF FAIRNESS ASSOCIATION.\" SHE CHARACTERIZED MOST OF THEM AS \"RADICALS\". MOST OF THE MEMBERS, SHE SAID, ARE WELL-EDUCATED. MANY ARE PROFESSIONALS SUCH AS DOCTORS, LAWYERS, AND PHARMACISTS. MOST OF THE WOMEN ARE TOTALLY COVERED. EVEN THOSE WHO ARE EDUCATED (AND MOST OF THEM ARE, ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE) SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT WOMEN SHOULD BE COVERED SO AS NOT TO ATTRACT MEN AND THEREBY \"COMMIT A SIN.\" EXPANDING ON THIS LOGIC, SHE SAID THAT PROPONENTS OF THIS POLICY BELIEVE THAT IF THE WOMAN HAS PRETTY HANDS, THEN THE HANDS HAVE TO BE COVERED. ATTRACTIVE EYES ALSO HAVE TO BE COVERED, EITHER BY WEARING GLASSES OR A VEIL. EVEN PHOTOGRAPHS OF PEOPLE WHICH USED TO DECORATE PARTY OFFICES HAVE BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSIDERED TABOO, ACCORDING TO RASHAD. IN A RELATED INCIDENT, SHE REPORTED THAT ABU ISMAIL\'S DEPUTY, SHAYKH YUSIF AL-BADRI (AKA YOUSSEF EL BADRY) WAS ONCE INFURIATED BECAUSE \"AL-AHRAR\" NEWSPAPER HAD PICTURED \"NAKED WOMEN\" ON ONE OF ITS PAGES. MRS. RASHAD DISCOVERED LATER THAT BY NAKED WOMEN, HE MEANT WOMEN WHOSE HAIR WAS NOT COVERED. MRS. RASHAD HAS, HERSELF, COME UNDER PRESSURE TO WEAR THE VEIL, BUT SHE HAS THUS FAR SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED. - 9. ASKED FOR HER VIEWS ON THE CURRENT APPEAL OF ISLAM TO EGYPT\'S YOUNG PEOPLE, RASHAD RECITED REASONS MENTIONED BY MANY IN THE COUNTRY\'S SECULAR POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES ARE CHIEFLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RELIGIOUS REVIVAL, SHE SAID. NEVERTHELESS, SHE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE ALL OF THE YOUNG MEN WHO WEAR BEARDS AND CLAIM TO BE RELIGIOUS ARE AS DEEPLY COMMITTED AS THEY STATE. SHE RECALLED THE STORY OF A RELATIVE WHO WAS A MEMBER OF ONE OF THE \"SUNNI\" (IN THIS CONTEXT, \"SUNNI\" MEANS RELIGIOUSLY DEVOUT BEARDED PEOPLE) GROUPS. HE FELL IN LOVE WITH A GIRL WHO WAS NOT VEILED AND EVENTUALLY LEFT THE GROUP, SHAVED HIS BEARD, AND ADOPTED A DECIDEDLY SECULAR LIFE STYLE. - 10. BIO NOTE: RAGAA RASHAD HAS LONG BEEN ACTIVE IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND WOMEN\'S AFFAIRS. IN THE LATTER CONTEXT, SHE HAS ADVOCATED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMITTEE IN ALEXANDRIA TO DEFEND WOMEN\'S RIGHTS. SHE HAS PARTICIPATED IN A NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCES ABROAD AND, LOCALLY, HAS LECTURED TO THE MUSLIM YOUTH ASSOCIATION ABOUT CITIZENS\' RIGHTS. A POLITICAL MODERATE, SHE IS A LAWYER AND CURRENTLY IN CHARGE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS IN ALEXANDRIA\'S GUMRUK DISTRICK. TWO LOCAL ISSUES OF CURRENT INTEREST TO HER ARE SOLUTION OF THE CITY\'S ENORMOUS SEWERAGE PROBLEM THROUGH COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF DAY CARE NURSERIES TO HELP WORKING WOMEN PLACE THEIR CHILDREN DURING THE DAY. HAMBLEY " "140","10/21/1986 11:36","86ALGIERS5347","Embassy Algiers","SECRET","","P 211136Z OCT 86 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6046 INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY MOSCOW USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 ALGIERS 05347 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, XF, AG SUBJECT: ALGERIA AND THE ARAB WORLD: MOVING FROM RADICALISM TO MEDIATION REF: KPRP-4 (FY-87) 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT 2. SUMMARY: UNLIKE ITS SELF-PERCEIVED LEADERSHIP ROLE IN AFRICA, ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO POSITION ITSELF IN THE ARAB WORLD AS A MEDIATOR/PEACEMAKER AT THE CENTER OF COMPETING FACTIONS AND INTERESTS. ALGERIA IS NO LONGER IN THE FOREFRONT OF RADICAL ARAB CAUSES, ALTHOUGH IT STILL TRADES ON THE FORMER ASSOCIATIONS IT ESTABLISHED UNDER BOUMEDIENE AND THUS RETAINS ACCESS TO VIRTUALLY ALL ARAB GROUPS. REFLECTING PRESIDENT BENDJEDID\'S OWN CONSENSUS-BUILDING DOMESTIC STYLE, ALGERIA HAS WORKED FOR THE CREATION OF A GREATER ARAB MAGHREB AS AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION UNDER WHICH REGIONAL PROBLEMS MIGHT BE SOLVED AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO PROMOTE PLO UNITY AS A MEANS OF MOVING THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS FORWARD (IN CONJUNCTION WITH RECONCILIATION EFFORTS IN LEBANON). ALTHOUGH PESSIMISTIC ABOUT FINDING A CONCILIATORY BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE GULF WAR, ALGERIA HAS PERSISTED IN SEEKING OPENINGS TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST A CEASEFIRE THERE. RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST CONFRONTATION STATES OF SYRIA AND JORDAN HAVE WAXED AND WANED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, AS HAVE TIES WITH THE GULF STATES, PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA. ALGERIA REMAINS ACTIVE IN THE ARAB LEAGUE AND ITS VARIOUS SUB-ORGANIZATIONS, BUT IS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE VITALITY OF THE LEAGUE AND ITS ABILITY TO UNITE, INSTEAD OF DIVIDE, ITS MEMBER STATES. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES ARE BASED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON PETROLEUM--ITS PRICE AND THE QUANTITIES MARKETED. AS A PRICE \"HARDLINER,\" ALGERIA OFTEN FINDS ITSELF AT ODDS WITH ITS FELLOW ARAB PRODUCERS WITHIN OPEC. THE GOA LEADERSHIP ALSO DEVOTES CONSIDERABLE ENERGY TO ADVANCING ITS INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD, AT LEAST IN PART TO ENCOURAGE GREATER STABILITY AS A HEDGE AGAINST THE POTENTIAL ENCROACHMENT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM INTO NORTH AFRICA. 3. AS A CREDIBLE GO-BETWEEN WITH MOST ARAB GROUPS, ALGERIA HAS CONTRIBUTED IMPORTANTLY TO THE ACHIEVE- MENT OF SOME U.S. REGIONAL OBJECTIVES, FROM THE MEDIATION OF THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS IN 1980/81 TO PRESENT GOA EFFORTS IN LEBANON, AS WELL AS ACTING AS A COUNTER TO LIBYAN INFLUENCE. ALGERIA WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY WITH THE U.S. ON TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO RESOLVING NUMEROUS ARAB-RELATED ISSUES, EVEN WHERE WE SHARE A COMMON GOAL. HOWEVER, UNLIKE UNDER BOUMEDIENE, THE BENDJEDID REGIME IS PREPARED TO \"REASON WITH US\" AND EXPLORE POTENTIALLY WORKABLE SOLUTIONS FREE OF THE RHETORIC WHICH PREVIOUSLY CHARACTERIZED ALGERIAN POLICYMAKING. END SUMMARY. ----------- THE MAGHREB ----------- 4. FOR ALGERIA, ITS POLICY IN THE ARAB WORLD BEGINS WITH THE MAGHREB AND EFFORTS TO FOSTER REGIONAL STABILITY, PARTICULARLY ALONG ITS BORDERS. TO FURTHER THIS GOAL THE GOA HAS PROMOTED A POLICY OF REGIONAL UNITY UNDER THE RUBRIC OF A \"GREATER ARAB MAGHREB\" AND HAS CONCLUDED A FRIENDSHIP AND CONCORD TREATY WITH TWO OF ITS MAGHREB NEIGHBORS, TUNISIA AND MAURITANIA. WHILE A FUNCTIONING MAGHREB ORGANIZATION IS STILL IN THE DISTANCE, THE IDEA OFFERS ALGERIA A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH TO SEEK RESOLUTION OF SOME OF ITS MAJOR REGIONAL PREOCCUPATIONS. THE GOA BELIEVES A MAGHREB ORGANIZA- TION COULD PROVIDE AN INSTITUTIONAL COVER FOR A WESTERN SAHARA SOLUTION AND ALSO RESOLVE ALGERIA\'S OUTSTANDING BORDER PROBLEMS WITH MOROCCO AND LIBYA. IN ALGERIA\'S VIEW IT WOULD HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR GREATLY EXPANDING ECONOMIC COOPERATION THROUGH COMPLEMENTARY ECONOMIES AND A POSSIBLE FREE TRADE ZONE PATTERNED AFTER THE COMMON MARKET. THE GOA BELIEVES IMPROVED REGIONAL TIES WOULD ENHANCE POLITICAL STABILITY AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN TUNISIA AFTER BOURGUIBA. FINALLY, THE GOA HOPES THAT THE POTENTIAL ADHERENCE BY LIBYA TO SUCH A REGIONAL GROUPING WOULD MODERATE QADHAFI\'S BEHAVIOR TO SOME EXTENT AND INCREASE HIS STAKE IN COOPERATION. 5. DESPITE ALGERIA\'S ASPIRATIONS FOR A GREATER MAGHREB AS A SOURCE OF REGIONAL UNITY AND STRENGTH, THE GOAL DOES NOT APPEAR ANY CLOSER TO REALIZATION NOW THAN PRIOR TO THE MOROCCAN-LIBYAN ACCORD OF AUGUST 1984. ALGERIA\'S BILATERAL STRAINS WITH MOROCCO AND THE CONTINUING UNWILLINGNESS BY QADHAFI TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF ALGERIA\'S AGREEMENT WITH TUNISIA AND MAURITANIA MILITATE AGAINST A UNITED MAGHREB. IN ADDITION, THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT REMAINS A MAJOR COMPLI- CATING FACTOR BLOCKING GREATER REGIONAL COOPERATION. 6. GIVEN THE UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS FOR A GREATER MAGHREB, THE GOA NEVERTHELESS DIRECTS ITS POLICIES TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS AS IF SUCH A SCHEME MIGHT BE ACHIEVABLE. WITH TUNISIA THE GOA FOLLOWS AN ACTIVE POLICY OF PROMOTING ECONOMIC COOPERATION, PROVIDING ASSURANCES AND MATERIAL SUPPORT TO COUNTER LIBYAN PRESSURES AGAINST THE GOT, EXCHANGING HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO COORDINATE SOME REGIONAL ACTIONS AND MAINTAINING AS CLOSE TIES AS POSSIBLE WITH A VIEW TOWARD A PEACEFUL, POST- BOURGUIBA TRANSITION. ON LIBYA, GOA POLICY HAS MOVED AWAY FROM RADICAL SOLIDARITY AS A MEMBER OF THE \"REJECTIONIST FRONT\" TO ONE OF SOMETIMES OPEN AND OTHER TIMES DISGUISED OPPOSITION TO THE QADHAFI REGIME. ALGERIA OPENLY OPPOSES LIBYAN ACTIONS IN CHAD AND ITS SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE GOA ATTEMPTS TO COUNTER LIBYAN INFLUENCE IN WEST AFRICA, SUDAN, AND EVEN AMONG RADICAL ARAB FACTIONS. DESPITE THESE POLICY DIFFERENCES, ALGERIA HAS, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1986, TRIED TO EASE BILATERAL TENSIONS THROUGH A MEASURED PUBLIC RAPPROCHEMENT WITH LIBYA. THIS POLICY HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED TO US BY BENDJEDID\'S ADVISOR GENERAL BELKHEIR AS A MEANS OF FOLLOWING THE LIBYAN DOMESTIC SITUATION CLOSELY WHILE LOOKING FOR OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH WHICH IT CAN MODIFY QADHAFI\'S BEHAVIOR OR HIS POSITION WITHOUT RUINING FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A POST-QADHAFI LIBYA. 7. CURIOUSLY, ALGERIANS FEEL THE CLOSEST AFFINITY WITH MOROCCANS EVEN THOUGH IN GEOPOLITICAL TERMS MOROCCO IS THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH COULD LAY PLAUSIBLE CLAIM TO BEING A REGIONAL RIVAL. FOR THE MOMENT, THAT RIVALRY IS FOCUSED ON THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT, WHICH APPEARS STALEMATED BOTH MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE GOA WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO ISOLATE MOROCCO WITHIN THE REGION, IN THE ARA8 WORLD AND IN AFRICA, AS A MEANS OF INCREASING PRESSURE FOR A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT. HAVING SUPPORTED THE POLISARIO CAUSE FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOLONIALIZATION FOR EVEN LONGER, THE GOA LEADERSHIP IS NOT LIKELY TO ABANDON THE POLISARIO AND CEDE SOVEREIGNTY TO MOROCCO WITHOUT A CREDIBLE POLITICAL PROCESS BEING ESTABLISHED TO SETTLE THE ISSUE. UNTIL THEN, DESPITE THE VOICED BEST INTENTIONS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, BILATERAL RELATIONS WILL REMAIN COM- PETITIVE RATHER THAN COOPERATIVE, WITH THE RISK OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION BEING LOW. ON THE MARGINS WILL BE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN MAURITANIA IN WHICH THE GOA COMPETES FOR INFLUENCE THROUGH ITS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE GIRM. ----- EGYPT ----- 8. EGYPT, AT THE EDGE OF THE MAGHREB, HAS HAD ALTERNATELY WARM AND COOL RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA. DURING ALGERIA\'S INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE NASSER\'S EGYPT PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT MILITARY TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE. MANY OF THE ALGERIAN SOLDIERS WHO SURVIVED ON THAT AID HAVE ATTAINED RANKING POSITIONS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY AND ARE A SOURCE OF WARM PERSONAL CONTACTS FOR EGYPT. HOWEVER, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS OF 1978 PUSHED BOUMEDIENE\'S ALGERIA INTO BECOMING AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE \"REJECTIONIST FRONT\" TO MOBILIZE ARAB EFFORTS TO ISOLATE EGYPT. BUT BENDJEDID BEGAN TO MOVE ALGERIA GRADUALLY BACK TOWARD EGYPT IN THE EARLY 1980\'S. THE PACE OF THIS RAPPROCHEMENT HAS ACCELERATED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, ESPECIALLY SINCE AUGUST 1984 WHEN, IN THE WAKE OF THE OUJDA ACCORD, ALGERIA SOUGHT TO BALANCE AN INCREASED THREAT IT PERCEIVED FROM LIBYA WITH GREATER COORDINATION ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT SECURITY MEASURES WITH EGYPT ALONG LIBYA\'S EASTERN AND WESTERN BORDERS. HIGH-LEVEL VISITS HAVE BECOME MORE FREQUENT AND VISIBLE, AS HAVE CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES. IN RECENT MONTHS, THE PACE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS HAS SLOWED, PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF IMPROVING EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF A DIMINISHED LIBYAN \"THREAT.\" NEVERTHELESS, SUBSTANTIVE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS CONTINUE, WITH THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF MONITORING AND INFLUENCING QADHAFI\'S BEHAVIOR. IT IS NOT LIKELY THE GOA WILL RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH EGYPT ANYTIME SOON, BUT COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE AS EACH ATTEMPTS TO PURSUE ITS INTERESTS--ALGERIA TO FORESTALL ANOTHER SHIFT IN EGYPTIAN POLICY ON THE WESTERN SAHARA BACK TO FAVORING MOROCCO (EGYPT SUPPORTED THE ALGERIAN POSITION IN THE 1985 UNGA) AND EGYPT TO MAINTAINING SYMPATHETIC ACCESS TO ARAB \"RADICAL\" STATES AND GROUPS THROUGH ALGERIA WHEN NECESSARY. ------------------------------ PALESTINE AND THE PALESTINIANS ------------------------------ 9. ALGERIA HAS ALWAYS PRIDED ITSELF AS BEING ONE OF THE STRONGEST SUPPORTERS OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND OF ITS MAJOR POLITICAL/MILITARY ORGANIZA- TION, THE PLO. ALGERIA\'S OWN EXPERIENCE IN GAINING INDEPENDENCE HEAVILY INFLUENCES ITS VIEW OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND ITS BELIEF THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE MUST HAVE THEIR OWN LAND IN WHICH THEY CAN EXPRESS THEIR NATIONAL CHARACTER. AS ALGERIA WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE ONLY THROUGH THE UNITY THE FLN DEMONSTRATED IN THE FACE OF THE FRENCH \"OCCUPATION,\" SO THE LOCAL CATECHISM GOES, THE PLO WILL BE ABLE TO REGAIN ITS HOMELAND ONLY THROUGH A SIMILAR POLICY OF UNITY. THEREFORE, THE GOA BELIEVES PLO UNIFICATION IS ESSENTIAL IF THERE IS TO BE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ALGERIA ACKNOWLEDGES THERE ARE SERIOUS IDEOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE PLO, BUT HAS URGED THE PLO TO SUBMERGE THESE DIFFERENCES BEHIND A FACADE OF UNITY. ALGERIA\'S OVERRIDING CONCERN WITH UNITY HAS TENDED TO MAKE ALGERIA A SUPPORTER OF PLO CHIEF ARAFAT WHO THE GOA BELIEVES IS THE ONLY PALESTINIAN LEADER WHO HAS THE STATURE AND BROAD FOLLOWING TO UNITE THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOA DIFFERS WITH ARAFAT ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS, AS IT DID IN EARLY 1985 OVER THE HOLDING OF THE PNC IN JORDAN AND THE SUBSEQUENT AMMAN ACCORD. (THE GOA REFRAINED FROM PUBLIC DENUNCIATION BUT PRIVATELY EXPRESSED STRONG SKEPTICISM THAT THE AMMAN ACCORD COULD HAVE ANY POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE PEACE PROCESS.) 10. SINCE MARCH 1986 THE GOA HAS ATTEMPTED TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO ITS PRINCIPLES ON PLO UNITY. FOLLOW- ING BENDJEDID\'S MARCH 25-28 VISIT TO MOSCOW, HE LAUNCHED A MAJOR INITIATIVE TO HOLD A UNITY MEETING IN ALGIERS OF THE NINE PLO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FACTIONS. OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS THE GOA HAS SENT SPECIAL MISSIONS TO SYRIA, LIBYA, AND THE USSR, AS WELL AS RECEIVED MOST OF THE SIGNIFICANT PLO LEADERS IN ALGIERS. THUS FAR, ALGERIAN EFFORTS HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY CONTINUING INTERNAL PLO DIFFERENCES, THE UNWILLINGNESS OF SYRIA TO CONTRIBUTE TO A PLO UNITED BEHIND ARAFAT, AND A LACK OF SUFFICIENT SOVIET LEVERAGE ON SYRIA TO FORCE SYRIAN COOPERATION. DESPITE THESE SETBACKS, THE GOA WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR PLO UNITY, WHILE PROVIDING MODEST MILITARY TRAINING WITHIN ALGERIA, AS THE ONLY MEANS, IN THE GOA VIEW, OF OBTAINING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 11. CONCURRENTLY, THE GOA MAINTAINS SOME ACCESS TO THE MARGINAL \"RADICAL\" FACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING ABU NIDAL, ABU MUSA, AND HIZBOLLAH. ALGERIA HAS SERVED AS A CONDUIT TO THESE GROUPS ON VARIOUS HOSTAGE ISSUES, BUT ALSO HAS ACQUIRED INTELLIGENCE ON THEIR LEADERSHIP AND STRUCTURES. IN SOME CASES, THE GOA HAS BEEN WILLING TO SHARE THIS INTELLIGENCE WITH NON-ARAB COUNTRIES. UNLIKE THE BOUMEDIENE GOVERNMENT, THE PRESENT ALGERIAN REGIME APPARENTLY DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THESE FACTIONS. --------------------------------------------- ------ RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST CONFRONTATION STATES --------------------------------------------- ------ 12. ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE IN LEBANON WITH THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF CREATING A STABLE ARAB BASE FROM WHICH MORE EFFECTIVE CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL COULD BE ORGANIZED. IN THE PROCESS THE GOA HOPES TO PRESERVE THE LIVES OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES WHO ARE ENCAMPED IN LEBANON, END THE INTERNECINE KILLING AMONG ALGERIA\'S ARAB BROTHERS, ENCOURAGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS, EXPEL ISRAELI TROOPS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND EVENTUALLY RE-ESTABLISH A VIABLE LEBANESE STATE-- ALL IN ALL A TALL ORDER. THE GOA HAS MOVED CAUTIOUSLY TO ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON, USING ITS FORMER AMBASSADOR (ABDELKRIM GHERAIEB) TO OPEN CONTACTS WITH ALL LEBANESE GROUPS AND SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER TALKS AMONG THESE GROUPS. ALGERIAN CONTACTS WITH NABIH BERRI\'S AMAL WERE PARTICULARLY USEFUL DURING THE JUNE 1985 TWA HIJACKING TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH U.S. HOSTAGES REMAINING IN LEBANON. ALTHOUGH ALGERIA HAS SUSPENDED ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ARAB LEAGUE\'S SOLIDARITY FUND FOR LEBANON, IT REMAINS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION EFFORTS, RECENTLY DISPATCHING A SPECIAL ENVOY (MINISTER OF CULTURE BOUALEM BESSAIEH) AND A RANKING FLN PARTY MEMBER (SADEK ZOUATEN) TO EXPLORE THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS. ALGERIA DOES PROVIDE SOME BILATERAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF 200 UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIPS ANNUALLY, BUT NOT MUCH FINANCIAL AID DESPITE GEMAYEL\'S BEST EFFORTS. OVER THE NEXT YEAR, THE GOA IS LIKELY TO MAINTAIN AN ACTIVELY NEUTRAL \"WATCHING BRIEF\" IN LEBANON RATHER THAN RISK ITS PRESTIGE IN A DRAMATIC POLICY INITIATIVE. 13. RELATIONS WITH JORDAN HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE LATE 1970\'S, INCLUDING AN EXCHANGE OF HIGH-RANKING MILITARY DELEGATIONS AND THE VISIT OF THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER IN 1985. THE MILITARY EXCHANGES WERE USEFUL FOR THE GOA BECAUSE THEY PROVIDED FURTHER INSIGHTS ON HOW TO APPROACH AND DEAL WITH WESTERN ARMS SUPPLIERS, NOTABLY THE U.K. AND THE U.S., WITH WHOM ALGERIA HOPES TO DIVERSIFY ITS ARMS PURCHASES. SECONDLY, THE GOA WAS EXPOSED TO WESTERN ARMS SYSTEMS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES. DESPITE CRITICISM FROM RADICAL ARAB FACTIONS AND STATES OF THE AMMAN ACCORD, ALGERIA RESERVED ITS JUDGMENT, THUS PRESERVING ITS ENTREE WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. OTHERWISE, BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE CORDIAL WITHOUT BEIMG PARTICULARLY PROFOUND. WHAT IS NOTEWORTHY IS THAT ALGERIA NOW RECOGNIZES THE VALUE OF MAINTAINING CORDIAL TIES WITH ARAB \"MODERATES\" (EVEN MONARCHS), A RECOGNITION OF THE VALUE OF SUCH TIES THAT ONLY FAINTLY EXISTED IN THE PRE-BENDJEDID ERA. 14. PERHAPS ALGERIA\'S MOST FRUSTRATING POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE WITH SYRIA, A COUNTRY WITH WHICH ALGERIA USED TO SHARE AN IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY AND INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK. THE IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY HAS BEEN FADING RAPIDLY IN RECENT YEARS, AND ALGERIA\'S INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE HAS BEGUN TO DIVERGE SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT OF SYRIA IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS. ALGERIA NO LONGER FINDS ITSELF ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN A REJECTIONIST FRONT MEETING AND IS RELUCTANT TO RECONSTITUTE SUCH A FRONT. WHILE SYRIA SUPPORTS ALGERIA ON THE WESTERN SAHARA AND COOPERATES WITH ALGERIA IN EFFORTS TO ISOLATE MOROCCO, IT REMAINS THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO ALGERIA\'S ATTEMPT TO UNIFY THE PLO. ALGERIA HAS ALSO BEEN CRITICAL OF SYRIA\'S ROLE IN LEBANON (AS A COMPLICATING FACTOR PREVENTING RECONCILIATION) AND HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH SYRIA\'S SUPPORT FOR HIZBOLLAHS \"TERRORIST\" ACTIVITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE TWO COUNTRIES MAINTAIN VERY ACTIVE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS TO COORDINATE POLICIES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, WITH THE GOA HOPING FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORT ON PLO UNITY AND SYRIA HOPING TO EXCHANGE THIS FOR A NEW REJECTIONIST FRONT. ------------ THE GULF WAR ------------ 15. THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, LIKE THEIR PREVIOUS DISPUTE IN THE 1970\'S MEDIATED BY ALGERIA, IS AN ONGOING CONCERN FOR THE GOA. IN DISCUSSING THE SITUATION, FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIMI IS ALWAYS QUICK TO POINT OUT HIS PREDECESSER LOST HIS LIFE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THE WAR. PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THIS SETBACK, AND ALGERIAN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CONTINUING INTRANSIGENCE OF BOTH PARTIES, THE GOA HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY NEW INITIATIVE ON THE WAR. IN THE INTERIM ALGERIA HAS MAINTAINED ITS CREDIBILITY WITH IRAN BY ABSTAINING ON ONE- SIDED ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS FAVORING IRAQ AND CONTINUING HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES. THE GOA HAS USED THESE CONTACTS TO PROBE IRANIAN FLEXIBILITY, THUS FAR WITHOUT ANY POSITIVE RESULTS, ADDING TO THE PESSIMISM IBRAHIMI HAS EXPRESSED TO US. RECENT IRANIAN GAINS AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQI TERRITORY HAVE \"TILTED\" ALGERIAN POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. HOWEVER, ALGERIA IS ONE OF THE ONLY COUNTRIES WHICH CAN APPROACH EITHER IRAN OR IRAQ TO ARRANGE A CEASEFIRE THAT MIGHT LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. -------------------------------- SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES -------------------------------- 16. ALGERIAN RELATIONS IN THE GULF, AS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES, REVOLVE AROUND TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA. IN THIS REGARD, WHILE THE TENOR OF GOA-SAG RELATIONS HAS IMPROVED TO THE LEVEL OF A POLITE DIALOGUE, THERE ARE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES PREVENTING CLOSER COOPERATION. SIMILAR TO THE SAUDIS, THE ALGERIANS ARE QUICK TO TAKE OFFENSE AT PERCEIVED SLIGHTS AND THEY ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE ETIQUETTE OF RELATIONS, GRANTING OR WITHDRAWING ACCESS FOR SAUDI EMISSARIES DEPENDING ON TREATMENT ACCORDED TO ALGERIANS. BEYOND SUCH ATMOSPHERIC ISSUES, THE GOA HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE MOROCCAN WAR EFFORT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA, SAUDI STRATEGY WITHIN OPEC, AND SAUDI PARTICIPATION IN THE EXTRAORDINARY ARAB SUMMIT ORGANIZED IN CASABLANCA IN AUGUST 1985. FM IBRAHIMI HAS ALSO VOICED IMPATIENCE OVER REPEATED SAUDI REQUESTS FOR ALGERIAN INTERVENTION WITH \"RADICAL\" ARABS WITHOUT RECEIVING RECIPROCAL SAUDI SUPPORT ON THE WESTERN SAHARA. NEVERTHELESS, ALGERIA RECOGNIZES THE DEGREE OF SAUDI INFLUENCE WITHIN OPEC, THE ARAB LEAGUE AND WITH THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT, AND HAS ATTEMPTED TO EMPLOY A QUIET DIPLOMACY IN THE PAST YEAR TO MODIFY SAUDI POLICIES. THE GOA GIVES ITSELF CREDIT FOR SOME PROGRESS WITHIN OPEC AND IS MODESTLY OPTIMISTIC THAT SAUDI ARABIA WILL AGREE TO HOLD AN ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT IN DECEMBER TO \"CLOSE ARAB RANKS.\" (THIS WOULD BE THE LONG- DELAYED SUMMIT ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 1984.) ON THE WESTERN SAHARA, THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE. 17. ALGERIA MAINTAINS CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT, THE UAE, AND OMAN. THE GOA JUST ASSIGNED NEW RESIDENT AMBASSADORS TO BAHRAIN AND QATAR, AND THIS MAY PORTEND AN UPSURGE IN THE IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. HOWEVER, RELATIONS ARE LIKELY TO FOCUS CHIEFLY ON OIL PRICING AND PERHAPS SECONDARILY ON KEEPING THE \"WOLF\" OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AWAY FROM THE GULF\'S DOOR. FURTHER SOUTHWEST, ALGERIA WAS DISTURBED BY THE OVERTHROW OF THE ALI NASIR MUHAMED REGIME IN SOUTH YEMEN AND THE SOVIET ROLE IN SUPPORTING HIS SUCCESSOR. THE GOA LEADERSHIP DERIVED A CERTAIN LESSON FROM THESE EVENTS AND HAS INFUSED A COOLNESS INTO ITS FORMERLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH YEMEN. INFREQUENT CONTACTS PERSIST WITH ALI NASIR MUHAMED, ALTHOUGH THE ALGERIANS HAVE NOT ASSISTED ANY EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE ATTAS GOVERNMGNT. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE HAS BEEN A RELUCTANT ACCEPTANCE OF ATTAS, WHO IS EXPECTED TO VISIT ALGIERS LATER THIS YEAR OR IN EARLY 1987. AS FOR NORTH YEMEN, THE YAR JUST APPOINTED A NEW AMBASSADOR TO ALGIERS WHO APPEARS WELL-CONNECTED WITHIN SANAA, POSSIBLY SIGNIFYING IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. ALGERIA HAS COORDINATED TO A SMALL EXTENT ITS RESPONSES WITH NORTH YEMEN ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL OF ALI NASIR. --------------- THE ARAB LEAGUE --------------- 18. FOR THE PAST FEW YEARS ALGERIA HAS VIEWED THE ARAB LEAGUE AS A NEARLY MORIBUND, INCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT ORGANIZATION, REFLECTIVE OF THE DISARRAY IN THE ARAB WORLD. APPARENTLY,THOUGH, WITHIN THE PAST TWO MONTHS THE GOA HAS SEIZED UPON THE LEAGUE AS A POTENTIAL VEHICLE FOR RENEWING/ REVITALIZING ARAB UNITY. TO THIS END THE GOA HAS SENT EMISSARIES TO DAMASCUS (MESSAADIA), SAUDI ARABIA (IBRAHIMI) AND BEIRUT (BESSAIH/ZOUATEN) TO LOBBY FOR THE NECESSITY OF A SUMMIT, OPTIMISTICALLY IN DECEMBER. THE GOA HAS ALSO USED THE ARAB LEAGUE TO REINFORCE ITS CREDIBILITY WITH IRAN BY OPPOSING ANTI-IRANIAN RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF WAR. HOWEVER, ALGERIA HAS BEEN LESS SUCCESSFUL IN GAINING ARAB SUPPORT ON THE WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE, AND THIS HAS HINDERED ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO GAIN SDAR ADMISSION INTO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM). FURTHERMORE, THE GOA HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LEAGUE AND HAS WORKED TO BOTH STREAMLINE AND IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AT THE LEAGUE\'S HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS. ------------------ ECONOMIC RELATIONS ------------------ 19. OIL AND HYDROCARBON REVENUES ARE THE LIFEBLOOD OF THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY, AND THEREFORE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING OIL ARE CRITICAL TO ALGERIA\'S WELFARE. ALGERIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN HIGH PRICES WHILE PRESSURING MAJOR PRODUCERS TO ACCEPT \"REASONABLE\" PRODUCTION LEVELS, PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA. THIS PRESSURE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH LIBYA AND IRAN PRINCIPALLY, BUT RECENTLY THE GOA HAS TRIED TO FORM AN ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN PRODUCERS FOR A SIMILAR OBJECTIVE. AS PRICES HAVE STABILIZED SINCE AUGUST, ALGERIA HAS TAKEN SOME SATISFACTION FROM ITS EFFORTS, EVEN IF IN REALITY THEY HAD ONLY A MARGINAL IMPACT ON OPEC DECISIONS. BESIDES OIL, THERE IS VERY LITTLE TRADE BY ALGERIA WITHIN THE ARAB MARKET, AND ONLY A BARELY MORE SIGNIFICANT MONETARY INTEREST BY ARAB BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE ARAB DEVELOPMENT BANK AND THE SAUDI DEVELOPMENT BANK. WE BELIEVE LOANS FROM THESE SOURCES WERE LESS THAN $100 MILLION, REPRESENTING A DECLINE FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR. THUS, AS THE OIL MARKET GOES, SO GO ALGERIA\'S TRADE RELATIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD, HAVING SOME REPERCUSSIONS FOR ITS POLITICAL RELATIONS. ---------------------- ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM ---------------------- 20. AS IN MOST ARAB COUNTRIES, ISLAM IS THE STATE RELIGION IN ALGERIA AND, AS SUCH, ENJOYS A PRIVILEGED POSITION VIS-A-VIS OTHER INSTITUTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED TO CO-OPT ISLAMIC PRECEPTS AND VALUES BY INCORPORATING THEM INTO THE NATIONAL CHARTER AND BY ENCOURAGING MOSQUE CONSTRUCTION AND PAYING AND TRAINING THE IMAMS. THERE IS ALSO SUBSTANTIAL ANNUAL SUPPORT FOR ALGERIAN PILGRIMS TO PERFORM THE HAJJ TO MECCA. HOWEVER, WHEN EXTERNAL INFLUENCES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO INVADE THE GOA\'S MONOPOLY ON ISLAM, IT REACTS VIGOROUSLY. THE GOA WAS PARTICULARLY INCENSED BY LIBYAN EFFORTS IN 1983-84 TO FUND \"PRIVATE\" MOSQUES, WHICH THE GOA CORRECTLY VIEWED AS SOURCES OF FUNDAMENTALISM. RUMORS OF SAUDI FINANCING TO ALGERIAN ISLAMISTS IN MID-1986 ALSO RAISED GOA SUSPICIONS ABOUT SAUDI INTENTIONS. THE GOA CON- TINUES TO BE CONCERNED BY BEN BELLA\'S EFFORTS TO USE ISLAM TO RECRUIT ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS. TO COUNTER THESE ACTIVITIES, THE GOA HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT TO RECRUIT TRADITIONALLY ORIENTED ISLAMIC SCHOLARS TO STAFF ALGERIA\'S NEW UNIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC AND SCIENTIFIC STUDIES IN CONSTANTINE. THE GOA ALSO TRIES TO CONTROL THE INFLOW OF ISLAMIC MATERIALS, SUCH AS RECORDED SERMONS AND LITERATURE, WITH ONLY MODERATE SUCCESS. DESPITE RELATIVELY ACTIVE CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTALISM, THE GOA DOES NOT APPEAR TO COORDINATE ITS RESPONSES WITH ITS MAGHREB NEIGHBORS. FOR ALGERIA, FUNDAMENTALISM REMAINS MORE OF A LONG- TERM POTENTIAL PROBLEM RATHER THAN AN IMMEDIATE THREAT, AND AS SUCH IS USUALLY NOT ON ALGERIA\'S AGENDA IN ITS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MOST ARAB COUNTRIES. ------------------------- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ------------------------- 21. MUTUAL U.S.-ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON ALGERIA\'S APPROACH ON NUMEROUS ARAB-RELATED ISSUES. DESPITE OUR DISAGREEMENT OVER TACTICS, OUR SHARED DISTRUST OF QADHAFI HAS ALLOWED US TO MAINTAIN A USEFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE GOA ON LIBYA. SIMILARLY, ALGERIA HAS ADOPTED A CONSTRUCTIVE, NON-AGGRESSIVE POSTURE TOWARD TUNISIA TO CONTRIBUTE TO A STABLE TRANSITION THERE. ALGERIAN REACTIONS WERE RELATIVELY MUTED TO THE U.S. RAID ON TRIPOLI (APRIL 15), AND, AFTER A BRIEF PAUSE, THERE WAS AN UPSURGE IN BILATERAL COOPERATION ACROSS A BROAD SPECTRUM, INCLUDING MILITARY AND SECURITY INTERESTS. FOREIGN MINISTRY SECGEN HAMDANI EXPLAINED TO US THAT ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO HAVE THE PLO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ARE INTENDED TO ENABLE THE PLO TO RESPOND TO PEACE INITIATIVES IN A MORE POSITIVE MANNER. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS MADE TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES IN LEBANON, AIDED BY ALGERIA\'S ACCESS TO THOSE RADICAL GROUPS HOLDING THE AMERICANS. FINALLY, THE GOA HAS RECENTLY TAKEN STEPS TO COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. ON COUNTERING TERRORISM. 22. THESE CONCRETE ACTIONS BY THE GOA TO WORK WITH THE U.S. ON ARAB-RELATED ISSUES THAT AFFECT OUR INTERESTS HAVE BEEN REFLECTED TOO IN ALGERIA\'S RHETORICAL PUBLIC APPROACH, WITH A LOWERING OF DIRECT CRITICISM, EVEN WHILE VOTING AGAINST U.S. POSITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. THE GOA LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN WILLING TO PAY A DOMESTIC PRICE FOR THIS POLICY, DEFLECTING CRITICISM BY INTERNAL HARDLINERS AND MOVING FORWARD, ALBEIT GRADUALLY, WITH A VARIETY OF BILATERAL PROGRAMS. ACTIVE U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT TOUCHES UPON NORTH AFRICA, AS IT DID IN THE OCTOBER 1985 ISRAELI BOMBING OF PLO HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS, WILL GIVE THE GOA SERIOUS INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES IN WORKING TOWARD BROADLY DEEPER COOPERATION ON ARAB-RELATED ISSUES. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE A GROWING CAPACITY TO SEPARATE ISRAELI ACTIONS FROM U.S. POLICIES, AS APPEARS TO BE THE CASE WITH ALGERIAN ACCUSATIONS OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN MOROCCO. IF THIS TREND CONTINUES, IT MIGHT BE A STRONG INDICATION THAT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAS TAKEN ON AN IMPORTANCE WHICH COULD TRANSCEND PREVIOUS ALGERIAN CONVICTIONS THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF ARAB SOLIDARITY WAS THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN ITS POLICY FORMULATION. IN ANY CASE, IT IS CLEAR THAT ALGERIA NOW INCLUDES POTENTIAL U.S. REACTIONS AS PART OF ITS POLICY DELIBERATIONS AND FREQUENTLY GIVES THESE REACTIONS CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT IN ITS DECISION-MAKING. THIS WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE U.S. WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE GOA TO ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. JOHNSTONE " "141","11/4/1986 5:29","86COLOMBO8227","Embassy Colombo","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 040529Z NOV 86 FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9787 INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMCONSUL MADRAS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 08227 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINS, CE SUBJECT: PLOTE AND THE LTTE REF MADRAS 3214 1. CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT. - - 2. ACCORDING TO TAMIL FSN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN THE NORTH, APPROXIMATELY 75 PLOTE MEMBERS TURNED OVER THEIR ARMS TO THE LTTE IN JAFFNA OCTOBER 30. THE FSN DESCRIBED THE PLOTE FIGHTERS INVOLVED AS MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-UMA MAHESWARAN FACTION OF PLOTE WHICH SPLINTERED FROM THE PARENT ORGANIZATION IN JULY 1986. - 3. A GSL MILITARY OFFICER TOLD EMBOFF THAT THE SRI LANKAN PRESS HAD OVERPLAYED THE \"PLOTE SURRENDER TO THE LTTE,\" AS FEW MEMBERS OF PLOTE HAD IN FACT HANDED THEIR WEAPONS TO THE TIGERS. IT WAS THE OFFICER\'S OPINION THAT THIS ACTION WILL DO LITTLE TO CHANGE THE MILITARY BALANCE ON THE JAFFNA PENINSULA, AS \"PLOTE REALLY COULD NOT GET MUCH MORE INACTIVE THAN THEY WERE BEFORE.\" CITING REPORTS OF MINOR CLASHES BETWEEN THE LTTE AND THE EPRLF OVER A FEW ABANDONED PLOTE OBSERVATION POSTS IN JAFFNA, THE OFFICER SAID HE BELIEVED A SHOWDOWN BETWEEN THE EPRLF AND THE LTTE WAS IN THE OFFING. - 4. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH PLOTE IS THOUGHT TO BE THE LARGEST OF THE TAMIL INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS, IT HAS SO FAR REFRAINED FROM WIDESCALE INVOLVEMENT IN THE GUERRILLA WAR. PLOTE HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY DORMANT IN THE JAFFNA PENINSULA, WHICH APPEARS TO BE LARGELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE LTTE. HOWEVER, PLOTE HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE NORTH-CENTRAL VAVUNIYA DISTRICT, AND TO A LESSER DEGREE IN PARTS OF THE EAST. WE HAVE SEEN NO REPORTS OF A PLOTE \"STAND-DOWN\" TAKING EFFECT ANYWHERE OUTSIDE OF THE JAFFNA AREA. END COMMENT. - 5. AS THIS WAS BEING TYPED AMBASSADOR AND POLOFF SPOKE WITH PRINCIPAL OF JAFFNA COLLEGE, WHO APPEARED TO AGREE WITH GSL MILITARY OFFICER\'S ASSESSMENT PARA 3. HE SAID PLOTE WAS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE IN JAFFNA, BUT THAT EPRLF WAS AND THAT SHOWDOWN BETWEEN IT AND LTTE WAS POSSIBLE. THE PRINCIPAL, PASSING THROUGH COLOMBO FROM JAFFNA ON HIS WAY TO THE UNITED STATES, SAID THAT THE PERCEPTION IN THE JAFFNA AREA WAS THAT LTTE WAS THE STRONGER AND MORE DISCIPLINED OF THE TWO MILITANT GROUPS. HOWEVER, THE EPRLF HAS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT--BOTH MONETARY AND MORAL-- FROM TAMILS IN EUROPE, WHO BELIEVE EPRLF MORE LIKELY TO TRANSCEND CASTE BARRIERS THAN THE LTTE WHICH IS GAINING INCREASING SUPPORT FROM THE JAFFNA TAMIL ELITES. SPAIN " "142","11/5/1986 13:15","86ALEXANDRIA1240","Consulate Alexandria","CONFIDENTIAL","86ALEXANDRIA805","R 051315Z NOV 86 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6249 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALEXANDRIA 01240 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, IS, EG SUBJECT: ISRAELI ACTIVITIES IN ALEXANDRIA AND THE DELTA REF: ALEXANDRIA 805 1. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.) - 2. SUMMARY: ISRAELI CONSUL GENERAL WAS PLEASED WITH RESULTS OF HIS AMBASSADOR\'S RECENT (AND, SURPRISINGLY, HIS FIRST) \"OFFICIAL\" VISIT TO ALEXANDRIA. IN WAKE OF SEPTEMBER SUMMIT, INCREASED INTEREST IN TOURISM WAS EXPRESSED, BUT LOCAL ISRAELIS DO NOT EXPECT ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE. ZIM LINES IS DOING ADEQUATE BUSINESS WITH ALEXANDRIA\'S PORT, DESPITE TRADE SLOWDOWN GENERALLY. SMALL ISRAELI AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY CONTINUES IN DELTA, RECENTLY EXPANDED BY NEW, GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT JOINT VENTURE NEAR GIANCLIS. ISRAELI CONGEN IS MUM ABOUT RUMORS HE WILL BE REPLACED EARLY NEXT YEAR. END SUMMARY. SASSON\'S \"OFFICIAL\" VISIT TO ALEXANDRIA: ---------------------------------------- 3. AT AN OCTOBER 28 MEETING, ISRAELI CONGEN TUVAL AND I SHARED PERPSECTIVES ON RECENT VISITS BY OUR RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS TO ALEXANDRIA. AFTER DESCRIBING THE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY AMBASSADOR AND MRS. WISNER AND THE ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION THEY RECEIVED, I ASKED TUVAL HOW SASSON\'S OWN OCTOBER 16 VISIT HAD GONE. 4. TO MY ASTONISHMENT, TUVAL SAID THIS WAS SASSON\'S FIRST \"OFFICIAL\" VISIT TO ALEXANDRIA IN THE OVER FIVE YEARS HE HAS BEEN ISRAEL\'S AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO. HE SAID SASSON HAD VISITED THE CITY IN CONNECTION WITH BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER, OR TO ACCOMPANY DELEGATIONS. HOWEVER, HE HAD NEVER CALLED ON THE GOVERNOR OR MET WITH ALEXANDRIAN PERSONALITIES. IN ANY EVENT, BOTH HE AND SASSON WERE PLEASED WITH THE VISIT. 5. TUVAL SAID THE MEETING WITH GOVERNOR GAWSAQI HAD GONE WELL. I PROBED HIM A LITTLE ON THIS POINT, AND HE ADDED THAT THE GOVERNOR WAS FRIENDLY, EVINCED SUPPORT FOR GOOD EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS, AND BASICALLY RESPONDED \"INSHALLAH\" (GOD WILLING) TO THE ISRAELIS\' EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN EXPANDED TRADE AND TOURISM. AT A BUFFET LUNCH, TUVAL INTRODUCED HIS AMBASSADOR TO OVER 40 LOCAL BUSINESSMEN, TRAVEL AGENTS, ACADEMICS, AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN CUSTOMS AND THE JUDICIARY WITH WHOM HE HAS HAD OFFICIAL DEALINGS. HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED BY BOTH THE TURNOUT AND THE ENSUING DISCUSSIONS. NOTING THAT HE HAS DIFFERED FREQUENTLY IN THE PAST WITH SASSON\'S OFTEN DOUR DEPICTION OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS, TUVAL SAID HIS AMBASSADOR HAD CONCEDED THAT ALEXANDRIANS GENERALLY SEEM TO BE READIER TO ACCEPT NORMALIZATION (OR AT LEAST TO MEET WITH ISRAELIS) THAN MANY IN CAIRO. TUVAL ACCEPTED MY POINT THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF ALEXANDRIAN SOCIETY (NOTABLY THE ISLAMIC RIGHT) PROBABLY DO NOT SHARE THIS VIEW. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE FEELS A BROADER AND MORE REPRESENTATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES IS AVAILABLE IN ALEXANDRIA, AND HE HOPES OTHER ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICERS WILL VISIT THE CITY AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE. 6. COMMENT: ABOVE NOTWITHSTANDING, TUVAL COMPLAINED ON NOVEMBER 4 ABOUT THE REFUSAL OF SENIOR GOVERNORATE OFFICIALS TO ATTEND HIS FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING THE ONE FOR SASSON. HE ALLEGED THAT CITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT EZZAT KADDOUS HAD TOLD HIM UNOFFICIALLY SOME TIME AGO THAT THIS IS DONE TO \"SIYASSAT AL-IMTINA\'\", AN OFFICIALLY CONDONED \"ABSTENTION POLICY.\" END COMMENT. 7. AT HIS MEETING WITH THE GOVERNOR, TUVAL SAID HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE TWO ISRAELI SAILORS WHO WERE DETAINED IN EGYPT (RELEASED ON THEIR OWN RECOGNIZANCE) IN FEBRUARY 1986 WHILE THEIR CASE (ALLEGED HASHISH SMUGGLING) WAS CONSIDERED BY THE LOCAL COURTS (SEE REFTEL). THEY WERE FOUND \"NOT GUILTY\" IN EARLY OCTOBER BUT ARE STILL UNABLE TO LEAVE EGYPT UNTIL THE DECISION IS REVIEWED. TUVAL ASKED THE GOVERNOR TO INTERVENE OR AT LEAST USE HIS GOOD OFFICES TO EXPEDITE MATTERS, BUT THE LATTER DECLINED. HE EVINCED IRRITATION THAT GAWSAQI, WHO IS A JUDGE BY TRAINING, WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF WHAT IS INVOLVED IN THE VERDICT REVIEW PROCESS. AT NOVEMBER 4 DINNER, TUVAL WAS EVEN MORE PERPLEXED THAT THE SAILORS HAD STILL NOT BEEN REMOVED FROM THE DEPARTURE \"BLACKLIST\" BECAUSE OF CONTINUING BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THE CASE WOULD NOT BECOME A BILATERAL ISSUE. POST SUMMIT DEVELOPMENTS: ------------------------ 8. I ASKED TUVAL IF HE HAD DETECTED ANY CHANGES IN LOCAL ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL SINCE THE SEPTEMBER SUMMIT. HE SAID HE FOUND THE FEW GOVERNORATE OFFICIALS HE MEETS REGULARLY TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE RELAXED IN HIS PRESENCE. ALSO, HIS CONSULATE HAS RECEIVED A RECENT INCREASE IN INQUIRIES FROM LOCAL TRAVEL AGENTS ABOUT TOURISM, AND HE HAS MET WITH ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM A LOCAL TRAVEL AGENCY. HOWEVER, TUVAL SAID HE DOES NOT EXPECT ANY UPSURGE IN EGYPTIAN SIGHTSEERS. HE IS HOPEFUL, HOWEVER, THAT A LARGER NUMBER OF JEWISH PILGRIMS WILL ATTEND THIS YEAR\'S COMMEMORATIVE BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS AT THE TOMB OF THE VENERATED 19TH CENTURY RABBI YACOUB ABU HASIRAH NEAR DAMANHOUR. ZIM LINES: ---------- 9. ZIM CONTINUES TO DO ADEQUATELY IN ALEXANDRIA, DESPITE EGYPT\'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND THE FALLOFF IN TRADE. ALTHOUGH I DID NOT RAISE THIS SUBJECT WITH TUVAL, THE COMPANY\'S LOCAL AGENT SAID RECENTLY THAT ZIM NOW OFFERS A CONTAINER SERVICE TWICE MONTHLY. BUSINESS WITH EAST ASIA IS PARTICULARLY GOOD. EACH SHIP IS ALSO ABLE TO PICK UP FROM 50 TO 60 CONTAINERS ON EACH OUTWARD VOYAGE, AN ACHIEVEMENT THE AGENT IS ESPECIALLY PROUD OF. LEADING EXPORTS CARRIED BY ZIM INCLUDE COTTON AND TEXTILES, USUALLY OF ASIAN OR EUROPEAN DESTINATIONS. DELTA AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES: ----------------------------- 10. TUVAL SAID ISRAEL HAS TWO ONGOING AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN THE DELTA. THE OLDEST IS THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT UNDERTAKEN BY AN EXPERT NAMED KEIDAR (RESIDENT IN CAIRO) AT A FARM NEAR TANTA. (THERE IS ONE ZVI KEIDAR ON THE ISRAELI EMBASSY DIP LIST WHO MAY BE THE EXPERT MENTIONED.) A VERY RECENT UNDERTAKING IS A JOINT GOVERNMENT-TO- GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL VENTURE NEAR THE DELTA TOWN OF GIANCLIS. TUVAL SAID THIS PROJECT IS ALSO GOING WELL AND THAT A RESIDENT EXPERT IS PRESENT, BUT HE DID NOT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAILS. (COMMENT: I ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO VISIT THESE TWO PROJECTS SOME DAY AS BOTH ARE IN MY CONSULAR DISTRICT. TUVAL SAID NO. EVEN HE AND OTHER ISRAELIS ARE NOT NORMALLY ALLOWED TO VISIT THE SITES IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEIR \"LOW PROFILE\" NATURE. HOWEVER, TUVAL SAID HE HOPES TO VISIT THEM WITH AMBASSADOR SASSON IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND WOULD BRIEF ME AT THAT TIME. END COMMENT.) 11. ANOTHER AGRICULTURALLY-REALTED PROJECT WE ARE AWARE OF IS PURELY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND IS DIRECTED BY ONE BENNY DUMAI (PHONETIC), A RESIDENT OF CAIRO, WHO HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS IN INTRODUCING ISRAELI DRIP IRRIGATION TECHNIQUES TO PRIVATE EGYPTIAN ENTREPRENEURS. ONE SUCH ENTREPRENEUR IS AN ALEXANDRIAN WHO HAS USED DUMAI\'S TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE THE CULTIVATION OF PEARS AND OTHER FRUIT ON HIS FARM IN THE CITY\'S SUBURBS. THIS EGYPTIAN WAS FULSOME IN HIS PRAISE FOR DUMAI, HIS TECHNOLOGY, AND WHAT IT HAS DONE FOR HIS FARM. AT THE SAME TIME, HE NOTED THAT DUMAI WORKS VERY QUIETLY AND WITHOUT MUCH PUBLICITY (TUVAL SAID HE DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE NAME). THE EGYPTIAN LIKEWISE FEELS HE MUST BE DISCREET IN HIS DEALINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS (HE WORKS AT AIN SHAMS UNIVERSITY). HE HAS EVEN TAKEN THE PRECAUTION OF PUTTING A WALL AROUND THE MAIN CONTROL UNIT FOR HIS IRRIGATION SYSTEM TO PREVENT OUTSIDERS FROM SEEING THE HEBREW LETTERING ON THE MACHINERY. COTTON: ------- 12. THE ISRAELIS ARE APPARENTLY INVOLVED IN SOME COTTON DEALINGS HERE AS WELL. TUVAL IS HAZY ON THE DETAILS BUT HE RECALLS THAT SOMEONE FROM EILAT (PERHAPS NAMED \"MUKKI;\" TUVAL SAID HE WOULD TRY TO CHECK) BEING INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH AN ALEXANDRIA- BASED PUBLIC SECTOR COTTON COMPANY TO TRADE OR SELL ISRAELI SHORT FIBER COTTON IN EXCHANGE FOR EGYPT\'S MUCH PRIZED LONG FIBER VARIETY. (COMMENT: U.S. COTTON PRODUCERS HAVE A SIMILAR ARRANGEMENT WHICH IS PROFITABLE AND ADVANTAGEOUS FOR BOTH OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED. WE WILL REPORT ON DETAILS ABOUT THE ISRAELI ARRANGEMENTS AS AVAILABLE. END COMMENT.) ISRAELI CONGEN ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE ALEXANDRIA: -------------------------------------------- 13. TUVAL\'S CONSULAR DISTRICT INCLUDES FOR PROVINCES: ALEXANDRIA, BUHAYRA, KAFR AL-SHAYKH, AND DAQAHILIYAH (MANSURA). THUS FAR, HE HAS ONLY VISITED THE BUHAYRA IN THE HINTERLAND, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE THE GOVERNORS OF KAFR AL-SHAYKH AND DAQAHILIYAH HAVE NEVER RESPONDED TO REQUESTS FOR APPOINTMENTS. HE SAID HE PLANS TO TRY TO CALL ON THEM WITHOUT APPOINTMENTS SOMETIME BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. TUVAL\'S FUTURE: -------------- 14. TUVAL\'S SUBORDINATES HAVE MENTIONED RECENTLY TO FRIENDS ON CONGEN STAFF THAT TUVAL WILL BE LEAVING HIS POST IN EARLY 1987. ISRAELI MFA IS ALLEGED TO BE LOOKING FOR A SUCCESSOR WHO IS \"PUBLIC RELATIONS MINDED.\" THE ZIM LINE AGENT HAS ALSO TOLD US THAT TUVAL MAY BE DEPARTING \"SOON.\" TUVAL HIMSELF IS MUM ON THE SUBJECT. ASKED NOVEMBER 4 HOW LONG A NORMAL TOUR OF DUTY IS, TUVAL (WHO ARRIVED IN 1984) REPLIED \"THREE TO FOUR YEARS.\" 15. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH I SEE TUVAL ON A REGULAR BASIS, AND WE HAVE A GOOD RELATIONSHIP, THE MEETINGS ARE USUALLY AT MY INITIATIVE. TUVAL IS NOT AS ACTIVE AS HIS PREDECESSOR AND PROBABLY HAS NOT OPENED AS MANY DOORS AS HE MIGHT HAVE DONE. THE SEPARATION FROM HIS FAMILY (RESIDENT IN JERUSALEM FOR SCHOOLING) HAS TAKEN ITS TOLL IN THIS REGARD. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE IS PLEASANT, NOT PUSHY, AND HAS GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO UNDERSTAND EGYPTIAN VIEWPOINTS AND PUT DOMESTIC EVENTS IN EGYPT INTO A BROADER CONTEXT. IT IS APPARENT THAT HE IS NEITHER HELPED NOR ENCOURAGED BY HIS EMBASSY IN CAIRO IN HIS VARIOUS UNDERTAKINGS. HE CONSULTS REGULARLY, BUT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE KEPT IN THE INFORMATION LOOP. WITHOUT HIS AMBASSADOR\'S FULL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT, IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE HOW HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO DO MUCH BETTER AS A WELL-INFORMED AND EFFECTIVE PROPONENT OF IMPROVED EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TIES. TUVAL IS ASSISTED IN HIS HAMBLEY " "143","11/5/1986 16:43","86BEIRUT6115","Embassy Beirut","UNCLASSIFIED","","O 051643Z NOV 86 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9606 ","UNCLAS BEIRUT 06115 TERREP E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, IR, LE SUBJ: RAFSANJANI ON RELEASE OF HOSTAGES 1. NOVEMBER 5 EDITION OF AL-SAFIR (LEFTIST) QUOTES RAFSANJANI, IN HIS STATEMENTS ABOUT ALLEGED MCFARLANE VISIT, AS SAYING: -- \"WE WILL ADVISE THE GROUPS IN LEBANON LOYAL TO IRAN TO RELEASE THE AMERICAN ANDIFRENCH HOSTAGES IF LEBANESE PRISONERS IN ISRAEL ARE FREED AND WASHINGTON AND PARIS STOP THEIR USELESS HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST US. IF THE DEMANDS OF THE OPPRESSED MUSLIMS IN LEBANON ARE MET AND IF YOU PROVE THAT YOU WILL NOT BE HOSTILE, OR BEHAVE ANTAGONISTICALLY, WE WILL INFORM OUR FRIENDS IN LEBANON ABOUT OUR OPINIONS, FROM A HUMANITARIAN VIEW. THE FATE OF SOME OF THE HOSTAGES IS IN THE HANDS OF ISLAMIC GROUPS AND SOME OF THE ISLAMIC FORCES DO LISTEN TO US...IF IRAN SHOULD CALL FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, OUR FRIENDS IN LEBANON ARE FREE TO RESPOND OR NOT. THEY LISTEN TO US SOMETIMES.\" 2. COMMENT: ABOVE STATEMENT APPEARS AT CONCLUSION OF RAFSANJANI\'S REPOMED REMARKS. END COMMENT. KELLY " "144","11/13/1986 10:31","86CAIRO26111","Embassy Cairo","CONFIDENTIAL","86CAIRO22742","R 131031Z NOV 86 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0056 INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY TUNIS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 26111 E.O.: 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, EG, US SUBJ: \"NO NASSERISM, ONLY NASSERISTS\" REF: CAIRO 22742 1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY. \"NASSERISM\" HAS GAINED PUBLICITY AND TOPICALITY IN RECENT MONTHS (REFTEL), BUT NEITHER A COHERENT IDEOLOGY NOR A BROAD BASED POLITICAL MOVEMENT HAS EMERGED TO GIVE DEFINITION TO THE TERM. THE MOST CREDIBLE ATTEMPT TO FORM A MOVEMENT IS THE SQUARELY ANTI-U.S., ANTI-ISRAEL \"ARAB SOCIALIST NASSERIST PARTY\" (ASNP), NOW IN THE LEGAL LIMBO OF \"PARTY UNDER ESTABLISHMENT.\" A NEW WEEKLY NASSERIST NEWSPAPER CLAIMS INDEPENDENCE FROM THE ASNP, BUT CLEARLY HAS LINKS TO IT OF DUBIOUS LEGALITY. MUBARAK HAS TOLERATED BUT CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED THE RE-EMERGENCE OF NASSERIST VISIBILITY. THE NASSERISTS CLEARLY POSE NO IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE REGIME, AND ARE LOCKED IN HOSTILE COMPETITION WITH ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS IN THE ATTEMPT TO BEND POPULAR ECONOMIC DISSATISFACTION INTO POLITICAL SUPPORT. THE NASSERISTS\' PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE IS THEIR THEORETICAL POTENTIAL TO INCITE OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC REFORM, ADDING TO MUBARAK\'S CAUTION IN ECONOMIC DECISIONS. END SUMMARY. 3. NASSER\'S GHOST: REFTEL REPORTED DIVERSE ELEMENTS OF AN APPARENT RE-EMERGENCE OF \"NASSERIST \" POLITICAL ACTIVITY, NOTABLY: MOHAMMED HASSANEIN HEIKAL\'S RE-APPEARANCE IN PRINT; ESTABLISHMENT OF A PLAINLY NASSERIST WEEKLY NEWSPAPER; PROMINENT OFFICIAL COMMEMORATION ON 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF NASSER\'S NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND HIS SUBSEQUENT EMERGENCE AS A NATIONAL HERO IN THE 1956 WAR; AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF A PROSPECTIVE NEW NASSERIST POLITICAL PARTY. THERE IS LINGERING, PERHAPS EVEN MARGINALLY REVIVED POPULAR NOSTALGIA FOR ELEMENTS OF NASSER\'S LEGACY. NEVERTHELESS, THIS SELECTIVE NOSTALGIA IS VOICED MAINLY AMONG INTELLECTUALS AND THE LOWER MIDDLE CLASS PUBLIC SECTOR AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, WHO PROSPERED UNDER NASSER. EVEN THE DEMAGOGIC LEFTIST OPPOSITION HAS AVOIDED PROMINENT PLAY OF NASSERISM AND THE BRUITED NASSERIST REVIVAL. 4. MUBARAK AND REVISIONIST NASSERISM: IN HIS SPEECHES IN SEPTEMBER AROUND THE ANNIVERSARY OF NASSER\'S DEATH, MUBARAK LAID CLAIM AS THE TRUE HEIR OF NASSERIST NATIONALISM AND INDEPENDENCE FROM SUPERPOWER DOMINATION, BUT DISTINGUISHED HIS OWN APPROACH FROM NASSER\'S IN KEY AREAS (PEACE WITH ISRAEL, DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC REFORM). BESIDES REVISING THE VALUES OF NASSERISM, THE MUBARAK GOVERMENT IS TOYING WITH THE NEW \"NASSERISTS.\" IT EFFECTIVELY HAS LURED THEM ABOVE GROUND BY PERMITTING PRE-ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, WHILE ARRESTING SOME ACTIVISTS AND WARNINQ AT LEAST ONE WOULD-BE LEADER OF THE LIMITS ON HIS ACTIVITIES. THE NASSERISTS ARE THEMSELVES (UNADMITTED) REVISIONISTS, CLAIMING TO PROMINENT PROSPECTIVE RECRUITS THAT THEY HAVE DISCARDED NASSER\'S AUTHORITARIANISM. EVIDENTLY THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THE MEMORY OF NASSER\'S OPPRESSION ALSO REMAINS VIVID FOR SOME. 5. NASSERISTS VS NASSERISM. NASSER CONFIDANT AND CHRONICLER MOHAMMED HASSANEIN HEIKAL APTLY HAS CHARGED IN PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS AND PRIVATE CON- VERSATIONS THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS \"NASSERISM, BUT ONLY NASSERISTS\" TAKING PERSONAL INITIATIVES. ABSENT THE GREAT HERO HIMSELF OR A BODY OF SEMINAL PUBLICATIONS TO GUIDE HIS HEIRS, NO COHERENT POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY EXISTS TO UNIFY THEM. COMPETING NASSERISTS ARE ALLEGEDLY ACTIVE IN EACH OF THE ESTABLISHED POLITICAL PARTIES; THE REMNANTS OF THE DORMANT \"EGYPT PARTY\"; A PROSPECTIVE NEW NASSERIST PARTY; A NEW WEEKLY NEWSPAPER; AND EVEN AMONG ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS. THE TERM \"NASSERIST\" IS USED LOOSELY AND DISPARAGINGLY: THE FREE-MARKET WAFDISTS, LIBERALS, AND MEMBERS OF THE CONSERVATIVE SIDE OF THE NDP REGULARLY ACCUSE MUBARAK OF TOLER- ATING NASSERISTS (IF NOT OUTRIGHT MARXISTS) AMONG HIS SENIOR ADVISORS, USING AS EXAMPLES (WITHOUT EXPLANATION) OSAMA AL BAZ AND SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT RIFA\'AT MAHGOUB. THE RIGHT SUSPECTS NEW PM ATIF SIDQI FOR HIS PAST ASSOCIATION WITH NASSER THROUGH MAHGOUB. ONE WELL-CONNECTED, INDE- PENDENT POLITICAL SCIENTIST CLAIMED THAT THE NASSER- ISTS ARE DELIBERATELY PURSUING THEIR OBJECTIVES IN MULTIFARIOUS CHANNELS, NOT QUITE AT ODDS WITH EACH OTHER BUT NOT QUITE COOPERATING EITHER, AS A MEANS TO EVADE GOVERNMENT PRESSURE. 6. FARID ABDEL KARIM AND THE ASNP: THE MOST PRO- MINENT OF THE NASSER REVIVALISTS -- AND PERHAPS LEAST LIKELY TO FAIL -- IS CONTROVERSIAL LAWYER FARID ABDEL KARIM, THE \"DEPUTY\" OF THE NEW \"ARAB SOCIALIST NASSERIST PARTY\" (ASNP). THE ASNP IS NOW IN THE LEGAL LIMBO DEFINED AS \"UNDER ESTABLISHMENT.\" THAT GIVES THE ASNP THE DISADVANTAGES OF BEING OUT IN THE OPEN, AND HENCE EASY MONITORING BY THE GOVERN- MENT -- WITHOUT THE ADVANTAGES THAT GO WITH BEING COMPLETELY LEGAL: HAVING A REGULAR PUBLIC VOICE (SEE PARA 8), OR UNRESTRICTED ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES. ABDEL KARIM TOLD POLOFF THAT THERE ARE ONLY TWO IMPORTANT POLITICAL FORCES IN EGYPT TODAY: NASSERISM AND ISLAM, NEITHER OF WHICH ARE REPRESENTED BY POLITICAL PARTIES. ABDEL KARIM CLAIMS THE NASSERISTS BELIEVE IN TRUE DEMOCRACY, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PERMIT ALL THOSE DESIRING POLITICAL PARTIES TO FORM THEM. IN THIS CASE, THE ISLAMIC ELEMENTS WOULD QUICKLY LOSE THEIR POPULARITY IN THEIR FRACTIOUSNESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OVERWHELMING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR NASSERISM -- ABDEL KARIM CLAIMS 100,000 FOUNDING MEMBERS -- WOULD ASSURE THE PRIMACY OF HIS PARTY. ABDEL KARIM SAID THE ASNP AIMS NOT TO TAKE POWER, BUT TO UNITE THE NASSERISTS ONLY TO LEAD THE LEGI- TIMATE OPPOSITION THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS. HE PRO- FESSED SATISFACTION AT THE RECENT GOVERNMENT PRESSURE ON HIMSELF AND OTHER NASSERISTS, CLAIMING THAT THIS IS A POWERFUL UNIFYING FACTOR. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE USES THE TITLE \"DEPUTY\" (\"WAKEEL\") -- ALTHOUGH HE IS THE FOUNDER AND LEADER OF THE NEW PARTY, BECAUSE NO FORMAL ELECTION OF A PRESIDENT CAN BE HELD UNTIL THE PARTY EMERGES FROM \"UNDER ESTABLISHMENT.\" 7. FOREIGN POLICY: AS IN HIS PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS, ABDEL KARIM MADE CLEAR THAT TWO KEY ELEMENTS OF ASNP POLICY ARE OPPOSITION TO U.S. \"INFLUENCE\" IN EGYPT AND TO PEACEFUL EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TIES. HE CHARGED US PRESSURE IS THE PRIMARY REASON THAT THE GOVERNMENT STILL HAS NOT PERMITTED FULL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ASNP AND HAS SUSPENDED ITS PUBLICATION, \"AL ISHTIRAKI\", AFTER ONLY TWO ISSUES (PHOTOCOPIES POUCHED INR). NONETHELESS, HE WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A DIALOGUE, AND CLAIMED MANY PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS WITH AMERICANS. HE ALSO IMPLIED THAT HE OPPOSES U.S. INFLUENCE IN EGYPT PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF HIS MANIFEST HATRED FOR ISRAEL, RATHER THAN FOR ANY PURELY NATIONALIST OR IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATION. ABDEL KARIM DENIED LINKS BETWEEN THE NASSERISTS AND QADDAFI, CHARGING THAT QADDHAFI IS NASSERISM\'S WORST ENEMY. HE SAID QADDHAFI SEEKS ALLIANCE WITH NASSERISM TO DOMINATE IT, BUT THE NASSERISTS REFUSE HIS BLANDISHMENTS. 8. \"SAWT AL ARAB\": AN EXAMPLE OF THE CONFUSED AND COMPETING RELATIONSHIPS AMONG LEADING NASSERIST LIGHTS IS THE CASE OF THE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED \"SAWT AL ARAB\" NEWSPAPER AND ITS FOUNDER-EDITOR, ABDEL AZIM MANAF, WHO HAS AVOIDED EMBASSY CONTACT. HEIKAL (FOR ONE) DENIED THAT \"SAWT AL ARAB\" IS A NASSERIST ORGAN, CHARGING (AS DO MANY OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS) THAT MANAF IS ON THE LIBYAN PAYROLL. ONE OF MANAF\'S FORMER UNIVERSITY MENTORS SAID MANAF IS A \"FANATIC,\" BUT FIRMLY DENIED THE PREVALENT BELIEF THAT MANAF GETS LIBYAN FUNDING, CLAIMING SAWT AL ARAB IS INSTEAD SUPPORTED BY THE SONS OF NASSER. FOR HIS PART, FARID ABDEL KARIM DENIES LINKS WITH MANAF OR HIS NEWSPAPER; HE ALSO DENIES THAT MANAF HAS POLITICAL CONNECTIONS WITH LIBYA OR THE SONS OF NASSER. THE OFFICE OF SAWT AL ARAB ALSO DENIES CONNECTIONS WITH ABDEL KARIM\'S ASNP, ALTHOUGH THE PAPER HEAVILY COVERS ABDEL KARIM AND TOUTS A NASSERIST LINE. THE PRACTICAL BUT UNOFFICIAL LINK BETWEEN THE ASNP AND SAWT AL ARAB IS DARING, BECAUSE UNTIL THE ASNP IS FORMALLY ESTABLISHED IT MAY NOT LEGALLY PUBLISH A REGULAR NEWSPAPER. MININT ZEKI BADR COULD CLOSE BOTH ORGANIZATIONS AT HIS PLEASURE ON THIS LEGAL BASIS. 9. COMMENT. WE DETECT NO CONSENSUAL UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE TERM \"NASSERISM\" MEANS, AND NO POPULAR BASIS FOR A REVIVAL OF NASSERISM AS A POLITICAL MOVEMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE ABSENCE OF A SIMILARLY CHARISMATIC NATIONAL HERO. AS HEIKAL SUGGESTED, THE ESSENCE OF NASSERISM, AND THAT FOR WHICH SOME NOSTALGIA REMAINS, WAS THE MAN AND HIS IMAGE, RATHER THAN ANY COHERENT BODY OF IDEAS. MANY PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES PROBABLY DO SHARE LEFTIST INTELLECTUALS\' RESENTMENT AT THE PERCEIVED U.S. PRESSURE ON MUBARAK AND HIS GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT ECONOMIC MEASURES THEY CONSIDER INIMICAL TO THEIR INTERESTS. MANY EGYPTIANS NO DOUBT ALSO SHARE THE NASSERISTS\' BITTER ANTI-ISRAELI ATTITUDES, BUT SUCH ATTITUDES ARE ALSO HELD BY ISLAMIC OPPONENTS OF NASSERISM, AND DO NOT DETERMINE AN INDIVIDUAL\'S IDENTIFICATION AS A \"NASSERIST.\" THE CHIEF IMPLICATION OF LATTER DAY NASSERISM FOR U.S. INTERESTS IS ITS POTENTIAL TO DIMINISH POPULAR SUPPORT, OR AT LEAST TOLERANCE, FOR THE ECONOMIC REFORMS REQUIRED FOR EGYPTIAN STABILITY. THEY LACK ORGANIZATION AND MASS APPEAL, SO THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IN ACTUALLY INCITING THE PEOPLE AGAINST ECONOMIC REFORMS PROBABLY WOULD BE ONLY MARGINALLY INCREASED IF THEY EVENTUALLY ARE PERMITTED TO FORM A LEGITIMATE PARTY (OR PARTIES) UNDER THE CURRENT INFORMAL LEADERSHIP. END COMMENT. WISNER " "145","12/1/1986 15:26","86DAMASCUS7104","Embassy Damascus","SECRET","86BEIRUT6526\|86DAMASCUS7043","O 011526Z DEC 86 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7504 INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 07104 PARIS FOR WINN E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, SY SUBJECT: CONTINUED WAR FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS -- ANOTHER SYRIAN FAILURE? REF: A) BEIRUT 6526, B) DAMASCUS 7043 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: AS REFTELS POINT OUT, SYRIA APPEARS TO BE FACING A SUBSTANTIAL DEFEAT IF IT IS NOT ABLE TO QUICKLY AND RESOLUTELY RESOLVE THE LATEST ROUND IN THE \"WAR OF THE CAMPS\" IN LEBANON. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS LATEST ROUND OF FIGHTING ALREADY REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL FAILURE OF SYRIAN POLICY WHICH THREATENS TO ERODE DAMASCUS\' STRATEGY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS AND ITS EFFORTS TO SABOTAGE THE PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION PROCESS NOW GOING ON. FURTHER IT DAMAGES SYRIA\'S IMAGE WITHIN THE ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND INCREASINGLY CONTRIBUTES TO DISSENT WITHIN THE POLICY- MAKING PROCESS IN DAMASCUS ITSELF. END SUMMARY. 3. WE CONCUR WITH EMBASSY BEIRUT (REFTEL) THAT THE CONTINUED FIGHTING BETWEEN AMAL AND THE PALESTINIANS, IN WHICH AMAL PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN SADLY DEFICIENT, REPRESENTS A MAJOR DILEMMA FOR SYRIAN POLICY-MAKERS. INDEED, WE WOULD GO FURTHER AND SAY THAT THE FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE FIGHTING AT THIS POINT ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO AMAL AND THE SYRIANS ALREADY REPRESENTS A SEVERE SYRIAN DEFEAT AND THREATENS TO FURTHER UNRAVEL DAMASCUS\' ALREADY DISINTEGRATING PALESTINIAN POLICY. -- 4. A JORDANIAN JOURNALIST WITH EXCELLENT PALESTINIAN CONTACTS HAS TOLD US THAT IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE, THE PFLP -- THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE SYRIAN-BACKED PNSF WITH SUBSTANTIAL POPULAR SUPPORT AMONG THE PALESTINIANS -- HAS TAKEN A DECIDEDLY ANTI-SYRIAN LINE AND HAS SPLIT WITH THE MORE TRACTABLE PRO-SYRIAN ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE ABU MUSA FATAH GROUP, THE PFLP-GC, AND SAIQA. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, THE PFLP IS NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF ITSELF, THE DFLP, FATAH AND THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE CAMPS. SPECIFICALLY, THE PFLP NEGOTIATORS REFUSE TO TURN OVER TERRITORIES GAINED IN THE SIDON AREA TO ANYONE BUT MUSTAFA SA\'ID\'S POPULAR NASSARISTS MOVEMENT. THE SCENARIO WE HAVE RECEIVED OF NEGOTIATIONS POSITS GREAT BITTERNESS BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AS A WHOLE ON THE ONE HAND AND NABIH BERRI AND THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE OTHER, AS WELL AS A GREAT DEAL OF BACK-BITING WITHIN BOTH THE PALESTINIAN AND LEBANESE GROUPINGS. 5. THE MILITARY FAILURE ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON IS NOT DAMASCUS\' ONLY DILEMMA. AS IN PREVIOUS SYRIAN EFFORTS TO SUBJUGATE THE PALESTINIANS IN THE LEBANESE REFUGEE CAMPS THROUGH THE USE OF DAMASCUS\' AMAL SURROGATE, THE LATEST FIGHTING HAS CREATED GREAT BITTERNESS AMONG OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS. DAMASCUS IS PRESENTLY OR HAS RECENTLY BEEN HOST TO A VARIETY OF SENIOR ARAB AND ISLAMIC ENVOYS -- ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIMI, LIBYA\'S MAJOR JALLUD, SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTER PRINCE NAIF, AND A NUMBER OF SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIALS. WHILE JALLUD AND THE IRANIANS HAVE BECOME PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE PALESTINIAN/LEBAN- ESE NEGOTIATIONS, WE UNDERSTAND THAT BOTH THE ALGERIAN AND THE SAUDI DELIVERED TOUGH MESSAGES TO ASAD REGARDING THIS LATEST ASSAULT ON THE PALESTINIANS. THE SYRIANS MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TAKE SOME SMALL COMFORT IN THE ANNOUNCE- MENT BY THE \"PAN-ARAB COMMAND\" CALLING FOR SOLIDARITY WITH SYRIA AGAINST THE AMERICAN, BRITISH AND ISRAELI CONSPIRACY AGAINST IT, SUPPORT FOR AMAL, AND A REDEFINI- TION OF THE PALESTINIAN ROLE IN LEBANON. THIS ORGANIZATION IS, HOWEVER, ONE OF LITTLE STANDING AMONG THE ARAB STATES AS A WHOLE, TO SAY THE LEAST, AND IS LARGELY A SYRIAN-LIBYAN CREATURE. INDEED, EVEN THIS MINOR \"VICTORY\" AND JALLUD\'S VERY CAREFUL STATEMENT OF MEASURED SUPPORT HAVE BEEN CONTRADICTED BY LIBYAN LEADER MO\'AMMAR QADHAFI\'S LATEST BLAST CONDEMNING AMAL. -- 6. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, NOT ALL THE LEBANESE GATHERED HERE ARE IN FULL SUPPORT OF SYRIA EITHER. WHILE NONE WANT TO SEE THE RECREATION OF THE PALESTINIAN \"STATE- WITHIN-A-STATE\" IN LEBANON, FEW ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA THAT THIS TYPE OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE CAMPS IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE LEBANESE. AS THEY SEE IT, LEBANESE MILITIAS ARE BEING ASKED TO DO SYRIA\'S WORK FOR IT AND TO SHOULDER THE BLAME WITHIN THE ARAB COMMUNITY. DRUSE LEADER WALID JUMBLATT, ACCORDING TO REPORTS, FEELS PARTICULARLY SQUEEZED. AMAL\'S SH\'IA RIVALS, HIZBALLAH, ARE NOT PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND, AS IN THE PAST, HAVE REFRAINED FROM GETTING INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. AT THE SAME TIME, HIZBALLAH\'S IRANIAN MENTORS ARE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE HERE. OF INTEREST, PALESTINIANS TOLD OUR JORDANIAN SOURCE THAT SHAYKHOLESLAM EXPRESSED DEEP SYMPATHY FOR THE PALESTINIAN POSITION WHEN MEETING WITH PNSF LEADERS ON NOVEMBER 24. ON THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 27, HOWEVER, SHAYKHOLESLAM RETURNED TO THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP COLDLY BEARING BERRI\'S PROPOSALS. WE DO NOT, NEVERTHELESS, BELIEVE THAT IRAN\'S BASIC DISAGREEMENT WITH THE SYRIAN STRATEGY TOWARDS LEBANON HAS CHANGED IN ANY WAY. THEY WANT TO TAKE ASAD\'S \"LEBANESE CARD\" AWAY FROM HIM. 7. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THE PNSF LEADERS BLINDLY LOYAL TO DAMASCUS DO NOT HAVE ANY REAL ABILITY TO DELIVER THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IN THE TYRE, SIDON, OR BEIRUT CAMPS. WHAT IS NOW AT STAKE FOR DAMASCUS IS NOT MERELY AN EMBARRASSMENT THROUGH A MILITARY DEFEAT FOR ITS LEBANESE SURROGATES. RATHER, SYRIA IS FACED WITH BITTER DIVISIONS WITHIN ITS OWN UMBRELLA PALESTINIAN ORGANIZA- TION THAT COULD FINALLY TEAR IT APART, LEAVING A RUMP OF \"YES-MEN\" WITH NO BROAD PALESTINIAN POPULAR SUPPORT. SYRIA COULD LOSE ITS \"PALESTINIAN CARD.\" -- 8. THIS PARALLELS THE CURRENT STAGES OF THE PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION EFFORT, WITH PFLP LEADER GEORGE HABASH NOW IN THE THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH FATAH NUMBER TWO MAN KHALIL AL-WAZIR IN ALGIERS. ALTHOUGH HABASH CONTINUES TO HOLD OUT FOR HIS DEMANDS THAT INCLUDE PRIOR ABROGATION OF THE AMMAN ACCORDS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADEN-ALGIERS AGREEMENTS, AND PLO BREAKING OFF ITS CONTACTS WITH EGYPT, THE FACT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE IS DEEPLY DISTURBING TO DAMASCUS. KHALID FAHOUM HAS TOLD WESTERN DIPLOMATS THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE INFORMED THE DAMASCUS-BASED PALESTINIANS THAT ANY OF THEM ATTENDING AN ALGERIAN PNC WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO RETURN TO SYRIA. 9. COMMENT: THE CAMPS WAR REPRESENTS A MULTIFACETED, COMPLEX DILEMMA FOR DAMASCUS. ITS IMPACT IS NOT MERELY ONE OF SYRIAN PRESTIGE AND SUPPORT OF ITS AMAL ALLY. IT HAS SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS FOR ASAD\'S PALESTINIAN POLICY, HIS IMAGE WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD, AND HIS PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH ARAB AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL - INCLUDING SOVIET - LEADERS. CLOSER TO HOME, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS INTENSE INTERNAL DEBATE AMONG ASAD\'S LIEUTENANTS AS TO HOW TO DEAL WITH BOTH THE CAMPS WAR AND LEBANON AS A WHOLE. THUS FAR, ASAD DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE A GRIP ON THE SITUATION. THE LONGER THIS REMAINS THE CASE, THE MORE ROOM HIS LIEUTENANTS WILL HAVE TO MANEUVER AND TO INTRIGUE AGAINST ONE ANOTHER. SEVERAL KEY SYRIAN OFFICIALS, AMONG THEM VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ALI DUBA, HAVE GREAT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE EVOLUTION OF SYRIA\'S LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN POLICIES. FAILURE IS NOT USUALLY PERMITTED BY DAMASCUS UNDER ASAD. HOWEVER, AS WE LOOK AROUND HERE, FAILURE SEEMS TO BE BECOMING AN INCREASING PHENOMENA WITHIN SYRIAN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLICY. 10. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RANSOM " "146","12/4/1986 13:17","86BEIRUT6632","Embassy Beirut","SECRET","","O 041317Z DEC 86 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9884 INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY NICOSIA AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM UNVIE MISSION VIENNA 0003 USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 06632 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: MOPS, PREL, LE SUBJECT: THE CAMPS WAR IN LEBANON 1. (SECRET/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY: THE WAR OF THE CAMPS IN LEBANON CONTINUES UNABATED WITH FIERCE FIGHTING. NOT SURPRISINGLY, LEBANESE POLITICIANS HAVE DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE WAR, DEPENDING ON THEIR POLITICAL OPTIC. THERE FOLLOWS OBSER- VATIONS BY SEVERAL LEBANESE POLITICIANS IN CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR DECEMBER 3 AND 4. END SUMMARY. 3. THE CAMPS WAR BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND THE SHIA AMAL FORCES CONTINUES TO RAGE. NOW IN ITS SIXTH WEEK, A MAJOR STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION CONTINUES AROUND SIDON. THE RASHADIYAH CAMP NEAR TYRE REMAINS ENCIRCLED. SHATILA AND BURJ AL-BURAJINAH IN BEIRUT\'S SOUTHERN SUBURBS CONTINUE UNDER RELENTLESS BOMBARDMENT. AS REPORTED BY DAO/BEIRUT, ELEMENTS OF THE MUSLIM 6TH AND 1ST BRIGADES OF THE LEBANESE ARMY HAVE JOINED WITH AMAL IN THE SIEGES OF SHATILA AND BURJ AL-BURAJINAH. THE SYRIANS ARE PROVIDING AMMO AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO AMAL. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF UP TO 300 SYRIAN TROOPS IN AMAL UNIFORMS JOINING THE FIGHTING. 4. NATIONAL LIBERALS PARTY PRESIDENT DANY CHAMOUN (MARONITE CHRISTIAN) TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT HE IS DELIGHTED WITH THE WAR OF THE CAMPS. CHAMOUN SAID THAT AS LONG AS THE SHIA AND THE PALESTINIANS ARE KILLING ONE ANOTHER AND LEAVING THE CHRISTIANS ALONE, THE SITUATION IS JUST FINE. 5. FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER FUAD BUTROS (ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN) SEES THE CAMPS WAR AS ENHANCING THE POSSIBILITY OF A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN LEBANESE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSD. BUTROS SAID THAT SYRIAN FAILURE TO HAVE THEIR SURROGATE AMAL FIGHTERS ACHIEVE VICTORY OVER THE PALESTINIANS HAS FURTHER UNDERMINED ASSAD\'S POSITION, WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN WEAKENED BY WESTERN PRESSURE FOLLOWING THE REVELATIONS OF SYRIAN- SPONSORED TERRORIST ACTS. BUTROS BELIEVES THAT BECAUSE ASSAD IS WEAKENED, HE WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO BE ACCOMMODATING TO GEMAYEL. - 6. SHIA MODERATE DEPUTY RAFIQ SHAHIN (WHOSE CONSTITUENCY OF NABATIYAH INCLUDES THE MAGHDUSHAH AREA WHICH COMMANDS THE HEIGHTS OVERLOOKING SIDON) VIEWS THE WAR AS A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE SHIA POSITION. SHAHIN TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE SHIA CANNOT AFFORD TO ALLOW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN ENCLAVE CENTERED AROUND SIDON AND INCLUDING THE HEIGHTS OF MAGHDUSHAH. IF THE PALESTINIANS SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING AND HOLDING SUCH AN ENCLAVE, SOUTHERN LEBANON AND THE SHIA WILL BE CUT IN HALF. THE PALESTINIANS WILL CONTROL ACCESS BETWEEN BEIRUT AND THE SOUTH AND WILL BE IN A POSITION TO CHOKE IT OFF AT ANY TIME. FURTHERMORE, PALESTINIAN RETENTION OF MAGHDUSHAH WILL PUT THE PALESTINIANS WITHIN A KILOMETER OR TWO OF LAHAD\'S ISRAELI-SPONSORED \"ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON.\" SHAHIN SAID LAHAD\'S MILITIA OCCUPIES THE TERRAIN BETWEEN JEZZINE AND SIDON, OVERLOOKING MAGHDUSHAH. SHAHIN ASSERTED THAT A PALISTIANH CLAVE AROUND SIDO, WOULD MEAN UNREMITTING PALESTINIAN OPERATIONS AGAINST LAHAD AND ISRAEL. 7. SHAHIN DESCRIBED AMAL LEADE NABIH BERRI\'S POSITION AS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM ALL SIDES. IF BERRI AND AMAL CANNOT REMOVE THE PALESTINIANS AROUND SIDON AND FORCE THEM BACK INTO THE CAMPS, BERRI AND AMAL AS A COHESIVE MOVEMENT WILL BE FINISHED. THE DIVIDED SHIA COMMUNITY WOULD THEN BE PREY TO EVEN MORE EXPLOITATION BY THE IRANIAN-SPONSORED HIZBALLAH EXTREMISTS. - 8. SHAHIN SAID THAT BECAUSE OF OQE CURRENT SITUATION, HIZBALLAH FIGHTERS ARE FIGHTING AND DYING WITH AMAL. SHAHIN\'S SON IN NABITIYAH DESCRIBED TO SHAHIN DECEMBER 3 THE FUNERAL OF 15 SHIA FROM ONE VILLAGE: 12 AMAL FIGHTERS AND 3 HIZBALLAH. SHAHIN SAID HIZBALLAH IS ALSO COOPERATING WITH AMAL AROUND TYRE AND IN BEIRUT. THE HIZBALLAH LEADERSHIP DOES NOT LIKE SUPPORTING BERRI BUT BECAUSE OF THE EXTENSIVE BLOODSHED, THE SHIA ARE UNITED AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS. 9. SHAHIN ALSO DESCRIBED BLOODY ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY BOTH SIDES AGAINST NON-COMBATTANTS, WOUNDED, AND PRISONERS. 10. SHAHIN ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE FAILURE THUS FAR OF THE SYRIAN-SUPPORTED AMAL EFFORT ENHANCES GEMAYEL\'S LEVERAGE WITH ASSAD. 11. COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS THIRD VERSION OF THE CAMPS WAR DIFFERS FROM THE PREVIOUS TWO. IF THE PALESTINIANS SUCCEED IN SECURING AN ENCLAVE IN AND AROUND SIDON, THEY WILL HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CHANGING THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL MAP OF LEBANON FROM BEIRUT TO THE ISRAELI BORDER. KELLY " "147","12/9/1986 8:09","86ABUDHABI5867","Embassy Abu Dhabi","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 090809Z DEC 86 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4900 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BERN AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY VIENNA AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY DOHA AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MADRID AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY NICOSIA AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN AMEMBASSY OTTAWA USMISSION USBERLIN AMCONSUL FRANKFURT AMCONSUL HAMBURG AMCONSUL IZMIR AMCONSUL MUNICH AMCONSUL STUTTGART AMCONSUL ZURICH AMCONSUL DHAHRAN AMCONSUL KARACHI AMCONSUL ISTANBUL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 05867 FROM AMCONSUL DUBAI E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINR, PGOV, PREL, IR, TC SUBJECT: ENGINEER COMMENTS ON LIFE IN RASHT, AND THE - LIKELY LEADERS OF A POST-KHOMEINI IRAN 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: AN IRANIAN ENGINEER CLAIMED THAT WHILE SOME INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES IN THE CITY OF RASHT HAVE BEEN FORCED TO SEND EMPLOYEES TO THE WAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO SHORTAGE OF VOLUNTEERS. SINCE THE FIRMS WERE OPERATING AT LESS THAN FULL CAPACITY, THEIR ABSENCE AFFECTED OUTPUT ONLY MARGINALLY. INDUSTRIAL CHIEFS IN THE REGION WERE ESCORTED LAST SPRING THROUGH THE FAO PENINSULA. WEST GERMANY IS TRAINING MANY OF THESE ENGINEERS IN A \"DIVIDEND-FOR-TRAIN- ING\" EXCHANGE PROGRAM. KHOMEINI IS LIKELY TO BE SUCCEEDED BY A \"GROUP OF FIVE\" THAT INCLUDES MONTAZERI, RAFSANJANI, KHAMENEI, AHMAD KHOMEINI, AND MESHKINI. END SUMMARY. 3. ON NOVEMBER 22, CONOFF DUBAI SPOKE WITH A U. S.- TRAINED IRANIAN ENGINEER RESPONSIBLE FOR WATER SYSTEMS IN A FACTORY IN BANDAR ANZALI, NEAR RASHT. IRANIAN\'S OBSER- VATIONS ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: 4. INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY AND WAR RECRUITMENT: OF THE THREE MAJOR INDUSTRIES IN RASHT, THE TEXTILE AND PAPER MILLS ARE RUNNING AT ONLY ONE-HALF CAPACITY, WHILE THE ELECTRIC POWER PLANT CONTINUES AT FULL CAPACITY. TEN PER CENT OF THE TEX- TILE AND PAPER EMPLOYEES HAVE HAD TO SERVE AT THE WAR FRONT, BUT THE POWER PLANT EMPLOYEES HAVE BEEN EXEMPTED. SOURCE CLAIMED THAT NO FORCE HAD TO BE USED TO COERCE EM- PLOYEES TO JOIN THE MILITARY. \"BRAIN-WASHING\" HAS BEEN SO EFFECTIVE THAT \"IN RASHT THERE IS NEVER A SHORTAGE OF BASIJ.\" VOLUNTEERS ARE GIVEN 45 DAYS OF TRAINING IN RASHT, AND THEN ARE SENT FOR TWO TO FOUR WEEKS FURTHER TRAINING NEAR TEHRAN. HE SAID MANY IRANIANS BELIEVE THAT AN END TO THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN AN END TO CON- FRONTATION. THEY SEE THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR INCAPABLE OF ABSORBING IRANIAN SOLDIERS AND REASON THAT NEW CONFRONTA- TIONS, PERHAPS WITH PAKISTAN, WOULD BE USED TO KEEP THE SOLDIERS \"OCCUPIED.\" 5. INDUSTRIAL HEADS VISIT FAO: IN APRIL, 1986, THE GOI ORGANIZED A TWO-WEEK TRIP TO THE FAO WAR FRONT FOR RASHT INDUSTRIAL LEADERS. THE TRIP HAD TWO OBJECTIVES: FIRST, TO FAMILIARIZE INDUSTRIAL HEADS WITH THE TYPES OF EQUIPMENT BEING USED SO THAT THEIR FACTORIES COULD FABRICATE SPARE PARTS. SAMPLE EQUIPMENT AND PARTS WERE COLLECTED, BUT AT- TEMPTS TO REPRODUCE THEM IN RASHT AND BANDAR ANZALI FAILED. MOST SPARE PARTS, HE SAID, PARTICULARLY THOSE FOR HIGH PRESSURE COMPRESSORS, ARE BEING FABRICATED FROM AMERICAN AND BRITISH DESIGNS IN TURKEY, AND ARE BEING TRUCKED INTO IRAN. A SECOND OBJECTIVE WAS TO HAVE INDUSTRIAL LEADERS WITNESS THE DETERMINATION OF THE MILITARY, AND CONVEY FAVORABLE IMPRESSIONS TO THEIR NEIGHBORS AND EMPLOYEES IN RASHT SO THAT THE FLOW OF BASIJ VOLUNTEERS WOULD CONTINUE UNIMPEDED. 6. EXCHANGING EMPLOYEE TRAINING FOR DIVIDENDS: SOURCE CLAIMED THAT THE GOI OWNS 25 PER CENT OF THE GERMAN COR- PORATE GIANT KRUPP. INSTEAD OF PAYING DIVIDENDS TO THE GOI, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS WORKED OUT A SCHEME WHEREBY IRANIAN ENGINEERS ARE SENT FOR INDUSTRIAL TRAINING IN GERMANY INSTEAD. SOURCE SAID THAT IN THE SUMMER OF 1985, HE HAD RECEIVED A TWO-WEEK TRAINING COURSE IN WEST GERMANY IN ASSORTED METHODS OF WASTE WATER TREATMENT. 7. HOW MANY AYATOLLAHS DOES IT TAKE TO REPLACE KHOMEINI?: THIS SOURCE AND OTHER IRANIAN CONTACTS IN DUBAI BELIEVE THAT MUCH OF AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI\'S RECENT DIFFICULTIES, IN- CLUDING THE ARREST OF MEHDI HASHEMI, ARE TRACEABLE TO AN UNWILLINGNESS AMONG OTHER LEADERS TO ACCEPT MONTAZERI AS THE SOLE LEADER OF THE POST-KHOMEINI ERA. THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION ALLOWS FOR A THREE-TO-FIVE-PERSON GROUP TO LEAD THE NATION, AND THE LIKELY FIVE WHO WOULD SHARE THE LEADERSHIP AFTER KHOMEINI\'S DEATH APPEAR TO BE: (A) AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI--HAVING BEEN CHOSEN BY KHOMEINI, HE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE EXCLUDED. HE IS SEEN BY MOST IRANIANS AS A \"COMPASSIONATE\" LEADER, IN CONTRAST TO THE \"DICTATORIAL\" KHOMEINI, DESPITE HIS EVIDENT LACK OF SOPHISTICATION OR COHERENT WORLD VIEW. (B) HOJJAT-OL-ESLAM RAFSANJANI--AS SPEAKER OF THE PARLIA- MENT, HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO SHAPE EVENTS TO HIS OWN ADVANT- AGE. IRANIANS CONTINUE TO NOTE THAT IT IS \"NO COINCID- ENCE\" THAT RAFSANJANI WAS ABSENT BOTH TIMES WHEN BOMBS KILLED MANY OF HIS LIKELY RIVALS. MANY IRANIANS BELIEVE THAT HE WILL STOP AT NOTHING TO ASSURE HIS PLACE IN THE \"GROUP OF FIVE\" AND THAT, IF HE HAS TO SHARE POWER, IT WILL ONLY BE BECAUSE OF HIS WEAKER RELIGIOUS CREDENTIALS (HE IS NOT AN AYATOLLAH). (C) PRESIDENT ALI HOSEINI KHAMENEI--LIKE RAFSANJANI, KHAMENEI HAS BEEN ABLE TO SOLIDIFY HIS ACCESS TO THE ELITES FROM HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT. WHEN RAFSANJANI WANTED TO LIMIT THE POWER OF THE COMITEHS TO MAKE DECI- SIONS WITHOUT CONSULTING HIGHER LEVELS OF THE GOI, KHAMENEI SUPPORTED THE COMITEHS\' INDEPENDENCE, WHOSE MEM- BERSHIP ARE NOT LIKELY TO FORGET HIS SUPPORT FOR THEM. (D) AHMAD MUSAVI-KHOMEINI--AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI\'S SON IS BELIEVED TO BE THE ONLY PERSON WITH UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE IMAM. EVERY PERSON WHO CALLS ON THE AYATOLLAH MUST FIRST BE \"APPROVED\" BY \"GATEKEEPER\" AHMAD BEFORE HE IS AL- LOWED TO SEE KHOMEINI. WHILE AHMAD RARELY FIGURES IN IRANIAN HEADLINES, IT IS BELIEVED THAT SINCE HE KNOWS ALL THAT HAS TRANSPIRED BETWEEN THE IMAM AND HIS GUESTS, HE WILL BE ABLE TO USE THIS KNOWLEDGE TO ASSUME HIS PLACE IN THE \"GROUP OF FIVE.\" IN ADDITION, SOME IRANIANS IN THE MAJLIS HAVE REPORTEDLY VOICED THE CONCERN THAT \"WE CAN NEVER ALLOW THE NAME \'KHOMEINI\' TO FADE FROM OUR VIEW.\" ONE WAY OF ASSURING THIS IS TO KEEP AHMAD IN THE UPPER LEVELS OF THE GOI. (E) AYATOLLAH ALI AKBAR MESHKINI--SPEAKER FOR THE \"COUNCIL OF EXPERTS,\" HE RARELY MAKES NEWS. HOWEVER, IRANIANS WE HAVE TALKED TO IN DUBAI BELIEVE THAT HE IS ORCHESTRATING MUCH OF THE CONTINUED ANTI-WEST, ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC. SINCE HE ALLEGEDLY HAD A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN HELPING TO CHOOSE MONTAZERI AS THE IMAM\'S SUCCESSOR, THE DEBT MONTA- ZERI OWES HIM MAY WELL BE REPAID WITH A POSITION IN THE \"GROUP OF FIVE.\" 8. COMMENT: THESE OBSERVATIONS ON THE \"GROUP OF FIVE\" COME FROM IRANIANS WHOSE INFORMATION HAS PROVED TO BE RELI- ABLE IN THE PAST. WHILE MONTAZERI, RAFSANJANI, AND KHA- MENEI ARE MOST OFTEN CITED IN ANY DISCUSSION OF POST- KHOMEINI LEADERS, THE NAMES OF AHMED KHOMEINI AND MESHKINI HAVE APPEARED OFTEN ENOUGH TO WARRANT THEIR INCLUSION. MACK " "148","12/12/1986 14:50","86BRASILIA13835","Embassy Brasilia","UNCLASSIFIED","86BRASILIA13511\|86BRASILIA4799","R 121450Z DEC 86 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1591 INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO AMCONSUL SAO PAULO AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE POUCH AMCONSUL RECIFE POUCH AMCONSUL SALVADOR DA BAHIA POUCH BELO HORIZONTE POUCH AMEMBASSY COLOMBO AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA AMEMBASSY MANAGUA ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 13835 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E.O.12356: N/A TAGS: PARM, PREL, BR, IR, HO, NU, CE SUBJECT: THE BRAZILIAN CONNECTION WITH IRAN AND THE CONTRAS REFS: (A)BRASILIA 13511, (B)BRASILIA 4799 1. (U) WITH THE UNRAVELING OF THE IRANIAN ARMS/CONTRA AID SCANDAL, THE BRAZILIAN PRESS CONTINUES TO POINT TO A SO-CALLED \"BRAZILIAN CONNECTION\". WEEKLY NEWS MAGAZINE \"VEJA\" AND CONSERVATIVE \"O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO\" RAN STORIES IN THE LAST FEW DAYS ON THE SUPPOSED BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT. 2. \"ESTADO\'S\" DEFENSE EDITOR ROBERTO GODOY WROTE ABOUT ALLEGED U.S. ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN HAWK MISSILES FROM BRAZIL IN 1986, AN UNUSUAL REQUEST, ACCORDING TO GODOY, FOR BRAZIL DOES NOT HAVE SUCH SYSTEM IN ITS INVENTORY. THE FIRST CONTACT, GODOY SAID, WAS MADE IN EARLY 1986 BY AN \"ADVISOR\" TO H. ROSS PEROT TO A LOCAL ARMS PRODUCER, AND THE SECOND IN MAY, TO A FORMER MEMBER OF THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INVOLVED WITH THE ARMS INDUSTRY. GODOY EXPLAINED THAT THE AMERICAN PROPOSED TO TRADE HAWKS FOR THE MORE ADVANCED SPARROW, NOT SPECIFYING WHERE THE WEAPONS WOULD GO. IN BOTH INSTANCES, HE CONTINUED, THE AMERICAN WAS TURNED DOWN BECAUSE THE BRAZILIANS SUSPECTED THE CONTRAS OR IRAN AS RECIPIENTS AND SAID GOVERNMENT RULES WOULD NOT ALLOW SUCH \"NEBULOUS\" TRANSFERS OR SALES TO A NATION AT WAR. GODOY ALSO REFERRED TO JAIRO IWAMASSA GUINOZA\'S CONNECTION (SEE REFTEL A) RESTATING THAT GUINOZA WAS NEVER ABLE TO PURCHASE ANY ARMS FROM BRAZILIAN MANUFACTURERS. 3. \"VEJA\'S\" STORY CLAIMS TO PRESENT \"PROOF\" OF BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CONTRAS AND IRAN, BUT IT IS SHORT ON EVIDENCE AND SOURCES. ONE OF THE \"PROOFS\" IS A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH OF FIVE BOXES OF HAND GRENADES MADE BY COMPANHIA DE EXPLOSIVOS VALPARAIBA IN SAO PAULO. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, THE GRENADES WERE SHIPPED TO SRI LANKA IN 1984 AND IT SPECULATES THAT SOME OF THEM WERE DIVERTED TO HONDURAS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, A PORT STOP ALONG THE WAY. \"VEJA\" DOES NOT KNOW HOW MANY CONTRABAND WEAPONS ENDED UP IN THE CONTRA\'S TRAINING CAMP, NOR THE SIZE OF THE ORIGINAL SHIPMENT TO COLOMBO, BUT SUGGESTS THAT THE TRANSFER WAS MADE WITH THE CONSENT OF THE BUYER, FOR SRI LANKA DID NOT PROTEST THE INCOMPLETE SHIPMENT. ANOTHER \"PROOF\" WAS FINDING TWO HONDURAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS TRAINING AT EMBRAER ALSO IN 1984. HONDURAS HAD SIGNED A US DOLS 10 MILLION CONTRACT \"FINANCED BY RONALD REAGAN\'S GOVERNMENT\" FOR THE PURCHASE OF TUCANOS. IN \"VEJA\'S\" OPINION, NICARAGUA NOW HAS EVIDENCE TO MAKE A CLAIM FROM ITAMARATY ON BRAZIL\'S SUPPORT TO NICARAGUA\'S FOES. 4. (U) \"VEJA\" ALSO REHASHES THE STORY OF U.S. CITIZEN GEORGE PERRY\'S DEATH IN 1983 IN NEW YORK. SUPPOSEDLY PERRY WAS KILLED BECAUSE HE DIDN\'T FULFILL HIS PART ON A US DOLS 20 MILLION DEAL TO DELIVER ARMS TO IRAN, AND THE GOB\'S VISA REFUSAL FOR THE U.S. INVESTIGATOR OF THE CRIME. IN ADDITION, VARIOUS ATTEMPTS AT SHADY SALES TO AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE EARLY 80\'S ARE DESCRIBED. THE STORY ENDS WITH THE UNDOCUMENTED ASSERTION THAT IRAN PURCHASED IN 1983 US DOLS 500 MILLION WORTH OF \"EXPLOSIVES\" AND THAT SINCE THEN THE GOB HAS \"TENDED TO IRAN\'S REQUESTS\" INCLUDING SENDING A \"PLANE LOAD OF ARMS\" LAST WEEK. 5. (LOU) COMMENT: THE BRAZILIAN PRESS IS SEARCHING FOR BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE US/IRAN/CONTRA ARMS TRAFFIC BUT SO FAR THE EVIDENCE IS NOT CONVINCING. MOST OF THE INSTANCES CITED BY THE PRESS OCCURRED A FEW YEARS BEFORE THE U.S. BEGAN ITS SECRET CONTACTS. ATTEMPTS AT SALES MUST HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN MADE INDEPENDENT OF U.S. EFFORTS. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, \"JORNAL DO BRASIL\" REPORTED IN JUNE 1984 NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SALE OF ONE MILLION GRENADES TO A SUBSIDIARY OF THE VALPARAIBA COMPANY MENTIONED ABOVE. ENOUGH TALES OF INTRIGUE AND POTENTIALLY EMBARRASSING SHADY ARMS DEALS MIGHT MAKE THE GOB CONSIDER THE ADVANTAGES OF REQUIRING A NON-TRANSFER TO THIRD PARTIES CLAUSE IN THEIR ARMS SALES CONTRACTS, A REQUIREMENT NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR CURRENT ARMS SALES POLICY GUIDELINES (SEE REFTEL B). SHLAUDEMAN " "149","12/19/1986 5:50","86STATE391887","Secretary of State","UNCLASSIFIED","","O 190550Z DEC 86 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE ","UNCLAS STATE 391887 FOR POLITICAL OFFICERS, INFO PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, SY SUBJECT: DOCUMENTS ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM 1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FACT PAPER ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND A CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS. EARLIER VERSIONS OF BOTH DOCUMENTS WERE RELEASED TO THE PRESS ON NOVEMBER 14 AND APPEARED IN THE USIA WIRELESS FILE ON THAT DATE. BOTH DOCUMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN REVISED TO REFLECT THE HASI CONVICTION IN WEST BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 26. WE ASSUME USIS MADE APPROPRIATE USE OF THE MATERIAL APPEARING IN THE WIRELESS FILE. WE ARE SENDING THE REVISED VERSIONS SO THAT POLOFFS MAY SHARE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THESE DOCUMENTS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS. 2. (BEGIN TEXT OF FACT PAPER) DECEMBER 5, 1986 SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 1983-1986 NEW EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR AND DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO LIGHT IN TWO RECENT TRIALS INCLUDING THE CONVICTION IN GREAT BRITAIN OF NIZAR HINDAWI FOR THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF AN EL AL CIVILIAN AIRPLANE WITH 375 PASSENGERS ABOARD. SYRIA CLEARLY HAS A LONG RECORD OF INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM. SYRIA IS ONE OF THE \"CHARTER MEMBERS\" OF COUNTRIES ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT\'S TERRORISM LIST, WHICH WAS FIRST COMPILED IN 1979. (COUNTRIES CURRENTLY ON THE LIST ARE SYRIA, LIBYA, IRAN, SOUTH YEMEN, AND CUBA.) THE PATTERN OF SYRIAN ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM HAS VARIED. FROM THE MID-1970\'S THROUGH 1983, SYRIAN PERSONNEL ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN TERRORIST OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS WERE PRIMARILY DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER ARABS, SUCH AS SYRIAN DISSIDENTS, MODERATE ARAB STATES SUCH AS JORDAN, AND PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS, AS WELL AS ISRAELI AND JEWISH TARGETS. IN 1982, FOR EXAMPLE, A CAR BOMB EXPLODED IN FRONT OF THE OFFICES OF A LEBANESE-OWNED PRO-IRAQI NEWSPAPER IN DOWNTOWN PARIS, KILLING ONE PERSON AND INJURING SCORES OF OTHERS. FRANCE LATER EXPELLED TWO SYRIAN DIPLOMATS AND ORDERED ITS AMBASSADOR HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS. BY LATE 1983 DAMASCUS HAD CURTAILED USE OF ITS OWN PERSONNEL. INSTEAD, IT BEGAN TO RELY MORE HEAVILY ON TERRORIST GROUPS MADE UP OF NON-SYRIANS WHO HAVE BASES AND TRAINING FACILITIES IN SYRIA AND SYRIAN-OCCUPIED AREAS OF LEBANON. THE MOST NOTORIOUS OF THESE IS THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION. AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT SYRIA PREFERS TO SUPPORT GROUPS WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY IN LINE WITH SYRIAN OBJECTIVES, RATHER THAN TO SELECT TARGETS OR CONTROL OPERATIONS ITSELF. DAMASCUS UTILIZES THESE GROUPS TO ATTACK OR INTIMIDATE ENEMIES AND OPPONENTS AND TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. YET AT THE SAME TIME IT CAN DISAVOW KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR OPERATIONS. SUCH SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS HAVE CARRIED OUT SCORES OF ATTACKS AGAINST PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB, TURKISH, ISRAELI AND WESTERN TARGETS DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS. THIS YEAR, INVESTIGATIONS INTO MAJOR INCIDENTS HAVE REVEALED ANOTHER CHANGE IN SYRIAN ACTIVITIES: THAT SYRIA HAS NOT ABANDONED ITS WILLINGNESS TO BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ATTACKS. THE BRITISH TRIAL AND INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTIVE EL AL BOMBING EXPOSED THE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF PRESIDENT ASSAD\'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. AND THE WEST BERLIN TRIAL INTO THE BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB FRIENDSHIP UNION IN WEST BERLIN REVEAED THE INVOLVEMENT OF SYRIAN OFFICIALS. TO A LARGE DEGREE, SYRIA HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN COVERING ITS TRACKS. NOW, HOWEVER, IN BRITAIN AND BERLIN, EVIDENCE OF MORE DIRECT SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT HAS EMERGED. LONDON AND BERLIN INVESTIGATIONS IN THE BRITISH INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTED EL AL ATTACK, HINDAWI TOLD BRITISH POLICE HE WAS RECRUITED BY HAITHAM SAID, AN AIDE TO MAJOR GENERAL AL-KHULI, CHIEF OF SYRIAN AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE. ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL, AL-KHULI\'S OPERATIVES: (1) SUPPLIED HINDAWI, A JORDANIAN, WITH A SYRIAN PASSPORT; (2) GAVE HIM DOLLARS 12,000 AND PROMISED HIM MORE MONEY WHEN HE COMPLETED HIS MISSION TO PLANT A BOMB ABOARD AN EL AL CIVILIAN AIRLINER; (3) PROVIDED HIM WITH THE BOMB WHICH WAS CARRIED INTO LONDON ABOARD THE SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES, WHICH ALSO GAVE HIM SAA CREW MEMBER HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS; AND (4) TRAINED HIM IN THE BOMB\'S USE. HINDAWI TRIED TO USE HIS PREGNANT GIRL FRIEND AS THE UNWITTING CARRIER OF THE SOPHISTICATED BOMB WHICH WAS BUILT INTO HER CARRY-ON BAG. IF AN ALERT SECURITY OFFICIAL HAD NOT SPOTTED THE DEVICE AFTER HER BAG CLEARED AN EARLIER CHECK, 375 INNOCENT PERSONS, INCLUDING SOME 230 AMERICANS, WOULD HAVE PERISHED. AFTER THE APRIL 17 PLAN FAILED, ACCORDING TO EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL, HINDAWI FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO THE SYRIAN EMBASSY, WHERE HE WAS GREETED BY THE AMBASSADOR AND HIDDEN IN A SYRIAN SAFEHOUSE IN LONDON. BRITISH PRESS REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION SAY BRITAIN ALSO HAS EVIDENCE THAT THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING IN RECRUITING HINDAWI FOR SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE. IN WEST BERLIN, HINDAWI\'S BROTHER, AHMAD HASI, AND ANOTHER ARAB, FAROUK SALAMEH, WERE CONVICTED FOR THE MARCH 29 BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB FRIENDSHIP UNION IN WEST BERLIN IN WHICH ELEVEN PERSONS WERE INJURED. IN A SWORN STATEMENT, HASI SAID HE PICKED UP THIS BOMB AT THE SYRIAN EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN FROM A SENIOR SYRIAN AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, HAITHEM SAEED, AND A SYRIAN EXPLOSIVES EXPERT WAS SENT FROM DAMASCUS TO REPAIR THE DEVICE AFTER IT TWICE FAILED TO EXPLODE. ABU NIDAL SYRIA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE MOST ACTIVE AND BRUTAL INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUP OPERATING TODAY, ABU NIDAL. (SEE NOTE BELOW) ALTHOUGH ABU NIDAL NOW ALSO RECEIVES BACKING AND SUPPORT FROM LIBYA, AND SANCTUARY IN EASTERN EUROPE, DAMASCUS HAS PROVIDED ABU NIDAL WITH IMPORTANT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT EVER SINCE THE GROUP MOVED FROM IRAQ IN 1983. SYRIA ALLOWS ABU NIDAL\'S GROUP TO MAINTAIN TRAINING CAMPS IN THE LEBANESE BIQA\' VALLEY, AN AREA UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SYRIAN ARMED FORCES. SYRIA PROVIDES THE GROUP WITH TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND PERMITS ITS OPERATIVES TO TRANSIT FREELY THROUGH DAMASCUS WHEN DEPARTING ON MISSIONS. SYRIA CONTINUES TO PERMIT OPERATION OF ABU NIDAL FACILITIES IN DAMASCUS. (THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ASSERTS THAT THE SOLE FUNCTION OF THESE FACILITIES IS LIMITED TO CULTURAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS.) ALTHOUGH LAST DECEMBER\'S ROME AIRPORT ATTACK WAS COMMITTED UNDER LIBYAN SPONSORSHIP, THE SURVIVING MEMBER OF THE FOUR-MAN TERRORIST TEAM, ACCORDING TO REPORTS ON THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION, TOLD INVESTIGATORS THE TEAM WAS TRAINED IN SYRIAN-OCCUPIED AREAS OF LEBANON BY SYRIANS. THE TEAM THEN TRAVELED TO DAMASCUS, WHERE IT REMAINED WHILE FINAL PREPARATIONS WERE MADE FOR THE ATTACK IN WHICH 16 CIVILIANS AND 3 TERRORISTS WERE KILLED. IN ANKARA ON NOVEMBER 6, TURKISH PROSECUTERS ISSUED AN INDICTMENT ACCUSING SIX PALESTINIANS WORKING FOR THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION OF KILLING A JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT IN JULY, 1985. THE INDICTMENT ALSO LINKED THE MEN WITH FOUR OTHER ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE SEPTEMBER 6, 1986 ATTACK ON AN ISTANBUL SYNAGOGUE, KILLING 21 PERSONS AND A 1983 ATTEMPT TO PLACE A BOMB ON AN ALITALIA FLIGHT, AND THE ATTEMPTED CAR BOMBING OF A U.S. OFFICERS CLUB IN IZMIR IN 1983. (BEGIN NOTE) THE OFFICIAL NAME OF THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION IS \"FATAH - REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.\" IT IS HEADED BY SABRI AL-BANNA, A PALESTINIAN WHO USES THE NOM DE GUERRE ABU NIDAL. THE GROUP\'S ORIGINAL NAME WAS THE BLACK JUNE ORGANIZATION WHEN IT WAS FORMED IN 1976. IRONICALLY, THIS GROUP FIRST CONCENTRATED ON SYRIAN TARGETS, INCLUDING AN ATTACK ON SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, NOW VICE PRESIDENT, IN 1977. (END NOTE) THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION\'S MOVE TO SYRIA IN 1983 WAS FOLLOWED BY A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN THE GROUP\'S TERRORIST ATTACKS: MORE THAN A DOZEN ATTACKS IN 1984 AND TWICE THAT NUMBER IN 1985. MORE THAN HALF OF THE 1985 ATTACKS OCCURRED IN WESTERN EUROPE, INCLUDING ATTACKS ON BRITISH TOURISTS AT HOTELS IN ATHENS. WHEN KING HUSSEIN LAUNCHED HIS FEBRUARY 1985 PEACE INITIATIVE, JORDAN BECAME A MAJOR TARGET. BUT WHEN JORDANIAN-SYRIAN RELATIONS BEGAN TO WARM IN MID-1985, ATTACKS ON JORDANIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD DIMINISHED. IN ITS DEALINGS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES, SYRIA HAS CONSISTENTLY TRIED TO PLAY DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS CONNECTION WITH ABU NIDAL AND HAS DENIED PERMITTING HIS GROUP TO ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT DAMASCUS HAS ACTUALLY RESTRAINED ABU NIDAL\'S ACTIVITIES (ABU NIDAL TRAINING CAMPS IN THE SYRIAN-CONTROLLED BIQA\' VALLEY CONTINUE TO OPERATE FOR EXAMPLE) OR CUT BACK ON OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT KNOW ABOUT EVERY OPERATION, GIVEN THE AMOUNT AND NATURE OF SYRIAN SUPPORT, DAMASCUS COULD INFLUENCE AND CONSTRAIN THE ABU NIDAL GROUP\'S ACTIVITIES IN SYRIA AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF LEBANON IF IT CHOSE TO DO SO. OTHER SYRIAN-SUPPORTED PALESTINIAN GROUPS SYRIA ALSO PROVIDES VARYING AMOUNTS OF SUPPORT TO OTHER RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS. THESE INCLUDE: SAIQA, WHICH IS UNDER TOTAL SYRIAN CONTROL; THE ABU MUSA GROUP, NOW ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON DAMASCUS; THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE--GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC); AND THE MARXIST POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), WHICH NOW MAINTAINS ITS PRINCIPAL BASE IN DAMASCUS. IN ALL, SYRIAN-SPONSORED GROUPS, INCLUDING THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION, WERE LINKED TO ABOUT 30 TERRORIST ATTACKS DURING 1985, A QUARTER OF THEM IN GREECE ALONE. THE ABU MUSA GROUP ANNOUNCED FROM DAMASCUS ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO BOMB AN EL AL AIRLINER, IN MADRID ON JUNE 26 OF THIS YEAR. THE SUSPECT IN THAT ATTEMPT HAS ADMITTED BEING A MEMBER OF THE GROUP. TWO WEEKS LATER, OTHER GROUPS SUPPORTED BY SYRIA, THE PFLP AND THE LEBANESE SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY, ATTEMPTED AN ATTACK ON AN ISRAELI RESORT TOWN ON JULY 10, 1986. SUPPORT FOR NON-PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS IN ADDITION TO THE RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS, A VARIETY OF OTHER TERRORISTS HAVE FACILITIES AND RECEIVED TERRORIST TRAINING IN SYRIA OR SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF LEBANON: THE JAPANESE RED ARMY, THE KURDISH LABOR PARTY, THE ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA (ASALA), AND THE PAKISTANI AL ZULFIKAR. IN ADDITION, THE LEBANESE ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION (LARF) IS BASED IN THE LEBANESE VILLAGE OF QUBAYAT, WITHIN THE AREA OF SYRIAN CONTROL IN LEBANON. TO THESE GROUPS MUST BE ADDED THE INDIVIDUAL INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS WHO FREQUENT DAMASCUS. BRUNO BREGUET, AN ASSOCIATE OF CARLOS, THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST, WAS ARRESTED IN PARIS IN FEBRUARY 1982 FOR TRANSPORTING ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES. LATER RELEASED, HE WAS RECENTLY SIGHTED ON A FLIGHT TO DAMASCUS, MET ON ARRIVAL BY SYRIAN AUTHORITIES, AND ESCORTED THROUGH THE AIRPORT WITHOUT HAVING TO PASS THROUGH THE NORMAL CONTROLS. EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT FREDERIC ORIACH, A MILITANT MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACTION DIRECT, SPENT JULY AND AUGUST 1986 IN DAMASCUS PURSUING IDEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY STUDIES. CASUALTIES AND CONTROL ATTACKS BY SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS SINCE 1983 HAVE KILLED OR WOUNDED NEARLY 500 PEOPLE. SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS HAVE ATTACKED U.S. FACILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST OVER 10 TIMES SINCE 1983. IN JORDAN LAST YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SYRIAN-SPONSORED JORDANIAN PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY PARTY ATTEMPTED TWO ANTI-U.S. ATTACKS. BOMBS WERE FOUND AT A USAID EMPLOYEE\'S HOME AND AT THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR ORIENTAL STUDIES. THESE OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS OTHERS AIMED AGAINST JORDANIAN TARGETS, HAVE HALTED SINCE THE SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT LATE LAST YEAR--UNDERSCORING SYRIA\'S ABILITY, IF IT WISHES, TO CONTROL ITS SURROGATES\' ACTIVITIES AND TO SEVERELY CURB THE CAPABILITY OF THOSE TO WHOM IT PROVIDED SAFE HAVEN AND SUPPORT. THIS HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY A TOP SYRIAN OFFICIAL WHO TRIED TO DISMISS, IN A WASHINGTON POST PRESS INTERV1EW THIS SEPTEMBER, EVIDENCE THAT ABU NIDAL\'S GROUP WAS INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ATTACKS. SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FAROUK CHARAA SAID IN DISCUSSING THE ACTIONS OF THE ABU NIDAL GROUP: \"WHOEVER KNOWS MY GOVERNMENT MUST REALIZE THAT SUCH ATTACKS COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ITS AWARENESS.\" (END TEXT OF FACT PAPER.) 3. (BEGIN TEXT OF CHRONOLOGY) CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS: 1983-1986 THE FOLLOWING LIST OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IS NOT INTENDED TO BE ALL-INCLUSIVE BUT IS ILLUSTRATIVE OF SYRIA\'S INVOLVEMENT IN AND SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND TERRORIST GROUPS. THE GROUPS CITED HERE HAVE LINKS WITH SYRIA. 1986 26 NOVEMBER WEST BERLIN. A COURT CONVICTED TWO ARABS FOR THE MARCH 29 BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB FRIENDSHIP UNION WHICH INJURED 11 PERSONS. IN A SWORN STATEMENT ONE OF THE DEFENDENTS, AHMAD HASI, SAID HE PICKED UP THE BOMB AT THE SYRIAN EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN FROM A SYRIAN AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. HASI IS A BROTHER OF NIZAR HINDAWI, WHO WAS CONVICTED IN A BRITISH COURT FOR THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF AN EL AL AIRLINER. 6 NOVEMBER TURKEY. TURKISH PROSECUTORS ISSUED AN INDICTMENT ACCUSING SIX PALESTINIANS WORKING FOR THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION OF KILLING A JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT IN JULY 1985. AN ARREST WARRANT ALSO WAS ISSUED FOR THE SYRIAN EMBASSY SECOND SECRETARY, MOHAMMED DARWICHI, WHO WAS ONE OF THE ORIGINAL DEFENDENTS AND LEFT TURKEY. THE INDICTMENT ALSO LINKED MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WITH FOUR OTHER ACTIONS: THE SEPTEMBER 6, 1986 ATTACK ON AN ISTANBUL SYNAGOGUE, WHICH KILLED 22 PERSONS; AN ATTEMPT TO PLACE A BOMB ON AN ALITALIA FLIGHT IN 1983; THE ATTEMPTED CAR BOMBING OF A U.S. OFFICERS\' CLUB IN IZMIR IN 1983, AND THE KILLING OF A PALESTINIAN STUDENT IN ANKARA IN 1982. 26 JUNE MADRID. A SPANIARD ATTEMPTED TO BOARD AN EL AL FLIGHT WITH A SUITCASE BOMB, APPARENTLY WITHOUT KNOWING IT. THE SUSPECT ARRESTED BY SPANISH POLICE CARRIED A SYRIAN PASSPORT. A SPOKESMAN FOR THE ABU MUSA GROUP, WHICH IS ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON DAMASCUS, CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANTING THE BOMB, ALTHOUGH THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT DENIED INVOLVEMENT. 17 APRIL LONDON. EL AL SECURITY DISCOVERED A SYRIAN-MADE BOMB IN THE LUGGAGE OF AN IRISH WOMAN AS SHE ATTEMPTED TO BOARD A PLANE FOR TEL AVIV. A BRITISH COURT FOUND HER BOYFRIEND, NIZAR HINDAWI, GUILTY OF THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING, AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN OFFICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE TERRORIST ACT. 2 MARCH WEST BANK. TWO GUNMEN ASSASSINATED THE MAYOR OF NABLUS, ZAFER AL-MASRI, A PALESTINIAN APPOINTED BY ISRAEL. BOTH THE ABU NIDAL GROUP AND THE POPULAR FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF PALESTINE CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1985 27 DEC. ROME AND VIENNA. ABU NIDAL TERRORISTS SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTACKED EL AL TICKET COUNTERS IN THE ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORTS, KILLING MORE THAN 20 PEOPLE, INCLUDING FIVE AMERICANS, AND WOUNDING SOME 120 OTHERS. (ALTHOUGH THESE ATTACKS WERE COMMITTED UNDER LIBYAN SPONSORSHIP, REPORTS ON THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION INDICATE THAT THE ROME TERRORIST TEAM RECEIVED TRAINING IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF LEBANON AND PASSED THROUGH DAMASCUS.) 30 SEPT. NETHERLANDS. A SMALL BOMB DAMAGED THE EL AL OFFICE OF AMSTERDAM. FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL--THE ABU NIDAL GROUP\'S OFFICIAL NAME--CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 25 SEPT. ITALY. A BOMB EXPLODED IN A BRITISH AIRWAYS OFFICE IN ROME, INJURING 15 PEOPLE. POLICE ARRESTED HASSAN ITAB FLEEING THE SCENE. ITAB CLAIMED HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, AN ABU NIDAL \"COVER\" NAME, AND WAS LATER IDENTIFIED BY WITNESSES AS THE SAME MAN WHO THREW A GRENADE AT THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN ATHENS IN MARCH. 18 SEPT. GREECE. MICHEL NIMRI, A JORDANIAN MAGAZINE PUBLISHER AND REPORTEDLY A PERSONAL FRIEND OF YASSIR ARAFAT, WAS ASSASSINATED IN ATHENS. BLACK SEPTEMBER, A NAME USED BY THE ABU NIDAL GROUP, CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY THE NEXT DAY. 16 SEPT. ITALY. A GRENADE ATTACK ON A ROME SIDEWALK CAFE INJURED 38 TOURISTS, INCLUDING NINE AMERICANS. POLICE ARRESTED A PALESTINIAN IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATTACK. THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, ANOTHER SYRIAN-LINKED GROUP, CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY ON 19 SEPTEMBER. 3 SEPT. GREECE. TERRORISTS THREW HAND GRENADES THAT WOUNDED 19 BRITISH TOURISTS AT THE GLYFADA HOTEL IN ATHENS. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED THE ATTACK WAS TO PRESSURE THE GREEK AUTHORITIES TO RELEASE A MAN ARRESTED NEAR THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY ON 31 AUGUST. 31 AUGUST GREECE. POLICE ARRESTED A HEAVILY ARMED MAN NEAR THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN ATHENS. SAMIR SALAMEH ACKNOWLEDGED MEMBERSHIP IN BLACK SEPTEMBER AND CLAIMED HE PLANNED TO ASSASSINATE THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR. 8 AUGUST GREECE. A BOMB EXPLODED IN THE KITCHEN OF THE LONDON HOTEL IN ATHENS, INJURING 13 PEOPLE--NINE OF THEM BRITISH SUBJECTS. THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY, CONTENDING THE HOTEL WAS A \"HIDEOUT\" FOR BRITISH SPIES. 24 JULY TURKEY. THE FIRST SECRETARY AT THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN ANKARA WAS ASSASSINATED BY A LONE GUNMAN. THE INCIDENT WAS CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 11 JULY KUWAIT. TWO BOMBS EXPLODED WITHIN MINUTES OF EACH OTHER KILLING EIGHT PEOPLE AND INJURING 89 IN TWO CAFES ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS APART. THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1 JULY SPAIN. A BOMB EXPLODED AT THE BRITISH AIRWAYS TICKET OFFICE IN MADRID, ALSO DAMAGING THE TWA OFFICE UPSTAIRS. THE ALIA ROYAL JORDANIAN AIRLINES TICKET OFFICE NEARBY WAS HIT BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE AND TWO GRENADES THAT FAILED TO EXPLODE. ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND 27 WERE WOUNDED. CLAIMED BY ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED, REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, AND BLACK SEPTEMBER. 4 APRIL GREECE. A ROCKET WAS FIRED AT A JORDANIAN AIRLINER AS IT WAS TAKING OFF FROM ATHENS AIRPORT. THE PROJECTILE HIT THE PLAN BUT DID NOT EXPLODE. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 3 APRIL ITALY. A ROCKET NARROWLY MISSED THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY ON THE FIFTH FLOOR OF AN OFFICE BUILDING IN ROME. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 21 MARCH ITALY. THREE UNIDENTIFIED MEN THREW HAND GRENADES INTO A JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN ROME, INJURING TWO PEOPLE. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 21 MARCH GREECE. AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW A HAND GRENADE INTO THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN ATHENS, INJURING THREE PEOPLE. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. (SEE SEPTEMBER 25, 1985 INCIDENT.) 21 MARCH CYPRUS. AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW TWO HAND GRENADES INTO THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN NICOSIA. CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 9 MARCH UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. A BOMB WAS FOUND ON A JORDANIAN AIRLINER. THE YOUNG PALESTINIAN WHO CARRIED THE BOMB ONTO THE KARACHI-TO-AMMAN FLIGHT SAID HE THOUGHT HE WAS TRANSPORTING DRUGS TO SUPPORT ABU NIDAL TERRORIST OPERATIONS. 22 FEB. JORDAN. THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE\'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY PLACED A BOMB AT THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR ORIENTAL RESEARCH IN AMMAN. THE BOMB WAS FOUND AND DEFUSED. 10 JAN. JORDAN. A BOMB PLANTED BY THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE\'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS DEFUSED NEAR A USAID EMPLOYEE\'S HOME. THE EXPLOSIVES HAD NEITHER A POWER SOURCE NOR A TIMING DEVICE. 1984 29 DEC. JORDAN. TWO UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN ASSASSINATED FAH AL-QAWASMEH, A MEMBER OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND FORMER MAYOR OF HEBRON, OUTSIDE HIS HOME IN AMMAN. TWO WITNESSES TO THE SHOOTING WERE INJURED BY GUNFIRE AS THEY TRIED TO BLOCK THE ASSASSINS\' FLEEING VEHICLE. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 14 DEC. ITALY. ISMAIL DARWISH, A LEADING MILITARY FIGURE IN THE FATAH MOVEMENT, WAS GUNNED DOWN ON A ROME STREET BY AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN WHO FLED ON A WAITING MOTOR SCOOTER. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 4 DEC. ROMANIA. THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION OF THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY WAS SHOT AND KILLED AS HE WAS GETTING INTO HIS CAR IN BUCHAREST. BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 2 DEC. JORDAN. A GUARD DISCOVERED A BOMB CONCEALED IN AN ATTACHE CASE INSIDE THE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE AND CITIBANK BUILDING IN AMMAN. BOMB TECHNICIANS DEFUSED THE DEVICE, WHICH CONTAINED 18 BLOCKS OF TNT AND A TIMER. THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE\'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS LATER DETERMINED TO BE RESPONSIBLE. 4 OCT. CYPRUS. A CAR BOMB EXPLODED BEHIND THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN NICOSIA, SLIGHTLY INJURING ONE PERSON. CLAIMED BY ABU MUSA\'S FATAH DISSIDENT ORGANIZATION. 13 AUGUST JORDAN. JORDANIAN POLICE DEFUSED A BOMB CONSISTING OF SEVERAL HUNDRED GRAMS OF SOVIET-MADE EXPLOSIVES NEAR THE RESIDENCE OF A US EMBASSY OFFICIAL. THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE\'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS LATER DETERMINED TO BE RESPONSIBLE. 11 AUGUST JORDAN. MEMBERS OF THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE\'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY TRIED TO SET OFF A BOMB OUTSIDE THE JORDAN RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION. THE BOMB WAS DISCOVERED AND DEFUSED. 3 AUGUST JORDAN. A BOMB EXPLODED UNDER A WATER TRUCK PARKED NEAR THE U.S. EMBASSY WAREHOUSE IN AMMAN. THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AND ONLY MINOR DAMAGE. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 29 MAY CYPRUS. A FORMER SAIQA OFFICER WHO HAD SWITCHED HIS ALLEGIANCE TO ARAFAT, ABDULLAH AHMAD SULEIMAN EL SAADI, WAS MURDERED IN LIMASSOL. FOUR SYRIAN MEN AND TWO WOMEN WERE ARRESTED FOR THE MURDER AND SUBSEQUENTLY DEPORTED FROM CYPRUS. 3 MAY CYPRUS. AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN SHOT AND KILLED PALESTINIAN PUBLISHER HANNA MUQBIL AND WOUNDED HIS SECRETARY IN NICOSIA. MUQBIL WAS REPORTEDLY A FORMER MEMBER OF ABU NIDAL WHO HAD DEFECTED TO ARAFAT\'S CAMP. 24 MARCH JORDAN. A BOMB WAS DEFUSED OUTSIDE THE BRITISH CONSULATE IN AMMAN. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 24 MARCH JORDAN. A BOMB WAS DISCOVERED AND DEFUSED OUTSIDE THE BRITISH CULTURAL CENTER. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 24 MARCH JORDAN. A BOMB EXPLODED IN THE PARKING LOT OF THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL, WHICH IS ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY, DAMAGING TWO VEHICLES AND SLIGHTLY INJURING A USAID EMPLOYEE AND HIS DAUGHTER. A SECOND BOMB WAS DISCOVERED IN THE PARKING LOT AND DEFUSED. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1983 29 DEC. SPAIN. TWO JORDANIAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEES WERE ATTACKED BY A LONE GUNMAN AS THEY WERE LEAVING THE EMBASSY. WALID JAMAL BALKIS WAS KILLED INSTANTLY, AND IBRAHIM SAMI MOHAMMED WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 19 DEC. TURKEY. A CAR BOMB WAS DISCOVERED IN AN ABANDONED RENTAL CAR MIDWAY BETWEEN THE FRENCH CULTURAL HOUSE AND THE CORDON HOTEL USED BY AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN IZMIR. THE BOMB\'S TIMER APPARENTLY MALFUNCTIONED. TURKISH POLICE LINKED THE ABU NIDAL GROUP AND SYRIAN AGENTS TO THE INCIDENT. 7 NOV. GREECE. TWO SECURITY GUARDS OF THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY WERE WOUNDED ON A CROWDED STREET IN ATHENS. ONE OF THE TWO VICTIMS DIED FROM HIS WOUNDS. THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 26 OCT. ITALY. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE VATICAN AND HIS DRIVER WERE WOUNDED IN AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN ROME. THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 25 OCT. INDIA. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR WOUNDED BY AN UNKNOWN ASSAILANT IN NEW DELHI. CLAIMED BY THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES. 13 OCT. JORDAN. TWO HAND GRENADES WERE THROWN INTO A POLICE BARRACKS IN AMMAN. A MEMBER OF THE POLICE RECRUITED BY SAIQA CONFESSED TO THE ATTACK. LOCAL AUTHORITIES SUSPECTED THAT ABU NIDAL ELEMENTS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. 21 AUGUST GREECE. A HIGH-LEVEL PLO OFFICIAL, MA\'MUM MURAYSH, WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEN ON A MOTORCYCLE. THE VICTIM\'S SON AND HIS DRIVER WERE WOUNDED. THE MOVEMENT FOR REBUILDING FATAH CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 10 APRIL PORTUGAL. THE PLO OBSERVER TO AN INTERNATIOAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIALISTS, ISAM AL-SARTAWI, WAS SHOT TO DEATH IN A HOTEL LOBBY. SARTAWI\'S SECRETARY WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK. THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 1 JANUARY ISRAEL. A GRENADE ATTACK ON A CIVILIAN BUS IN TEL AVIV INJURED 12. BOTH SAIQA AND ABU NIDAL CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. (END TEXT OF CHRONOLOGY.) 4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT, KABUL, MOSCOW, AND LENINGRAD. SHULTZ " "150","1/21/1987 13:58","87KAMPALA184","Embassy Kampala","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 211358Z JAN 87 FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6103 USDOC WASHDC INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM AMEMBASSY KIGALI AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA AMEMBASSY KINSHASA AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY LONDON USIA WASHDC 3249 SECDEF WASHDC DIA WASHDC USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KAMPALA 00184 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: EAID, PREL, PHUM, US SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MUSEVENI. 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED BY PAO MET WITH UGANDAN PRESIDENT YOWERI MUSEVENI FOR ALMOST TWO HOURS AT STATE HOUSE ENTEBBE JANUARY 15. THE MAJORITY OF THE MEETING CONCENTRATED ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND NRA USE OF \"3-PIECE TIE\". AMBASSADOR DESCRIBED HIS EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE US TRADERS TO JOIN IN BARTER TRADE WITH UGANDA. MUSEVENI WELCOMED US WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND TO RECENT PL-480 REQUEST. THE PRESIDENT CLAIMED THAT DESPITE SOME RECENT SHARP ENGAGEMENTS WITH UNLA REMNANTS IN THE NORTH, HE FELT THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE NORTH WAS QUICKLY COMING UNDER CONTROL. THE PROBLEM COULD BE AT AN END WITHIN TWO MONTHS. THE PRESIDENT CASTIGATED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR ITS INEPTITUDE IN ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE A VISIT FOR HIM TO THE UNITED STATES LAST YEAR, AND ASKED THE AMBASSADOR\'S ASSISTANCE IN PROPERLY WORKING OUT A VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND A CALL ON PRESIDENT REAGAN THIS FALL. END SUMMARY. 3. HUMAN RIGHTS: THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT UGANDA HAD SUFFERED A \"HANGOVER\" FROM THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF THE AMIN AND OBOTE PERIODS AND THAT IN RECENT MONTHS THE SPECIAL HUMAN RIGHTS SCRUTINY THAT HAD BEEN APPLIED BY THE USG TO THINGS SUCH AS MULTI- LATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LOANS TO UGANDA HAD EASED AS A RESULT OF THE IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE OF THE NRM GOVERNMENT. THE USG WOULD CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN UGANDA CLOSELY AND HOPED THAT THE FORMER SENIOR MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED ON TREASON CHARGES WOULD SOON COME TO TRIAL AND RECEIVE THE FULL PROTECTION OF THE LAW DURING THE HEARING OF THEIR CASES. THE PRESIDENT SAID THERE NEED NOT BE ANY FEAR ON THAT SCORE AS THE TRIALS WOULD TAKE PLACE SOON. HE ADDED THAT IF THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO BRING A PARTICULAR CASE TO TRIAL THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED WOULD BE RELEASED. BASED UPON HIS MONITORING OF THE INVESTIGATION SO FAR, HE FELT THAT THERE WOULD BE ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO BRING SOME TO TRIAL, WHILE OTHERS IN CUSTODY WOULD BE RELEASED BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 4. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS DISTURBED TO HEAR THAT THE NRA WAS USING THE \"3-PIECE TIE\" IN THE NORTH AS A MEANS OF EXTRACTING INFORMATION DURING THE INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS. MUSEVENI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE 3-PIECE TIE WAS BEING USED AND WONDERED WHY IT SHOULD CONCERN OUTSIDE OBSERVERS. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT THE INFLICTION OF PAIN TO ELICIT INFORMATION FROM A DETAINEE WAS TORTURE AND A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ADDING THAT HE HAD HEARD OF CASES WHERE GANGRENE HAD DEVELOPED AND ARMS HAD TO BE AMPUTATED AS A RESULT OF THE USE OF THE 3-PIECE TIE. MUSEVENI PROTESTED THAT IF PROPERLY APPLIED THE 3-PIECE TIE SHOULD NOT RESULT IN SUCH INJURY. HE WENT ON TO CLAIM THAT WITHOUT ITS USE THE NRA WOULD BE SEVERELY HAMPERED IN BRINGING PEACE TO TESO AND SOUTH KARAMOJA WHICH WERE CURRENTLY BEING PLAGUED BY ARMED RUSTLERS. \"I DON\'T LIKE CRUELTY BUT WE MUST HAVE TOUGHNESS,\" CONTINUED THE PRESIDENT. \"THESE PEOPLE ARE USED TO A ROUGH LIFE; THEY ARE NOT PUNISHED BY BEING LOCKED UP. IF YOU\'RE NOT TOUGH WITH LAWLESS ELEMENTS, THE LAW ABIDING FEAR TO TALK. IF YOU JUST USE VERBAL INTERROGATION, IT WON\'T GET ANYWHERE.\" THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE USE OF TORTURE COULD NOT BE RATIONALIZED BY CLAIMS THAT IT WAS USED IN THE PURSUIT OF A \"GOOD CAUSE.\" \"THE 3-PIECE TIE IS A FORM OF TORTURE AND CLEARLY A HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE WHICH IF CONTINUED BY THE NRA WILL SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THE FAVORABLE HUMAN RIGHTS REPUTATION WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE NEW NRM GOVERNMENT.\" 5. IN RESPONSE TO MUSEVENI\'S REQUEST THAT THE AMBASSADOR DEFINE TORTURE THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO OBTAIN A PRECISE DEFINITION FROM THE HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS IN WASHINGTON, BUT THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED THE INFLICTION OF PAIN TO ELICIT INFORMATION WAS CLEARLY TORTURE AND A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION. THE PRESIDENT REJOINED THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN HURTING ANYONE BUT SIMPLY WANTED TO BRING STABILITY. THERE WAS A CULTURAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UGANDA AND THE WEST. THE PRESIDENT ASSERTED THAT IF HE TRIED TO USE MORE HUMANE METHODS HE WOULD BE SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE OF POPULAR OPINION. THE POPULAR VIEW IS THAT THIEVES SHOULD BE HURT. MOST PEOPLE BELIEVE THE LEGAL MACHINERY IS HOPELESS AND AS A CONSEQUENCE TAKE THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BELABOR THE POINT BUT IF THE NRA PERSISTED IN THE USE OF THE 3-PIECE TIE THE GOVERNMENT\'S CLAIM THAT THEY WERE TRULY DIFFERENT FROM PREVIOUS UNPOPULAR REGIMES WOULD HAVE A HOLLOW RING. 6. COMMENT: MUSEVENI\'S ATTEMPT TO LIGHTLY DISMISS AND THEN DEFEND THE USE OF THE 3-PIECE TIE WAS DISAPPOINTING AND SOMEWHAT DISTURBING. BASED ON HIS REACTIONS, I SUSPECT THAT OUR INTERVENTION WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED ON IT. THE EMBASSY WILL BE APPROACHING OTHER EMBASSIES AND MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO REINFORCE THIS DEMARCHE TO THE PRESIDENT. 7. BARTER TRADE: THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD NOT REVIEW THE OBVIOUS LIMITATIONS OF THE BARTER TRADE AS IT ALREADY HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH MANY MINISTERS. HE SIMPLY WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO KNOW THAT IF HIS GOVERNMENT WAS HELL-BENT ON PURSUING THIS FORM OF TRADE, HE WANTED HIM TO KNOW THERE WERE A NUMBER OF AMERICAN FIRMS ENGAGED IN THIS TYPE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT FIND IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO DEAL WITH THEM THAN TO PURSUE SOME OF THE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT DEALS CURRENTLY BEING DISCUSSED. THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THAT ONE OF THE FRUSTRATIONS IN TRYING TO ASSIST AMERICAN COMPANIES, SUCH AS GENERAL MOTORS, WHO WERE INTERESTED IN GETTING INVOLVED IN BARTER TRADE WITH UGANDA WAS THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING GOOD INFORMATION ON THE TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF COMMODITIES UGANDA COULD MAKE AVAILABLE FOR BARTER. REFERRING TO THE CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE VARIOUS MINISTRIES, THE PRESIDENT SAID \"THESE FELLOWS ARE NOT SERIOUS\" AND THEN INSTRUCTED HIS PERSONAL ASSISTANT TO SEND THE AMBASSADOR THE REQUESTED INFORMATION. THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THAT AN AMERICAN BARTER TRADING FIRM, THE IBE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK, WOULD BE SIGNING AN AGREEMENT-WITH THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE WHICH WOUL? P?OIDE THE FRAMEWORK (E.G., SWING CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS) FOR THEM TO TRADE WITH UGANDA. IBE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE FARM EQUIPMENT ON CREDIT AND THEN TAKE PAYMENT IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE TO LIQUIDATE THE DEBT. THE PRESIDENT BEAMED THAT THIS WAS EXACTLY THE TYPE OF DEAL HE WOULD LIKE TO FOSTER AND THANKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR ENCOURAGING AMERICAN FIRMS TO CONSIDER BARTERING WITH UGANDA. 8. U.S. ASSISTANCE: THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THE PL-480 REQUEST RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THE GOU, COMMENTING THAT IT WAS RECEIVING EXPEDITIOUS CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON. MUSEVENI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN EVOLUTION IN GOVERNMENT THINKING REGARDING FOOD AID AND THAT THERE WAS NOW AN APPRECIATION THAT PL-480 COULD BE IMPORTANT IN MEETING NEAR-TERM FEEDING REQUIREMENTS, AS WELL AS IN GENERATING RESOURCES FOR LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENT. THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT THE EMBASSY WAS FOLLOWING VERY CLOSELY GOVERNMENT\'S DIALOGUE WITH THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF ON ECONOMIC POLICY, EMPHASIZING THAT OUR LONGER-TERM ASSISTANCE PLANNING WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ACCOMPLISH BEFORE GOVERNMENT REACHED SOME BASIC DECISIONS ON ECONOMIC POLICY (E.G., EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTMENT). THE AMBASSADOR SHARED WITH MUSEVENI A COPY OF A DRAFT PLANNING CONCEPT PAPER PREPARED BY THE AID MISSION STATING THAT WHILE IT HAD NO APPROVAL OR STATUS IN WASHINGTON, WE WOULD LIKE TO USE IT AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSING WITH GOVERNMENT ITS DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES, AND HOW THE USG MIGHT BEST ASSIST. MUSEVENI SAID HE WOULD READ THE PAPER AND LOOKED FORWARD TO OPENING A DIALOGUE ON DEVELOPMENT PLANNING. 9. SUDAN SITUATION: THE AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR MUSEVENI\'S ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN AND WHETHER THERE WAS ANY USEFUL ROLE WHICH THE USG OR OTHER OUTSIDE PARTIES COULD PLAY TO BRING THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. MUSEVENI SAID HE DID NOT HAVE ANY RECOMMENDATION AT THIS TIME BUT THAT HE WOULD THINK ABOUT IT. HE SAID HE HAD ADVISED GARANG LAST YEAR TO TALK SERIOUSLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN KHARTOUM. AS FAR AS THE PRESIDENT WAS CONCERNED THE CONFLICT HAD TO BE SOLVED POLITICALLY; HE COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT WAS PARANOID ABOUT GARANG\'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ETHIOPIA. GARANG WAS NOT IN ADDIS BECAUSE HE SUPPORTS THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT BUT RATHER BECAUSE THEY ARE HIS ONLY SUBSTANTIAL SOURCE OF SUPPORT. THE PRESIDENT SAID THE SUDANESE HAD MADE TWO FUNDAMENTAL ERRORS: THEY ASSERTED THAT THE SUDAN WAS AN ARAB NATION AND AN ISLAMIC COUNTRY. 10. SITUATION IN THE NORTH: THE AMBASSADOR ASKED HOW THE FIGHTING IN THE NORTH WAS PROGRESSING AND MUSEVENI REPLIED THAT THE NRA\'S RECENT OPERATIONS ALONG THE SUDANESE BORDER HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. THE UNLA REMNANTS LACKED A CENTRAL COMMAND, A COHERENT STRATEGY, AND POLITICAL PROGRAM. HE ADMITTED THAT THE REBELS HAD TAKEN THE NRA BY SURPRISE WHEN THEY ATTACKED LAST AUGUST BUT FELT THAT THE NRA NOW HAD ADEQUATE FORCES IN THE NORTH AND WAS IN A POSITION TO \"FINISH THEM IN TWO MONTHS.\" HE OBSERVED THAT THE KEY PROBLEM IN TRYING TO PURSUE A NEGOTIATED END TO THE CONFLICT WAS THAT THE NRA WAS FACING PEOPLE WHO WERE \"POLITICALLY PRIMITIVE.\" HE CLAIMED THAT EVIDENCE HAD RECENTLY COME TO THE NRA\'S ATTENTION THAT THE UNLA FORCES WERE INVOKING WITHCRAFT TO ENTHUSE THEIR FORCES. IT WAS NOT WORKING AND WAS LEADING TO THE LOPSIDED CASUALTY FIGURES IN THE NRA\'S FAVOR. 11. MUSEVENI TRIP TO WASHINGTON. WHEN THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF THE PRESIDENT HAD ANY ISSUES HE WANTED TO RAISE, MUSEVENI SAID HE HAD BEEN EMBARRASSED AND ANGERED BY THE POOR ADVICE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHEN IT RECOMMENDED HE VISIT WASHINGTON LAST YEAR. THAT SAID, THE PRESIDENT QUICKLY CONTINUED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO VISIT WASHINGTON LATER THIS YEAR. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS PLANNING TO ATTEND THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING IN CANADA AND WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN ATTENDING THE UNGA. THOSE TWO EVENTS SUGGESTED A GENERAL TIMEFRAME FOR A VISIT TO WASHINGTON WHICH THE AMBASSADOR WOULD SO RECOMMEND TO HIS GOVERNMENT. THE AMBASSADOR ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT ARRANGING A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT AND COMMENTED THAT HE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED WHEN MUSEVENI DECIDED NOT TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES LAST YEAR, WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. A NUMBER OF VERY USEFUL MEETINGS WITH SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION SHORT OF THE PRESIDENT, AND KEY FIGURES IN THE CONGRESS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR COULD HAVE BEEN ARRANGED. ASSURING MUSEVENI THAT HE WOULD MAKE HIS BEST EFFORT TO TRY TO ARRANGE A CALL ON PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT SHOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE, A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES TO MEET OTHER INFLUENTIAL PERSONALITIES IS STILL VERY MUCH IN HIS INTEREST. 12. COMMENT: MUSEVENI OBVIOUSLY WANTS VERY BADLY TO VISIT WASHINGTON AND CALL ON THE PRESIDENT, AND FINDS IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS SO DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE, ESPECIALLY AFTER HIS SUCCESSFUL TRIP TO EUROPE WHERE HE MET WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, THE QUEEN, THE KING OF THE BELGIANS, THE POPE, ETCETERA. MUSEVENI KNOWS LITTLE OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL. LET US START NOW TO TRY AND ARRANGE AN OFFICE CALL ON THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF HIS TRAVEL TO NORTH AMERICA IN THE FALL. HOUDEK " "151","2/12/1987 6:10","87COLOMBO1041","Embassy Colombo","CONFIDENTIAL","86COLOMBO6174","P 120610Z FEB 87 FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1264 INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMCONSUL MADRAS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 01041 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINS, PINR, CE SUBJECT: INSIDE THE LTTE: A LOOK AT THE TIGERS\' COMMAND STRUCTURE AND REGIONAL LEADERS REF: 86 COLOMBO 6174 1. CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: PRABHAKARAN HAS DIVIDED HIS LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM INTO FIVE POLITICO-MILITARY REGIONS, EACH COMMANDED BY A REGIONAL LEADER RESPONSIBLE TO PRABHAKARAN. IN TURN THESE REGIONAL COMMANDERS HAVE SUBORDINATE AREA COMMANDERS UNDER THEIR CONTROL. THE LTTE STRUCTURE IS A TIGHT PYRAMID, WITH POWER CONCEN- TRATED AT THE APEX--PRABHAKARAN. HIS LIEUTENANT IN JAFFNA IS KITTU, WHO SPORTS A LEOPARD-SKIN HOLSTER, KEEPS A PET MONKEY, AND IS GENERALLY KNOWN AS PRABHAKARAN\'S \"ENFORCER.\" THE TOP MAN IN MANNAR IS RADHA, THE REPUTED LEADER OF THE LTTE RAID ON ANURADHAPURA IN 1985 THAT LEFT 150 SINHALESE CIVILIANS DEAD. IN BATTICALOA THE LTTE LEADER IS KUMARAN, A WILY GUERRILLA WHO HAS NARROWLY ESCAPED CAPTURE OR DEATH TWICE IN THE LAST 6 MONTHS. GIVEN WHAT WE KNOW OF THE LTTE\'S STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS, IF AN LTTE-CONTROLLED TAMIL EELAM WERE TO BE ESTABLISHED, IT WOULD BE DOMINATED BY PRABHAKARAN, WOULD BE HIGHLY CENTRALIZED AND AUTHORITARIAN (ALTHOUGH NOT VERY IDEOLOGICAL), AND BE PLAGUED BY CLEAVAGES BASED ON REGION, CASTE, AND RELIGION. END SUMMARY. 3. INTRODUCTION: THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) ARE NOW INDISPUTABLY THE PREDOMINANT TAMIL SEPARATIST ORGANIZATION, HAVING COWED RIVAL MILITANT GROUPS, SUPPLANTED THE MODERATE TULF AS THE LEADING POLITICAL LIGHT OF THE TAMIL CAUSE, SLIPPED THE BONDS OF INDIAN TUTELAGE, AND ESTABLISHED A FUNCTIONING (IF LIMITED) CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN TERRITORY UNDER THEIR CONTROL. EMBASSY COLOMBO IN PAST WEEKS HAS FOCUSED ON THE LTTE POLITICO-MILITARY STRUCTURE IN SRI LANKA AND ON THE LOCAL LTTE LEADERS WHO OPERATE UNDER PRABHAKARAN\'S DIRECTION IN THE NORTH AND EAST. REFTEL CONTAINS BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON THE LTTE LEADER, VELUPILLAI PRABHAKARN, WHO RECENTLY RETURNED TO JAFFNA AFTER 3 YEARS OF EXILE IN TAMIL NADU. THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS DESCRIBE THE LTTE COMMAND STRUCTURE AND GIVE PROFILES OF SOME OF THE LTTE REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL COMMANDERS. THIS MESSAGE SEEKS TO PROVIDE A GLIMPSE INSIDE THE LTTE AND INFORMATION ON CHARACTERISTIC LOCAL COMMANDERS. EMBASSY HAS INFORMATION ON THREE OF THE FIVE REGIONAL COMMANDERS AND WILL INFORM ADDRESSEES IF SUBSEQUENT DATA ON TRINCOMALEE AND VAVUNIYA LTTE LEADERS COMES TO LIGHT. INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS FROM OPEN, PUBLISHED SOURCES, AS WELL AS FROM THE SRI LANKAN POLICE, MILITARY, FOREIGN AND SRI LANKAN JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE TRAVELED IN THE NORTH AND EAST, AND LOCAL PRIVATE CONTACTS. --------------------------------------------- ---------- ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE --------------------------------------------- ---------- 4. LUCKY FIVE; A REGIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE: THE LTTE HAS DIVIDED THE NORTH AND EAST INTO FIVE REGIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURES, EACH WITH AN OVERALL REGIONAL COMMANDER WHO REPORTS DIRECTLY TO PRABHAKARAN. EACH OF THE FIVE REGIONS IS FURTHER SUBDIVIDED INTO SMALLER AREAS, WITH A DESIGNATED LOCAL LEADER WHO REPORTS TO THE REGIONAL COMMANDER. THE FIVE REGIONS ARE JAFFNA, MANNAR, VAVUNIYA (COMPRISED OF VAVUNIYA, KILINOCHCHI, AND MULLAITTIVU DISTRICTS), TRINCOMALEE, AND BATTICALOA (BATTICALOA AND AMPARAI DISTRICTS). THE NUMBER FIVE IS CONSIDERED TO BE VERY LUCKY IN TAMIL HINDU MYTHOLOGY, AND ONE MILITARY CONTACT SAYS PRABHAKARAN SET UP FIVE REGIONAL COMMANDS FOR THIS REASON. THE FIVE REGIONAL COMMANDERS SIT ON THE LTTE\'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, ALONG WITH PRAKHAKARAN AND A FEW SELECT OTHERS. THE REGIONAL COMMANDERS ARE CONCURRENTLY MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS; THERE IS NO DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE LTTE\'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY HIERARCHY. 5. HIGHLY CENTRALIZED: THE LTTE OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE IS HIGHLY CENTRALIZED AND IS DOMINATED BY PRABHAKARAN. JAFFNA PLAYS THE KEY ROLE OVERALL, BOTH BECAUSE OF THE LTTE CONTROL AND FREEDOM OF OPERATION THERE, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT JAFFNA TAMILS DOMINATE THE LTTE\'S RANKS. THE TIGERS RUN A SOPHISTICATED RADIO COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK BETWEEN THE REGIONAL COMMANDS AND JAFFNA, A SYSTEM WHICH MANY CLAIM IS A PRIMARY REASON FOR THE LTTE\'S CENTRALIZED COORDINATION, DISCIPLINE, AND EFFECTIVENESS. THE REGIONAL COMMANDERS ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THEIR AUTHORITY BY MEANS OF STRICT CONTROL OF ALL MUNITIONS AND SUPPLIES DISTRIBUTED THROUGH THE LTTE STRUCTURE. SUB-REGIONAL COMMANDERS HAVE GUNS, AMMO, AND OTHER SUPPLIES DOLED OUT TO THEM BY THE REGIONAL COMMANDERS. ONE POLICE CONTACT CLAIMED THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL RANSOM COLLECTIONS MADE BY THE LTTE ARE ALL IMMEDIATELY SENT BACK TO JAFFNA, FOR LATER DISTRIBUTION FOR THE WHOLE ORGANIZATION AS PRABHAKARAN SEES FIT. ACCORDING TO A PRESS REPORT, \"EVERYONE IS REQUIRED TO TAKE AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO PRABHAKARAN. THE REGIONAL LEADERS ARE HANDPICKED BY PRABHAKARAN HIMSELF ON THE BASIS OF TRUST, LOYALTY, AND EXPERIENCE.\" --------------------------------------------- ---------- JAFFNA --------------------------------------------- ---------- 6. KITTU; MACHO ANIMAL LOVER: THE JAFFNA REGION COMMANDER AND REPUTEDLY THE SECOND MOST POWERFUL MAN IN THE LTTE IS KITTU (WHOSE REAL NAME IS SATHASIVAM KRISHNAKUMAR). KITTU, 27, IS SAID TO BE A CLOSE RELATIVE OF PRABHAKARAN AND IS FROM THE SAME FISHERMAN CASTE (KARAYAR) AND HOMETOWN (VALVEDDITURRAI). HE IS REPORTED TO SPEAK ONLY TAMIL--ALTHOUGH HE MAY UNDERSTAND SOME ENGLISH--AND TO HAVE COMPLETED THE \"ORDINARY LEVEL\" EXAMS (10 YEARS OF EDUCATION). PICTURES HAVE APPEARED IN THE COLOMBO PRESS OF KITTU HOLDING HIS PET MONKEY, \"BILL,\" AND ONE FOREIGN JOURNALIST WHO INTERVIEWED HIM SAID HE WAS CONSTANTLY SURROUNDED BY A PACK OF FRIENDLY DOGS. HE IS A NOTORIOUSLY BAD DRIVER; THE JOURNALIST CITED ABOVE CLAIMED KITTU TOOK HIM FOR A HAIR-RAISING RIDE AROUND JAFFNA. GSL REPORTS IN SEPTEMBER 1986 THAT KITTU HAD BEEN BADLY WOUNDED BY MORTAR FIRE WERE BASED ON THE FACT THAT, ACCORDING TO TAMIL SOURCES, KITTU HAD SMASHED UP HIS LEG RATHER SERIOUSLY IN AN AUTO WRECK. RECENT REPORTS FROM JAFFNA OF KITTU ZIPPING AROUND ON A SCOOTER INSTEAD OF HIS CAR HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO (1) A DEMOTION WITHIN THE LTTE HIERARCHY, OR (2) EFFECTS OF THE GSL FUEL EMBARGO IN JAFFNA. IT MAY BE THE CASE, HOWEVER, THAT KITTU SIMPLY HAS SMASHED UP HIS CAR ONCE AGAIN. 7. KITTU, DESCRIBED BY ONE JOURNALIST AS LOOKING LIKE \"AN ECCENTRIC BUT RICH UNDERGRADUATE,\" ALSO HAS A DARKER, TYRANNICAL SIDE. ONE CONTACT SAID HE HAD A \"MACHO SWAGGER\" AND CARRIES A .45 IN A LEOPARD-SKIN HOLSTER (ANOTHER REPORT IDENTIFIES HIS SIDE-ARM AS A .357 MAGNUM). THE JOURNALIST CITED IN PARA 6 SAID THAT WHILE ON A TOUR OF THE JAFFNA AREA, KITTU WOULD STOP THE CAR, PULL OUT HIS PISTOL, AND BLAST AWAY AT CROWS (\"HE NEVER HIT ANYTHING,\" THE JOURNALIST ADDED). HE ALSO REPORTEDLY WEARS A POTASSIUM CYANIDE CAPSULE AROUND HIS NECK IN ORDER TO COMMIT SUICIDE IF CAPTURED, A PRACTICE COMMON WITH LTTE CADRE. ACCORDING TO A VARIETY OF SOURCES, KITTU IS RUTHLESS WHEN DEALING WITH TAMILS SUSPECTED OF COOPERATING WITH THE GSL; ONE INTERVIEWER STATED, \"THE HEADMASTER OF A WELL-ESTABLISHED JAFFNA SCHOOL WAS KILLED ON KITTU\'S ORDERS FOR THE CRIME OF PLAYING FOOTBALL WITH THE ARMY.\" (WE ASSUME THIS TO REFER TO EDWIN ANANDRAJAM, THE PRINCIPAL OF ST. JOHN\'S COLLEGE, WHO WAS SHOT AND KILLED JUNE 26, 1985. HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW TOLD POLCOUNS THAT THE LTTE HAD EXECUTED HIM FOR HAVING ALLOWED HIS SCHOOL TO PLAY AGAINST AN ARMY TEAM.) A GSL SOURCE, IN COMMENTING ON KITTU\'S TEMPER AND VIOLENT NATURE, SAID THAT A RECENT MEETING TOOK PLACE AT KITTU\'S HOUSE WITH A DOZEN OR SO LTTE CADRE. MANY OF THE CADRE HAD PARKED THEIR BICYCLES OUTSIDE HIS HOUSE, AND WHEN A GSL HELICOPTER FLEW OVER THE AREA KITTU ORDERED THE MEN TO MOVE THEIR BICYCLES FOR SECURITY REASONS. WHEN HIS ORDERS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY CARRIED OUT, KITTU GOT AN AX, WENT OUTSIDE, AND DEMOLISHED THE BICYCLES. 8. KITTU\'S POLITICAL LEANINGS ARE NOT WELL KNOWN; IT MAY BE THAT BEYOND MILITANT TAMIL NATIONALISM HIS IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS ARE THIN. IN AN AUGUST 1986 INTERVIEW WITH JON SWAIN OF THE \"SUNDAY TIMES\" KITTU IS QUOTED AS SAYING, \"THE TIGERS ARE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISTS WHOSE ULTIMATE AIM IS THE CREATION OF A ONE-PARTY SOCIALIST STATE.\" 9. THE COLOMBO PRESS IN PAST MONTHS HAS PLAYED UP THE ALLEGED FALLING OUT BETWEEN KITTU AND PRABHAKARAN. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES REPORTED THAT KITTU HAD VANISHED AND MAY HAVE BEEN KILLED IN LTTE IN-FIGHTING, CHAFFED AT HAVING PRABHAKARAN RETURN TO JAFFNA AFTER KITTU HAD BEEN TOP DOG THERE FOR 3 YEARS, AND THAT KITTU WAS TO MARRY A TAMIL DOCTOR AND WAS NOW MORE INTERESTED IN MAKING LOVE THAN WAR. MANY OBSERVERS FEEL THAT THE KITTU-PRABHAKARAN RIFT WAS EITHER INVENTED BY THE GSL, OR MAGNIFIED IN ORDER TO FOSTER THE PERCEPTION THAT THE TIGERS WERE GOING TO BE TORN ASUNDER. 10. RAHIM; TRILINGUAL ARISTOCRAT: KITTU\'S PURPORTED NUMBER TWO, INTERPRETER, AND JAFFNA REGION LTTE SPOKESMAN IS REPORTEDLY 22 YEARS OLD, ALTHOUGH HIS AGE IS OFTEN GIVEN AS 19 BY FOREIGN MEDIA. HIS REAL NAME IS BALASUBRAMANIAM CANAGARATNAM. WHEN THE JULY 1983 COMMUNAL RIOTS BROKE OUT, RAHIM WAS A SECONDARY STUDENT AT TRINITY COLLEGE IN KANDY. HIS FATHER WAS A SENIOR PLANTER ON A STATE TEA PLANTATION AND EVIDENTLY BORE THE BRUNT OF SINHALESE IRE IN THE AREA. RAHIM IMMEDIATELY QUIT SCHOOL AND MOVED TO JAFFNA WITH HIS FAMILY AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER JOINED THE LTTE. RAHIM HAS TWO UNCLES WHO ARE WELL-KNOWN SURGEONS, HIS GRANDFATHER WAS SRI LANKA\'S AUDITOR-GENERAL, AND THE FAMILY IN GENERAL WAS PART OF THE \"ASSIMILATED\" TAMIL ESTABLISH- MENT. RAHIM, A MEMBER OF A HIGH JAFFNA TAMIL CASTE, SPEAKS ENGLISH, TAMIL, AND SINHALA FLUENTLY. HE BECAME SOMEWHAT OF AN ISLAND-WIDE PERSONALITY DURING RECENT VISITS TO JAFFNA OF A SINHALESE POLITICIAN WHO MADE A VIDEO TAPE OF HIS TRIP WHICH WAS DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN THIS VIDEO TAPE RAHIM APPEARS AS THE HANDSOME, SLENDER, ARTICULATE LTTE SPOKESMAN, IN CONTRAST TO THE PUDGY, BALDING, BESPECTACLED, AND MONOLINGUAL KITTU. RAHIM\'S COMBAT EXPERIENCE AND CAPABILITIES ARE LARGELY UNKNOWN. --------------------------------------------- ----------- BATTICALOA --------------------------------------------- ----------- 11. KUMARAN: SIXTH SENSE: THE LTTE COMMANDER IN CHARGE OF THE BATTICALOA AND AMPARAI DISTRICTS GOES BY THE NOM DE GUERRE KUMARAN (OR AT TIMES IS REFERRED TO AS KUMARAPPAN). WE DO NOT KNOW HIS REAL NAME. HE IS SAID TO BE A SUPERB TACTICIAN AND LOGISTICIAN, RUNNING A CLASSIC GUERRILLA OPERATION FAR FROM HIS SOURCE OF SUPPLIES AND REINFORCEMENTS. KUMARAN, A HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT, WAS RAISED IN BATTICALOA. HIS MOTHER WAS A BATTICALOA TAMIL, WHILE HIS FATHER WAS FROM JAFFNA, THUS MAKING HIM ACCEPTABLE TO THE BATTICALOA CADRES AS WELL AS THE JAFFNA-DOMINATED CENTRAL STRUCTURE. ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS HE HAS BARELY AVOIDED CAPTURE OR DEATH. ONE SERIOR GSL SECURITY OFFICER TOLD POLOFF OF AN AMBUSH SET SPECIFICALLY TO KILL KUMARAN. THE AUTHORITIES LEARNED THAT KUMARAN WAS PERSONALLY TO COME COLLECT A KIDNAPPING RANSOM FROM A TAMIL FAMILY OUTSIDE OF BATTICALOA. THE FAMILY COOPERATED WITH THE GSL, WHO SET UP AN AMBUSH SITE ON THE ROAD TO THE FAMILY\'S HOUSE. KUMARAN AND ANOTHER MAN CAME DOWN THE ROAD ON A MOTOR- CYCLE TOWARD THE AMBUSH, WHEN FOR NO APPARENT REASON KUMARAN STOPPED THE MOTORCYCLE, GOT OFF, LOOKED DOWN THE ROAD, AND THEN TURNED AROUND AND WENT BACK THE WAY HE HAD COME. THE SECURITY OFFICER SAID, \"I DON\'T KNOW HOW HE COULD HAVE POSSIBLY SPOTTED THE AMBUSH-- HE MUST HAVE SOME SIXTH SENSE.\" HE ALSO NARROWLY ESCAPED THE STF DURING A LATE JANUARY RAID ON AN LTTE BASE CAMP IN BATTICALOA. THE TROOPS REPORTEDLY MANAGED TO CAPTURE HIS COMMAND VEHICLE IN THE RAID--A 4-WHEEL DRIVE CAMOU- FLAGED PICKUP WITH THE WORD \"BEIRUT\" STENCILED ACROSS THE HOOD. 12. DAVID; POLICE BARBER\'S SON: KUMARAN\'S SUBORDINATE IN CHARGE OF SOUTHERN BATTICALOA DISTRICT AND NORTHERN AMPARAI DISTRICT IS DAVID (REAL NAME NOT KNOWN TO US), THE SON OF A BARBER FROM POTUVIL IN AMPARAI DISTRICT WHO REGULARLY SERVED AS THE POLICE BARBER IN THE AREA. THE COMMANDANT OF THE STF TOLD POLOFF IN AUGUST 1986 THAT DAVID HAD A BAND OF 12 TO 15 MEN WHO OPERATED IN SOME OF THE LEAST ACCESSIBLE JUNGLES ON THE ISLAND. THE COMMANDANT STATED THAT THE TROOPS HAVE FREQUENTLY ZEROED IN ON DAVID\'S RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BUT HAVE NEVER MANAGED TO RESPOND QUICKLY ENOUGH TO NAB THE GUERRILLA BAND. THE REPORTED MASSACRE OF SOME 40 SINHALESE CIVILIANS IN FEBRUARY 1987 OCCURRED IN THE AREA OF DAVID\'S COMMAND, BUT IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER HE LED OR DIRECTED THE KILLINGS. --------------------------------------------- ----------- MANNAR --------------------------------------------- ----------- 13. RADHA; BUTCHER OF ANURADHAPURA: THE MANNAR REGIONAL COMMANDER, RADHA (REAL NAME, ANTHONY KATHTHIAR), IS A HIGH-CASTE HINDU FROM ARIALAI IN THE JAFFNA PENINSULA. APPROXIMATELY 24 YEARS OLD, HE ASSUMED THE MANNAR COMMAND IN OCTOBER 1986 FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF VICTOR, THE POPULAR MANNAR COMMANDER. VICTOR, A CATHOLIC FROM MANNAR (CATHOLICS CONSTITUTE 42 PERCENT OF MANNAR DISTRICT\'S POPULATION, HINDUS 25 PERCENT AND THE REMAINDER ARE MUSLIM) HAD A STRONG PERSONAL FOLLOWING AMONG THE LTTE FIGHTERS IN MANNAR. WHEN PRABHAKARAN CHOSE A JAFFNA HINDU TO REPLACE HIM, A NUMBER OF LTTE MEMBERS TRIED TO RESIGN. PRABHAKARAN ALLEGEDLY DISPATCHED KITTU TO REMIND THE DISAFFECTED MANNAR \"BOYS\" THAT NOBODY RESIGNS FROM THE LTTE. ACCORDING TO A MILITARY SOURCE, THE LTTE HAS UNDER- TAKEN NO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS EXCEPT FOR THREE LAND- MINE EXPLOSIONS IN MANNAR DISTRICT SINCE RADHA REPLACED VICTOR IN OCTOBER OF LAST YEAR. THE OFFICER ADDED THAT IT WAS RADHA, THEN WORKING UNDER VICTOR\'S COMMAND, WHO ORGANIZED AND EXECUTED THE ATTACK IN MAY 1985 ON THE HOLY BUDDHIST TOWN OF ANURADHAPURA IN WHICH OVER 150 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED. RADHA REPORTEDLY SPENDS A GOOD DEAL OF TIME IN VALVEDDITTURAI ON THE JAFFNA PENINSULA. BEFORE ASSUMING THE MANNAR COMMAND HE WAS IN SOUTH INDIA FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD, IN CHARGE OF TRAINING THE \"FOURTH BATCH\" OF LTTE RECRUITS. 14. SHAHJAHAN; MANNAR DANDY: RAHDA\'S DEPUTY IS SHAHJAHAN, A LOCAL FROM MANNAR DISTRICT WHO HAS TAKEN VICTOR\'S PLACE AS THE POPULAR FAVORITE AMONG LTTE SUPPORTERS IN MANNAR. HE IS REFERRED TO AS \"THE INDIAN MOVIE STAR\" BOTH BECAUSE OF HIS NOM DE GUERRE AND DASHING GOOD LOOKS. 15. SALIM; CORRUPT COMMISSAR: SALIM, ANOTHER LEADER IN THE MANNAR LTTE STRUCTURE, HAS BEEN TASKED WITH ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS SUCH AS \"TAX COLLECTION,\" MAGISTERIAL DUTIES, PROPAGANDA EFFORTS, ETC. ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE, RADHA HAS COMPLAINED TO PRABHAK- ARAN THAT SALIM IS EMBEZZLING FUNDS AND IS GENERATING POPULAR RESENTMENT IN THE AREA AGAINST THE LTTE. IF TRUE, SALIM\'S TENURE IS LIKELY TO BE SHORT-LIVED, ACCORD- ING TO THIS REPORT. --------------------------------------------- ---------- CONCLUSIONS --------------------------------------------- ---------- 16. THE PRIMACY OF VELUPILLAI PRABHAKARAN IN NEARLY EVERY ASPECT OF THE LTTE\'S ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES-- BE IT APPOINTING REGIONAL COMMANDERS, DIVYING UP RANSOM MONEY, DECIDING ON THE QUANTITIES OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPPLIES FOR THE VARIOUS REGIONS, ETC.--BECAME QUICKLY APPARENT AS WE LOOKED AT THE LTTE\'S FUNCTIONING STRUCTURE IN SRI LANKA. IF PRABHAKARAN WERE TO LEAVE THE SCENE FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE LTTE? KITTU IS BEST PLACED TO TAKE OVER THE ORGANIZATION, BEING THE COMMANDER OF THE MOST IMPORTANT REGION AND GENERALLY RECOGNIZED AS PRABHAKARAN\'S DEPUTY. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR IF KITTU HAS THE PERSONAL AND/OR ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORITY TO DICTATE TO THE ORGANIZATION AS PRABHAKARAN THUS FAR HAS BEEN ABLE TO. THE IRON DISCIPLINE AND EFFECTIVE COORDINATION OF THE LTTE, ONE KEY TO THE TIGERS\' SUCCESSES SO FAR, WOULD PROBABLY BE WEAKENED IN A POST- PRABHAKARAN POWER STRUGGLE. 17. IF THE CURRENT POLITICO-MILITARY \"MANAGEMENT STYLE\" OF THE LTTE COMMAND STRUCTURE IS ANY INDICATION (AND WE BELIEVE IT IS), THEN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN LTTE-CONTROLLED TAMIL EELAM WE WOULD MOST LIKELY SEE AN AUTHORITARIAN, HEAVILY CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION. THE REGIME IS APT TO BE A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP IN THE GUISE OF A (REHETORICALLY) SOCIALIST ONE-PARTY SYSTEM, BEING NEITHER PARTICULARLY BENEVOLENT NOR IDEOLOGICAL. A MORE LIEKLY PROSPECT IS THAT PRABHAKARAN COULD BECOME THE NORTHERN PROVINCE CHIEF MINISTER UNDER SOME DEVOLUTION SCHEME. UNDER THIS SETUP HIS AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES WOULD PROBABLY BE ATTENUATED TO SOME DEGREE BY THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OUTLINED IN THE GSL\'S PROVINCIAL COUNCIL PROPOSALS. 18. CLEAVAGES ALREADY VISIBLE WITHIN THE LTTE WOULD BE EXACERBATED IN THE EVENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TAMIL EELAM UNDER LTTE CONTROL. DOMINATION BY LOW- AND MIDDLE- CAST HINDUS FROM JAFFNA, CURRENTLY THE CORE OF LTTE POWER WOULD RANKLE MANY TAMILS, ONCE \"DOMINATION\" BY THE SINHALESE BUDDHISTS WERE THROWN OFF. RIFTS WOULD LIKELY APPEAR BETWEEN JAFFNA--NON-JAFFNA TAMILS, HINDUS-- CHRISTIANS, BETWEEN CASTE GROUPINGS, EASTERNERS- NORTHERNERS, ETC. THE NONDEMOCRATIC INCLINATION OF PRABHAKARAN WOULD LEAVE LITTLE OR NO OUTLET FOR DISSENT BASED ON THESE CLEAVAGES. IN SHORT, AN LTTE-CONTROLLED TAMIL EELAM WOULD LIKELY BE AN UNHAPPY PLACE FOR MANY TAMILS, EVEN MANY OF THOSE SUPPORTIVE OF THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT TODAY. SPAIN " "152","2/25/1987 15:18","87ALEXANDRIA290","Consulate Alexandria","CONFIDENTIAL","86ALEXANDRIA899\|87ALEXANDRIA1341\|87ALEXANDRIA289","R 251518Z FEB 87 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6518 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY RIYADH USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALEXANDRIA 00290 USCINCCENT FOR POLAD HOWELL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KPRP, PINS, PGOV, PHUM, ECON, PINR, SOCI, EG SUBJECT: ISLAMIC TRILOGY, PART I: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IN ALEXANDRIA REF: ALEXANDRIA 00289 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.) - - ALEXANDRIA\'S RADICAL PAST... ---------------------------- 2. PERHAPS IN KEEPING WITH ITS REPUTATION AS A CENTER OF DISSENT, IN THE 1970\'S, ISLAMIC RIGHT ACTIVITIES IN ALEXANDRIA WERE FOCUSED ON THE POLITICAL: THE RADICAL \"SHIBAB MUHAMMAD\" ORGANIZATION, WHICH TRIED TO OVERTHROW SADAT IN 1974, AND THE FIRST RENDITION OF \"AL-JIHAD\" WHICH WAS ACTIVE IN 1979-81, DREW MANY OF THEIR LEADERS AND ADHERENTS FROM ALEXANDRIA AND LARGE DELTA TOWNS--IN CONTRAST TO \"AL-TAKFIR W\'AL-HIJRA\" AND LATER RADICAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH WERE ORGANIZED AND FOCUSED ON CAIRO AND UPPER EGYPT. MORE VISIBLY, TWO ALEXANDRIA-BASED RELIGIOUS LEADERS, SHAYKHS MAHALLAWI AND EID, GALVANIZED A LARGE, VOCAL, AND YOUTHFUL FOLLOWING BETWEEN 1977-81 THROUGH THEIR POLEMICS (ALBEIT NON-VIOLENT) AGAINST SADAT AND CAMP DAVID AND THEIR EXHORTATIONS IN FAVOR OF AN ISLAMIC-STYLE REPUBLIC. - - ... AND LOWER PROFILE PRESENT ----------------------------- 3. THE SITUATION IN ALEXANDRIA IS CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT IN 1987. IN CONTRAST TO THE DAYS WHEN MAHALLAWI AND EID WERE IMPORTANT FIGURES ON THE NATIONAL POLITICAL SCENE, NO CURRENT LOCAL FIGURE CAN BE SAID AT PRESENT TO HAVE SUCH AN INFLUENCE OR A FOLLOWING. EXTREMIST ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING VIOLENCE PROBABLY HAVE ADHERENTS, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ALEXANDRIA IS A PARTICULAR CENTER FOR THESE GROUPS. - - 4. HOWEVER, RADICAL (BUT NON-VIOLENT) ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS (AND ESPECIALLY THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE VARIOUS ISLAMIC GROUPS OR \"GAMAAT\") RETAIN UNTESTED BUT CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CLOUT. THIS IS BEST EVIDENCED BY THE LATTER\'S SUCCESS IN RECENT UNIVERSITY STUDENT UNION ELECTIONS (86 ALEXANDRIA 1341) AND THE CAREFUL AND SUCCESSFUL ORCHESTRATION OF THE MASS PUBLIC PRAYER SERVICES IN ALEXANDRIA BY SUPPORTERS OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS AT THE END OF RAMADAN AND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FEAST OF SACRIFICE (86 ALEXANDRIA 899). IN THIS SENSE, THE ISLAMIC RIGHT\'S LOWER POLITICAL PROFILE IN ALEXANDRIA COULD BE MISLEADING. WHILE THERE ARE DOUBTLESS MANY DIVISONS BETWEEN VARIOUS FACTIONS, THERE ARE ALSO SUGGESTIONS THAT THE ISLAMIC RIGHT, HOWEVER AMORPHOUS, IS BETTER ORGANIZED, DISCIPLINED, AND FINANCED THAN SOME OBSERVERS SUGGEST. THE BIG QUESTION MARK IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH VARIOUS GROUPS IN ALEXANDRIA HAVE LINKAGES AMONG THEMSELVES OR WITH NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LIKE THE SEMI-LEGAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. THIS ISSUE WILL BE ADDRESSED IN PART II. - - ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IN-ROADS ---------------------------- 5. WHERE THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IS MORE READILY HAVING ITS INFLUENCE FELT (AND RAPID GROWTH OBSERVED) IS IN COMMERCE, SOCIAL AND WELFARE ACTIVITIES, AND PHILANTHROPY. FOR THE TIME BEING, THIS HAS NOT TRANSLATED INTO ANY DIRECT POLITICAL SPOILS, BUT THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS IN THESE AREAS HAS BECOME AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE LOCAL SCENE. WHILE IT MUST BE CONCEDED THAT SOME PEOPLE AFFILIATE THEMSELVES WITH SUCH ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES BECAUSE IT IS CHIC TO DO SO, IT IS NEVERTHELESS EQUALLY TRUE THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS ARE INCREASING THEIR SHARE OF THE LOCAL WEALTH, CREATING JOBS IN AN OTHERWISE STAGNANT ECONOMY, AND RESPONDING TO SOCIAL NEEDS THAT AN OTHERWISE OVERBURDENED CITY GOVERNMENT CANNOT PROVIDE. - - 6. THIS THREE PART REPORT PROVIDES A FIRST TENTATIVE MICROSCOPIC VIEW OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IN ALEXANDRIA: ITS LEADERS, ITS ACTIVITIES, AND ITS IMPACT. SOME OF THE PERSONALITIES HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN EARLIER REPORTING; OTHERS HAVE NOT BEEN AND ARE STILL RELATIVELY UNKNOWN TO US. VARIOUS OBSERVERS ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE PEOPLE AND THEIR ACTIVITIES IN DIFFERENT WAYS: SOME ARE GENUINELY SCARED, FEARING THAT THESE ACTIVISTS, LOADED WITH SEEMINGLY LIMITLESS FUNDS, WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE A SIGNIFICANT (AND NEGATIVE) POLITICAL IMPACT ON EGYPT\'S FUTURE. OTHERS ARE MORE SANGUINE AND ARGUE THAT THE UPSURGE IN ISLAMIC ACTIVISM IS MERELY REFLECTIVE OF POPULAR OPINION IN FAVOR OF INCREASED RELIGIOSITY. - - 7. BOTH OF THESE VIEWPOINTS ARE HEARD FREQUENTLY IN ALEXANDRIA. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT THERE ARE INDEED POSITIVE ASPECTS TO THE CURRENT ACTIVISM OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IN ALEXANDRIA: IN A CITY WHERE THERE ARE MANY PROBLEMS AND LITTLE PROSPECT FOR EARLY IMPROVEMENT, THE ISLAMIC RIGHT, NOT INFREQUENTLY, IS HELPING TO FILL THE VOID AND, IN THIS MANNER, CREATING A MORE STABLE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT. - - 8. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE ARE TOO MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AS TO WHO IS FINANCING VARIOUS ISLAMIC ENTERPRISES AND UNDERTAKINGS AND ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIOUS ISLAMIC ENTREPRENEURS AND PHILAN- THROPISTS AND NATIONAL OR LOCAL ISLAMIC PERSONALITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS WHO HAVE A POLITICAL AGENDA WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE GOE. UNTIL THESE QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED, ONE MUST CONTINUE TO VIEW THE ISLAMIC RIGHT AND ITS PROPONENTS WITH CONTINUED CAUTION AND CURIOSITY. - - 9. PART II IN THIS SERIES WILL IDENTIFY SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL SPIRITUAL AND (POTENTIALLY) POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IN ALEXANDRIA. THE THIRD AND FINAL PART WILL LOOK AT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROWING ISLAMIC BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND ASSESS THEIR ROLE IN COMMERCE, SOCIAL WELFARE, AND PHILANTHROPIC ACTIVITIES. HAMBLEY " "153","2/25/1987 15:25","87ALEXANDRIA291","Consulate Alexandria","CONFIDENTIAL","87ALEXANDRIA289\|87ALEXANDRIA290","R 251525Z FEB 87 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6520 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY RIYADH USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ALEXANDRIA 00291 USCINCCENT FOR POLAD HOWELL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KPRP, PINS, PGOV, PHUM, ECON, PINR, SOCI, EG SUBJECT: ISLAMIC TRILOGY, PART II: LEADERS AND MOSQUES OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IN ALEXANDRIA REF: (A) ALEXANDRIA 00289 (B) ALEXANDRIA 00290 - 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.) - - 2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: THIS TELEGRAM TRANSMITS PART II OF OUR REPORT ON THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IN ALEXANDRIA AND IDENTIFIES SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL SPIRITUAL AND (POTENTIALLY) POLITICAL LEADERS IN THIS CITY AND THE MAIN \"RADICAL\" MOSQUES. WHILE THERE ARE DOUBTLESS MANY DIVISIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS FACTIONS, THERE ARE ALSO SUGGESTIONS THAT THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IS BETTER ORGANIZED THAN SOME OBSERVERS SUGGEST. THIS MAY ACCOUNT, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE \"ISLAMIC GAMAAT\'S\" RECURRING SUCCESSES IN ALEXANDRIA UNIVERSITY\'S STUDENT UNION ELECTIONS. MOREOVER, THE ORGANIZATION, DISCIPLINE, AND WELL- FINANCED MASS PUBLIC PRAYER MEETINGS HELD AT THE END OF RAMADAN AND THE BEGINNING OF THE \'ID AL-IDHA SUGGEST THERE MUST BE MORE LINKAGES BETWEEN PRINCIPAL LEADERS AND VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS THAN MEETS THE EYE. ANOTHER INTERESTING POINT IS THE CONTINUED ACTIVISM IN ALEXANDRIA OF MANY OF THE ISLAMIC STUDENT LEADERS OF THE 1970\'S, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE NOW LEFT SCHOOL, ENTERED THE WORK PLACE, AND MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE. THEY MAY NO LONGER BE DEMONSTRATING IN THE STREETS, BUT THEIR COMMITMENT TO AN ISLAMIC EGYPT APPEARS, IN MANY CASES AT LEAST, UNABATED. FUTURE POST REPORTING WILL ATTEMPT TO EXPLORE THEIR ACTIVITIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON ALEXANDRIA\'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN GREATER DETAIL. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. - - THE SPIRITUAL AND (POTENTIALLY) POLITICAL LEADERS --------------------------------------------- ---- 3. WITH PERIODIC EXCEPTIONS, LEADERS OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IN ALEXANDRIA NO LONGER CAPTURE THE NATIONAL NEWSPAPER HEADLINES AS THEY DID IN THE LATE 1970\'S AND EARLY 1980\'S, WHEN TWO ALEXANDRIAN CLERICS, AHMAD AL-MAHALLAWI AND MAHMUD EID, WERE AMONG THE BEST KNOWN OF EGYPT\'S \"RADICAL\" SHAYKHS. NEVERTHELESS, THE ISLAMIC RIGHT\'S SPIRITUAL AND (POTENTIALLY) POLITICAL RANKS ARE FAR FROM EMPTY. SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS, SOME IDENTIFIED OPENLY WITH THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, HAVE FOLLOWINGS IN ALEXANDRIA AND CAN BE CONSIDERED THE ISLAMIC RIGHT\'S LEADING SPIRITUAL AND (POTENTIALLY) POLITICAL LEADERS. THEY ARE BUTTRESSED BY THE LEADERS OF THE NUMEROUS \"ISLAMIC GAMAAT\" OR GROUPS. THE LATTER ARE FOCUSED LARGELY, BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY, ON THE ALEXANDRIA UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. INCREASINGLY, WE HAVE DETECTED \"GAMAAT\" ACTIVITY AMONG YOUNG PROFESSIONALS, AND MANY OF THE \"GAMAAT\" LEADERS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY ARE DRAWN FROM THIS LATTER CATEGORY. FINALLY, THERE ARE OTHER ISLAMIC RIGHT LEADERS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF SECULAR POLITICAL PARTIES. THESE MEN ARE NOT ALL NECESSARILY \"RADICAL\" IN THEIR RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINTS, AND SOME ARE CONSIDERED POLITICAL OPPORTUNISTS WHO HAVE SIMPLY \"ADOPTED\" THE ISLAMIC TREND IN ORDER TO FURTHER THEIR OWN POLITICAL AMBITIONS. WHETHER THEY WILL SURVIVE THE ELECTORAL LIST VETTING NOW UNDERWAY IN PREPARATION FOR THE APRIL 6 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION REMAINS TO BE SEEN. - - 4. JUST AS INDIVIDUAL LEADERS ARE NO LONGER AS VISIBLE AS THEY WERE, SO TOO IS IT DIFFICULT TO PINPOINT INDIVIDUAL MOSQUES AS PARTICULAR \"HOTBEDS\" OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT. IN THIS MESSAGE, WE HAVE DENOTED SEVERAL OF THE MOSQUES WITH ACTIVE IMAMS AND CONGREGATIONS, BUT NONE OF THEM APPROACHES, EITHER SYMBOLICALLY OR POLITICALLY, THE IMPORTANCE WHICH SHAYKH AL-MAHALLAWI\'S \"QA\'ID IBRAHIM\" MOSQUE HAD BEFORE 1981. - - 5. WHAT THIS ALL MEANS IS OPEN TO DEBATE. SOME INSIST, UNCONVINCINGLY, THAT THE ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP IN ALEXANDRIA, AS ELSEWHERE IN EGYPT, HAS NO CENTRAL ORGANIZATION. THEY DEPICT THE ISLAMIC RIGHT HERE AS BEING LITTLE MORE THAN NUMEROUS, HIGHLY INDIVIDUALISTIC, RELIGIOUS GROUPS WITH NO COMMON AGENDA AND LITTLE CONTACT AMONG ONE ANOTHER WHICH EXPLAINS WHY THEIR SUCCESS IN LOCAL ELECTIONS HAS BEEN MODEST. - - 6. OTHER INFORMED OBSERVERS (INCLUDING A GOOD SOURCE IN STATE SECURITY) ARE CONVINCED THAT THE LEADERS OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT CONSCIOUSLY ADOPTED A \"LOWER PROFILE\" IN ORDER TO AVOID RENEWED GOE RETRIBUTION ON THE SCALE OF SADAT\'S 1981 CRACKDOWN WHILE DEVELOPING ROOTS AMONG THEIR LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND FOLLOWERS. WHILE CONCEDING THAT THERE IS COMPETITION AMONG VARIOUS ELEMENTS COMPRISING THE ISLAMIC RIGHT, THEY POINT BOTH TO PRESIDENT SADAT\'S 1981 ASSERTION THAT THE \"ISLAMIC GAMAAT\" ARE ESSENTIALLY AN MB-SPONSORED UNDERGROUND AND TO THE ISLAMIC RIGHT\'S WELL-COORDINATED ORCHESTRATION OF UNIVERSITY STUDENT UNION ELECTIONS AND THE MASS PUBLIC PRAYER MEETINGS AT THE ALEXANDRIA STADIUM WHICH MOBILIZE OVER 100,000 WORSHIPPERS TWICE YEARLY. - - 7. WE HAVE DIVIDED THE ISLMAIC RIGHT\'S SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP IN ALEXANDRIA INTO THREE SEPARATE CATEGORIES. AS NONE OF THESE MEN CURRENTLY HOLDS AN IMPORTANT POSITION (ASIDE FROM POSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP) WITHIN A POLITICAL PARTY, THE SEMI-LEGAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD OR ANY OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPING, THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE IS STILL MORE POTENTIAL THAN REAL. ON THE ONE HAND, THERE IS NO WAY OF KNOWING AS YET THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY HARBOR PERSONAL POLITICAL AMBITIONS. ON THE OTHER, CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT PROPITIOUS FOR THEM TO ENTER THE POLITICAL ARENA EVEN IF THEY SHOULD WANT TO. - - 8. PRINCIPAL INFLUENCES: - - (A) AHMAD AL-MAHALLAWI, IMAM OF AL-QA\'ID IBRAHIM MOSQUE: SINCE HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON IN 1982, AL-MAHALLAWI HAS TAKEN A LOWER PROFILE IN ISLAMIC AFFAIRS. USUALLY HIS FRIDAY SERMONS FOCUS ON RELIGIOUS MATTERS, NOT POLITICS (ONE EXCEPTION WAS HIS ANTI-ISRAEL BLAST FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 1986 ALEXANDRIA SUMMIT). AN ASCETIC TYPE WHO LIVES HUMBLY, AL-MAHALLAWI IS QUITE ALOOF AND DOES NOT IMPRESS A WESTERNER AS A PERSONALITY WITH MUCH CHARISMA. NEVERTHELESS, HE RETAINS CONSIDERABLE STATURE IN ALEXANDRIA AND HAS A DEVOTED FOLLOWING. ACCORDING TO OPPOSIION PRESS REPORTS, IT WAS AL-MAHALLAWI\'S ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS A MOSQUE IN ASYUT LAST YEAR WHICH SPARKED A SERIOUS CLASH BETWEEN ISLAMIC RADICALS AND SECURITY POLICE. IN GENERAL, AL- MAHALLAWI\'S RHETORIC HAS MELLOWED IN RECENT YEARS, ALTHOUGH HE REMAINS A PASSIONATE ADVOCATE OF AN ISLAMIC STATE. SINCE THE SURPRISE ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, RUMORS HAVE CIRCULATED THAT AL-MAHALLAWI WILL BE A CANDIDATE FOR ONE OF THE INDEPENDENT SEATS. IF HE RUNS (AND IF THE ELECTIONS ARE FAIR), OBSERVERS BELIEVE HE WILL BE DIFFICULT TO BEAT. - - (B) MAHMOUD EID (AKA MAHMUD \'ID): ALONG WITH AL-MAHALLAWI, EID WAS VERY ACTIVE IN THE LATE 1970\'S. HE HAS SPENT MOST OF THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS IN THE GULF, ALTHOUGH HE IS SAID TO RETAIN A DEVOTED FOLLOWING IN ALEXANDRIA. HE IS ALSO ALLEGED TO RETAIN SEVERAL OF THE RADICAL ISLAMIC VIEWS WHICH GOT HIM INTO TROUBLE WITH THE LATE PRESIDENT SADAT. - - (C) MUHAMMAD AL-MARAGHI: A WAFDIST MEMBER OF THE PEOPLE\'S ASSEMBLY, AL-MARAGHI IS KNOWN LOCALLY AS A LEADING MEMBER OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND SPIRITUAL LEADER TO SOME OF THE \"ISLAMIC GAMAAT\" (GROUPS) IN THE CITY. IN HIS LATE FORTIES OR EARLY FIFTIES, HE IS KNOWN AS A FORCEFUL SPEAKER WHO IS TOTALLY COMMITTED TO AN ISLAMIC STATE IN EGYPT. HOSTILE TO THE U.S. AND ITS POLICIES. AL-MARAGHI SEEMS TO HAVE ALMOST AS MANY DETRACTORS AS HE HAS ADMIRERS, AND HIS REELECTION TO THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY IN THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IS IN DOUBT. - - (D) ADEL EID (AKA ADIL \'ID): AN ARTICULATE AND RADICAL ALEXANDRIAN LAWYER, EID IS ALLEGED TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN RADICAL ISLAMIC CIRCLES AND, LIKE AL-MARAGHI, TO BE THE SPIRITUAL LEADER OF SOME LOCAL \"ISLAMIC GAMAAT.\" ARDENTLY ANTI-U.S. AND ANTI-ISRAEL, HE ONCE INDICATED HE WOULD ONLY COME TO CG\'S RESIDENCE IF HE COULD BE CONVINCED \"NO ISRAELIS WERE PRESENT.\" HE WASN\'T, AND HE DIDN\'T COME. EID IS ALSO MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE FOR THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY. - - (E) YASSIN RUSHDI: RUSHDI WAS ALLEGEDLY A MUSLIM BROTHER AT ONE TIME. HE IS A FORMER NAVAL OFFICER WHO WAS BOOTED OUT OF THE MILITARY BY NASSER FOR HIS ISLAMIC ACTIVISM. NOT RESPECTED AS A SCHOLAR (HE HAS NO SUCH CREDENTIALS), RUSHDI IS NEVERTHELESS KNOWN AS A CHARISMATIC AND ARTICULATE LEADER WHO HAS A LARGE AND DEVOTED FOLLOWING DRAWN FROM THE MIDDLE AND UPPER MIDDLE CLASSES. HIS SERMONS AND LECTURES ARE AVAILABLE ON WIDELY-SOLD TAPES. RUSHDI\'S LARGE AND TASTEFUL MOSQUE (\"AL-MOWASSAT\") IS JAMMED AT PRAYER TIMES AND FOR HIS EVENING LECTURES. HE IS KNOWN GENERALLY TO SHY AWAY FROM POLITICAL SUBJECTS AND EMPHASIZE PERSONAL PIETY. ABOUT FIFTY, HE WELL OFF OWING TO A CONSTRUCTION BUSINESS HE OPERATES ON THE SIDE. BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED MAGNETIC HOLD ON UPPER CLASS WOMEN, HE HAS BEEN TERMED BY SOME HERE AS \"THE RASPUTIN OF ALEXANDRIA.\" - - 9. LEADERS OF ALEXANDRIA\'S \"ISLAMIC GAMAAT\": - - (A) AHMAD MAHMUD NAFIS HAMDI: A LEADER OF THE \"ISLAMIC GAMAAT\" AT ALEXANDRIA UNIVERSITY\'S ENGINEERING FACULTY, HAMDI WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE STUDENT UNION IN EARLY DECEMBER 1986. VERY RELIGIOUS, HE IS SAID TO BE NON-CONFRONTATIONAL AND VERY PERSONABLE. - - (B) WAGIH MUHAMMAD ABU HALIMA: CURRENTLY VICE PRESIDENT OF THE ALEXANDRIA STUDENT UNION, ABU HALIMA IS ONE OF THE \"GAMAAT\" LEADERS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOL, THE FACULTY WHICH PERHAPS SHOWS MORE ISLAMIC MANIFESTATIONS THAN ANY OF THE OTHERS. HE IS SAID TO BE MORE VOCAL AND AMBITIOUS THAN HAMDI. - - (C) KHALID ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-ZAFARANI: HEAD OF THE PHYSICIANS SYNDICATE IN ALEXANDRIA, AL-ZAFARANI ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE IS FRIENDLY WITH (AND ONCE THE EMPLOYEE OF) DR. ALI MEHELBA, CHAIRMAN OF THE ANDALUS ACID COMPANY (SEE PART III). AL-ZAFARANI IS VERY ACTIVE IN THE \"GAMAAT\" MOVEMENT. IN HIS MID-30\'S, HE HAS FLIRTED WITH VARIOUS FACTIONS OVER THE PAST DECADE, INCLUDING \"AL-TAKFIR W\'AL-HIJRA\" IN ITS FORMATIVE YEARS. CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS ARE UNKNOWN. AL-ZAFARANI IS SAID TO BE CHARISMATIC. HE AVOIDS WESTERNERS AND STAYS OUT OF THE LIMELIGHT. STATE SECURITY TELLS US HE WAS A LEADER OF THE \"GAMAAT\" MOVEMENT EARLY IN THE DECADE AND WAS IMPRISONED FOR HIS ACTIVITIES IN 1981. HE CONTINUES TO BE UNDER SURVEILLANCE. MANY SOURCES IN ISLAMIC CIRCLES HERE BELIEVE AL-ZAFARANI MAY BE CONSIDERING A HIGHER PROFILE. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED TO US HE MAY BECOME A CANDIDATE FOR THE APRIL 6 PEOPLES ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS. - - (D) SAMIH SAID HASAN AL-SABA: CURRENTLY 27 YEARS OLD AND THE FORMER HEAD OF THE \"GAMAAT\" IN THE ALEXANDRIA MEDICAL FACULTY, AL-SABA WAS IMPRISONED IN 1981 AND SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED. HE IS ALLEGEDLY A FOLLOWER OF AL-ZAFARANI, AND STATE SECURITY ALLEGES SOMETIMES ENGAGES IN ANTI-REGIME AND ANTI-AMERICAN PAMPHLETERRING (THE LAST TIME APPARENTLY DURING THE \"ACHILLE LAURO\" EPISODE). - - (E) SABRI NUR: IN HIS FIFTIES, NUR IS AN OLDER, BUT CHARISMATIC AND ARTICULATE, LEADER OF ONE OF THE ISLAMIC GROUPS IN ALEXANDRIA WHICH IS BELIEVED TO SUPPORT SHAYKH SALAH ABU ISMAIL. NUR VOICES AN EXTREMIST POLITICAL AGENDA AND CLAIMS TO HAVE A LARGE AND YOUTHFUL FOLLOWING. HE IS PERIODICALLY THE SUBJECT OF PRESS INTERVIEWS AND COMMENTARY IN THE LIBERALS\' WEEKLY NEWSPAPER, \"AL-AHRAR.\" - - (F) AHMAD AL-SAYYID HATAYBA: TWENTY-NINE YEARS OF AGE, HATAYBA WAS THE HEAD OF THE ISLAMIC GROUP IN THE ALEXANDRIA FACULTY OF DENTISTRY UNTIL HIS 1981 ARREST. HE IS CONSIDERED MORE POLITICIZED THAN SOME OF HIS FELLOW \"GAMAAT\" LEADERS AND IS SAID TO FREQUENTLY CRITICIZE GOE POLICIES. - - (G) FAHMI MUHAMMAD AMER: ANOTHER OF AL-ZAFARANI\'S ALLEGED PROTEGES, AMER IN THE PAST HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE \"FAJR AL-ISLAM\" MOVEMENT (SEE PART III). HE WAS A LEADER OF THE \"GAMAAT\" MOVEMENT IN THE FACULTY OF ARTS DURING HIS STUDENT YEARS. - - (H) MAJDI MUHAMMAD HASAN RAJAB WARDA (AKA MAGDI WARDA): WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO PINPOINT THE MOSQUE WHERE WARDA IS CURRENTLY ACTIVE. HOWEVER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT IN HIS ACTIVE YEARS AT ALEXANDRIA\'S LAW FACULTY HE WAS A VOCAL AND HARSH CRITIC OF THE COPTS AND STILL DELIVERS ANTI-CHRISTIAN AND ANTI-JEWISH POLEMICS PERIODICALLY FROM ANY ONE OF THE DOZENS OF PRIVATE MOSQUES IN THE CITY. - - 10. ISLAMIC VOICES IN THE ALEX BRANCHES OF THE SECULAR PARTIES: - - (A) HAMMAD AL-KHAYYAL: A NDP MEMBER OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, AL-KHAYYAL IS BEARDED AND ESPOUSES RELIGIOUS CAUSES. ALEXANDRIANS ARE SUSPICIOUS OF HIS MOTIVES. AL-KHAYYAL IS ALLEGED BY THESE SOURCES TO BE A LEFTIST WHO IS USING HIS NEW ISLAMIC GUISE TO FURTHER HIS OWN POLITICAL AIMS. SOME IN THE NDP ARE TRYING TO REMOVE HIM FROM THE PARTY LIST FOR THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS. - - (B) AHMAD AL-SHARNOUBI (AKA AL-SHARNUBI): LIKE AL-KHAYYAL, AL-SHARNOUBI IS BEARDED AND STRONGLY SUPPORTS ISLAMIC ISSUES (E.G., HE FAVORS PROHIBITION AND ADOPTION OF THE \"SHARIA\"). HE IS ALSO CONSIDERED BY SOME HERE AS A CLOSET LEFTIST. HE IS AN NDP MEMBER OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY. SOME LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM REMOVED FROM THE FORTHCOMING PARTY LIST. - - (C) MUSTAFA EL GUEINDY (AKA MUSTAFA AL-GUINDI): CHAIRMAN OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, AL-GUINDI IS ALSO A SECONDARY SCHOOL ARABIC TEACHER AND THE IMAM OF KABARI MOSQUE IN WEST ALEXANDRIA. HE IS VERY RELIGIOUS BUT REGARDED AS A MODERATE. - - (D) DR. AHMAD SAYYID DARWISH: ACTIVE AS WELL IN THE LOCAL BRANCH OF THE LIBERALS (\"AL-AHRAR\") PARTY. DARWISH IS THE HEAD OF THE PARTY\'S YOUTH ORGANIZATION IN ALBANJNDRIA. O NIS BEING PROMOTED AS A CANDIDATE FOR THE NEW PEOPLES ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS. HE IS IN HIS LATE FIFTIES OR EARLY SIXTIES AND IS SUSPICIOUS OF WESTERNERS. - - RADICAL MOSQUES --------------- 11. IN THE DAYS WHEN THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT HAD A HIGH PROFILE IN ALEXANDRIA, TWO MOSQUES WERE THE PRINCIPAL FOCAL POINTS FOR ALMOST WEEKLY DEMONSTRATIONS: MAHALLAWI\'S \"AL-QA\'ID IBRAHIM\" MOSQUE AND \"AL-SALLAM\" MOSQUE IN THE BULKLI DISTRICT WHERE SHAYKH MAHMUD EID HELD FORTH. INFLUENCE IS NOW MORE DISPERSED, IN PART AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE GOE\'S EFFORTS TO BRING MORE OF EGYPT\'S ESTIMATED 40,000 PRIVATE OR \"UNOFFICIAL\" MOSQUES UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE MINISTRY OF AWQAF. THIS EFFORT HAS ONLY PARTIALLY SUCCEEDED IN ALEXANDRIA WHERE PRIVATELY BUILT AND FUNDED MOSQUES CONTINUE TO PROLIFERATE. MEMBERS OF THE \"GAMAAT\" FREQUENTLY COMPRISE THE BULK OF THE CONGREGATIONS AT THESE MOSQUES, WHERE VERY CONSERVATIVE (BUT NOT NECESSARILY POLITICAL) MESSAGES ARE PREACHED EACH FRIDAY AND DURING VARIOUS WEEKLY STUDY SESSIONS AND PRAYER MEETINGS. - - 12. FOLLOWING IS AN ANNOTATED LISTING OF SOME OF THE MORE PROMINENT MOSQUES IN ALEXANDRIA WHERE THE MORE ACTIVE PROPONENTS OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT GATHER: - - (A) \"AL-QA\'ID IBRAHIM\" MOSQUE: AL-MAHALLAWI HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THIS MOSQUE, AND PERIODICALLY HE WILL ATTRACT LOCAL ATTENTION WITH PROVOCATIVE REMARKS IN HIS FRIDAY SERMONS. AT PRESENT, IT IS NOT THE CENTER FOR ISLAMIC ACTIVISM THAT IT WAS IN 1980. - - (B) \"AL-SALAM MOSQUE\": WITH MUHAMMAD EID OUT OF THE COUNTRY, THIS MOSQUE IS NO LONGER AS IMPORTANT A GATHERING POINT FOR THE ISLAMIC RIGHT AS IT ONCE WAS. HOWEVER, IT IS STILL FREQUENTED BY WORSHIPPERS IN VERY CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC ATTIRE. - - (C) \"ASR AL-ISLAM\" MOSQUE: LOCATED ON A MAIN STREET IN THE SIDI GABR DISTRICT, THIS MOSQUE ATTRACTS FULLY VEILED WOMEN AND BEARDED MEN. IT HAS NO SPECIFIC IMAM, BUT MUHAMMAD MARAGHI IS SAID TO FREQUENT IT, AND UMAR AL-TALMASANI, THE LATE MB LEADER, PREACHED THERE IN 1986. ONE SERMON RECENTLY OVERHEARD BY A CONGEN EMPLOYEE ATTACKED THE WEALTHY HARSHLY FOR NOT HELPING THE POOR. ANTI-CHRISTIAN AND ANTI-JEWISH SERMONS ARE REGULARLY PREACHED, AS WELL. DURING THE SEPTEMBER 1986 ALEXANDRIA SUMMIT, THEN-PRIME MINISTER PERES WAS SCORNED IN VERY INSULTING TERMS. A MEDICAL CLINIC OF THE SAME NAME, FOR WOMEN ONLY, IS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS MOSQUE AND IS USUALLY CROWDED. TREATMENT IS SAID TO BE GOOD, AND PRICES ARE AFFORDABLE BY MIDDLE CLASS EGYPTIANS. - - (D) \"FAJR AL-ISLAM\" MOSQUE: THIS MOSQUE IS ALLEGEDLY RUN BY A GROUP CALLING THEMSELVES, \"SUPPORTERS OF KHOMEINI\"--A STRANGE APPELATION AS MOST DEVOUT SUNNIS DO NOT CONSIDER SHIA TO BE MUSLIMS. SERMONS ARE SAID TO BE FREQUENTLY ANTI- CHRISTIAN, ALLEGING FOR EXAMPLE, THAT CHRISTIANS ARE ATHEISTS WHO WILL SURELY GO TO HELL. - - (E) \"FATIH AL-ISLAM\" MOSQUE: LOCATED IN THE EXCLUSIVE RUSHDI DISTRICT WHERE MANY DIPLOMATS AND WESTERNERS LIVE, THIS MOSQUE WAS BUILT IN WHAT WAS INTENDED TO BE A GARAGE. MOST OF THE CONGREGANTS ARE YOUNG, BEARDED, AND WEAR WHITE GALIBIYAS. FROM WHAT WE CAN TELL, SERMONS TEND TO BE APOLITICAL, FOCUSING ON INTERPRETATIONS OF KORANIC PASSAGES. THICK GLOVES AND OTHER EXTREMIST ACCOUTREMENTS FOR WOMEN ARE SOLD OUTSIDE THE MOSQUE ON FRIDAYS. - - (F) \"AL-MOAWASSAT\" MOSQUE: THIS IS THE MOSQUE OF YASSIN RUSHDI, THE SO-CALLED \"RASPUTIN\" OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN ALEXANDRIA. RUSHDI IS NOT CONSIDERED A POLITICAL RADICAL, BUT HIS MOSQUE IS INCLUDED IN THIS LIST BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF ADHERENTS WHO GATHER HERE EACH WEEK TO LISTEN TO HIS SERMONS AND TEACHINGS. HAMBLEY " "154","2/25/1987 16:04","87ALEXANDRIA292","Consulate Alexandria","CONFIDENTIAL","86ALEXANDRIA1215\|86ALEXANDRIA1425\|87ALEXANDRIA1301\|87ALEXANDRIA1406\|87ALEXANDRIA289\|87ALEXANDRIA290\|87ALEXANDRIA291\|87CAIRO28338","R 251604Z FEB 87 FM AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6526 INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY RIYADH USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALEXANDRIA 00292 USCINCCENT FOR POLAD HOWELL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KPRP, PINS, PGOV, PHUM, ECON, PINR, SOCI, EG SUBJECT: ISLAMIC TRILOGY, PART III: COMMERCIAL AND PHILANTHROPIC ACTIVITIES OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IN ALEXANDRIA REF: (A) ALEXANDRIA 00289 (B) ALEXANDRIA 00290 (C) ALEXANDRIA 00291 - 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.) - - 2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: THIS TELEGRAM TRANSMITS THE THIRD AND FINAL INSTALLMENT IN OUR SERIES ON THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IN ALEXANDRIA. WHILE THE SPIRITUAL FORCE OF RIGHTIST ISLAM IS GROWING, ITS POLITICAL POTENTIAL IS STILL RELATIVELY UNFORMED AND DIFFICULT TO GAUGE IN ALEXANDRIA, EVEN IF IT EXISTS BEHIND THE SCENES. WHERE THE ISLAMIC RIGHT IS HAVING ITS INFLUENCE MORE PALPABLY FELT IS IN COMMERCE, SOCIAL AND WELFARE ACTIVITIES, AND PHILANTHROPY. FOR THE TIME BEING, THIS HAS NOT TRANSLATED INTO ANY DIRECT POLITICAL SPOILS. HOWEVER, BUSINESSMEN WITH ISLAMIC CREDENTIALS (OR IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ISLAMIC CREDENTIALS) DONATE MONEY TO THE \"ISLAMIC GAMAAT,\" SOME OF THE PROMINENT RELIGIOUS LEADERS MENTIONED IN PART II, AND MANY OF THE WELFARE AND CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES THEY SPONSOR. IN THIS WAY, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ISLAMIC ECNOMIC SECTOR ARE SOMEWHAT DISTURBING, TENDING TO PROVIDE THE FINANCIAL WHEREWITHAL TO POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING SOCIO-POLITICAL GROUPS WHO SOMETIMES HAVE A VERY DIFFERENT POLITICAL AGENDA THAN THE GOE. IN OTHER WAYS, HOWEVER, THESE BUSINESSMEN ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE STABILITY OF THE CURRENT REGIME BY PROVIDING A PORTION OF THE SAFETY NET AND SERVICES WHICH AN OVERSTRETCHED GOVERNMENT CANNOT PROVIDE. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. - - WHO\'S WHO IN ALEXANDRIA\'S ISLAMIC BUSINESS WORLD? --------------------------------------------- ---- 3. AN INCREASING NUMBER OF COMPANIES IN ALEXANDRIA, AS ELSEWHERE IN EGYPT, ARE ADDING \"ISLAMIC\" TO THEIR TITLES OR--MORE COMMONLY--LETTING WORD SPREAD THAT THEY ARE ISLAMIC COMPANIES. IN PRACTICE, THIS SOMETIMES MEANS USING ISLAMIC BANKING INSTITUTIONS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND GIVING PREFERENCE TO MUSLIMS AS EMPLOYEES. IN SOME INSTANCES, BUSINESSMEN ARE AFFILIATING THEMSELVES WITH SUCH ACTIVITIES OR COMPANIES BECAUSE IT IS CHIC TO DO SO. OTHERS INVOLVE THEMSELVES FROM SINCERE CONVICTION, BECAUSE THEY HOPE TO PROFIT FROM SUCH ALLIANCES, OR THE MOTIVATION MAY BE A COMBINATION OF THE ABOVE. - - 4. TWO PILLARS OF THE LOCAL BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT, MUSTAFA AL-NAGGAR, AND MOHAMMED RAGAB HAVE LONG BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH THIS CURRENT, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT AFFILIATED DIRECTLY WITH ANY ISLAMIC COMPANIES PER SE. TOGETHER, THEY ARE AMONG THE LEADING BENEFACTORS IN ALEXANDRIA TO ISLAMIC INDIVIDUALS, ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETIES--SOME RADICAL, SOME NOT. FOR EXAMPLE, AL-NAGGAR IS PERSONALLY CLOSE TO SHAYKH AHMAD AL-MAHALLAWI, ALTHOUGH HE (NAGGAR) NEVER ARTICULATES SIMILARLY INTOLERANT POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS VIEWS AND, INDEED, INSISTS THAT AL-MAHALLAWI HAS MELLOWED. NEVERTHELESS, NAGGAR IS CONSIDERED ONE OF THE TWO WEALTHIEST MEN IN ALEXANDRIA, AND HIS SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC RIGHT HERE, REGARDLESS OF MOTIVATION, IS SIGNIFICANT. - - 5. MOHAMMAD RAGAB IS YOUNGER, MORE DYNAMIC, AND--IN THE VIEW OF OUR MUCH PRAISED COMMERCIAL SPECIALISTS--A BETTER BUSINESSMAN THAN NAGGAR. HE IS NOT AS WEALTHY, BUT HE IS MORE AMBITIOUS AND OUTSPOKEN. A SIGN OVER THE BAR NEXT TO THE OLYMPIC-SIZED INDOOR POOL AT HIS SUMPTUOUS HOME ADVERTISES THAT \"FOR THE SAKE OF YOUR HEALTH, THE RAGABS SERVE ONLY FRUIT JUICES AND SOFT DRINKS.\" - - 6. THERE IS BAD BLOOD BETWEEN RAGAB AND NAGGAR, LARGELY BECAUSE THE FORMER MOVED INTO THE IMPORTED FOOD AREA WHICH HAD BEEN NAGGAR\'S MAINSTAY WHEN THE CAR IMPORT AND HEAVY MACHINERY BUSINESS, WHICH WAS RAGAB\'S PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY, LOST VIABILITY WITH THE NEW IMPORT RESTRICTIONS. RAGAB CURRENTLY HEADS THE ALEXANDRIA BUSINESSMEN\'S GROUP BUT HAS AMBITIONS TO CUT A WIDER SWATH. AS EFFECTIVE AS HE IS, HE IS DISLIKED IN SOME CIRCLES BECAUSE HE IS VIEWED AS TOO MUCH OF A SELF-PROMOTER. NOT IDENTIFIED WITH ANY ONE ISLAMIC SPIRITUAL PERSONALITY IN ALEXANDRIA, RAGAB IS ALLEGED TO DONATE CONSIDERABLE SUMS OF MONEY TO A VARIETY OF ISLAMIC CHARITIES AND \"ISLAMIC GAMAAT.\" IN ADDITION, HE HAS HELPED PROMOTED BUSINESSMEN WHO ARTICULATE A SIMILAR, \"ISLAMIC,\" POINT OF VIEW. - - 7. ANOTHER FIGURE WHO IS OF INTEREST LOCALLY IS DR. ALI AL-MEHELBA WHO HEADS THE AL-ANDALUS ACID COMPANY (DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN 86 ALEXANDRIA 1406). TRAINED AS A MEDICAL DOCTOR, AL-MEHELBA MORE OR LESS CAME FROM NOWHERE. HIS CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES (UPSCALE HOUSING, HOSPITALS, AND TOURIST VILLAGE SCHEMES) ARE WIDE SCALE AND ARE ALLEGEDLY FINANCED THROUGH SHAREHOLDING AND PYRAMID FINANCING IN A WAY TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF PAYING \"INTEREST.\" HOWEVER, HE APPEARS TO HAVE OVER EXTENDED HIMSELF, AND LOCAL SOURCES TELL US HE MAY BE IN TROUBLE. THIS HAS NOT STOPPED HIM, HOWEVER, FROM PLANNING ADDITIONAL PROJECTS. - - 8. MEHELBA IS BELIEVED TO HAVE CLOSE TIES AND \"FRIENDS\" IN SAUDI ARABIA. HE MAINTAINS BRANCHES OF HIS FIRM THERE, IN PART TO ELICIT FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE LARGE EXPATRIATE EGYPTIAN COMMUNITY WHO OFTEN INVEST IN HIS CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. IT IS ALSO RUMORED THAT UNIDENTIFIED SAUDI SOURCES GAVE MEHELBA HIS INITIAL BOOST AND MAY ALSO BE CALLED UPON TO RESCUE HIM IF HIS CURRENT LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS ARE NOT RESOLVED. - - 9. TWO OTHER INTERESTING BUSINESS FIGURES HAVE ALLEGED TIES TO SAUDI ARABIA. ONE, TALAAT MUSTAFA IBRAHIM (USUALLY KNOWN AS TALAAT MUSTAFA) RUNS THE HUGE ALEXANDRIA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. NO ONE REALLY KNOWS WHERE MUSTAFA GOT HIS ORIGINAL SEED MONEY: ALEXANDRIANS ARE SUSPICIOUS THAT MUSLIM BROTHERS (MANY OF WHOM WERE EXILED IN SAUDI ARABIA) HELPED HIM OBTAIN SAUDI BACKING IN THE MID-1970\'S. - - 10. IN ANY EVENT, MUSTAFA TENDS TO WEAR HIS ISLAM ON HIS SLEEVE, WHILE HIS WIFE, WHO WEARS THE \"HEGAB\" OR HEAD COVERING, HAS MADE HERSELF UNWELCOME IN SOME QUARTERS BECAUSE OF HER INCESSANT EXHORTATIONS TO OTHER UPPER CLASS WOMEN TO DO LIKEWISE. MUSTAFA\'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL MOVE TO DATE HAS BEEN THE PLACEMENT OF A LARGE, AND HIGHLY VISIBLE BILLBOARD, WITH THE ISLAMIC CREED EMBLAZONED ON IT, ON TOP OF ONE OF HIS BUILDINGS (86 ALEXANDRIA 1425). HE HAS VERY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH MUHAMMED RAGAB, AND THE LATTER HAS BEEN ACCUSED BY DETRACTORS OF TRYING TO PROMOTE HIM INTO A KEY POSITION WITHIN THE ALEXANDRIA BUSINESSMEN\'S GROUP. TOGETHER, THE TWO WERE RECENTLY INVOLVED IN A CONTROVERSIAL (BUT NOT UNPOPULAR) PROPOSAL TO BUILD AN ISLAMIC-ORIENTED PRIVATE COLLEGE IN ALEXANDRIA. THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION RECENTLY QUASHED THE IDEA ON CURRICULUM GROUNDS, BUT MOVES ARE UNDERWAY TO TRY TO RESUSCITATE IT. - - 11. ANOTHER \"MYSTERIOUS\" BUSINESSMAN WHO IS BECOMING PROMINENT IS HAJJ AHMED EBEID (AKA AHMAD UBAYD). HE IS AFFILIATED WITH TWO ISLAMIC INVESTMENT COMPANIES. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SUGGESTIONS THAT EBEID IS AFFILIATED WITH ALI AL-MEHELBA, BUT THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED. - - ALEXANDRIA ACTIVITIES OF ISLAMIC COMPANIES AND BANKS --------------------------------------------- ------- 12. THERE ARE SEVERAL \"ISLAMIC COMPANIES\" BASED IN ALEXANDRIA, INCLUDING AL-ANDALUS ACID (MENTIONED ABOVE), AL-MADINA AL-MINAWARA (REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT), AL-MARWA, AL-SAFAA, AND THE ALEXANDRIA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, AN OLDER COMPANY FOUNDED IN 1974. A FORMER GOVERNOR OF ALEXANDRIA TOLD US ON JANUARY 29 THAT THE ISLAMIC COMPANIES ARE HEALTHY, GROWING RAPIDLY, AND THAT THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE. - - 13. THE LARGEST SUCH FIRM (AND ONE OF THE OLDEST) IS PROBABLY TALAAT MUSTAFA\'S ALEXANDRIA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. THIS COMPANY HAS BUILT 600 FLATS IN MONTAZA AND IS CONSTRUCTING SUMMER FLATS IN MAMOURA. TO THE WEST OF THE CITY, IT CONSTRUCTED ITS FIRST PROJECT AND A PLANT TO EXTRACT SALTS IN 1974 AND BUILT 1,500 FLATS TO ACCOMMODATE THE WORKERS. - - 14. IN AN OCTOBER 1986 DISCUSSION, MUSTAFA STATED THAT HIS COMPANY, LIKE MANY OTHERS, PUTS ITS MONEY IN THE FAYSAL BANK AND OTHER ISLAMIC BANKS BECAUSE THEY \"TRUST\" THEM AND ALSO, BECAUSE THEY CAN TAKE DOLLARS OUT OF EGYPT \"IF OR WHEN NECESSARY.\" HE FLATLY DENIED THAT FUNDS FOR ISLAMIC COMPANIES COME FROM SAUDIS OR THE SAG, ALLEGING THAT THE MONEY COMES SOLELY FROM EGYPTIAN EXPATS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF WHO WANT TO INVEST IN EGYPT, BUY FLATS, AND WHO HAVE \"MORE TRUST\" IN ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS THAN IN SECULAR ONES. - - 15. WHILE THE FAYSAL BANK HIRES ONLY MUSLIMS, (86 ALEXANDRIA 1215), THIS IS NOT TRUE OF SOME OF THE COMPANIES. A GOOD CHRISTIAN SOURCE TOLD US RECENTLY THAT HE HAS FRIENDS WHO WORK IN ONE OF THE AL-ANDALUS COMPANIES. MANY ARE DESIRABLE, HE SAID, BECAUSE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES. - - ISLAMIC WELFARE ASSOCIATIONS IN ALEXANDRIA ------------------------------------------ 16. EMBASSY REPORTING 986 CAIRO 28338) HAS DETAILED THE IMPORTANT ROLE PRIVATE WELFARE ASSOCIATIONS ROLE PLAY AS A SAFETY NET AND AS A STABILIZING FORCE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY. SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS PROSPER IN ALEXANDRIA, AND MANY OF THEM ARE SPONSORED BY THE ISLAMIC RIGHT. SOME OF THESE, LIKE THE \"FAJR AL-ISLAM\" AND \"ASR-AL-ISLAM\" CLINICS MENTIONED IN REF B ARE AFFILIATED TO RADICAL MOSQUES (COMMENT: THE \"FAJR AL-ISLAM\" CHARITABLE SOCIETY WAS THE ONLY ISLAMIC CHARITABLE SOCIETY IN ALEXANDRIA BANNED BY THE GOE IN THE 1981 CRACKDOWN. THE BAN WAS SUBSEQUENTLY LIFTED. END COMMENT.) - - 17. MORE COMMONLY, HOWEVER, THE ISLAMIC RIGHT SPONSORS MODERATE CHARITY AND WELFARE ACTIVITIES WITH FEW OR NO POLITICO-RELIGIOUS TRAPPINGS. ALEXANDRIA PHYSICIANS ARE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE IN ESTABLISHING POLYCLINCS. THEY SOLICIT PRIVATE DONATIONS FROM MOSQUES, BUY THEIR EQUIPMENT, AND STAFF THEIR CLINICS WITHOUT ASSISTANCE FROM THE MINISTRIES OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS OR HEALTH. OFTEN, PHYSICIANS FROM THE UNIVERSITY DONATE THEIR TIME IN THE AFTERNOONS. HOSTELS FOR NEEDY FEMALE STUDENTS FROM OUTSIDE ALEXANDRIA, AS WELL AS DAY CARE AND OLD-AGE CENTERS, ARE OTHER TYPES OF ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED BY WELL-TO-DO DEVOUT MUSLIMS. BECAUSE THE GOE IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE FACILITIES FOR THESE VERY NECESSARY ACTIVITIES, ISLAMIC SOCIAL WELFARE ASSOCIATIONS OF THIS NATURE FULFILL A STABILIZING SOCIAL FUNCTION. - - PHILANTHROPY FROM THE ISLAMIC RIGHT ----------------------------------- 18. MANY OF THE PROMINENT OWNERS OF ISLAMIC COMPANIES, SUCH AS MOHAMMED RAGAB, MUSTAFA AL-NAGGAR, AND DR. ALI MAHELBA, ARE ALSO WELL KNOWN PHILANTHROPISTS. FOR EXAMPLE, RAGAB AND AL-NAGGAR HAVE CONTRIBUTED LARGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY TO A NEW DRUG REHABILITATION HOSPITAL IN MONTAZA; AL-NAGGAR HAS DONATED VERY EXPENSIVE EQUIPMENT TO THE UNIVERSITY OF ALEXANDRIA HOSPITAL; AND DR. MAHELBA TOLD US VERY RECENTLY THAT HE IS SETTING UP A PROJECT TO SUPPLY FOOD TO THE POOR BY GETTING WEALTHY PEOPLE TO DONATE PROVISIONS. THE PROJECT HAS BEEN WORKED OUT ON PAPER; HE NOW SEEKING SOMEONE TO ADMINISTER IT. THIS LIST OF PHILANTHROPIC ACTIVITIES IS A LONG ONE AND AN IMPORTANT (AND IN SOME CASES, VITAL) SOURCE OF SUPPORT TO BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HOSPITALS, CLINICS, ORPHANAGES, AND SPECIALIZED WELFARE INSTITUTIONS. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF USAID, \"ISLAMIC\" BUSINESSMEN ARE PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT BENEFACTORS OF PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS (ISLAMIC OR OTHERWISE) IN ALEXANDRIA AT THE PRESENT TIME. - - 19. CONCLUDING COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE ECONOMIC SQUEEZE DEPICTED IN 86 ALEXANDRIA 1301 HAS EASED SOMEWHAT, INCREASED NUMBERS OF UNEMPLOYED AND RISING PRICES CONTINUE TO BE A SERIOUS POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN ALEXANDRIA, AS ELSEWHERE. THE LOCAL GOVERNMNET IS TRYING TO GET A HANDLE ON THE MANY INFRASTRUCTURAL INADEQUACIES AND GENERAL UNCLEANLINESS WHICH PLAGUE ALEXANDRIA, BUT THE PROBLEMS THE GOVERNORATE FACES CLEARLY OUTNUMBER THE AMOUNT OF RESOURCES IT HAS AVAILABLE TO CORRECT THEM OR AT LEAST BRING THEM UNDER CONTROL. - - 20. IN THIS SENSE, THE EXPANDING ISLAMIC PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES ARE A CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE, PROVIDING JOBS AND CONTRIBUTING GENEROUSLY TO VITALLY NEEDED SOCIAL SERVICES THROUGH A WIDE RANGING COMMITMENT TO WELFARE AND PHILANTHROPIC ACTIVITIES. THUS, WHILE IT HAS BECOME FASHIONABLE IN SOME QUARTERS TO VIEW THE ISLAMIC RIGHT SOLELY IN TERMS OF A THREAT TO EGYPTIAN STABILITY, IN SOME RESPECTS, MODERATE ISLAMIC PROPONENTS MIGHT ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTE TO EGYPT\'S STABILITY, PROVIDED THE ECONOMY DOES NOT FURTHER DETERIORATE AND RADICALIZE KEY SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION. IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN, EXTREMIST LEADERS FROM THE ISLAMIC RIGHT, WHO IN ALEXANDRIA HAVE ADOPTED A LOW PROFILE, COULD VERY WELL TRY TO EXPLOIT A TROUBLED SITUATION AND SEIZE THE INITIATIVE FROM THE NAGGARS, THE RAGABS, AND THEIR ILK WHO, DESPITE THEIR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR SOME NON-VIOLENT RADICAL ELEMENTS, SEEM DEDICATED ONLY TO SLOW, EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN EGYPT. END CONCLUDING COMMENT. HAMBLEY " "155","3/6/1987 21:47","87HAVANA746","US Interests Section Havana","CONFIDENTIAL","","O 062147Z MAR 87 FM USINT HAVANA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7551 INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 00746 E.O. 12356: OADR TAGS: UNHRC, PHUM, CU SUBJECT: CASTRO ON ARTISTIC FREEDOM 1. (C) WE NOTE, FROM CUBAN MEDIA REPORTING, THAT CUBAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE UNHRC DEBATE ON MARCH 4 AND 5 CLAIMED THAT THE GOC PERMITS BROAD FREEDOM FOR ARTISTS AND WRITERS. OUR DELEGATION MAY FIND THE QUOTATION BELOW FROM A CASTRO SPEECH IN JUNE 1961 OF USE IN REPLYING TO SUCH RIDICULOUS ASSERTIONS. THE SPEECH HAS SINCE BECOME FAMOUS AS HAVING SET DOWN GUIDELINES FOR STATE AND PARTY VIEWS ON OBLIGATIONS OF ARTISTS AND WRITERS. IT WAS GIVEN EXTEMPORANEOUSLY IN THREE SEPARATE SESSIONS ON JUNE 16, 23, AND 30, 1961, IN THE NATIONAL LIBRARY OF HAVANA. 2. (U) BEGIN QUOTE: \"THE PROBLEM WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING HERE, AND ARE GOING TO TOUCH ON FURTHER, IS THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FOR WRITERS AND ARTISTS...THE REVOLUTION MUST HAVE AS ITS OBJECTIVE THAT ALL HONEST MEN AND WOMEN, WHETHER WRITERS OR NOT, MARCH TOGETHER WITH IT...THE REVOLUTION MUST TRY TO WIN TO ITS IDEAS THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE...THEREFORE, WITHIN THE REVOLUTION, EVERYTHING; AGAINST THE REVOLUTION, NOTHING. AGAINST THE REVOLUTION, NOTHING, BECAUSE THE REVOLUTION ALSO HAS ITS RIGHTS, AND THE FIRST RIGHT OF THE REVOLUTION IS THE RIGHT TO EXIST, AND NO ONE HAS PRECEDENCE BEFORE THE RIGHT OF THE REVOLUTION TO BE AND TO EXIST...IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE REVOLUTION. COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES, THAT IS TO SAY, ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION, HAVE NO RIGHTS AGAINST THE REVOLUTION, BECAUSE THE REVOLUTION HAS A RIGHT: THE RIGHT TO EXIST, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOP AND THE RIGHT TO BE VICTORIOUS...\". 3. (C) IF THE DELEGATION MAKES USE OF THIS QUOTATION, IT MIGHT ADD TO ITS PRESENTATION AN INVITATION TO ANY OF THE CUBAN DELEGATES TO DISAGREE WITH THIS QUOTATION IF THEY THINK IT NO LONGER EXPRESSES CUBAN POLICY ON ARTISTIC FREEDOM. JOYCE " "156","3/27/1987 12:24","87DAMASCUS1746","Embassy Damascus","SECRET","","O 271224Z MAR 87 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9055 ","S E C R E T DAMASCUS 01746 TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER SUBJECT: CHANGES IN ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST (STRICTLY PROTECT) WITH WELL- ESTABLISHED CONTACTS IN AMMAN AND DAMASCUS WITH DFLP AND PFLP PERSONALITIES HAS BEEN TOLD BY HIS PALESTINIAN SOURCES THAT THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION HAS OFFERED TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN ITS ACTIVITIES. THE OFFER WAS EXTENDED DURING THE TALKS WITH QADHAFI AND THE OTHER FIVE PALESTINIAN FACTIONS REPRESENTED AT THE RECENT TRIPOLI CONFERENCE. IN ORDER TO GAIN PARTICIPA- TION AT THE UPCOMING ALGIERS PNC, ACCORDING TO PFLP AND DFLP SOURCES HERE, ANO NUMBER TWO ATIF ABU BAKR AGREED THAT HIS ORGANIZATION WOULD ADHERE IN THE FUTURE TO THE 1979 PLO DECISION FORBIDDING ARMED ACTIONS OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. 3. THE DFLP AND PFLP OFFICIALS WHO PROVIDED THIS INFORMATION STATED THAT THERE HAS BEEN FOR SOMETIME A DEBATE GOING ON AMONG THE ANO LEADERSHIP AS TO ITS FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION. THEY FEAR THAT THE SARG, BOTH BECAUSE OF WESTERN PRESSURES AND ITS OWN POLICIES, WILL INCREAS- INGLY RESTRICT ANO OPERATIONS BASED IN SYRIA AND LEBANON, AND THAT, IF EXPELLED FROM THESE SANCTUARIES, THEY WILL B HARD PRESSED TO FIND A SATISFACTORY BASE OF OPERATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THOSE ADVOCATING A CHANGE IN STRATEGY HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE REPUTATION AMONG PALESTINIAN YOUTHS THAT THEY HAVE GAINED THROUGH TAKING ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE ROLES IN THE DEFENSE OF THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AGAINST THE AMAL MOVEMENT. THIS GROUP, REPORTEDLY LED BY ATIF ABU BAKR, SUPPOSEDLY HAS DECIDED TO ADOPT A MORE MODERATE ROLE IN ORDER TO GAIN POLITICAL RESPECTA- BILITY AND REASSERT ITSELF DIRECTLY IN PALESTINIAN COUNCILS. 4. A SMALLER, DIE-HARD FACTION, HOWEVER, REMAINS COMMITTED TO AN ACTIVE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ROLE. NO MATTER WHAT THE REST OF THE ORGANIZATION DOES, IT WILL CONTINUE THEIR ACTIVITIES ALBEIT, PERHAPS, WITHOUT ALL OF THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE NOW TO THE ANO. THE BOTTOM LINE IS, OF COURSE, THAT WE WILL STILL HAVE AN ANO EVEN IF IT OPERATES UNDER A DIFFERENT NAME. 5. THE JOURNALIST SAYS THAT HIS PLFP CONTACTS INSIST THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CLOSED DOWN THE ABU NIDAL OFFICES IN DAMASCUS AND EXPELLED ITS OFFICIALS FROM SYRIA THE DFLP CONTACTS ON THE OTHER HAND SAY THAT THE ANO OFFICES ARE OPEN BUT THAT ABU NIDAL PERSONNEL ARE COMPLETELY RESTRICTED IN THEIR MOVEMENTS BY THE SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. ALL OF THE DAMASCUS PALESTINIANS AGREE THAT WITHIN THE CAMPS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA TODAY THE ANO ENJOYS PERHAPS GREATER PRESTIGE THAN ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATION AMONG THE YOUNGER GENERATION -- WHAT THEY CALL THE SABRA/SHATILLA GENERATION. ACCORDING TO THE YOUNG PEOPLE \"ONLY THE ANO IS DOING ANYTHING.\" THE JOURNALIST SAYS THAT THIS IS A FACT REFLECTED IN HIS OWN EXPERIENCES IN AMMAN WHERE THE CHILDREN OF HIS MIDDLE CLASS PALESTINIAN FRIENDS VOCIFERIOUSLY SUPPORT ABU NIDAL IN THE FACE OF THEIR MODERATE PARENTS. 6. COMMENT: WHILE SOME OF THE LOGIC OF THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ANO MUST CHANGE ITS STRIPES OR RISK LOSING ITS SANCTUARIES MAKES SENSE, FROM EVERYTHING WE KNOW ABOUT THE ANO, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT ATIF ABU BAKR OR ANY OTHER LEADER IS WILLING TO ESCHEW TERRORISM AGAINST ARABS AND OTHERS OUTSIDE ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WE HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE IN OUR SOURCE, HOWEVER, AS HE IS AN ACCURATE AND EXPERIENCED REPORTER WITH VERY GOOD TIES IN PALESTINIAN CIRCLES AND CANNOT DISMISS HIS REPORT OUT OF HAND. FURTHERMORE, ANO - IF IT THOUGHT IT FACED A LOSS OF ITS SYRIAN BASE - MIGHT GO QUITE FAR TO KEEP ONE IN LIBYA AND ESTABLISH ITS PALESTINIAN CREDENTIALS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FOLLOW UP. END COMMENT. 7. DEPARTMENT SHOULD RETRANSMIT TO OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE. RANSOM " "157","4/2/1987 9:37","87DHAKA2354","Embassy Dhaka","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 020937Z APR 87 FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1381 INFO DIA WASHDC//AO-3// AMCONSUL CALCUTTA AMEMBASSY COLOMBO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 02354 CINCPAC FOR FPA E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, KPRP, IN, BG SUBJECT: BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS THIS TELEGRAM FULFILLS ONE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE POST REPORTING PLAN 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT). -- 2. SUMMARY: BANGLADESH HOPES THAT RAJIV GANDHI WOULD BE A POWERFUL FORCE IN IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE FADED OVER THE PAST YEAR. BANGLADESH AND INDIA HAVE MADE LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS UNDER RAJIV; MANY AGAIN APPEAR INTRACTABLE AND NEW PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN. THE UPSURGE IN VIOLENCE IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS HAS BEEN A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT SETBACK. WHILE THE USG HAS NO INTEREST IN GETTING INVOLVED IN BANGLADESH-INDIA PROBLEMS AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO AVOID ANY POSITIONS ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES, THE IMPROVEMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN PROMOTING REGIONAL STABILITY, A LONG-TIME U.S. OBJECTIVE IN SOUTH ASIA. END SUMMARY. -- BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT PERCEPTIONS --------------------------------- 3. BANGLADESHI HOPES THAT INDIAN PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI WOULD BE A POWERFUL FORCE IN IMPROVING RELATIONS HAVE FADED OVER THE PAST YEAR. THERE IS A GROWING REAL- IZATION THAT RAJIV FACES A MYRIAD OF DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, AS WELL AS DIFFICULT RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND SRI LANKA, AND CAN DEVOTE LITTLE TIME TO BANGLADESH. IN THE BDG VIEW, WHAT GOODWILL OR NOBLE INTENTIONS HE MAY HAVE TOWARDS IMPROVING RELATIONS HAVE BEEN STYMIED AT EVERY TURN BY THE INDIAN BUREAUCRACY AND BY LESS HELP- FUL POLITICAL FIGURES. (WATER RESOURCES MINISTER B. SHANKARANAND REMAINS A FAVORITE BDG BLACK HAT.) MANY BANGLADESHIS CONSIDER THAT THE INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY BUREAUCRACY IS DOMINATED BY PEOPLE WITH AN IMPERIOUS ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDIA\'S NEIGHBORS. THEY BELIEVE THAT WHILE ERSHAD AND RAJIV MAY PERSONALLY GET ALONG WELL AND WANT TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, INDIAN BUREAUCRATS ARE DETERMINED TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON BANGLADESH. REPORTS THAT RAJIV CANNOT MANAGE THESE BUREAUCRATS, AND GROWING PERCEPTIONS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER\'S POLITICAL POSITION IS WEAKENING, ONLY COMPOUND THE FEAR AMONG MANY IN BANGLADESH THAT RAJIV IS POWERLESS TO EFFECT CHANGE. -- 4. PRESIDENT ERSHAD\'S STATE VISIT TO DELHI JULY 14-16, 1986 LED TO AN OPEN AND POSITIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, BUT MANY IN BANGLADESH VIEWED IT AS A TEST OF RAJIV\'S ABILITY TO HASTEN THE RESOLUTION OF BILATERAL PROBLEMS, IN PARTICULAR THE TIN BIGHA LAND CASE AND THE EASTERN WATERS PROBLEM. BY JANUARY 1987, OPTIMISM THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON BILATERAL ISSUES HAD FADED. FOREIGN MINISTER TIWARI FACED A LITANY OF BDG GRIEVANCES DURING HIS JANUARY 6-8 VISIT TO DHAKA. BANGLADESH AND INDIA HAVE MADE LITTLE PROGRESS ON LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS UNDER RAJIV; MANY AGAIN APPEAR INTRACTABLE AND NEW PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN. FOREIGN MINISTER CHOUDHURY, IN A MARCH 25 SPEECH BEFORE PARLIAMENT, DEVOTED NEARLY HALF OF HIS HOUR-LONG ADDRESS TO INDO-BANGLADESHI BILATERAL PROBLEMS. CHOUDHURY\'S FOCUS ON INDIA REFLECTED THE BDG INTEREST IN DEMONSTRATING THE CORRECTNESS OF A STRONG STAND ON BILATERAL ISSUES AT A TIME WHEN THE BDG IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY EMBARRASSED AND FRUSTRATED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, SUCH AS THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS PROBLEM. -- BILATERAL ISSUES ---------------- 5. THE FOLLOWING BILATERAL ISSUES, THE MAJORITY OF WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED EXTENSIVELY FROM DHAKA, FOR THE MOST PART ILLUSTRATE THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE BESET BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS OVER THE PAST YEAR AND DIMINISHED HOPES THAT RELATIONS WOULD IMPROVE UNDER RAJIV. LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN RECORDED ON LONG- STANDING POLITICAL ISSUES. AND IN ONE INSTANCE, THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, THE UPSURGE OF VIOLENCE THERE HAS CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT SETBACK. -- POLITICAL ISSUES ---------------- 6. EASTERN WATERS. ALTHOUGH THE BDG WAS PLEASED THAT INDIA AGREED TO A TRILATERAL APPROACH TO AUGMENTING THE FLOW OF GANGES RIVER WATER TO BANGLADESH, SENIOR BDG OFFICIALS RECOGNIZED THAT ANY EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE EASTERN WATERS ISSUE BY BUILDING A SERIES OF DAMS IN NEPAL WAS CERTAIN TO BE FRUITLESS. IN A \"SHARING\" APPROACH, BANGLADESH IS NOW ASKING INDIA FOR A GUARAN- TEED FLOW OF 25,000 CUSECS FROM THE GANGES, LESS THAN THAT PROVIDED IN THE SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT NOW IN FORCE, BUT ABOUT EQUAL TO WHAT BANGLADESH RECEIVES IN THE LOWEST WATER MONTHS BECAUSE OF THE BURDEN-SHARING PROVISIONS OF THAT AGREEMENT. BANGLADESH ALSO WANTS A GUARANTEED 75 PERCENT OF THE FLOW OF THE BRAHMAPUTRA AND 50 PERCENT OF THE FLOW OF THE OTHER BORDER RIVERS. IF INDIA AGREES TO GUARANTEE THESE QUANTITIES OF WATER FOR BANGLADESH, THE BANGLADESH IRRIGATION MINISTER CLAIMS THE BDG WILL DROP ITS PROPOSAL FOR STORAGE DAMS IN NEPAL AND INDIA COULD THEN ABANDON THE IDEA OF A LINK CANAL FROM THE BRAHMAPUTRA TO THE GANGES ACROSS BANGLADESH. THE BDG BELIEVES THAT SUCH A SHARING AGREEMENT WITH INDIA IS POSSIBLE, BUT THE INDIAN BUREAUCRACY REMAINS OBSTRUCTIVE. IN BANGLADESH POLITICS, THE GREAT DANGER IS BEING SEEN AS \"PRO- INDIAN.\" THUS, PRESIDENT ERSHAD IS CAUTIOUS IN DEALING WITH THE EASTERN WATERS ISSUE. -- 7. CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS. BDG OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT INDIA HAS PROVIDED ARMS, REFUGE, AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE SHANTI BAHINI INSURGENTS IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, THUS FUELING AN INSURGENCY WHICH HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY VIOLENT. INDIA, ON THE OTHER HAND, CLAIMS THAT BANGLADESH HAS GIVEN REFUGE TO MEMBERS OF AN INDIAN INSURGENT GROUP, THE TRIPURA NATIONAL VOLUNTEERS. INDIA AND BANGLADESH RECENTLY REACHED AN AGREEMENT THAT BANGLADESH WOULD REPATRIATE OVER 24,000 CHAKMA REFUGEES WHO FLED FROM BANGLADESH IN THE WAKE OF SHANTI BAHINI VIOLENCE. THE REPATRIATION PROGRAM WAS TO HAVE BEGUN ON JANUARY 15, BUT SHANTI BAHINI ATTACKS STOPPED THE REPATRIATION BEFORE IT BEGAN. INDIA AND BANGLADESH CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE CHARGES ABOUT WHICH COUNTRY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE. FOREIGN MINISTER (#)UMAYUN RASHID CHOUDHURY IN A MARCH 25 SPEECH BEFORE PARLIAMENT SAID THAT BANGLADESH IS READY TO TAKE BACK THE REFUGEES, BUT THAT THE GOI HAS NOT RESPONDED TO BANGLADESH\'S PROPOSAL TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HOME SECRETARIES ON THE REPATRIATION PROGRAM. THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS ISSUE IS A PARTICULARLY SENSI- TIVE ONE FOR BANGLADESH IN VIEW OF A SEPTEMBER 1986 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT CHARGING WIDESPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE HILL TRACTS BY BANGLADESH LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS. -- 8. TIN BIGHA. THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT RULED IN SEPTEMBER 1986 THAT THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION MUST BE AMENDED BEFORE INDIA COULD LEASE THE TIN BIGHA CORRIDOR TO BANGLADESH IN PERPETUITY. THE BANGLA- DESHIS HAD ASKED FOR THE TERRITORY TO BE TURNED OVER TO THEM DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1987. RAJIV PROMISED TO DELIVER QUICKLY ON TIN BIGHA, AND HAS THUS FAR FAILED TO KEEP THAT PROMISE. THE BDG CLAIMS THE ISSUE IS A TEST OF INDIA\'S SINCERITY IN IMPROVING RELATIONS OVERALL, BUT IN FACT APPEARS FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT INDIA\'S SLOWNESS. -- 9. MARITIME BOUNDARY. FOREIGN MINISTER CHOUDHURY IN HIS MARCH 25 SPEECH HAS SAID THAT, ACCORDING TO ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION, SOUTH TALPATTY ISLAND BELONGS TO BANGLADESH. INDIA, HOWEVER, HAS STAKED A CLAIM TO THE ISLAND. THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO DETERMINE OWNERSHIP THROUGH A JOINT SURVEY. -- 10. IN THE MIDST OF THESE CONTENTIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES, SOME BRIGHT SPOTS EXIST. FOR EXAMPLE: -- 11. TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE. BANGLADESH\'S ELECTION PERIOD AND TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE IN 1986 PASSED WITHOUT DAMAGE TO BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS. INDO-BANGLADESHI RELATIONS WERE NEVER A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE PARLIAMENTARY OR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS. WHILE THE INDIANS MAY HAVE WANTED THE AWAMI LEAGUE TO EMERGE IN A STRONG POSITION IN PARLIAMENT, NEITHER EVIDENCE NOR ACCUSATIONS OF INDIAN INVOLVEMENT EXIST. SIMILARLY, THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD OF THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT ERSHAD, THERE WERE NO SERIOUS ACCUSATIONS OF EITHER INDIAN INTERVENTION IN BANGLADESH\'S AFFAIRS OR PRO-INDIAN SENTIMENT ON THE PART OF BDG OFFICIALS. AWAMI LEAGUE LEADER SHEIKH HASINA\'S MEETING WITH RAJIV GANDHI IN NOVEMBER 1986 CREATED A BRIEF FLURRY IN DHAKA, BUT APPEARS TO HAVE HAD NO LASTING IMPACT ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE. -- 12. SAARC. ALTHOUGH THE SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC) HAS YET TO HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE ROLE IN THE REGION, INDIA HAS COOPERATED WITH ITS NEIGHBORS TO ESTABLISH SAARC. RAJIV\'S SUPPORT FOR ERSHAD\'S PERSONAL ROLE IN SAARC\'S ESTAB- LISHMENT, AND THEIR USE OF THE FORUM SAARC PROVIDED FOR THE DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL ISSUES, HAVE BEEN POSITIVE FACTORS IN BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR. -- 13. ASSAM BORDER. THE ASSAM INFILTRATION ISSUE APPEARS TO HAVE SUBSIDED, AND THE INDIANS SEEM TO HAVE DROPPED PLANS TO CONSTRUCT THEIR PROVOCATIVE BORDER FENCE AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE HERE. BUT LIKE MANY OTHER PROBLEMS IN INDO-BANGLADESH RELATIONS, THE ISSUE OF ALLEGED BANGLADESHI INFILTRATION INTO LESS HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS OF NORTHEASTERN INDIA REMAINS ONE WHICH CAN SUDDENLY BE BROUGHT AGAIN TO PROMINENCE EITHER BY A STRAY EVENT OR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF PERCEIVED DOMESTIC POLITICAL NEEDS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES. -- ECONOMIC ISSUES --------------- 14. TRADE. BANGLADESH\'S FRUSTRATIONS OVER THE GROWING TRADE DEFICIT WITH INDIA AND INDIA\'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE BDG REQUEST FOR IMPORT FINANCING HAVE HEIGHTENED BANGLADESH\'S DISAPPOINT- MENT AND PUBLIC SKEPTICISM ABOUT INDIAN INTENTIONS. BANGLADESH-INDIA ECONOMIC TALKS ON DECEMBER 1-2, 1986 FOCUSED PRINCIPALLY ON THE TRADE IMBALANCE, WHICH GREW TO 57 MILLION DOLLARS IN FY 1985. IN THAT YEAR, BANGLADESHI EXPORTS WERE UNUSUALLY STRONG, BUT SUCCEEDED IN COVERING ONLY 39 PERCENT OF THE IMPORTS FROM INDIA. BANGLADESHIS VOICED DISAPPOINT- MENT AT THE LACK OF CONCRETE DECISIONS COMING FROM THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. PROTESTS SURROUNDING THE OPENING OF AN INDIAN TRADE EXHIBITION IN DHAKA IN NOVEMBER 1986 REFLECTED THE UNDERLYING TENSION IN BANGLADESH\'S COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE IN SOME POLITICAL QUARTERS. -- 15. ACCESS. INDIAN REQUESTS FOR ACCESS THROUGH BANGLADESH TERRITORY HAVE MET WITH RESISTANCE FROM BDG AUTHORITIES. ACCESS TO ASSAM VIA INLAND WATER TRANSPORT, RAIL, AND ROAD, AND ACCESS TO THE SEA (THROUGH CHITTAGONG) FOR MIZORAM HAVE BECOME CONTEN- TIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES. ACCORDING TO THE MFA\'S DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE BANGLADESH MILITARY FEAR BOTH THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF SUCH ACCESS AND THE \"SMUGGLING\" WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE. BANGLADESH BELIEVES THERE WOULD BE A TREMEN- DOUS, UNCONTROLLABLE LEAKAGE OF INDIAN GOODS INTO BANGLADESH FROM RAILWAY AND ROAD TRANSIT. THE DIRECTOR ADDED THAT INDIA HAS THREATENED TO BUILD A ROAD THROUGH THE NARROW NECK OF LAND WHICH CONNECTS ASSAM TO THE REST OF INDIA. THAT WOULD \"CUT BANGLADESH OUT\" OF THE \"BENEFITS\" (TAXING POWER, FOR EXAMPLE) WHICH WOULD COME FROM ALLOWING INDIA ACCESS TO ASSAM THROUGH BANGLADESH TERRITORY. (THE DIRECTOR, HOWEVER, THINKS THE THREAT IS A BLUFF; THE ROAD WILL NEVER BE BUILT BECAUSE IT IS TOO EXPENSIVE.) MORE POSITIVELY, INDIA AND BANGLADESH AGREED TO IMPROVE LAND LINE TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATIONS TO PERMIT AUTOMATIC DIRECT DIALING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE SERVICE TOOK EFFECT ON MARCH 26. -- 16. SMUGGLING. LONG A PROBLEM BETWEEN INDIA AND BANGLADESH, SMUGGLING APPEARS TO HAVE INCREASED DRAMATICALLY OVER THE PAST YEAR, ALTHOUGH NO RELIABLE STATISTICS ARE AVAILABLE. THIS FURTHER STRAINS ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE BDG HAS FORMED AN ANTI-SMUGGLING COMMITTEE, IN WHICH ERSHAD TAKES A PERSONAL INTEREST, TO CRACK DOWN ON ALL SMUGGLING, PARTICULARLY ACROSS THE POROUS INDIA-BANGLADESH BORDER. ON MARCH 23, 1987 THE PARLIAMENT PASSED AN AMENDMENT TO THE SPECIAL POWERS ACT ALLOWING THE DEATH PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED AGAINST SMUGGLERS. THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO SIGN THE LEGISLATION LATER THIS YEAR. IN ADDITION TO TRADITIONAL SMUGGLED ITEMS SUCH AS COTTON TEXTILES, BANGLADESH OFFICIALS BELIEVE HEROIN AND OTHER ILLEGAL DRUGS ARE FINDING THEIR WAY INTO BANGLADESH FROM INDIA. -- IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY ---------------------------- 17. THE USG HAS NO INTEREST IN GETTING INVOLVED IN BANGLADESH-INDIA PROBLEMS AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO AVOID ANY POSITIONS ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT IMPROVEMENT OF BANGLADESH- INDIA RELATIONS WILL PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY, A LONG-TIME U.S. OBJECTIVE IN SOUTH ASIA. OUR ROLE MUST BE TO ENCOURAGE EACH SIDE, IN A LOW-KEY WAY, TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE OTHER TO RESOLVE THE BILATERAL PROBLEMS. AND ALL MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS NO QUICK, EASY SOLUTION TO ANY OF THEM. SCHAFFER " "158","4/11/1987 16:29","87ALGIERS2184","Embassy Algiers","CONFIDENTIAL","","P 111629Z APR 87 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7300 INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY LONDON USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 02184 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: KPAL, PREL, KPRP, PLO, AG SUBJECT: ALGERIA AND THE PLO REF: KPRP 28 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: ALGERIA HAS LONG BEEN AN ACTIVE-- IF DISTANT--PARTICIPANT IN MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY. ENGAGEMENT ARISES FROM ALGERIA\'S SELF-PERCEPTION AS ROLE MODEL FOR ALL NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLES AND FROM STRONG EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB/ISLAMIC CAUSE. POINT OF ENGAGEMENT HAS BEEN THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, AND ALGERIA HAS CONSISTENTLY TRIED TO IMPART THE \"LESSONS LEARNED\" FROM ITS OWN STRUGGLE AGAINST COLONIALISM, URGING \"UNITY\" ON THE PALESTINIANS FIRST AND FOREMOST. 3. THE PLO HAS BEEN A SLOW LEARNER. PALESTINIANS HAVE TRIED MIGHTILY TO IMPOSE \"UNITY,\" BUT HAVE LACKED THE RESOURCES AND REACH THAT THE FLN HAD IN ITS WAR AGAINST FRANCE. ALGERIA, NONETHELESS, HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT ALLY FOR THE PLO, AND THE PALESTINIANS HAVE DERIVED BENEFIT FROM THE GOA\'S WIDELY VALUED DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. ALGIERS HAS ALSO SERVED AS A USEFUL VENUE FOR A NUMBER OF PLO ACTI- VITIES, MAINLY TRAINING AND LARGE CONGRESSES--SUCH AS THE PNC SLATED FOR APRIL 20. 4. ALGERIA, FOR ITS PART, HAS COMPLETED A LONG JOURNEY FROM THE REJECTIONIST/STEADFASTNESS FRONT APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE, BUT IT STILL VIEWS THE CAMP DAVID APPROACH AS A SELLOUT OF ESSENTIAL PALESTINIAN INTERESTS. BUT, WHILE CHAMPIONING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, ALGERIA HAS LEFT UNCLEAR WHAT IT THINKS THE VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE COULD BE. THE GOA REJECTS \"TERROR\" AS A TACTIC, BUT STILL REGARDS ACTS OF VIOLENCE \"IN THE TERRITORY TO BE LIBERATED\" AS ACCEPTABLE. END SUMMARY. -------------------- TO PNC OR NOT TO PNC -------------------- 5. ALGERIA IS PLANNING TO HOST THE PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON APRIL 20 AFTER A PREPARATORY MEETING STARTING APRIL 13. THESE MEETINGS ARE THE RESULT OF MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF INTRICATE, CONFUSING, AND OFTEN FRUSTRATING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND PRO- TRACTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH NUMEROUS PALESTINIAN FACTIONS AND OTHER ARAB STATES. WHILE ALGERIA WILL BE PLEASED IF THERE IS A SUCCESSFUL PNC, THE LONG-TERM GOAL REMAINS PUTTING TOGETHER A MORE LASTING UNITY THAT WILL ALLOW THE PLO TO PARTICIPATE COHESIVELY IN AN ARAB SUMMIT, AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AND EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ALGERIA\'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS HAVE SOUGHT TO COMPOSE INTERNAL PALESTINIAN DIFFERENCES, INDUCE SYRIA TO PUT ASIDE ITS PAROCHIAL OBJECTIVES AND DISLIKE FOR YASSIR ARAFAT, AND SOLICIT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR UNITY UNDER ARAFAT. AT THE SAME TIME, ALGERIA HAS ALSO BEEN CAREFUL TO HOLD OUT A GLIMMER OF HOPE THAT EGYPT CAN REJOIN THE ARAB COMMUNITY WITHOUT ABANDONMENT OF ITS ESSENTIAL INTERESTS. WITH THESE FACTORS TO DEAL WITH, IT WILL BE NO SMALL FEAT IF THE PNC ACTUALLY CONVENES APRIL 20. --------------- HISTORY LESSONS --------------- 6. THE ALGERIANS CONSIDER THEIR WARTIME EXPERIENCE A MODEL FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND FOR THE PLO IN PARTICULAR. FOR THE ALGERIANS, MAINTAINING REVOLUTIONARY UNITY UNDER THE FLN UMBRELLA PREVENTED BOTH THE FRENCH AND OTHER ARAB STATES FROM EXPLOITING PUBLIC CLEAVAGES TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. ONCE THE ALGERIANS MADE IT CLEAR THAT FRANCE COULD HOLD ON NO LONGER IN NORTH AFRICA, THE FLN ATTAINED VIRTUALLY ALL OF ITS OBJECTIVES. IN URGING THESE LESSONS ON THE PALESTINIANS, HOWEVER, THE ALGERIANS OVERLOOK ONE KEY FACTOR: THEIR UNITY WAS THE RESULT OF RUTHLESS LIQUIDATION OF ANY ELEMENT THOUGHT RECALCITRANT OR INCONVENIENT, FROM HARKIS WHO FOUGHT WITH FRANCE TO COMMUNISTS WHO JOINED THE STRUGGLE FOR ANTI-NATIONALIST GOALS. TRY AS THEY MIGHT, THE PALESTINIANS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE UNITY ON THIS BASIS. 7. IN DEALING WITH THE PLO, THE ALGERIANS HAVE TRIED--WITH VARYING SUCCESS--TO CONVEY A FOUR-PART MESSAGE TO THEIR PALESTINIAN FRIENDS: A) ALGERIA IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO ADVISE MOVEMENTS ENGAGED IN \"NATIONAL LIBERATION\" STRUGGLES. B) A KEY ELEMENT OF SUCCESS IS CONCEALING INTERNAL DISPUTES BEHIND A FACADE OF UNITY. C) NO OUTSIDE POWER CAN BE ALLOWED TO DICTATE GOALS, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY. THE PALESTINIANS, IN CONTRAST TO THE FLN, HAVE SPLINTERED INTO FACTIONS IDENTIFIED CLOSELY WITH ARAB STATES THAT HAVE SACRIFICED PALESTINIAN INTERESTS FOR THE SAKE OF THEIR OWN PAROCHIAL OBJECTIVES. D) ALGERIA HAS MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH ALL PALESTINIAN GROUPS FROM THE MAIN-LINE FATAH TO THE EXTREME ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION AND HAS INSISTED THAT UNIFICATION OF ALL FACTIONS, WHATEVER THEIR IDEOLOGY, IS THE ONLY WAY TO ADVANCE THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. ------------------------------- MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT ------------------------------- 8. IN ADDITION TO LESSONS ON HOW TO ORGANIZE A REVOLUTIONARY WAR, ALGERIA HAS FURNISHED THE PLO MORE TANGIBLE MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT. AS OF LATE MARCH 1987, ABOUT 600 PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS WERE LOCATED WITH THE ALGERIAN MILITARY AT EL-BAYADH, A REMOTE SITE ABOUT 600 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF THE CAPITAL. THESE COMBATANTS, WHO ARE REPORTEDLY UNHAPPY WITH THEIR LOT IN THE REMOTE DESERT LOCATION, HAD MOVED TO EL-BAYADH IN LATE 1986 FROM A CAMP AT TEBESSA, NEAR THE TUNISIA FRONTIER. 9. ALGERIA ALSO HOSTS AN OFFICIAL PLO EMBASSY, LED BY AN ARAFAT SUPPORTER, AND SMALL LIAISON OFFICES FOR SOME OF THE PLO FACTIONS. ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL, THE ALGERIANS HAVE, SINCE THE DEATH OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER BENYAHIA IN 1982, DEALT PUBLICLY WITH THE PLO THROUGH THE APPARATUS OF THE RULING PARTY (FLN). THE PLO WORKS WITH THE ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ON ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS, WITH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ON MILITARY TRAINING, AND WITH THE FLN ON MATTERS OF POLICY. THE MAIN FIGURES WITHIN THE FLN WHO DEAL WITH ALGERIAN-PLO RELATIONS ARE MOHAMMED CHERIF MESSAADIA, HEAD OF THE PERMANENT SECRETARIAT OF THE FLN CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATE, SADEK ZOUATEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY COUNCIL OF FRIENDSHIP WITH PEOPLES. ------------------------- CATCHING FLIES WITH HONEY ------------------------- 10. ZOUATEN AND MESSAADIA TAKE CARE OF VISITING PALESTINIAN DELEGATIONS, BUT PRESIDENT BENDJEDID ALSO ENGAGES HIMSELF PERSONALLY, RECEIVING MOST PALESTINIAN DELEGATIONS, AND HIS POSITION AS FLN SECRETARY-GENERAL ALLOWS THE ALGERIANS TO PRESERVE THE FORMS OF PARTY-TO-PARTY RELATIONS. THE ALGERIANS CAREFULLY BALANCE THEIR PROTOCOL TREATMENT OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS, ENSURING THAT NONE IS SEEN AS FAVORED. WHEN GEORGE HABBASH AND THE PFLP, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE AT THEIR MOST INTRANSIGENT ON THEIR CONDITIONS FOR ATTENDING ANY REUNIFICATION CONFERENCE, THE ALGERIANS BECOME EVEN WARMER AND MORE WELCOMING IN THEIR PUBLIC TREATMENT OF HABBASH, SEEKING TO WIN HIM OVER TO WHAT IS THE ESSENTIALLY PRO-FATAH VIEW OF THE GOA. 11. WHILE AVOIDING A PUBLIC BREAK WITH ANY PLO FACTION, THE ALGERIANS HAVE ALSO APPLIED DISCREET PRESSURE ON ALL GROUPS TO PUT REUNIFICATION ABOVE PERSONAL AND FACTIONAL INTERESTS. PART OF THIS PRESSURE IS TO INSTILL AND EXPLOIT A SENSE OF SHAME AND PERSONAL OBLIGATION. BENDJEDID HAS STAKED CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CAPITAL ON HIS REUNIFICATION INITIATIVE, AND NO PALESTINIAN GROUP WANTS OPENLY TO DEFY THE PRESIDENT\'S CALLS FOR UNITY AND BEAR THE BLAME FOR THE FAILURE OF HIS EFFORTS. 12. THE ALGERIANS HAVE ALSO TRIED TO PRESSURE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS WHO THEY BELIEVE ARE OBSTRUCTING UNITY EFFORTS. IN FEBRUARY 1987, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ALGERIANS APPARENTLY GAVE ARAFAT COLD TREATMENT FOR OPPOSING A UNITY PLATFORM DURING AN ALGIERS PALESTINIAN WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS CONFERENCE. IN ORDER TO BRING GEORGE HABBASH AND THE PFLP INTO THE UNIFICATION TALKS, ALGERIA HAS TRIED TO USE WHAT INFLUENCE IT HAS ON THAT FACTION\'S SYRIAN BACKERS. WITH THIS GOAL IN MIND, ALGERIA HAS TAKEN A NOTABLY PRO-SYRIAN PUBLIC STAND SINCE BENDJEDID\'S JANUARY 23 VISIT TO DAMASCUS AND SINCE THE KUWAIT ISLAMIC CONFERENCE SUMMIT. IN SO DOING, ALGIERS HAS HAD TO SWALLOW HARD AND MAINTAIN PUBLIC SILENCE OVER SYRIA\'S SUPPORT FOR THE AMAL MILITIA IN THE LEBANON CAMPS WAR. --------------------------------- TERRORISM VS. NATIONAL LIBERATION --------------------------------- 13. ALGERIA RECOGNIZES THE TERRIBLE DAMAGE THAT TERRORISM DOES TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE WITH WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. YET, DRAWING FROM THEIR OWN STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FRENCH, THE ALGERIANS FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT USE OF VIOLENCE IS A LEGITIMATE TACTIC AGAINST A COLONIZER WHO SHOWS NO SIGN OF GIVING IN TO THE DEMANDS OF A \"COLONIZED PEOPLE.\" ALGERIANS FEEL THE DILEMMA ACUTELY--BOTH ON A PHILOSOPHICAL AND A TACTICAL LEVEL-- AND HAVE COME UP WITH A LINE OF ARGUMENT THAT CONDEMNS TERRORISM, BUT ACCEPTS THE MORAL AND TACTICAL VALIDITY OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE ON THE TERRITORY TO BE LIBERATED. THIS ALLOWS THE GOA TO BE CRITICAL OF TOTALLY REPRE- HENSIBLE ACTIONS LIKE RANDOM ATTACKS AT EUROPEAN AIRPORTS ON INNOCENT PASSENGERS AND THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR, BUT PRESUMABLY LEAVES A DOOR OPEN TO ATTACKS ON ISRAEL DIRECTLY. FOR FEAR OF TYING THEMSELVES DOWN OR PREJUDGING ISSUES ON WHICH THE PALESTINIANS CANNOT THEMSELVES AGREE, THE ALGERIANS ARE PURPOSE- FULLY VAGUE ABOUT WHAT TERRITORY IS TO BE LIBERATED-- THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OR ISRAEL ITSELF. 14. BEYOND THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUE, THE ALGERIANS FACE MORE PRACTICAL DILEMMAS IN HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS THAT ENGAGE IN TERRORISM. THE ACHILLE LAURO DISASTER WAS EASY TO CRITICIZE, BUT THEY STILL CONSIDER ABU ABBAS AN IMPORTANT PALES- TINIAN LEADER WHO MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN UNITY GFFORTS. THEY CONSIDER ABU NIDAL BEYOND THE PALE, A JUDGMENT MADE EASIER BY THE FATAH DEATH SENTENCE AGAINST HIM, BUT THE GOA NONETHELESS IS NOT OVERTLY HOSTILE TO ABU NIDAL AND PERMITS AT LEAST TWO PALES- TINIAN STUDENTS LOYAL TO HIM TO LIVE IN ALGIERS. 15. WHATEVER THE GOA\'S VIEWS ON THE UTILITY OF TERRORISM, ALGERIA\'S BROAD POLICY OF KEEPING DOORS OPEN TO EVERY CONCEIVABLE \"NATIONAL LIBERATION\" MOVEMENT OVERRIDES MOST OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. THE GOA SEES ITSELF AS THE WORLD\'S MIDDLEMAN AND RECOG- NIZES THAT TO DEAL WITH ALL PARTIES TO DISPUTES, IT MUST BE ON SPEAKING TERMS WITH THEM. AT A TIME WHEN NO OTHER COUNTRY COULD HAVE ACHIEVED WHAT ALGERIA HAS WITH THE PLO UNITY EFFORT THUS FAR, AN ARGUMENT CAN BE MADE IN FAVOR OF THAT OPENNESS. ------------------------------------- WILL THE REAL ALGERIA PLEASE STAND UP ------------------------------------- 16. ALGERIA HAS COME A LONG WAY FROM THE DAYS IT FORMED THE REJECTIONIST/STEADFASTNESS FRONT WITH THE LIKES OF SYRIA, SOUTH YEMEN, AND LIBYA. WHILE ITS VIEWS ON THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE HAVE CHANGED RADICALLY AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO HAVE ITS NAME ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRUE HARDLINERS IS NON-EXISTENT, THE GOA HAS BECOME VAGUE ON HOW IT THINKS PEACE CAN BE FOUND IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND GESTURES LIKE HASSAN\'S MEETINB WITH PERES AT IFRANE ARE STILL ROUNDLY CRITICIZED IN THE ALGERIAN PRESS. YET, THE ALGERIANS WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY NOT TO CRITICIZE THE HUSSEIN/ARAFAT ACCORDS WHEN THEY SHOWED PROMISE OF WORKING, AND THEY HAVE MADE SOME OVERTURES TO EGYPT, INDICATING THAT THE EGYPTIANS CAN EVENTUALLY MAKE THEIR WAY BACK INTO THE ARAB COMMUNITY ON THEIR OWN TERMS. 17. SO FAR THE ALGERIANS HAVE CAREFULLY AVOIDED INVOLVEMENT IN DETAILS OF THE COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE PNC MEETING. WHATEVER THEIR PRIVATE FEELINGS ABOUT SPECIFIC ISSUES, THEY HAVE TAKEN NO PUBLIC STAND ON THE ABROGATION OF THE AMMAN ACCORD, ON PLO TIES WITH EGYPT, ON THE ORGANIZATION OF PLO LEADERSHIP, OR ON OTHER DIVISIVE QUESTIONS. DRAWING ON THEIR OWN REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE, THE ALGERIANS HAVE SAID ONLY THAT THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES MUST DECIDE THESE QUESTIONS WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE AND THAT PERSONALITIES, EVEN YASIR ARAFAT\'S, SHOULD NOT BECOME AN ISSUE THAT OBSCURES REVOLUTIONARY GOALS. --------- PROSPECTS --------- 18. THE SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR ALGERIA AND THE PLO RAISE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS: A) CAN ALGERIA HOST A PNC MEETING IN APRIL AS PLANNED DESPITE FACTIONAL DISPUTES AMONG THE PALESTINIANS? B) IF SO, WILL THE PNC INCLUDE ALL FACTIONS OR WILL IT BE A RUMP SESSION WITHOUT PFLP AND OTHER PRO-SYRIAN PARTICIPATION? FOR THE ALGERIANS, THE LATTER WOULD REPRESENT ALMOST AS SERIOUS A DIPLOMATIC SETBACK AS A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF THE MEETING. C) WILL THE PNC MEETING ACHIEVE SOME SORT OF UNITY OR WILL IT BE ANOTHER FORUM FOR COMPETING GROUPS AND PERSONALITIES TO AIR THEIR DISPUTES IN PUBLIC? D) GIVEN THE COMPETING INFLUENCES AT WORK AMONG THE PALESTINIANS, WHAT WILL BE THE LIFE SPAN OF ANY AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE NEXT PNC? 19. WHILE ALGERIA RETAINS ITS SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING ALL PALESTINIAN FACTIONS TO ALGIERS IN LATE APRIL, ITS LONG-TERM GOAL REMAINS RESTORING A PLO THAT CAN PRESENT A FACADE OF UNITY, SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM, AND ATTEND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AS A COHESIVE GROUP. AT THE SAME TIME, ALGERIA WILL TRY TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION AS MEDIATOR AND DISINTERESTED FRIEND AND TEACHER TO ALL PALESTINIAN FACTIONS--A TEACHER WHOSE PRESTIGE AND EXPERIENCE SHOULD GUIDE RELUCTANT AND REBELLIOUS STUDENTS ON THE CORRECT REVOLUTIONARY PATH. IF ONLY THEY WOULD LISTEN. JOHNSTONE " "159","4/23/1987 4:31","87STATE121525","Secretary of State","UNCLASSIFIED","","O 230431Z APR 87 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE ","UNCLAS STATE 121525 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE HAGUE FOR CROOK E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: IR, US, NL, PREL SUBJECT: LATEST RAFSANJANI STATEMENTS 1. WE ARE NOW AWARE OF AT LEAST TWO RAFSANJANI STATEMENTS, ASSERTING LINKAGE BETWEEN THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN LEBANON AND THE DISPOSITION OF IRANIAN ASSETS, THAT HAVE APPEARED IN THE PRESS SINCE THE APRIL 3 U.S. LETTER TO BOCKSTIEGEL: THE INTERVIEW BY A CORRESPONDENT FROM KEVAN HAVA\'I; AND THE RAFSANJANI PRESS CONFERENCE REPORTED BY IRNA ON APRIL 20. AS NEAR AS WE CAN TELL, THE LATTER PRESS CONFERENCE IS PROBABLY THE SOURCE FOR THE ARTICLES IN THE WASHINGTON POST AND THE HERALD-TRIBUNE. (YOU SHOULD ALREADY HAVE RECEIVED THESE STATEMENTS BY DATAFAX.) 2. THIS PERSISTENT REPETITION BY RAFSANJANI OF THE HOSTAGE THEME MAKES IT NECESSARY FOR US AGAIN TO PUT ON RECORD WITH THE TRIBUNAL THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF SUCH STATEMENTS, AND THE NECESSITY FOR THE TRIBUNAL TO ADDRESS THE HOSTAGE ISSUE ADEQUATELY IN ITS FINAL ORDER. THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING TO THE TRIBUNAL, IN WHATEVER WRITTEN FORM YOU JUDGE MOST APPROPRIATE. 3. BEGIN TEXT. THE UNITED STATES REGRETS THAT IT IS AGAIN NECESSARY TO CALL THE ATTENTION OF THE TRIBUNAL TO FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS ISSUED BY A HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH CLEARLY SUGGEST THAT IRAN WILL WITHHOLD ITS ASSISTANCE IN SECURING THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN LEBANON UNTIL THE RELEASE TO IRAN OF ASSETS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF VARIOUS TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS. THESE STATEMENTS (COPIES ATTACHED) WERE MADE BY MAJLIS SPEAKER RAFSANJANI AND APPEARED IN THE PRESS DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL, MAKING A TOTAL OF AT LEAST THREE SUCH STATEMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE LATEST ASSURANCES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN THAT NO SUCH LINKAGE TO THE ILLEGAL DETENTION OF HOSTAGES EXISTS. THE REPEATED REITERATION OF SUCH STATEMENTS BY HIGH-LEVEL IRANIAN OFFICIALS POINTS EVEN MORE STRONGLY TO THE CLEAR NEED FOR THE GRANTING OF THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN THIS REGARD BY THE UNITED STATES IN ITS SUBMISSION OF 19 MARCH. SUCH LINKAGE IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AND, WE BELIEVE, IS AN AFFRONT TO THE TRIBUNAL AS WELL. END TEXT. SHULTZ " "160","5/21/1987 5:12","87STATE154739","Secretary of State","UNCLASSIFIED","","P 210512Z MAY 87 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY ","UNCLAS STATE 154739 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: MASS, SA, US SUBJECT: U.S. PLANS ARMS SALE TO SAUDIS 1. TEXT OF MAY 16 WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE \"U.S. PLANS ARMS SALE TO SAUDIS, WHITE HOUSE TO NOTIFY CONGRESS OF $500 MILLION DEAL\" BY BARRY SCHWEID OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS FOLLOWS. 2. BEGIN TEXT: 3. IN A MOVE CERTAIN TO TOUCH OFF HEATED DEBATE, THE WHITE HOUSE WILL NOTIFY CONGRESS NEXT WEEK THAT IT INTENDS TO SELL $500 MILLION WORTH OF F15 FIGHTER PLANES TO SAUDI ARABIA, REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES SAID YESTERDAY. CONGRESS, WHICH HAS THE AUTHORITY TO VETO THE PURCHASE, IS LKELY TO TAKE A CLOSE LOOK AT THE PLAN IN LIGHT OF REPORTS THAT THE SAUDIS SECRETLY PROVIDED FINANCIAL HELP TO THE NICARAGUAN CONTRAS. THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTED THIS WEEK THAT SOURCES CLOSE TO THE SAUDIS ESTIMATE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTRAS AT $23 MILLION IN 1984-85. SOME MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR HAVE ESTIMATED SAUDI CONTRIBUTIONS TO HAVE BEEN AS HIGH AS $32.5 MILLION. ISRAEL\'S SUPPORTERS, MEANWHILE, ARE BOUND TO CHALLENGE THE DEAL AS POSING A POTENTIAL MILITARY DANGER. THE SOURCES, WHO DEMANDED ANONYMITY, SAID THE PLANES--12 TO 15, DEPENDING ON ULTIMATE PRODUCTION COSTS--WOULD BE KEPT IN THE UNITED STATES AND PROVIDED TO THE ARAB KINGDOM ONLY TO REPLACE JETS LOST IN ACCIDENTS. \"IT IS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION AS ATTRITION REPLACEMENTS,\" ONE OFFICIAL SAID. AFTER BITTER DEBATE IN CONGRESS, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IN 1978 WON APPROVAL FOR THE SALE OF 62 JETS TO THE SAUDIS. FOUR OR FIVE PLANES HAVE SINCE BEEN LOST IN ACCIDENTS, AND THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO KEEP THE LEVEL UP TO 60, AN OFFICIA1 SAID. CONGRESS WAS TO HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED THIS WEEK. BUT THE PLAN WAS \"SHORT-CIRCUITED\" BY THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, THE SOURCES SAID. SAUDI AID TO THE CONTRAS CAME AT A CRITICAL PERIOD WHEN CONGRESS HAD PROHIBITED U.S. MILITARY ASISTANCE TO THE REBELS. IN THE PERIOD, THE ADMINITRATION SHIPPED 400 STINGER ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA AND ALSO SAID IT WAS CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL TO SELL $12 BILLION IN ADDITIONAL ARMS TO THE OIL-RICH KINGDOM. WHILE CONGRESS WAS UNAWARE OF THE SECRET CONTRA AID, OPPONENTS THREATENED TO REJECT THE PURCHASES--AND WITH ENOUGH VOTES TO OVERRIDE A VETO BY PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE SCALED DOWN THE DEAL, BUT THE SAUDIS WITHDREW THE ENTIRE PACKAGE. THEIR NEW REQUEST INCLUDES BOTH F15C AND F15D JETS, WHICH ARE PRODUCED BY MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. THE SAUDIS INITIALLY BOUGHT 47 F15CS AND 15 F15DS. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS IS DUE TO END PRODUCTION OF BOTH TYPES OF AIRPLANES IN MAY 1988. IT WILL TURN OUT THE MORE POTENT F15E, WHICH AN OFFICAL DESCIBED AS A \"STRIKE AIRCRAFT\" THAT THE ADMINISTRAT1ON WOULD NOT SELL TO THE SAUDIS AND CONGRESS WOULD NOT APPROVE. THE OFFICIAL, WHO DECLINED TO BE IDENTIFIED, ESTIMATED THAT IT WOULD TAKE THREE YEARS TO MANUFACTURE THE FIRST OF THE REPLACEMENT JETS. THE FIRST GROUP OF FOUR OR FIVE-,OR MORE IF OTHER EXISTING PLANES ARE LOST--WOULD BE SENT TO SAUDI ARABIA THEN, WHILE THE OTHERS WOULD BE KEPT IN THE UNITED STATES TO BE SUPPLIED AS NEEDED. 4. END TEXT. SHULTZ " "161","6/5/1987 14:00","87DAMASCUS3020","Embassy Damascus","SECRET","","O 051400Z JUN 87 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0018 ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 03020 TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, SY SUBJECT: SYRIAN CLOSURE OF ABU NIDAL OFFICES REF: A) FBIS AMMAN JO 040709Z JUN 87 -- B) LINO/GREENE TELECON JUNE 4, 1987 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP SOME -- BUT NOT YET CONCLUSIVE -- CONFIRMATION THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN STEPS TO END THE \"OFFICIAL\" ABU NIDAL PRESENCE IN SYRIA. THE THREE OFFICES IN DAMASCUS APPEAR CLOSED. WHILE THE SYRIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ACTION MAY WELL BE ANGER OVER ABU NIDAL\'S DALLIANCE WITH ARAFAT IN ALGIERS, THE REAL REASONS SEEM TO BE ANO-SYRIAN CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON AND WESTERN PRESSURES. END SUMMARY. 3. POST HAS BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH SOME, BUT AS YET INCONCLUSIVE, CONFIRMATION OF \"JORDAN TIMES\" ARTICLE (REFTEL A) THAT SARG HAS FINALLY MOVED TO END THE ANO PRESENCE IN SYRIA. DATT HAS SURVEYED THE THREE IDENTIFIED ABU NIDAL OFFICES IN DAMASCUS. AS OF JUNE 4, SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OUTSIDE THE PRESS OFFICE AND THE ANO HEADQUARTERS IN DAMASCUS PROPER HAVE BEEN REMOVED (THESE CAMERAS HAD BEEN PRESENT JUNE 3). THE GUARD FORCE NORMALLY PRESENT OUTSIDE BOTH LOCATIONS HAD ALSO BEEN MOVED AS OF JUNE 4, AND REGULAR SYRIAN POLICE CARS, NEVER PREVIOUSLY SEEN AT THE HEADQUARTERS LOCATION, WERE PARKED IN FRONT. FOLLOW-UP SURVEY ON JUNE 5 FOUND THE OFFICES APPARENTLY DESERTED. LOCAL AP CORRESPONDENT TOLD POLOFF JUNE 4 THAT HE HAD VISITED THE ANO HEADQUARTERS THAT MORNING AND FOUND THEM OCCUPIED BY \"ALI DUBA\'S MEN\" WHO WERE TEARING POSTERS OFF THE WALLS. 4. AP CORRESPONDENT INSISTS THE STORY IS TRUE, AND THAT THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN ORDERED TO VACATE SYRIA COMPLETELY. HE ASSERTS ALSO THAT THE TRAINING CAMPS IN THE BIQA\' HAVE BEEN CLOSED. (THE SOURCE REMINDED US THAT HE HAD MADE THE LATTER CLAIM A WEEK AGO.) PNSF CHAIRMAN KHALID AL-FAHOUM ALSO CONFIRMED THIS STORY TO THE ITALIAN COUNSELOR ON THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 4, AS DID A \"FORMER SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL\" TO A NUMBER OF OTHER WESTERN DIPLOMATS (WEST GERMAN CHARGE SAYS THE SOURCE WAS MOHAMMED SAKARIAN ISMAIL). 5. ON JUNE 4 AND 5, MISSION OFFICERS CALLED ON AUSTRIAN, BRITISH, DUTCH, FRENCH, GERMAN, CANADIAN, SPANISH, ITALIAN AND YUGOSLAV COLLEAGUES. DATT CONTACTED HIS CHINESE AND AUSTRALIAN COUNTERPARTS. THE AUSTRIANS, SPANISH, AND ITALIANS CLAIM TO HAVE SOME CONFIRMATION. ALL OUR CONTACTS PROMISED TO FOLLOW UP WITH LOCAL PALESTINIAN SOURCES OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND TO GET BACK TO US. (ARAB EMBASSIES IN DAMASCUS WERE CLOSED FRIDAY, JUNE 5. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH THEM OVER THE WEEKEND.) 6. COMMENT: PHYSICALLY, THE ANO OFFICES APPEAR SHUT DOWN. THEIR STATUS HAS GREATLY CHANGED FROM THE DATT\'S LAST RECONNAISSANCE. THE SYRIANS HAVE BEEN TELLING US, AS WELL AS THE REST OF OUR DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES, THAT ABU NIDAL\'S ORGANIZATION HAD LEFT SYRIA, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FRONT OFFICES WHICH WERE MANNED BY LOW LEVEL PERSONNEL, FOR SOME TIME. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE \"JORDAN TIMES\" STORY JUNE 4, MFA EUROPEAN DIRECTOR SULAYMAN HADDAD QUIPPED THAT \"THE AMERICANS SPEND MILLIONS ON THEIR CIA AND YET THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE ABLE TO GRASP THE FACT THAT ABU NIDAL IS GONE.\" FAHOUM AND DFLP AND PFLP LEADERS HAVE ALSO BEEN INSISTING SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR THAT, OTHER THAN THE TOKEN PRESENCE OF THE OFFICES, THAT THE ANO HAD LEFT SYRIA, FIRST FOR LEBANON AND THEN TO LIBYA. 7. COMMENT CONTINUED. THE INFORMAL BUT OFFICIAL JUSTIFI CATION FOR THE FINAL SYMBOLIC GESTURE OF CLOSING THE OFFICES IS ABU NIDAL\'S DEALINGS WITH ARAFAT IN ALGIERS. ONE LOCAL SOURCE TELLS US THAT ABU NIDAL REPRESENTATIVES MISREPRESENTED THE DISCUSSIONS TO THE SYRIANS FOLLOWING THEIR DEPARTURE FROM ALGIERS. THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR POINTS OUT, HOWEVER (AND WE AGREE), THAT THE SAME JUSTIFICATION SHOULD APPLY MORE APPROPRIATELY TO THE DFLP, PFLP, PCP AND OTHERS WHO PARTICIPATED FULLY IN THE PNC. MORE LIKELY, THE SYRIANS HAVE GROWN INCREASING- LY IRRITATED BY THE ANO\'S ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO SYRIAN EFFORTS TO END THE ARMED PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND THE SYRIAN MILITARY OCCUPATION OF WEST BEIRUT. DAMASCUS, TOO, IS ANXIOUS TO RELIEVE WESTERN PRESSURE REGARDING TERRORISM AND MAY AT LAST HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF WHAT THEY INSIST IS A TOKEN POLITICAL PRESENCE IS NOT WORTH THE PRICE. LINO " "162","6/8/1987 8:18","87ISTANBUL2686","Consulate Istanbul","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 080818Z JUN 87 FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7382 AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMCONSUL IZMIR AMCONSUL ADANA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 02686 DEPT FOR NEA/NGA, INR E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PINS, IR, TU SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH FEMALE UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN PROFESSOR 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY. CONOFF SPOKE WITH A 32 YEAR OLD IRANIAN FEMALE PROFESSOR WHO TEACHES MANAGEMENT AT AL ZAHRAH UNIVERSITY AND ENGLISH LITERATZE AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY. SHE DESCRIBED CONDITIONS IN TEHRAN AND AT THE UNIVERSITY. DURING ONE VERY EMOTIONAL MOMENT SHE COMPLAINED THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION IS THE RESULT OF WESTERN INTERFERENCE IN IRANIAN INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS. END SUMMARY. 3. CONOFF SPOKE BRIEFLY WITH A 32 YEAR OLD FEMALE PROFESSOR FROM AL ZAHRAH (WOMEN\'S) UNIVERSITY IN THE VANAK NEIGHBORHOOD OF TEHRAN. SHE ALSO TEACHES AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY. SHE TEACHES 12 HOURS PER WEEK AT AL ZAHRAH THE FORMER FARAH UNIVERSITY, WHICH IS A WOMEN ONLY UNIVERSITY AND 8 HOURS PER WEEK AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY. IN TEHRAN UNIVERSITY SHE IS ONE OF 30 FEMALE FACULTY MEMBERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LITERATURE. 4. SHE SAID THAT MOST OF THE STUDENTS ENROLLED IN COURSES IN THE ENGLISH LITERATURE DEPARTMENT ARE LEARNING ENGLISH TO ENABLE THEM TO STUDY ADVANCED COURSE WORK IN OTHER FACULTIES, WHICH USE TEXTS AND RESEARCH MATERIALS PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH. ALTHOUGH THE CLASSROOMS AND LECTURE HALLS ARE CO-ED THE MALE STUDENTS SIT ON ONE SIDE OF THE ROOM AND THE FEMALE STUDENTS SIT IN A GROUP ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE. ALL FEMALE STUDENTS AND FEMALE FACULTY HAVE TO WEAR \"APPROPRIATE ISLAMIC DRESS.\" WHEN ASKED IF SHE WAS TREATED WITH RESPECT BY THE MALE STUDENTS SHE SAID THAT SHE HAS NEVER HAD A PROBLEM. 5. INFORMANT TOLD CONOFF THAT IT IS HER OPINION THAT THE MAJORITY OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN IRAN HAVE CONNECTION TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY, A CERTAIN MULLAH, OR IN SOME WAY HAVE CONVINCED OFFICIALS OF THEIR STRONG ISLAMIC BELIEFS. SHE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT MOST PEOPLE IN IRAN ARE TIRED OF THE REGIME, A COMMENT WE HAVE HEARD NUMEROUS TIMES FROM A WIDE ASSORTMENT OF PEOPLE. PEOPLE HAVE TO ACT FAITHFUL AND \"PRETEND TO FOLLOW THOSE STUPID, CRAZY MULLAHS, BUT THE MAJORITY NO LONGER BELIEVES IN THE GOVERNMENT. HOW CAN THEY WHEN THINGS ARE SO EXPENSIVE AND ALL THOSE BOYS ARE DYING IN THAT SENSELESS WAR IN BASRA.\" 6. WHEN ASKED WHY THE REGIME IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE IF SO MANY PEOPLE DISLIKE IT SHE SAID THAT EVERYONE IS AFRAID. \"IF YOU GO ALONG WITH THEM THEY WON\'T HURT YOU AND THERE IS ALWAYS SOME BENEFIT, LIKE THE STUDENTS GETTING ACCEPTED INTO UNIVERSITY.\" SHE ADDED, \"THE PEOPLE KNOW THAT IF THEY DEMONSTRATE KHOMEINI WILL KILL THEM. SHE POINTED OUT THAT THE SHAH CONTINUED TO PAY STRIKING WORKERS AND ADDED \"IF HIS TROOPS HAD KILLED A FEW THOUSAND HE WOULD STILL BE IN POWER. KHOMEINI WOULD DO THAT WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT IT. THAT\'S WHY NO ONE TRIES TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT.\" 7. SHE SAID THAT THIS YEAR APPROXIMATELY 600,000 STUDENTS WOULD TAKE PART IN THE NATION-WIDE UNIVERSITY ENTRANCE EXAMS BUT ONLY 40,000 TO 50,000 WOULD BE ACCEPTED. \"THIS AND THE WAR IS WHY YOUP HAVE SO MANY YOUNG PEOPLE OUT IN THE WAITING ROOM,\" SHE SAID. \"DO YOU BLAME THEM? IF THEY DON\'T GET ADMITTED TO A UNIVERSITY WHAT CAN THEY DO, THERE ARE NO JOBS.\" WHEN ASKED HER OPINION OF THE NIV APPLICANTS SHE SAID,\" I TOLD YOU. THERE ARE NO JOBS. FOR THE BOYS IF THEY CAN\'T GO TO SCHOOL WHAT IS LEFT? GOING TO THE MILITARY.\" 8. INFORMANT SAID THAT FEMALE UNIVERSITY FACULTY ARE PAID SALARIES EQUAL TO THAT OF MALE COUNTERPARTS AND THERE IS NO OPEN DISCRIMINATION, HOWEVER, \"THEY DO THINGS, LITTLE THINGS TO UPSET YOU.\" A FACULTY MEMBER IS ONLY ALLOWED TO TEACH 24 HOURS PER WEEK, BUT THEY TRY TO FIND EXCUSES TO KEEP WOMEN FROM CARRYING A FULL LOAD. \"HAVING HAIR EXPOSED COULD BE GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION, SUCH AS HAVING A COURSE TAKEN AWAY FROM YOUR SCHEDULE.\" SHE TOLD CONOFF THAT MOST STUDENTS ARE BIDDING THEIR TIME, HOPING THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS WILL IMPROVE BY THE TIME THEY GRADUATE. SHE BELIEVES THAT THE AVERAGE STUDENT IS WEAKER AND LESS MOTIVATED THAN IN THE PAST. \"THERE REALLY ISN\'T MUCH INCENTIVE TO EXCELL.\" 9. AFTER LENGTHY QUESTIONING SHE JOKED THAT CONOFF SHOULD TELL HER WHEN THE U.S. PLANS TO TOPPLE KHOMEINI. WE FIND IT INTERESTING THAT MANY IRANIANS INCLUDING EDUCATED AND WESTERN-ORIENTED PROFESSIONALS SUCH AS THIS PROFESSOR BELIEVE THAT THE SHAH\'S DOWNFALL WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE U.S. OR A COMBINATION OF WESTERN POWER BROKERS. WHEN CONOFF REMINDED HER THAT THERE WERE NO AMERICANS IN IRAN TO PROVIDE US INFORMATION SHE LAUGHED AND SAID, \"YOU DON\'T HAVE TO HAVE AN AMERICAN TO TELL YOU WHAT IS GOING ON; THE CIA DOESN\'T USE JUST AMERICANS. I\'M SURE THAT YOU OR SOMEONE IN YOUR GOVERNMENT KNOWS JUST AS MUCH AS RAFSANJANI AND KHOMEINI DO ABOUT MY COUNTRY.\" 10. COMMENT. IN THE IRANIAN WORLDVIEW THERE IS ALWAYS SOMEONE OR SOMETHING ELSE TO BLAME FOR ONE\'S MISFORTUNES. THIS MAY BE A RULER, A BOSS, THE WEATHER OR FATE IN GENERAL. IT IS INTERESTING, HOWEVER, THAT SO MANY IRANIANS BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. INTERESTS ARE ENHANCED BY PROLONGING THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND BY KEEPING KHOMEINI IN POWER. END COMMENT. RAU "	Success: CSV parsed	null	12,117
163	6/9/1987 22:18	87BOGOTA7890	Embassy Bogota	SECRET	[ "87BOGOTA3997" ]	P 092218Z JUN 87 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7510 INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN AMEMBASSY QUITO AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY PANAMA AMEMBASSY LIMA CIA WASHDC DIA WASHDC ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 07890 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KPRP, PINS, MILI, PTER, CO SUBJECT: THE GUERRILLA SITUATION: PREPARING FOR WAR? REF: BOGOTA 3997 1. (C) SUMMARY. COLOMBIA\'S GUERRILLA WAR HAS BEEN QUIESCENT THE LAST FEW WEEKS. THOUGH ARMED CONTACTS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GUERRILLA GROUPS AND THE MILITARY CONTINUE, THE PACE OF MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS HAS SLACKENED. THE MAIN ARENA OF CONFRONTATION HAS BEEN THE MEDIA, WHERE THE UNION PATRIOTICA (UP), POLITICAL FRONT OF THE COLOMBIAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (FARC), LEVELED CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST THE MILITARY. COLOMBIA\'S GUERRILLA GROUPS ARE IN A RETRENCHMENT PHASE: REGROUPING, FORGING ALLIANCES, AND RETHINKING STRATEGIES. THE GOC CONTINUES TO RESTRUCTURE ITS SECURITY APPARATUS AND TO AUGMENT THE ARMY\'S STRENGTH THROUGH RECRUITMENT OF VOLUNTEER UNITS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT BOTH SIDES ARE PREPARING FOR AN EVENTUAL BREAKDOWN OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE RESUMPTION OF FULL-SCALE CONFLICT. END SUMMARY. GUERRILLAS - THE PUBLIC PROFILE ------------------------------- 2. (S/NF) WAVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS BANNER: THE FARC AND THE UNION PATRIOTICA ARE THE ONE COLOMBIAN GUERRILLA GROUPING POSSESSED OF A MEDIA SENSE. IN RECENT WEEKS, THEY HAVE USED THE MEDIA TO MAKE THEIR CASE TO THE COLOMBIAN AND FOREIGN PUBLIC. THE MAJOR THRUST BY THE UP WAS A MAY 8 PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH EX-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JAIME PARDO LEAL CHARGED OVER 100 MILITARY OFFICERS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST UP MEMBERS AND ACTIVISTS (SEE BOGOTA 6456). THE UP\'S CHARGES RESULTED IN A SWIFT DENIAL AND A NAME-BY-NAME REBUTTAL BY DEFENSE MINISTER SAMUDIO. PARDO\'S THRUST WAS COMPLEMENTED BY REPORTS OF A PARIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH UP CONGRESSMAN AND EX-FARC COMANDANTE BRAULIO HERRERA DECLARED THE UP AND THE PEACE PROCESS TO BE IN DANGER OF EXTINCTION FROM ASSAULTS BY THE MILITARY AND MILITARY-SUPPORTED PARA-MILITARY GROUPS (SEE BOGOTA 7001). HERRERA\'S PARIS SOJOURN IS PROBABLY THE OPENING PHASE OF A LARGE SCALE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY FORCES. SPECIAL REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC) IS COORDINATING SUCH A CAMPAIGN WITH LEFTIST GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE. THE CAMPAIGN IS TO BE MODELED ON THOSE CONDUCTED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENTS OF EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND ARGENTINA. ANALOGY BETWEEN ARGENTINA\'S \"DIRTY WAR\" AND CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA WILL BE THE KEY THEME. THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS TO CONSTRAIN GOC ACTIONS AGAINST ANY GUERRILLA GROUP AND TO FRUSTRATE ATTEMPTS TO SECURE COUNTER-INSURGENCY SUPPORT FROM ABROAD. 3. (U) PARDO ON THE PEACE PROCESS: FOLLOWING ON THE CHARGES OF MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, THE CONSERVATIVE WEEKLY \"GUION\" PUBLISHED AN INTERVIEW WITH PARDO IN ITS MAY 27 EDITION. AFTER THE NOW-RITUAL DECLARATION OF THE UP\'S INDEPENDENCE FROM THE FARC, PARDO WENT ON TO DENOUNCE THE BARCO ADMINISTRATION\'S CONDUCT OF THE PEACE PROCESS. HE DECLARED THE PROCESS TO BE IN CRISIS BECAUSE THE GOC LACKS THE WILL TO BUILD ON THE BASE CREATED BY THE BETANCUR ADMINISTRATION. IN PARTICULAR, HE CITED THE GOC\'S REFUSAL TO NAME AN INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION COMMISSION AS PROOF OF A LACK OF INTEREST IN PEACE. \"THE GOVERNMENT,\" PARDO CONTINUED, \"HAS NOT MOVED A SINGLE FINGER TO PUT AN END TO...ARMED CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT OBSERVING THE TRUCE.\" HE ALSO CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT CONTENTION THAT THE ARMED FORCES MUST HAVE FREE ACCESS TO ANY PART OF THE COUNTRY. CHALLENGED THAT THE TREATY DID NOT CONCEDE \"INDEPENDENT REPUBLICS\" TO THE FARC, PARDO COUNTERED THAT \"THE FARC NEEDS A GEOGRAPHICAL SITE, A PIECE OF EARTH.\" 4. (U) A LETTER TO BARCO: THE UP\'S EFFORTS WERE COMPLEMENTED BY DESPATCH MAY 10 OF A LETTER FROM THE FARC COMANDANTES TO PRESIDENT BARCO. REVEALING A NEW AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT, THE FARC WARNED THAT THE FATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IS IN BARCO\'S HANDS. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE FARC DECLARED THAT THEY DID NOT SIGN A TRUCE WITH \"MILITARISM\" AND ARE READY TO JOIN \"OUR PEOPLE WHEN IT DECIDES TO RISE UP AGAINST MILITARISM.\" THE FARC\'S LETTER CONTAINS AN IMPLICIT THREAT: SHOULD BARCO BECOME \"MILITARISTIC\" IN THE FARC\'S EYES, THE GUERRILLAS WILL HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO ABANDON THE PEACE PROCESS AND RESUME OPERATIONS. GUERRILLAS - BEHIND THE SCENES MANEUVERING ------------------------------------------ 5. (C/NF) FARC - STIRRING FROM THE NEST: WHILE THE FARC\'S PUBLIC ORGANS ARE ENGAGED IN TARRING THEIR GOC/MILITARY OPPONENTS, THE FARC AND COLOMBIA\'S OTHER GUERRILLA ARMIES, SINGLY OR IN CONCERT, HAVE BUSIED THEMSELVES WITH REORGANIZATION, ALLIANCES, AND STRATEGIC RETHINKING. AS THE LARGEST GUERRILLA ARMY, AND THE SOLE GROUP REMAINING WITHIN THE PEACE PROCESS, THE FARC\'S ACTIVITIES COMMAND THE LION\'S SHARE OF INTEREST. RECENT REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE FARC IS REDISTRIBUTING FORCES, POSSIBLY WITH AN EYE TO READINESS IN EVENT OF AN OPEN BREAK WITH THE GOC. ONE MILITARY SOURCE REPORTS THAT FIVE ADDITIONAL FARC FRONTS ARE BEING FORMED. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS PROJECTED EXPANSION REFLECTS ADDITIONAL ARMED STRENGTH, A REDISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE STRENGTH TO COUNTER GOC INITIATIVES, OR A RESPONSE TO RIVAL GUERRILLA GROUPS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE GROWTH IN FARC STRENGTH SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS, IT FAIR TO ASSUME THAT THE NEW FRONTS REFLECT AUGMENTATION OF THE FARC\'S ARMED STRENGTH. BY CONTRAST, OTHER SPECIAL REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE FARC IS CONSOLIDATING FRONTS IN ANTICIPATION OF THE MARCH 1988 ELECTIONS. ANOTHER FACET OF THE SITUATION IS A JUNE 2 REPORT IN \"EL ESPECTADOR\", BOGOTA\'S LEADING DAILY, THAT THE FARC IS ABANDONING ITS MOUNTAIN HEADQUARTERS AT LA URIBE AND SHIFTING FORCES TO META AND GUAVIARE DEPARTMENTS. THIS REPORT REMAINS UNCONFIRMED; GOC OFFICIALS PLED IGNORANCE WHEN PRESSED BY THE MEDIA FOR CONFIRMATION. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE FARC WOULD LEAVE INACCESSIBLE LA URIBE FOR NEW AND UNHARDENED QUARTERS. ANY SHIFT OF PERSONNEL FROM LA URIBE MAY IN FACT BE TIED TO THE ACTIVATION OF NEW FRONTS. 6. (S/NF) EXTENDING A HAND TO THE EPL: WHILE CONTINUING TO SPAR WITH THE GOC ON THE PEACE PROCESS, THE FARC HAS NOT ABANDONED ITS HOPES OF DOMINATING COLOMBIA\'S GUERRILLA MOVEMENT. A MAJOR STEP IN THIS DIRECTION WAS THE APRIL 4 AGREEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE\'S LIBERATION ARMY (EPL) WHICH CALLED FOR GUERRILLA UNITY, \"DEMOCRATIC CONVERGENCE\" AND POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO COLOMBIA\'S PROBLEMS. CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT EACH SIDE SEES ADVANTAGES FLOWING FROM THE PACT. THE FARC FORESEES A NOMINAL TRUCE BETWEEN THE GOC AND THE EPL WHICH WOULD ALLOW INCREASED EPL TO INCREASE POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS CORDOBA DEPARTMENT STRONGHOLD -- AN ADVANTAGE FOR THE RADICAL LEFT. THEY ALSO VIEW THE PACT AS AN INCENTIVE FOR OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE FARC. FOR ITS PART, THE EPL SEES THE AGREEMENT AS A MEANS OF LURING THE FARC OUT OF THE PEACE PROCESS. THUS, THE AGREEMENT COULD SUCCUMB TO THE DISTRUST AND IDEOLOGICAL SQUABBLING THAT HAVE KEPT COLOMBIA\'S GUERRILLAS DIVIDED. 7. (S/NF) EXTENDING A FIST TO THE ELN: DESPITE SUCCESS IN FORGING LINKS TO THE EPL, TENSIONS BETWEEN THE FARC AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN) HAVE ESCALATED. IN PARTICULAR, THE FARC HAS ACCUSED THE ELN OF MURDERING MEMBERS OF THE FARC\'S UNION PATRIOTICA (UP) POLITICAL FRONT IN ARAUCA INTENDENCY. THE SITUATION MIRRORS THE CONFLICTING AMBITIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS IN THAT AREA. WHILE THE FARC REMAINS INTENT ON MONOPOLIZING POLITICAL POWER IN ARAUCA, AND USING THE AREA AS A RECRUITING POOL, THE ELN SEEKS TO DOMINATE THE AREA THROUGH ATTACKS ON THE OIL PIPELINE. CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE ELN DESIRES A MEETING TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. IT IS UNKNOWN IF SUCH A MEETING OCCURRED, BUT NEW DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE FARC AND THE ELN HAVE TEMPORARILY SHELVED THEIR DIFFERENCES. 8. (C) ONE FOR ALL, ALL FOR ONE: THE NEW DEVELOPMENT SUGGESTING A SUBSUMPTION OF FARC-ELN DIFFERENCES IS THE GENERAL STRIKE CALLED FOR JUNE 7-9. THIS STRIKE, DESIGNED TO PARALYZE SEVEN DEPARTMENTS OF NORTHEASTERN COLOMBIA, WAS JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE FARC, THE PEOPLE\'S LIBERATION ARMY (EPL), THE M-19, THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN), AND THE NEWLY-REACTIVATED RICARDO FRANCO FRONT (A DISSIDENT WING OF THE FARC). VICE-MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT FERNANDO BOTERO TOLD MISSION JUNE 9 THAT THE STRIKE HAS NOT ASSUMED THE DIMENSIONS ORIGINALLY FEARED. URBAN WORKERS HAVE LARGELY IGNORED CALLS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS. BOTERO ADDED THAT ABOUT 18,000 CAMPESINOS HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED UNDER DURESS BY THE GUERRILLAS, THREATENED WITH A 20,000 PESO FINE OR DEATH FOR NON-COMPLIANCE. WHILE SATISFIED THAT THE STRIKE\'S IMMEDIATE IMPACT IS MINIMAL, BOTERO COMMENTED THAT THE EVIDENT GUERRILLA COOPERATION IN FOMENTING THE CAMPESINO MARCHES IS DISTURBING (COMMENT: WE SHARE BOTERO\'S CONCERN; WHATEVER THE SUCCESS OF THE CIVIC STRIKE, ITS PLANNING POINTS TOWARD POSSIBLE GREATER COOPERATION AMONG THE GUERRILLAS.) 9. (S/NF) M-19 -- THROWING THEIR HAT IN THE RING: THE FARC IS NOT ALONE IN RETHINKING ITS POSITION AND IN RESTRUCTURING ITS FORCES. CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE LONG-UNHEARD-FROM M-19 HAS DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 1988 MAYORAL ELECTIONS. THE GROUP INTENDS TO ACT THROUGH FRONT GROUPS AND TO SEEK ALLIANCES WITH MAINSTREAM POLITICIANS AND GROUPS SUCH AS THE FARC\'S UNION PATRIOTICA. THE FARC/EPL AGREEMENT CITED IN PARAGRAPH (6) IS A PRIME MOTIVATION FOR THE M-19\'S ACTION. IN ADDITION, THE M-19 INTENDS TO FORGE CLOSER LINKS WITH THE FARC. AS WITH OTHER INTER-GUERRILLA AGREEMEMTS, SELF-INTEREST ASSUMES A COMMANDING POSITION; THE M-19 HOPES THAT CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE FARC WILL FOSTER JOINT OPERATIONS SHOULD THE FARC-GOC TRUCE COLLAPSE. IN OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, THE M-19 IS CREATING NEW URBAN TERRORIST UNITS IN COLOMBIA\'S MAJOR CITIES, AND HAS BEGUN JOINT TRAINING WITH THE EPL TO REBUILD ITS DEPLETED STRENGTH ALONG THE CARIBBEAN COAST. 10. (S/NF) ELN - PULSO FIRME Y MANO TENDIDA: IN ADDITION, THE ELN IS NEARING COMPLETION OF A MAJOR REORGANIZATION OF ITS BOGOTA UNITS. FORMERLY LARGELY AUTONOMOUS, THESE UNITS WILL NOW BE SUBJECT TO THE ELN\'S NATIONAL DIRECTORATE. GIVEN THE ELN\'S REPUTATION FOR DISCIPLINE, FUTURE ELN ACTIONS IN BOGOTA MAY SEEK TO HAVE AN IMPACT SIMILAR TO THEIR PIPELINE ATTACKS IN ARAUCA. REGARDING THE PIPELINE, ON JUNE 1, THE ELN PROPOSED TO THE GOC A CESSATION OF PIPELINE ATTACKS, PROVIDED THE GOC MET SEVERAL ELN DEMANDS REGARDING PETROLEUM EXTRACTION AND EXPORT (SEE BOGOTA 7451). THESE DEMANDS WERE ROUNDLY REJECTED BY RECONCILIATION ADVISOR CARLOS OSSA ESCOBAR, WHO DECLARED THAT THE GOC WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ITS ENERGY POLICY \"WITH AN ARMED MINORITY INTENT ON ATTACKING THE NATIONAL PATRIMONY.\" THE GOVERNMENT - RESTRUCTURING FOR CONFLICT ------------------------------------------- 11. (C/NF) MILITARY GROWTH: GUERRILLA EFFORTS AT RESTRUCTURING HAVE THEIR PARALLEL ON THE GOVERNMENT SIDE. THOUGH PRESIDENT BARCO REITERATED TO VISITING GENERAL GALVIN (SEE BOGOTA 7463) HIS BELIEF THAT HIS REHABILITATION PLAN WILL SAP MUCH OF THE FARC\'S STRENGTH, HE REMAINS INTENT ON EXPANDING THE SIZE, MOBILITY, AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE ARMED FORCES. BARCO BELIEVES (COMMENT: WE AGREE) THAT THE ARMED FORCES ARE NOT NOW IN A POSITION TO TAKE ON A FULLY-ACTIVE FARC. HOWEVER, HIS RECENT COMMENTS SUGGEST THAT ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS ARE BRAKING THE PACE OF ARMY EXPANSION. IN A JUNE 2 SPEECH AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY, BARCO STATED THAT HIS GOVERMMENT WOULD PROVIDE THE \"BASIC ELEMENTS\" NEEDED BY THE ARMY, BUT ONLY \"TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE.\" WHATEVER THE REALITY OF BUDGET LIMITATIONS, THE COLOMBIANS HAVE DECIDED TO PURCHASE U.S.-MADE TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS AT A COST OF $36 MILLION, THOUGH DELIVERY OF THE FIRST UNIT WILL NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL LATE 1987. IN ADDITION, THE ARMY HAS BEEN RECRUITING SOME 2,000 DISCHARGED SOLDIERS FOR SERVICE IN SPECIAL VOLUNTEER COMPANIES. THESE UNITS ARE HIGHLY RATED DUE TO THE MEN\'S PRIOR EXPERIENCE, AND HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN CONTESTED AREAS SUCH AS CAQUETA DEPARTMENT. RECRUITMENT OF ADDITIONAL VOLUNTEER UNITS IS EXPECTED. 12. (U) SECURITY RESTRUCTURING: AS A FURTHER STEP IN COMBATTING THE THREAT POSED BY THE GUERRILLAS AND THE EROSION OF PUBLIC ORDER, THE COUNTRY\'S PRINCIPAL INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANS HAVE BEGUN MAJOR REORGANIZATIONS. THE NATIONAL POLICE ANNOUNCED JUNE 2 THE ACTIVATION OF 30 INTELLIGENCE \"BRIGADES\" DESIGNED TO DETECT URBAN ACTIVITIES BY GUERRILLA GROUPS, BE THEY MILITARY OR POLITICAL IN NATURE. FOR ITS PART, THE ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS - COLOMBIAN FBI) HAS CREATED THREE NEW COMMANDS DEDICATED TO SECURITY, EXPLOSIVES AND COUNTER-TERRORISM, AS WELL AS INTELLIGENCE CENTERS IN BOGOTA, CALI, MEDELLIN, AND CUCUTA. ACCORDING TO DAS COMMANDER GENERAL MAZA, ALL UNITS ARE DESIGNED TO COUNTER THE WAVE OF CRIMINALITY, TERRORISM, AND ARMED SUBVERSION CONFRONTING COLOMBIA. PROGNOSIS --------- 13. (C) AS INDICATED IN MISSION\'S LAST ASSESSMENT OF COLOMBIA\'S GUERRILLA SITUATION (REFTEL), THE LEVEL OF CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA IS EXPECTED TO GROW DURING 1987. THE STEPS BEING TAKEN BY BOTH THE GOC AND THE VARIOUS GUERRILLA GROUPS REFLECT THAT EXPECTATION. THE ACTIVE GUERRILLA GROUPS APPEAR INTENT ON STRIKING THE GOC ANEW ONCE REDEPLOYMENT AND RETRAINING ARE ACCOMPLISHED. HOWEVER, THE MAJOR DANGER TO COLOMBIAN INSTITUTIONS AND U.S. INTERESTS HERE LIES IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE FARC. EVOLUTION OF EVENTS, OF COURSE, WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE FARC FORESEES PROSPECTS OF ITS UNION PATRIOTICA POLITICAL FRONT IN THE MARCH 1988 POPULAR ELECTIONS FOR MAYORS. CURRENT PROJECTIONS SUGGEST THE UP WILL DO FAIRLY WELL IN SOME ISOLATED RURAL AREAS, AND MAY ELECT UP TO EIGHTY MAYORS (OUT OF OVER 1,000), ALL IN RELATIVELY SMALL TOWNS. BASED ON THIS EXPECTATION, MOST OBSERVERS HERE THINK THE FARC WILL BE VERY RELUCTANT TO FORMALLY BREAK THE TRUCE BEFORE NEXT MARCH -- ALTHOUGH THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE MAY RISE WITHOUT ANY DECLARATION. BEFORE OR AFTER MARCH, THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE EVENTS IS WIDE: THE FARC IN OPEN WARFARE, OR STILL-NOMINAL ADHERENCE TO THE PEACE ACCORDS; THE UP LEAVING THE CONGRESS, OR STAYING TO USE IT AS A PLATFORM TO DENOUNCE THE GOVERNMENT. BUT IN OUR JUDGEMENT ALL THESE SCENARIOS WILL HAVE ONE COMMON FACTOR: HEIGHTENED VIOLENCE AND INCREASED THREAT TO COLOMBIA\'S INSTITUTIONS AND U.S. INTERESTS. GILLESPIE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	24,542
164	6/10/1987 13:16	87DAMASCUS3087	Embassy Damascus	SECRET	[ "87DAMASCUS3020", "87DAMASCUS3026" ]	O 101316Z JUN 87 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0077 ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 03087 TERREP EXCLUSIVE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, PREL, SY, US, LE SUBJECT: SYRIAN EXPULSION OF THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION REF: A) DAMASCUS 3020, B) DAMASCUS 3026 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: EVERY SOURCE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FOLLOW UP WITH CONCERNING ABU NIDAL\'S EXPULSION FROM SYRIA HAS CONFIRMED THE STORY IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. NO ONE, HOWEVER, CAN SAY AUTHORITATIVELY THAT THE SYRIAN BAN ON THE ANO HAS EXTENDED TO THE CAMPS IN THE BIQA\' VALLEY. END SUMMARY. 3. POST HAS DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FOLLOW UP INITIAL REPORTS THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAS EXPELLED THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION FROM ITS TERRITORY. EVERY SOURCE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTACT IN THE PAST TWO DAYS HAS SAID THE SAME THING: THE ANO IS GONE. 4. POLOFF SPOKE WITH LEBANESE BA\'TH PARTY LEADER QANSUH JUNE 7 WHO STATED UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE EXPELLED THE ANO. QANSUH SAID QADHAFI HAD SENT A SENIOR EMISSARY TO GET THE EXPULSION ORDER REVERSED OR DELAYED, BUT ASAD HAD REJECTED THE APPEAL. MICHEL SAMAHA TOLD POLOFF THE SAME DAY THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM MEETINGS WITH KHADDAM, SHARA\', AND KHOULI, ALL OF WHOM CONFIRMED THE ANO HAD BEEN OUSTED, ADDING THAT THIS WAS A POLITICAL DECISION TAKEN \"A MONTH AGO\" BUT EXECUTED AT A MOMENT (JUST BEFORE THE VENICE SUMMIT) TO MAXIMIZE ITS PROPAGANDA VALUE IN THE WEST. 5. AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE TALKED WITH PNSF CHAIRMAN KHALID AL-FAHOUM, PNSF INDEPENDENT SHAHABI, AND A MEMBER OF THE PFLP POLITBURO. ALL THREE PALESTINIAN SOURCES TOLD THE AUSTRALIANS PRACTICALLY THE SAME THING: ABU NIDAL IS OUT. THE ONE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE THREE PALESTINIANS WAS THAT FAHOUM INDICATED THAT A FEW ANO MEMBERS REMAIN IN DAMASCUS TAKING CARE OF LAST MINUTE TRANSPORTATION DETAILS, BUT THAT THEY TOO WILL BE GONE BY FRIDAY, JUNE 15. THE OTHER SOURCES SAID THOSE ANO MEMBERS NOT HOLDING SYRIAN DOCUMENTATION WERE ALREADY GONE. THE AUSTRALIANS\' PALESTINIAN CONTACTS ELABORATED ON THE QUESTION OF \"SYRIAN DOCUMENTATION.\" THOSE ANO MEMBERS WHO HOLD THE PALESTINIAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS NORMALLY ISSUED BY THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT TO PALESTINIANS ARE PERMITTED TO STAY. THESE ARE BASICALLY REFUGEES WHO ARRIVED IN SYRIA IN 1948 AND THEIR CHILDREN WHO WERE BORN IN SYRIA. PERMISSION TO STAY APPARENTLY DOES NOT EXTEND TO ANO MEMBERS WHO HAVE RECEIVED SYRIAN PASSPORTS IN THE COURSE OF THEIR ANO \"DUTIES.\" THOSE ANO MEMBERS WHO DO REMAIN ARE ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN ANO ACTIVITIES. THEY WILL LIKELY BE CLOSELY WATCHED AND, IF ARRESTED FOR ANY VIOLATIONS, WILL BE TREATED AS ORDINARY SYRIAN CITIZENS. THESE PALESTINIAN SOURCES, FINALLY, SUGGEST THE REASONS FOR THE SARG\'S DECISION RELATE TO THE DESIRE TO RELIEVE WESTERN PRESSURES REGARDING TERRORISM AS WELL AS REFLECT SYRIAN WRATH OVER ABU NIDAL\'S MEETING WITH FATAH LEADERS IN ALGIERS. 6. YUGOSLAV DCM REPORTED THAT TWO \"RESPONSIBLE\" PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS (WHOM HE OTHERWISE DECLINED TO IDENTIFY), HAVE ALSO INSISTED THE ANO HAS LEFT SYRIA. LIKE THE AUSTRALIANS\' SOURCES, THE YUGOSLAV\'S CONTACTS SAY THAT MOST HAVE GONE DIRECTLY TO LIBYA, WITH A FEW TO ALGIERS. THE YUGOSLAV TOLD US THAT HIS SOURCES SAY THE REAL REASON FOR THE SARG\'S IMMEDIATE WRATH WAS THAT SYRIA INTELLIGENCE HAD \"CAUGHT\" ANO OPERATIVES \"SPYING\" ON SYRIA. 7. THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAS ALSO TOLD US THAT RELIABLE PALESTINIAN CONTACTS HAVE CONFIRMED THE ANO\'S OUSTER AND DEPARTURE. 8. COMMENT: EVERY SIGN HERE IS THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERN- MENT FINALLY HAS TAKEN THE \"DIFFICULT STEP\" TO ELIMINATE THE ANO PRESENCE IN DAMASCUS. CERTAINLY A SIGNIFICANT MOTIVATION HAS BEEN THE DESIRE AND NEED TO ALLEVIATE WESTERN PRESSURES AND SANCTIONS. SEVERAL SYRIAN AND LEBANESE CONTACTS HAVE ALL BUT PLEADED THAT AMERICA MUST NOW RESPOND TO ASAD\'S \"GESTURE\" BY RETURNING THE U.S. AMBASSADOR. THE PALESTINIANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE IMPORTANCE OF WESTERN PRESSURES, INSIST THAT DAMASCUS HAD COMPELLING REASONS OF ITS OWN FOR SHUTTING DOWN ABU NIDAL WHICH WILL STAND UP TO ARAB SCRUTINY. THEY POINT OUT, TOO, THAT THE BULK OF THE ANO OPERATIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN SHIFTED OUT OF SYRIA OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS TO ESCAPE INCREASINGLY ONEROUS SYRIAN SUPERVISION AND RESTRICTIONS AND IN THE FACE OF SYRIA\'S UNRELENTING PRESSURE ON ALL THE PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING THE ANO, IN THE CAMPS\' WAR. 9. COMMENT CONTINUED: WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO COME UP WITH CONFIRMABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SYRIAN DECISION TO SEVER TIES WITH ABU NIDAL HAS EXTENDED TO THE TRAINING CAMPS IN THE SYRIAN OCCUPIED BIQA\' VALLEY. AT THE SAME TIME, NO ONE SAYS THEY ARE STILL IN OPERATION EITHER. A \"SOMETIMES RELIABLE\" JOURNALIST INSISTS THAT THE BIQA\' CAMPS HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR SOME TIME, AND OFFERED TO ARRANGE FOR DAMASCUS POLOFF TO VISIT THE CAMPS WITH SYRIAN MILITARY ESCORT. SAMAHA VENTURED WHAT HE ADMITTED WAS A GUESS THAT THEY HAD BEEN OR WOULD BE CLOSED. NO ONE ELSE CLAIMS TO KNOW. THE YUGOSLAV DCM HAS TOLD US THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO GET INFORMATION TO DATE FROM HIS PALESTINIAN CONTACTS, BUT WAS CERTAIN HE WOULD HAVE SOMETHING \"IN A WEEK OR SO.\" POST WILL KEEP TRYING. LINO "	Success: CSV parsed	null	24,853
165	7/1/1987 15:54	87AMMAN7695	Embassy Amman	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "87AMMAN6461" ]	O 011554Z JUL 87 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2346 INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY TUNIS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 07695 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PTER, KPAL, PLO, JO, SY SUBJECT: SYRIAN RELATIONS WITH ABU NIDAL AND THE PLO REF: AMMAN 6461 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. WE SPOKE ON JUNE 30 WITH JORDAN TIMES REPORTER LAMIS ANDONI (STRICTLY PROTECT), AUTHOR OF AN ARTICLE PRINTED ON JUNE 4 IN THE JORDAN TIMES THAT BROKE THE NEWS OF SYRIA\'S CLOSURE OF THE DAMASCUS OFFICES OF THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION. ANDONI IS ONE OF THE TOP ARAB REPORTERS OF PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS; SHE IS WELL CONNECTED WITH A WIDE RANGE OF SOURCES IN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT, INCLUDING IN FATAH, THE PFLP, AND THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION. 3. ANDONI PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL DETAILS ABOUT SYRIAN RELATIONS WITH THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION: - THE SOURCES FOR HER STORY IN THE JORDAN TIMES, LABELED IN THE ARTICLE AS \"PALESTINIAN,\" INCLUDED MEMBERS OF FATAH, THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION, AND \"OTHERS\" (WHICH WE ASSUME MEANS PFLP). - THE ABU NIDAL SOURCES TOLD ANDONI THAT THEY REALIZED THEIR OFFICES IN DAMASCUS WERE UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS THERE, SPECIFICALLY THE AMERICANS. - FURTHERMORE, THE ABU NIDAL SOURCES SAID THAT THEY REALIZED DIPLOMATS IN SYRIA WOULD \"DISBELIEVE\" ACCOUNTS THAT SYRIA SEVERED ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ABU NIDAL, BECAUSE OF THEIR PRESUMPTION THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS MORE INTIMATE THAN IN FACT IT WAS. - THE ABU NIDAL SOURCES INSIST THAT THE CUT IS REAL; ANDONI BELIEVES THAT THIS IS THE RESULT OF SYRIAN SPONSORED ATTACKS ON THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN LEBANON, WHICH ABU NIDAL JOINED IN DEFENDING, AND A FEELING BY THE ABU NIDAL RANK AND FILE THAT THE MOVEMENT SHOULD BECOME CLOSER TO THE PLO AS A WHOLE. 4. ON SYRIAN RELATIONS WITH THE PLO, SPECIFICALLY FATAH, ANDONI SAID THAT RECENT SYRIAN-FATAH MEETINGS HAVE BEEN UNPRODUCTIVE. SHE CONFIRMED THAT PLO \"FOREIGN MINISTER\" QADDUMI HAD MET WITH SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SHARA\' IN BRIONI IN EARLY JUNE, FOLLOWED BY MEETINGS BETWEEN FATAH SECURITY CHIEF ABU AL-HUL WITH TWO SENIOR SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, MOHAMMAD NASSIF AND ADNAN RAM HAMDANI, IN CYPRUS. THE QADDUMI MEETING WITH SHARA\' FOCUSED ON BROADER SYRIAN-PLO RELATIONS, WHILE THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS\' MEETING FOCUSED ON LEBANON. 5. ANDONI PROVIDED A COUPLE OF BIOGRAPHIC DETAILS ON ABU NIDAL SPOKESMAN ATIF ABU BAKR. ABU BAKR UNTIL NOVEMBER 1984 WAS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PLO IN EASTERN EUROPE (SHE COULD NOT REMEMBER WHETHER IT WAS BELGRADE OR PRAGUE). HE THEN DEFECTED TO THE ABU MUSA DISSIDENT ORGANIZATION AND IN EARLY 1985 JOINED THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION. 6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BOEKER "	Success: CSV parsed	null	24,971
166	7/7/1987 19:46	87STATE208025	Secretary of State	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "87ANKARA7938", "87ANKARA8068" ]	P R 071946Z JUL 87 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 208025 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PTER, TU SUBJECT: PKK PLANS AND AMERIN CASE REF: A) ANKARA 7938 B) ANKARA 8068 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT 2. REF A SUMMARIZED PRESS REPORTING THAT CODED DOCUMENTS SEIZED FROM TWO CAPTURED TERRORISTS REVEALED PKK (KURDISH LABOR PARTY) PLANS TO ATTACK, INTER ALIA, THE TURKISH/AMERICAN COMMON DEFENSE BASE IN PIRINCLIK. AS EMBASSY WILL REALIZE, PKK TARGETING OF A JOINT TURKISH/U.S. MILITARY FACILITY WOULD REPRESENT A NEW AND GRAVE MOVE BY THE PKK. (COMMENT: DEPARTMENT ASSUMES THAT THE PKK WOULD BE WELL AWARE OF THE BASE\'S U.S. CONNECTION. END COMMENT) IT WOULD ALSO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER NEIGHBORING GOVERNMENTS WERE AWARE OF AND EITHER TOLERATED OR SUPPORTED SUCH AN ATTACK. 3. DEPARTMENT IS AWARE OF THE NEED TO TREAT TURKISH PRESS REPORTS WITH GREAT CAUTION. NONETHELESS, GIVEN THE POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS MATTER, DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT U.S. MISSION ATTEMPT TO VERIFY WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS DOCUMENTARY OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF SUCH A SHIFT IN PKK TARGETING. 4. REF B REPORTED PRESS ACCOUNTS THAT THE TURKISH MILITARY COURT HAD DROPPED SPYING CHARGES AGAINST JORDANIAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE AMERIN FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING FURTHER DETAILS ASAP. SHULTZ "	Success: CSV parsed	null	25,061
167	7/9/1987 10:20	87COLOMBO4526	Embassy Colombo	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "87COLOMBO2374", "87COLOMBO4388" ]	P 091020Z JUL 87 FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3520 INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMCONSUL MADRAS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 04526 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINS, PREL, CE, IN, PHUM SUBJECT: THE LTTE FACES PROBLEMS 1. CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT. 2. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A VARIETY OF RELIABLE SOURCES THAT THE LTTE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED BY OPERATION LIBERATION BEGUN IN LATE MAY AND THAT IT HAD YET TO RECOUP ITS LOSSES. PERHAPS THE MOST DETAILED AND CREDIBLE REPORT CAME FROM LOUIS PAUL, A SENIOR EDITOR OF THE SATURDAY REVIEW, A RESPECTED JAFFNA FORTNIGHTLY WHICH MAINTAINS VERY GOOD TIES WITH THE LTTE. DCM AND POLCOUNS MET WITH PAUL, WHO WAS IN COLOMBO FOR A FEW DAYS, ON JULY 7. --------------------------------------------- ---------- THE EFFECT OF THE OFFENSIVE --------------------------------------------- ---------- 3. PAUL SAID THAT OPERATION LIBERATION WAS A REAL TURNING POINT IN THE INSURGENCY SINCE IT RESULTED IN THE ALIENATION FROM THE LTTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE JAFFNA CIVILIAN POPULATION. UNTIL THAT POINT, MOST JAFFNA CITIZENS--INCLUDING THOSE WHO DID NOT AGREE WITH LTTE AIMS OR METHODS--LOOKED UPON THE TIGERS AS PROTECTORS WHO SHIELDED THE CIVILIANS FROM THE GSL \"ARMY OF OCCUPATION.\" THE TIGERS IN MANY INSTANCES IN MAY/JUNE ABROGATED THIS ROLE: NOT ONLY DID THEY NOT PROTECT THE PEOPLE BUT SOMETIMES EVEN FAILED (BEFORE THEY THEMSELVES MELTED AWAY) TO WARN THE POPULATION WHEN THEY HAD INTELLIGENCE THAT A GSL OPERATION WAS PLANNED IN A SPECIFIC AREA. THE COMMON MAN, ACCORDING TO PAUL, DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE DISAPPEARANCE FROM THE FIELD OF THE LTTE AS BEING A STANDARD GUERRILLA TACTIC. INSTEAD HE SEES IT AS A BETRAYAL. THE RESULT HAS BEEN A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN ATTITUDES, HE CLAIMS, WITH MANY PEOPLE SHIFTING THEIR TRUST FROM THE LTTE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AS THEIR ONLY POSSIBLE \"PROTECTOR.\" NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME, PAUL SAYS, PEOPLE IN JAFFNA ARE TALKING OPENLY ABOUT ANNEXATION BY INDIA AS BEING AN ACCEPTABLE, EVEN PREFERRED, SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT CRISIS. 4. BOTH THE SIZE AND MORALE OF THE LTTE HAVE REPORTEDLY DIPPED PRECIPITIOUSLY BECAUSE OF THE OFFENSIVE. PAUL BELIEVES THAT THE LTTE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO REPLACE MUCH OF THE MUNITIONS AND EQUIPMENT IT LOST DURING THE OFFENSIVE. HE SAYS THAT TIGER MORALE REMAINS LOW. THE NUMBER OF CADRE TOO HAS DROPPED, PAUL SAID, FROM A HIGH WHICH HE PLACED AT 7,000 TO SOME 3,000 NOW. OF THAT NUMBER, HE ESTIMATED, ONLY ABOUT 500 HAD RECEIVED ANY REAL TRAINING. WHEN THE OFFENSIVE CAME, MANY SIMPLY QUIT FIGHTING BUT STAYED IN THE NORTH. A NUMBER OF YOUNG MEN HAVE LEFT NOT ONLY THE MOVEMENT BUT THE ISLAND, CROSSING TO INDIA. (EMBASSY COMMENT: SOME UNDOUBTEDLY ARE COMING SOUTH AS WELL. WE WERE TOLD JULY 7 BY A WELL-PLACED TAMIL SOURCE IN COLOMBO THAT HE WAS BUSY FINDING HOUSING AND PLACEMENT IN SCHOOLS FOR A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF TAMIL YOUTH WHO HAVE COME DOWN FROM JAFFNA PENINSULA IN RECENT DAYS.) --------------------------------------------- ----------- THE LTTE LEADERSHIP --------------------------------------------- ----------- 5. PAUL SAID THAT RECENT GSL CLAIMS OF SUCCESSES IN KILLING VARIOUS TIGER LEADERS (WHICH WE HAD QUESTIONED IN OUR LATEST WEEKLY ROUNDUP, COLOMBO 4388) ARE ESSENTIALLY CORRECT. HE SAID THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE \"DECIMATED\" THE UPPER-MIDDLE LEADERSHIP IN RECENT MONTHS AND THAT PRABHAKARAN NOW SUFFERS FROM A DEARTH OF QUALIFIED LIEUTENANTS. MAHATHAYA (THE ALIAS SIMPLY MEANS \"MR.\"), THE FORMER KILINOCHCHI AREA COMMANDER WHO WAS BROUGHT TO JAFFNA TO TAKE OVER AFTER KITTU WAS WOUNDED EARLIER THIS YEAR, IS DEFINITELY PRABHAKARAN\'S SENIOR LIEUTENANT NOW. KITTU HOWEVER CONTINUES TO REMAIN ACTIVE IN THE LTTE DESPITE SOME REPORTS HERE THAT HE HAD LEFT THE ORGANIZATION AFTER THE ATTEMPT ON HIS LIFE. (EMBASSY COMMENT: ACCORDING TO IQBAL ATHAS, A COLOMBO JOURNALIST WHO REPORTS EXTENSIVELY ON THE LTTE AND WHO HAS EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITH THEIR LEADERSHIP, MAHATHAYA\'S REAL NAME IS MAHENDRA RAJA. HE IS BETWEEN 35-40 YEARS OLD AND IS FROM VAVUNIYA IN THE WANNI AREA SOUTH OF THE PENINSULA. (SEE COLOMBO 2374 OF APRIL 9 FOR WHAT OTHER FEW DETAILS WE HAVE ON MAHATHAYA.) 6. BUT, AS WE HAVE REPORTED BEFORE, THE LTTE REMAINS A HIGHLY CENTRALIZED AND AUTHORITARIAN ORGANIZATION. PRABHAKARAN IS \"THE ONLY LEADER\" WHO COUNTS AT ALL. IF SOMETHING WERE TO HAPPEN TO HIM, PAUL SAYS, THE LTTE WOULD PROBABLY FALL APART. PRABHAKARAN REMAINS ON THE PENINSULA BUT CONTINUES TO STAY OUT OF SIGHT. HE HAS REFUSED TO SEE ANY OF THE MANY JAFFNA JOURNALISTS OR PROMINENT CITIZENS WHO HAVE ASKED TO SEE HIM IN RECENT MONTHS. PAUL COMMENTED THAT PRABHAKARAN AND PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE SHARE AT LEAST ONE WEAKNESS: \"THEY BOTH SUFFER FROM ISOLATION FROM THEIR PEOPLE.\" --------------------------------------------- ----------- PRABHAKARAN AND NEGOTIATIONS --------------------------------------------- ----------- 7. PRABHAKARAN REMAINS ABSOLUTELY UNBENDING IN HIS DEMAND FOR EELAM. PAUL SAID THAT MANY IN THE LTTE HIERARCHY, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY KITTU AND RAHIM, WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AS LONG AS IT INCLUDED THE CONCEPT OF A TAMIL \"HOMELAND.\" BUT PRABHAKARAN WOULD NOT AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND HIS IS THE ONLY LTTE VIEW WHICH MATTERS. HIS ANTIPATHY TO NEGOTIATIONS EXTENDS TO REFUSING EVEN SECRET, INDIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE GSL: ACCORDING TO PAUL, PRABHAKARAN THIS SPRING REFUSED TO SEE THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE SATURDAY REVIEW (GAMINI NAVARATNA, ONE OF THE RELATIVELY FEW SINHALESE LIVING IN JAFFNA) EVEN KNOWING THAT NAVARATNA HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE PRESIDENT TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO HIM ON J. R.\'S BEHALF. PAUL APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT A WAY WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND TO REMOVE PRABHAKARAN FROM THE SCENE IF THERE WERE TO BE ANY HOPE FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. SPAIN "	Success: CSV parsed	null	25,103
168	7/9/1987 20:03	87BOGOTA9309	Embassy Bogota	UNCLASSIFIED	[]	P 092003Z JUL 87 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8227 INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY QUITO AMEMBASSY LIMA AMEMBASSY LA PAZ USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 09309 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PINS, CO SUBJECT: FARC PUBLICLY REJECTS DISARMAMENT 1. U) SUMMARY: THE FARC GUERRILLA HIGH COMMAND ON JULY 7 PUBLICLY REJECTED \"DEMOBILIZATION OR DISARMAMENT\" FOR ITS FORCES, CLAIMING FURTHER THAT IT HAD NEVER PROMISED SUCH ACTION. END SUMMARY 2. (U) FARC-UP IN ARMS: IN A RADIO PRESS CONFERENCE JULY 7, TOP LEADERS OF THE COLOMBIAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (FARC), COLOMBIA\'S LARGEST GUERRILLA GROUP, ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD NOT DEMOBILIZE OR DISARM THEIR FORCES. FOLLOWING THE JUNE 16 CAQUETA AMBUSH, THE GOC STATED THAT ANY FURTHER SESSIONS OF THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD BE LIMITED TO DISCUSSIONS OF THESE TOPICS. FARC COMMANDERS ADDED THAT THEY HAD NEVER PROMISED DISARMAMENT: \"NEITHER AS A POLICY NOR IN RESPONSE TO THE AGREEMENTS OF LA URIBE, WAS THAT SPOKEN OF.\" FARC COMMANDER MANUEL MARULANDA, \"TIROFIJO\" (SURE-SHOT), SPOKE, AS DID HIS DEPUTY AND CHIEF IDEOLOGUE JACOBO ARENAS, AND ALFONSO CANO. THE BROADCAST REPORTEDLY ORIGINATED FROM A SOUTH BOGOTA SITE AND WAS TRANSMITTED ON VARYING FREQUENCIES. 3. (U) UNREPENTANT: THE FARC LEADERS INSISTED THEY WOULD REMAIN INSIDE THE TRUCE WITH THE GOC, BUT ADDED THAT MORE INCIDENTS LIKE THE RECENT CAQUETA AMBUSH COULD WELL OCCUR, BECAUSE OF \"MILITARY PERSECUTION.\" THEY REVEALED THAT THEY HAD SPOKEN THE SAME DAY TO THE GOC USING THE \"HOT LINE\" TELEPHONE FROM THEIR HEADQUARTERS AT LA URIBE AND HAD MADE 19 COMPLAINTS, MAINLY RELATED TO ALLEGED GOC MILITARY OPERATIONS NOW UNDERWAY AGAINST \"VARIOUS FRONTS\" OF THE FARC. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE CAQUETA INCIDENT WAS THE RESULT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, EVEN THOUGH \"FOR THE SAKE OF DISCUSSION\" THEY WERE WILLING TO USE THE WORD AMBUSH. THEY POINTED OUT THAT SIMILAR GOC-GUERRILLA INCIDENTS HAD OCCURRED UNDER THE PREVIOUS (BETANCUR) GOVERNMENT, BUT HAD BEEN OVERCOME BECAUSE THE DESIRE TO DO SO EXISTED -- INSTANCING THE AMBUSH AND DEATH OF 22 FARC GUERRILLAS IN ANTIOQUIA AT THE HANDS OF GOC MILITARY. 4. (U) STRIKE NOW; TALK LATER: FARC LEADERS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE (PRESUMABLY USING THE PATRIOTIC UNION, THE COMMUNIST-FRONT POLITICAL PARTY) A NATIONAL PROTEST STRIKE TO \"REESTABLISH THE LA URIBE ACCORDS.\" THEY COMPLAINED THAT THOSE ACCORDS HAD NEVER BEEN PROPERLY CARRIED OUT, SINCE THE \"POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS CONTEMPLATED THEREIN\" HAD NEVER BEEN CARRIED OUT. THEY INDICATED CONTINUED INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOC, BUT SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SEND A HIGH-LEVEL COMMISSION TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS; THAT THE (BETANCUR-ERA) COMMISSIONS OF DIALOGUE AND VERIFICATION SHOULD BE REESTABLISHED; THAT DIALOGUE SHOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT ON PRIOR CONDITIONS (LIKE THE GOC\'S INSISTENCE ON TALKING ABOUT DISARMAMENT); AND THAT THE \"ATMOSPHERE\" DID NOT CURRENTLY EXIST FOR TALKING ABOUT DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION. 5. (LOU) WHAT DID THE FARC PROMISE? RAFAEL PARDO, SECRETARY OF POPULAR INTEGRATION AND ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENTIAL PEACE ADVISOR CARLOS OSSA ESCOBAR, TOLD US THAT THE 1984 LA URIBE ACCORDS, AND THE 1986 RENEWAL, IMPLY DISARMAMENT, AND DIRECTED US TO THE RELEVANT ARTICLES. IN FACT, THE LANGUAGE OF THE SECTIONS HE SUGGESTED IS VAGUE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS. ARTICLE 6 OF THE 1984 ACCORD SPEAKS OF A ONE-YEAR PERIOD FOR THE FARC TO \"ORGANIZE ITSELF POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY.\" \"DURING THIS PERIOD THE GOVERNMENT WILL UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO REESTABLISH CIVIC ORDER IN THE ZONES OF VIOLENCE.\" ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1986 RENEWAL SAYS THAT THE FARC WILL PARTICIPATE IN PEACEFUL ELECTIONS \"WITHOUT PHYSICAL, MORAL OR ECONOMIC COERCION.\" ARTICLE 6 OF THE SAME TEXT CALLS ON THE FARC TO INTENSIFY ITS INCORPORATION INTO \"POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE AND PRODUCTIVE CIVIC ACTION, SO THAT WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME ITS ADHERENTS WILL PARTICIPATE IN FULL INSTITUTIONAL NORMALITY.\" COMMENT ------- 6. (LOU) THE GOC FEELS THAT PARTICIPATION IN PEACEFUL ELECTIONS WITHOUT RESORTING TO ARMED INTIMIDATION -- AND \"INCORPORATION INTO FULL INSTITUTIONAL NORMALITY\" -- ARE MEANINGLESS WITHOUT DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION. THE FARC CLAIMS TO SEE NO CONTRADICTION, AND IS LIKELY TO INSIST ON A LITERAL READING OF THE ACCORDS, WHICH DO NOT USE THE WORDS DISARMAMENT OR DEMOBILIZATION. 7. (LOU) ANOTHER STEP IN THE DECLINE OF THE TRUCE AND PEACE PROCESS. THE FARC\'S MAIN CONCERN, AS WE SEE IT, WAS PROBABLY TO SCORE POINTS IN THE ON-GOING BATTLE TO FIX BLAME FOR THAT DECLINE. GILLESPIE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	25,237
169	7/10/1987 6:05	87DAMASCUS3703	Embassy Damascus	SECRET	[ "87STATE208025" ]	R 100605Z JUL 87 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0541 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 03703 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER TU SY SUBJECT: SYRIA AND NEWS OF A \"NEW AND GRAVE MOVE BY THE PKK\" REF: STATE 208025 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT 2. SUMMARY: REFTEL IS DEAD RIGHT TO SEEK ALL THE INFORMATION WE CAN GET ON A PKK ATTACK ON U.S. FACILITIES IN TURKEY. IF WE FIND SYRIA IS INVOLVED, WE SHOULD PROTEST HERE STRONGLY -- BARRING TURKISH OBJECTIONS TO SUCH A U.S. MOVE. BUT WE SEE SYRIA AS LARGELY -- IF NOT ENTIRELY -- ABANDONING TERRORISM FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS. END SUMMARY. 3. PKK ATTACKS SUCH AS THE ONE ALLEGED IN THE TURKISH PRESS ACCOUNT MENTIONED IN REFTEL MUST BE PURSUED BUT WE NO LONGER REFLEXIVELY ASSUME THAT SYRIA PROMOTED OR CONDONED THE ATTACK. THE PKK HAS NOT BEEN TOTALLY UPROOTED HERE LIKE ABU NIDAL, BUT IT HAS BEEN RESTRICTED. IT WON\'T BE COMPLETELY UPROOTED, IN OUR VIEW. KURDS FORM ONE OF THE IMPORTANT MINORITIES OF SYRIA AND THE RULING ALAWIS HAVE REACHED OUT TO THEM -- AS TO MINORITY CHRISTIANS, DRUZE AND ISMAILIS -- TO FORM THE COALITION WHICH IS NEEDED TO OFFSET THE GREAT MAJORITY OF SYRIANS, WHO ARE SUNNI ARABS, THE TRADITIONAL RULING CLASS. KURDS ARE THE LEAST PROMINENT PART OF THE COALITION, PARTLY BECAUSE THEY ARE SUNNI, AND ARE IN NO WAY IN A POSITION T ASSERT A RIGHT TO CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS WHICH COMPLICAT SYRIAN RELATIONS WITH A RESURGENT TURKEY. 4. WE CONTINUE TO DOUBT THAT SYRIA IS ENCOURAGING, RATHE THAN DISCOURAGING, ANY SUCH ATTACKS. SYRIA HAS CLAMPED DOWN ON ASALA -- THE ARMENIAN BISHOP HERE SAYS IT HAS BEEN THROWN OUT -- AND HAS MOVED PKK CAMPS OUT OF THE COUNTRY. THE REASONS ARE MANY: BLOWN OPERATIONS, EUPHRATES WATER, A SKILLFUL TURKISH DIPLOMACY WHICH COMBINES THE CARROT WITH THE STICK. OPERATIONS CONTINUE, BUT IRAQI AND IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR SUCH OPERATIONS -- TO EMBARRASS SYRIA AND EMBROIL IT WITH TURKEY -- REMAIN PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR US. BUT WE MUST FOLLOW UP SUCH GOSSAMER POSSIBILITIES AS REFTEL - BUT - ALTHOUGH WE HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN RAISING KURDISH TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. FACILITIES, THE TURKS WILL NOT RPT NOT WELCOME OUR DOING SO WITH SYRIANS IN THE CASE OF PKK. THE TURKS PROBABLY WILL WANT US NOT TO GET INVOLVED AT ALL, IN FACT -- EVEN IF IT IS PROVED THAT THE ALLEGED PKK ATTACKERS CAME FROM SYRIA. 5. UNDERGIRDING THIS NOW IS OUR FEELING THAT A BROAD AND DISPARATE NUMBER OF DEVELOPMENTS -- WITH THE WEST, TURKEY, MODERATE ARABS, IRAQ, IRAN, AND THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY HAVE FORCED A TURN-AROUND HERE ON TERRORISM. EVE SYRIA\'S MUCH PUBLICIZED SUPPORT FOR ITS OWN SUICIDE BOMBERS IN SOUTH LEBANON HAS ALL BUT HALTED IN THE PAST YEAR. ASAD IS WEAK AND WANTS NO PROBLEMS WITH ISRAEL. WE DON\'T EXPECT ATTACKS ON ISRAELI TARGETS TO BE DISCARDED ENTIRELY; AFTER ALL, SMALL SCALE, DENIABLE ATTACKS ARE THE WEAPON OF THE WEAK. IN ADDITION, ASAD BELIEVES HE HAS EVERY RIGHT TO SUPPORT \"NATIONAL RESISTANCE\" INSIDE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORY AGAINST CERTAIN TARGETS. (THIS IS A PROBLEM FOR US. THE ISRAELI DEFINITION OF \"TERRORISM\" ON THE WEST BANK AND SOUTHERN LEBANON APPEARS DIFFERENT FROM OURS -- UNDERSTANDABLY, SINCE WE CHAMPION FOES OF OCCUPATION IN AFGHANISTAN, NIC- ARAGUA, ANGOLA, CAMBODIA, AND ELSEWHERE, WHILE THE ISRAELIS ARE OCCUPIERS WITH NO LARGE STAKE BEYOND THEIR BORDER.) THUS, ASAD MAY TOSS MOST PALESTINIANS OUT OF DAMASCUS, BUT HE WILL HOLD OUT A REMNANT TO FRONT FOR HIS TOTTERING POLICY OF \"ARMED CONFRONTATION\" WITH ISRAEL HE SIMILARLY WANTS TO USE HIZBALLAHIS AGAINST ISRAEL\'S OCCUPATION AND WON\'T HESITATE, WE THINK, TO TAKE ON CERTAIN LEBANESE GROUPS WHICH PUSH HIM TOO FAR; THE LEBANESE ARE WEAKER THAN SYRIA, AND USE TERRORISM EVERY DAY THEMSELVES. WITNESS KARAMI, AND MANY OTHERS OF EVERY CONFESSION. ANYWAY, SYRIA ISN\'T OUT OF THE TERRORISM BUSINESS. 6. ONLY TIME WILL TELL WHETHER ASAD HAS REDUCED TERRORISM AS MUCH AS WE THINK. \"YOU WON\'T BELIEVE ME,\" SHRUGGED ASAD, AFTER TELLING ONE AMERICAN VISITOR THAT THERE WOULD BE NO TERRORIST OPERATION RUN OUT OF SYRIA IN THE FUTURE, \"BUT IT IS USEFUL TO SAY SO, TO CLOSE THE DOSSIER.\" WE MUST BE ALERT TO EVERY INCIDENT--BUT NOT IGNORE THE SIGNS OF A BASIC CHANGE. RANSOM "	Success: CSV parsed	null	25,347
170	8/7/1987 12:11	87NEWDELHI19406	Embassy New Delhi	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "87NEWDELHI17853" ]	P 071211Z AUG 87 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9341 INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD SECDEF WASHDC USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 19406 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT--PARAS 4 AND 5) USCINCPAC AND USCINCCENT FOR POLADS E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, PGOV, IN SUBJECT: INCREASE IN SIKH TERRORISM LIKELY: NO MODERATION IN SIGHT REF: NEW DELHI 17853 1. SUMMARY: ELEVEN PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN PUNJAB STATE ON AUGUST 6 IN CONTINUING SECTARIAN STRIFE. DELHI POLICE ARE GEARING UP TO MEET THE EXPECTED INCREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY BEFORE THE INDEPENDENCE DAY CELEBRATIONS ON AUGUST 15. ACTING JATHEDAR DARSHAN SINGH RAGI\'S CONVENTION, HELD AUGUST 4, PROVIDED A FORUM FOR EXTREME AND MODERATE POINTS OF VIEW WITH NO OBVIOUS MEETING OF MINDS. END SUMMARY 2. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS ELEVEN PEOPLE--NINE OF WHOM WERE HINDUS--WERE KILLED IN TERRORIST RELATED VIOLENCE IN PUNJAB ON AUGUST 6. TWO ALLEGED TERRORISTS WERE KILLED BY SECURITY FORCES WHO RECOVERED A US MADE AUTOMATIC WEAPON FROM ONE OF THE BODIES. ALMOST ALL THE VIOLENT ACTIVITY TOOK PLACE IN AMRITSAR DISTRICT. A COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA ACTIVIST, AND GENERAL SECRETARY OF PARA MEDICAL EMPLOYEES, WAS SHOT BY THREE TERRORISTS. THE KILLERS, WHO LEFT A NOTE CLAIMING TO BE FROM THE RANJIT SINGH RANA GROUP, ESCAPED ON THE VICTIM\'S SCOOTER. 3. ACCORDING TO NEWSPAPER REPORTS, THE HOME MINISTRY \"HAS DEFINITE INFORMATION THAT THE EXTREMISTS ARE PLOTTING DO SOMETHING VERY IMPRESSIVE\" IN THE WEEK LEADING UP TO INDEPENDENCE DAY. OTHER SOURCES REPORT THAT THE TERRORISTS WILL PROBABLY STRIKE ON AUGUST 15 FOR MAXIMUM ALL-INDIA ATTENTION. DELHI POLICE, REELING FROM THEIR FAILURE TO STOP RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE POSH SOUTH DELHI HOUSING COLONIES, ARE STEPPING UP THEIR ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL POSSIBLE TERRORIST ENTRY TO THE CITY. ALL ENTRY POINTS TO THE CITY ARE NOW GUARDED THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND THE POLICE HAVE REPORTEDLY IMPROVED THEIR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS. THERE APPEARS TO BE NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT TERRORISTS WOULD NECESSARILY STRIKE IN DELHI, ALTHOUGH THAT WOULD GIVE THEM THE PUBLICITY THEY DESIRE. BOTH HARYANA AND PUNJAB GOVERNMENTS HAVE INTENSIFIED THEIR SECURITY MECHANISMS. 4. ACTING JATHEDAR DARSHAN SINGH RAGI CONTINUED HIS LONE CAMPAIGN FOR A BALANCING ACT BETWEEN THE MILITANTS AND MODERATES WITH A SIKH CONVENTION ON AUGUST 4. (SEE REFTEL) THE CONVENTION WAS A NOISY AFFAIR WITH LITTLE CONGRUENCE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE MODERATES AND MILITANTS AND AN ABUNDANCE OF RADICALISM ON THE PART OF THE MILITANTS. ALTHOUGH MANY PARTICIPANTS OF THE CONVENTION CLEARLY DEMANDED NO LESS THAN KHALISTAN, THE CONVENTION RESOLUTION CALLED FOR THE SIKHS TO BE GIVEN AN \"AREA AND POLITICAL SETUP IN NORTH INDIA WHERE SIKHS CAN EXPERIENCE THE GLOW OF FREEDOM.\" ACCORDING TO RAGI, THE DEMAND WAS A SPINOFF FROM AN ASSURANCE GIVEN TO THE SIKHS BY JAWAHARLAL NEHRU IN 1946. EXPANDING ON THE THEME, THE HIGH PRIEST EXPLAINED THAT THE PROPOSED \"SET-UP\" WOULD RESULT IN GREATER AUTONOMY FOR THE STATE. A SIKH CLAIMING TO REPRESENT SIKHS LIVING OUTSIDE PUNJAB SAID THAT SIKH DEMANDS REPRESENTED DEMANDS OF ALL INDIAN STATES AND URGED THE HIGH PRIESTS TO START A NATIONWIDE MOVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF INCREASED AUTONOMY. 5. MODERATE SPEAKERS CALLED FOR A NON-VIOLENT STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE THE AIMS OF THE SIKHS AND MOST SPEAKERS DEMANDED IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANANDAPUR SAHIB RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED FOR GREATER AUTONOMY IN THE STATES. THE MILITANTS, AS WAS EXPECTED, DEMANDED THE FORMATION OF KHALISTAN AND DECLARED THAT THE GUN WAS THE ONLY ANSWER FOR THE SIKHS. THE MILITANT GROUPS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE BABBAR KHALSA, ALL QUESTIONED THE LEADERSHIP OF THE HIGH PRIESTS BUT MADE NO MOVES TO REPLACE THEM. IN RAGI\'S CONCLUDING STATEMENT HE AGREED WITH THE MILITANTS THAT THEY COULD NOT ACHIEVE THEIR AIMS WITHOUT WEAPONS. BUT, THE HIGH PRIEST NOTED, WEAPONS MUST CHANGE WITH THE TIMES AND THE TIMES NO LONGER CALLED FOR VIOLENT STRUGGLE. THE TIME HAD COME, RAGI PLEADED, \"FOR UNITY BETWEEN THOSE WHO FAVORED THE GUN AND THOSE WHO FAVORED NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.\" 6. THE CONVENTION WAS ATTENDED BY SOME FIVE HUNDRED PARTICIPANTS ALL OF WHOM PASSED THROUGH STRICT POLICE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE ENTERING THE GOLDEN TEMPLE. MODERATE POLITICIANS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AKALI DAL (L), WERE NOT INVITED TO ATTEND THE CONVENTION. PARTICIPANTS DID INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE \"UNIFIED\" AKALI DAL, THE BABBAR KHALSA, BOTH THE MANJIT SINGH AND GURJIT SINGH FACTIONS OF THE ALL INDIA SIKH STUDENTS FEDERATION, THE BHINDRANWALE TIGERS FORCE OF KHALISTAN, THE KHALISTAN COMMANDO FORCE, THE KHALISTAN LIBERATION FORCE, THE SIKH INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL AND THE DALIT FRONT. INDIVIDUALS LAWYERS, INTELLECTUALS AND RETIRED MILITARY ALSO ATTENDED. 7. COMMENT: THE CONTINUING VIOLENCE AND THE FLAT RESULT OF DARSHAN SINGH RAGI\'S ATTEMPTS TO FORGE MILITANT-MODERATE UNITY INDICATE THAT THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE PROGRESS ON THE SIKH\'S SIDE OF THE PUNJAB DILEMMA. THE SPEECHES AT THE SIKH CONVENTION SHOW THE DEEP DIFFERENCES THAT REMAIN BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. INDEED, THE FINAL DECLARATION IS AN OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO PAPER OVER THESE DIVISIONS. DARSHAN SINGH RAGI\'S ATTEMPT WAS WELL RECEIVED BY POLITICAL OBSERVERS AND THE HIGH PRIEST REMAINS THE BEST HOPE FOR SOME SOLUTION. STREEB "	Success: CSV parsed	null	25,444
171	8/26/1987 12:46	87RIYADH8409	Embassy Riyadh	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	R 261246Z AUG 87 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5740 INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMCONSUL DHAHRAN AMCONSUL JEDDAH ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 08409 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, SA, IR SUBJECT: WAR OF WORDS BETWEEN RIYADH AND TEHRAN REF: (A)FBIS LD211453 AUG 87 AND FF. (11 SECTIONS) - (B)FBIS LD211046 AUG 87 AND FF. - (C)FBIS LD221904 AUG 87 AND FF. - (D)FBIS NC200643 AUG 87 - (E)FBIS LD221557 AUG 87 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY: THE WAR OF WORDS BETWEEN TEHRAN AND RIYADH CONTINUES AT A HIGH PITCH. FOR THE IRANIANS, THE SAUDIS ARE SERVANTS AND INSTRUMENTS FOR \"WORLD ARROGANCE\" OR THE \"GREAT SATAN\" (I.E. THE U.S.) WHO HAVE PERPETRATED A \"DIRTY, UGLY, ODIOUS AND MONSTROUS ACT\" IN MECCA AND WHO WITH THE KUWAITIS PLOTTED TO BRING THE FORCES OF THEIR U.S. MASTERS INTO THE GULF. FAHD AND THE AL SAUD ARE CONDEMNED AS LIARS, OPPRESSORS AND CORRUPT RULERS, UNWORTHY OF CONTROLLING ISLAM\'S HOLIEST SITES. THESE CHARGES ARE IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE OFFENSIVE TO THE SAUDIS. THEY HAVE RESPONDED VIGOROUSLY, AT HOME AND ABROAD. THE SAUDIS TAKE TWO LINES IN REGARD TO THE IRANIANS: A RELIGIOUS APPROACH ARGUING THAT THE IRANIANS ARE GUILTY OF \"USING ISLAM TO SERVE POLITICS\" AND THAT IRANIAN METHODS AND BEHAVIOR DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE ISLAMIC LAW; AND A POLITICAL APPROACH THAT DEPICTS THE IRANIANS AS FANATICS, COMPULSIVE LIARS, AND PROVOCATEURS WHO SYSTEMATICALLY SHOW CONTEMPT FOR INTERNATIONAL RULES AND FOR ATTEMPTS TO DEAL CIVILLY WITH THEM. IMAGES EMPHASIZED BY THE SAUDIS INCLUDE THE RIOTS AT MAKKAH (WITH IRANIAN ATTEMPTS TO SMUGGLE EXPLOSIVES IN 1986), THE ATTACKS ON EMBASSIES, AND NOW THE INHUMAN TREATMENT RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF SAUDI DIPLOMAT AL-GHAMDI. SAUDI OFFICIAL AND PRESS TREATMENT DIFFER ONLY IN TONE: OFFICIALS TEND TO PLAY THESE THEMES MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER. THE SAUDIS MAY TIRE OF THIS UNACCUSTOMED LEVEL OF RHETORIC, BUT NOT UNLESS THE IRANIANS BACK OFF. THE SAUDIS SEE THEIR POSITION AS STRONG DIPLOMATICALLY, PROPAGANDISTICALLY, AND RELIGIOUSLY, INCLUDING IN THE AREA OF POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE IRANIANS FOR NEXT YEAR\'S HAJJ. END SUMMARY. 3. THE WAR OF WORDS BETWEEN RIYADH AND TEHRAN, WHICH BEGAN IN EARNEST AFTER THE MAKKAH VIOLENCE OF JULY 31, CONTINUES TO DOMINATE THE SAUDI PRESS, ANSWERING THE VIRULENT RHETORIC ISSUING FROM TEHRAN. THE IRANIANS CALL FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE SAG AND ACCUSE THE SAG DAILY OF MASSACRING HUNDREDS OF MUSLIMS IN MAKKAH AND OF VARIOUS OTHER RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL \"CRIMES\". IRANIAN MAJLIS SPEAKER RAFSANJANI\'S FRIDAY SERMON OF AUGUST 21 (REF A) PROVIDES A COMPENDIUM OF IRAN\'S PROPAGANDA THEMES, CONSTANTLY REECHOED IN PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA. TAKING AS HIS CENTRAL THEME \"ARROGANCE VS. MEEKNESS,\" RAFSANJANI DISCUSSES FIRST THE WAR AND SECOND THE \"EXISTING SITUATION IN THE REGION.\" HE ESTABLISHES AS HIS FRAMEWORK THE PROPOSITION THAT \"WORLD ARROGANCE\"--THE U.S., PORTRAYED AS THE \"MASTERS AND SUPPORTERS OF IRAQ AND OTHER PUPPETS--HAS BEEN FORCED BY THE PROSPECT OF AN IMMINENT IRANIAN VICTORY TO ABANDON ITS PRETENSE OF NEUTRALITY AND COME OUT IN THE OPEN IN THE REGION. 4. AFTER AN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION IN KORANIC TERMS OF THE NATURE OF ARROGANCE AND U.S. ORCHESTRATION OF THE WAR AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION AND THE INEVITABLE DEFEAT OF THE U.S. AND ITS DESIGNS, RAFSANJANI MOVES ON TO DISCUSS SAUDI ARABIA. ADDRESSING THE U.S., HE SAYS \"YOU HAVE HAD TO FORCE SAUDI ARABIA TO COMMIT SUICIDE IN ORDER THAT YOU MAY ACHIEVE YOUR ENDS. THE HOUSE OF SAUD WAS MUCH TOO WISE TO SOIL ITS HANDS IN A CRIME WHICH ACCORDING TO THE IMAM\'S SAYING CAN NEVER BE CLEANSED WITH WATER OF ZAMZAM UNTIL ETERNITY. EVEN IF MR. FAHD BATHS IN THE WELL OF ZAMZAM, NOBODY COULD BELIEVE THAT THE (STAIN) COULD BE ERADICATED.\" IN CONTEXT, THIS ATTACK APPEARS TO REFER BOTH TO THE SAUDI ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE GULF AND TO THE \"MASSACRE\" IN MECCA, AND RAFSANJANI GOES ON TO DENOUNCE AT LENGTH THE U.S. PRESENCE AND TO PREDICT ITS CERTAIN FAILURE. 5. FINALLY, RAFSANJANI TAKES UP THE \"BITTER EVENT\" IN MAKKAH, DECLARING THAT \"THIS WAS SUCH A DIRTY, UGLY, ODIOUS AND MONSTROUS ACT THAT WE DO NOT THINK THAT ANY OTHER SINISTER ELEMENT SAVE THE GREAT SATAN WOULD BE PREPARED TO SOIL ITS HANDS IN THIS....\" HE CLAIMS THAT THROUGHOUT THE ISLAMIC WORLD MUSLIMS ARE PROTESTING: \"HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF YOUNG PEOPLE ARE NOW ANGRY.... THEY (THE SAUDIS) HAVE NOW SENSED THIS; THEY SUDDENLY INSTRUCTED THAT 100 OF THOSE PRINCES..INDULGING THEMSELVES IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE--RETURN TO SAUDI ARABIA.\" IN KEEPING WITH HIS THEME AND FRAMEWORK, RAFSANJANI SAYS \"THE UNITED STATES IS ITSELF RESPONSIBLE.....THE DEFEAT OF SAUDI ARABIA WOULD MEAN THE DEFEAT OF THE UNITED STATES, SINCE SAUDI ARABIA IS ITS MOST IMPORTANT BASE IN THE REGION. THE UNITED STATES HURT ITSELF AND SAUDI ARABIA BY THIS ACT.\" RAFSANJANI ALSO CHARGED THAT THE SAG WAS FUNDING A PRO-REAGAN PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN IN THE U.S. TO HELP REAGAN RECOVER POLITICAL POPULARITY LOST BECAUSE OF EVENTS IN THE GULF (REF. 3.). OTHER RECENT IRANIAN CHARGES INCLUDE THE SAG\'S IMPRISONING OF ITS OWN SOLDIERS FOR REFUSING \"TO SHOOT AT HAJJ PILGRIMS DURING THE MASSACRE IN MAKKAH.\" THE IRANIANS ALSO HAVE CALLED FOR THE SAUDIS TO RELINQUISH CONTROL OVER MAKKAH AND MEDINA, THE CENTERS OF THE ANNUAL MUSLIM PILGRIMAGE AND HAVE QUOTED HIZBOLLAH MEMBERS FROM LEBANON CALLING FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE SAG. SAUDI CONTACTS ALSO REPORT HEARING IRANIAN RADIO BROADCASTS IN ARABIC DENOUNCING THE SAG FOR RECEIVING U.S. CONGRESSMAN STEPHEN SOLARZ. 6. THE SAUDIS FOR THEIR PART HAVE LAUNCHED THEIR OWN RHETORICAL AND DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVES AGAINST IRAN. THERE HAVE BEEN DAILY ARTICLES, PHOTOGRAPHS AND EDITORIALS: FRONT PAGE DISPLAYS OF CONFISCATED WEAPONS FROM MAKKAH (MOSTLY SCISSORS, NAIL FILES AND LARGE KITCHEN KNIVES); ARTICLES ACCUSING THE IRANIANS OF WORSHIPING KHOMEINI, NOT GOD; CLAIMS TO HAVE DOCUMENTED IRANIAN INTENTIONS TO SEIZE CONTROL OF THE GRAND MOSQUE; INTERVIEWS WITH SAUDI OFFICIALS (E.G. THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY AND HIS BOSS MINISTER OF INTERIOR NAYIF); EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF IRANIAN BARBARITY IN MECCA; AND EXTENSIVE, SOMETIMES ALMOST LURID PLAY ON THE ATTACKS ON THE SAUDI, KUWAITI AND OTHER EMBASSIES IN TEHRAN. THE DEATH OF SAUDI POLITICAL ATTACHE IN TEHRAN MUSA\'ID AL-GHAMDI SUPPLIED AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE BATTLE OF RHETORIC THE PAST WEEK: IN BOLD HEADLINES AUGUST 19 THE ARABIC NEWSPAPER AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT DEMANDED THAT IRAN\'S RULERS BE PUT TO TRIAL FOR AL-GHAMDI\'S DEATH. THE IRANIANS RESPONDED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD PREVENTED AL-GHAMDI FROM RECEIVING THE MEDICAL TREATMENT HE NEEDED, WHILE THE SAUDIS SAID THE IRANIANS HAD REFUSED TO ALLOW THEM TO MEDEVAC AL-GHAMDI SO HE COULD GET THE NEEDED TREATMENT. 7. THE THEMES OF THE SAUDI OFFENSIVE, AS THEY HAVE EMERGED IN STATEMENTS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (INCLUDING IN THE EMBASSY\'S PAST THREE YEARS\' HAJJ REPORTING) ARE SEVERAL. ONE OFT-REPEATED THEME IS THAT POLITICS MUST BE CONDUCTED TO SERVE ISLAM AND ITS PRACTICES AND RITES, WHEREAS THE ABUSE OF ISLAM AND ITS RITES TO SERVE POLITICAL PURPOSES IS IMPIOUS. THIS THEME IS AMPLIFIED AND SUPPORTED BY CONSTANT ATTACKS ON IRANIAN BEHAVIOR AND ACTIONS AS NOT ONLY UNISLAMIC BUT AS IN CONTRAVENTION OF SPECIFIC ISLAMIC INJUNCTIONS. THIS HAS BEEN REPEATED IN THE STATEMENT OF THE SAUDI ULEMA (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED), IN CITATIONS OF AL-AZHAR AND ISLAMIC AUTHORITIES OF SEVERAL NATIONS, AND IN ANGRY COMMENTARIES AND EDITORIALS. KHOMEINI IS ANATHEMATIZED AS THE TRUE SPIRITUAL HEIR OF THE KILLERS OF ALI AND OF THE PROPHET\'S GRANDSON HUSSEIN, A LATTER-DAY PROPONENT OF THE ZUNJ AND OF THE QARMATI SCHISMATICS, AN EXPONENT OF DEVIATION (BID\'A), LEADING THE FAITHFUL TO HELL-FIRE. DESCRIPTIONS OF THE MECCA EVENTS BY JOURNALISTS AND SAUDI OFFICIALS (CF. REFS B AND C) DEPICT THE IRANIANS AS TRYING OVER THE YEARS, IN THE FACE OF PATIENT AND RESTRAINED SAUDI EFFORTS TO RESTRAIN THEM, TO ENGAGE DURING THE HAJJ RITES IN EXTRANEOUS ACTIVITIES HARMFUL TO THE PILGRIMAGE AND ENDANGERING TO OTHER PILGRIMS, E.G. LAST YEAR\'S EFFORT BY IRANIAN PILGRIMS TO SMUGGLE A LARGE QUANTITY OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES INTO THE KINGDOM. THIS YEAR\'S EVENTS--DEPICTED AS A WELL-PLANNED AND PREPARED PROVOCATION--ARE PAINTED AS HAVING EXHAUSTED THE SAG\'S AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD\'S PATIENCE AND FORCED THE SAG AND OTHER MUSLIMS TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT HOW TO CONTROL IRAN\'S INCORRIGIBLE AND DANGEROUS TROUBLEMAKING. IRAN\'S FANATICAL AND STUBBORN INSISTENCE ON SUCH BEHAVIOR ON THE PILGRIMAGE IS ASSOCIATED WITH ITS EQUALLY STUBBORN INSISTENCE ON CONTINUING A WAR THAT ALL RESPONSIBLE PARTIES KNOW MUST END AND THAT IS A MAJOR SOURCE OF HARM TO THE ISLAMIC WORLD. 8. IRANIAN INTRANSIGENCE, DESTRUCTIVENESS AND UNISLAMIC BEHAVIOR, IN BOTH THE MECCA EVENTS AND THE GULF WAR, ALSO FORM THE THEMES OF THE EMERGING SAUDI DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE. THROUGHOUT THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLDS IN PARTICULAR, THE SAUDIS APPEAR TO HAVE ENGAGED IN A DELUGE OF INFORMATION ACTIVITY (NOTABLY DISTRIBUTION OF VIDEOTAPES) AND ARM-TWISTING, AT TIMES MAKING A SUPPORTIVE REACTION WITH REGARD TO THE MECCA RIOTS A TOUCHSTONE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. THIS EFFORT IS DIRECTED AT TWO ENDS: TO ISOLATE IRAN IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD (AND CREATE AT LEAST THE THREAT OF SEVERE RESTRICTIONS ON IRANIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PILGIMAGE), AND TO GENERATE GREATER SUPPORT FOR UNSC AND OTHER ACTIVITIES TO PRESSURE IRAN TO END THE GULF WAR. 9. WHILE FONMIN SAUD IN TUNIS DID NOT, IN OUR UNDERSTANDING, \"CALL FOR\" THE ARABS TO BREAK RELATIONS WITH IRAN, IT IS CLEAR FROM HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS BEFORE AND DURING THE ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL THAT THIS IS AN EVENTUALITY THAT SAUD DID WANT TO RAISE AND WANTS IRAN TO BEGIN CONTEMPLATING. IN HIS ARRIVAL STATEMENT SAUD SPECIFICALLY AVERRED THAT IRAN\'S \"ACTIONS AGAINST THE EMBASSIES OF THE KINGDOM AND KUWAIT AND OTHER EMBASSIES CONFIRMS THAT THIS COUNTRY DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF DIPLOMATIC ACTION.\" (REF E). WHILE THE ROLE SAUD PLAYED IN THE MEETING WAS AGGRESSIVE (AND SAUDI DIPLOMACY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE IN THIS VEIN), WE BELIEVE THE SAUDI GOAL WAS NOT TO ACHIEVE A BREAK IN ARAB RELATIONS WITH IRAN BUT TO CREATE THE THREAT. (THE SAUDIS ARE REALISTS AND UNDERSTAND THE LINEUP OF THE PLAYERS.) THE COMBINATION OF DISCUSSING A HARSH DRAFT RESOLUTION, ADOPTING A MILDER ONE, AND DECIDING TO RECONVENE IN A MONTH GENERATES PRESSURE ON BOTH SYRIA AND IRAN. IT ALSO PROVIDES SYRIA A JUSTIFICATION FOR ACCEPTING THE RESOLUTION THAT WAS ACTUALLY PASSED, WHICH IN FACT APPEARS TO GIVE THE SAUDIS WHAT THEY WANTED FROM THIS MEETING: SUPPORT FOR ENFORCEMENT OF UNSC RES. 598, AND FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT. 10. COMMENT: THE SAUDI PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IS UNPRECEDENTED IN ITS EXPLICTNESS, ITS INTENSITY AND ITS DURATION. SINCE THE VIOLENT CLASHES IN MAKKAH BETWEEN IRANIAN PILGRIMS AND SAG SECURITY FORCES, IRAN HAS YET TO BE ABSENT FROM THE FRONT PAGE HEADLINES OF THE SAUDI PRESS. SAUDI DIPLOMACY, TOO, IS UNACCUSTOMEDLY HIGH-PROFILE AND SHOWS SIGNS OF CONTINUING TO BE SO. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SAG MAY TIRE OF ALL THIS ACTIVITY AND CONFRONTATION, WE DOUBT THAT THIS WILL HAPPEN UNLESS THE IRANIANS CHANGE COURSE AND OFFER THE SAG AMPLE SPACE AND EXCUSE TO EASE UP. THE PROVOCATIONS AND THE STAKES, IN THE SAG PERSPECTIVE, HAVE BEEN AND ARE UNUSUALLY GRAVE. THE CHALLENGE TO SAUDI CUSTODIANSHIP OF THE SHRINES AT MECCA AND MEDINA IS FAR TOO SERIOUS AN ISSUE FOR THE SAG TO RISK LOSING BY DEFAULT IN ISLAMIC OPINION. FURTHER, SAG CONCERN AT THE THREAT POSED BY THE GULF WAR HAS STEADILY GROWN, AND WITH IT SAUDI DETERMINATION TO PUSH HARD FOR AN END TO THE WAR. THE SAG SEES IN THE MECCA EVENTS AN OPPORTUNITY FURTHER TO ISOLATE IRAN AND TO CREATE GREATER INTERNATIONAL MOMENTUM FOR ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON IRAN. 11. ON THE HOME FRONT THE SAG SEES THE POSSIBILITY OF PUTTING IRAN IN THE POSITION OF WEAKENED DEMANDEUR WITH REGARD TO FUTURE HAJJ ARRANGEMENTS. WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OR ALL SAUDI DIPLOMATS MAY BE WITHDRAWN FROM TEHRAN AND HINTS ABROAD OF SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC APPROVAL FOR THE SAUDIS TO RESTRICT THE RIGHT OF TROUBLEMAKERS TO MAKE THE HAJJ, THE SAUDIS BELIEVE THE IRANIANS WILL ONE DAY NOTE THAT THEY MAY FACE THE CHOICE OF CONCILIATING THE SAG OR BEING UNABLE, WHETHER FOR FORMAL OR LOGISTICAL REASONS, TO SEND MORE THAN A HANDFUL OF PILGRIMS NEXT YEAR. THUS THE SAUDIS SEE THEIR POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE IRANIANS AS ESPECIALLY STRONG AT PRESENT, AND ARE SHOWING EVERY SIGN OF DETERMINATION TO PRESS THEIR ADVANTAGE. END COMMENT. HORAN " "172","9/21/1987 16:29","87LONDON20480","Embassy London","UNCLASSIFIED","","R 211629Z SEP 87 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6222 INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMCONSUL PESHAWAR AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY PRETORIA USIA WASHDC 4890 ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 20480 E.O.12356: N/A TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IR SUBJECT: AFGHANS SELL US STINGERS TO KHOMEINI 1. THE SUNDAY TIMES CARRIED A STORY ON SEPTEMBER 20 ALLEGING THAT THE U.S. HAS CUT OFF SUPPLIES OF STINGER MISSILES TO THE AFGHAN MUJAHEDEEN BECAUSE SOME OF THE REBEL COMMANDERS HAD SOLD STINGERS TO THE IRANIANS FOR MONEY AND POLITICAL FAVOR. 2. BEGIN TEXT. AFGHANS SELL US STINGERS TO KHOMEINI THE UNITED STATES HAS CUT OFF SUPPLIES OF STINGER ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES TO AN AFGHAN GUERRILLA GROUP AFTER DISCOVERING THAT AT LEAST 16 OF THE WEAPONS WERE SOLD BY THE RESISTANCE TO IRAN. OTHER MUJAHEDDIN LEADERS EMBARRASSED BY THE REVELATION, SAID THAT AS A RESULT RESISTANCE TO THE SOVIET-BACKED AFGHAN REGIME HAD COLLAPSED IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN. THE STINGER, WHICH IS SHOULDER-FIRED AND SIMPLE TO USE, IS CONSIDERED BY MILITARY EXPERTS TO HAVE TIPPED THE BALANCE OF THE EIGHT-YEAR WAR IN THE MUJAHADDIN\'S FAVOUR. THE UNITED STATES STARTED TO DELIVER LARGE NUMBERS OF STINGERS TO AFGHAN REBEL GROUPS LAST YEAR, AND THIS LED TO HEAVY LOSSES AMONG AFGHAN AND SOVIET HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. - TWO COMMANDERS FROM THE HEZBI ISLAMI PARTY OF YOUNIS KHALIS, ONE OF THE STRONGEST OF THE SEVEN GUERRILLA GROUPS, ARE IMPLICATED IN THE SALE. IT APPARENTLY EARNED THEM 10M TOUMANS (ONE MILLION DOLLARS) AND IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE REGIME OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. THE GROUP IS THE MOST FUNDAMENTALIST FACTION AMONG THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE AND MAINTAINS REPRESENTATION IN TEHRAN. THE COMMANDERS WHO ARE SAID TO HAVE SOLD THE MISSILES, MULLAH MAHIULLAH OF NIMROOZ AND MULLAH FAQIR-AHMAD OF ANAR DARA, WHO CONTROLS THE KHASH RUD DISTRICT, WERE SUPPLIED WITH 36 MISSILES. THEY DENY HAVING SOLD THE WEAPONS AND INSTEAD CLAIM THAT THEY WERE CAPTURED BY IRANIANS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. THE RESULTING SHORTAGE OF STINGERS IN THE REGION HAS PROVED DISASTROUS FOR THE MUJAHEDDIN. \"NINETY NINE PERCENT OF NIMROOZ WAS IN COMMUNIST HANDS,\" SAID AN OBSERVER IN THE PAKISTAN BORDER TOWN OF QUETTA. \"ONLY KHASH RUD WAS LEFT. ALL SUPPLIES TO HERAT HAD TO GO THROUGH KHASH RUD, SO IT WAS VITAL TO KEEP THE WAY OPEN. NOW KHASH RUD HAS BEEN BOMBED FLAT AND RESISTANCE HAS VIRTUALLY CEASED THERE.\" WESTERN AFGHANISTAN HAS BEEN CONSIDERED RISKY FOR THE US BECAUSE THE AREA MAINTAINS CLOSE HISTORICAL AND ETHNIC LINKS WITH NEIGHBOURING IRAN. MOST OF THE AFGHAN SHI\'ITE POPULATION LIVE THERE. \"COMMANDERS COME TO PAKISTAN AND SWEAR ON THE KORAN THAT THEY HAVE NO LINKS WITH KHOMEINI. THEN THEY GO AND SELL WEAPONS. WHAT CAN YOU DO?\" ASKED ON OBSERVER. \"MULLAHS HAVE NO SENSE OF NATIONALITY,\" HE ADDED. \"ANY MUSLIM COUNTRY IS THEIR HOME AND THEY CONSIDER IRAN TO BE WAGING JIHAD (HOLY WAR) AGAINST IRAQ.\" MANY LOCAL COMMANDERS ARE BITTER ABOUT THE SALE OF STINGERS. ONLY FOUR COMMANDERS IN THE KANDAHAR AREA, AND THREE IN NIMROOZ, ARE KNOWN TO HAVE THE MISSILES. EVEN POWERFUL LOCAL COMMANDERS, SUCH AS ABDUL RAZIQ OF AFGHANISTAN, HAVE DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING THE WEAPONS, WHICH ARE DISTRIBUTED THROUGH PAKISTAN. UNCOMFIRMED REPORTS EARLIER THIS YEAR MAINTAINED THAT THE IRANIANS HAD USED STINGERS TO SHOOT DOWN IRAQI AIRCRAFT IN THE GULF WAR. THE US, WHICH DENIED THESE REPORTS, IS CONCERNED THAT THE WEAPONS WILL FALL INTO TERRORIST HANDS, OR WILL BE COPIED AND SUPPLIED IN LARGE NUMBERS TO OTHER HOSTILE STATES SUCH AS LIBYA. IN THE FLAT COUNTRY SURROUNDING KANDAHAR, WHICH HAS BEEN A MUJAHEDDIN STRONGHOLD, THE NEED FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS IS ACUTE. THE GUERRILLAS TRAVEL BY TRUCK ALONG DUST TRACKS AND ARE EASILY SPOTTED BY OBSERVATION PLANES FITTED WITH NIGHT-SENSING EQUIPMENT. COMMANDERS AND JOURNALISTS VENTURING TO THE WEST HAVE OFTEN FOUND THEMSELVES THE TARGET OF AN ORGANISED HUNT. I ENCOUNTERED FIVE AMBUSHES IN THE REGION DURING A THREE-WEEK TRIP. END TEXT. 3. KABUL - MINIMIZE CONSIDER. PRICE " "173","9/25/1987 11:40","87NEWDELHI23722","Embassy New Delhi","CONFIDENTIAL","87COLOMBO6523","P 251140Z SEP 87 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1517 AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY INFO AMCONSUL MADRAS PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 23722 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT E.O. 12356: 9/25/88 TAGS: PREL, IN, CE, PINS SUBJ: INDIAN FRICTION WITH LTTE GROWS REF: COLOMBO 6523 1. (C) SUMMARY. ON SEPTEMBER 24 THE INDIAN MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ISSUED ANOTHER WARNING TO THE LTTE THAT IT WILL RESPOND MORE FORCEFULLY IF THE TAMIL MILITANT ORGANIZATION DOES NOT STOP HAMPERING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SRI LANKA PEACE ACCORD. THE MEA SPOKESMAN BLAMED THE LTTE FOR INSTIGATING AND ENGINEERING A VIOLENT CONFRONTATION SEPTEMBER 23 BETWEEN SRI LANKAN CIVILIANS AND ELEMENTS OF THE INDIAN PEACE KEEPING FORCE (IPKF). THE GROWING THREAT OF SUCH CLASHES BETWEEN SRI LANKANS AND INDIAN TROOPS APPARENTLY LIES BEHIND THE DECISION TO SEND SEVERAL BATTALIONS OF INDIAN POLICE INTO THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN PROVINCES OF SRI LANKA (REFTEL). THERE IS GROWING SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT IF THE LTTE CONTINUES ITS PROVOCATIONS, THE INDIAN FORCES SHOULD MOVE MORE DECISIVELY AGAINST IT. END SUMMARY. 2. (U) THE MEA SPOKESMAN EXPLAINED THAT A CROWD OF 900 TO 1000 PEOPLE--MAINLY LTTE SUPPORTERS WITH WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN THE VANGUARD--COLLECTED IN FRONT OF THE IPKF CAMP IN MANNAR, OSTENSIBLY WANTING TO PRESENT A PETITION TO THE LOCAL INDIAN MILITARY COMMANDER. WHILE ARRANGEMENTS WERE BEING MADE FOR RECEIVING THE PETITION, THE LTTE SUPPORTERS REPORTEDLY STARTED THROWING STRONES, SHOUTING SLOGANS, AND PUSHING THE CROWD INTO THE CAMP. THE IPKF FIRED FIVE ROUNDS. TWO PERSONS REPORTEDLY WERE WOUNDED BY THE FIRING AND 17 INJURED N THE RESULTING STAMPEDE. ACCORDING TO THE LTTE, ONE OF THE PERSONS WOUNDED BY GUNFIRE SUBSEQUENTLY DIED. ACCORDING TO THE MEA SPOKESMAN, THE USE OF INNOCENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN AS A COVER FOR THE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION WAS \"REPREHENSIBLE AND COWARDLY.\" HE WARNED THEAT INDIAN TROOPS WOULD BE \"COMPELLED TO RESPOND WITH EVEN STRONGER MEASURES IF VIOLENCE IS DELIBERATELY PROVOKED BY THE LTTE.\" 3. (U) ACCORDING TO MAJOR INDIAN NEWSPAPERS ON SEPTEMBER 25, BOTH THE INDIAN AND SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT GROWING IPKF-CIVILIAN TENSIONS IN THE NORTH AND AGREED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE INDIAN PARALIMITARY RESERVE POLICE FORCE (REFTEL) IS NECESSARY FOR CROWD-CONTROL DUTIES. \"IT WAS FELT BY BOTH COUNTRIES THAT FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF INDIA THE ARMY MUST NOT BE USED REGULARLY TO PREVENT ETHNIC OR OTHER RIOTS EXCEPT IN EXTREME EMERGENCIES AND FOR VERY SHORT PERIODS. IT IS ALSO FELT THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE ARMY SOMETIMES ACTS AS AN IRRITANT TO GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN WARFARE FOR QUITE SOME TIME. . . . IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CRPF UNITS WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH TEARGAS SHELLS, RUBBER BULLETS, AND OTHER EQUIPMENT TO COUNTER SUCH VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS BY MOBS. . . . THESE FORCES CAN ALSO BE USED FOR PATROLLING AREAS FROM WHERE REPORTS OF COLONIZATION BY SINHALAS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED.\" 4. (C) COMMENT. SUCCESSIVE GOI WARNINGS TO THE LTTE HAVE BEEN GIVEN HIGH EMPHASIS IN THE INDIAN MEDIA. THERE APPEARS TO BE A GROWING SENTIMENT AMONG INFORMED INDIANS--WHICH IS BEGINNING TO BE EXPRESSED IN NEWSPAPER COMMENTARIES--THAT THE IPKF MUST MOVE DECISIVELY AND FAST TO PREVENT THE INDO-SRI LANKA ACCORD FROM GOING \"THE WAY OF THE PUNJAB ACCORD.\" THERE IS CONCERN THAT THE GOOD WILL WHICH THE GOI WON AMONG TAMILS BY ITS AIR-DROP IN JUNE IS BEING ERODED BY LTTE PROPOGANDA ALLEGING THAT THE IPKF IS ACTING AS AN ALLY OF THE COLOMBO GOVERNMENT. \"THE SITUATION CAN BE SAVED AND THE ATMOSPHERE CREATED FOR MODERATE LEADERS TO COME INTO THE OPEN,\" THE TIMES OF INDIA STATES, \"ONLY IF THE INDIAN TROOPS MOVE QUICKLY AND DISARM THE LTTE COMPLETELY.\" DEAN " "174","10/7/1987 8:17","87TUNIS11327","Embassy Tunis","CONFIDENTIAL","87TUNIS11130","P 070817Z OCT 87 FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2540 INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY PARIS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 11327 E.O. 12356: TAGS: PGOV, PINR SUBJECT: REACTION TO AND BACKGROUND ON TUNISIA\'S NEW PRIME MINISTER AND PARTY LEADER REF: TUNIS 11130 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. ----------------------- ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI ----------------------- 2. LOCAL AND FOREIGN REACTION TO ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI\'S APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER IS GENERALLY POSITIVE. AT HOME, HE IS RESPECTED AS A COMPETENT HARD-WORKER SOMEWHAT ALOOF FROM THE USUAL POLITICAL SQUABBLES. HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND AND TENURE AT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, HOWEVER, LEAD MANY TUNISIANS TO SUSPECT A HARDENING OF GOT\'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS DISSENT, AN IMPRESSION THAT BEN ALI\'S INITIAL STATEMENT AND RECENT EDITORIALS BASED ON THAT STATEMENT HAVE TAKEN PAINS TO DISPEL. THE FOREIGN MEDIA, INCLUDING SUCH CRITICS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TUNISIA AS \"LE MONDE\", HAVE SPOKEN FAVORABLY OF HIS APPOINTMENT. CHARACTERIZING BEN ALI AS A \"STRONG MAN\", LE MONDE OPINED THAT BEN ALI IS THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE JOB AT THIS TIME. GOT SEEMS PARTICULARLY GRATIFIED BY THIS ENDORSEMENT FROM THE FOREIGN MEDIA AND HAS GIVEN IT PROMINENT COVERAGE. 3. ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI WAS BORN AT HAMMAM SOUSSE, A SMALL TOWN NEAR PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA\'S BIRTHPLACE OF MONASTIR, ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1936. HE STUDIED AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY OF SAINT-CYR AND THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL IN CHALONS SUR-MARNE IN FRANCE AND TOOK THE SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICERS INTELLIGENCE COURSE AT FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND, AND AN ARTILLERY COURSE AT FORT BLISS, TEXAS. HE BECAME DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN 1958, A POSITION HE HELD FOR 16 YEARS UNDER FOUR DIFFERENT DEFENSE MINISTERS. IN 1974, BEN ALI WAS SENT AS MILITARY ATTACHE TO RABAT. ACCORDING TO JEUNE AFRIQUE, THIS APPOINTMENT RESULTED FROM PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA\'S SUSPICIONS WHEN BEN ALI\'S NAME APPEARED ON A LIST OF PROJECTED APPOINTMENTS RESULTING FROM THE STILL-BORN TUNISIAN/LIBYAN UNION AGREEMENT. KNOWN FOR HIS DISCIPLINE AND COMPETENCE, BEN ALI WAS CALLED BACK TO TUNIS TO RUN THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL SECURITY (SURETE NATIONALE) JUST BEFORE LABOR STRIFE CULMINATED IN GOT\'S VIOLENT CRACKDOWN OF THE GENERAL STRIKE OF 1978. IN 1980 HE REPORTEDLY RAN AFOUL OF MRS. WASSILA BOURGUIBA AND WAS SENT AWAY TO BECOME AMBASSADOR TO POLAND. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIOLENT BREAD RIOTS OF 1984, BEN ALI WAS RECALLED TO THE DIRECTORSHIP OF NATIONAL SECURITY. ON 28 APRIL, HE WAS NAMED MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND IN MID-MAY WAS PROMOTED TO MINISTER OF STATE. 4. WHILE HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCE IS SOMEWHAT AUSTERE, BEN ALI IN PRIVATE DISPOSES OF CONSIDERABLE CHARM AND RADIATES CONFIDENCE. IN RECENT MONTHS, HE HAS INCREASINGLY BEEN CALLED UPON TO EXPLAIN GOT SECURITY POLICY IN PUBLIC MEETINGS AND WITH THE FOREIGN PRESS AND HANDLED THESE SITUATIONS WELL. HE HAS LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ECONOMICS, AND WILL HAVE TO RELY ON HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES IN THESE AREAS AT LEAST INITIALLY. HIS TENDENCY FOR MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF THE SECURITY SERVICE MUST ALSO CHANGE AS INDICATED BY THE APPOINTMENT OF MOHAMED KARBOUL, A CAREER INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIAL, AS DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY OCTOBER 6. --------------- MAHJOUB BEN ALI --------------- 5. MAHJOUB BEN ALI, THE NEW DESTOURIAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSD) CHIEF, IS THE MOST PROMINENT OF FIVE OR SIX HARDLINERS THAT PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA HAS CALLED BACK TO SERVICE IN THE RECENT MONTHS. REACTION TO MAHJOUB\'S APPOINTMENT IS GENERALLY NEGATIVE. THE EDUCATED ELITE IN PARTICULAR HAVE A LOW OPINION OF HIM. THEY SNEER AT HIS LACK OF FORMAL EDUCATION AND DEEM HIM RIGID AND NARROW-MINDED. 6. MAHJOUB BEN ALI, 62, WAS BORN IN BIZERTE. IN 1952 HE WAS PUT IN CHARGE OF ORGANIZING PRE-INDEPENDENCE RESISTANCE TO THE FRENCH IN THE NORTH AND BECAME A PRINCIPAL LEADER OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. MAHJOUB LED THE GUERILLA ATTACK ON A BUSLOAD OF FRENCH CIVILIANS IN 1952 THAT BOURGUIBA CREDITS WITH SHAKING FRANCE OUT OF ITS COMPLACENCY ABOUT TUNISIA. HE LED THE NATIONAL GUARD FROM 1956 UNTIL 1967 WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED FOR FAILING TO CONTROL ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE 6 DAY WAR. HE THEN OCCUPIED A NUMBER OF LESSER POSITIONS WHERE HE EARNED A REPUTATION FOR HEAVY-HANDEDNESS. IN THE WAKE OF THE BOMBINGS AT THE TOURIST HOTELS LAST AUGUST, HE WAS APPOINTED DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE PSD IN CHARGE OF THE VIGILANCE COMMITTEES. PELLETREAU " "175","10/8/1987 10:23","87RIYADH10227","Embassy Riyadh","CONFIDENTIAL","","P 081023Z OCT 87 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6540 INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN AMCONSUL JEDDAH ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 10227 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, SA SUBJECT: OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHY OF CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH 1. CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT. 2. FOLLOWING IS AN OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHY SENT TO THE EMBASSY FROM CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH\'S OFFICE IN THE NATIONAL GUARD TO ASSIST IN PLANNING FOR ABDULLAH\'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. WHILE THE BIOGRAPHY CONTAINS NOTHING SURPRISING, IT IS NOTEWORTHY FOR ITS EMPHASIS ON THE CONTINUITY OF THE AL SAUD PRESENCE IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND ITS STRESS ON ABDULLAH\'S ROLE AS AN INTERNATIONAL STATESMAN. AN UNOFFICIAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS. WE WILL POUCH ORIGINAL ARABIC TO NEA/ARP. BEGIN TEXT OF CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH\'S BIOGRAPHY: HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ABDULLAH IBN ABD AL-AZIZ CROWN PRINCE, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND COMMANDER OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD BIRTH: HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ABDULLAH IBN ABD AL-AZIZ IBN ABD AR-RAHMAN AL-FAYSAL AL SAUD WAS BORN IN THE CITY OF RIYADH, CAPITAL OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA IN 1343H CORRESPONDING TO 1924 AD. HIS FAMILY: HE BELONGS TO THE AL SAUD FAMILY. HIS FATHER IS THE LATE KING ABD AL-AZIZ IBN ABD AR-RAHMAN AL-FAYSAL AL SAUD (1880-1953 A.D.), WHO FOUNDED THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AFTER HE BOLDLY EMBARKED ON THE BATTLE TO UNIFY THE ARABIAN PENINSULA IN THE FIRST THIRD OF THE 20TH CENTURY. HE BROUGHT HIS PEOPLE FROM A STATE OF CONTENTIOUS TRIBES AND SMALL, ISOLATED PRINCIPALITIES INTO A MODERN ARAB NATION THAT HAS ADOPTED ISLAM BOTH AS A WAY OF LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT. KING ABD AL-AZIZ ALWAYS BELIEVED, \"WE, THE AL SAUD, ARE FIRST A HOUSE WITH A RELIGIOUS MESSAGE, AND THEN A HOUSE OF RULERS.\" HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE AL SAUD FAMILY TRACES ITS ROOTS TO THE TRIBE OF ANZA IBN RABE\'A, NUMERICALLY THE LARGEST ARAB TRIBE. IT CAME INTO PROMINENCE DURING THE LAST TWO CENTURIES AS THE FAMILY OF REFORM AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL, CULTURAL, AND LINGUISTIC UNITY OF THE ARAB PENINSULA, BASED ON THE ISLAMIC TRADITIONALIST MOVEMENT FOUNDED BY A SON OF THE NEW-ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE, SHEIKH MOHAMMAD IBN ABD AL-WAHAB (1703-1792 AD). FIRST AMONG THOSE WHO SUPPORTED THE SHEIKH IN THE SPREAD OF HIS CALL WAS PRINCE MOHAMMAD IBN SAUD WHO DIED IN 1765H. HE WAS THE FOUNDER OF THE FIRST SAUDI DYNASTY, WHICH ITSELF PASSED THROUGH SEVERAL STAGES, INCLUDING THE PERIOD OF THE GREAT IMAMS WHO FOUGHT SUPERSTITIONS, UNIFIED THE RANKS OF THE NATION AND WERE DEEMED TO BE THE PIONEERS OF RELIGIOUS, ETHICAL, AND SOCIAL REFORM. THE UNIFICATION AND RENOVATION MOVEMENT LED BY KING ABD AL-AZIZ, FATHER OF PRINCE ABDULLAH, IS A CONTINUATION OF THE STRUGGLE OF HIS FAMILY TO MOTIVATE MUSLIM ARAB SOCIETY TOWARD A REAWAKENING AND STRUCTURING, BASED ON TRUE FAITH, RETURN TO THE PURE TEACHINGS OF THE HOLY KORAN AND PURE PROPHETIC TRADITIONS. INFLUENCES IN PRINCE ABDULLAH\'S LIFE: A. PRINCE ABDULLAH LEARNED POLITICS AT HIS FATHER\'S SIDE. B. HE BEGAN HIS EDUCATION IN THE TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC WAY, IN THE MOSQUES UNDER RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS WHO CULTIVATED HIS MIND. HE IS AN AVID AND VORACIOUS READER INTERESTED IN CULTURE, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS. C. HIS FAMILY: FOUR OF THE CROWN PRINCE\'S BROTHERS, UNDER WHOM HE HAS SERVED IN THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, HAVE BEEN KING: --SAUD IBN ABD AL-AZIZ (1952-1964) --FAYSAL IBN ABD AL-AZIZ (1964-1975) --KHALED IBN ABD AL-AZIZ (1975-1982) --KING FAHD IBN ABD AL-AZIZ, THE CURRENT KING (WHOM PRINCE ABDULLAH NOW SERVES AS CROWN PRINCE) D. AS CROWN PRINCE, PRINCE ABDULLAH IS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH URBAN, RURAL AND DESERT SAUDI SOCIETY. HE OFTEN MEETS WITH THE ULEMA, SHEIKHS AND RELIGIOUS COUNSELORS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND CONSULTATIONS. HE ALSO RECEIVES ANY SAUDI NATIONAL WHO REQUESTS A MEETING WITH HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS FOR ANY RELIGIOUS OR MUNDANE MATTER. INSTALLATION OF PRINCE ABDULLAH AS CROWN PRINCE: ON SUNDAY, JUNE 13, 1982, THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA PROCLAIMED HIS MAJESTY KING FAHD IBN ABD AL-AZIZ KING AND LEADER AND HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ABDULLAH CROWN PRINCE. ALL MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY ACKNOWLEDGED THEM AND PAID HOMAGE TO THEM. THE EVENING OF THE SAME DAY, KING FAHD APPOINTED PRINCE ABDULLAH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, IN ADDITION TO HIS POST AS CROWN PRINCE. COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD: WHEN KING FAYSAL IBN ABD AL-AZIZ ASSUMED POWER, HE WAS FULLY AWARE THAT HIS ERA WOULD BE HISTORICALLY SIGNIFICANT. HE THEREFORE SELECTED HIS OFFICIALS FOR THEIR QUALITY. THE NATIONAL GUARD, WHICH BRINGS TOGETHER THE DESCENDENTS OF THOSE WHO LIVED WITH KING ABD AL-AZIZ WHEN HE UNITED THE KINGDOM, HAS A SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE. THE NATIONAL GUARD NEEDED A MAN WHO COULD LEAD AND DEVELOP THE FORCE INTO A SETTLED INSTITUTION. PRINCE ABDULLAH WAS SUCH A MAN. KING FAYSAL THEREFORE CHOSE HIM TO TAKE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY IN 1964 (1384H). PRINCE ABDULLAH\'S APPOINTMENT WAS A MILESTONE FOR THE INSTITUTION, AND SINCE THEN, PRINCE ABDULLAH HAS COMMANDED THE FORCE, A LEADER CLOSE TO HIS MEN WHO PAYS ATTENTION TO THEIR CONCERNS AND LIVES, WITH THE CONSCIENCE AND SPIRIT OF A MUSLIM COMMANDER. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER: IN 1975, KING KHALED APPOINTED PRINCE ABDULLAH SECOND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, IN ADDITION TO HIS POST AS COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. ARAB AND ISLAMIC RELATIONS: AS PART OF THE POLICY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA TO STRENGTHEN ARAB AND ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY AND PURSUE JOINT ENDEAVORS WHICH SERVE THE ISLAMIC AND ARAB NATION AND TO DEEPEN THE EXISTING BROTHERLY TIES AMONG ARAB STATES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE ARAB SUMMITS, PRINCE ABDULLAH HAS TRAVELED AND HAD NUMEROUS CONTACTS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLD. THE CROWN PRINCE WORKS CONSTANTLY TO HEAL ARAB RIFTS. IN HIS VIEW, RIYADH IS A PLACE OPEN TO ALL ARABS BECAUSE OF THE KINGDOM\'S SPECIAL ROLE IN GUARDING THE HOLIEST ARAB AND MUSLIM SHRINES. HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS HAS VISITED THE FOLLOWING ARAB COUNTRIES: 1975 LEBANON 1977 EGYPT 1977 SYRIA 1977 JORDAN 1979 LIBYA 1979 UAE 1984 KUWAIT 1985 ALGERIA 1985 SYRIA 1986 YEMEN 1986 SYRIA 1986 IRAQ OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES: 1984 PAKISTAN 1984 TURKEY INTERNATIONAL ARENA: IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA HAS A MAJOR ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND A PIVOTAL ROLE TO PLAY IN FURTHERING WORLD STABILITY. IT ALSO PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN OPEC, IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, AND IN COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NON-ALIGNED STATES, AS WELL AS OTHER INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AND PROBLEMS. THEREFORE, PRINCE ABDULLAH HAS VISITED THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: 1974 SPAIN 1975 UNITED KINGDOM 1975 UNITED STATES 1984 UNITED KINGDOM 1984 SPAIN 1985 FRANCE 1985 AUSTRIA HOBBIES: READING AND HORSEMANSHIP, IN THE ARAB TRADITION. THE CROWN PRINCE IS PRESIDENT OF THE SAUDI EQUESTRIAN CLUB IN RIYADH. END TEXT. HORAN## " "176","10/9/1987 13:47","87TUNIS11489","Embassy Tunis","SECRET","87TUNIS11130","O 091347Z OCT 87 FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2603 INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY MADRID AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY ROME USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TUNIS 11489 E.O. 12356: TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TS SUBJECT: BEN ALI AS PRIME MINISTER: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? REF: TUNIS 11130 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. ------- SUMMARY ------- 2. BOURGUIBA\'S ABRUPT DISMISSAL OF SFAR AND ELEVATION OF INTERIOR MINISTER BEN ALI AGAIN DEMONSTRATES PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA\'S PERSONAL CONTROL OF POWER IN TUNISIA. BEN ALI\'S APPOINTMENT PUTS A STRONG MAN IN THE PRIME MINISTRY AND A HEARTBEAT AWAY FROM THE PRESIDENCY. IN GOVERNING, BEN ALI WILL HAVE SUPPORT FROM SOCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTER BACCOUCHE, CHIEF OF STAFF BARKETT AND PRESIDENTIAL COMPANION SAIDA SASSI. ON THE OTHER HAND, BEN ALI WILL PROBABLY BE AT ODDS WITH PSD DIRECTOR MAHJOUB BEN ALI. BEN ALI\'S RAPPORT WITH EDUCATION MINISTER SAYAH DESERVES PARTICULAR ATTENTION. ADDITIONAL CABINET CHANGES ARE WIDELY RUMORED--THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES, JUSTICE, AND POSSIBLY DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. BEN ALI\'S MOST DRAMATIC POLICY SIGNAL HAS BEEN A CALL FOR RESPONSIBLE DIALOGUE AND DIRECT CONTACT WHICH WAS FOLLOWED UP BY MEETINGS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS. U.S. INTERESTS ARE WELL SERVED BY BEN ALI\'S APPOINTMENT SINCE IT WILL ENHANCE STABILITY IN THE NEAR AND LONGER TERM. WHILE HE IS NOT \"AMERICA\'S MAN,\" HE CARRIES NO IDEOLOGICAL BAGGAGE WHICH WOULD IMPEDE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS. U.S. INTERESTS ARE ALSO SERVED BY BEN ALI\'S TENTATIVE OPENING TO CRITICS WHICH SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. END SUMMARY. --------------------------- BOURGUIBA MAINTAINS CONTROL --------------------------- 3. (NO FORN) - PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA HAS AGAIN DEMONSTRATED HIS PERSONAL CONTROL OF TUNISIAN POLITICS BY ABRUPTLY DISMISSING RACHID SFAR AND ELEVATING PRIME MINISTER BEN ALI (REFTEL) TO THE PRIME MINISTRY. SFAR\'S DISMISSAL WAS EXPLAINED LAST WEEK AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENTIAL DISSATISFACTION WITH THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER\'S ATTEMPT TO DESIGNATE HIS CANDIDATE, ABDELMALEK AL \'ARIF, AS DIRECTOR OF THE RULING DESTOURIAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSD). THAT EXPLANATION HAS GAINED CREDIBILITY BY THE SUBSEQUENT REPORT IN A LEADING NEWSPAPER THAT BOURGUIBA AND SFAR FIRST CLASHED OVER APPOINTMENTS SEPT. 10 WHEN SFAR PROPOSED AL \'ARIF AS MINISTER OF INFORMATION, ONLY TO HAVE THE PRESIDENT OVERRULE HIM AND APPOINT ABDELWAHAB ABDULLAH TO THAT POST. A SIRO SOURCE REPORTED THAT BOURGUIBA PROPOSED THE PRIME MINISTRY TO BEN ALI SEPT. 13 BUT THE LATTER RECOMMENDED THE CHANGE TAKE PLACE AFTER THE MTI TRIAL WHICH CONCLUDED SEPT. 27. NEVERTHELESS, THE CHANGE ITSELF WAS HANDLED CLUMSILY WITH THE PRESIDENT PLACING HIMSELF IN THE EMBARRASSING POSITION OF APPROVING HIGH-LEVEL APPOINTMENTS ONE DAY--I.E PARTY CHIEF, MINISTER OF CULTURE ETC.--ONLY TO RETRACT THEM THE NEXT. BY SEVERAL RELIABLE ACCOUNTS, THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO EXTRAORDINARILY ABUSIVE TO FORMER PRIME MINISTER SFAR, AT THE CABINET MEETING SEPT. 30, WHO PROTESTED ALL ALONG THAT HE HAD ACTED WITH PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL. HENCE, THE PRESIDENT HAS SIMULTANEOUSLY REASSERTED PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES WHILE RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS GRIP ON EVENTS. 4. LIKE HIS PREDECESSORS, BEN ALI\'S RAPPORT WITH THE PRESIDENT WILL BE A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN HIS ABILITY TO GOVERN. ON SECURITY ISSUES, HE HAS SHOWN A DEFT TOUCH -- E.G. OPPOSING THE CREATION OF MTI MARTYRS WITHOUT LOOSING CREDIBILITY. BEN ALI\'S FIRST OFFICIAL STATEMENT CAREFULLY ACKNOWLEDGED PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES AND CHARACTERIZED THE PRIME MINISTER AS FIRST AMONG EQUALS IN SERVING THE PRESIDENT. ---------------------------- A STRONGMAN A HEARTBEAT AWAY ---------------------------- 5. UNLIKE SFAR, BEN ALI IS NOT VIEWED AS A TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. ANY PRIME MINISTER SERVES AT THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT AND BOURGUIBA HAS NEVER TOLERATED A TRULY POWERFUL PRIME MINISTER IN THE PAST. NEVERTHELESS BEN ALI\'S TENURE IS MORE SECURE THAN HIS PREDECESSOR\'S BECAUSE HE IS A PILLAR OF TUNISIA\'S INTERNAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT -- NOT IRREPLACEABLE, BUT NOT EASILY REPLACED. WITH BEN ALI\'S APPOINTMENT, THE ENTIRE SUCCESSION PICTURE HAS OBVIOUSLY CHANGED. INSTEAD OF A WEAK PROSPECTIVE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD HAVE INVITED CHALLENGES FROM POLITICAL OPPONENTS, THERE IS A STRONG AND VIGOROUS SUCCESSOR. WHATEVER ELSE HAPPENS, THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IS NOT LIKELY TO GET OUT OF HAND AS LONG AS THERE IS NO OPEN SPLIT IN THE RULING ESTABLISHMENT. ------ ALLIES ------ 4. BEN ALI\'S ALLIES IN THE GOVERNMENT ARE STRONG AND WELL PLACED. FIRST AND FOREMOST IS SOCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTER BACCOUCHE WHO ALSO COMES FROM HAMMAM SOUSSE AND IS AN OLD PERSONAL FRIEND. BACCOUCHE IS PRESUMED TO BE BEN ALI\'S PRIMARY POLITICAL ADVISOR. AN ADROIT POLITICIAN, BACCOUCHE WAS PSD DIRECTOR (1983-86) AND IS CURRENTLY MANAGING TUNISIA\'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH LIBYA AND THEIR IMPACT ON HER RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA AND MOROCCO. BACCOUCHE\'S MAJOR LIABILITY IS THE PRESIDENT\'S ANTIPATHY FOR HIM WHICH STEMS IN PART AT LEAST FROM BACCOUCHE\'S INDEPENDENT ATTITUDE AS PARTY DIRECTOR. SECOND, CHIEF OF STAFF BARKETT THINKS HIGHLY OF BEN ALI AND HAS MAINTAINED REGULAR CONTACT. INDEED, BARKETT WAS THE ONLY SENIOR MILITARY FIGURE WHO FAILED TO ATTEND A DINNER AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY ON THE EVE OF THE GOVERNMENT CHANGE, WHICH HAS PRODUCED SPECULATION THAT HE ALONE IN THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT WAS INFORMED AND CONSULTED BY BEN ALI IN ADVANCE. THIRD, PRESIDENTIAL COMPANION SAIDA SASSI WAS OBSERVED AS AN ALMOST DAILY VISITOR TO THE INTERIOR MINISTRY IN RECENT WEEKS. SHE HAS EVEN PLACED PHONE CALLS FROM BEN ALI\'S OFFICE. BY SEVERAL ACCOUNTS, BEN ALI SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING SASSI TO COUNSEL MODERATION TO THE PRESIDENT IN THE MTI TRIAL. THE BEN ALI-SASSI CONNECTION DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE DEEPLY ROOTED AND MAY NOT ENDURE. ----------- ADVERSARIES ----------- 6. BEN ALI HAS GENERALLY NOT ENGENDERED PERSONAL ANTIMOSITY. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAS POLITICAL RIVALS AND PERSONAL ANTIPATHIES. THE NEW PSD DIRECTOR MAHJOUB BEN ALI IS THOUGHT TO BE ON A TOTALLY DIFFERENT WAVELENGTH THAN THE PRIME MINISTER. PRIME MINISTER BEN ALI IS MORE SUBTLE AND SEES THE NUANCES OF A SITUATION. PSD DIRECTOR BEN ALI IS A BLUNT INSTRUMENT. MOREOVER, THE PSD\'S NEWLY RE-ACTIVATED MILITIA\'S ARE HELD IN CONTEMPT BY THE PROFESSIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT AND THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN SEVERAL RELATIVELY MINOR CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA PRESUMABLY RECOGNIZED THE INCOMPATIBILITY AND NAMED MAHJOUB IN PART AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE NEW PRIME MINISTER. PRIME MINISTER BEN ALI ALSO REPORTEDLY DISLIKES MINISTER OF TRANSPORT, HOUSING AND EQUIPMENT SKHIRI WHO HIMSELF ALMOST CERTAINLY ASPIRED TO HEAD THE GOVERNMENT. SKHIRI HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH CORRUPTION IN THE PAST AND HAS REPORTEDLY MISMANAGED HIS MINISTRY SO HE IS NOT IN A PARTICULARLY STRONG POSITION. EDUCATION MINISTER SAYAH WOULD BE A MUCH MORE FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY GIVEN HIS PERSONAL RAPPORT WITH THE PRESIDENT (HE IS BOURGUIBA\'S BIOGRAPHER) AND DEEP AND WIDE PARTY CONNECTIONS. BECAUSE OF HIS POLITICAL SKILLS, SAYAH WAS FOR MANY THE LEADING CANDIDATE TO SUCCEED SFAR AND EVENTUALLY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF. HE NOW FINDS A FORMIDABLE OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF THOSE AMBITIONS. SAYAH\'S ONLY HINT OF DISATISFACTION THUS FAR WAS A PUBLIC COMMENT PRIOR TO THE GOVERNMENT CHANGE TO THE EFFECT THAT TUNISIA HAS BEEN AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE LEAD BY CIVILIANS -- A POSSIBLE REFERENCE TO BEN ALI\'S MILITARY BACKGROUND. THE SAYAH-BEN ALI RELATIONSHIP BEARS WATCHING. --------------------- MORE CABINET CHANGES? --------------------- 7. SINCE BEN ALI\'S APPOINTMENT, TUNIS\' RUMOR MILLS HAVE BEEN WORKING OVERTIME AND FURTHER CABINET CHANGES ARE ALMOST UNIVERSALLY EXPECTED. MUCH OF THE SPECULATIONS HAS FOCUSED ON THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES. THE PRESIDENT REPORTEDLY MADE A SLIGHTING REMARK IN THE SEPT. 30 CABINET MEETING ABOUT MINISTER OF PLAN KHELIL\'S FREQUENT TRIPS TO THE U.S. (HE HAS BEEN IN WASHINGTON FOR IMF MEETINGS.) BEN ALI, WHOSE ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE IS NIL, IS ALSO PERCEIVED TO NEED HELP PARTICULARLY IN THIS DOMAIN. JUSTICE MINISTER AYARI IS ALSO THOUGHT TO BE BURNT OUT. MOREOVER, THE PRESIDENT WAS REPORTEDLY NOT PLEASED WITH THE COURSE OF THE MTI TRIAL. THE FOREIGN MINISTER\'S DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE PRESIDENT EARLIER THIS SUMMER AND TOTAL EXCLUSION FROM RECENT MAGHREB DIPLOMACY HAVE ALSO RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS STATUS. DEFENSE MINISTER BALY\'S NAME IS ALSO MENTIONED AS SOMEONE WHO MIGHT BE CHANGED TO BRING NEW BLOOD INTO THE GOT. ONE LEADING CANDIDATE FOR A MINISTRY IS TUNISIA\'S AMBASSADOR TO BONN BEJI CAID ESSEBSI, A FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO HAD BEEN IN TUNIS THIS PAST WEEK AND IS EXPECTED BACK LATER THIS WEEK. UN PERMREP MESTIRI HAS ALSO BEEN MENTIONED AS A CANDIDATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. --------------------------------------------- ----- POLICY CHANGES: DIALOGUE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS --------------------------------------------- ----- 8. BEN ALI\'S ONE CLEAR POLICY INITIATIVE HAS BEEN A SLIGHT OPENING TO THE REGIME\'S CRITICS. IN HIS INITIAL POLICY STATEMENT AS PRIME MINISTER, HE CALLED FOR \"A REINFORCEMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY BASED ON BOURGUIBIAN PRINCIPLES OF DIRECT CONTACT, RESPONSIBLE DIALOGUE AND CONCORD TO SERVE TUNISIA\'S HIGHER INTERESTS AND TO SAFEGUARD TUNISIA\'S STABILITY AND INVULNERABILITY.\" SUBSEQUENTLY, HE MET ON OCT. 6 IN SEPARATE AND HIGHLY-PUBLICIZED MEETINGS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE INDEPENDENT TUNISIAN HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE AND GOT-CONTROLLED ASSOCIATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC LIBERTIES. THESE GESTURES HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED. OPPOSITION POLITICIANS WITH WHOM BEN ALI MAINTAINED CONTACTS AS INTERIOR MINISTER ARE NO DOUBT HOPING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER\'S ATTENTION WILL EVENTUALLY EXTEND TO THEM. IF SO, IT WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT. -------------- U.S. INTERESTS -------------- 9. U.S. INTERESTS ARE WELL SERVED BY BEN ALI\'S APPOINTMENT. IN THE NEAR TERM, IT ENHANCES STABILITY AT A TIME WHEN THE MTI CHALLENGE HAS BEEN BLUNTED, BUT NOT RESOLVED AND WHEN TUNISIA IS MOVING TOWARD A MORE NORMAL AND OPEN RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBYA. IN THE LONGER TERM, SHOULD ANYTHING HAPPEN TO THE PRESIDENT, BEN ALI WOULD BE ALMOST THE IDEAL PERSON TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE TRANSITION. HE IS NOT \"AMERICA\'S MAN\" -- A WIDELY HELD PERCEPTION IN TUNIS BASED ON BEN ALI\'S REPUTATION FOR \"LAW AND ORDER\" AND HIS LIMITED STUDY AS A SOLDIER IN THE U.S. RATHER HE IS DISTINCTLY NON-IDEOLOGICAL. NEVERTHELESS, THE ABSENCE OF INTELLECTUAL BAGGAGE--I.E. MZALI\'S AMBITION TO BRING TUNISIA CLOSER TO THE ARAB WORLD, FOREIGN MINISTER MABROUK\'S FRANCOPHILIA, ETC. -- IS AN ADVANTAGE AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED. ALSO IN U.S. INTERESTS IS BEN ALI\'S TENTATIVE OPENING TO THE REGIME\'S CRITICS. AT A MINIMUM, HE HAS ENDORSED THE LEGITIMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITY IN TUNISIA. WHETHER HE PROCEEDS FARTHER TOWARD POLITICAL PLURALISM WILL DEPEND ON MANY FACTORS -- PRINCIPALLY THE PRESIDENT\'S ACQUIESCENCE OR RESISTANCE. IT IS A TENDENCY, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE. PELLETREAU## " "177","10/28/1987 22:37","87STATE336019","Secretary of State","UNCLASSIFIED","","P 282237Z OCT 87 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS PRIORITY INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 5420 JCS WASHDC PRIORITY 8192 ALL POLADS COLLECTIVE USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY USCINCLANT NORROLK VA PRIORITY USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PA PRIORITY CSAASHINGTON DC PRIORITY CNO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY CSAF WASHDC PRIORITY CIMCMAC COTT AFB IL PRIORITY UTRANSCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY ","UNCLAS STATE 336019 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, US SUBJECT: AIDS TESTING OF VISITING U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL 1. PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS OF HOST NATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN OCCASIONAL REQUESTS THAT VISITING MILITARY UNITS DEMONSTRATE THAT UNIT PERSONNEL ARE FREE OF AIDS VIRUS. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR RESPONDING TO EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN, OFFICIAL ACTION, OR OTHER EFFORTS BY HOST NATIONS TO CONDITION U.S. MILITARY VISITS ON AIDS TESTING. 2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING COMMUNICABLE DISEASES ON VISITING U.S. NAVY SHIPS AND U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT, A HOST GOVERNMENT CAN BE INFORMED THAT: A. A COMMANDING OFFICER OF A U.S. NAVY SHIP OR U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT IS REQUIRED TO REPORT AT ONCE TO LOCAL HEALTH AUTHORITIES ANY CONDITION ABOARD HIS SHIP OR AIRCRAFT WHICH PRESENTS A HAZARD OF INTRODUCTION OF A COMMUNICABLE DISEASE OUTSIDE THE SHIP OR AIRCRAFT. THE COMMANDING OFFICER, IF REQUESTED, WILL CERTIFY THAT THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT MILITARY PERSONNEL ENTERING THE HOST NATION FROM HIS SHIP OR AIRCRAFT WILL PRESENT SUCH A HAZARD. B. CONCEALMENT OF ANY CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH MIGHT SUBJECT A U.S. NAVY SHIP OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO QUARANTINE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED UNDER DOD REGULATIONS. ANY U.S. NAVAL OFFICER ENGAGING IN SUCH CONCEALMENT WOULD BE LIABLE TO COURT MARTIAL. 3. IF ASKED WHAT THE U.S. IS DOING TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF AIDS BY U.S. SERVICE PERSONNEL, THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT MAY BE GIVEN TO THE HOST COUNTRY: QUOTE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY REQUIRES ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BE SCREENED FOR SEROLOGICAL EVIDENCE OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV) INFECTION. THOSE WITH POSITIVE SEROLOGICAL EVIDENCE OF HIV INFECTION ARE ASSIGNED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS POLICY, U.S. NAVY AND MARINE PERSONNEL DEPLOYING OVERSEAS IN U.S. NAVY SHIPS AND OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL ENROUTE TO PERMANENT OVERSEAS DUTY ARE TESTED PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT. UNQUOTE. 4. THE UNITED STATES VIEWS NAVY SHIPS AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT AS SOVEREIGN. THEREFORE THE U.S. WILL REFUSE REQUESTS TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS, TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUAL CREW MEMBERS, AND TO UNDERTAKE OTHER REQUESTED ACTIONS SINCE THE CERTIFICATION OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER IS DEFINITIVE. FOR SECURITY AND OTHER REASONS, THE U.S. DOES NOT RELEASE FOR ANY REASON DETAILED LISTS OF PERSONNEL EMBARKED IN U.S. NAVY SHIPS OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT VISITING FOREIGN PORTS. 5. FYI: IN USING THE ABOVE GUIDANCE AND ADDRESSING HOST NATION QUERIES, POSTS SHOULD BE SENSITIVE TO AND RESIST MEASURES WHICH DISCRIMINATE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL OR UNITS. EXAMPLES INCLUDE: A. REQUIRING MORE INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL THAN VISITING MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. B. TREATING U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AS HIGHER RISK GROUP THAN MERCHANT SEAMEN, VISITING COMMERCIAL AIRCREWS, ETC. SHULTZ " "178","10/29/1987 6:41","87MADRAS3111","Consulate Chennai","CONFIDENTIAL","87CHENNAI3108","O R 290641Z OCT 87 FM AMCONSUL MADRAS TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7502 INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY AMCONSUL CALCUTTA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRAS 3111 E. O12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IN, CE SUBJECT: LTTE: MADRAS VIEWS AND MISCELLANEY REF: MADRAS 3108 1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT 2. SUMMARY: CANADIANS FIND LTTE HAS LITTLE SYMPATHY HERE AND IS NOT EXPECTED TO BECOME ACTIVE AGAIN IN TAMIL NADU. POLICE COMMISSIONER BELIEVES THERE ARE STILL 3,000 LTTE MEN IN TAMIL NADU, MOST WITH WEAPONS OF SOME KIND. ACCORDING TO S. RAMACHANDRAN, CHIEF MINISTER MGR IS \"OK\" AND RETURNING OCTOBER 31. END SUMMARY. 3. CANADIAN DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER GARY SMITH AND IMMIGRATION COUNSELOR DEL MCKAY SHARED WITH US THE RESULTS OF THEIR THREE-DAY VISIT TO MADRAS AND ENVIRONS. PAIR SAID THEIR TALKS CONFIRMED \"REAL MADRAS DISINTEREST\" IN THE LTTE, THOUGH NOTING (AS OTHER OBSERVERS HAVE) THAT FULL- SCALE SLAUGHTER OF LTTE COULD INCREASE TENSION. POLICE AND COMMISSIONER DEVARAM TOLD THEM THAT THE GOVERNMENT (GOTN) ESTIMATES THERE ARE STILL 3,000 LTTE MEMBERS IN TAMIL NADU AND THAT MOST OF THEM HAVE AT LEAST RETAINED THEIR SIDEARMS, IF NOT OTHER WEAPONS. NEITHER POLICE NOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS EXPECT LTTE TO BECOME ACTIVE HERE AGAIN. SMITH ADDED THAT SEVERAL POLICE OFFICIALS APPEARED EAGER TO CRACK DOWN ON THEM IF THEY DID (THIS SQUARES WITH OUR READINGS, TOO). 4. HOME SECRETARY T. VENKATRAMAN SEEMED VERY RELAXED OVER THE RECENT SPATE OF DMK, DK AND OTHER ARRESTS WHICH HAVE NETED ABOUT 7,000 PEOPLE (SEE ALSO REFTEL). ABOUT 400 OF THE LEADERS HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO A PRISON \"OUTSIDE\" MADRAS WHERE THE WILL BE HELD FOR A FEW DAYS TO COOL OFF. SMITH ADDED THAT VENKATRAMAN CERTAINLY WASN\'T GOING TO STAY LATE AT THE OFFICE TO FOLLOW THE MATTER AND CITED THIS AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF RELAXED VIEW HELD BY MOST GOTN OFFICIALS THEY SPOKE WITH. 5. CANADIANS SAW FOOD MINISTER S. RAMACHANDRAN (RAM) EVENING OCTOBER 28. RAM CONFIRMED TODAY\'S PRESS REPORTS THAT MGR WILL RETURN TO MADRAS MID-MORNING OCTOBER 31 VIA BOMBAY. RAM SAID MGR WAS \"OK, BUT PRESSED AS TO WHETHER HE WAS \"HEALTHY,\" SAID NO. STEMPEL "	Success: CSV parsed	null	25,574
179	10/29/1987 11:49	87BAGHDAD5528	Embassy Baghdad	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "87BAGHDAD5515" ]	P 291149Z OCT 87 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5471 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0148 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 05528 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, USUN, IZ, IR SUBJECT: RAFSANJANI STICKS TO NAMING AGGRESSOR BEFORE - CEASEFIRE REF: BAGHDAD 5515 1. (C) DURING RECENT MEETING, MFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIRECTOR AL-QAYSI PROVIDED DCM WITH MFA ARABIC TRANSLATION OF OCTOBER 25 TEHRAN RADIO INTERVIEW WITH RAFSANJANI IN WHICH RAFSANJANI SAID THAT NAMING THE AGGRESSOR MUST PRECEDE A CEASEFIRE AND THAO ONLY NAMING THE AGGRESSOR OR DEFEATING THE AGGRESSOR WILL END THE WAR. AL-QAYSI ASKED RHETORICALLY WHY IRAQ SHOULD BE ASKED TO ABANDON THE SEQUENTIAL ORDER OF 598 WHEN IRAN, AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT \"THE AGGRESSOR BE NAMED\" BEFORE THERE IS EVEN A CEASEFIRE, MUCH LESS WITHDRAWAL. THAT SAID, HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE AVOIDED GIVING ANY HINT OF IRAQ\'S POSITION ON SIMULTANEOUS VS SEQUENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION PENDING DELIVERY OF IRAQ\'S RESPONSE TO THE SYG OCTOBER 30 (REFTEL). 2. (U) FOR THE RECORD, INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF MFA TRANSLATION OF THE INTERVIEW FOLLOWS. BEGIN TEXT: INTERVIEW WITH RAFSANJANI TEHRAN RADIO 2330, OCTOBER 25, 1987 Q. MY QUESTION IS CONNECTED WITH THE GULF WAR. THE UNSG HAS SUGGESTED A PLAN OF NINE POINTS TO EFFECT A TEMPORARY CEASEFIRE AND ESTABLISH A COURT TO JUDGE THE AGGRESSOR. REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE UNSG HAS PASSED THEIR SUGGESTION TO OFFICIALS OF BOTY COUNTRIES (IRAN AND IRAQ). WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THIS AND WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN? A. WE HAVE RECEIVED SUCH A THING. ITS CONTENT IS SIMILAR TO WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED. IT HAS BEEN AGREED TO ESTABLISH A COMMITTEE TO DETERMINE THE AGGRESSOR AND THAT IT SHOULD START ITS WORK. IT WAS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT A CEASEFIRE SHOULD TAKE PLACE, BUT THE TIMING OF THESE TWO THINGS HAS NOT BEEN FIXED. WE BELIEVE THAT A CEASEFIRE WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER THE AGGRESSOR IS NAMED AND, IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE ARE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, THE UNSG, AND OTHERS. WE DO NOT WANT TO USE DELAYING TACTICS AND PROLONG THE DISCUSSIONS AS SOME PARTIES EXPECT AND BELIEVE. FROM THE BEGINNING, WE HAVE SAID OUR LAST WORD. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE ONLY TWO WAYS TO END THE WAR: (1) TO NAME THE AGGRESSOR; (2) TO DEFEAT THE AGGRESSOR, WHICH WILL END THE WAR AUTOMATICALLY. THE FIRST WILL END THE WAR BY POLITICAL METHODS; THE SECOND WILL END IT BY MILITARY MEANS. IF THE UNSC DOES ITS DUTY AND ACCEPTS ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, THE FIRST (POLITICAL METHOD) WILL PREVAIL AND COULD BE IMPLEMENTED. END TEXT. NEWTON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	26,782
180	11/2/1987 11:35	87MADRAS3155	Consulate Chennai	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O P 021135Z NOV 87 FM AMCONSUL MADRAS TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7541 AMCONSUL BOMBAY AMCONSUL CALCUTTA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRAS 3155 E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, CE, INF SUBJECT: N. RAM: LTTE CRUSHED, MAHATHAYA DEAD? 1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT. 2. \"THE HINDU\" ASSOCIATE EDITOR N. RAM JUST RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO COLOMBO, WHERE HE INTERVIEWED JAYAWARDENE AND SPOKE TO MEMBERS OF IPKF, JOURANLISTS AND OTHERS. HE OFFERED THESE THOUGHTS TO CG AND POLECON OFF AT LUNCH NOVEMBER 2.: 3. ACCORDING TO JAYAWARDENE AND IPKF SOURCES, THE LTTE HAS BEEN CRUSHED AND IS ON THE RUN. BASED ON LTTE INTERCEPTS, RAM IS ALMOST SURE THAT MAHATHAYA (THE LTTE NO. 2) WAS KILLED IN THE ASSULT ON CHAVAKACHERI. INTERCEPTS SAID THAT SOMEONE AT THE VERY TOP, BUT NOT PRABHAKARAN, WAS KILLED. RAM BELIEVES THAT THIS COULD ONLY DESCRIBE MAHATHAYA. LOCAL PRESS HAS REPORTED UNCONFIRMED RUMORS OF HIS DEATH. LTTE\'S YOGI HAD TOLD RAM EARLIER THAT MAHATHAYA WAS LTTE\'S CANDIDATE FOR CHIEF MINISTER OF THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN PROVINCE. RAM SAID THAT THE INDIAN MILITARY ALSO FOUND HIM TO BE SOMEONE WITH WHOM THEY COULD DEAL. HIS DEATH, UNLIKE PRABHAKARNA\'S, WOULD BE A BLOW TO A FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS. 4. PRABHAKARAN WAS \"CERTAINLY\" BEEN WOUNDED IN A SEPARATE INCIDENT, PROBABLY WHEN INDIAN PARATROOPERS LANDED NEAR HIS HEADWUARTERS. RAM ALSO FINDS IT VERY CURIOUS THAT PRABHAKARAN\'S NAME HAS NOT BEEN USED AT ALL BY THE LTTE RECENTLY -\"HE\'S COMPLETELY OUT OF SIGHT.\" 5. RAM ESTIMATES THAT 1,000 LTTE FIGHTERS HAVE BEEN KILLED, INCLUDING 700 IN THE ASSAULT ON CHAVAKACHERI ALONE. 6. RAM\'S BASIC VIEW OF RECENT EVENTS IN JAFFNA IS MORE POSITIVE (FROM AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE) THAN WE HAVE HEARD FROM ANY OTHER KNOWLEDGABLE SOUCE HERE. IT MUST BE CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE OF HIS RECENT TRIP TO COLOMBO AND HIS EARLIER PRE-AGREEMENT CONCERN FOR THE LTTE. SUBSTANTIAL CROSS CURRENTS IN TAMIL ELITE OPINION PREVENT US FROM DISCERNING ANY \"LINE\" DOMINANT HERE. NO ONE HAS MUCH REAL SYMPATHY FOR THE LTTE; KARUNANIDI AND THE DMK SUPPORT THEM FOR OPPORTUNISTIC REASONS, AND EVEN MGR\'S RETURN (BEING COVERED SEPTEL) HAS NOT YET CLARIFIED AIADMK THINKING ON THE SUBJECT. 7. ONE THING RAM WAS CLEAR ON: THE GOI WILL NOT BE EASILY LED INTO ANY KIND OF COMPROMISE. GURKHA TROOPS ARE SURROUNDING THE NALLUR TEMPLE NEAR JAFFNA, AND THERE WILL BE NO STAND-DOWN, SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS, OR CEASE FIRE UNTIL THE LTTE LOUDLY AND PUBLICLY AGREES TO START HANDING OVER ARMS AND ABIDE BY THE JULY 29 AGREEMENT. RAM CONFIRMED THE EARLIER REPORTED \"NECKLACE KILLINGS\" OF FIVE INDIAN SOLDIERS AND THE BRUNING TO DEATH OF 13 OTHERS. HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT NONE OF THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED TO THE PRESS BECUASE THE GOI WANTED TO KEEP EMOTIONS DOWN. BUT THE ARMY KNOWS, AND IT IS PRETTY BLOODY-MINDED RIGHT NOW. PRABHAKARAN OR ANY OTHER LEADERSHIP FIGURE WOULD HAVE TO \"WAVE A VERY WHITE FLAG\" TO SURVIVE HIS/THEIR OWN SURRENDER. STEMPEL "	Success: CSV parsed	null	26,854
181	11/6/1987 10:40	87PRETORIA17012	Embassy Pretoria	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O 061040Z NOV 87 FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000 AMEMBASSY LUSAKA INFO AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG AMCONSUL DURBAN AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM AMEMBASSY GABORONE AMEMBASSY HARARE AMEMBASSY MBABANE AMEMBASSY MAPUTO AMEMBASSY MASERU AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 17012 AF FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER FROM AMBASSADOR PERKINS E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: SF, PGOV SUBJECT: MBEKI\'S RELEASE -- WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. I BELIEVE THAT THE RELEASE OF GOVAN MBEKI SHOULD BE SEEN AS A SIGNIFICANT EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO LOOSEN UPTHE POLITICAL GRIDLOCK IN THE COUNTRY ON THE KEY ISSUE OF BLACK/WHITE DIALOGUE. I SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THE GESTURE AND THE OTHER RELEASES WHICH WE HOPE WILL OCCURIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS ARE AIMED MORE AT DRAWING MODERATE INTERNAL BLACK LEADERS INTO A DIALOGUE, RATHER THAN AT ENGAGING THE EXTERNAL ANC. SIMPLE HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, I.E., THE POSSIBLE DEATH IN PRISON OF AGED ANC PARTIARCHS, ALSO PLAYED A ROLE IN PRETORIA\'S GAMBIT. THE HUMANITARIAN ANGLE 3. DFA DIRECTOR GENERAL NIEL VAN HEERDEN TOLD US YESTERDAY JUST BEFORE MBEKI\'S RELEASE THAT TO SOME EXTENT P.W. BOTH\'S DECISION SHOULD BE SEEN AS SOMETHING \"FROM ONE OLD MAN TO ANOTHER.\" VAN HEERDEN SAID THAT IN THE NOVEMBER 4 SAG SESSION WHICH FINALIZED THE DECISION, P.W. SAID THE MAN IS SEVENTY SEVEN YEARS OLD AND IN GOOD HEALTH FOR A MAN THAT AGE, BUT HE IS NOT A YOUNG MAN. P.W., IN VAN HEERDEN\'S VIEW, SEEMED TO BE MUSING OVER HIS OWN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE TWILIGHT YEARS OF HIS LIFE. 4. VAN HEERDEN SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ARGUMENT ABOUT THE UNCONDITIONALNATURE OF MBEKI\'S RELEASE. THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT, IF ALL WENT WELL, THIS WOULD BE ONLY THE FIRST STEP INA PROCESS INVOLVING THE FREEING OF MORE ANC PRISONERS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION MANDELA BUT OUR ASSUMPTION IS THAT HE WOULD BE THE FINAL ACT IN THE PROCESS. THE POLITICAL ANGLE 5. VAN HEERDEN STRESSED THAT IN A BROADER CONTEXT THE GOVERNMENT IS WELL AWARE THAT THE SITUATION IS \"TUMBLING HEAD OVER HEELS TOWARD SOME KIND OF CATASTROPHE. A GESTURE OF SOME SORT WAS NEEDED TO BREAK UP THE MOMENTUM AND BRING PEOPLE AROUND TO THE NEED TO TALK. 6. CENTRAL TOTHIS CONTEXT IN MY VIEW IS THE PERCEPTION INSIDE THE SAG,RECENTLY EXPRESSED TO ME BY STOFFEL VAN DER MERWE, THAT CREDIBLE BLACK LEADERS INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA SUCH AS BUTHELEZI HAVE PAINTED THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER BY REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE WITH PRETORIA UNTIL THE POOLSMORE/ROBBEN ISLAND GOVERNMENT HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO MEET THAT CONDITION. HOWEVER, IN DOING SO, THERE IS NO INTENTION AT THIS STAGE TO DEAL WITH THE LUSAKA AND. 7. I WOULD SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT STOFFEL HAS ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT AN IMPENDING SEA OF CHANGE IN BLACK REJECTION OF CHRIS HEUNIS\' NATIONAL COUNCIL. HOWEVER, IN PLAYING A LONGER TERM GAME VIS A VIS INTERNAL BLACK POLITICAL FIGURES, THE SAG MUST FEEL IT MAY NOW BE ABLE TO MOVE A FEW PIECES IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IN THAT CONNECTION, INFORMATION DUPUTY DIRECTOR DAVID STEWART REMARKED TO US EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT WHILE THE GOVERNMENT IS OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF PHYSICAL STRENGTH,AT SOME STAGE A POLITICAL DIALOGUE MUST TAKE PLACE, \"IF NOT IN THE NATIONAL COUNCIL, THEN IN WHATEVER FORUM FOLLOWS IT OR WHATEVER COMES AFTER THAT.\" OUR REACTION 8. IN SUM, WE SHOULD HEARTILY WELCOME MBEKI\"S RELEASE AS WE HAVE DONE AND GENTLY PRESS THE SAG TO FOLLOW UP WITH OTHER PRISONERS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. (AT THE SAME TIME, WE MIGHT QUIETLY URGE THE ANC NOT TO CROW VICTORY TOO LOUDLY.) HOWEVER, WE SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSION THAT THIS PARTICULAR SAG STRATEGY -- ASIDE FROM ATTEMPTING TO CLAIM SOME HIGH GROUND -- IS IN A SENSE AIMED AT A NEAR TERM SAG/ANC DIALOGUE. PERKINS NNNN "	Success: CSV parsed	null	26,928
182	11/27/1987 5:10	87BANDARSERIBEGAWAN1188	Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O R 270510Z NOV 87 FM AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2824 INFO AMEMBSSY SINGAPORE AMEMBASSY JAKARTA AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR AMEMBASSY BANGKOK AMEMBASSY MANILA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 1188 E.O. 12356: NA TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BX SUBJ: THE SULTAN\'S FIRST YEAR ON HIS OWN - A SOLID PERFORMANCE 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT 2. SUMMART: THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI HAS NOW GOVERNED BRUNEI ON HIS OWN FOR A LITTLEMSORE THAN ONE YEAR. IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS INCLUDE VISITS TO ALMOST EVERY AREA OF THE NATION AND AN EMPHASIS ON A RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT. HE HAS WARNED AGAINST THE SPREAD OF EXTREMIST ISLAMIC BELIEFS AND MOVED TO REINFORCE A MODERATE ISLAMIC WAY OF LIFE IN BRUNEI. IN THE FOREIGN POLICY AREA, BRUNEI SEEKS A ROLE THT IS BEYOND MERE RECOGNITION OF ITS RIGHT AS AN INDEPENDENT NATION. THE MILITARY\'S CONTACTS WITH OTHER NATIONS ARE EXPANDING AND IT IS MOVING TOWARDS UPGRADING ITS EQUIPMENT CAPABILITIES. THE SULTAN\'S ADMINISTRATION HAS SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO TACKLE DIFFICULT SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS IN THIS MALAY SOCIETY THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DRUG REHABILITATION CNETER AND AN INFORMATION PROGRAM AIMED AT PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF AIDS. BRUNEI\'S PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY WHEN COMPARED TO THOSE OF ITS NEIGHBORS, ARE MODEST. THE NATION NEEDS TO IMPROVE BASIC SERVICES, SUCH AS TELEPHONE AND WATER SERVICE. MORE TROUBLESOME IS THE CONTINUAL BLURRING OF LINES BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BUSINESS. END SUMMARY. 3. WITH THE DEATH OF THE SERI BEGAWAN (SUTLAN\'S FATHER) IN SEPTEMBER 1986, THE SULTAN COULD FINALLY SET HIS OWN COURSE FOR THE GOVERNMENT, CHOOSE HIS OWN CABINET, AND GOVERN THE NATION OF BRUNEI, WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF HIS FATHER. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FORTY DAY MOURNING PERIOD HE INSTALLED A NEW CABINET THAT GAVE SOME VERY ABLE MEN, SUCH AS PEHIN ISA, IMPORTANT POSTS. AT THE SAME TIME THE SULTAN SHUNTED ASIDE SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS, SUCH AS PEHIN AZIZ, WHOSE IDEAS FOR BRUNEI DID NOT MATCH HIS OWN. ONE OF THE FIRST AREAS THE SULTAN AND PEHIN ISA TACKKED WAS THE CRITICISM THAT THE SULTAN WAS TOO DISTANT FROM THE PEOPLE. FOR THE LAST YEAR THE SULTAN HAS JORNEYED AT LEAST ONCE A MONTH TO A KAMPONG, MET THE KAMPONG LEADERS, VISITED THE KAMPONG SCHOOL AND MOSQUE, AND THEN SEEN A PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISE RUN BY A BUDDING BUMIPUTRA BUSINESSMAN. ALL OF THIS HAS BEEN RECORDED BY RADIO TELEVISION BRUNEI AND SHOWN ON THE VENING NEWS. ANOTHER REGULAR FEATURE OF THESE VISITS HAVE BEEN THE SULTAN ACCEPTING PETITIONS FROM THE KAMPONG ELDERS FOR SERVICES AND NEEDS OF THE KAMPONG. DURING THIS YEAR THE SULTAN HAS VISITED ALL OF BRUNEI, INCLUDING KAMPONGS ONLY ACCESSIBLE BY AIR OR RIVER BOAT. A CONSITENT THEME EMPHASIZED BY THE SULTAN AND ISA DURING THE YEAR IS THE GOVERNMENT IS TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE. 4. THROUGH THESE KAMPONG VISITS PEHIN ISA, WHO HEADS THE ESTABLISHMENTS OFFICE, AND HIS STAFF HAVE BEGUN TO TACKLE THE KAMPONG PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE INCREASING NUMBER OF ILLEGAL ALLIENS AND THE LACK OF SERVICES. IN A SIMILIAR MOVE, THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION HAS UNDERTAKEN A PROGRAM TO VISIT EVERY SHCOOL IN THE NATION (THERE ARE 176 SCHOOLS) AND MEET THE SCHOOL PRINICPALS AND TEACHERS. ONE OF THE VIIBLE CHANGES IS THAT SCHOOLS ARE NOW REPARIED WHEREAS BEFORE THEY WERE IN DEPLORABLE SHAPE, ESPECIALLY FOR A NATION OF BRUNEI\'S WEALTH. 5. ANOTHER CIRICISM OF THE BRUFEI GOVERNMENT IS THT IT DOESN\'T FACE TOUGH ISSUES WITH CULTURAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS. ONE EXAMPLE IS THAT THE OFFICIAL LINE ON DRUGS USED TO BE THAT THERE WAS NO PROBLEM. DURING THE LAST YEAR THE SULTAN HAS WARNED AGAINST THE EVILS OF DRUG ABUSE AND THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED A DRUG REHABILITATION CENTER. WHILE BRUNEI\'S DRUG PROGLEM IS MINOR COMPARED TO THAT OF MALAYSIA, THE GOVERNMMENT NOW ACKNOWLEDGES THE ISSUE AND IS WORKING TO PREVENT DRUG ABUSE. 6. ANOTHER DIFFICULT ISSUE THAT THE HEALTH MINISTER AND HIS DEPARTMENT HAVE FACED FORTHRIGHTLY IS AIDS. THE NATION HAS LAUNCHED A PUBLIC INFORMATION COMPAIGN WITH POSTERS AND PAMPHLETS. WHAT WAS TACITLY ACKNOWLEDGED WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS CAMPAIGN IS THAT BRUNEI HAS A COMMUNITY OF HIGH RISK MEN, SOMETHING MOST BRUNEIANS PREFER TO OVERLOOK. 7. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THE GOVERNMENT\'S REALIZATION THAT SOMETHING MUST BE DONE ABOUT THE HIGH NUMBER OF TRAFFIC DEATHS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TAKE PLACE IN BRUNEI. THE HEALTH MINISTRY AND COMMUNICATIONS MINISTRY WORKED TOGETHER TO PASS A SELT BELT LAW, A GOOD START. THEN THE MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS LAUNCHED A CAMPAIGN FOR DRIVER\'S EDUCATION. 8. THE IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT WORKS TO STOP ANY KNOWN ISLAMIC EXTREMIST FROM ENTERING THE NATION. TOP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE WORRIED BY THE PROBLEMS IN MALAYSIA WITH ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS AND WORK TO PREVENT TE GROWTH IN BRUNEI. THE SULTAN IS ALSO PROMOTING MAINSTREAM ISLAMIC BELIEFS. THIS YEAR THE SULTAN PERFORMED THE HAJ ALONG WITH MANY OF ADVISORS. THE PEOPLE OF BRUNEI, INCLUDING BUSLOADS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN, LINED THE STREETS WHEN HE DEPARTED AND AGAIN WHEN HE RETURNED. THE DAY WHEN THE SULTAN RETURNED THERE WAS A MASSIVE PUBLIC GATHERING NEAR THE PALACE WHERRE THE SULTAN SPENT HOURS WITH HIS SUBJECT, TAKING WITH EVERYONE, ALL TO THE CONSTERNATION OF HIS SECURITY PEOPLE. 9. THE SULTAN HAS WORKER TO SIDESTEP THOSE WHOSE VIEWS ARE NOT IN LINE WITH HIS, FOR INSTANCE, THE GRAND MUFTI WHO IS CONSIDERED PART OF THE OLD GUARD. HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE PROMOTING THE CAREER OF THE RELATIVELY YOUNG PERMANENT SECRETARY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, WHOSE SPEECHES RELFLECT THE SULTAN\'S MODERATE ISLAMIC VIEWS. 10 IN THE FOREIGH POLICY ARDA, BRUNEI IS MOVING BEYOND ITS GOAL SINCE INDEPENDENCE, WHICH WAS RECOGNITION OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS RIGHT TO EXIST AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS PLAYING MORE OF A ROLE IN ASEAN MEETINGS AND PREPARING FOR BRUNEI\'S LEADERSHIP OF VARIOUS COMMITTEES. THE ASEAN LABOR CONFERENCE, HELD IN LATE 1986, WAS THE FIRST MEETING AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL HELD IN BRUNEI. ONE OF THE DIRECT BENEFICIARIES OF THE SERI BEGAWAN\'S PASSING FROM THE SCENE HAS BEEN INDONESIA. SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THE SULTAN OFFERED A SOFT LOAN OF $100 MILLION TO INDONESIA, SOMETHING THAT WOULD HAVE NEVER HAPPENED DURING THE SULTAN\'S FATHER TIME BECAUSE HE NEVER FORGAVE THE INDONESIANS FOR THEIR ROLE IN THE 1962 UPRISING. 11. WHILE BRUNEI FOREIGN POLICY EMPHASIZES CONSENSUS, AS DOES ITS WAY OF LIFE, AND AVOIDING CONFLICTS, THE RECENT ASEAN DEBATE ON WHETHER OR NOT TO GO TO MANILA DEMONSTRATE THE NATION IS WILLING TO TAKE A POSITION AND DEFEND IT. EARLY ON BRUNEI DECIDED THE MINISTERIAL MUST GO ON IN MANILA AND HAS NOT WAVERED FROM THAT POSITION. 12. THE MILITARY HAS CONTINUED TO EXPAND THEIR CONTACTS WITH OTHER NATIONS THIS PAST YEAR. THEY HAVE MOVED TO SHARE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH THE MALAYSIANS AND THE MALAYSIANS WORKED WITH THE BRUNEIANS TO CLEAR SEA AND AIR TRAFFIC DURING THE BRUNEIAN\'S FIRING OF TWO EXOCET MISSLES. THE BRUNEIANS ARE CONSIDERING A JOINT VENTURE IN A MUNITIONS PLANT IN MALAYSIA. SINGAPORE EXISTING PROGRAMS IN BRUNEI CONTINUE TO GROW. RBAF TROOPS ARE OBTAINING BASIC SPECIAL FORCES TRANING IN AUSTRALIA. 13. THE MILITARY IS MOVEING TOWARDS NEW EQUIPMENT ACQUISTIONS INCLUDING FIXED WING AIRCRAFT, NEW PATROL BOATS (CORVETTE CLASS) AND AN INTEGRATED RADAR SYSTEM. THE MAJOR CONSTRAINT IS THE LACK OF PERSONNEL. OVER 4,000 MEN ARE ALREADY IN THE MILITARY, A LARGE AMOUNT FOR A NATION OF JUST 225,000 WITH ONLY ABOUT 135,000 MALAYS. 14. BRUNEI\'S PROBLEMS ARE MODEST, ESPECIALLY WHEN COMPARED TO NEIGHBORING NATIONS. IN SPITE OF THE BEST EFFORTS OF THE NEW MINISTER OF DEVELOPMENT, HIS MINISTRY, WHICH IS REALLY A GIANT PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT, JUST ISN\'T ABLE TO MAINTAIN ROADS WELL OR BUILD GOOD BRIDGES IN A TIMELY FASHION. WHY A NATION WITH 6 FEET OF RAINFALL A YEAR HAS PERIODIC WATER SHORAGES IS A QUESTION NO MINISTRY OFFICALS WANTS TO ANSWER. LOCAL TELEPHONE SERVICE CONTINUES TO BE A SORE SPOT WITH EVERYONE. 15. ONE PROBLEM THAT IS GETTING BIGGER IS THE BLURRING OF LINES BETWEEN PULBIC AND PRIVATE BUSINESS. AN OBVIOUS EXAMPLE IS THE INTERNATION BANK OF BRUNEI, FORMERLY THE ISLAND DEVELOPMENT BANK. THIS BANK IS CONTROLLED BY THE ROYAL FAMILY AND THE DIRECTORS ARE MEMBERS OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE. THE QUESTION IS WHO SHOULD REGULATE THE BANK IF THE MINISTRY OFFICIALS ARE THE DIRECTORS. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THE GROWING NUMBER OF FIRMS WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE ROYAL FAMILY OR RELATIVES OF MINISTERS. THE QUESTION IS: \"JUST HOW COZY CAN THE RELATIONSHIPS BE BEFORE THEY CAUSE DIFFICULTIES. 16. ANOTHER PROBLEM AREA IS ON PUBLICITY ATTACHED TO THE SULTAN\'S VENTURES OUTSIDE OF BRUNEI, WHETHER IT BE THE RECENT PURCHASE OF THE BEVERLY HILLS HOTEL OR THE SOFT LOAN FOR INDONESIA. MONEY SPENT INSIDE BRUNEI IS NOT VIEWED IN A HARSH LIGHT, FOR INSTANCE, BRUNEIANS DO NOT VIEW THE PALACE AS AN EXTRAVAGENCE BECAUSE IT DOUBLES AS A GOVERNMENT BUILDING AND THEY GET TO VISIT IT AT LEAST ONCE A YEAR, AT HARI RAJA, WHEN THE SULTAN SHAKES EVERYONE\'S HAOND AND GIVES FOOD TO ALL VISITORS. HOWEVER, BRUNEIANS QUESTION PURCHASES OR VENTURES OUTSIDE THE NATION WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT THE MONEY SHOULD BE SPENT ON DEVELOPING BRUNEI. FERGUSON " "183","12/19/1987 20:12","87STATE393879","Secretary of State","UNCLASSIFIED","","O 192012Z DEC 87 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE ","UNCLAS STATE 393879 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: OPDC, TS SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE 1. ON DECEMBER 11 THE TUNISIAN EMBASSY TRANSMITTED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BEN ALI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN: . BEGIN TEXT: THE WASHINGTON SIGNING OF THE TREATY FOR THE DISMANTLING OF THE INTERMEDIATE MISSILES PROVIDES ME AN OCCASION TO SEND YOU MY HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS FOR THIS HISTORIC ACT WHICH WITHOUT A DOUBT WILL BE A LANDMARK ON THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THIS ACCORD COULD HAVE COME ABOUT THANKS ONLY TO YOUR POLITICAL COURAGE, YOUR KEEN SENSE OF RESPONSIBLITY AND YOUR DETERMINATION TO WRITE A NEW PAGE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PAGE 02 STATE 393879 IN THIS HISTORY OF MANKIND. I CARRY THE HOPE THAT YOU WILL OVERCOME ALL OBSTACLES IN ORDER TO BANISH THE SPECTOR OF WAR AND CONFRONTATION IN THE WORLD AND TO PRESERVE FUTURE GENERATIONS FROM DESTRUCTION. MAY THIS DOCUMENT CONTRIBUTE TO TURNING THE PAGE OF THE PAST AND TO OPENING A NEW ERA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FOUNDED CHIEFLY ON COOPERATION, SOLIDARITY, AND DIALOGUE. PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST ESTEEM. ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA. END TEXT. 2. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT BEN ALI AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY: BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I GREATLY APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR KIND NOTE CONGRATULATING ME ON THE SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT WITH SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. WE BELIEVE THOSE MEETINGS INDEED MARK A HISTORIC MOMENT IN ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, AS WELL AS IN ESTABLISHING A MORE STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE US RELATIONSHIP. THE INF TREATY THAT I SIGNED WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY IS CLEARLY A LANDMARK ACHIEVEMENT: FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY OUR TWO NATIONS HAVE AGREED TO REDUCE OUR NUCLEAR ARSENALS, NOT JUST LIMIT THEIR GROWTH. AND THERE IS THE PROMISE OF STILL GREATER PROGRESS IN PLACING EAST-WEST RELATIONS ON A SOUNDER FOOTING. MY TALKS WITH GORBACHEV WERE QUITE FRANK AND CANDID -- NEITHER OF US ATTEMPTED TO MASK OUR DISAGREEMENTS. THE GENERAL SECRETARY UNDERSTANDS THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP CAN RESULT ONLY IF WE SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THE ENTIRE FOUR-PART AGENDA: HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL CONCERNS, BILATERAL MATTERS AND ARMS REDUCTIONS. WE HAD A FRANK AND VERY LIVELY EXCHANGE ON ALL OF THESE ISSUES, AND WHILE WE DID NOT MAKE BREAKTHROUGHS IN EVERY AREA, I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH GORBACHEV IS CONSIDERING OUR POINT OF VIEW. BEST WISHES FOR A HAPPY NEW YEAR. SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN END TEXT. 3. DEPARTMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF RELEASING TEXT BUT HAS NO OBJECTION SHOULD GOT CHOOSE TO DO SO. WHITEHEAD " "184","12/30/1987 14:07","87IZMIR1213","Consulate Izmir","UNCLASSIFIED","","R 301407Z DEC 87 FM AMCONSUL IZMIR TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7096 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL AMCONSUL ADANA ","UNCLAS IZMIR 01213 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER PINS TU SUBJECT: EXPLOSION AT IZMIR SUMERBANK 1. AT 9:30 PM LOCAL TIME DECEMBER 29, A BOMB EXPLODED AT A SUMERBANK RETAIL STORE IN THE KAPILAR SECTION OF DOWNTOWN IZMIR. THE STORE WAS CLOSED AT THE TIME AND NO ONE WAS INJURED BUT POLICE ESTIMATE THE BOMB WAS OF \"CONSIDERABLE\" STRENGTH AS NINE OR TEN SHOPS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY ALSO SUFFERED DAMAGE, MAINLY BROKEN GLASS. 2. OUR POLICE AND SUMERBANK CONTACTS ARE NOT ABLE AT THIS POINT TO ADD MUCH MORE TO THE INFORMATION ABOVE, ALL OF WHICH WAS REPORTED IN THE PRESS. THE POLICE ADD ONLY THAT THE BOMB WAS CERTAINLY A \"CLOCK\" OR TIMED BOMB AND THE THE PKK IS THE PRIMARY SUSPECT. WHILE THE POLICE SAY THAT THEY RECEIVED NO CALLS, YENI ASIR REPORTS IT RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A PERSON CLAIMING PKK RESPONSIBILITY AND ASSERTING THAT \"SUCH ACTIONS WILL CONTINUE.\" KLEMP " "185","1/2/1988 12:58","88BAGHDAD28","Embassy Baghdad","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 021258Z JAN 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9118 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 00028 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PINS IZ SUBJECT: CHRISTIANS IN MOSUL 1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) 2. ON DECEMBER 29 AMBASSADOR CALLED ON SENIOR CHRISTIAN CLERIC RESIDENT IN MOSUL, CHALDEAN ARCHBISHOP GARMO (STRICTLY PROTECT), FOR DISCUSSION OF CHRISTIAN CONDITIONS IN MOSUL AREA. 3. GARMO TOLD US THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT ANY FURTHER DISTURBING OF CHRISTIAN VILLAGES. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, WHAT RELOCATION THERE HAS BEEN HAS BEEN OVER FOR WEEKS. THE CHRISTIAN (NOT JUST CHALDEAN) VILLAGES TO THE NORTH OF MOSUL IN THE AREA AROUND TELL KAYF ARE EXISTING NORMALLY. (A SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO SEVERAL OF THOSE VILLAGES CONFIRMED THAT THIS IS THE CASE.) 4. THE TWO CHIEF ISSUES ON THE PATRIARCH\'S MIND, GARMO SAID, ARE THE CHRISTIAN DESIRE TO OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR CHRISTIAN TEACHING IN THE SCHOOLS, (THIS IS ALLOWED ONLY IF THE STUDENT BODY LS 51& CHRISTIAN), AND THE WISH FOR SOME KIND OF NEWSLETTER. 5. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PATRIARCH HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN AN APPOINTMENT WITH SADDAM FOR SOME TIME. WHILE THE \"UNPRECEDENTED\" CHRISTMAS GREETINGS FROM SADDAM TO THE PATRIARCH ON CHRISTMAS EVE HAD RAISED HOPES, THEY WERE DASHED WHEN SADDAM CONTINUED TO PUT OFF THE PATRIARCH, BUT DID RECEIVE THE CHALDEAN ARCHBISHOP RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TINY CHALDEAN LEBANESE COMMUNITY. 6. LOCALLY, THE GOVERNOR IS UNFAILINGLY PLEASANT, BUT WILL TAKE NO INITIATIVE. THE ARCHBISHOP, THEREFORE, RELIES ON THE HEAD OF SECURITY FOR MOSUL, A NEW APPOINTEE WHO HAS SO FAR PROVED HELPFUL AND COMPASSIONATE. BUT THIS IS A WEAK REED, AND THE CHURCH WOULD NATURALLY PREFER TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE TOP. IN THE CASE OF SOME SERIOUS PROBLEM THE CHRISTIANS STILL REGARD THEIR ACE IN THE HOLE TO BE ADNAN KHAIRALLAH\'S FATHER, WHO IS ACCESSIBLE AND HAS BEEN HELPFUL DURING DIFFICULT TIMES IN THE PAST. 7. IN VISITING MONASTERIES AND VILLAGES NORTHEAST AND SOUTHEAST OF MOSUL, EMBASSY OFFICIALS DID SEE MONEY BEING SPENT BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CHRISTIANS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SPANKING NEW VILLAGES, MARKED \"SADDAM MODEL VILLAGE,\" AND THE 4TH CENTURY MONASTERY AT MAR BAHNAM HAS RECEIVED AN EXPENSIVE FACELIFTING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE, INCLUDING EXPENSIVE NEW MARBLE FACING. GLASPIE " "186","1/15/1988 6:09","88BAGHDAD224","Embassy Baghdad","CONFIDENTIAL","88ABUDHABI137","R 150609Z JAN 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6069 AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY MANAMA AMEMBASSY DOHA AMEMBASSY MUSCAT AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY SANAA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 00224 PASS TO CONGEN DUBAI E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, SOCI, IR, IZ SUBJECT: THE RELIGIOUS SUCCESSION IN IRAN REF: ABU DHABI 137 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. AN ARAB BUSINESSMAN IN REFTEL SAID THAT GRAND AYATOLLAH KHOI\'S RELATIVES IN IRAN ALLEGE THAT SEVENTY PERCENT OF IRANIAN SHI\'A, AND ALMOST ALL IRAQI SHI\'A, FOLLOW KHOI\'S INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM. WE HAVE RECEIVED MUCH THE SAME VERSION FROM ONE OF KHOI\'S SONS HERE. WE ALSO RECALL EARLIER CONGEN DHAHRAN REPORTING THAT A SIMILAR PERCENTAGE OF SAUDI SHI\'A ADHERE TO HIM. 3. WE TOO WOULD LIKE TO HAVE RELIABLE CONFIRMATION OF KHOI\'S APPEAL IN IRAN. WE ARE NOT SO SURE ABOUT CONGEN DUBAI\'S ASSESSMENT THAT KHOI\'S POSITION MAY HAVE BEEN ERODED IN IRAN. AFTER ALL, KHOMEINI WAS IN NAJAF FOR FOURTEEN YEARS, WHICH DID NOTHING TO ERODE HIS STANDING IN IRAN. KHOI HAS BEEN IN NAJAF FOR MOST OF THIS CENTURY, FOLLOWING A TRADITION OF IRANIAN AYATOLLAHS THAT GOES BACK TO 1722. WE DOUBT, AS SUGGESTED BY REFTEL\'S SOURCE,THAT KHOI HAS COME TO BAGHDAD OR THAT HE IS INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN ANTI- KHOMEINI BROADCASTS. ALTHOUGH HE IS CERTAINLY NO FRIEND OF KHOMEINI, WHOM HE CONSIDERS AN UPSTART WITH DUBIOUS RELIGIOUS CREDENTIALS, HE HAS STEAD- FASTLY REFUSED TO TAKE SIDES PUBLICLY ON THE WAR. 4. WHETHER KHOI IS ACTUALLY A THREAT TO MONTAZERI OR ANY OTHER POTENTIAL SUCCESSOR TO KHOMEINI IS ANOTHER MATTER, SINCE KHOI, WHO IS NOW AGED AND INFIRM, IS NO MORE POLITICALLY ORIENTED, WE UNDER- STAND, THAN GOLPAYEGANI. KHOI HAS ALWAYS BEEN A STRONG PROPONENT OF THE QUIETIST SCHOOL OF AYATOL- LAHS WHO INSIST THAT CLERICS SHOULD STAY OUT OF GOVERNMENT. UNLIKE KHOMEINI\'S CASE, ALLEGIANCE TO KHOI\'S RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATIONS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN SUPPORT OF A POLITICAL NATURE. THE ISSUE, AS REFTEL POINTED OUT, IS THAT THE LEGITIMACY OF A SUCCESSOR REGIME WILL DEPEND TO A MAJOR DEGREE ON THE PERCEPTION OF ITS RELIGIOUS CREDENTIALS. 5. ONE ISSUE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO US IS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE USULI SCHOOL OF TWELVER SHI\'A ISLAM DOMINANT IN IRAN THAT RULINGS OF A CLERIC, NO MATTER HOW PROMINENT, LOSE THEIR VALIDITY WHEN HE DIES, ENTIRELY UNLIKE THE SUNNIS OR THE MINORITY TWELVER SCHOOL WHO HAVE A CORPUS OF CANON LAWS. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT IRAN HAS A CLERGY AND THE ARAB STATES DO NOT IN THE SAME SENSE. WE WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT THE RULINGS OF KHOI, A VERY TRADITIONAL CLERIC, NOT TO OUTLIVE HIM. WHETHER KHOMEINI\'S WILL IS THE QUESTION. IF SO, HE WILL BE THE FIRST AYATOLLAH TO HAVE A \"CALIPH\"(SUCC ESSOR), AND SHI\'A ISLAM IN IRAN AND ITS ROLE IN THE COUNTRY WILL BE CHANGED IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY. NEWTON " "187","2/4/1988 6:32","88STATE34351","Secretary of State","CONFIDENTIAL","","R 040632Z FEB 88 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY NIAMEY AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT ","C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 034351 FOR AMBASSADOR E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, NG, MR SUBJECT: LIBYA: THE VIEW FROM QADHAFI\'S BACK PORCH 1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE 14270 TO CAIRO (DATED JANUARY 16, 1988) REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO. BEGIN TEXT. 3. QADHAFI IS MAKING SOLID GAINS IN THE MAGHREB. HIS RAPPROCHMENT WITH ALGERIA IS BEARING FRUIT--THOUGH NOT YET THE FULL-BLOWN UNION HE IS SEEKING. THE PROCESSION OF CHAD DEFEATS HAS ENDED; AND HE IS SLOWLY STRENGTHENING HIS LINKS WITH NEIGHBORING AFRICAN STATES. AS A RESULT, HIS SELF-CONFIDENCE IS RISING, AND WE EXPECT HIM GRADUALLY TO SHIFT TO A HIGHER PROFILE STANCE IN COMING MONTHS. ---------------------- MAGHREB THE JEWEL IN THE GROWN? ----------------------- 4. (C) QADHAFI CONTINUES TO DIGEST THE LESSONS HE LEARNED FROM OUR AIRSTRIKE IN 1986. HE CANNOT COUNT ON OUTSIDE SUPPORT IF HE GETS IN DIFFICULTY BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN TO OUT OF STEP WITH HIS FELLOW ARABS. TO REMEDY THIS WEAKNESS IN HIS POSITION, HE HAS BEEN EAGERLY RESPONDING TO ALGERIAN OVERTURES FOR HALF A YEAR. WHILE HE HAS ON OCCASION STARTLED THE ALGERIANS WITH TOO AVID A COURTSHIP--HE HAS SETTLED INTO MORE DURABLE STEPBY-STEP MILITARY, BUSINESS AND \"PARLIAMENTARY\" EXCHANGES. HE HAS MET ALGERIA\'S INSISTENCE THAT HE RENEW RELATIONS WITH TUNISIA. HE MAY EVEN HAVE ARRESTED THE EROSION OF RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO BY MONEY AS WELL AS WORDS CRITICAL OF THE POLISARIO. ------------\"--------- FRIENDSHIP ON THE DOTTED LINE ---------\"------------- 5. (C) IF QADHAFI ACCEDES TO ALGERIA\'S SECOND CONDITION\"LIBYAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE TRIPARTITE ACCORD OF 1983 WHICH ENSURED (PAPER) CORDIALITY BETWEEN ALGERIA, MAURITANIA, AND TUNISIA--HE WILL GET APPLAUSE FROM LIBYANS AND , THAT MOST ELUSIVE OF GOALS, LEGITIMACY IN THE REGION. QADHAFI LOVES SIGNED STATEMENTS OF FRIENDSHIP, ALMOST AS MUCH AS \"UNION\" PACTS; HE WILL ACCEPT HALF A LOAF BY JOINING THE MAGHREB CLUB, RELISHING ITS PROPAGANDA VALUE. 6. (C) HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY EXPLOIT HIS NEW ROLE TO TAUNT THE US, WHICH GIVES HIM CLOUT WITH SOME ARABS WHILE DISMAYING HIS OLD ENEMY, EGYPT. HE WILL CERTAINLY USE THE RELAXATION OF VISA RESTRICTIONS FOR ITS INTELLIGENCE VALUE OF HAVING UNDERCLARED AGENTS ON THE GROUND IN TUNIS, NOUAKCHOTT, AND ALGIERS. ECONOMICALLY, HE MAY SUGGEST \"JOINT VENTURES\" WITH HIS NEWFOUND PARTNERS, WHICH COULD AFFECT CURRENT US BUSINESS VENTURES WITH MAGHREB STATES, OR GIVE HIM ACCESS TO US TECHNOLOGY. EVERYONE ELSE IN THE ACCORD IS CASH-POOR AND OPEN TO LIBYAN LARGESSE. QADHAFI MAY ALSO BE LOOKING AT SECURITY IMPLICATION, I.E. TURNING ANY FUTURE US THREATS OF HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST HIM INTO \"THREATS AGAINST THE ACCORD\" -------------------------- QUIET ALONG THE SOUTHERN FLANK -------------------- 7. (C) MEANWHILE, QADHAFI\'S DIPLOMATS ARE PLAYING A WAITING GAME WITH THE OAU ON CHAD. THE LONGER THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER WHO OWNS HOZOU ARE DRAGGED OUT, THE FIRMER ARE LIBYAN SOUTHERN DEFENCES AGAINST HABRE\'S WARRIORS. LIBYAN ENVOYS TO NIGER HAVE PROMISED TO MAKE GOOD SOME 1973 URANIUM DEBTS, PROBABLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO FACILITATE ACCESS TO THE CHADIAN FRONT. LIKEWISE IN SUDAN, QADHAFI CONTINUES TO PLY SADIQ-AL-MAHDI WITH GOODIE BAGS OF ARMS, MEDICINE, AND AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT--MEANWHILE CONTINUING TO SEND LIBYANBACKED MERCENARIES IN THE TRACKLESS CORNER OF SUDAN NEAR CHAD. IN UGANDA, QADHAFI EXPLOITS A PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUSEVENI, KEEPING MILITARY HARDWARE AND TRAINING FLOWING--OR DID UNTIL LAST WEEK WHEN SOME UGANDANS, UPSET ABOUT TOO CLOSE AN EMBRACE, KILLED A LIBYAN OPERATIVE. END TEXT. SHULTZ "	Success: CSV parsed	null	27,040
188	2/16/1988 11:24	88BAGHDAD855	Embassy Baghdad	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	R 161124Z FEB 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6329 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE 0250 USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL 0085 DIA WASHDC 0028 AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 00855 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPH 3, LAST THREE SENTENCES) E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, PHUM, PTER, PINR, IZ, IR SUBJECT: VIEWS OF IRANIAN KURDISH LEADER QASSEMLU 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: COMING DOWN OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS FOR ONE OF HIS OCCASIONAL TRIPS TO BAGHDAD, IRANIAN KURDISH LEADER QASSEMLU MET SADDAM FEBRUARY 10. QASSEMLU ADMITTED THAT INTENSE SHELLING IN THE AREA OF HIS FORMER HEADQUAR- TERS (DOWNRIVER FROM THE EMBATTLED TOWN OF MAWAT) HAD FORCED HIM RECENTLY TO MOVE 35 KILOMETERS NORTH. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE 10-12,000 ACTIVE FIGHTERS AND THE CAPABILITY TO CALL ON MANY MORE AND TO HAVE AMPLE ARMS (CAPTURED FROM IRANIANS) AND MONEY (THROUGH SMUGGLING). HE MADE AN APPEAL FOR U.S. \"MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT,\" NOTING THAT HIS PARTY HAS ALWAYS STRONGLY DISAPPROVED OF HOSTAGE-TAKING. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR HAS APPROACHED HIM ON BEHALF OF KIDNAPPEES HELD BY TALABANI AND HE IS HOPEFUL THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO GET THEM FREED. 3. QASSEMLU DESCRIBED HIS RELATIONS WITH TALABANI AS GOOD, ALTHOUGH HIS POLICY OF STRICT NEUTRALITY BETWEEN TALABANI AND THE IRAQIS SOMETIMES CAUSES FRICTION. QASSEMLU RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR AN ALLIANCE WITH OTHER IRANIAN OPPOSITION GROUPS, BUT RAJAVI--WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS AN \"AMATEUR\"--SEEMS UNWILLING. RAJAVI\'S LIMITED MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE NORTH COMPLICATED QASSEMLU\'S RELATIONS WITH TALABANI, AND RAJAVI WILL NOW MOVE HIS EFFORTS SOUTH. UNLIKE RAJAVI, QASSEMLU AVOIDS EVER BEING PHOTOGRAPHED WITH SADDAM. QASSEMLU DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN AS STABLE, WHILE THE SITUATION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN HAS \"SHARPLY DETERIORATED\" (I.E., FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN BAGHDAD) DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS. THE IRAQI VILLAGE DESTRUCTION CAMPAIGN HAS NOT YET BEEN MIRRORED ON A LARGE SCALE IN IRAN. END SUMMARY 4. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE 1988 CONGRESS OF THE DEMOCRA- TIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN OF IRAN (KDPI), SECRETARY GENERAL A.R. QASSEMLU (WHO SPELLS HIS NAME GHASSEMLOU) CAME DOWN FROM THE MOUNTAINS TO MEET SADDAM HUSSEIN FEBRUARY 10. BECAUSE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF IRANIAN KURDS IN SWEDEN AND FRANCE, QASSEMLU TYPICALLY CONTACTS THE SWEDISH AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS WHEN HE MAKES TRIPS TO BAGHDAD, EVERY FIVE TO SEVEN MONTHS. POLCHIEF LOBBIED SWEDLSH AMBASSADOR THOREN FOR A MEETING WITH QASSEMLU AND WAS INVITEO TO A SIX-HOUR LUNCH FEBRUARY 12. QASSEMLU CAME ACROSS AS EX- TREMELY OPEN, SOPHISTICATED, AND ARTICULATE, EVEN IN ENGLISH WHICH IS ONLY HIS SIXTH-BEST LANGUAGE (AFTER KURDISH, PERSIAN, ARABIC, FRENCH, AND CZECH). HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE DIRECTORS OF THE KDPI\'S PARIS, STOCKHOLM, AND BAGHDAD OFFICES (ABDULLAH GHEDERI, EBRAHIM DJEURABESKA, AND SALAM AZIZI). ------------------------------- APPEAL FOR MORAL SUPPORT ------------------------------- 5. QASSEMLU MADE A STRONG APPEAL FOR AMERICAN \"MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT.\" HE OBSERVED THAT THE KDPI HAS ALWAYS HAD A POLICY OF STRONGLY OBJECTING TO TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE-TAKING, AND HE PROVIDED POLCHIEF WITH A PAPER HE HAD RECENTLY PRESENTED (THROUGH HIS REPRESEN- TATIVE) AT A PARIS SYMPOSIUM ON TERRORISM, IN WHICH HE OBJECTED TO TERRORISM AS A TOOL FOR REVOLUTIONARY LIBERATION GROUPS. HE CLAIMED TO BE PERPLEXED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS RECEIVED \"A RAGTAG BUNCH OF BACKWARD AFGHAN FUNDAMENTALISTS\" AND PERSISTS IN TRYING TO BOLSTER \"NONVIABLE NICARAGUAN GROUPS,\" WHILE NOT AFFORDING ATTENTION TO \"TRUE DEMOCRATIC GROUPS\" WHO ARE FIGHTING FOR \"UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS.\" 6. POLCHIEF OBSERVED THAT THERE IS PUBLIC SYMPATHY FOR THE KURDISH SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES BUT NOT VERY MUCH IS KNOWN ABOUT IT; QASSEMLU MIGHT DO WELL TO CULTIVATE JOURNALISTS. QASSEMLU SAID THAT ONE OF THE THINGS HE HAD DONW WHILE IN BAGHDAD THIS TIME WAS TO PUSH THROUGH A VISA FOR THE WASHINGTON POSO\'S JONATHAN RANDAL (PARIS), WHO HE SAID IS WRITING A BOOK ABOUT KURDS AND TO WHOM HE HAS GIVEN FOURTEEN HOURS OF INTERVIEW. QASSEMLU LAMENTED THAT \"THE SOVIETS ALWAYS TEND TO SEE THE KDPI AS SUPPORTED BY THE AMERICANS AND THE AMERICANS ALWAYS SUSPECT THE SOVIETS\" WHILE IN FACT THE KDPI HAS NO FRIENDS. \"OUR ONLY FRIENDS ARE THE MOUNTAINS.\" ------------------------ ITALIAN HOSTAGES ------------------------ 7. QASSEMLU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD JUST MET ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TOSCANO AND GIVEN HIM A PLEDGE TO DO WHAT HE COULD ABOUT THE THREE ITALIAN KIDNAPPEES BEING HELD BY TALABANI\'S PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN (PUK). HE NOTED THAT HE HAD INTERVENED OCCASIONALLY IN THE PAST, HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN INFLUENCING TALABANI TO RELEASE HOSTAGES, AND HE \"HAD EVERY CONFIDENCE\" THAT HE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL AGAIN. (HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE ITALIANS HAD APPROACHED HIM AND THUS HE HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY MADE ANY EFFORTS ON THE CIVILIAN\'S BEHALF.) QASSEMLU BETRAYED A TRACE OF ANNOYANCE THAT OTHER GROUPS\' WILLINGNESS TO RESORT TO TERRORISM HAD GAINED THEM GREATER ATTENTION THAN THAT GIVEN THE KDPI, EVEN THOUGH THE KDPI, HE CLAIMED, IS A \"MUCH MORE FIRMLY AND WIDELY BASED ORGANIZATION.\" ------------------------------- KDPI BASE OF SUPPORT ------------------------------- 8. QASSEMLU SAID THAT HE HAS 10-12,000 ACTIVE FIGHTERS AND \"CANNOT HANDLE\" ANY MORE THAN THAT FOR LOGISTICAL JEXNSJM WHENEVER HE NEEDS, HE CAN CALL UP \"SEVERAL MULTIPLES\" OF THAT FIGURE. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAS NO REAL COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE AMONG IRANIAN KURDS (\"80 PERCENT ARE BEHIND ME\") AND HE SCOFFED AT THE SITUATION IN IRAQ: \"THERE IS NOTHING SIMILAR IN IRAN TO A (KURDISH) TAHA MA\'RUF AS \'VICE PRESIDENT\' OR THE KURDS THAT HOLD MINISTRIES HERE. THERE IS NOTHING LIKE THE HUGE NUMBERS OF \'JAHASH\'\" (THE PEJORATIVE TERM FOR THE KURDISH TRIBAL FORCES HELD BY VHENIRAIE (##) --AND THUS BECOME SOMETHING EQUIVALENT TO THE \"JAHASH.\"). 9. IN HIS APPEAL FOR AMERICAN \"MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT,\" QASSEMLU STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT CALLING FOR MONEY OR ARMS. \"OF COURSE ONE ALWAYS LIKES MORE, BUT WE HAVE PLENTY.\" HE CLAIMED THAT THE KDPI HAS, OVER THE YEARS, BEEN ABLE TO CAPTURE AMPLE ARMS FROM THE IRANIAN URMY/PASDARAN. HE WAS RELUCTANT TO GO INTO HIS FINANCIAL SOURCES, CLAIMING ONLY THAT \"EVERY FAMILY IN KURDISTAN MAKES VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS,\" BUT IN THE COURSE OF CONVERSATION IT BECAME CLEAR THAT BOTH THE KDPI AND PUK SUSTAIN THEMSELVES IN LARGE PART THROUGH SMUGGLING. QASSEMLU SAID THAT HE \"ONLY\" CJARGES A \"THREE PERCENT DUTY\" ON GOODS PASSING FROM IRAQ INTO IRAN, AS OPPOSED TO \"AS MUCH AS TWENTY PERCENT\" LEVIED BY TALABANI. EXAMPLES OF GOODS GOING INTO IRAN INCLUDE WHISKEY AND VIDEOS AND OF GOODS GOING INTO IRAQ, CARPETS AND PISTACHIOS. FORMERLY TEA CAME FROM IRAQ AND SUGAR FROM IRAN, BUT LATELY BOTH TEA AND SUGAR HAVE BEEN MOVING FROM IRAQ INTO IRAN. QASSEMLU SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY ASKED TALABANI HOW LONG HE COULD SURVIVE FINANCIALLY IF HIS MONETARY SOURCES SUDDENLY DRIED UP, AND TALABANI SAID, \"TWO MONTHS,\" WHEREAS QASSEMLU CLAIMED HE WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY GOING ON FOR \"AT LEAST TWO YEARS.\" 10. QASSEMLU DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN AS \"STABLE,\" I.E., MUCH THE SAME AS IT HAS XBEEN FINCE 1980 WHEN THE KDPI LOST ITS CONTROL OVER THE CITIES AND CHANGED FROM CONVENTIONAL WARFARE TO GUERRILLA TACTICS. THE IRANIANS CONTROL THE CITIES VNOW BUT ONLY CONTROL THE MAIN HIGHWAYS FROM EIGHT TO FVE; TE KDPI TACES OVER AT NIGHT. QASSEMLU PRO\' XFESSED TO BE \"OPTIMISTIC\" ABOUT THE FUTURE, SINCE HIS SUPPORT IN IRANIN KURDISTAN IS \"ROCK-SOLID.\" HE SAID THAT HE ISHPREPARED TO HOLD OUT IN THE MOUNTAINS FOR 25 YEARS, BUT IF KHOMEINI DIES SOON \"THERE MAY BE CONSIDERABLE TURMOIL IN TEHRAN,\" AND THE IRANIAN ECONOMY IS \"IN A TAILSPIN.\" WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE OR TALABANI AND BARZANI CONTROLLED MORE TERRAIN, QASSEMLU SAID THAT THREE YEARS AGO HE DID, BUT NOW THE IRAQI KURDS DO. THE REASON, HE EXPLAINED, IS NOT THAT HE IS DOING WORSE--TO THE CONTRARY HE IS HLDING HIS OWN--IT IS RATHER THAT THE SITUATION FOR THE BAGHDAD REGIME IN IRAQI KURDISTAN HAS \"DETERIOKA- TED SO SHARPLY\" OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS. (#) CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN BRINGING TALABAMI AND SADDAM TOGETHER FOR PROLONGED NEGOTIA- TIOS TH YEARS AGO, WHICH BROKE DOWN. -------------------------------------- COMPELLED TO MOVE HEADPUARTERS -------------------------------------- 11. QASSEMLU ADMITTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN OBLIGED TO MOVE HIS HEADQUARTERS.BECAUSE OF INTENSE IRANIAN SHELLING. HIS FORMER HEADQUARTERS--HE POINTED OUT ON AN UNFORTUNATELY NOT VERY DETAILED MAP--APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NEAR THE LESSER ZAB RIVER WHERE IT FLOWS INTO IRAQ (APPROXIMATELY 3601N 4520E). HE HAD HAD A LARGE HOSPI- TAL TYERE TO WHICH FRENCH DOCTORS CAME EVERY MONTH, AND OFTEN THE KDPI WAS PUT IN THE ANOMOLOUS SITUATION OF HAVING BOTH TALABANI AND IRAQI ARMY CASUALTIES AT THE HOSPITAL AT THE SAME TIME. THE LOCALS BECAME UNTENABLE BECAUSE THE IRANIAN ARMY WAS JUST TO THE EAST, THE IRAQI ARMY JUST TO THE WEST, AND TALABANI\'S FORCES BEHIND THE IRAQI ARMY FURTHER TO THE WEST--\"EVERYBODY WAS POUNDING EVERYBODY.\" NOW HE HAS MOVED TO A POINT (APPROXIMATELY 3620N 4515E) SOME THIRTY-FIVE KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH, AGAIN RIGHT ON THE IRANIAN BORDER SO THAT QASSEMLU SPENDS MUCH OF HIS TIME ON THE IRANIAN SIDE (HE CLAIMS), BUT WHERE THE IRAQI ARMY IS MUCH FURTHER AWAY TO ZHE WEST. THUS, HIS HEADQUARTERS NOW APPEARS TO BE IN A KIND OF NO-MAN\'S-LAND WHERE THE KDPI HAS FULL SWAY. HE SAYS HE HAS REBUILT THE HOSPITAL THERE AND THE FRENCH DOCTORS CONTINUE TO COME. 12. ON FIGHTING AT MAWAT ON THE GOGASUR RIVER JUST TO THE SOUTH OF WHERE HIS FORMER HEADQUARTERS WAS, QASSEMLU SAID THAT THE IRANIAN OBJECTIVE IS TO CLEAR TALABANI\'S EAST-WEST ACCESS. TALABANI\'S HEADQUARTERS, HE CLAIMED, IS LOCATED SOUTHEAST OF MAWAT (SOMEWHERE VAGUELY IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHILER RIVER WHICH MEETS THE GOGASUR SOUTH OF MAWAT, APPROXIMATELY AT 3547N 4540E). THE IRANIANS CONTROL THE RIDGE OVERLOOKING MAWAT TO THE EAST, THE IRAQIS CONTROL THE HILLS SOUTHWEST OF MAWAT, AND THERE HAS BEEN MUCH FIGHTING THERE AND IN THE MOUNTAIN WEST OF MAWAT WHICH THE IRANIANS PARTIALLY CONTROL. JUST THAT MORNING QASSEMLU RECEIVED A CALL FROM HIS HEADQUARTERS THAT THE IRAQIS HAD JUST LAUNCHED A NEW ATTACK ON THE IRANIAN POSITIONS WEST OF MAWAT. MAWAT ITSELF, \"LIKE PANJWIN,\" QASSEMLU COMMENTED, IS COMPLETELY ABANDONED. -------------------------------- RELATIONS WITH TALABANI -------------------------------- 13. QASSEMLU CLAIMED TO BE \"VERY GOOD FRIENDS\" WITH TALABANI. RECENTLY HE HAD ASKED TALABANI TO PICK UP SOME CAVIAR FOR HIM FROM THE CASPIAN, AND WHEN TALABANI BROUGHT IT TO HIM HE JOKED THAT HE HAD HAD TO GO THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS TO GET MORE CAVIAR THAN IS NOW USUALLY PERMITTED AND IF THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAD KNOWN WHOM IT WAS FOR \"THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN APOPLECTIC.\" QASSEMLU ADMITTED THAT THERE ARE TIMES WHEN DELICATE ISSUES ARISE. FOR EXAMPLE, RECENTLY 52 IRAQI SOLDIERS, INCLUDING SIX OFFICERS, HAD TAKEN REFUGE WITH THE KDPI AND TALABANI HAD DEMANDED THAT THEY BE HANDED OVER. THE DISPUTE WENT ON FOR TWO WEEKS BUT QASSEMLU WAS ADAMANT THAT THE KDPI MUST REMAIN \"ABSOLUTELY NEUTRAL\" IN ALL MATTERS BETWEEN IRAQIS AND KURDS, AND HE EVENTU- ALLY HANDED THE SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS BACK TO THE IRAQI ARMY. QASSEMLU, WHO WHILE BEING REMARKABLY OPEN ALSO TENDED TO CHOOSE HIS WORDS CAREFULLY, WAS UNWILL- ING TO BE DRAWN OUT ABOUT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH MAS\'UD BARZANI, BUT HE RIDICULED THE IDEA THAT THE BARZANIS\' \"KDP\" WAS EVER \"A REAL PARTY.\" \"THEY ARE MERELY A TRIBE.\" ---------------------------------- SADDAM IS IN CHARGE ---------------------------------- 14. QASSEMLU WAS UNWILLING TO DISCUSS HIS MEETING WLTH SADDAM, INDEED EVEN DIRECTLY TO ADMIT IT TOOK PLACE (ALTHOUGH PRIVATELY TO THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR HE HAD BEEN MORE CANDID), ALTHOUGH HE DID ALLUDE TO THE PERSIAN SAYING THAT \"IF YOU CAN MEET GOD, THERE IS NO POINT IN SETTLING FOR ONE OF THE TWELVE IMAMS.\" QASSEMLU SAID THAT, UNLIKE MUJAHEDIN E-KHALQ LEADER RAJAVI, HE HAD \"ABSOLUTELY NO DESIRE\" TO BE PHOTO- GRAPHED WITH SADDAM OR HAVE ANY PUBLICITY OF HIS TRAVEL TO BAGHDAD, MUCH LESS OF MEETING SADDAM--\"IT DOES NOT GO OVER VERY WELL IN IRAN.\" POLCHIEF PRESSED HIM ON WHO IN IRAQ IS IN CHARGE OF KURDISH ISSUES, AND QASSEMLU SAID, \"SADDAM. HE IS IN CHARGE OF EVERYTHING.\" THAT ASIDE, HOWEVER, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN DAY-TO- DAY AFFAIRS, \"THERE ARE THREE IMPORTANT PEOPLE IN IRAQ: SADDAM; \'ADNAN (KHAYRALLAH, MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND FIRST COUSIN AND BGOTHER-IN-LAW OF SADDAM), WHO IS IN CHARGE OF THE SOUTH; AND \'ALI HASAN (AL-MAJID, PATER- NAL COUSIN AND LOOK-ALIKE OF SAWAAV0\| WHO IS IN UHAR3 RGFITHE NORTH.\" HOWEVER, QASSEMLU INDICATED HE DID NOT SEE \'ALI HASAN, HEADQUARTERED IN KIRKUK, VERY OFTEN, APPARENTLY BECAUSE QASSEMLU NEVER SETTLES FOR LESS THAN \"GOD.\" -------------------------------- VILLAGE DESTRUCTION -------------------------------- 15. POLCHIEF ASKED QASSEMLU FOR HIS REACTION TO THE IRAQI CAMPAIGN OF DESTROYING KURDISH VILLAGES. QASSEMLU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT \"MOST\" VILLAGES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BUT HE SEEMED UNEMOTIONAL ON THE POINT. POLCHIEF ASKED IF THE CAMPAIGN HAD HAD THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS AND REFUGEES. HE ANSWERED THAT IT HAD \"GREATLY\" INCREASED THE NUMBER OF UERRILLAS BUT NEITHER HE NOR TALABANI ENCOURAGED THE IDEA OF REFUGEES INTO THE OTHER\'S TERRITORY, BECAUSE OF THE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN FEEDING AND CARING FOR PEOPLE. THE NET EFFECT OF THE IRAQI VILLAGE DES- TRUCTION CAMPAIGN, HE ACKNOWLEDGED, IS THE ALMOST COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF THE IRAQI KURDS\' TRADITIONAL AGRARIAN WAY OF LIFE. KURDISH MEN IN IRAQ HAVE ONLY TWO CHOICES, TO GO TO THE CITIES OR TO STAY: IN NEWLY CONSTRUCTED CENTERS WHERE THE ONLY LIVELIHOOD IS TO BE \"JAHASH.\" QASSEMLU SAID THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE SO FAR ONLY DESTROYED 25 VILLAGES, OUT OF OVER SEVEN THOUSAND IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN (AND A CLAIMED KURDISH POPULATION IN IRAN OF SEVEN MILLION), BUT HE COMMENTED, \"ALAS, EACH SIDE TENDS TO LEARN BAD HABITS FROM THE OTHER.\" ONE BAD HABIT THAT HE CLAIMED THE IRANIANS HAVE (#) IS THE USE OF CHEMICUL WEAPONS. \"BOTH SIDES DO IT, ALTHOUGH THE IRAQIS MUCH MORE.\" POLCHIEF ASKED WHETHER, GIVEN THE DENUDED NATURE OF MOST OF KURDISTAN, HELICOPTERS AND OTHER AIRBORNE ATTACKS POSE A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE PESHMERGA. QASSEMLU SAID, \"NEITHER WE NOR THE IRAQI KURDS ARE WORRIED ABOUT HELICOPTERS. WE CAN TAKE CARE OF THEM. BUT ARTILLERY IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR US. AND CHEMICAL WARFARE IS A PROBLEM TOO.\" ----------------------------- A KURD\'S VIEW OF IRAQ ----------------------------- 16. QASSEMLU DID NOT GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO CRITICIZE IRAQ, BUT HE COULD NOT RESIST A BARRAGE OF CUTTING REMARKS THAT CLEARLY SHOWED HIS DISDAIN FOR ARABS AND FOR THE IRAQI REGIME. IN PARTICULAR, HE SAID THAT HE VERY MUCH DISLIKED BAGHDAD AND AVOIDED COMING UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. HE GRUDGINGLY ADMITTED THAT IRAN IS A MORE FLUID AND DYNAMIC SOCIETY--\"YES, IN URMIA PEBPLE CAN PICKIUP THE PHONE TO THE UNITED STATES ANY TIME THEY WANT, AND THEY ARE FREE TO TRAVEL OUT OF THE COUNTRY,\" HE SAID WISTFULLY --BUT HE WAS QUICK TO EMPHASIZE THAT THERE IS MUCH LESS INTERFERENCE IN PEOPLE\'S PRIVATE MORALS IN IRAQ AND THAT IRAQ STANDS FOR \"MORE MODERN IDEAS.\" HE HAD DETESTED THE SHAH, \"BUT KHOMEINI IS MUCH WORSE.\" HE HAD SEEN KHOMEINI TWICE IN 1979 AND BEEN \"LIED TO SHAMELESSLY.\" QASSEMLU PROCEEDED TO GIVE A LECTURE ON THE SHI\'A PRACTICE OF \"TAQIYA\" (DECEIT TO SERVE A HIGHER PURPOSE) AS AN PNGRAINED PART OF THE SHI\'A PERSONALITY; POLCHIEF NOTED THAT WE HAD RECENTLY LEARNED A FEW LDSSONS ON THE SUBJECT OURSELVES. ------------------------ RAJAVI ------------------------- 17. QASSEMLU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE KDPI IS IN NEED OF ALLIANCES WITH OTHER IRANIAN OPVBSITION GROUPS, SINCE BY ITSELF IT OBVIOUSLY CANNOT OVERTHROW THE REGIME. HE ADMITTED THAT THE REGIME HAS WIDE SUVPORT (\"HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF MULLAHS WHO ALL SEE THEIR LIVELIHOOD AT STAKE\") AND ITS OVERTHROW WILL BE NO EASY MATTER. POL- CHIEF ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE ALLIANCE WITH RAJAVI WHO, IN ANY CASE, HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN MOUNTING MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE NORTH. QASSEMLU DESCRIBED RAJAVI AS AN \"AMATEUR,\" WHO HAS 1200 FIGHTERS \"AT THE MOST\" BUT HAS A GOOD PROPAGANDA MACHINE. HE ADMITTED THAT RAJAVI \"HAD TRIED A FEW ACTIONS IN THE NORTH,\" BUT UNLIKE THE KDPI THE MUJAHEDIN E-KHALQ \"HAVE NO REAL STRENGTH IN PLACE IN IRAN.\" \"IN FACT, OF ALL THE OPPOSITION GROUPS,\" QASSEMLU CLAIMED, \"ONLY MY PARTY HAS SIGNIFICANT STRENGTH INSIDE IRAN.\" QASSEMLU SAID THATSRAJAVI\'S RECENT ACTIONS IN THE NORTH HAD CAUSED PROBLEMS FOR THE KDPI, BECAUSE IT HAD ON OCCASION ENGAGED TALABANI\'S FORCES. QASSEMLU SAID THAT HENCEFORTH RAJAVI WILL NOT BE OPERATING IN THE NORTH BUT HAS NOW SWITCHED TO THE SOUTH. HE ADMITTED THAT RAJAVI \"IS APPARENTLY NOT EAGER FOR ANY ALLIANCES.\" \"RAJAVI HAS VISIONS OF GRANDEUR; HE THINKS HE IS ABLE TO CARRY IT BY HIMSELF.\" ------------------------------- KDPI CONGRESS ------------------------------- 18. IN AN ASIDE, THE KDPI PARIS REPRESENTATIVE (WHO WITH HIS COLLEAGUE IN STOCKHOLM WAS TO RETURN TO EUROPE FEBRUARY 15) SAID THAT \"APPROXIMATELY 200\" PARTY REPRESENTATIVES HAD APPEARED FOR THE CONGRESS, HELD AT THE NEW PARTY HEADQUARTERS. THE CONGRESS HAD ALWAYS PREVIOUSLY BEEN BIENNIAL, BUT BECAUSE OF THE ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES FACED BY MANY OF THE PARTY MEMBERS IN MAKING THE JOURNEY FROM OUTLYING PARTS OF IRANIAN KURDISTAN OVER THE BORDER TO THE HEADQUARTERS IN IRAQ, IT HAS NOW BEEN DECIDED NOT TO HAVE THE NEXT CONGRESS FOR THREE YEARS. QASSEMLU, WHILE REPEATEDLY STRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF HIS PARTY AND ITS POLICIES (AND HE CLARIFIED THAT HE MEANT \"DEMOCRATIC\" IN THE WESTERN RATHER THAN EASTERN SENSE), ADMITTED THAT HE HAD HAD NO OPPONENT FOR POSITION OF SECRETARY GENERAL. POLCHIEF ASKED WHETHER ANY KDPI REPRESENTA- TIVES FROM THE U.S. HAD PARTICIPATED, AND THE REPLY WAS THAT WHILE ONE HAD ATTENDED THE PREVIOUS CONGRESS, NONE CAME THIS TIME. ------------------------------------ KOMALA ------------------------------------ 19. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR DISPLAYED CONSTERNATION THAT TWO WEEKS AGO HE HAD GIVEN A PROMINENT IRANIAN KURDISH FIGURE, SHAYH \'IZZ AL-DIN HUSAYNI, A TOURIST VISA TO SWEDEN, AND NOW HE IS ASKING FOR ASYLUM. THE VISA HAD BEEN REQUESTED ON HIS BEHALF BY HIS SON-IN-LAW, NAMED CHAMSI, THE BAGHDADREPRESENTATIVE OF KOMALA (SMALL MARXIST IRANIAN KURDISH GROUP). QASSDMLU DISCOUNTED SHAYKH HUSAYNI\'S RELIGIOUS IMPBRTANCE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF KOMALA. ----------------------------- BIOGRAPHICS ----------------------------- 20. QASSEMLU (GHASSEMLOU) WAS BORN IN 1930. HIS EARLY EDUCATION WAS IN URMIA BUT HE ALSO ATTENDED THE AMERICAN COLLEGE IN TEHRAN. HE WENT TO UNIVERSITY IN PARIS BUT WAS EXPELLED FROM IRAN (#) REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. HE WON A SCHOLARSHIP AT THE UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE, AND HE WAS AN ECONOMICS PROFESSOR IN PRAGUE FOR TWENTY YEARS. HE DEPARTED WHEN THE SOVIETS MARCHED IN IN 1968. OFF AND ON DURING THE 1970S HE SERVED AS AN ECONOMIST IN THE MINISTRY OF PLANNING IN BAGHDAD, DURING WHICH HE AUTHORED A MAJOR OVERALL ECONOMIC PLAN FOR IRAQ, HE CLAIMS. OF MEDIUM HEIGHT AND SLENDER BUILD, HIS HAIR IS GRAYING BUT HE MOVES WITH THE QUICKNESS AND AGILITY OF A YOUNGER MAN. HE TELLS A GOOD ANECDOTE AND PEPPERS HIS CONVERSATION WITH CONSTANT HUMOR. NEWTON NOTE BY OC/T: (#): OMISSION: PARA 20 LINE 4. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW. "	Success: CSV parsed	null	27,590
189	2/17/1988 16:02	88CARACAS1552	Embassy Caracas	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O 171602Z FEB 88 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1154 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 01552 FOR ARA ABRAMS; INR ABRAMOWITZ DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR SORZANO E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, CU, VE SUBJECT: CUBA AFTER CASTRO -- ARE WE READY? 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: THIS CABLE ASKS THE QUESTION: \"IS THE UNITED STATES PREPARED FOR A SUDDEN CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN CUBA?\" IT DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION, NOR DOES IT SPECULATE ON THE PROBABILITY OF SUCH AN EVENT. IT ALSO DOES NOT PROPOSE COURSES OF ACTION DESIGNED TO BRING THAT EVENT ABOUT. IT DOES SUGGEST THE USG ESTABLISH A STUDY GROUP TO CONSIDER OUR OPTIONS IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY, AS UNLIKELY AS IT MAY APPEAR TO BE AT THIS TIME. 3. ALTHOUGH \"EXPERTS\" HAVE BEEN PREDICTING CASTRO\'S DOWNFALL FOR ABOUT 29 YEARS, THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT HE WILL NOT LAST FOREVER. IF IT IS TRUE THAT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN CUBA ARE VERY BAD AND CONTINUING TO DETERIORATE; IF RECENT HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES DEFECTORS ARE INDICATIVE OF A COLLAPSE OF THE \"NOMENKLATURA\"; IF CASTRO\'S AGE BEGINS TO TAKE ITS TOLL, COULD WE BE SEEING THE BEGINNING OF THE END? MAYBE NOT, BUT, IF SO, ARE WE READY TO SEIZE WHAT MAY BE A FLEETING OPPORTUNITY BROUGHT ABOUT, FOR EXAMPLE, BY A MILITARY COUP, AS FAR-FETCHED AS THAT IDEA SEEMS RIGHT NOW? IT COULD BE A WORTHWHILE INVESTMENT TO STUDY OUR OPTIONS, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE QUESTION OF WHAT COULD BE CALLED THE \"DENAZIFICATION\" OF CUBA. THE U.S. HAS HAD PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH \"EXORCISING\" OTHER SOCIETIES OF MILITARIZED, HATE-FILLED IDEOLOGIES WHICH MAINTAINED THEMSELVES IN POWER BY TERROR AND BRUTALITY. HAVE WE EXAMINED, ON THE ONE HAND, THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY, FASCIST ITALY AND JAPAN, AND CUBA ON THE OTHER? IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE AND CERTAINLY MORE THAN SIMPLY AN ACADEMIC EXERCISE. STRANGER THINGS HAVE HAPPENED IN HISTORY, THAT A TYRANNY SUDDENLY CEASES TO EXIST, DUE TO INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL CAUSES. IF THAT HAPPENS IN CUBA, ARE WE PREPARED TO WORK QUICKLY WITH WHATEVER CUBANS INSIDE THE ISLAND MAY BE WILLING TO DETACH HER FROM THE SOVIET BLOC BEFORE HARD-LINE COMMUNISTS AND CASTROITES CAN SUCCESSFULLY REACT? IF WE ARE, CAN WE SUSTAIN THE EFFORT BY BEGINNING A PROCESS OF UNDOING NEARLY THIRTY YEARS OF BRAIN-WASHING AND PROPAGANDA? 4. WE COULD EXAMINE OUR EXPERIENCE IN A MINOR BUT MORE RECENT AND STILL RELEVANT CASE: GRENADA. WERE WE READY FOR A SUDDEN CHANGE IN GRENADA IN 1983? ALTHOUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE DIFFERENT, DID WE MAKE OUR TASK EASIER OR MORE DIFFICULT BY OUR ADVANCE PLANS OR LACK THEREOF? WHAT WAS OUR EXPERIENCE IN THE FIRST FEW WEEKS AND MONTHS AFTER THE RESCUE MISSION? HOW WOULD IT HAVE WORKED IN THE CASE OF A SPANISH-SPEAKING COUNTRY WITH 30 YEARS OF COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP INSTEAD OF 4 YEARS? ALTHOUGH AN INVASION OR OCCUPATION OF CUBA BY U.S. FORCES IS NOT AT ALL LIKELY, IT COULD BE THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, UNDER A SCENARIO OF A SUCCESSFUL COUP BY CUBAN MILITARY OFFICERS FOLLOWING, LET\'S SAY A CASTRO HEART ATTACK, THAT THE PROVISIONAL CUBAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ASK THE USG FOR ALL TYPES OF ASSISTANCE. IF WE ARE NOT READY TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY, A COUNTER-COUP COULD BE LAUNCHED. THE FATE OF CUBA FOR ANOTHER 30 YEARS COULD THUS BE DECIDED IN A MATTER OF HOURS, WITH THE CORRESPONDING CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY. HOW MUCH HAS A COMMUNIST BASE NINETY MILES FROM FLORIDA COST US IN THE PAST THREE DECADES? EVEN IF THERE IS NO VIOLENT RESISTANCE TO THE \"NEW\" CUBAN GOVERNMENT, ARE WE PREPARED TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC (E.G., FOOD, OIL) AND OTHER HELP WHICH THE NEW GOVERNMENT--ASSUMING, OF COURSE, THAT IT IS PRN-US--SEEKS? 5. A WASHINGTON-BASED TASK FORCE OR STUDY GROUP CONSISTING OF THE PRINCIPAL USG AGENCIES WITH KNOWLEDGE OF CUBA, AUGMENTED BY CONSULTANTS INCLUDING TRUSTWORTHY CUBANS AND AMERICANS SUCH AS LONG-TIME EXILES, RECENT DEFECTORS, ACADEMICS, AND PERSONS FAMILIAR WITH ISSUES SUCH AS \"DE NAZIFICATION\" IN POST WWII GERMANY, COULD PREPARE AN ACTION PLAN WHICH COULD SAVE THE UNITED STATES MUCH COST AND SUFFERING IN THE EVENTUALITY OF A SUDDEN CHANGE IN CUBA. REICH "	Success: CSV parsed	null	28,025
190	2/28/1988 10:41	88BAGHDAD1097	Embassy Baghdad	SECRET	[]	P 281041Z FEB 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6425 INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMCONSUL ADANA ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 01097 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PGOV, IZ, TU SUBJECT: KURDISH INSURGENCY IN IRAQ AND TURKEY 1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY: TRAINING CAMPS FOR PKK IN IRAN ARE A GROWING WORRY FOR TURKEY AND, ACCORDING TO TURKISH AMBASSADOR, HAVE BEEN A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION IN RECENT IRANIAN-TURKISH MEETINGS. BARZANI\'S KDP, APPARENTLY IN SOME DISARRAY, HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REIN IN THE PKK, WHICH HAS ACTIVELY BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH TALABANI\'S PUK. THE TURKS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS TO PKK BY THE IRAQIS. END SUMMARY. 3. ACCORDING TO TURKISH AMBASSADOR KOKSAL, ONE OF THE TOP ITEMS ON THE AGENDA DURING THE IRANIAN MINISTER OF INTERIOR\'S RECENT VISIT TO ANKARA WAS IRANIAN SUPPORT OF THE PKK INSURGENTS BY PROVIDING THEM TRAINING CAMPS IN IRAN AND BY ASSISTING THEM IN THEIR IRAQI SANCTUARIES. (ANOTHER TOP PRIORITY, KOKSAL SAID, WAS THE PROBLEM OF THE LARGE IRANIAN REFUGEE POPULATION.) IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE PKK IS A DEVELOPMENT THAT HAS ONLY BEEN NOTICED OVER THE PAST YEAR, AS THE IRANIAN EMPHASIS PREVIOUSLY WAS IN SUPPORTING FUNDAMENTALIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY. THESE NEVER GARNERED SUFFICIENT POPULAR ENTHUSIASM, SO THE IRANIANS APPEAR TO BE TRYING A NEW TACTIC. 4. KOKSAL SAID THAT, DESPITE ASSURANCES TO TURKEY THAT IT WOULD NOT GIVE ANY AID TO THE PKK, ELEMENTS OF MASOUD BARZANI\'S KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAQ HAVE BEEN AIDING THE PKK, EVEN AS OTHERS OF ITS ELEMENTS ARE BEING ATTACKED BY THE PKK. KOKSAL ATTRIBUTED THE PROBLEM TO MASOUD\'S POOR CONTROL OVER HIS DISORGANIZED FORCES. IN A SEPARATE CON- VERSATION, TURKISH DCM OKCUN OBSERVED THAT THE KDP HAS \"FALLEN INTO SOME DISARRAY\" FOLLOWING IDRIS BARZANI\'S DEATH ONE YEAR AGO. MASOUD HAD APPARENTLY EVEN GIVEN THE ORDER TO KILL PKK INSURGENTS, IN CONFORMITY WITH HIS \"UNDERSTANDING\" WITH A TURKISH GENERAL IN COMMAND IN EASTERN TURKEY TO \"SHUT OUT\" THE PKK, BUT MASOUD \"CANNOT DISCIPLINE HIS OWN PEOPLE.\" 5. OKCUN SAID THAT APO ACALAN (HEAD OF PKK, RESIDENT IN SYRIA) HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH JALAL TALABANI, HEAD OF THE PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN (PUK), PRESUMABLY THROUGH SOME SYRIAN INTERMEDIATION AND IMPETUS. TALABANI IS SEEKING GREATER STATUS AS \"THE PREEMINENT KURDISH LEADER\" AND THUS WANTS THE PKK AS AN ALLY, BUT ONLY IF THE PKK BEHAVES ITSELF. ACCORDING TO OKCUN, TALABANI ALSO IS LOOKING TOWARD A TIME WHEN THE PKK WILL BE HELPFUL TO HIM IN MOVING AGAINST BARZANI. THE ELEMENTS OF THE TALABANI- ACALAN AGREEMENT SEEM TO BE: -- CESSATION, FOR THE TIME BEING, OF PKK ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS, -- CESSATION OF PKK ASSASSINATIONS OF OTHER KURDS, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE, -- TURNING AGAINST THE KDP IN FULL FORCE, BUT NOT UNTIL \"THE TIME IS RIPE.\" OKCUN OBSERVED THAT IT IS ODD THAT THE PKK IS CULTI- VATING THE PUK, WHOSE TRADITIONAL AREA OF OPERATION IS AROUND SULAYMANIYYA AND NOT ALONG THE IRAQI- TURKISH BORDER WHICH IS KEY TO THE PKK, BUT HE ASSUMED THAT THE IMPORTANT FACTORS ARE ANGER AT MASOUD\'S PRESSURE ON THE PKK AND MASOUD\'S INCREASING LACK OF CONTROL WHICH ALLOWS THE PKK TO USE BASES IN KDP TERRITORY DESPITE ENMITY WITH MASOUD. OKCUN SAID THAT IN THE PAST SIX WEEKS, THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED DECREASE IN PKK ATTACKS, EVEN ON JANDARMA, AND HE GAVE CREDIT TO THE PUTATIVE ACALAN-TALABANI- SYRIAN AGREEMENT. 6. OKCUN ADDED THAT A NEW WORRISOME ELEMENT HAS EMERGED IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS: USE BY THE PKK OF NEW WEAPONRY OBTAINED FROM THE IRAQIS. THE TURKS, OKCUN SAID, HAVE TO ASSUME THAT THESE WEAPONS HAVE NOT BEEN CAPTURED, SINCE THEY ARE IN SERIAL SEQUENCE AND NEW. THE TURKS HAVE NOT RAISED THE ISSUE YET WITH THE IRAQIS, IN HOPES THAT IT WILL TURN OUT TO HAVE BEEN A LIMITED ARRANGEMENT. (ASKED WHY THE IRAQIS WOULD RISK HARMING ITS KEY RELATIONAHIP WITH TURKEY--AFTER ALL, NEITHER STATE IS BLESSED WITH AN OVERABUNDANCE OF FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS-- OKCUN MUSED THAT \"ALL THESE COUNTRIES\"--SYRIA, IRAN, AND IRAQ--ARE ACCUSTOMED TO PUTTING ON PRESSURE THROUGH RUNDERHANDED, VIOLENT MEANS: \"IT IS IN THEIR CHARACTER,\" WAS HIS VIEW.) 7. COMMENT: THE HISTORY OF KURDS, AT LEAST IN IRAQI KURDISTAN, IS THAT PPWE THEY ARE ALWAYS READY TO FIGHT NON-KURDISH OUTSIDERS THEY ALSO FREQUENTLY FIGHT EACH OTHER. THE CURRENT PKK-KDP SITUATION AND FREQUENT KDP-PUK FUEDS ILLUSTRATE THIS CONSTANT OF IRAQI KURDISH POLITICS. NEWTON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	28,129
191	3/2/1988 0:58	88STATE64278	Secretary of State	SECRET	[]	O 020058Z MAR 88 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE ","S E C R E T STATE 064278 FROM INR/DAS:DACLARK E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: IZ, IR, MOPS, MCAP SUBJECT: IRAQI MISSILE ATTACKS ON TEHRAN 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT 2. FOLLOWING IS A SPOT INTELLIGENCE REPORT ISSUED BY INR WITH INFORMATION AS OF 0900 EDT 1 MARCH 1988: 3. IRAQ HAS ANNOUNCED A TOTAL OF 13 MISSILE STRIKES AGAINST TEHRAN SINCE THE AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY 29. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFIRMS AT LEAST TEN OF THE FIRINGS, AT LEAST THREE WERE TRACKED TO TEHRAN. INITIAL PRESS REPORTS INDICATE SUBSTANTIAL CASUALTIES. 4. THESE ATTACKS WERE PROMPTED BY IRANIAN FIRING OF THREE SCUD MISSILES AT BAGHDAD THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 28-29, WHICH IN TURN WAS RETALIATION FOR AN IRAQI AIR STRIKE ON THE REY OIL REFINERY IN TEHRAN\'S SUBURBS FEBRUARY 27. 5. OUR BEST GUESS, BASED ON EARLIER REPORTS OF IRAQI EXPERIMENTATION, IS THAT IRAQ IS FIRING REDUCED-PAYLOAD SCUD MISSILES. THE ORDINARY SCUD CAN ONLY REACH HALFWAY TO TEHRAN, BUT THE IRAQIS WERE CLAIMING TO HAVE DOUBLED THE MISSILE\'S RANGE TO OVER 600 KM., WHICH WOULD JUST MAKE IT TO TEHRAN FROM THE KNOWN LAUNCHING AREA NEAR AL-AMARA. IRAQ IS CREDITED WITH OVER 140 SOVIET-ORIGIN SCUD SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. 6. BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED THAT US EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A RESOLUTION TO ENFORCE UNSC RES. 598 AGAINST IRAN HAVE STALLED. THUS, THE RESTRAINT SHOWN BY IRAN AND IRAQ UNTIL RECENTLY WILL INCREASLINGLY FRAY. IRAN IS LIKELY TO RESPOND WITH FURTHER SCUD ATTACKS AGAINST BAGHDAD AND ARTILLERY SHELLING OF IRAQI BORDER CITIES. THE IRANIANS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO LAUNCH ONE OR MORE MAJOR GROUND ATTACKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WHITEHEAD "	Success: CSV parsed	null	28,247
192	3/2/1988 9:51	88BAGHDAD1177	Embassy Baghdad	SECRET	[]	P 020951Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6461 ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 01177 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL IZ SUBJECT: THE REGIME IS PART OF THE PROBLEM 1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY. IRAQI MORALE IS AT A LOW POINT, ALTHOUGH IRAQIS REMAIN AS WEARILY DETERMINED AS EVER NOT TO LOSE THE WAR. SEVERAL RECENT GOVERNMENT ACTIONS -- RENEWED POPULAR ARMY RECRUITING, THE EX POST FACTO CANCELLATION OF AN AMNESTY FOR DESERTERS, AND THE BUNGLED EVACUATION EXERCISE -- ARE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS DIP. EROSION OF LIVING STANDARDS THROUGH INFLATION REMAINS A SERIOUS LONG TERM PROBLEM. THE RECENT MISSILE EXCHANGE HAS ADDED TO CIVILIAN FEARS. IT HAS ALSO GIVEN A BOOST TO THE MORALE OF SOME TO SEE IRAQ ABLE TO STRIKE BACK AT TEHRAN, BUT THIS POSITIVE EFFECT WILL DISSIPATE IF THE EXCHANGE CONTINUES VERY LONG. OFFICIAL BRAVADO IS A RESULT OF LOCAL MACHISMO AND A DESIRE TO BOOST SAGGING HOME-FRONT MORALE. END SUMMARY. 3. IN THE OPINION OF THE AMBASSADOR, CIVILIAN MORALE IN BAGHDAD IS CURRENTLY LOWER THAN AT ANY TIME DURING HIS THIRTY-NINE MONTHS AT POST. WHILE THE QUESTION MAY NOT BE CRITICAL FOR IRAQ, SINCE IRAQIS SOMEHOW DO AND MUST KEEP ON WITH THEIR DAILY LIVES IN THE FACE OF OFFICIAL COMPULSION AND POSSESS A GENUINE IF WEARY DETERMINATION NOT TO BE DEFEATED BY A DESPISED IRANIAN REGIME, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BURDEN IS MORE ANGUISHING NOW THAN IN RECENT MEMORY. 4. UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE IRAQIS, MUCH OF THE ADDED BURDEN ON MORALE IS DUE DECISIONS AND MISCALCULATIONS BY THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT IN RECENT MONTHS, INCLUDING: -- 1) A MAJOR REAPPEARANCE OF POPULAR ARMY PRESS GANGS AFTER AN ABSENCE OF A YEAR. ONE EXPLANATION IS THAT THE REGIME IS RAISING UNITS TO REPLACE KURDISH TRIBAL IRREGULAR UNITS DOING GARRISON AND REAR-AREA PATROL DUTY, SINCE THESE UNITS ARE CONSIDERED EVEN LESS RELIABLE IN THE WAKE OF THE GOVERNMENT\'S WHOLESALE DESTRUCTION OF KURDISH VILLAGES. (THE STREET RUMOR IS THAT THREE-FOURTHS OF THE NEW PA FORCES WILL GO NORTH TO KURDISTAN;ONE FOURTH TO GUARD PIPELINE.) MIDDLE-AGED BAGHDADIS REALLY FEAR DUTY IN KURDISTAN, EXPECTING TO HAVE THEIR THROATS CUT IN THE DARK OF NIGHT. ANOTHER EXPLANATION IS THAT AFTER A YEAR OF RECRUITING INACTIVITY, MANY PA UNITS ARE DUE TO BE DEMOBILIZED AFTER THEIR FOURTEEN MONTHS DUTY PERIOD AND MUST NOW BE REPLACED WHOLESALE. -- 2) THE EX POST FACTO CANCELLATION BY SADDAM OF THE LAST AMNESTY DECLARED IN JANUARY. MANY IRAQIS ACCUSE THE REGIME OF LURING DESERTERS IN TO SENTENCE THEM TO PRISON AND SOME TO EXECUTION. THIS PERCEIVED DOUBLE-DEALING HAS HARMED THE REGIME\'S ALREADY POOR CREDIBILITY WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE. -- 3) THE BUNGLED EVACUATION EXERCISE CANCELLED IN LATE FEBRUARY. THE GOVERNMENT\'S CHARACTERISTIC FAILURE TO EXPLAIN ITSELF AND THE POPULATION\'S USUAL PENCHANT FOR WILD RUMORS IN THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF RELIABLE INFORMATION SOWED REAL PANIC, WITH RUMORS OF IMPENDING NUCLEAR ATTACK, CHEMICAL WARFARE, AND FLOODING DUE TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE SADDAM TIGRIS DAM NEAR MOSUL. 5. A LONGER TERM SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR IRAQIS REMALNS THE STEADY EROSION OF THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING THROUGH STEADY INFLATION IN THE FACE OF A NINE-YEAR GOVERNMENT WAGE FREEZE AND THE DRAFTING ONE AFTER ANOTHER OF WORKING MALE FAMILY MEMBERS. A HIGH GOVERNMENT MONTHLY SALARY OF 250 DINARS (800 DOLLARS AT THE OFFICIAL RATE, 125 AT THE BLACK MARKET AND REAL VALUE RATE) BUYS LITTLE WHEN MEAT ON THE BONE COSTS NINE DINARS A KILO AND A KILO OF FRUITS OR VEGETABLES TWO TO THREE DINARS. 6. ONE NOTICEABLE RESULT OF THESE CURRENT PRESSURES HAS BEEN THE GROWING NUMBER OF BAGHDADIS MOVING THEIR FAMILIES OUT OF THE CITY OR MAKING ALTERNATIVE EMERGENCY ACCOMMODATIONS ARRANGEMENTS ELSEWHERE. THE EVACUATION EXERCISE AND THE LATEST MISSILE EXCHANGE WITH IRAN HAVE ACCELERATED THIS TREND. (THE AMBASSADOR\'S NEAREST NEIGHBOR, ONE OF IRAQ\'S RICHEST BUSINESSMEN, HAS DECAMPED TO MOSUL AND POORER PEOPLE ARE TRYING TO MOVE IN WITH RELATIVES ELSEWHERE.) WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY WHOLESALE FLIGHT, BUT TRAFFIC IN BADHDAD IS CURRENTLY NOTICEABLY LIGHTER THAN USUAL. 7. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT THE LONGER-TERM EFFECT OF THE MISSILE EXCHANGE WILL BE. FOR MANY, IF NOT MOST, IT HAS MEANT FEAR. OTHERS ARE PLEASED TO SEE IRAQ AT LAST ABLE TO RESPOND IN KIND AND IN FORCE TO PREVIOUS IRANIAN SCUD ATTACKS ON BAGHDAD AND HOPE IT WILL FRIGHTEN IRAN FROM FURTHER ATTACKS. IF, AS WE WOULD EXPECT, IRAN RESPONDS INSTEAD WITH MORE SCUDS, THESE LATTER PEOPLE WILL LIKELY LOSE THIS OPTIMISTIC INTERPRETATION. FINALLY SOME GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING A NORMALLY PACIFIC MFA SOURCE, ARGUE THAT IRAQ SHOULD ENCOURAGE A MAJOR IRANIAN ATTACK SINCE THE IRAQI ARMY HAS NEVER BEEN STRONGER, ITS MORALE BETTER, WHILE THE IRANIANS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY MOBILIZING. WE PUT THIS VIEW DOWN TO OFFICIAL BRAVADO ARISING OUT OF A RESURGENCE OF IRAQI MACHISMO AND A DESIRE TO COMBAT SAGGING HOME-FRONT MORALE. NEWTON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	28,296
193	3/2/1988 10:53	88BAGHDAD1181	Embassy Baghdad	SECRET	[]	O 021053Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6465 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE 0261 ","S E C R E T BAGHDAD 01181 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IZ, IR, US SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN WAR: ESCALATION OF THE WAR: NEED TO PRESSURE IRAQ TO DE-ESCALATE 1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT) 2. NOW THAT THE WAR OF THE CITIES HAS RESUMED (REGARDLESS OF WHO ACTUALLY STARTED IT), THE IRAQIS APPEAR TO FEEL THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1980-81 THEY HAVE A SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE OVER IRAN. ALTHOUGH UNDERSECRETARY HAMDOON ARGUED TO ME YESTERDAY THAT IRAQ WANTS TO ASSURE MUTUAL DETERRENCE AGAINST HITTING THE TWO CAPITALS, THE IRAQIS ARE SHOWING NONE OF THE MEASURED RESPONSE SUCH A GOAL WOULD IMPLY. RATHER THEY HAVE FIRED NINETEEN MISSILES TO DATE, NAMED BY THEM PROVOCATIVELY THE \"HUSSEIN\" AFTER SHIA ISLAM\'S MOST HOLY FIGURE, AND, EVEN MORE PROVOCATIVELY, HAVE FIRED THE LATEST ONE AGAINST THE HOLY CITY OF QUM. 3. WE BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQIS SEE THIS STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE AND ARE PRESSING IT HOME. IF THEY HAVE STOCKPILED A LARGE SUPPLY OF MISSILES (WE ASSUME BUT DO NOT KNOW THAT THEY ARE SOVIET SS-12\'S), THEY HAVE BADLY OUTGUNNED THE IRANIANS WHO HAVE ONLY A LIMITED SUPPLY OF OBSOLETE, SLOW-RELOADING SCUD B\'S WITH A FEW LAUNCHERS. THE IRAQIS ALSO KNOW THAT THEY HAVE AN ADVANTAGE ON THE GROUND. IRAN IS NOT READY FOR AN ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH. IF IT IS GOADED TO ATTACK WITH WHAT THEY HAVE, THEY FACE ALMOST CERTAIN DEFEAT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A STRONG COUNTER-ATTACK FROM IRAQ. THE WINDOW FOR ATTACKING IS RAPIDLY RUNNING OUT FOR IRAN, SINCE THE PRIME WINTER IAPYJV S PQMF AILL BE OVER BY THE END OF THIS MONTH, HARDLY ENOUGH TIME EVEN IF A NEW RECRUITING OF BASIJ STIMULATED BY THE MISSILE ATTACKS BEGINS IMMEDIATELY. 4. THE IRAQ MOTIVE IN FORCING AN ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING IS CLEARLY TO MAKE IRAN GIVE UP ITS WAR AIMS. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE INITIAL AIR RAIDS ON KHARG ISLAND THREE YEARS AGO, IRAQ SENSES THAT IT REALLY HAS THE ABILITY TO FORCE AN END TO HOSTILITIES, RATHER THAN JUST TO REACT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS NOT LIKELY TO LISTEN TO APPEALS TO EASE OFF. 5. OUR CONDEMNATION OF BOTH SIDES FOR ATTACKING CIVILIAN TARGETS WAS JUST RIGHT. I BELIEVE THAT, IF THE ATTACKS GO ON ANOTHER DAY, WE SHOULD GO BEYOND THE CONDEMNATION AND PRASS IRWY TT BE-ESCALATE. I AM NOT SANGUINE THAT THEY WILL LISTEN, SINCE THEY SEE A VITAL OPPORTUNITY AND THEIR RECORD FOR LISTENING TO OUR UNWELCOME ADVICE IS NOT ENCOURAGING. BUT IN THE INTEREST OF OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A QUICK PEACEFUL END TO THIS CONFLICT AND ABOVE ALL TO AVOID THE DANGERS OF AN INTENSIFIED WAR, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MAKE THE EFFORT. NEWTON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	28,412
194	3/2/1988 15:07	88NDJAMENA1239	Embassy Ndjamena	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE42378" ]	P 021507Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9351 ","UNCLAS NDJAMENA 01239 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, LY, CD SUBJECT: CHAD: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 42378 1. CHAD DOES NOT ENGAGE IN OR SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. RATHER, THIS COUNTRY HAS LONG BEEN THE TARGET OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT OR SPONSORED BY LIBYA, WHOSE ULTIMATE GOAL IS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HABRE REGIME AND THE EXPANSION OF LIBYAN HEGEMONY SOUTHWARD. 2. LIBYAN TERRORISM HAS BEEN LARGELY INEFFECTIVE OVER THE PAST YEAR DUE TO A COMBINATION OF ITS OWN INCOMPE- TENCE, THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF ACCESS TO THIS ISOLATED LAND, AND (MOST IMPORTANT), THE TIRELESS EFFORTS OF THE CHADIAN SECURITY SERVICES, WHICH FOILED SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO SMUGGLE ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES INTO THE COUNTRY. 3. DURING 1987, ONLY TWO ATTEMPTS AT TERRORISM WERE IN ANY WAY SUCCESSFUL IN CHAD. IN MARCH 1987, A LIBYAN- SPONSORED TERRORIST ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY A BRIDGE CONNECT- ING NDJAMENA TO KOUSSERI IN CAMEROUN. THE TERRORIST DID SUCCEED IN BLOWING HIMSELF UP, BUT ONLY DAMAGED THE BRIDGE, WHICH WAS BACK IN LIMITED OPERATION WITHIN HOURS. IN OCTOBER 1987, A BUILDING BELONGING TO AN AMERICAN PRIVATE VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATION IN THE PROVINCIAL TOWN OF MOUNDOU WAS DAMAGED BY AN EXPLOSION FOR WHICH LOCAL AUTHORITIES BELIEVE LIBYAN-INSPIRED TERRORISTS WERE RESPONSIBLE. BLANE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	28,480
195	3/6/1988 12:17	88ABUDHABI1313	Embassy Abu Dhabi	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O 061217Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9556 INFO GULFWAR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 01313 FROM AMCONSUL DUBAI E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: MOPS, MARR, SOCI, IR SUBJECT: IRAQI MISSILE ATTACKS ON TEHRAN 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. ABOUT FORTY IRAQI MISSILES HAD FALLEN ON TEHRAN AS OF LATE FRIDAY, MARCH 4, ACCORDING TO A TEHRAN BANKING OFFICIAL RECENTLY INTERVIEWED AT AMCONSUL DUBAI. THE RATE OF MISSILE ATTACKS HAD FALLEN FROM AN INITIAL ONE PER HALF HOUR TO ABOUT ONE EVERY FOUR HOURS BY FRIDAY. WHILE MOST OF THE MISSILES FELL ON RESIDENTIAL AREAS, FOUR HOSPITALS AND FOUR MILITARY BARRACKS HAD BEEN HIT, THE SOURCE CLAIMED. HE SAID MISSILES SHATTERED WINDOWS WITHIN A TWO HUNDRED METER RADIUS OF IMPACT, CAUSING MANY INJURIES. 3. OUTWARDLY, LIFE IN TEHRAN GOES ON, BUT RESIDENTS ARE ESPECIALLY NERVOUS ABOUT THE MISSILE ATTACKS BECAUSE NO AIR RAID SIRENS ARE SOUNDED IN ADVANCE, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL IRANIANS INTERVIEWED ON MARCH 5 AND 6. WHILE RESIDENTS RECEIVE ADEQUATE WARNING OF IMPENDING BOMB ATTACKS, THE FIRST AND ONLY WARNING OF A MISSLE ATTACK IS THE APPARENTLY TERRIFYING NOISE THE MISSILE MAKES SHORTLY BEFORE IMPACT. ONE TEHRANI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GREATEST EFFECT OF THE MISSILES IS PSYCHOLOG- ICAL. WHILE HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT ACTUALLY BEING HIT, HE WAS UNDER CONSTANT STRESS BECAUSE OF THE ATTACKS. 4. TEHRAN AIRPORT IS OPERATING AS USUAL, BUT INTER- NATIONAL TELEPHONE SERVICE HAS BEEN DISRUPTED. AS OF FRIDAY TEHRAN RESIDENTS TRYING TO CALL ABROAD WERE GIVEN A RECORDING TELLING THEM TO DIAL THE OPERATOR, WHO THEN TOLD THEM ALL LINES WERE FULL. DUBAI SOURCES HAVE TOLD US THAT SOME CALLS HAVE BEEN MADE FROM TEHRAN TO DUBAI. WE UNDERSTAND A SYSTEM HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WHEREBY TEHRAN RESIDENTS MAY PLACE CALLS OF UP TO THREE MINUTES FROM A CENTRAL EXCHANGE, PROVIDED THEY LIMIT THEIR CONVERSATIONS TO PERSONAL TOPICS ONLY - I.E., NOT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN TEHRAN. 5. THE GOI HAS FINGERED THE SOVIETS AS THE CULPRITS FOR SUPPLYING THE MISSILES. AN IRANIAN RESIDENT IN DUBAI MONITERED A BROADCAST SPEECH BY KHOMEINI TWO DAYS AGO CONDEMNING MOSCOW. IRAN TV ALSO DISPLAYED AN UNEXPLODED MISSILE WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE RUSSIAN LETTERING, AND THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED A LARGE ANTI- SOVIET PROTEST FOLLOWING FRIDAY (MARCH 4) PRAYERS. THE GOVERNMENT WAS CAREFUL, HOWEVER, TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE POLICE PROTECTION TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY DURING THE PROTEST. 6. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MACK "	Success: CSV parsed	null	28,520
196	3/10/1988 11:27	88BAGHDAD1369	Embassy Baghdad	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O 101127Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6545 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE 0272 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 01369 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IZ, IR SUBJECT: IRAQ HALTS WAR OF THE CITIES 1. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT) 2. MFA SENIOR UNDERSECRETARY ZIHAWI CALLED IN AMBASSADORS OF FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS AT 1330 MARCH 10 TO ANNOUNCE IRAQ LEADERSHIP\'S DECISION TO HALT ATTACKS ON IRANIAN CITIES. A PUBLIC ANNOUNCE- MENT IS TO BE MADE SHORTLY, PROBABLY ON THE 1430 LOCAL NEWS. ZIHAWI CONCEDED THAT IF IRAN DID NOT STOP, IRAQ WOULD BE FORCED TO RESUME. 3. ZIHAWI SAID THAT THE DECISION WAS MADE SOME TIME AGO (NOTE: PRESUMABLY A REFERENCE TO TOP LEVEL RE- VIEW UNDERSECRETARY HAMDOON SAID WAS BEING CONDUCTED SEVERAL DAYS AGO). IT WAS NOT, ZIHAWI UNDERLINED, IN RESPONSE TO THE INITIATIVE OF ANY OUTSIDE PARTY. 4. ZIHAWI CONCLUDED BY EMPHASIZING RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FIVE TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY BY PASSING AN ARMS ENFORCEMENT AGAINST IRAN IN THE FORM OF AN ARMS EMBARGO. 5. ON THE WAY OUT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ASKED THE AMBASSADOR WHY IRAQ WAS STOPPED. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT PERHAPS THE SOVIET UNCON SHOULD GET SOME CREDIT SINCE IT HAS PROPOSED SUCH AN UNWELCOME RESOLUTION IN NEW YORK. 6. COMMENT: IRAQ IS ENDING WITH A FLOURISH SINCE IT CLAIMS TO HAVE FIRED FOUR MISSILES IN THE LAST 24 HOURS (1800, 2250, 0534, AND 1230). THE LAST IRANIAN MISSILE WAS 0941 MARCH 9. NEWTON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	28,585
197	3/14/1988 9:20	88ALGIERS1474	Embassy Algiers	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE42378" ]	R 140920Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9916 INFO AMEMBASSY TUNIS ","UNCLAS ALGIERS 01474 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, KPAL, AG SUBJECT: ALGERIA: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT: UNCLASSIFIED SECTION REF: STATE 42378 1. ALGERIA. 2. RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). THERE HAS BEEN A PLO OFFICE IN ALGIERS SINCE THAT ORGANIZATION WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1964. THE ALGERIAN DIPLOMATIC LIST SHOWS EIGHT EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING A REPRESENTATIVE, TWO DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVES, A MILITARY ATTACHE, AND FOUR FIRST SECRETARIES. THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE FULL DIPLOMATIC STATUS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE MATTER, ALGERIA PROVIDES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE PLO OFFICE HERE AND PROVIDES FACILITIES FOR CONFERENCES SUCH AS THE PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS (LAST HELD IN APRIL 1987) AND THE CONFERENCE OF PALESTINIAN WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS (LAST HELD IN FEB 1987). WHEN MAJOR PALESTINIAN FIGURES ARE IN ALGERIA, THEY ARE REPORTEDLY GUESTS OF THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT. ALGERIA CONDUCTS MOST OF HER RELATIONS WITH THE PLO ON A PARTY-TO-PARTY BASIS, SPECIFICALLY THROUGH THE COMMITTEE FOR FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY AMONG PEOPLES, OF THE RULING NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. 3. THERE IS FURTHER REPORTING ON OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT VIA SEPARATE (CLASSIFIED) MESSAGE. JOHNSTONE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	28,630
198	3/14/1988 9:20	88HARARE1365	Embassy Harare	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "87HARARE6985", "88HARARE17", "88HARARE240", "88HARARE394" ]	R 140920Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7441 INFO DIA WASHDC USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5//ECJ2// ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 17 HARARE 01365 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINS, PINR, KPRP, PGOV SUBJECT: THE NEW GOZ: BIO INFORMATION REF: A) HARARE 17 B) HARARE 394 C) 87 HARARE 6985 D) HARARE 240 1. (U) SUMMARY. PRESIDENT MUGABE ANNOUNCED ON JANUARY 2, 1988 THE COMPOSITION OF HIS NEW CABINET (REF A). THIS NEW GOVERNMENT CONSISTS OF THREE SENIOR MINISTERS, 21 CABINET MINISTERS, 3 CABINET-RANK MINISTERS OF STATE, 15 DEPUTY MINISTERS, 5 MINISTERS OF STATE WHO WORK AS \"PARTY APPOINTEES\", AND 3 DEPUTY MINISTERS OF STATE WHO ASSIST THE \"PARTY APPOINTEES\". 2. (U) AMONG THESE VARIED GROUPS, THERE ARE 14 ZERURU, 12 KARANGA, 11 MANYIKA, 8 NDEBELE, 3 WHITES, 2 COLOUREDS, AND AN ASIAN (REF B). SIX OF THESE 51 APPOINTEES ARE WOMEN. WHILE SOME MINISTERS FROM THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT HAVE RETAINED THEIR PORTFOLIOS, OTHER VETERAN MINISTERS HAVE BEEN MOVED TO NEW ASSIGNMENTS. SEVERAL PROMINENT PERSONALITIES HAVE ALSO BEEN REMOVED FROM THE CABINET AND THERE ARE, OF COURSE, SOME NEW FACES. PROVIDED BELOW ARE BIO SKETCHES FOR ALL THE MEMBERS OF THIS NEW GOVERNMENT. OTHER APPOINTMENTS, SUCH AS PERMANENT SECRETARIES AND AMBASSADORS, ARE STILL TO BE ANNOUNCED. THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS REPORT IS THE BEST OVERALL DATA WHICH HAVE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ASSEMBLE SINCE THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GOZ. WE WELCOME COMMENTS AND ADDITIONS AS WELL AS QUERIES FOR MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THIS GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY. THE VICE PRESIDENT ------------------ 3. (U) SIMON VENGESAI MUZENDA: IS A VETERAN NATIONALIST AND LONG-TIME MUGABE CONFIDANT AND LOYALIST. IN THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT HE SERVED AS THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, A POSITION HE HAS HELD CONTINUOUSLY SINCE INDEPENDENCE. MUZENDA IS ZANU\'S SECOND SECRETARY AND MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO. IN ADDITION TO BEING NAMED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN 1980, MUZENDA ALSO SERVED UNTIL JANUARY 1981 AS MUGABE\'S FIRST FOREIGN MINISTER. MUZENDA WAS BORN IN 1922. HE IS MARRIED AND HAD EIGHT CHILDREN, ONE OF WHOM WAS KILLED DURING THE WAR. 4. (C) MUZENDA IS FROM THE KARANGA TRIBE AND IS THE LEADER OF ONE OF THE POLITICAL FACTIONS WHICH NOW DIVIDES THAT GROUP. IT IS SAID THAT MUZENDA MAY ACTUALLY BE A MEMBER OF THE TINY VENDA TRIBE, A NON-SHONA GROUP FROM SOUTHERN ZIMBABWE WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY INCORPORATED INTO THE KARANGA. UNLIKE OTHER KARANGAS, MUZENDA AND HIS FACTION (AS MUGABE LOYALISTS) ARE NOT CHALLENGING THE ZEZURU POLITICAL ASCENDENCY. IT IS SAID THAT THERE IS BAD BLOOD BETWEEN MUZENDA AND JOSHUA NKOMO, AND BETWEEN MUZENDA AND FELLOW KARANGA EDDISON ZVOBGO. THE ANIMOSITY BETWEEN MUZENDA AND NKOMO WAS REPORTEDLY EXACERBATED BY THE FACT THAT BOTH MUZENDA AND NKOMO EXPECTED TO BE NAMED VICE PRESIDENT. MUGABE, IT IS RUMORED, MADE MATTERS WORSE BY DELAYING HIS DECISION ON WHICH MAN TO TAP FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT. DESPITE HIS BEING VICE PRESIDENT, MUZENDA IS NOT GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE THE LIKELY PERMANENT SUCCESSOR TO MUGABE SHOULD THE LATTER LEAVE OR BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE, THOUGH HE WOULD LIKELY BE THE INTERIM LEADER DUE TO HIS NUMBER TWO POSITIONS IN BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY. SENIOR MINISTERS ---------------- 5. (U) MAURICE NYAGUMBO: REMAINS IN CHARGE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE PRESIDENT\'S OFFICE. HE SERVED IN THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AS THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND CO-ORDINATION OF COOPERATIVES, ATTACHED TO THE PRIME MINISTER\'S OFFICE. NYAGUMBO IS ONE OF THE TOP FIVE ZANU PARTY OFFICIALS, IS IN THE POLITBURO, AND SERVES AS THE PARTY\'S SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION. SINCE INDEPENDENCE, NYAGUMBO SERVED AS THE MINISTER OF MINES AND ENERGY RESOURCES UNTIL JANUARY 1984 WHEN HE BECAME A MINISTER OF STATE. NYAGUMBO WAS BORN IN 1924. HE IS MARRIED AND HAS SIX CHILDREN. NYAGUMBO TRAVELED TO THE US IN 1987 ON A USIA IV GRANT. 6. (C) NYAGUMBO IS ANOTHER LONG-TIME MUGABE ASSOCIATE AND WAS HELD IN DETENTION WITH MUGABE UNTIL HIS RELEASE IN 1975. WHILE IN PRISON, NYAGUMBO SUPPORTED MUGABE\'S BID TO TAKE OVER THE LEADERSHIP OF ZANU FROM NDABANINGI SITHOLE. NYAGUMBO IS A MANYIKA--THE LEADER OF A MANYIKA FACTION WHICH IS LOYAL TO MUGABE--AND OPPOSES THE MANYIKA FACTION LED BY EDGAR TEKERE. LIKE THE KARANGA, THE MANYIKA ARE DIVIDED BY VARIOUS INTERNAL FACTIONS AND LACK A SINGLE COMMANDING LEADER. UNLIKE THE KARANGA, THE MANYIKA HAVE HISTORICALLY ALLIED THEMSELVES WITH THE ZEZURU. NYAGUMBO IS NOW WELL POSITIONED TO BE A STRONG CONTENDER FOR EVENTUALLY SUCCEEDING MUGABE AS PRESIDENT, BUT HE HAS NOT IMPRESSED MANY PEOPLE WITH HIS ADMINISTRATION OR LEADERSHIP QUALITIES. 7. (U) BERNARD CHIDZERO IS NOW THE SENIOR MINISTER OF FINANCE, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT. HE HAS SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES OF INDUSTRY, TRADE AND COMMERCE, LAND AND AGRICULTURE, AND MINES. HE ALSO SERVES AS HIS OWN FINANCE MINISTER, THE POSITION HE HELD IN THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. CHIDZERO RECIEVED HIS HIGHER EDUCATION IN CANADA, EARNING AN M.A. AT OTTAWA UNIVERSITY IN 1955, AND A PH.D. AT MCGILL UNIVERSITY (MONTREAL) IN 1958. HE DID POST-GRADUATE STUDIES IN OXFORD. BEFORE ENTERING GOVERNMENT IN 1980 AS MINISTER OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, CHIDZERO HELD SEVERAL POSITIONS IN THE U.N. ORGANIZATIONS, THE LAST BEING AS DIRECTOR OF THE COMMODITIES DIVISION OF UNCTAD. CHIDZERO WAS BORN IN 1927. HE CONVERTED TO ROMAN CATHOLICISM AS A YOUNG MAN. HE IS MARRIED TO A CANADIAN AND HAS FOUR CHILDREN. 8. (C) CHIDZERO, THE SON OF A ZEZURU MOTHER AND A MALAWIAN FATHER, WAS BORN AND RAISED IN THE HARARE AREA. HE WAS OVERSEAS DURING MOST OF THE NATIONALIST STRUGGLE AND THUS LACKS THE POLITICAL BASE AND LIBERATION CREDENTIALS TO BE ANYTHING MORE THAN A WELL RESPECTED TECHNOCRAT. HE IS WIDELY RESPECTED IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR HERE AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL COMMUNITY. HE CLEARLY FAVORS MOST OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS AND GROWTH STRATEGIES WHICH THE WORLD BANK RECOMMENDS FOR ZIMBABWE. HE ALSO FAVORS THE EXECUTION OF AN OPIC AGREEMENT. DISAPPOINTINGLY, HE WILL NOT FORCEFULLY ARGUE FOR SUCH ECONOMIC CHANGES IN CABINET IF HE SENSES THAT PRESIDENT MUGABE HAS ANY RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE CHANGE. 9. (U) JOSHUA NKOMO, A VETERAN NATIONALIST AND PRESIDENT OF ZAPU, IS NOW BACK IN GOVERNMENT AS THE SENIOR MINISTER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, WITH ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COMMUNITY AND CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT, WOMEN\'S AFFAIRS, AND NATIONAL HOUSING. NKOMO, WHO TURNED DOWN MUGABE\'S OFFER TO MAKE HIM THE PRESIDENT OF ZIMBABWE AFTER INDEPENDENCE, FIRST SERVED IN THE GOVERNMENT AS THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS FROM MARCH 1980 TO JANUARY 1981, WHEN HE WAS SHIFTED TO MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SERVICE. IN THE LATTER POSITION, NKOMO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RESTRUCTURING THE WHITE-DOMINATED CIVIL SERVICE. NKOMO\'S REASSIGNMENT WAS SEEN BY SOME AS A DEMOTION AND AN ATTEMPT BY THE RULING ZANU CLIQUE TO EXCLUDE ZAPU MEMBERS FROM MINISTRIES DEALING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS. NKOMO WAS MADE MINISTER WITHOUT PORFOLIO, AND WAS FINALLY DISMISSED FROM THE CABINET ALONG WITH OTHER ZAPU MINISTERS IN FEBRUARY 1982. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, NKOMO WENT INTO EXILE IN THE UK BUT RETURNED TO ZIMBABWE AFTER A FEW MONTHS. SINCE THEN, NKOMO WORKED EXCLUSIVELY ON ZAPU BUSINESS AND ENTERED A SERIES OF DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WITH MUGAGE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF ZANU AND ZAPU. THESE NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED AT THE END OF 1987, AND THE \"UNITY AGREEMENT\" WAS SIGNED ON DECEMBER 22 (REF C). NKOMO WAS BORN IN 1917. HE BEGAN HIS POLITICAL CAREER AS A TRADE UNIONIST WITH THE RAILWAY WORKERS. HE IS MARRIED AND HAS THREE GROWN CHILDREN. 10. (C) THERE HAD BEEN RUMORS THAT NKOMO EXPECTED TO BE APPOINTED TO THE VICE PRESIDENCY WHEN MUGABE WAS INAUGURATED AS THE NEW EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT ON DECEMBER 30, 1987. MUGABE, HOWEVER, APPOINTED FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND ZANU SECOND SECRETARY SIMON MUZENDA AS THE NEW VICE PRESIDENT, MUCH TO NKOMO\'S CHAGRIN. IT IS EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THAT NKOMO AND MUZENDA WILL HAVE EQUIVALENT POSITIONS, SUBORDINATE TO MUGABE, IN THE HIERARCHY OF THE UNIFIED ZANU/ZAPU PARTY ALTHOUGH SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT NKOMO WILL EVENTUALLY EMERGE THE STRONGER. AS THE SENIOR MINISTER IN CHARGE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, NKOMO SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CHANNEL MUCH NEEDED GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT AND ASSISTANCE INTO MATABELELAND (NKOMO\'S HOME TURF) WHICH HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY NEGLECTED IN TERMS OF DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE AND BLIGHTED BY DROUGHT AND BANDITRY. NKOMO\'S PRIORITIES ARE TO END UNEMPLOYMENT AND VIOLENCE IN MATABELELAND, AND HE RECENTLY ADJURED THE BANDITS/DISSIDENTS THERE TO LAY DOWN THEIR WEAPONS. NKOMO HAS ALSO PUT HIS PERSONAL PRESTIGE BEHIND THE UNITY OF ZAPU AND ZANU AND IT APPEARS THAT HE CONTINUES TO BE POPULAR AMONG THE NDEBELE. NKOMO, HIMSELF, IS FROM THE KALANGA TRIBE WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY MADE UP OF SHONA-SPEAKING PERSONS ABSORBED BY THE NDEBELE AT THE TIME OF THE LATTER\'S OCCUPATION OF SOUTHWESTERN ZIMBABWE IN THE LAST CENTURY. THE KALANGA ARE NOW IDENTIFIED WITH THE NDEBELE. NKOMO IS ONE OF SEVERAL PROMINENT ZAPU LEADERS WHO, THOUGH ASSUMED TO BE NDEBELE, IS ACTUALLY PART OF THE KALANGA SUBGROUP. THERE IS NOT, HOWEVER, THE SAME AMOUNT OF TRIBAL RIVALRY BETWEEN THE KALANGA AND THE NDEBELE AS THERE IS AMONG THE VARIOUS SHONA-SPEAKING SUBGROUPS. CABINET MINISTERS ----------------- 11. (U) MUGABE NAMED 21 CABINET MINISTERS (UP FROM 18 MINISTERS IN THE PREVIOUS CABINET). THESE MINISTERS ARE: 12. (U) MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: NATHAN SHAMUYARIRA -- SHAMUYARIRA IS NEW TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND TAKES OVER THIS PORTFOLIO FROM WITNESS MANGWENDE. A JOURNALIST BY TRAINING, HE SERVED AS THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION SINCE 1980. SHAMUYARIRA IS A MEMBER OF THE ZANU POLITBURO AND IS THE PARTY\'S SECRETARY FOR PUBLICITY AND INFORMATION. HE JOINED ZAPU IN 1962, BUT LEFT IN 1963 TO HELP FOUND ZANU. IN 1964, SHAMUYARIRA LEFT TO STUDY POLITICAL SCIENCE AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, AND RECEIVED A BA IN 1967. HE SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK A POSITION AS A LECTURER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM. SHAMUYARIRA WAS APPOINTED ZANU\'S SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN 1968. HE LEFT ZANU IN 1971 TO HELP FOUND FROLIZI, BUT LEFT FROLIZI TO RETURN TO THE UNIVERSITY OF DAR IN 1973. HE REJOINED ZANU IN 1977 AND WENT TO MOZAMBIQUE AS THE DIRECTOR OF ZANU\'S EDUCATION DEPARTMENT. HE LATER SERVED AS THE PARTY\'S ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY. SHAMUYARIRA IS THE AUTHOR OF THE BOOK \"CRISIS IN RHODESIA\" (ANDRE DEUTSCH, 1965). HE IS MARRIED AND HAS A DAUGHTER. 13. (C) SHAMUYARIRA IS A ZEZURU BUT HAS NO PERSONAL POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY. HE IS ESSENTIALLY A TECHNOCRAT RATHER THAN A POLITICIAN, AND IS DEPENDENT ON MUGABE\'S FAVOR FOR HIS POSITION. AS THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION, SHAMUYARIRA DISPLAYED A TENDENCY TOWARD DOCTRINAIRE SOCIALISM AND HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, MANY OBSERVERS DESCRIBE HIM AS MORE OF AN OPPORTUNIST THAN A COMMITTED IDEOLOGUE. IN THE TWO MONTHS THAT SHAMUYARIRA HAS BEEN FOREIGN MINISTER, HE HAS BEEN REASONABLE AND ACCESSIBLE AND CERTAINLY HAS BEEN AN IMPROVEMENT OVER HIS PREDECESSOR, WITNESS MANGWENDE. A SOURCE TELLS US THAT SHAMUYARIRA, ALONG WITH ANOTHER ZEZURU MINISTER, SIDNEY SEKERAMAYI, WERE THE DRIVING FORCES BEHIND BLOCKING THE APPOINTMENT OF EMMERSON MNANGAGWA, A KARANGA, TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. SHAMUYARIRA IS REPORTEDLY ONE OF THE LEADERS IN THE \"GROUP OF 26\" WHICH SEEKS TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE ZEZURU ASCENDENCY ON THE GOZ. SHAMUYARIRA ALSO REPORTEDLY RESISTED THE ZAPU/ZANU UNITY ACCORD. HE IS ALSO WIDELY BELIEVED TO BE VERY CLOSE TO THE SOVIETS, THOUGH FOR OPPORTUNISTIC AND PRAGMATIC, RATHER THAN IDEOLOGICAL REASONS. 14. (U) MINISTER OF INFORMATION, POSTS, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS (IPT) WITNESS MANGWENDE: -- MANGWENDE PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SINCE 1981. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING INDEPENDENCE N 1980, MANGWENDE SERVED AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. MANGWENDE STUDIED AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS DURING THE YEARS OF THE NATIONALIST STRUGGLE, AND SERVED AS THE PRESIDENT OF ZANU\'S ZIMBABWE STUDENTS\' UNION. IN 1979 HE WAS APPOINTED CHIEF ZANU REPRESENTATIVE TO MOZAMBIQUE. MANGWENDE WAS BORN IN 1946, IS MARRIED, AND HAS NO CHILDREN. 15. (C) WHILE MANGWENDE DOES NOT HAVE A PERSONAL POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY, HE REMAINS IN THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF HIS MEMBERSHIP IN A PROMINENT ZEZURU CLAN. MANGWENDE THEREFORE CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO WHICH FAVORS THE ZEZURU ASCENDENCY. HE WAS NOT FAVORABLY REVIEWED AS A FOREIGN MINISTER BY THE LOCAL DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. MANGWENDE WAS DIFFICULT TO REACH, DIFFICULT TO WORK WITH, AND HAS A DRINKING PROBLEM. HIS LACK OF DIPLOMATIC SKILLS AND COMPLETE ESPOUSAL OF THIRD WORLD, ANTI-US RHETORIC, GREATLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE DETERIORATION OF US-ZIMBABWE RELATIONS IN THE 1983-86 PERIOD. SINCE BECOMING INFORMATION MINISTER, MANGWENDE HAS BEEN FEATURED PROMINENTLY ON RADIO AND TELEVISION, HAS CRITICIZED THE IMPORTING OF FOREIGN TELEVISION PROGRAMS, AND HAS CALLED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL TELEVISION PRODUCTION INDUSTRY. 16. (U) MINISTER OF DEFENSE: ENOS NKALA -- NKALA IS NEW TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, TAKING OVER THIS PORTFOLIO FROM MUGABE WHO, SINCE INDEPENDENCE, HAD SERVED AS HIS OWN DEFENSE MINISTER. NKALA JOINED THE GOVERNMENT AS THE MINISTER OF FINANCE IN 1980, AND THEN BECAME THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS IN JULY 1985. HE IS A MEMBER OF THE ZANU POLITBURO, AND IS THE PARTY SECRETARY FOR FINANCE. NKALA BEGAN HIS CAREER AS A JOURNALIST, AND FIRST BECAME INVOLVED IN NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE LATE 1950\'S. HE WAS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF ZANU, AND WAS DETAINED WITH MUGABE AND OTHER ZANU LEADERS FROM 1964 TO 1974. NKALA WAS BORN IN 1932. HE WAS A WIDOWER; HE REMARRIED IN 1987. HE HAS THREE CHILDREN FROM HIS FIRST MARRIAGE. NKALA TRAVELED TO THE US IN 1987 ON A USIS IV GRANT. 17. (C) THOUGH AN NDEBELE, NKALA IS PERSONALLY VERY LOYAL TO MUGABE AND SUPPORTS THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO (PERHAPS BECAUSE HE HAS NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN WINNING POLITICAL SUPPORT AMONG HIS OWN TRIBE). NKALA HAS LIVED IN HARARE FOR MANY YEARS AND HIS HOME WAS A MEETING PLACE FOR THE FOUNDERS OF ZANU. WHILE NKALA WAS DETAINED ALONG WITH OTHER ZANU LEADERS, HE SUPPORTED MUGABE\'S BID TO REPLACE SITHOLE AS ZANU PRESIDENT. MUGABE IS SAID TO HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE IN NKALA. AS THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, NKALA WAS CONSIDERED TO BE THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE PERSECUTION OF ZAPU IN THE LAST YEAR. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT NKALA WAS NAMED TO THE DEFENSE MINISTRY AFTER THE ZEZURU CLIQUE OBJECTED TO MUGABE\'S PLAN TO NAME EMMERSON MNANGAGWA, A KARANGA, TO THAT POST. SOURCES INDICATE THAT NKALA\'S MISSION IS TO ASSERT CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE COMMANDS AND CRACK DOWN ON CORRUPTION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. 18. (U) MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS: MOVEN MAHACHI -- MAHACHI, WHO PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS THE MINISTER OF LANDS, AGRICULTURE, AND RURAL RESETTLEMENT, HAS TAKEN OVER THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS FROM ENOS NKALA. THOUGH HE IS ONE OF THE YOUNGEST MEMBERS OF THE CABINET (BORN 1948), MAHACHI HAS BEEN IN THE GOVERNMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE. HE FIRST SERVED AS DEPUTY MINISTER FOR LANDS, RESETTLEMENT, AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, BECOMING THE MINISTER IN FEBRUARY 1982. THE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO WAS LATER ADDED TO HIS MINISTRY IN JULY 1985. DURING THE NATIONALIST STRUGGLE, MAHACHI SERVED AS AN UNDERGROUND OPERATIVE IN SUPPORT OF ZANU. HE WAS ARRESTED IN 1975 AND DETAINED UNTIL 1979. MAHACHI IS MARRIED AND HAS FOUR CHILDREN. HE JOINED THE ANGLICAN CHURCH AS A YOUNG MAN. 19. (C) MAHACHI IS A MANYIKA, BUT HE HAS NO INDEPENDENT POLITICAL BASE. HIS POSITION IN GOVERNMENT IS DUE TO HIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH MUGABE. DURING THE NATIONALIST STRUGGLE, MAHACHI WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN SECRETLY CONVEYING MUGABE TO MOZAMBIQUE IN 1975 TO AVOID ANOTHER ARREST. ONCE INSIDE MOZAMBIQUE, MUGABE CONSOLIDATED HIS CONTROL OVER ZANU/ZANLA AND BECAME THE PREEMINENT NATIONALIST LEADER. MAHACHI SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE EASY ACCESS TO MUGABE AS HE MANAGES THE DIFFICULT HOME AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO. AS A MUGABE LOYALIST, MAHACHI CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE ZEZURU POLITICAL ASCENDENCY. A SOURCE TELLS US THAT MAHACHI WAS ALONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT RELEASE OF TWO WHITE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS ON SUSPICION OF SPYING FOR SOUTH AFRICA. IT IS RUMORED THAT MAHACHI WAS REPRIMANDED FOR THIS ACTION. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT MAHACHI IS HAVING TROUBLE WITH THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND THAT THE COMMISSIONER DOES NOT ALWAYS CARRY OUT MAHACHI\'S ORDERS. SOME OBSERVERS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT MAHACHI MAY BE \"TOO SOFT\" FOR HIS CURRENT ASSIGNMENT. 20. (U) MINISTER OF LANDS, AGRICULTURE, AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: DAVID KARIMANZIRA -- TOOK OVER THIS PORTFOLIO FROM MOVEN MAHACHI. HE IS ANOTHER YOUNG MINISTER (BORN 1947) BUT, UNLIKE MAHACHI, WAS ONLY APPOINTED TO THE CABINET IN 1985 AFTER HIS FIRST ELECTION TO PARLIAMENT AS THE MINISTER OF SPORT, YOUTH AND CULTURE. KARIMANZIRA HAS, HOWEVER, SERVED IN VARIOUS NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS SINCE INDEPENDENCE. IN 1980 HE WAS APPOINTED AS THE UNDERSECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION IN MUGABE\'S FIRST GOVERNMENT AND LATER BECAME DEPUTY MINISTER. HE HAS ALSO SERVED AS A PROVINCIAL OFFICER FOR ZANU. HE IS A MEMBER OF THE ZANU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND IS THE PARTY\'S DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY. KARIMANZIRA RECEIVED HIS UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION IN RHODESIA, AND ALSO STUDIED IN THE UK IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE 1970\'S. DURING THAT TIME HE WAS ACTIVE IN ZANU\'S ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UK. HE IS MARRIED (HIS WIFE WORKS IN THE METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE) AND THEY HAVE TWO CHILDREN. 21. (C) KARIMANZIRA IS A ZEZURU AND IS CONSIDERED MORE OF AN APPARATCHIK THAN A POLITICIAN WITH AN INDEPENDENT BASE. AS A ZEZURU HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO UPHOLD THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO. KARIMANZIRA HAS THE REPUTATION FOR BEING CRITICAL OF THE US AND HE HAS THE DUBIOUS DISTINCTION OF MAKING THE SPEECH AT EMBASSY HARARE\'S FOURTH OF JULY (1986) RECEPTION THAT PROMPTED FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER TO WALK OUT. KARIMANZIRA DID NOT, HOWEVER, WRITE THE OFFENDING SPEECH AND WAS SPEAKING AT THE TIME ON BEHALF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER. 22. (U) MINISTER OF YOUTH, SPORT, AND CULTURE: DAVID KWIDINI -- HAS TAKEN OVER THIS MINISTRY FROM DAVID KARIMANZIRA. KWIDINI IS AN NDEBELE WHO, AS A ZAPU MP AND MEMBER OF THE ZAPU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CROSSED OVER TO JOIN ZANU IN MAY 1986. THIS IS KWIDINI\'S FIRST APPOINTMENT TO GOVERNMENT. KWIDINI IS AN EDUCATOR BY PROFESSION AND IS NOW ALSO SERVING AS THE INTERIM SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ALL AFRICA PARLIAMENTRAY COUNCIL ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT. 23. (U) MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS: EMMERSON MNANGAGWA (ALSO SPELLED MUNANGAGWA) -- TOOK OVER THIS PORTFOLIO FROM EDDISON ZVOBGO, WHO IS NOW ONE OF THE MINISTERS OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ATTACHED TO ZANU HEADQUARTERS. MNANGAGWA IS A VETERAN ZANLA GUERILLA LEADER WHO, SINCE INDEPENDENCE, HAS SERVED AS THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. MNANGAGWA JOINED ZANU IN 1963, AND WAS AMONG THE FIRST GROUP OF FIVE ZANU GUERILLAS TO TRAVEL TO THE PRC FOR TRAINING. HE WAS ARRESTED BY THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES IN 1965 AND WAS IMPRISONED UNTIL 1974. ONCE RELEASED, HE WENT TO ZAMBIA AND OBTAINED A LAW DEGREE. HE WAS ADMITTED TO THE ZAMBIAN BAR IN 1976. MNANGAGWA IS THE ZANU POLITBURO SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. HE IS MARRIED AND HAS FOUR CHILDREN. 24. (C) MNANGAGWA HAS BEEN A LONG-TIME ADVISOR TO MUGABE ON SECURITY MATTERS, AND SOURCES REPORT THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE NAMED MINISTER OF DEFENSE OR HOME AFFAIRS IN THE NEW CABINET. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES, A ZEZURU CLIQUE (LED BY NATHAN SHAMUYARIRA AND SIDNEY SEKERAMAYI) IN THE GOZ PERSUADED MUGABE NOT TO APPOINT MNANGAGWA, A KARANGA, TO A SECURITY MINISTRY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT MNANGAGWA WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH HIS NEW ASSIGNMENT AS JUSTICE MINISTER, ESPECIALLY SINCE JUSTICE\'S MOST IMPORTANT TASK IN RECENT YEARS (I.E. DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS FOR ENDING RACIAL REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT AND ESTABLISHING AN EXECUTIVE PRESIDENCY) HAS BEEN COMPLETED. WE HEARD THAT MNANGAGWA WAS EVEN CONSIDERING AT ONE POINT RETIRING FROM GOVERNMENT AND GOING INTO PRIVATE BUSINESS, BUT HE IS NOW SAID TO HAVE ACCEPTED HIS NEW POSITION. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, IF MNANGAGWA WILL CONTINUE TO SERVE AS ZANU\'S SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. 25. (U) MINISTER OF STATE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: SYDNEY SEKERAMAYI -- HAS TAKEN OVER MNANGAGWA\'S FORMER POSITION AND OPERATES OUT OF THE PRESIDENT\'S OFFICE. SEKERAMAYI IS A PHYSICIAN BY TRAINING (HAVING BEEN ONE OF THE FIRST STUDENTS TO BE SPONSORED BY ZANU FOR OVERSEAS STUDIES IN THE 1960\'S; HE STUDIED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND SWEDEN WHERE HE OBTAINED HIS M.D.). HE BRIEFLY WORKED IN SWEDEN BEFORE MOVING TO SET UP HIS MEDICAL PRACTICE IN ZAMBIA, WHERE HE REMAINED UNTIL 1976 WHEN HE WENT TO UK FOR SPECIALIZED SURGICAL TRAINING. HE WAS RECALLED BY ZANU TO SERVE WITH ZANLA IN MOZAMBIQUE. HE JOINED THE ZANU CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN 1977. HE IS NOW A MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AND SERVES AS THE PARTY\'S SECRETARY FOR TRANSPORT. IN 1980 SEKERAMAYI BECAME THE MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT, AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT. HE BECAME THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE IN FEBRUARY 1982 AND WAS THE ACTING MINISTER OF HEALTH. HE WAS FORMALLY APPOINTED AS MINISTER OF HEALTH IN JANUARY 1984 AND HELD THAT PORTFOLIO UNTIL THE FORMATION OF THIS NEW CABINET. SEKERAMAYI WAS BORN IN 1944 AND IS MARRIED. 26. (C) SEKERAMAYI IS A ZEZURU, WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THE MAIN REASON IN COMBINATION WITH HIS PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AS THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE, FOR REPLACING MNANGAGWA AS THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. WE HAVE HEARD THAT SEKERAMAYI WAS, ALONG WITH NEW FOMIN SHAMUYARIRA, ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE ZEZURU CLIQUE WHICH BLOCKED MNANGAGWA\'S APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE. SEKERAMAYI CAN BE EXPECTED THEREFORE TO SUPPORT THE ZEZURU NOMINATION OF THE GOZ TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE KARANGA. HE IS AN IMPRESSIVE INDIVIDUAL IN CONVERSATION AND APPEARS BOTH BRIGHTER AND MORE ARTICULATE THAN MOST OF HIS COLLEAGUES. HE MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A POSSIBLE FUTURE PRESIDENT. 27. (U) MINISTER OF HEALTH: BRIGADIER FELIX MUCHEMWA -- HAS TAKEN OVER FROM SYDNEY SEKERAMAYI AS THE NEW MINISTER OF HEALTH. MUCHEMWA IS THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY\'S MEDICAL SERVICES, AND SERVED AS THE COMMANDER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD UNTIL OCTOBER 1987 WHEN HE WAS ELECTED AS A NON-CONSTITUENT MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. MUCHEMWA WAS FORMERLY A ZANLA GUERILLA. 28. (C) MUCHEMWA IS A MANYIKA AND AS SUCH CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO. SOURCES HAVE TOLD US THAT MUCHEMWA WAS, IN EFFECT, \"KICKED UPSTAIRS\" BY MUGABE WHEN MUGABE INCLUDED MUCHEMWA ON THE ZANU LIST FOR ELECTION TO A NON-CONSTITUENT SEAT IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. AS A RESULT OF THIS ELECTION, MUCHEMWA, WHO ONLY BECAME A BRIGADIER IN NOVEMBER 1986, HAD TO RESIGN FROM THE ARMY. MUCHEMWA APPARENTLY DID NOT HAVE A GOOD REPUTATION AS A MILITARY OFFICER, AND IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT HE HAS A DRUG PROBLEM. AS THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF ARMY MEDICAL SERVICES, MUCHEMWA SHOULD HAVE PICKED UP CONSIDERABLE KNOWLEDGE ON DEALING WITH AIDS AND STD. SUCH EXPERIENCE SHOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH WHICH IS INCREASINGLY PREOCCUPIED WITH AIDS IN ZIMBABWE. AS IS THE CASE WITH THE TWO OTHER MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN RECENTLY APPOINTED TO THE GOZ, MUCHEMWA HOLDS A NON-CONSTITUENT SEAT IN PARLIAMENT AND DOES NOT HAVE A POLITICAL BASE OF HIS OWN. (SEE REF D FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE CABINET.) 29. (U) MINISTER OF TRANSPORT: SIMBARASHE MUMBENGEGWI -- REPLACED HERBERT USHEWOKUNZE. MUMBENGEGWI PREVIOUSLY HELD A NUMBER OF OTHER CABINET POSTIONS AS THE MINISTER OF WATER RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT, THE MINISTER OF HOUSING, AND THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION AND NATIONAL HOUSING, WHICH PORTFOLIO HE HELD UNTIL THE FORMATION OF THIS CURRENT GOVERNMENT. MUMBENGEGWI ALSO SERVED AS DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FROM INDEPENDENCE TO FEBRUARY 1982 AND HAS ACTED AS FOREIGN MINISTER ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. HE BECAME ACTIVE IN POLITICS AS A MEMBER OF ZAPU AND LATER ZANU YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS. HE ATTENDED UNIVERSITY IN AUSTRALIA AND RECEIVED A DEGREE IN EDUCATION. FROM 1973 TO 1978 HE WAS ZANU\'S CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE IN AUSTRALIA. BETWEEN 1978 AND 1980 HE WAS THE CHIEF ZANU REP IN ZAMBIA. MUMBENGEGWI HAS BEEN A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT SINCE 1980. MUMBENGEGWI WAS BORN IN 1945, IS MARRIED AND HAS ONE CHILD. 30. (C) MUMBENGEGWI IS SAID TO BE A LOYAL CIVIL SERVANT RATHER THAN A POLITICIAN WITH HIS OWN POLITICAL BASE. HE IS A KARANGA, SAID TO BE ALLIED WITH THE KARANGA FACTION LED BY VICE PRESIDENT MUZENDA. HE HAS A REPUTATION FOR DILIGENT HARD WORK AND HONESTY, SUGGESTING THAT HE WAS APPOINTED TO CLEAN UP THE MESS LEFT BY THE CORRUPT, OPPORTUNISTIC USHOWOKUNZE. 31. (U) MINISTER OF PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION AND NATIONAL HOUSING: JOSEPH MSIKA -- HAS TAKEN OVER THIS MINISTRY FROM SIMBARASHE MUMBENGEGWI. MSIKA IS THE VICE PRESIDENT OF ZAPU AND PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN THE GOVERNMENT AS THE MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND WATER DEVELOPMENT FROM APRIL 1980 TO FEBRUARY 1982 WHEN ZAPU MINISTERS WERE DEPOSED. BEFORE GOING INTO ZAPU POLITICS, MSIKA WAS TRAINED AS A CABINET MAKER AND LATER WAS A TRADE UNION OFFICIAL IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY. IN HIS NEW CABINET POSITION MSIKA WILL BE REPORTING TO SENIOR MINISTER NKOMO, WHO IS ALSO HIS PARTY LEADER. MSIKA WAS BORN IN 1923. MSIKA WAS PART OF THE ZAPU DELEGATION WHICH NEGOTIATED THE ZANU/ZAPU UNITY AGREEMENT. 32. (C) MSIKA IS A ZEZURU BUT WAS RAISED IN MATABELELAND AND IS A LONG-TIME ZAPU MEMBER AND OFFICIAL. HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO SIDE WITH JOSHUA NKOMO AND THE NDEBELES SHOULD THEY CHALLENGE THE SHONA DOMINANCE OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL MACHINERY. MSIKA JOINED ZAPU AT A TIME WHEN THAT ORGANIZATION HAD MANY ZEZURU MEMBERS AND WAS NOT CONSIDERED AN NDEBELE TRIBAL ENCLAVE. SUBSEQUENT DIVISIONS IN ZAPU IN THE EARLY 1960\'S CAUSED MANY SHONA TO SHIFT ALLEGIANCE TO ZANU. MSIKA REMAINED LOYAL TO ZAPU. 33. (U) MINISTER OF LABOUR, MANPOWER PLANNING, AND SOCIAL WELFARE: JOHN NKOMO -- ANOTHER HIGH RANKING ZAPU LEADER WHO HAS BEEN NAMED TO THE CABINET. NKOMO TAKES OVER AS MINISTER OF LABOUR FROM FREDRICK SHAVA. NKOMO (WHO IS NOT RELATED TO ZAPU PRESIDENT JOSHUA NKOMO) PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN GOVERNMENT AS DEPUTY MINISTER FOR INDUSTRY AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT UNTIL APRIL 1982 WHEN HE WAS APPOINTED AS THE MINISTER OF STATE WITH SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. IN THIS CAPACITY IT IS SAID THAT HE DEVELOPED AN OVERALL KNOWLEDGE OF THE OPERATIONS OF EACH MINISTRY. NKOMO WAS RELIEVED OF HIS GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN NOVEMBER 1984 BECAUSE HE CONTINUED TO SIT ON THE ZAPU CENTRAL COMMITTEE. NKOMO IS THE ZAPU SECRETARY FOR PUBLICITY AND WAS A MEMBER OF THE ZAPU DELEGATION WHICH NEGOTIATED THE ZANU/ZAPU UNITY AGREEMENT. NKOMO TRAVELED TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1986 AS A USIA IV GRANTEE. 34. (C) EMBASSY HAS FOUND NKOMO TO BE A USEFUL AND THOUGHTFUL INTERLOCUTOR. HE SEEMS TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF ZIMBABWE\'S PROBLEMS AND IS INCLINED TO ACT. AS THE NEW MINISTER OF LABOUR, NKOMO HAS PUBLICALLY STATED THAT THE COUNTRY\'S LABOUR RELATIONS ACT (LRA) NEEDS ADJUSTMENT. IN PRIVATE, HOWEVER, HE TOLD US THAT THE LRA NEEDS TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY OVERHAULED. NKOMO IS A SHREWD POLITICIAN WHO SOMETIMES APPEARS TO BE PLAYING BOTH SIDES OF THE STREET AT ONCE. THERE ARE STORIES THAT HE SPOKE OUT IN ZAPU COUNCILS AGAINST UNITY WITH ZANU WHILE AT THE SAME TIME KEEPING IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ZANU OFFICIALS. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT NKOMO REMAINED IN HIS PREVIOUS GOZ POSITION UNTIL 1984 WHEN ALL OTHER ZANU OFFICIALS WERE SACKED FROM THE GOZ IN 1982. 35. (U) MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION: DZINGAI MUTUMBUKA -- HAS BEEN THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION SINCE 1980, BUT WITH THE FORMATION OF THIS NEW CABINET, HE HAS LOST RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATION (WHICH HAVE BEEN GROUPED INTO A NEW MINISTRY UNDER THE DIRECTION OF FAY CHUNG) AND WILL NOW CONTINUE AS THE MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION. MUTUMBUKA IS A MEMBER OF THE ZANU POLITBURO, AND SERVES AS THE PARTY\'S SECRETARY FOR PRODUCTION, CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. MUTUMBUKA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST PERSONS TO JOIN ZANU IN THE 1970\'S WHO HAD A HIGHER EDUCATION. HE OBTAINED A DOCTORATE DEGREE IN CHEMISTRY IN THE UK AND TAUGHT CHEMISTRY IN ZAMBIA UNTIL HE JOINED THE ARMED STUGGLE IN 1974. HE HAS REPRESENTED ZANU AT A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES. MUTUMBUKA TRAVELED TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1982 AS A USIA IV GRANTEE. 36. (C) MUTUMBUKA IS A KARANGA WHO HAS BEEN LOYAL TO MUGABE AND THE ZEZURU CLIQUE. NONETHELESS, THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT AS A KARANGA HE WAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST IN THE FORMATION OF THIS NEW CABINET WHEN MORE THAN HALF OF HIS PORTFOLIO WAS TAKEN FROM HIM. WE HAVE HEARD THAT MUTUMBUKA IS ANGERED THAT HIS PORTFOLIO HAS BEEN REDUCED TO HIGHER EDUCATION SINCE THERE IS ONLY ONE INSTITUTE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (THE UNIVERSITY IN ZIMBABWE) FOR HIM TO OVERSEE. THE ISSUE OF WHICH MINISTRY WILL BE IN CHARGE OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING HAS NOT YET BEEN SETTLED. THERE IS, HOWEVER, AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR THE REDUCTION OF MUTUMBUKA\'S PORTFOLIO. SINCE 1980 MUTUMBUKA HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT\'S POLICY OF MASS EDUCATION WHICH EACH YEAR TURNS OUT INCREASINGLY LARGE NUMBERS OF \"SCHOOL LEAVERS\" WHO EXPECT WHITE COLLAR EMPLOYMENT OR POSITIONS IN THE UNIVERSITY. BECAUSE THE UNIVERSITY CAN ONLY ADMIT A SMALL NUMBER OF THE SCHOOL LEAVERS EACH YEAR, AND JOB CREATION OUTSIDE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY NIL, THE POOL OF ZIMBABWE\'S UNEMPLOYED YOUNG PEOPLE IS GROWING RAPIDLY AND THE GOZ IS NOW VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH AN UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM. IT MAY BE THEREFORE THAT MUGABE BLAMES MUTUMBUKA FOR THIS \"SCHOOL LEAVERS\" CRISIS AND HAS PUNISHED HIM BY TAKING AWAY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION. 37. MINISTER OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: FAY CHUNG -- HAS TAKEN OVER THIS NEW MINISTRY WHICH WAS SPUN OFF FROM THE ORIGINAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. CHUNG, A ZIMBABWEAN OF CHINESE DESCENT, WAS NAMED DEPUTY MINISTER OF EDUCATION SHORTLY BEFORE HER ELECTION TO PARLIAMENT AS A NON-CONSTITUENT MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY IN OCTOBER 1987. SHE HAD SERVED IN THE MINISTRY\'S CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT UNIT FROM 1983 TO 1987. CHUNG WAS A PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHER. SHE JOINED ZANU IN 1973 AND MOVED TO MOZAMBIQUE IN 1975 WHERE SHE WORKED IN POLITICAL EDUCATION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS CAPACITY SHE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TEACHER TRAINING AND TEXTBOOK PRODUCTION. CHUNG\'S TEACHER-TRAINING PROGRAM IN MOZAMBIQUE IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN THE FORERUNNER OF THE CURRENT ZIMBABWE INTEGRATED NATIONAL TEACHER EDUCATION COURSE (ZINTEC), IN WHICH CHUNG HAS CONTINUED TO BE ACTIVE. SHE ALSO HAD A ROLE IN DEVELOPING THE ZIMBABWE FOUNDATION FOR EDUCATION WITH PRODUCTION (ZIMFEP). CHUNG RECEIVED HER B.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RHODESIA, AND EARNED AN M.A. AT LEEDS (UK) UNIVERSITY. SHE WAS BORN IN 1941 AND HAS ONE CHILD. SHE IS EXPECTED TO TRAVEL TO THE US ON A USIS IV GRANT IN MID-1981. 38. (C) CHUNG HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY A LOCAL OPINION MAGAZINE AS THE \"STAR APPOINTEE\" IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT CHUNG\'S STAR HAS BEEN ON THE RISE IN THE LAST YEAR. CHUNG, WHO HAS A REPUTATION FOR HAVING RADICAL POLITICAL VIEWS, IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN A LECTURER ON IDEOLOGY FOR THE ZANLA CADRES IN MOZAMBIQUE. CHUNG REPORTEDLY IS ALSO A DEVOUT CATHOLIC. SHE HAD HER CHILD DURING HER STAY IN THE BUSH, BUT SHE DID NOT MARRY, AND THE FATHER\'S IDENTITY IS NOT PUBLICLY KNOWN. WHILE IN MOZAMBIQUE CHUNG WAS REPORTEDLY CLOSE TO MUGABE, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT SHE AND MUGABE HAD A SERIOUS FALLING OUT WHICH RESULTED IN HER BEING IGNORED BY THE PARTY AND UNEMPLOYED AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THIS INCIDENT HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED IN THE PRESS WHICH HAS FEATURED ARTICLES ON HER RECENTLY. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT PROMPTED CHUNG\'S RECENT RETURN TO FAVOR WITH MUGABE. CHUNG DOES NOT HAVE AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL BASE AND HER POSITION RESTS ON THE CONTINUED FAVOR OF MUGABE. HER RAPID ELEVATION TO THE MINISTRY OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION MAY VERY WELL BE DUE TO THE URGENT NEED FOR THE GOZ TO RESTRUCTURE THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM TO REMEDY THE SCHOOL LEAVER CRISIS. 39. (U) MINISTER OF COMMUNITY AND CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND WOMEN\'S AFFAIRS: TERAI ROPA (JOYCE) MUJURU A/K/A: TERAI ROPA NHONGO -- IS A MEMBER OF THE ZANU POLITBURO AND SERVES AS PARTY SECRETARY FOR WOMEN\'S AFFAIRS. IN 1980 SHE BECAME THE FIRST WOMAN AND YOUNGEST MEMBER OF THE CABINET WHEN SHE WAS APPOINTED AS THE MINISTER OF YOUTH, SPORT, AND CULTURE. SINCE JANUARY 1981 SHE HAS SERVED AS THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND WOMEN\'S AFFAIRS ATTACHED TO THE PRIME MINISTER\'S OFFICE. WITH THE FORMATION OF THIS NEW GOVERNMENT, MUJURU\'S OFFICE HAS BEEN CONVERTED INTO A MINISTRY WITH THE ADDITION OF COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT ADDED TO THE PORTFOLIO. DURING THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, MUJURU JOINED ZANLA IN 1973, BECAME A MEMBER OF THE GENERAL STAFF, AND WAS OVERALL COMMANDER OF THE WOMEN\'S DETACHMENT WHEN IT WAS FORMED IN 1974. MUJURU IS A MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AND SERVES AS THE PARTY SECRETARY FOR WOMENS AFFAIRS. SHE IS MARRIED TO THE ARMY COMMANDER AND HAS THREE CHILDREN, BUT IS ESTRANGED FROM HIM. SHE IS A ZEZURU AND WAS BORN IN 1955. 40. (U) MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND TOURISM: VICTORIA CHITEPO -- IS THE THIRD AND FINAL WOMAN IN THE CABINET. SHE HAS HELD THIS PORTFOLIO SINCE FEBRUARY 1982, HAVING PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS DEPUTY MINISTER SINCE JANUARY 1981. HER PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT WAS AS DEPUTY MINISTER FOR EDUCATION AND CULTURE, TO WHICH SHE WAS APPOINTED IN 1980. CHITEPO, A TEACHER BY TRAINING, IS THE WIDOW OF HERBERT CHITEPO, THE ZANU NATIONAL CHAIRMAN WHO WAS ASSASSINATED IN ZAMBIA IN 1977. SHE TRAVELED TO THE US IN 1985 ON A USIA IV GRANT. CHITEPO WAS BORN IN 1927. 41. (C) CHITEPO IS SAID TO OWE HER POSITION IN GOVERNMENT TO RESPECT FOR HER LATE HUSBAND. SHE IS A VERY POOR ADMINISTRATOR. SHE IS A MANYIKA, BUT DOES NOT APPARENTLY HAVE HER OWN POLITICAL FOLLOWING. 42. (U) MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RURAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: ENOS CHIKORWORE -- HAS HELD THIS PORTFOLIO SINCE FEBRUARY 1982. HE PREVIOUSLY WAS APPOINTED AS DEPUTY MINISTER IN JANUARY 1981. CHIKOWORE BECAME ACTIVE IN POLITICS IN THE LATE 1950\'S AND JOINED ZANU IN 1963. AFTER BEING DETAINED HE WENT TO ZAMBIA WERE HE SERVED AS THE PARTY\'S FIRST SECRETARY FOR YOUTH AFFAIRS AND WAS ACTIVE IN THE RECRUITING OF CADRES. HE LEFT TO STUDY IN THE UK IN 1967 AND RETURNED TO ZIMBABWE IN 1980 WHERE HE WAS ELECTED TO THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY AS A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASHONALAND WEST. CHIKOWORE WAS BORN IN 1936 AND IS A ZEZURU. 43. (U) MINISTER OF ENERGY, WATER RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT: KUMBIRAI KANGAI -- HAS ALSO RETAINED HIS FORMER CABINET POSITION. KANGAI JOINED THE GOVERNMENT IN 1980 AND FIRST SERVED AS THE MINISTER OF LABOR. HE LATER BECAME THE MINISTER OF ENERGY, WATER RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT, THE POSITION HE CONTINUES TO HOLD. A TEACHER BY PROFESSION, KANGAI JOINED ZANU IN 1963 BUT WENT TO THE US IN 1964 WHEN HE LOST HIS TEACHING POSITION FOLLOWING AN ARREST FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. HE STUDIED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (CAMPUS UNKNOWN) UNTIL 1972, AND SERVED AS ZANU\'S CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE TO NORTH AMERICA DURING PART OF THAT TIME. HE WENT TO ZAMBIA IN 1973 AND WAS ELECTED AS A MEMBER OF THE ZANU REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (DARE). KANGAI, A MANYIKA, WAS BORN IN 1938. 44. (U) MINISTER OF MINES: RICHARD HOVE -- BECAME THE MINISTER OF MINES IN JULY 1985, AND HE RETAINS THAT PORTFOLIO IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. HOVE ENTERED THE GOVERNMENT IN 1980 AS THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SERVICE. HE BECAME THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS IN 1981, AND THE MINISTER OF TRADE AND COMMERCE IN 1982. DURING THE EARLY 1960\'S, HOVE WAS STUDYING BUSINESS AT THE UNIVERSTIY OF BOMBAY. AFTER JOINING UP WITH ZANU IN LUSAKA, HE WAS APPOINTED THE PARTY\'S CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE TO WESTERN EUROPE. HE WAS RECALLED TO LUSAKA IN 1971 AND WAS NAMED THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ELECTED TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. HOVE LATER MOVED TO MOZAMBIQUE WITH OTHER ZANU OFFICIALS WHERE HE CONTINUED TO SERVED AS THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. HOVE, A KARANGA ATTACHED TO THE FACTION LED BY VICE PRESIDENT MUZENDA, WAS BORN IN 1935. HE IS MARRIED AND HAS FOUR CHILDREN. 45. (U) MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY: CALLISTUS NDLOVU -- HAS BEEN REAPPOINTED TO THIS MINISTRY, A POSITION WHICH HE HAS HELD SINCE JULY 1985. PRIOR TO THIS ASSIGNMENT, NDLOVU WAS APPOINTED MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION IN JANUARY 1982, AND LATER TOOK OVER THE MINISTRY OF MINES FROM MAURICE NYAGUMBO IN JANUARY 1984. NDLOVU SWITCHED HIS PARTY AFFILIATION FROM ZAPU TO ZANU IN JUNE 1974 AND WAS APPOINTED AS THE ZANU CHAIRMAN IN MATABELELAND NORTH. NDLOVU IS A TEACHER BY PROFESSION, HAVING BEEN EDUCATED IN LESOTHO. HE WAS DETAINED IN 1967, AFTER WHICH HE LEFT ON FELLOWSHIP TO STUDY POLITICAL SCIENCE AT N.Y.U. FROM 1967 TO 1980 HE WAS AN ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND WAS DIRECTOR OF THE AFRICAN STUDIES INSTITUTE AT HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY. NDLOVU ALSO SERVED AS ZAPU\'S CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN FROM 1973 TO 1979. BEFORE BECOMING A MINISTER IN 1982, NDLOVU WAS AN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS MANAGER WITH UNION CARBIDE. HE TRAVELED TO THE US IN 1981 ON A USIA IV GRANT. NDLOVU IS IDENTIFIED WITH THE NDEBELE, BUT IT IS SAID THAT HE IS ACTUALLY FROM THE KALANGA TRIBE (WHICH WAS VIRTUALLY INCORPORATED INTO THE NDEBELE). HE WAS BORN IN 1936 AND IS MARRIED WITH FOUR CHILDREN. 46. (C) NDLOVU REPORTEDLY REMAINS A FAVORITE OF ZAPU LEADER JOSHUA NKOMO DESPITE NDLOVU\'S DEFECTION TO ZANU. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF HIS DEFECTION FROM ZAPU HE HAS LITTLE POLITICAL SUPPORT IN MATABELELAND. 47. (U) MINISTER OF TRADE AND COMMERCE: OLIVER MUNYARADZI -- HAS ALSO BEEN REAPPOINTED TO HIS PREVIOUS POSITION. HE BECAME THE MINISTER OF TRADE AND COMMERCE IN JULY 1985. HE FIRST ENTERED GOVERNMENT IN 1980 WHEN HE WAS APPOINTED DEPUTY MINISTER OF FINANCE. IN 1982 HE BECAME MINISTER OF HEALTH. MUNYARADZI WAS APPONTED MINISTER OF STATE FOR ENERGY IN 1984 AND IN NOVEMBER OF THE SAME YEAR HE BECAME THE MINISTER OF ENERGY AND WATER RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT, WHICH HE HELD UNTIL HIS APPOINTMENT TO HIS PRESENT POSITION AS COMMERCE MINISTER IN 1985. HE WAS SEVERELY INJURED IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT IN 1986 WHICH AFFECTED HIS CAPACITY TO WORK. HE HAS NOT RETURNED TO FULL EFFECTIVENESS SINCE THE ACCIDENT. MUNYARADZI IS A PHYSICIAN BY TRAINING. HE GRADUATED FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF DURBAN AND RECEIVED SPECIAL SURGICAL TRAINING IN THE UK IN 1969. UPON HIS RETURN HE WAS ACTIVE IN ZANU INTERNAL POLITICS AND WAS DETAINED IN 1976. IN 1978 HE BECAME A SENIOR LECTURER IN SURGERY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF RHODESIA. MUNYARADZI IS MARRIED AND HAS THREE SONS. HE WAS BORN IN 1933 AND IS A KARANGA. 48. (U) MINISTER OF NATIONAL SUPPLIES: SIMBI MUBAKO -- MUBAKO HAS SERVED AS MINISTER OF NATIONAL SUPPLIES SINCE JULY 1985. MUBAKO IS CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF THE BEST EDUCATED MEMBERS OF THE CABINET. HE BEGAN HIS CAREER AS A JOURNALIST AND WAS ONE OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE WEEKLY NEWS AND OPINION MAGAZINE \"MOTO\". HE LATER OBTAINED LAW DEGREES AT TRINITY COLLEGE (DUBLIN), AND CONTINUED LAW STUDIES IN LONDON. HE WAS A LECTURER IN LAW AT SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY (UK) FROM 1976 TO 1979. HE WAS A PROFESSOR AND DEAN AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LESOTHO UNTIL HE RETURNED TO ZIMBABWE IN 1980 AND WAS APPOINTED AS MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN MUGABE\'S FIRST CABINET. HE WAS LATER APPOINTED AS THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS IN 1984 AND HELD THAT POSITION UNTIL HE WAS APPOINTED AS THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL SUPPLIES IN 1985. MUBAKO IS THOUGHT TO BE A KARANGA. HE WAS BORN IN 1936, IS MARRIED, AND HAS THREE CHILDREN. 49. (U) MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICE: CHRIS ANDERSON -- ANDERSON, CONSIDERED BY SOME TO BE THE BEST LAWYER IN ZIMBABWE, RETAINS HIS PORTFOLIO AS THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE, A POSITION HE HAS HELD SINCE 1982. ANDERSON BECAME A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR THE RHODESIAN FRONT IN 1974. HE WAS APPOINTED MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN THE SMITH GOVERNMENT IN 1978 AND LATER BECAME THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT IN 1979. ANDERSON CONTINUED TO SERVE IN PARLIAMENT AFTER INDEPENDENCE IN 1980, BUT HE LEFT THE RHODESIAN FRONT IN 1982 TO BECOME AN INDEPENDENT. MUGABE APPOINTED HIM MINISTER OF STATE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE THAT SAME YEAR. ANDERSON IS THE FORMER HEAD OF THE BAR AND CONTINUES TO SIT AS AN INDEPENDENT MEMBER OF THE PARLIAMENT. BORN IN JOHANNESBURG IN 1935, ANDERSON CAME TO RHODESIA WITH HIS FAMILY IN 1938. HE TRAVELED TO THE US IN 1985 ON A USIA IV GRANT. ANDERSON IS MARRIED AND HAS THREE CHILDREN. 50. (C) AS A MEMBER OF THE RF, ANDERSON WAS KNOWN FOR ESPOUSING RACIST VIEWS. HE DID A COMPLETE ABOUT FACE IN 1982. HE IS THOUGHT TO BE KEPT IN HIS MINISTERIAL POSITION BY MUGABE IN AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE INTEGRITY WITHIN THE CIVIL SERVICE. HE HAS NO POLITICAL BASE IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY AND IS NOT REGARDED BY WHITES AS \"THEIR SPOKESMAN\" IN GOVERNMENT. HE IS AN AVID FLY FISHERMAN. 51. (U) MINISTER OF STATE FOR NATIONAL SCHOLARSHIPS: JOSEPH CULVERWELL -- CULVERWELL IS NEW TO THE CABINET, HAVING PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF EDUCATION. HE IS THE ONLY \"COLOURED\" MINISTER. A TEACHER BY PROFESSION, CULVERWELL WAS EDUCATED IN SOUTH AFRICA AND BRITAIN. HE WAS IMPRISONED FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN 1967 AND FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE WENT TO WORK AS A TEACHER IN THE UK. DURING THIS TIME IT IS SAID THAT HE WAS ACTIVE ASSISTING ZIMBABWEANS WHO WERE IN EXILE IN BRITAIN. CULVERWELL RETURNED TO ZIMBABWE IN 1980 TO CAMPAIGN FOR ZANU. AFTER THE ELECTION HE WAS APPOINTED TO THE SENATE. CULVERWELL HAS SERVED CONTINUOUSLY IN THE SENATE SINCE 1980 AND SINCE 1981 HE HAS SERVED AS DEPUTY MINISTER FOR EDUCATION. 52. (C) CULVERWELL, A COLOURED, IS REPORTEDLY NOT VERY POPULAR WITH THE COLOURED POPULATION IN ZIMBABWE. HIS POLITICAL POSITION IS DUE TO HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUGABE AND OTHER ZANU BOSSES FOR WHOM HE DID FAVORS AND RAN ERRANDS DURING THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE IN LONDON. IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHAT CULVERWELL IS EXPECTED TO DO IN THIS NEWLY CREATED POSITION AND EVEN THE LOCAL PRESS HAS SUGGESTED THAT IT IS A \"DO NOTHING\" JOB. CULVERWELL IS WELL KNOWN AS AN \"OLD ROGUE\" WHO IS USUALLY SEEN IN THE COMPANY OF LADY FRIENDS MUCH YOUNGER THAN HE. HE IS A FREQUENT VISITOR TO LOCAL NIGHT SPOTS, THOUGH HAS GIVEN UP SMOKING AND ALCOHOL FOR HEALTH REASONS. DEPUTY CABINET MINISTERS ------------------------ 53. (U) FIFTEEN DEPUTY CABINET MINISTERS HAVE BEEN APPOINTED TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT (UP FROM THE ELEVEN DEPUTY MINISTERS WHICH WERE FEATURED IN THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT). NOT ALL MINISTRIES HAVE DEPUTY MINISTERS, AND WE HAVE OBSERVED THAT THE MINISTRIES WHICH DEAL MOST DIRECTLY WITH NATIONAL SECURITY (SUCH AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND HOME AFFAIRS) DO NOT/NOT HAVE DEPUTY MINISTERS. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE ABSENCE OF DEPUTY MINISTERS IS TYPICAL FOR CERTAIN KEY MINISTRIES BECAUSE, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE MINISTER FROM A KEY MINISTRY, MUGABE APPOINTS ANOTHER OF HIS CLOSEST MINISTERS TO ACT IN THE PLACE OF THE ABSENT MINISTER RATHER THAN ALLOW THE MANAGEMENT OF A KEY MINISTRY TO FALL TO A DEPUTY MINISTER. THE DEPUTY MINISTERS IN THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT ARE: 54. (U) KENNETH BUTE, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY AND COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND WOMEN\'S AFFAIRS: -- BUTE IS NEW TO THE GOVERNMENT AND HIS PORTFOLIO IS A NEW ADDITION TO THE GOZ SINCE HIS IS ONE OF THE NEWLY CREATED MINISTRIES. BUTE ONLY RECENTLY GOT INVOLVED IN NATIONAL POLITICS, HAVING BEEN FIRST ELECTED TO THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY IN 1985 AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOROMONZI DISTRICT. HE IS NOT GENERALLY WELL KNOWN AND IS SAID TO BE A BUSINESSMAN BY PROFESSION. HE IS A ZEZURU. 55. (U) GEORGE CHINENGUNDU, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS: -- CHINENGUNDU IS ALSO OCCUPYING A NEWLY CREATED POSITION. HE IS, HOWEVER, A VETERAN OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT, HAVING PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TOWN PLANNING SINCE 1982. CHINENGUNDU MADE THE NEWS IN 1986 BY DISSOLVING THE WEDZA DISTRICT COUNCIL FOR MALADMINISTRATION. HE IS A LAWYER BY PROFESSION AND MADE HIS POLITICAL REPUTATION BY REPRESENTING POLITICAL PRISONERS DURING THE NATIONALIST STRUGGLE. HE WAS NOT OTHERWISE BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN POLITICS. CHINENGUNDU IS ALSO A SENATOR. HE IS A MANYIKA. 56. (U) CHARLES DUKE, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR MINES: -- DUKE IS NEW TO THE GOVERNMENT AND IS OCCUPYING ANOTHER NEWLY-CREATED POSITION. HE IS A GEOLOGIST BY TRAINING. DUKE, A WHITE, WAS FORMERLY A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT WITH THE OPPOSITION CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE OF ZIMBABWE (CAZ) PARTY. IN 1985 HE BECAME THE FIRST WHITE MP TO CROSS OVER TO JOIN ZANU. 57. (C) DUKE IS CONSIDERED AN OPPORTUNIST AND A POLITICAL LIGHTWEIGHT. HE IS NOT PARTICULARLY WELL REGARDED IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY. 58. (U) JOCK KAY, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR LANDS, AGRICULTURE AND RURAL RESETTLEMENT: -- KAY IS ALSO NEW TO GOVERNMENT AND IS OCCUPYING ANOTHER NEWLY-CREATED POSITION. KAY IS THE OTHER WHITE DEPUTY MINISTER AND, LIKE DUKE, HE WAS ONE OF THE FIRST WHITE CAZ MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT TO CROSS THE AISLE AND JOIN ZANU. KAY IS A COMMERCIAL FARMER FROM THE WEDZA DISTRICT. 59. (C) FELLOW WHITES, INCLUDING THE COMMERCIAL FARMERS, ARE NOT VERY IMPRESSED WITH KAY\'S APPOINTMENT. KAY IS INEXPERIENCED IN GOVERNMENT AND HIS PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IS ALSO QUESTIONABLE. THE WHITE COMMERCIAL FARMERS GENERALLY DOUBT THAT KAY WILL BE CAPABLE OF SAFEGUARDING THEIR INTERESTS EVEN IF HE WISHES TO. KAY HAS BEEN A LONG-TIME, WELL-MEANING AND FAITHFUL EMBASSY CONTACT. 60. (U) AMINA HUGHES, DEPUTY MINISTER OF TRANSPORT: --HUGHES RETAINS THIS PORTFOLIO WHICH SHE HAS HELD SINCE 1985. HUGHES, COLOURED, IS FROM MATABELELAND. SHE FIRST BECAME INVOLVED IN POLITICS AFTER INDEPENDENCE IN 1980 AND WAS ELECTED AS THE SECRETARY FOR THE ZANU WOMEN\'S LEAGUE IN MATABELELAND NORTH. HUGHES IS ALSO TO BE ACTIVE IN WOMEN\'S AFFAIRS. SHE WAS DEFEATED IN THE 1985 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AS A ZANU CANDIDATE IN BULAWAYO BUT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY APPOINTED TO THE SENATE AND BECAME THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF TRANSPORT. HUGHES IS SAID TO BE A PROTEGE OF THE FORMER MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION, HERBERT USHEWOKUNZE. SHE TRAVELED TO THE US IN 1986 ON A USIA IV GRANT. HUGHES IS A WIDOW WITH TWO ADULT SONS. 61. (U) MOTON MALIANGA, DEPUTY MINISTER OF TRADE AND COMMERCE: -- MALIANGA, A VETERAN OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT, IS NEW TO THIS POSITION AND REPLACES CHIMBINDZAYI SANYANGARE (WHO HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM THE GOVERNMENT). SINCE JANUARY 1981, MALIANGA SERVED CONTINUOUSLY AS THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC PLANNING. HE IS A VETERAN NATIONALIST, FIRST BECOMING INVOLVED IN NATIONALISTS POLITICS IN THE LATE 1950\'S. HE WAS ARRESTED IN 1962 AND, UPON HIS RELEASE A YEAR LATER, JOINED ZANU AND BECAME THE PARTY REPRESENTATIVE IN CAIRO. MALIANGA RETURNED TO RHODESIA IN LATE 1964 AND WAS ARRESTED AGAIN. WHILE IN PRISON, HE STUDIED BUSINESS AND LAW BY CORRESPONDENCE. HE WAS RELEASED IN 1971 AND BECAME OF MEMBER OF THE ANC CENTRAL COMMITTEE. HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE ANC NEGOTIATING TEAMS AT THE VICTORIA FALLS TALKS AND AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. MALIANGA WAS NOT ACTIVE IN POLITICS IN THE LATTER 1970\'S; HE RE-EMERGED IN 1980 WHEN HE WAS ELECTED AS A ZANU MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. MALIANGA WAS BORN IN 1930. HE IS A MANYIKA. 62. (U) KENNETH MANYONDA, DEPUTY MINISTER OF INFORMATION, POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS: -- MANYONDA IS NEW TO THE CABINET, AND TAKES THIS POSITION FROM NAOMI NHIWATIWA, WHO HAS RECENTLY BEEN APPOINTED AS A MINISTER OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ATTACHED TO ZANU HEADQUARTERS. MANYONDA IS A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT AND PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL FOR THE POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (PTC), A PARASTATAL WHICH OPERATES UNDER THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION. HE IS A FORMER TRADE UNIONIST AND IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN A LEADER IN THE ZANU YOUTH ORGANIZATION. MANYONDA IS A MANYIKA. 63. (U) ROBERT MARARE, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION AND NATIONAL HOUSING: -- MARARE IS ONE OF THE TWO INCUMBENT DEPUTY MINISTERS WHO CONTINUES TO HOLD THE SAME PORTFOLIO. HE HAS BEEN DEPUTY MINISTER FOR PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION SINCE 1982. MARARE IS ANOTHER VETERAN NATIONALIST WHO FIRST BECAME INVOLVED IN POLITICS IN THE EARLY 1950\'S. HE WAS ARRESTED AND DETAINED AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND WAS A ZANU DELEGATE TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. MARARE WAS ELECTED AS A ZANU MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT IN 1980. MARARE WAS BORN IN 1919 AND IS MARRIED WITH SEVEN CHILDREN. HE IS IDENTIFIED WITH THE ZEZURU. 64. (U) LTC. HERBERT MAHLABA (ALSO KNOWN AS BY HIS NOM DE GUERRE: \"CLEMENCE GAZA\"), DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOUR, MANPOWER PLANNING AND SOCIAL WELFARE: -- MAHLABA IS ALSO NEW TO THE GOVERNMENT AND HE OCCUPIES ANOTHER NEWLY CREATED POSITION. MAHLABA IS A MILITARY OFFICER BY PROFESSION, HAVING PREVIOUSLY BEEN A ZANLA COMBATANT DURING THE NATIONALIST STRUGGLE. MAHLABA HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED A GOOD DEAL OF PUBLIC ATTENTION AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ZIMBABWE-MOZAMBIQUE FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION (ZIMOFA), WHICH HAS BEEN RAISING RELIEF AID IN ZIMBABWE FOR MOZAMBIQUE. MAHLABA ONLY RECENTLY BECAME INVOLVED IN POLITICS WHEN HE WAS ELECTED TO A NON-CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY SEAT IN OCTOBER 1987. MAHLABA WAS REQUIRED TO RESIGN HIS COMMISSION AT THE TIME OF HIS ELECTION TO PARLIAMENT. HE IS AN KARANGA. 65. (C) MAHLABA WAS AN UNDISTINGUISHED ARMY OFFICER WHO HAS THE REPUTATION FOR BEING A \"NICE GUY\" WITH A PLEASANT, ALMOST JOLLY, PERSONALITY. HE ALSO HAS BEEN SUSPECTED OF SKIMMING OFF ZIMOFA FUNDS FOR PERSONAL USE AND IS BELIEVED TO BE CORRUPTIBLE. MAHLABA MAY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED SIMPLY TO SHOW THAT KARANGAS ARE BEING ELEVATED TO SENIOR GOVERNMENT POSITIONS BUT, AS A NON-CONSTITUENT MP WITH NO PERSONAL POLITICAL BASE, HE IS ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL NONENTITY WHO MAY EVENTUALLY FADE AWAY. IN THE MEANWHILE, ANOTHER KARANGA OFFICER WAS SHIFTED OUT OF THE ARMY. (SEE REF D FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE CABINET.) 66. (U) TICHAENDEPI MASAYA, DEPUTY MINISTER OF FINANCE, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT: -- MASAYA IS NEW TO THE CABINET, TAKING OVER THIS POSITION FROM MOTON MALIANGA WHO IS NOW DEPUTY MINISTER OF TRADE AND COMMERCE. MASAYA IS A STATISTICIAN BY TRAINING AND HAS LECTURED IN ECONOMICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE SINCE 1981. HE IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDLIFE BOARD AND IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (PTC), THE COMMUNICATIONS PARASTATAL WHICH OPERATES UNDER THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION. MASAYA IS SAID TO BE ACTIVE IN HARARE DISTRICT POLITICS, AND WAS ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT IN 1985 TO REPRESENT THE NYANGA DISTRICT OF MANICALAND. HE IS A MANYIKA. 67. (U) SWITHUN MOMBESHORA, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR HEALTH: -- MOMBESHORA SERVED AS THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LANDS AND AGRICULTURE IN THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. HE HAS TAKEN OVER AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF HEALTH FROM EDWARD PSWARAYI WHO IS NO LONGER IN GOVERNMENT. MOMBESHORA WAS REPORTEDLY ACTIVE IN ZANU YOUTH POLITICS AND LATER ASSISTED ZANLA BY ORGANIZING FINANCES AND SUPPLIES INSIDE THE COUNTRY DURING THE NATIONALIST STRUGGLE. HE IS A PHYSICIAN BY TRAINING AND WAS ACTIVE IN THE 1980 ELECTION CAMPAIGN. MOMBESHORA TRAVELED TO THE US IN 1983 ON A USIA IV GRANT. HE WAS BORN IN 1945 AND IS MARRIED WITH TWO DAUGHTERS AND ONE SON. MOMBESHORA IS A ZEZURU. 68. (U) LOT SENDA MOYO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RURAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: -- MOYO IS NEW TO THE GOVERNMENT AND REPLACES GEORGE CHINENGUNDU (WHO IS NOW THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF JUSTICE) IN THIS POSITION. MOYO IS ONE OF TWO ZAPU MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND NDEBELES WHO HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE GOVERNMENT AS A DEPUTY MINISTER. AS IS THE CASE WITH MANY ZAPU POLITICIANS, MOYO HAS DEVOTED HIMSELF ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO PARTY BUSINESS AND IS CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF THE ZAPU \"OLD GUARD\". 69. (U) CHARLES NDLOVU, DEPUTY MINISTER OF YOUTH, SPORT AND CULTURE: -- NDLOVU IS NEW TO THE CABINET AND TAKES OVER THIS POSITION FROM AMOS MIDZI WHO IS NO LONGER IN GOVERNMENT. NDLOVU, A ZEZURU, WAS ONCE A DISC JOCKEY WITH THE RHODESIAN BROADCASTING CORP. HE LEFT FOR MAPUTO IN THE MIND-1970\'S WHERE HE BECAME A BROADCASTER ON \"THE VOICE OF FREE ZIMBABWE\". IN THE EARLY 1980\'S, HE WAS NAMED HEAD OF PRODUCTION SERVICES IN THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, AND IN 1985 HE BECAME HEAD OF THE PARASTATAL CENTRAL FILM LABORATORIES. HE IS ALSO THE HEAD OF THE ZANU YOUTH WING. IN 1985 HE WAS ELECTED AS A ZANU MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. 70. (C) NDLOVU IS CONSIDERED A PARTY HACK WITH FAIRLY CLOSE TIES TO MUGABE. AS HEAD OF THE YOUTH WING OF THE PARTY, HE HAS HAD VERY CLOSE CONTACT WITH EAST BLOC NATIONS, NORTH KOREA AND CHINA, ALL OF WHOM HAVE SUPPORTED THE YOUTH WING. HOWEVER, HE IS ALSO VERY ACCESSIBLE TO US AND AN OCCASIONALLY USEFUL CONTACT WITH THE PARTY\'S IDEOLOGICAL WING. HE WAS MOVED FROM THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION TO CENTRAL FILM LABS IN 1985 AFTER A SCANDAL IN WHICH AN ALLEGED ZDOLS 50,000 WAS EMBEZZLED FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF PRODUCTION SERVICES THROUGH A FALSE PAYROLL SCHEME. THE DEPARTMENT\'S ACCOUNTANT COMMITTED SUICIDE, BUT NDLOVU--WHO IS WIDELY THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED--WAS SAVED, PROBABLY THROUGH HIS TIES WITH MUGABE. THOUGH MARRIED, NDLOVU IS WELL KNOWN AS A WOMANIZER AND HEAVY DRINKER. HE IS A REGISTERED MEMBER OF THE NORTON COUNTRY CLUB (HE HAS A FARM IN THE AREA) UNDER HIS PRE-REVOLUTIONARY NAME OF WEBSTER SHAMU. 71. (U) EDWARD NDLOVU, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR ENERGY, WATER RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT: -- NDLOVU IS NEW TO THE GOVERNMENT AND IS OCCUPYING A NEWLY-CREATED POSITION. HE IS CONSIDERED ANOTHER OF THE ZAPU \"OLD GUARD\" AND IS A ZAPU MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FROM GWANDA. NDLOVU IS THE SECOND OF TWO ZAPU MPS AND NDEBELES WHO HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE GOVERNMENT AS DEPUTY MINISTERS IN THE WAKE OF THE ZANU/ZAPU UNITY AGREEMENT. PRIOR TO ENTERING GOVERNMENT HE HAS MOSTLY DEVOTED HIMSELF TO ZAPU POLITICS. 72. (C) NDLOVU IS AN OLD FRIEND OF THE US AND A REGULAR CONTACT OF THE EMBASSY. HE IS A THOUGHTFUL POLITICAL OBSERVER AND A HARDCORE PRAGMATIST. 73. (U) HENRY POTE, DEPUTY MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY: -- POTE IS NEW TO THE GOVERNMENT AND IS OCCUPYING A NEWLY-CREATED POSITION. HE IS A ZANU MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FROM CHIREDZI. POTE IS NOT WELL KNOWN NATIONALLY OR IN HARARE, AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT HE WAS SELECTED FOR A POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT TO BE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NDAU-SPEAKING POPULATION OF THE LOW VELDT IN MASVINGO PROVINCE. POTE IS A KARANGA, HOWEVER, AND THERE IS SOME THOUGHT THAT HE IS ACTUALLY OF VENDA DESCENT. THE VENDA IS A SMALL TRIBE IN THE LOW VELDT THAT IS NOT OF SHONA ORIGIN BUT WAS ESSENTIALLY INCORPORATED INTO THE KARANGA. MINISTERS OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS (PARTY APPOINTEES) --------------------------------------------- ------------ 74. (U) THE MINISTERS OF STATES FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ARE NEWLY CREATED FORMED TO ACCOMMODATE FOUR FORMER MINISTERS AND ONE FORMER DEPUTY MINISTER WHO ARE NO LONGER IN GOVERNMENT. THESE MINISTERS OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ARE OFFICIALLY DESIGNATED AS \"PARTY APPOINTEES\"; THEY REPORT TO MAURICE NYAGUMBO, THE SENIOR MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE PRESIDENT\'S OFFICE. THOUGH THEY ARE CONSIDERED PARTY APPOINTEES, THE SALARIES OF THESE MINISTERS OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ARE PAID FOR BY THE GOVERNMENT. THESE MINISTERS OF STATE WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THREE DEPUTY MINISTERS OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. 75. (U) ERNEST KADUNGURE: PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN THE CABINET AS THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE SINCE JANUARY 1984. PRIOR TO THAT HE WAS APPOINTED MINISTER OF YOUTH, SPORT AND CULTURE IN 1981. IMMEDIATELY AFTER INDEPENDENCE, KADUNGURE SERVED AS THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT AND POWER. KANDUNGURE JOINED ZAPU IN 1962 BUT IN 1964 MOVED TO ZAMBIA TO WORK. HE JOINED THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN 1968 AND SERVED IN ZANLA. HE BECAME A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN 1977 AND BECAME THE PARTY SECRETARY FOR EDUCATION AND CULTURE. HE LATER WAS APPOINTED AS THE PARTY\'S FINANCE SECRETARY. KADUNGURE IS CURRENTLY A ZANU MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, THE PARTY SECRETARY FOR YOUTH AND A MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO. AS A MINISTER OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, KANDUNGURE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING THE GOVERNMENT\'S NATIONAL SERVICE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO ALLEVIATING THE GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM CAUSED BY THE LARGE NUMBER OF \"SCHOOL LEAVERS\". THIS NATIONAL SERVICE SCHEME IS SUPPOSED TO CONCENTRATE ON MILITARY SERVICE AND AGRICULTURAL TRAINING. KANDUNGURE WAS BORN IN 1942, IS MARRIED AND HAS ONE CHILD. HE IS A ZEZURU. 76. (C) A SOURCE TELLS US THAT MUGABE PROBABLY RELIEVED KANDUNGURE FROM HIS PREVIOUS POSITION AS THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE BECAUSE OF POOR PERFORMANCE. 77. (U) NAOMI NHIWATIWA: PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF INFORMATION, POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SINCE APRIL 1982. PRIOR TO THAT SHE SERVED AS THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF ROADS AND ROAD TRANSPORTATION, AND THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND WOMEN\'S AFFAIRS. AFTER COMPLETING HER SECONDARY EDUCATION IN RHODESIA, NHIWATIWA WENT TO COLLEGE IN THE UNITED STATES. SHE RECEIVED A DEGREE IN NUTRITION FROM LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, NEBRASKA (SIC), AND A MASTER\'S DEGREE IN PSYCHOLOGY AT WAYNE STATE (DETROIT). SHE LATER RECEIVED A PH.D. IN COMMUNICATIONS FROM NYU. NHIWATIWA RETURNED TO ZIMBABWE FOLLOWING THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND WAS ELECTED AS A ZANU MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. NHIWATIWA TRAVELED TO THE US IN 1982 ON A USIA IV GRANT. SHE IS A MANYIKA. NHIWATIWA WAS BORN IN 1942 AND IS UNMARRIED. 78. (C) NHIWATIWA HAD THE REPUTATION FOR BEING SOMETHING OF A \"PLAYGIRL\" WHICH, ALONG WITH ALLEGATIONS OF POOR PERFORMANCE AS A DEPUTY MINISTER, IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN THE MAIN REASON FOR HER DEMOTION. 79. (U) FREDERICK SHAVA: IS THE FORMER MINSTER OF LABOUR, MANPOWER PLANNING AND SOCIAL WELFARE, A POSITION HE HAS HELD SINCE JANUARY 1981. DURING THE NATIONALIST STRUGGLE, SHAVA WAS STUDYING AT UNIVERSITY IN LONDON. HE WAS ZANU CHAIRMAN IN THE UK AND WAS LATER NAMED IN 1977 AS CHIEF ZANU REPRESENTATIVE IN EUROPE. HE PARTICIPATED IN THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE, RETURNED TO ZIMBABWE IN JANUARY 1980 AND WAS ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT. THOUGH SHAVA IS A KARANGA, HE IS IDENTIFIED WITH THE ZEZURU CLIQUE. HE IS MARRIED AND HAS THREE CHILDREN. SHAVA IS 40 YEARS OLD. 80. (U) HERBERT USHEWOKUNZE: WAS THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT, A POSITION HE HELD SINCE JANUARY 1984. A MEDICAL DOCTOR BY PROFESSION, USHEWOKUNZE SERVED AS ZIMBABWE\'S FIRST MINISTER OF HEALTH UNTIL 1981. HE THEN SERVED AS THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS UNTIL LATE 1982. USHEWOKUNZE STUDIED MEDICINE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND WAS THE FIRST AFRICAN TO OPEN A MEDICAL PRACTICE IN MATABELELAND. HE JOINED THE YOUTH WING OF ZANU IN 1963 AND HELPED ORGANIZE THE UNDERGROUND CELLS. IN 1976 HE JOINED UP WITH THE ZANU LEADERSHIP IN MOZAMBIQUE, BECAME A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND WAS NAMED THE PARTY SECRETARY FOR HEALTH. USHEWOKUNZE IS MARRIED AND HAS TEN CHILDREN. HE WAS BORN IN 1938 AND IS A ZEZURU. 81. (C) USHEWOKUNZE IS POPULAR AMONG THE ZEZURU AND ONE OF THE FEW MEMBERS OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT WITH HIS OWN POWER BASE. HE ALSO HAS A REPUTATION FOR BEING VERY INEFFICIENT AND VERY CORRUPT. 82. (U) EDDISON ZVOBGO: WAS THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS IN THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. IN THAT POSITION, WHICH HE HELD SINCE 1982, ZVOBGO WAS IN CHARGE OF PREPARING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WHICH LED TO THE ABOLITION OF RACIAL REPRESENTATION IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE CREATION OF THE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENCY. IN HIS NEW POSITION AS A MINISTER OF STATE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, ZVOBGO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING THE REORGANIZATION OF ZANU TO ACCOMMODATE THE RECENTLY INCORPORATED ZAPU. IN JUNE 1960 ZVOBGO WAS APPOINTED CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP - THE NATIONALIST SUCCESSOR TO THE BANNED ANC) AT THE UN. HE ATTENDED TUFTS UNIVERSITY. ZVOBGO RETURNED TO RHODESIA IN 1963 AND WAS A FOUNDER OF ZANU. HE SERVED AS THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF ZANU UNTIL 1977. ZVOBGO WAS DETAINED, DURING WHICH TIME HE STUDIED LAW AND WAS ADMITTED TO THE BAR. HE RETURNED TO THE US IN 1972 TO CONTINUE HIS STUDIES AT THE FLETCHER SCHOOL (TUFTS) AND HARVARD LAW. HE LATER TAUGHT AS AN ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AT THE LEWIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW IN ILLINOIS. ZVOBGO WAS A LEGAL ADVISOR FOR ZANU AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND WAS A MEMBER OF THE ZANU DELEGATION AT THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE. HE RETURNED TO ZIMBABWE IN 1980 AND WAS THE ZANU ELECTION CHAIRMAN. ZVOBGO TRAVELED TO THE US IN 1987 ON A USIA IV GRANT. HE IS MARRIED TO ANOTHER MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, JULIA ZVOBGO, AND HAS FOUR CHILDREN. ZVOBGO WAS BORN IN 1935 AND IS A KARANGA. 83. (C) ZVOBGO WAS ALSO ONE OF THE FEW MEMBERS OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT WITH A POPULAR BASE OF SUPPORT (IN HIS CASE IN MASVINGO PROVINCE). HE WAS FORMERLY ZANU PARTY CHAIRMAN OF MASVINGO AND A MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO BUT WAS RELIEVED OF THESE POSTS IN 1986 AS A RESULT OF A POWER STRUGGLE WITH FELLOW KARANGA AND THEN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MUZENDA. HE HAS A SERIOUS DRINKING PROBLEM WHICH MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEMOTION. DEPUTY MINISTERS OF STATE ------------------------- 84. (U) GENERAL JEVAN MASEKO: IS THE FORMER ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR ADMINISTRATION AND QUARTERMASTER. AS A DEPUTY MINISTER OF STATE, MASEKO\'S MILITARY EXPERIENCE SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY USEFUL AS HE WILL BE WORKING UNDER MINISTER OF STATE KANDUNGURE IN THE PREPARATION OF A NATIONAL SERVICE PLAN. HE LEFT THIS POSITION AND RESIGNED HIS COMMISSION TO BECOME A NON-CONSTITUTENT MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER 1987. MASEKO IS A FORMER ZIPRA COMBATANT WHO ENTERED THE NEW ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY AT INDEPENDENCE. HE IS AN NDEBELE. 85. (C) MASEKO IS SAID TO BE A PLEASANT FELLOW BUT IS CONSIDERED TO BE A MEDIOCRE OFFICER. THOUGH HE HAS BEEN TO SOME EXTENT COOPTED BY THE SHONA HIERARCHY, HE IS SAID TO STILL BE POPULAR AMONG THE NDEBELE AND MAINTAIN SOME UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH ZAPU. AS A NON-CONSTITUENT MP HE LACKS A CLEARLY DEFINED POLITICAL BASE SO HIS FUTURE WILL DEPEND ON THE CONTINUED GOOD FAVOR OF MUGABE. BY ENTERING THE PARLIAMENT MASEKO HAD TO RESIGN HIS COMMISSION, SO THE SENIOR NDEBELE OFFICER HAS LEFT THE ARMY. (SEE REF D FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE CABINET.) 86. (U) SHUVAI MAHOFA: IS ONE OF TWO WOMEN WHO NOW SERVE AS DEPUTY MINISTERS OF STATE. MAHOFA IS A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FROM MASVINGO PROVINCE. DURING THE INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE MAHOFA SERVED IN AN UNDERGROUND DETATCHMENT WHICH PROVIDED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE NATIONALIST GUERILLAS. SINCE INDEPENDENCE SHE HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN WOMEN\'S AFFAIRS AND WAS ELECTED SECRETARY FOR WELFARE AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE ZANU WOMEN\'S LEAGUE. SHE FREQUENTLY TRAVELS WITH THE DELEGATIONS LED BY THE PRESIDENT\'S WIFE. MAHOFA IS A KARANGA. 87. (U) OPAH MUCHINGURI: HAS ONLY RECENTLY COME TO PUBLIC PROMINENCE. IN NOVEMBER 1987 SHE WAS ELECTED TO A NON-CONSTITUENT PARLIAMENTARY SEAT, AND IN JANUARY 1988 SHE RECEIVED HER FIRST APPOINTMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT AS A DEPUTY MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS. BEFORE HER ELECTION TO PARLIAMENT SHE WORKED AS A PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER MUGABE. MUCHINGURI JOINED THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE WHEN SHE LEFT HIGH SCHOOL IN 1975. SHE RECEIVED TRAINING IN SECRETARIAL SKILLS AND ACCOUNTING AND SERVED AS THE SECRETARY FOR THE ZANLA HIGH COMMAND. AFTER INDEPENDECE SHE WORKED BRIEFLY IN THE PRIME MINISTER\'S OFFICE BEFORE LEAVING IN 1981 FOR STUDIES IN THE UNITED STATES. SHE GRADUATED FROM MINNESOTA STATE IN 1983 WITH A DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY EARNED A MASTER\'S DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AT USC. SHE RETURNED TO ZIMBABWE IN JANUARY 1986 AND TOOK UP A POSITION IN THE PRIME MINISTER\'S OFFICE. MUCHINGURI IS SAID TO BE VERY CLOSE TO MUGABE. SHE IS A MANYIKA. 88. (C) MUCHINGURI ESSENTIALLY DROPPED OUT OF SIGHT FOR THE FOUR YEARS THAT SHE WAS A STUDENT IN THE US. THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT SHE DELIBERATELY LEFT THE COUNTRY BECAUSE SHE WAS A SURVIVOR OF THE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT WHICH KILLED ZANLA COMMANDER JOSIAH TONGONGARA IN 1980. WHILE THE OFFICIAL INQUIRY RULED THAT TONGONGARA\'S DEATH WAS AN ACCIDENT, DOUBTS CONTINUED AND SOME FELT THAT MUCHINGURI KNEW MORE THAN HAD BEEN TOLD TO THE PUBLIC. MUCHINGURI KEPT A LOW PROFILE FOR THE FIRST YEAR AND A HALF AFTER HER RETURN TO ZIMBABWE IN 1986. AS HAS BEEN THE CASE WITH FAY CHUNG, MUCHINGURI\'S STAR HAS BEEN ON THE RISE SINCE HER ELECTION TO PARLIAMENT IN NOVEMBER 1987. WE BELIEVE THAT MUCHINGURI\'S RISE IS DUE TO HER REPORTEDLY CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MUGABE. WE SUSPECT THAT SHE HAS BEEN APPOINTED AS A DEPUTY TO THE MINISTERS OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS SO THAT SHE CAN SPY ON THIS COLLECTION OF ERSTWHILE PARTY LEADERS AND POTENTIAL RIVALS TO MUGABE. RAWLINGS "	Success: CSV parsed	null	28,677
199	3/14/1988 15:23	88ALGIERS1498	Embassy Algiers	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88ALGIERS1474", "88ALGIERS2184", "88STATE42378" ]	R 141523Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9921 INFO AMEMBASSY TUNIS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 01498 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PTER, KPAL, AG SUBJECT: ALGERIA: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT: CLASSIFIED SECTION REFS: (A) STATE 42378; (B) ALGIERS 1474 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. IN ADDITION TO THE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT NOTED REF B, ALGERIA ALSO HOSTS ABOUT 600 PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS. THEY ARE LOCATED WITH THE ALGERIAN MILITARY AT EL-BAYADH, A REMOTE SITE ABOUT 600 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF ALGIERS. THESE COMBATANTS MOVED TO EL-BAYADH IN LATE 1986 FROM A CAMP AT TEBESSA, NEAR THE TUNISIAN FRONTIER. 3. FOR DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE PLO-ALGERIAN RELATIONSHIP, WE REFER READERS TO 87 ALGIERS 2184, \"ALGERIA AND THE PLO.\" JOHNSTONE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,054
200	3/14/1988 15:37	88ATHENS4106	Embassy Athens	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "87ATHENS4694", "88STATE42378", "88STATE54439", "88STATE54781" ]	R 141537Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7258 ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 04106 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, GR, KPRP SUBJECT: GREECE: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REFS: (A) STATE 42378; (B) STATE 54439; - (C) STATE 54781; (D) 87 ATHENS 4694 - - 1. GREECE. 2. DURING 1987 GREECE CONTINUED TO BE THE SCENE OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS, SPONSORED BOTH BY DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN GROUPS. TWO ATTACKS WERE DIRECTED SPECIFICALLY AGAINST AMERICANS. THE EXTREME-LEFT GREEK \"NOVEMBER 17TH\" TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (ACTIVE SINCE 1975 AND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PREVIOUS KILLINGS OF TWO U.S. OFFICIALS) CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMBINGS ON APRIL 24 AND AUGUST 10 OF BUSSES TRANSPORTING U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE ATHENS AREA. IN BOTH CASES AMERICANS WERE INJURED, BUT FORTUNATELY THERE WERE NO FATALITIES. THERE HAVE BEEN NO ARRESTS IN CONNECTION WITH THESE ATTACKS. - - 3. SYMPTOMATIC OF THE NATURE OF THE TERRORIST PROBLEM IN GREECE WERE THE KILLING OF A KUWAITI BUSINESSMAN JANUARY 7 BY UNKNOWN BUT PROBABLY MIDDLE EASTERN ASSAILANTS, THE SHOOTING WITH INTENT TO INJURE SERIOUSLY OF A PROMINENT GREEK NEUROSURGEON BY THE \"NOVEMBER 17TH\" ORGANIZATIOM FEBRUARY 4, THE SHOOTING AND SERIOUS WOUNDING OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GREEK CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS ON JUNE 24, THE SHOOTING WITH OBVIOUS INTENT TO KILL OF AN ARAB LEAGUE DEPUTY ON DECEMBER 21 (ALSO BY PROBABLE MIDDLE EASTERN ASSAILANTS), AND A NUMBER OF BOMBINGS WITHOUT APPARENT INTENT TO ENDANGER LIFE BY THE \"REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLES\' STRUGGLE\" ORGANIZATION (\"ELA\"), INCLUDING A BOMB ATTACK SEPTEMBER 27 AT THE U.S. MILITARY COMMISSARY IN CENTRAL ATHENS. - - 4. OFFICIAL EFFORTS NOTWITHSTANDING, THE CONTINUANCE OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY ON GREEK SOIL DURING 1987 HAS NOT BEEN MATCHED BY SIGNIFICANT SUCCESSES IN POLICE COUNTER-TERRORIST EFFORTS. THE MOST STRIKING SUCCESS ENJOYED BY THE AUTHORITIES DURING THE YEAR WAS A VIOLENT ENCOUNTER WITH A SMALL GROUP OF TERRORISTS ON OCTOBER 1 WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF ONE AND THE ARREST OF TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO HAVE CONNECTIONS WITH THE \"ANTI-STATE STRUGGLE\" GROUP. HOWEVER, DESPITE ACTIVE POLICE INVESTIGATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THIS EVENT, NO FURTHER ARRESTS HAVE YET TAKEN PLACE. - - 5. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, GREEK AUTHORITIES CONTINUED DURING 1987 THE EFFORTS THEY HAD INITIATED EARLIER TO IMPROVE SECURITY AT AIR AND SEA PORTS OF ENTRY (PARTICULARLY IN THE ATHENS-PIRAEUS AREA), TO IMPROVE SURVEILLANCE OF SUSPECTED FOREIGN TERRORISTS, TO ENHANCE THE TRAINING AND CAPABILITIES OF POLICE FORCES DEDICATED TO FIGHTING TERRORISM AND TO IMPROVE COORDINATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS HAS BEEN COMMENDABLE, ALTHOUGH THERE REMAINS COMSIDERABLE ROOM FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS GENERALLY BEEN RESPONSIVE TO U.S. GOVERNMENT REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE SECURITY FOR ITS PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES LOCATED IN GREECE. - - 6. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS AN AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARD STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM AS AN INTERNATIONAL POLICY PROBLEM. GREECE REMAINS THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WHICH DOES NOT CONDEMN STATES WHICH SPONSOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IT CONTINUES TO IMPOSE REQUIREMENTS FOR \"PROOF\" OF STATE COMPLICITY AND TO INTRODUCE SO-CALLED \"NATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES\" INTO ITS DECISIONS ON TERRORIST EVENTS WHICH VIRTUALLY PRECLUDE EITHER ANY CONDEMNATION OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE OR ANY ACTION LIKELY TO DISCOURAGE FURTHER SUCH ACTIVITIES. GREEK RELUCTANCE TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE POSITION AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM IS BASED ON A POLICY WHICH APPARENTLY DEFINES SOME TERRORIST ORGANIZATIOMS AS \"JUSTIFIABLE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS\". - - 7. DURING THE PERIOD JUNE-AUGUST 1987 THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONDUCTED A DIALOGUE WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ABOUT ITS CONCERNS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SPECIFICALLY TO REPORTS OF CONTACTS BETWEEN GREEK OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ABU NIDAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (WHICH WERE PUBLICLY AND VEHEMENTLY DENIED BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT). THIS DIALOGUE, WHILE CONFIDENTIAL, SERVED TO ENHANCE THE AWARENESS OF GREEK AUTHORITIES TO THE DEPTH OF AMERICAN CONCERN ABOUT TERRORIST ISSUES. - - 8. GREECE RECOGNIZES THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION WHICH MAINTAINS AN ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN ATHENS. WHILE THE PLO HAS ENJOYED CONSIDERABLE RHETORICAL SUPPORT IN GREECE (FROM ALL MAJOR POLITICAL FACTIONS), THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS ASSISTED THE PLO OR ANY OF ITS CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS IN THE CONDUCT OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THERE IS ALSO NO EVIDENCE THAT GREECE HAS EXTENDED SUPPORT TO ANY OTHER ORGANIZATION INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. - - 9. THERE WERE NO JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO TERRORIST CASES INVOLVING AMERICANS IN GREECE DURING 1987, LARGELY BECAUSE THERE WERE NO ARRESTS OF PERPETRATORS DURING THE YEAR. ON OCTOBER 6 AN IMPRISONED MEMBER OF THE \"ARMEMIAN SECRET APMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA\" (\"ASALA\"), VAHE KHODAVERDIAN, WAS RELEASED FROM GREEK PRISON AND DEPORTED. HE HAD BEEN SERVING A TEN YEAR SENTENCE, WHICH HE SUCCESSFULLY APPEALED WITH A CONSEQUENT REDUCTION TO A TERM OF TWO YEARS WHICH AMOUNTED TO TIME SERVED. 10. THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINS AN ACTIVE OFFICIAL DIALOGUE WITH GREEK AUTHORITIES ON ALL ASPECTS OF TERRORIST-RELATED ISSUES AND IT SEEKS TO ASSIST THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WHERE APPROPRIATE IN ITS COUNTER-TERRORIST EFFORTS. KEELEY "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,085
201	3/15/1988 6:43	88ADDISABABA1180	Embassy Addis Ababa	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE42318", "88STATE54781" ]	R 150643Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1847 ","UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 01180 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, ET SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: A) STATE 42318 B) STATE 54781 1. SINCE THE DAYS OF EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE, ETHIOPIA HAS TAKEN A STRONG ANTI-TERRORIST STANCE, LARGELY BECAUSE IT BELIEVES ANY SHOW OR WEAKNESS TO TERRORISTS WOULD SERVE AS A STIMULUS TO THE VARIOUS ARMED INSURGENT GROUPS WITHIN ETHIOPIA. AS A CONSEQUENCE, ETHIOPIA HAS BEEN FREE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST OPERATIONS SINCE THE DAYS OF HAILE SELASSIE WHEN SEVERAL HIJACKINGS WERE FORCEFULLY REPRESSED. 2. LIBYA HAS FOUR OFFICERS ACCREDITED AT ITS PEOPLE\'S BUREAU IN ADDIS ABABA AND ITS HEAD IS THE VICE DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS. LIBYA HAS A JOINT AGRICULTURAL PROJECT WITH ETHIOPIA, BUT THE NUMBER OF LIBYANS INVOLVED IS UNKNOWN. ETHIO-LIBYAN RELATIONS HAVE BEEN AT A LOW POINT FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND THE LIBYA-ETHIOPIA-PDRY TRIPARTITE PACT HAS BEEN MORIBUND FOR SOME TIME. 3. THE PLO OPENED ITS ONE-PERSON OFFICE IN ETHIOPIA IN 1978 BASED ON ITS OBSERVER STATUS AT THE OAU. THE PLO IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE DIPLOMATIC LIST AND DOES NOT ENJOY OTHER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES. 4. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE PLO LOST THE HOUSE AND CAR PROVIDED BY THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT AFTER THE PLO OFFICE IN PYONGYANG DISTRIBUTED A MAP OF ETHIOPIA WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE ERITREA AS A PROVINCE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THAT REPORT. 5. THE BUREAU OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE HAS ALSO MAINTAINED A ONE-PERSON OFFICE HERE SINCE 1978. IT HAS NO DIPLOMATIC STATUS, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THE REPRESENTATIVE IS PROVIDED WITH A HOUSE BY THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT. CHEEK "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,231
202	3/16/1988 3:43	88BEIJING6641	Embassy Beijing	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE42378", "88STATE54781" ]	P 160343Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2587 ","UNCLAS BEIJING 06641 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356:N/A TAGS: PTER, CH SUBJECT: PEOPLE\'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REFS: (A) STATE 54781 (B) STATE 42378 1. PEOPLE\'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2. THE PEOPLE\'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS AND TO RECOGNIZE THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. CHINA ESTABLISHED CONTACTS WITH THE PALESTINIAN OPPOSITION IN 1963 EVEN BEFORE IT HAD BEGUN ITS ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL. ON MARCH 22, 1965, A PLO DELEGATION VISITING CHINA SIGNED A JOINT STATEMENT WITH THE CHINESE PEOPLE\'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (WHICH COMES UNDER THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS), IN WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE PLO WOULD ESTABLISH AN OFFICE IN BEIJING IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN MUTUAL COOPERATION. IN MAY OF THE SAME YEAR, A PLO OFFICE ENJOYING DIPLOMATIC STATUS WAS FORMALLY ESTABLISHED IN BEIJING. PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN YASSIR ARAFAT VISITED CHINA IN 1964, 1970, 1981 AND 1984; AND IN MAY 1985, HE LED A JOINT PLO-JORDANIAN DELEGATION TO CHINA. OTHER PALESTINIAN LEADERS, INCLUDING THE PFLP\'S GEORGE HABASH, THE DFLP\'S NAYIF HAWATMEH, AND THE PLO\'S FARUQ QADDUMI HAVE ALSO MADE VISITS TO CHINA. IN AN APRIL 24, 1986, MEETING WITH QADDUMI, FOR EXAMPLE, THEN GENERAL SECRETARY HU YAOBANG CRITICIZED THE U.S. FOR ITS \"BIAS TOWARD ISRAEL AND IGNORING THE REASONABLE DEMANDS OF THE PALESTINIANS.\" HU ADDED THAT THE \"CHINESE PEOPLE WILL STAND BY THE PALESTINIANS TILL THEIR FINAL VICTORY, RESOLUTELY SUPPORT THE PLO, THE ONLY LEGITIMATE REPRE- SENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS, AND FIRMLY DEMAND THE RESTORATION OF ALL THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS.\" CHINESE LEADERS HAVE ALSO MET WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERS ON VISITS OVERSEAS. DURING A 1986 VISIT TO TUNISIA, THEN PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG MET WITH YASSIR ARAFAT ON JULY 25 IN TUNIS AND REITERATED SUPPORT FOR THE PLO AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. ZHAO ALSO CALLED FOR ARAB AND INTERNAL PLO UNITY AND ADVISED ARAFAT TO PAY GREATER ATTENTION TO POLITICAL STRUGGLE. ACCORDING TO THE MFA\'S \"GENERAL REVIEW OF CHINA\'S FOREIGN RELATIONS\" (ZHONGGUO WAIJIAO GAILAN, 1987), CHINA HAS MANY TIMES SINCE 1964 INVITED PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS, MASS ORGANIZATIONS, STUDY GROUPS AND DELE- GATIONS TO VISIT CHINA AND HAS FURTHERMORE PROVIDED THE PLO AND PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS WITH WEAPONS, MONEY, MEDICINE, MATERIAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE. THE MFA DIPLOMATIC LIST SHOWS FOUR PLO REPRESENTATIVES WORKING AT THE PLO MISSION IN BEIJING, ALL OF WHOM APPARENTLY HAVE FULL DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES, INCLUDING IMMUNITY AND THE USE OF THE POUCH. THE PLO MISSION REGULARLY DISTRIBUTES NEWS BULLETINS OF THE PLO NEWS ORGANIZATION WAFA THROUGHOUT THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. LORD "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,286
203	3/16/1988 23:14	88SEOUL3039	Embassy Seoul	SECRET	[ "88STATE42378" ]	P 162314Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8309 INFO COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//CJ-CT// ","S E C R E T SEOUL 03039 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, KS SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 42378 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. CLASSIFIED SECTION FOR THE REPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOLLOWS: U.S.-ROK BILATERAL COOPERATION: ------------------------------ 3. ROK COUNTERTERRORISM UNITS TRAINED WITH U.S. CT FORCES ON MANY OCCASIONS IN 1988. THE JADE NUGGET EXERCISE IN JUNE INCLUDED ROKG PLAYER AND OBSERVER CELLS. A SIMILAR THOUGH MORE ELABORATE ROK-US EXERCISE, JADE NUGGET 88, IS PLANNED FOR JUNE OF THIS YEAR. EXERCISE IVY CRAWLER IN OCTOBER 1987 WAS AN EXTREMELY INVOLVED ROK-US EFFORT. THE SCENARIO POSITED THREE TERRORIST SITES IN COMMUNICATION WITH ONE ANOTHER AND REQUIRED BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND MILITARY COORDINATION. U.S. FORCES TOOK DOWN ONE SITE, ROK FORCES ANOTHER, WHILE AN INTEGRATED FORCE TOOK DOWN THE THIRD. IT WAS A COMPLEX EXERCISE AND OF GREAT VALUE IN EVALUATING UNILATERAL AND COOPERATIVE METHODS AND CAPABILITIES. FURTHER MILITARY COOPERATION INCLUDED FIVE SMALL UNIT EXCHANGE/TRAINING EXERCISES, BOMB DOG, AND EXPLOSIVE ORDINANCE DEMOLITION TRAINING. 4. THE USG HAS ALSO PROVIDED COUNTERTERRORISM ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING THROUGH A VARIETY OF AGENCIES INCLUDING CUSTOMS, INS, FBI, FAA, AND SIRO (S/NF). FURTHER DETAILS OF SIRO (S/NF) COUNTERTERRORISM ASSISTANCE TO THE ROK ARE RESTRICTED TO SIRO (S/NF) REPORTING CHANNELS. JUDICIAL RESPONSE: ----------------- 5. DURING EXERCISE IVY CRAWLER, ROK OFFICIALS RESISTED ATTEMPTS BY U.S. PLAYERS TO TRY TO EXERCISE LEGAL JURISDICTION OVER TERRORISTS ACTING AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS ON A U.S. INSTALLATION AND CAPTURED BY U.S. FORCES. WHILE THIS EXAMPLE OF EXERCISE PLAY CANNOT BE TAKEN AS AN OFFICIAL ROKG POSITION AS HIGH-LEVEL ROKG DECISION-MAKERS DID NOT TAKE PART, WE BELIEVE IT A LIKELY RESPONSE. NONETHELESS, SHOULD THE ROKG DECIDE NOT TO EXTRADITE THE USG WOULD PROBABLY FIND A KOREAN LEGAL DECISION ACCEPTABLE, AS ROKG AND U.S. POLICIES ON TERRORISM AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE GENERALLY IN AGREEMENT. NORTH KOREA: ----------- 6. WE ASSUME THAT PREPARATION OF THE DEPARTMENT\'S REPORT ON NORTH KOREA CAN BEST BE PREPARED IN WASHINGTON. LILLEY "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,358
204	3/16/1988 23:20	88SEOUL3040	Embassy Seoul	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "87STATE311198", "87STATE371296", "88STATE42378" ]	P 162320Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8310 INFO COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//CJ-CT// ","UNCLAS SEOUL 03040 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, KS SUBJECT: REPUBLIC OF KOREA: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 42378 1. UNCLASSIFIED SECTION FOR THE REPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOLLOWS: I. REVIEW OF MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. A. INTRODUCTION AFTER YEARS OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING INFILTRATION BY NORTH KOREAN COMMANDO TEAMS AND AGENTS, AND HAVING SUFFERED TERRORIST ATTACKS SUCH AS THE 1983 RANGOON BOMBING, THE ROKG IS CONCERNED OVER TERRORISM. THAT CONCERN HAS HEIGHTENED IN ANTICIPATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 1988 SUMMER OLYMPICS TO BE HELD IN SEOUL AND WITH THE NOVEMBER 1987 DESTRUCTION OF KA 858 BY A CONFESSED NORTH KOREAN AGENT. PLANNING FOR THE OLYMPICS HAS ENCOURAGED THE ROKG TO CONSIDER TERRORISM FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, ALTHOUGH NORTH KOREA AND PRO-NORTH KOREAN GROUPS BASED IN JAPAN SUCH AS THE CHOSEN SOREN WILL CONTINUE AS THE PREDOMINANT FOCUS OF THEIR ATTENTION. B. MAJOR STEPS TAKEN 1)BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. THE ROKG AND USG HELD BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON TERRORISM IN WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER OF 1987. THE DISCUSSIONS LED TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH SIDE\'S ORGANIZATION FOR DEALING WITH TERRORISM AND TO SPECIFIC COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR INFORMATION SHARING, TRAINING, AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS. CLASSIFIED SOURCE MATERIAL: 1) SEPTEL. 2) DETAILS OF THE AGENDA OF THIS MEETING SHOULD BE ON FILE IN S/CT. 3) 87 STATE 311198 CONTAINS A PRELIMINARY READOUT ON THE CONSULTATIONS 4) 87 STATE 371296 OUTLINES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COOPERATIVE ACTION AMONG A VARIETY OF ROKG AND USG AGENCIES, ALMOST ALL OF WHICH ARE NOW IN PLACE. 2)BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH JAPAN JAPAN HAS AGREED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT ROK-JAPAN COMMITTEE WHICH WILL MEET ON A BIMONTHLY BASIS TO COORDINATE ANTITERRORISM COOPERATION RELATED TO THE OLYMPICS. FINAL MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS ON ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMITTEE TAKE PLACE ON 20 MARCH 1988. 3)UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES THE ROKG IS LIMITED TO OBSERVER STATUS IN THE UNITED NATIONS BUT IS SUPPORTIVE OF MEASURES AGAINST TERRORISM. IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH US IT INTRODUCED THE DESTRUCTION OF KA 858 INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR DEBATE, AND ITS CAREFULLY MARSHALLED ARGUMENTS CONTRIBUTED IMPORTANTLY TO THAT BODY\'S UNDERSTANDING OF NORTH KOREA\'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACT. II. RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, INCLUDING EXTRADITION REQUESTS, WITH RESPECT TO MATTERS RELATING TO TERRORISM AFFECTING AMERICAN CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. THE U.S. HAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE ROKG. ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECT THAT THE ROKG WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER THE EXTRADITION OF TERRORISTS TO THE U.S. ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS (SEE SEPTEL), WE CANNOT EXPECT THAT TERRORISTS GUILTY OF ACTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS OR FACILITIES WOULD BE EXTRADITED AS A MATTER OF COURSE. III. THE ROKG OFFERS NO SUPPORT, POLITICAL, FINANCIAL OR DIPLOMATIC, FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IT SUPPORTS NEITHER THE PLO OR FMLN. LILLEY "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,426
205	3/17/1988 10:05	88DHAKA2166	Embassy Dhaka	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE42378" ]	O 171005Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7193 ","UNCLAS DHAKA 02166 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, BG SUBJECT: BANGLADESH: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 42378 1. BANGLADESH. 2. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION: THE GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZES THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, WHICH MAINTAINS A DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN DHAKA. FOUR PLO REPRESENTATIVES APPEAR ON THE DIPLOMATIC LIST, AND APPARENTLY HAVE FULL DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES, INCLUDING IMMUNITY AND USE OF THE POUCH. AN ASSOCIATION OF APPROXIMATELY TWENTY PALESTINIAN STUDENTS IS ACTIVE IN THE PORT CITY OF CHITTAGONG. THE ASSOCIATION IS REPORTEDLY AFFILIATED WITH THE AL-FATAH GROUP OF THE PLO. THE STUDENTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED AGAINST U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAVE BURNED EFFIGIES OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND ISRAELI LEADERS. DOMESTIC INSURGENCY - THE SHANTI BAHINI: A SIMMERING INSURGENT MOVEMENT IS ACTIVE IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS REGION WHERE SOME 600,000 TRIBAL PEOPLE LIVE. THE MOVEMENT REFLECTS CONCERN THAT THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE IN THE HILL AREAS WAS BEING UNDERMINED BY SETTLERS WHO MOVED THERE FROM THE OVERPOPULATED PLAINS. THE INSURGENTS ARE DEMANDING AUTONOMY FOR THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS WITHIN THE BANGLADESH STATE. ARMED CLASHES HAVE OCCURRED BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND A GROUP OF TRIBAL INSURGENTS KNOWN AS THE SHANTI BAHINI (\"PEACE FORCE\"). THE SHANTI BAHINI HAVE CONDUCTED HIT-AND-RUN RAIDS AGAINST MILITARY PERSONNEL AND BENGALI SETTLEMENTS. OFFICIAL SOURCES CLAIM THAT IN 1987, 122 PERSONS WERE KILLED, 68 PERSONS WERE INJURED, AND 21 PERSONS WERE KIDNAPPED IN SHANTI BAHINI VIOLENCE. 3. MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN: THE BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT HAS NO SPECIFIC RESPONSE CAPABILITY BEYOND EXISTING POLICE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES. THE IMMIGRATION SERVICE IS AN ADJUNCT OF SPECIAL BRANCH, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THERE ARE NO DESIGNATED ANTI- TERRORISM POLICE. ANY ARMED RESPONSE TO A TERRORISM SITUATION WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE HANDLED BY THE MILITARY, WHICH HAS NO KNOWN ANTI-TERRORIST CAPABILITY. 4. RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: POST IS UNAWARE OF ANY ACTION TAKEN BY THE BANGLADESH JUDICIAL SYSTEM WITH RESPECT OF MATTERS RELATING TO TERRORISM AFFECTING AMERICAN CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. 5. POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL FORA: THE BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED MEASURES TO PREVENT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, BANGLADESH HAS CONDEMNED AS CRIMINAL ALL ACTS, METHODS, AND PRACTICES OF TERRORISM WHEREVER AND BY WHOMEVER COMMITTED. TO POST\'S KNOWLEDGE, THE BDG HAS ENDORSED INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS. BANGLADESH HAS SUPPORTED EFFORTS WITHIN THE SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC) TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. BANGLADESH\'S UNGA VOTING RECORD ON TERRORISM IS UNAVAILABLE AT POST. DE PREE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,522
206	3/17/1988 12:46	88RABAT2739	Embassy Rabat	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	R 171246Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7051 INFO AMCONSUL CASABLANCA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 02739 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, MO SUBJECT: MOROCCO: 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT GOC STATE 42378 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) - 2. FOLLOWING IS POST\'S CONTRIBUTION TO DEPARTMENT\'S ANNUAL REPORT ON TERRORISM, KEYED TO SUGGESTED FORMAT. - (1) MOROCCO - (2) RELATIONSHIP WITH PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION: THE PLO HAS HAD A DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN RABAT SINCE 1971. GOM-PLO RELATIONS SOURED IN 1987 OVER THE SEATING OF A POLISARIO REPRESENTATIVE AT THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN ALGIERS, RESULTING IN THE DOWNGRADING OF RELATIONS AND DEPARTURE OF PLO BUREAU CHIEF ABOU MARWAN. RELATIONS WERE NOT BROKEN, HOWEVER, AND PLO RABAT BUREAU ACTING CHIEF MOHAMMED AL-ALAMI PRESIDES OVER A STAFF OF A HALF DOZEN, INCLUDING A PRESS ATTACHE, TWO SECURITY OFFICERS AND TWO SECRETARY- COMMUNICATORS. THE BUREAU\'S ACTIVITIES, WHICH ARE MONITORED BY THE GOM, INCLUDE THE SUPPORT OF PALESTINIANS STUDYING IN MOROCCO AND PROMOTION OF PLO VIEWPOINTS IN THE MOROCCAN MEDIA. EXPATRIATE PLO BUREAU STAFF MEMBERS ENJOY DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND ARE ACTIVE INTHE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. ACCORDING TO KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES, THE BUREAU MAKES EVERY EFFORT TO STAY OUT OF INTERNAL MOROCCAN POLITICS AND, TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, TAKES NO PART IN ANY ACTIVITY RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IN KEEPING WITH THIS POLICY, THE LOCAL BUREAU WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE CASE OF A PLO SPLINTER GROUP, INVOLVING FOUR TERRORISTS WHO CAME FROM TUNISIA IN AUGUST 1986 AND WERE PROMPTLY ARRESTED IN CASABLANCA. NASSIF "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,609
207	3/28/1988 12:22	88DAMASCUS1795	Embassy Damascus	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	R 281222Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4358 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY BEIRUT AMEMBASSY MOSCOW ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 01795 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: ECON, PREL, SY, IR SUBJECT: A SYRIAN DIPLOMAT\'S VIEW OF LIFE IN TEHRAN 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT 2. SUMMARY: SOME SUBJECTIVE IMPRESSIONS OF LIFE IN THE IRANIAN CAPITAL FROM A SYRIAN DIPLOMAT PAINT A GLOOMY PICTURE. END SUMMARY. 3. MR. HUSNI DIAB IS THE RECENTLY RETURNED SYRIAN COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR IN TEHRAN (RETURNED TO DAMASCUS MARCH 14). HE IS A SUNNI DAMASCENE OF GOOD FAMILY WHO HAS SPENT THE BULK OF HIS CAREER IN THE BANKING SECTOR, FIRST WORKING FOR PRIVATE BANKS IN DAMASCUS, THEN FOR THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF SYRIA AFTER THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR IN THE 1960S. PRIOR TO DEPARTING FOR HIS MISSION IN TEHRAN, HE SPENT FOUR OR FIVE YEARS AT THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FOREIGN TRADE, WORKING WITH HIS OLD MENTOR AND UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND FOREIGN TRADE, MOHAMMED IMADI (WHO WAS ALSO MINISTER OF ECONOMY IN THE LATE 1970S). MR. DIAB HAS SPENT THE LAST FIVE YEARS IN TEHRAN. HE IS ALSO A FORMER AID GRANTEE WHO TRAINED WITH U.S. BANKS IN THE EARLY 1960S. - -------------------- 4. LIFE UNDER THE SCUDS - -------------------- IN A TYPICAL, FATALISTIC WAY, DIAB SAID THAT DURING THE RECENT PERIOD OF MISSILE ATTACKS HE PUT HIM- SELF TO SLEEP AT NIGHT WITH A VALIUM. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS NOT SO BAD DURING THE DAY WHEN THE NOISE OF THE CITY WOULD DROWN OUT THE SOUND OF DISTANT MISSILES FALLING. BUT IN THE QUIET OF THE NIGHT, THE SOUND WAS ALL TOO CLEAR. DIAB ESTIMATED THAT OF A POPULATION OF APPROXIMATELY 10 MILLION, ABOUT 30 PERCENT VACATED THE CITY AT NIGHT. \"THE WEALTHIER TEHRANIS GO AND STAY IN THEIR SUMMER HOUSES OR WITH RELATIVES IN THE OUT- LYING VILLAGES AND COUNTRYSIDE. ANYONE WITH A CAR WILL DRIVE OUTSIDE OF THE CITY AND SLEEP IN THE CAR OR CAMP.\" - ----------------- 5. IRANIAN OFFICIALS - ----------------- DIAB SAID THAT THE TOP LEVEL IRANIAN OFFICIALS HE DEALT WITH WERE INCOMPETENT AND UNTRAINED. MID- LEVEL OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY IN THE BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC SECTORS, HAD OVERWHELMINGLY BEEN TRAINED IN THE U.S. HE ADDED THAT HE FREQUENTLY PASSED THE U.S. EMBASSY BUILDING ON HIS WAY TO AN ADJACENT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BUILDING. HE SAID THE PREMISES ARE STILL MANNED BY REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS BUT NOT USED. DIAB\'S COMMENTS ON THE IRANIAN BUREAUCRACY WERE SCATHING. \"A SINGLE, SIMPLE TRANSACTION CAN TAKE THREE OR FOUR MONTHS TO COMPLETE. TO ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING REQUIRES AT LEAST THREE OR FOUR SEPARATE TRANSACTIONS. THE IRANIAN BUREAUC- RACY IS A NIGHTMARE TO DEAL WITH.\" CONSIDERING THAT THE SYRIAN BUREAUCRACY\'S PACE IS CLOSER TO THE TORTOISE THAN THE HARE, THIS IS STRONG LANGUAGE INDEED. - ------------------------- 6. IRANIAN TOURISTS IN SYRIA - ------------------------- DIAB AGREED THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT PAYS SYRIAN GOVERNMENT $250 PER TOURIST FOR A ONE WEEK TRIP TO SYRIA, INCLUDING FOOD AND TRANSPOR- TATION. HE SAID THE ARRANGEMENT IS FOR TWO THOUSAND TOURISTS PER WEEK. HE DENIED THAT FAMILIES OF MARTYRS ARE PROVIDED THIS TRIP AS A FREE BONUS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT UNDER BLACK MARKET RATES FOR THE IRANIAN CURRENCY THE AVERAGE IRANIAN PAYS APPROXIMATELY $80 FOR THE TOUR. HE SAID FOR THE MOST PART THE TRAVELERS ARE POOR VILLAGERS AND/OR RELIGIOUS ADHERENTS WHO ARE INTERESTED IN VISITING DAMASCUS\' MOSQUES AND SHRINES. THE WEALTHIER IRANIANS, HE ADDED, PARTICULARLY NOW DURING THE ANNUAL FEAST OF NAWRUZ, ARE TRAVELING TO EUROPE, CANADA AND THE U.S. - -------------- 7. FUNDAMENTALISM - -------------- DIAB WAXED PHILOSOPHICAL REGARDING THE CAUSES OF FUNDAMENTALISM IN IRAN. ESSENTIALLY, IT BOILED DOWN TO AN OPINION THAT THE SHAH IGNORED THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN THE SMALL WEALTHY ELITE AND THE GREAT MASS OF POOR. THE SHAH SHOULD HAVE DEVOTED MORE TIME AND MONEY TO PROVIDING ROADS, ELECTRICITY, CLEAN WATER AND EDUCATION TO THE MASSES AND NOT TO BEAUTIFYING EXCLUSIVE PARTS OF TEHRAN AND OTHER CITIES. THE POOR REACTED BY TURNING TO RELIGION AND THE REVOLUTION WAS BORN. NOW, EVEN FOR A FRIENDLY SYRIAN DIPLOMAT, LIFE IS DIFFICULT. THE BUREAUCRACY IS SLOW AND STUPID. THE ECONOMY IS IN TROUBLE AND THERE ARE SHORTAGES OF ALL KINDS. LAST, BUT NOT LEAST, THE SCUDS ARE FALLING. 8. WHEN DIAB RECEIVED WORD OF HIS REASSIGNMENT HOME, HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE EMBASSY CAME BY TO CONGRATULATE HIM. EVEN THE BENEFITS OF LIVING ABROAD ON A DOLLAR SALARY, APPARENTLY, DO NOT COMPENSATE FOR THE HARDSHIPS OF LIVING IN TEHRAN. 9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. EAGLETON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,657
208	3/29/1988 10:59	88BAGHDAD1731	Embassy Baghdad	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE88525" ]	O 291059Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6706 ","UNCLAS BAGHDAD 01731 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, PREL, IZ SUBJECT: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT: IRAQ REF: STATE 88525 REPEATING STATE 42378 NOT SENT TO BAGHDAD 1. IRAQ. 2. IRAQ STRONGLY DENIES ANY RELATIONSHIP TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE AVOWED TERRORIST ABU NIDAL WAS EXPELLED FROM THE COUNTRY IN 1983 AND SINCE THAT TIME IRAQ HAS GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ESTABLISH A NEW INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AS A STATE ABHORRING TERRORISM. THIS EFFORT HAS FITTED A GENERAL PATTERN OF TRYING TO ENGENDER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AS THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR HAS DRAGGED ON, NOW INTO ITS EIGHTH YEAR. 3. IRAQ HAS ALSO GONE TO GREAT EFFORTS TO DEVELOP ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PLO, WHICH LIKE ALL ARAB STATES IT DOES NOT VIEW AS BEING A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. PLO CHAIRMAN ARAFAT FREQUENTLY COMES TO BAGHDAD, AND THE PLO MAINTAINS OFFICES IN BAGHDAD. IN MARCH, IRAQ PROUDLY ANNOUNCED DONATING THREE MILLION DOLLARS TO THE PLO, DESPITE IRAQ\'S OWN MOUNTING INDEBTEDNESS DUE TO THE WAR. 4. CERTAIN PALESTINIAN GROUPS WHICH HAVE COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTIONS, SUCH AS THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION FRONT HEADED BY ABU AL-\'ABBAS AND THE MAY 15 ORGANIZA- TION, ARE KNOWN TO HAVE RECEIVED SANCTUARY AND ASSISTANCE FROM IRAQ SINCE 1983. CERTAIN OF THESE GROUPS MAY HAVE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE SUCH ASSISTANCE OR SANCTUARY IN 1987. NEWTON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,783
209	3/29/1988 18:36	88LIMA4116	Embassy Lima	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "87LIMA5659", "87LIMA6577", "88STATE42378" ]	O 291836Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7299 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA AMEMBASSY LA PAZ AMEMBASSY QUITO USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM DEAHQS WASHDC ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 04116 DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1 DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD JOHN YOULE E.O. 12356: DECL: 03/29/88 TAGS: PTER, PE SUBJECT: PERU: CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON TERRORISM REF: (A) STATE 42378 - (B) 87 LIMA 5659 - (C) 87 LIMA 6577 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. FOLLOWING IS PERU PORTION OF DEPARTMENT\'S NEW ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (REF A). REFS B AND C CONTAIN MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON PERUVIAN GUERRILLA GROUPS. 3. SINCE THE APPEARANCE OF TERRORISM IN 1980, TERRORIST ATTACKS AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES HAVE RESULTED IN A DEATH TOLL ESTIMATED AT OVER 10,000. DURING 1987, PERU CONTINUED TO CONFRONT TWO SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST GROUPS. THE LARGER GROUP, KNOWN AS \"SENDERO LUMINOSO\" (\"SHINING PATH\"), KILLED AT LEAST 600 PERSONS IN 1987. ITS VICTIMS RANGED FROM PEASANT OPPONENTS TO GOVERNMENT AND PARTY OFFICIALS AND THE SECURITY FORCES. IN ADDITION, SENDERO CARRIED OUT NUMEROUS BOMBINGS AND BLACKOUTS. DURING ONE BLACKOUT IN NOVEMBER 1987, SENDERO DETONATED A BOMB IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY, CAUSING MINOR MATERIAL DAMAGE. THE SMALLER \"TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT\" (MRTA) ALSO WAS ACTIVE DURING 1987, KILLING AS MANY AS 20 PERSONS AND CARRYING OUT NUMEROUS BOMBINGS. THE MRTA ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BOMBED THE USG INSTALLATIONS AND U.S. COMPANIES, CAUSING MINOR MATERIAL DAMAGES (BUT NO PERSONAL INJURIES). NO FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN PERU. 4. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO MAKE IMPORTANT ARRESTS OF ALLEGED TERRORISTS DURING 1987, INCLUDING HIGH- RANKING MEMBERS OF THE MRTA. THE GOVERNMENT NONETHE- LESS WAS UNABLE TO WEAKEN SENDERO SIGNIFICANTLY, AND SENDERO APPEARS TO HAVE ENLARGED ITS AREA OF OPERATIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR. PARTICULARLY WORRISOME IS SENDERO\'S EXPANSION INTO THE COCA-PRODUCING AREAS OF THE JUNGLE, LEADING THE GOVERNMENT TO CHARGE THAT SENDERO IS COOPERATING WITH NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. THIS IS PROBABLY TRUE IN SOME INSTANCES; IT IS CERTAINLY THE CASE THAT SENDERO HAS SOUGHT TO PORTRAY ITSELF AS DEFENDING PEASANT COCA GROWERS. 5. JUDICIAL EFFORTS AGAINST TERRORISM CONTINUE TO MOVE SLOWLY. THERE IS A HUGE BACKLOG IN PERUVIAN COURTS, AND TERRORISM SUSPECTS FREQUENTLY ARE DETAINED FOUR YEARS PENDING TRIAL. FEWER THAN 50 PERSONS WERE CONVICTED OF TERRORISM DURING 1987. AMONG THE CASES CURRENTLY BEING TRIED ARE 15 PERSONS ACCUSED OF THE JUNE 26, 1986 BOMBING OF THE CUZCO TRAIN STATION, DURING WHICH TWO AMERICANS AND SEVEN OTHER FOREIGNERS WERE KILLED, AND SEVERAL AMERICANS WERE WOUNDED. 6. SENDERO DOES NOT APPEAR TO RECEIVE ANY SUPPORT FROM ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUP. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SEVERAL WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE COLLECTED FUNDS ON BEHALF OF SENDERO, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW THESE FUNDS ARE CHANNELED TO SENDERO. THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, A GROUP OF MAOIST PARTIES HEADQUARTERED IN LONDON, PERIODICALLY ISSUES MANIFESTOS SUPPORTING SENDERO. 7. CLAIMS OF CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR THE MRTA SURFACE FROM TIME TO TIME IN THE PERUVIAN PRESS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN THAT AT LEAST ONE MRTA LEADER TRAVELED RECENTLY TO NICARAGUA BUT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED OR CLAIMED THAT THESE COUNTRIES PROVIDED ANY MATERIAL SUPPORT TO THE MRTA. THE MRTA DOES HAVE CLOSE TIES TO THE M-19 TERRORISTS OF COLOMBIA AND THE ALFARO VIVE CARAJO OF ECUADOR. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE MRTA HAS ACQUIRED ARMS FROM ONE OR BOTH OF THESE GROUPS. 8. PERU GIVES NO OFFICIAL RECOGNITION TO THE PLO, BUT THE PLO HAS HAD AN INFORMATION OFFICE IN PERU SINCE 1979. PERU DOES NOT ACCORD OFFICIAL STATUS TO THE SALVADORAN FMLN. 9. PERU RECEIVED NO EXTRADITION REQUESTS FOR TERRORISTS DURING 1987. IN 1986, PERU DEPORTED TO ECUADOR AN ECUADOREAN CITIZEN ACCUSED BY HIS GOVERNMENT OF PARTICIPATING IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. PERU DID NOT INITIATE ANY EXTRADITION REQUESTS FOR TERRORISM IN 1987. 10. PERU HAS NOT ASSISTED, TRAINED, OR PROVIDED SANCTUARY TO FOREIGN TERRORISTS. WATSON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,827
210	3/30/1988 13:39	88ANKARA4266	Embassy Ankara	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	R 301339Z MAR 88 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6575 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMCONSUL ADANA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL AMCONSUL IZMIR AMEMBASSY NICOSIA SECDEF WASHDC JCS WASHDC USMISSION USNATO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD// USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAFF// CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD// ","C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 04266 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PINS, PTER, TU SUBJECT: PKK KILLS NINE IN SIIRT 1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. PKK TERRORISTS KILLED NINE VILLAGERS AND 350 SHEEP IN YAGZIKOYMAK VILLAGE IN THE URUH DISTRICT OF SOUTHEASTERN SIIRT PROVINCE MARCH 29. THE TERRORISTS ATTACKED TWO DIFFERENT HOUSES IN THE VILLAGE, STRANGLING FOUR MEN IN ONE HOUSE AND THREE MORE IN ANOTHER. LATER, TERRORISTS, PERHAPS A DIFFERENT GROUP, SHOT TWO MEN AT A HOUSE TWO KILOMETERS AWAY. TERRORISTS ALSO EXECUTED 350 SHEEP WITH MACHINE GUN FIRE, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. THE SHEEP WERE IN A CAVE USED AS A SHEEPPEN AND WERE BEING GUARDED BY SOME OF THE MURDERED VILLAGERS. 3. HURRIYET SAID THAT THE VILLAGE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ATTACKED BY THE PKK AND HAD VILLAGE GUARDS AS WELL AS A POLICE STATION. HENCE, THE TERRORISTS KILLED THEIR VICTIMS BY STRANGLING TO AVOID DETECTION. 4. AMCONSUL ADANA HAS SPOKEN WITH THE GOVERNOR\'S OFFICE IN SIIRT, AND THEY CONFIRMED THE ATTACK. ADANA NOTED THAT THIS IS THE FIRST MAJOR PKK ACTION OF THE SEASON, AFTER A LONG HIATUS CAUSED BY THE REGION\'S HARSH WINTER. 5. COMMENT: THE ATTACK CAME ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1986 KILLING OF PKK LEADER MAHSUN KORKMAZ BY SECURITY OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS ON THE LAST DAY OF NEVRUZ, THE NEW YEAR HOLIDAY. IT MARKS THE BEGINNING OF THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE INSURRECTION IN TURKEY\'S SOUTHEAST. 6. DURING THE WINTER HIATUS, THE PKK HAD AN INTENSE INTERNAL DEBATE ON THE THE USEFULNESS OF ITS TERRORIST CAMPAIGN AGAINST VILLAGERS. THIS LATEST ATTACK WOULD INDICATE THAT THE DEBATE HAS BEEN RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF CONTINUED TERRORISM. WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE TERRORISTS DID NOT TARGET WOMEN AND CHILDREN THIS TIME, AS THEY DID IN SEVERAL OUTRAGES LAST SUMMER. STRAUSZ-HUPE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	30,940
211	4/5/1988 10:45	88COLOMBO2367	Embassy Colombo	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88COLOMBO1755" ]	O 051045Z APR 88 FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7892 INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY AMCONSUL MADRAS PRIORITY ","UNCLAS COLOMBO 02367 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE E.O. 12356; N/A TAGS: PREL, PINS, IN, CE SUBJECT: INDIAN PAYOFF TO LTTE REVEALED REF: COLOMBO 1755 1. MAJOR SRI LANKAN PAPERS APRIL 5 HAVE HEADLINED A REPORT (FIRST PUBLISHED IN THE APRIL 3 LONDON OBSERVER) WHICH QUOTES BOTH INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER J.N. DIXIT AND AN LTTE SPOKESMAN IN MADRAS THAT INDIAN PRIME MINISTER GANDHI AGREED IN LATE JULY TO PAY THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM A MONTHLY STIPEND TO COMPENSATE FOR LOST TAX REVENUES FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE INDO-SRI LANKAN ACCORD. THE MONTHLY PAYMENT, REPORTS SAY, WAS TO HAVE BEEN FIVE MILLION INDIAN RUPEES (OR NEARLY $400,000). AN INDIAN HICOMM OFFICER HAS CONFIRMED THAT SOME MONEY WAS GIVEN THE TIGERS IN LATE JULY. APPARENTLY ONLY ONE PAYMENT WAS MADE BEFORE THE LTTE RENEGED ON ITS PLEDGE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND THE DEAL FELL THROUGH. 2. AN UNNAMED LTTE SPOKESMAN IN MADRAS IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE PAYMENT WAS PART OF A LARGER SECRET PACKAGE OF GUARANTEES WHICH GANDHI OFFERED LTTE LEADER V. PRABHAKARAN IN JULY TO GET HIM TO AGREE TO THE BILATERAL ACCORD. OTHER PARTS OF THE PACKAGE, ACCORDING TO THIS REPORT, INCLUDED: - -- AN ASSURANCE THAT THE LTTE WOULD FORM A MAJORITY - OF THE INTERIM PROVINCIAL COUNCIL FOR THE NORTH - AND EAST. (COMMENT: THE LTTE WAS GIVEN SEVEN - OF THE TWELVE SEATS IN A DEAL WHICH WAS ANNOUNCED - AND FELL THROUGH THE SAME DAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1987.) - -- ONE BILLION INDIAN RUPEES FOR REHABILITATION OF THE - JAFFNA PENINSULA WHICH APPARENTLY WAS TO BE - FUNNELED THROUGH AN LTTE-DOMINATED INTERIM - ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL (COMMENT: THIS APPEARS TO - BE IN ADDITION TO THE AID WHICH INDIA PLEDGED - PUBLICLY AT THE DECEMBER CONSORTIUM MEETING IN - PARIS. AT THAT MEETING, THE GOI OFFERED US $40 - MILLION (ABOUT 520 MILLION INDIAN RUPEES) FOR - REHABILITATION WORK IN THE NORTH AND EAST.) - -- HELP, AFTER AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL - WAS IN PLACE, IN SETTING UP A TAMIL POLICE FORCE. - 3. EMBASSY COMMENT: LEFT UNSAID IS ANY INDICATION WHETHER THE PACKAGE SUGGESTED ABOVE IS STILL ON THE TABLE IN THE GOI-LTTE TALKS WHICH APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME TIME. ACCORDING TO JOHN RETTIE, THE LOCAL BBC CORRESPONDENT, TALKS BETWEEN THE TIGERS AND THE GOI BEGAN IN LATE FEBRUARY IN MADRAS. THEY WERE BROKEN OFF RECENTLY, HE SAID, BUT ARE DUE TO BEGIN AGAIN NEXT WEEK. END COMMENT. SPAIN "	Success: CSV parsed	null	31,000
212	4/6/1988 4:10	88MANAGUA2342	Embassy Managua	SECRET	[ "87MANAGUA1949", "88STATE42378" ]	O 060410Z APR 88 FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2147 ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 02342 DEPT FOR S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR TAGS: PTER NU SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: 1987 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: A) STATE 42378, B) 87 MANAGUA 1949 (NOTAL) 1. (U) SUMMARY: THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA (GON) MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES ON THE SECRETARY\'S TERRORISM LIST (REFTEL A) AND WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). IN ADDITION TO ITS DIPLOMATIC MISSION, CUBA PROVIDES ADVISORS TO MANY GON MINISTRIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES. GON SUPPORT FOR THE FARABUNDO MARTI LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) HAS BEEN REPORTED IN DETAIL IN A GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR LETTER CIRCULATED AS A UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY/SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT ISSUED IN FEBRUARY 1988. 2. (S) REFTEL B FORWARDED A DAO REPORT (IIR 6 870 0238 87) TO DIA IN MARCH 1987, REGARDING SANCTUARY AND SAFEHAVEN PROVIDED TO ITALIAN CITIZENS, KNOWN OR SUSPECTED MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS \"RED BRIGADES,\" \"AUTONOMIA OPERAIA,\" \"MIR\" AND OTHERS. 3. (C) ALTHOUGH IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE GON AND THE GOVERNING SANDINISTA PARTY CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN TIES TO AND PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS, NO FURTHER INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED BY THE POST ON SUCH SUPPORT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1987. 4. (U) RELATIONS WITH NATIONS ON THE SECRETARY\'S TERRORISM LIST: 1) NICARAGUA: 2) TERRORISM SUPPORT: THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA (GON) PROVIDES WIDE-RANGING SUPPORT FOR THE FARABUNDO MARTI LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) OPERATING IN EL SALVADOR. A GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR LETTER, CIRCULATED AS A UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (GENERAL ASSEMBLY DOCUMENT A/42/914, SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT 5/19486), DATED 9 FEBRUARY 1988, PROVIDES IN-DEPTH INFORMATION ON THIS SUPPORT. POST HOLDS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. --THE GON ALSO PROVIDES DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO SOCIALIST PEOPLE\'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED ON FEBRUARY 16, 1981. THE LATEST GON DIPLOMATIC LIST PUBLISHED IN 1985 SHOWED A COMMITTEE SECRETARY, A PRESS SECRETARY AND A CONSULAR AFFAIRS OFFICER ASSIGNED TO THE LIBYAN PEOPLE\'S OFFICE. IN 1985, THE LIBYAN PEOPLE\'S OFFICE OPENED AN ARABIC LANGUAGE SCHOOL IN MANAGUA. STAFFING OF THE SCHOOL WAS UNDETERMINED; IT MAY NO LONGER EXIST AS POST HAS SEEN NO ADVERTISING FOR THE SCHOOL SINCE 1986. --THE GON ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE\'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) ON MARCH 5, 1980, AND THE DPRK HAS MAINTAINED A SMALL MISSION IN MANAGUA SINCE THAT TIME. THE DPRK MISSION PUBLICLY LISTS AN AMBASSADOR, TWO COUNSELORS, A POLITICAL ATTACHE, A CULTURAL ATTACHE, A FIRST SECRETARY AND A THIRD SECRETARY. - --THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC ALSO MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH NICARAGUA THROUGH ITS MISSION IN HAVANA, CUBA. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED ON JANUARY 30, 1982. --THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN HAS A THREE-PERSON MISSION IN MANAGUA CONSISTING OF AN AMBASSADOR, AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL AND A THIRD SECRETARY. --THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) ESTABLISHED AN EMBASSY IN MANAGUA ON JANUARY 16, 1981. THE 1985 GON DIPLOMATIC LIST SHOWED AN AMBASSADOR AND A FIRST SECRETARY. - --THE GON AND CUBA HAVE MAINTAINED DIPLOMATIC TIES SINCE AUGUST 1, 1979. THE CUBAN MISSION TO NICARAGUA INCLUDES, IN ADDITION TO ONE OF THE LARGEST EMBASSIES IN MANAGUA, ADVISORS TO THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE, EDUCATION, HEALTH, AGRICULTURE AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES. --IRAQ MAINTAINS AN EMBASSY IN MANAGUA. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED ON JULY 9, 1982. --THE PEOPLE\'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH NICARAGUA THROUGH ITS EMBASSY IN HAVANA, CUBA. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED ON MAY 5, 1982. 3) COUNTERRORISM ACTIONS: NONE. 5. (C) THERE IS NO REPEAT NO FURTHER REPORTING ON TERRORISM SUPPORT VIA OTHER CHANNELS. MODDERNO "	Success: CSV parsed	null	31,070
213	4/14/1988 15:07	88BEIRUT2181	Embassy Beirut	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88BEIRUT2062" ]	R 141507Z APR 88 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6549 INFO USDA WASHDC AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY NICOSIA AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 02181 STATE FOR NEA/ARN AND AID/ANE/MENA USDA FOR PAUL KIENDALL E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: EAID, EAGR, ETRD, BEXP, PGOV, PINR, LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: EXCHANGE WITH MFA ECONOMIC DIRECTOR ON U.S. WHEAT AID AND SALES REF: BEIRUT 2062 (NOTAL) 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 2. BEGIN SUMMARY: MFA DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS SALLOUKH MADE DEMARCHE TO DCM ON FAMILIAR THEME OF A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT WHEAT PROGRAM WITH THE U.S. SALLOUKH ARGUED THAT FREE WHEAT WOULD HAVE GOOD PROPAGANDA VALUE FOR THE U.S. AND WOULD HELP THE GOL\'S FINANCES. REGARDING DISTRIBUTION, SALLOUKH THOUGHT THAT ALL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO LEBANON WERE FLAWED IN THIS REGARD AND CONTENDED THAT LEBANON WAS NO WORSE THAN OTHER COUNTRIES. THE SMUGGLING PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO HIM, IS GREATLY EXAGGERATED; ONLY \"5 PERCENT\" OF LEBANESE BREAD IS DIVERTED TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. THE DCM STRESSED THAT THE USG IS CONCERNED ABOUT EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION TO ALL CONFESSIONS WITHOUT MILITIA INVOLVEMENT. EVEN IF LEBANON WERE GRANTED FREE WHEAT FROM THE U.S., IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR WORLDWIDE POLICY, IT WOULD BE TIED TO THE GOL\'S ENACTING ECONOMIC REFORMS. SPECIFICALLY, THE GOL WOULD HAVE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF ITS 38.7 MILLION USD BREAD SUBSIDY. THE DCM STATED THAT RECENT PRESS REPORTS, CITING AMBASSADOR BOUHABIB AS BLAMING THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT FOR BLOCKING A WHEAT PROGRAM, WERE ERRONEOUS AND THE DECISION TO PROVIDE AID INVOLVES VARIOUS AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS IN THE USG. REGARDING WHEAT SALES, THE DCM UNDERLINED OUR STRONG DESIRE TO BE GIVEN A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO COMPETE IN GOL WHEAT TENDERS. SALLOUKH PLANS TO ENLIST ECONOMY MINISTER QASSIR\'S HELP IN PREPARING A REPORT ON THE WHEAT SITUATION IN LEBANON. HE WILL ALSO RAISE U.S. INTEREST IN COMPETING FOR GOL WHEAT TENDERS WITH THE MINISTER. THE DCM REPLIED THAT WE WELCOMED ANY INFORMATION SALLOUKH COULD PROVIDE ON BOTH SUBJECTS. END SUMMARY. 3. ON APRIL 12, DCM, ACCOMPANIED BY ECON COUNSELOR, PAID INTRODUCTORY CALL ON AMBASSADOR FAWZI SALLOUKH, LEBANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ECONOMIC DIRECTOR. MEETING LASTED APPROXIMATELY AN HOUR. THE PRINCIPAL TOPIC OF DISCUSSION WAS WHEAT FOR LEBANON. 4. AMBASSADOR SALLOUKH MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT WHEAT PROGRAM, WITH THE USG PROVIDING FREE WHEAT TO LEBANON. SALLOUKH INDICATED THAT AMBASSADOR BOUHABIB HAS ALREADY RENEWED THIS REQUEST IN WASHINGTON. FIRST AMONG THE REASONS CITED BY SALLOUKH FOR A WHEAT PROGRAM WAS THE \"PROPAGANDA\" VALUE FOR THE U.S. IN SO DIRECTLY HELPING THE GOL. SECONDLY, SALLOUKH STATED THAT FREE WHEAT WOULD ASSIST THE GOL IN COPING WITH ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE SHORTAGE. SALLOUKH PROPOSED A U.S. WHEAT GRANT BE HANDLED AS A REGULAR WHEAT PURCHASE. THAT IS, THE GOL WOULD SELL THE FREE WHEAT TO THE MILLERS WHO IN TURN WOULD SELL THE FLOUR TO BAKERS. THE HARD CURRENCY SAVED FROM NOT HAVING TO PURCHASE WHEAT COULD BE SPENT ELSEWHERE, TOWARD PAYING LEBANON\'S EXTERNAL DEBT OR PURCHASES OF FOREIGN-MADE EQUIPMENT FOR LEBANON\'S PUBLIC UTILITIES, FOR EXAMPLE. 5. SALLOUKH STATED THIS FRIDAY, APRIL 15, HE WILL BE MEETING ECONOMY MINISTER VICTOR QASSIR. SALLOUKH WILL SEEK THE MINISTER\'S SUPPORT IN PREPARING A REPORT ON THE WHEAT SITUATION IN LEBANON TO BE PROVIDED TO THE U.S. 6. DCM TOOK THAT OPENING TO EXPLAIN TO SALLOUKH THAT PRESS REPORTS APPARENTLY STIMULATED BY LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ABDALLAH BOUHABIB THAT WASHINGTON FAVORED WHEAT AID TO LEBANON BUT THAT IT WAS OUR EVIL EMBASSY IN BEIRUT THAT WAS BLOCKING IT WERE UNINFORMED. FIRST OF ALL, ON THE BASIS OF THE SEVERE NEED WE PERCEIVED HERE LAST FALL WHEN THE LEBANESE POUND AND PRICES HAD GONE CRAZY, WORSENING THE PLIGHT OF ALREADY POOR PEOPLE, WE HAD INCREASED THE FOOD AID THAT WE PROVIDED LEBANON THROUGH PVO\'S BY 35 PERCENT, TO A VALUE OF SOME USD 23 MILLION. SECONDLY, THE DECISION TO PROVIDE THE FOOD AID BY THAT ROUTE, AS OPPOSED TO THROUGH A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT PROGRAM, HAD BEEN ARRIVED AT BY OUR USUAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, INVOLVING VARIOUS OFFICES IN WASHINGTON (AID, STATE, COMMERCE, AGRICULTURE, THE CONGRESS) AS WELL AS THE EMBASSY. 7. THE DCM THEN CONTINUED THAT ANY INFORMATION ON THE WHEAT SITUATION IN LEBANON IS MOST WELCOME. HE STATED THAT OUR CURRENT FOOD ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON IS CHANNELED THROUGH PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS BECAUSE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT\'S WEAKNESSES. HE UNDERLINED THAT THE PVO\'S SEEM THE BEST VEHICLES TO ENSURE THAT OUR ASSISTANCE REACHES NEEDY LEBANESE, REGARDLESS OF CON- FESSION. AMONG THE QUESTIONS DEBATED IN CONSIDERING WHEAT FOR LEBANON, THE DCM EXPLAINED, WERE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, BREAD SMUGGLING OR \"EXPORTS\" TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND REFORM OF THE GOL\'S BREAD SUBSIDY. DCM MADE IT CLEAR THAT BY \"EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION\" WE MEAN HONEST DISTRIBUTION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WITHOUT REGARD TO CONFESSION AND WITHOUT MILITIA INVOLVEMENT. 8. SALLOUKH RESPONDED THAT THE SUBSIDY MIGHT BE REDUCED, BUT SAID THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE \"GRADUALLY,\" GIVEN THE CURRENT PUBLIC PRESSURE OVER SALARY INCREASES AND THE PERCEIVED HIGH COST OF LIVING. THIS DECISION IS \"POLITICAL,\" HE DECLARED. DCM REPLIED THAT WE ESTIMATED THE BREAD SUBSIDY TO COST THE GOL USD 38.7 MILLION PER YEAR IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND STRESSED OUR WORLDWIDE POLICY INTEREST IN REFORMS DIRECTE TOWARD MORE OPEN MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIC POLICIES. 9. REGARDING BREAD EXPORTS, SALLOUKH CLAIMED THAT THIS PROBLEM IS \"NOT AS DANGEROUS AS IMAGINED,\" HE DID NOT DENY THAT BREAD IS BEING SENT ABROAD. \"FRANKLY SPEAKING,\" SALLOUKH SAID HE IS AWARE THAT THERE ARE TAXI DRIVERS DRIVING FROM LEBANON TO DAMASCUS WITH 5 KILOS OF LEBANESE BREAD WHO MAY GIVE ONE KILO AT THE BORDER TO SYRIAN OFFICIALS TO FACILITATE CROSSING. HE ALSO THOUGHT SOME LEBANESE BREAD GOES TO CYPRUS, BUT IS ONLY CONSUMED BY LEBANESE RESIDENT THERE, \"A SMALL NUMBER.\" REGARDING SMUGGLING TO ISRAEL, SALLOUKH THOUGHT IT NON-EXISTENT. IN TOTALY, SALLOUKH ESTIMATED THE TOTAL BREAD DIVERTED FROM LEBANON AT NO MORE THAN 5, AND PROBABLY CLOSER TO 1 PERCENT OF THETOTAL PRODUCED, NOT THE 25 PERCENT SOMETIMES CITED. WE LISTENED BUT DID NOT AGREE, INDICATING INTEREST IN ANY INFORMATION SALLOUKH COULD PROVIDE IN THAT REGARD. 10. ON DISTRIBUTION, SALLOUKH THOUGHT MOST AID TO LEBANON IS NOT HANDLED AS IT SHOULD BE. HE SAID THAT SAUDI ASSISTANCE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD BEEN HANDED-OUT LOCALLY, REGARDLESS OF INCOME LEVEL; ALL 23 FAMILIES IN HIS APARTMENT BUILDING WERE OFFERED KING FAHD FOOD PACKAGES. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HIS FAMILY AND TWO RELATIVES LIVING IN THE SAME BUILDING, THE TWENTY OTHERS ACCEPTED THE AID, THOUGH NOT IN NEED. SALLOUKH BELIEVED MALDISTRIBUTION EXISTS IN OTHER FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO LEBANON AND FOR THAT MATTER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. SALLOUKH CONTENDED THAT COMPARED TO OTHER COUNTRIES RECEIVING U.S. WHEAT, DISTRIBUTION AND SMUGGLING WOULD BE NO WORSE IF NOT SLIGHTLY LESS OF A PROBLEM IN LEBANON. 11. THE DCM STATED THAT THE USG WAS NOT ONLY CONSIDERING GIVING LEBANON WHEAT, BUT IS ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN SELLING IT AS WELL. HE POINTED TO OUR STRONG DESIRE TO COMPETE FOR GOL WHEAT TENDERS UNDER OUR EEP PROGRAM AND THE NEED TO GIVE AMPLE NOTICE TO U.S. EXPORTERS, CITING THE MOST RECENT EXPERIENCE IN REFTEL. (GOL INFORMED US--DELIBERATELY LATE--THAT IT HAD OPENED THE TENDER ON MARCH 28, WITH A DEADLINE OF MARCH 30.) SALLOUKH SAID HE WOULD RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH MINISTER QASSIR IN THEIR UPCOMING MEETING. 12. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE SALLOUKH IS SINCERE IN HIS PLEDGE TO RAISE THE WHEAT TENDER ISSUE WITH QASSIR. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE PLEASANTLY SURPRISED IF THIS RESULTS IN A REAL OPENING FOR U.S. EXPORTERS, GIVEN ALLEGATIONS THAT QASSIR HIMSELF BENEFITS FROM THE TRANSACTION AS IT OCCURS. END COMMENT. 13. BIO DATA: AMBASSADOR SALLOUKH, TWENTY-EIGHT YEAR VETERAN OF THE MFA, APPEARS TO BE IN HIS EARLY TO MID FIFTIES. HE IS A SHI\'ITE MUSLIM FROM BETWEEN ALEY AND SOUK-EL-GHARB IN THE SHOUF MOUNTAINS. ALTHOUGH HE HAS SERVED THREE MONTHS AS MFA ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR, HE ALREADY SEEMS MORE ON TOP OF THE JOB THAN HIS PREDECESSOR GEORGE KHOURY, WHO HAD BEEN THERE ONE AND A HALF YEARS AND IS NOW OFF TO SANAA. MOST OF SALLOUKH\'S YEARS ABROAD HAVE BEEN SPENT IN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT: 2 YEARS IN LIBERIA, 7 IN SIERRA LEONE, 9 IN NIGERIA AND 4 IN ALGIERS. FOR THE SAKE OF HIS CHILDREN\'S EDUCATION, MANY OF THOSE YEARS HAVE BEEN SPENT WITHOUT HIS WIFE, DAUGHTER AND 2 SONS WHO REMAINED IN LEBANON. SALLOUKH SAYS HE HAS KNOWN MANY AMERICAN AMBASSADORS, MOST RECENTLY AMBASSADOR JOHNSTONE. KELLY "	Success: CSV parsed	null	31,177
214	4/19/1988 12:52	88BAGHDAD2144	Embassy Baghdad	SECRET	[]	O 191252Z APR 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6898 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0316 USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY 0138 DIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0086 ","S E C R E T BAGHDAD 02144 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IZ SUBJ: IRAQI OPERATION TO RECAPTURE FAO:\"WE SHOWED THE SOVIETS\" 1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT) 2. IN A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR MAY 19, MFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIRECTOR QAYSI DISCUSSED THE BRIEFING ON FAO GIVEN BY FONMIN AZIZ TO HIS SENIOR STAFF THAT MORNING. 3. AZIZ TOLD HIS PEOPLE THAT THE DECISION TO RETAKE FAO WAS MADE LAST FALL UNDER ELABORATE SECRECY WHEN THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP CONCLUDED THAT THE 598 PROCESS WOULD NOT GO ANYWHERE UNLESS IRAQ GAVE IT A PUSH BY GAINING SOME MILITARY VICTORY. (THE DECISION TO PRESS AHEAD WITH STOCKPILING \"HUSSEIN\" MISSILES FOR MASSIVE USE WAS PROBABLY RELATED.). IRAQ THEN ENGAGED IN A CAREFUL DECEPTION OPERATION, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT CREATED A FULL- SCALE MODEL OF THE FAO SALT PANS FOR DETAILED PRACTICE OPERATIONS BY ITS UNITS. WHEN THE TIME FOR THE OPERATION WAS NEAR, SADDAM, MINDEF KHAIRALLAH AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF MADE A WELL- PUBLISIZED VISITTO THE NORTH, BUT THEN SECRETLY JETTED IMMEDIATELY TO BASRA. PREVIOUSLY SOME UNNEEDED ARMY UNITS IN THE SOUTH (WE RECALL REPORT- ING ON A FULL DIVISION) WERE MOVED NORTH IN DAYLIGHT TO DECEIVE THE IRANIANS FURTHER. 4. IRAQI TROOPS JUMPED OFF AT 0625 MAY 17 ACCORDING TO AZIZ, AFTER DAWN WHEN IRANIAN UNITS WOULD HAVE BEGUN TO RELAX. (AN ORDER TO LAUNCH THE ATTACK AT 2200 THE PREVIOUS NIGHT WAS PART OF THE DECEPTION). IRAQI UNITS ACHIEVED COMPLETE SURPRISE AND PENE- TRATED THE ENTIRE IRANIAN DEFENSES IN THE SALT PANS IN A GUDERIAN-STYLE OPERATION, LEAVING IT TO FOLLOWING UNITS TO MOP UP RESISTANCE WHILE THE TWO PINCERS OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD AND THE SEVENTH CORPS JOINED ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE OBSTACLE. IRAQI UNITS THEN ENTERED FAO THE MORNING OF MAY 18. AZIZ SAID THAT IRAQI CASUALTIES HAD BEEN MORE THAN REASONABLE FOR SUCH AN OPERATION AND CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN PLANNERS HAD ANTICIPATED. AZIZ DID NOT GIVE ANY IRANIAN CASUALTY FIGURES OR COMMENT HOW MANY MIGHT HAVE ESCAPED. 5. QAYSI SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE ELATED BY THE NEWS WHICH HE AGREED WAS IRAQ\'S GREATEST MILITARY SUCCESS SINCE 1980-81. HE RECALLED A MEETING HE ATTENDED OF AZIZ WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN THE SUMMER OF 1986 IN MOSCOW AFTER THE FAO DEBACLE WHEN THE SOVIET, TREATING AZIZ HUMILIATINGLY LIKE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A DEFEATED NATION, URGED HIM TO AGREE TO HALT THE WAR ON THE BASIS OF A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. AZIZ TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT IRAQ WOULD NEVER SETTLE FOR LESS THAN A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE WITH FULL WITHDRAWAL AND AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS, BUT THE SOVIET FONMIN OBVIOUSLY DISMISSED THIS POSITION AS PURE PROPAGANDA. NOW IRAQ WAS VINDICATED, QAYSI SAID WITH PRIDE, AND HAD SHOWN THAT IT ALWAYS MEANT WHAT IT SAID. 6. IN A FINAL PURELY PERSONAL COMMENT, QAYSI GUESSED THAT IRAQ, FLUSHED WITH SUCCESS, MIGHT NOT BE FINISHED HITTING THE IRANIANS. HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED, HE SAID, TO SEE A SIMILAR OPERATION IN THE FUTURE EAST OF BASRA. THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT SUCH AN OPERATION STRAIGHT TOWARDS IRAN COULD BE EVEN TOUGHER THAN FAO. NEWTON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	31,376
215	5/4/1988 13:00	88KAMPALA1783	Embassy Kampala	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88KAMPALA1026", "88STATE99661" ]	P 041300Z MAY 88 FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9980 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L KAMPALA 01783 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, UG SUBJECT: ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT--STATUS OF PLO IN UGANDA REFS: A) STATE 99661, B) KAMPALA 1026 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. MFA CHIEF OF PROTOCOL GEO DE KINUKA SPELLED OUT FOR THE EMBASSY THE DIPLOMATIC STATUS OF THE PLO OFFICE IN KAMPALA. THE PLO ENJOYS THE SAME STATUS AS OTHER RECOGNIZED \"LIBERATION MOVEMENTS\" LIKE THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND THE PAN AFRICAN CONGRESS. THE HEAD OF THE OFFICE IS DESIGNATED AS \"REPRESENTATIVE.\" DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES SUCH AS IMPORT OF DUTY-FREE VEHICLES AND PERSONAL EFFECTS ARE EXTENDED TO THE PLO OFFICE BY GOU. POUCH PRIVILEGES ARE INCLUDED IN THESE PRIVILEGES, BUT KINUKA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE PLO OFFICE USES A POUCH. 3. COMMENT: UGANDA IS UNUSUALLY LIBERAL IN PROVIDING DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES TO ALL CLAIMANTS. THE WORLD BANK, IMF, AND OTHER DONOR ORGANIZATIONS RECEIVE THE SAME PRIVILEGES AS BILATERAL MISSIONS. PRACTICALLY NO LIMITS EXIST AS TO THE NUMBER OF CARS THAT MAY BE IMPORTED BY AN INDIVIDUAL OR OTHER LUXURY ITEMS. HOUDEK "	Success: CSV parsed	null	31,459
216	5/9/1988 13:08	88BAGHDAD2571	Embassy Baghdad	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O 091308Z MAY 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7086 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE 0329 USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL 0148 DIA WASHDC 0101 ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 02571 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, KPAL, IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ KEEPS THREATENING TO SEND MISSILES 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: EVERY DAY THE IRAQIS TURN OUT MILITARY COMMUNIQUES THREATENING \"SEVERE PUNISHMENT\" AGAINST IRAN FOR CONTINUING TO SHELL IRAQI BORDER TOWNS (TYPI- CALLY ONLY DARBANDIKHAN, WHICH TODAY SCARCELY FITS THE DEFINITION OFIA CIVILIAN TARGET). WITH NEARLY THREE WEEKS ELAPSING SINCE THE END OF THE MISSILE WAR, IT SEEMS MORE AND MORE LIKELY THAT THE IRAQIS INTEND TO DO NO MORE THAN KEEP THE IRANIANS AWARE THAT THEIR \"FINGER IS ON THE TRIGGER\" SHOULD THE IRANIANS TRY ANYTHING BIG, ALTHOUGH THE VALUE OF THE IRAQI WARNINGS IS GROWING INCREASINGLY HOLLOW. END SUMMARY. 3. THERE HAS BEEN NO RELENTING YET IN THE STRIDENCY OF IRAQI WARNINGS THAT IF THE IRANIANS DO NOT DESIST IN SHELLING BORDER CITIES AND \"VIOLATING THE CONDI- IONS STIPULATED FOR THE HALT OF IRANIAN CITIES,\" IRAQ WILL METE OUT \"SEVERE PUNISHMENT\" (CLEAR REFER- ENCE TO RESUMPTION OF USE OF MISSILES). THE ODD THING LS THAT IN THE PAST WEEK THE IRAQI MEDIA HAVE MENTION- ED ONLY TWO SUCH \"BORDER CITIES\"--DARBANDIKHAN (NEAR HALABJA) EVERY DY, AND ON ONE OCCASION ABUL-KHASIB (NEAR BASRA). BOTH ARE ABANDONED AND BOTH SIT ASTRIDE IMPORTANT HIGHWAYS CLOSE TO IRANIAN LINES THAT ARE OBVIOUS TARGETS FOR IRANIAN ARTILLERY. (INDEED, IT IS ESSENTIAL FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT FOR IRAN TO TRY TO INTERDICT MOVEMENT ALONG BOTH HIGHWAYS.) 4. FOR THEIR PART, THE IRAQIS STRUCK THE SHIRAZ REFINERY AND PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX ON MAY 4. THE SUBSEQUENT MILITARY COMMUNIQUE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY INTEND TO CONTINUE HITTING SUCH ECONOMIC TARGETS FOR THE DURATION OF THE WAR. 5. OF PARTICULAR NOTE, AS WE OBSERVE FROM FBIS REPORTAGE OF IRANIAN BROADCASTS, IS THE FERVOR WITH WHICH THE IRANIANS DENY STRIKING ANY CIVILIAN TARGETS IN IRAQ--INCLUDING DENYING ANY SHELLING OF DARBANDIKHAN. OUR AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUES TELL US THAT TEHRAN IS JUST BEGINNING TO COME BACK TO LIFE FULLY. THEIR EMBASSY IN TEHRAN ASSESSES THAT THE IRANIANS ARE EXTREMELY KEEN TO PREVENT A RESUMPTION OF THE MISSILE EXCHANGE--UNTIL, THAT IS, IRAN FEELS ON A TECHNOLOGICAL PAR WITH IRAQ AND CAN DELIVER JUST AS STRONG BLOWS AGAINST BAGHDAD AS THE IRAQIS CAN AGAINST TEHRAN. FOR THEIR PART, THE IRAQIS HAVE ALSO BEEN KEEN TO DENY IRANIAN CLAIMS OF IRAQI STRIKES ON IRANIAN BORDER AREAS. 6. MEANWHILE, IRAQ CONTINUES OFFICIALLY TO BUBBLE OVER WITH PLEASURE AT THE VICTORY AT FAO AND THE MIGHTINESS OF THE HUSSEIN MISSILE, NOW FOLLOWED BY THE ABBAS MISSILE OF A CLAIMED EVEN LONGER STRIKING POWER. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS MADE NO FEWER THAN FOUR VISITS TO AN EXHIBITION OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRY COMMISSION, AND ON MAY 5 HE BESTOWED ON THE COMMIS- SION\'S DIRECTOR--HIS SON-IN-LAW AND COUSIN HUSAYN KAMIL (JUST PROMOTED FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER)-- AND SEVERAL OF ITS STAFF \"RAFIDAIN MEDALS FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE.\" IN VIRTUALLY EVERY HIGH- LEVEL MILITARY MEETING SADDAM NOW HAS, HUSAYN KAMIL IS PHOTOGRAPHED AT HIS SIDE, ALONG WITH HIS BROTHER- IN-LAW AND COUSIN DEFENSE MINISTER ADNAN KHAYRALLAH. THE BIG NEWS IN THE PRESS MAY 8 WAS THE OFFICIAL DELIVERY BY PARTY NUMBER-TWO IZZAT IBRAHIM TO SADDAM OF HIS LATEST BIRTHDAY PRESENT, A MINIATURE OF THE HUSSEIN MISSILE FROM THE PEOPLE OF SALAH AL DIN (TIKRIT) PROVINCE. THE BIG NEWS ON MAY 9 WAS SADDAM\'S PRESIDING OVER DISCUSSION OF FINAL DESIGNS FOR A MONUMENT TO BE ERECTED AT THE BILAT AL-SHUHADA SCHOOL, DESTROYED BY AN IRANIAN MISSILE OCTOBER 13, AND HIS REVIEWING A HALL FULL OF BIRTHDAY PRESENTS \"GIVEN TO HIM BY THE IRAQI PEOPLE SHOWING THEIR JOY.\" 7. SADDAM\'S MAY 1 INTERVIEW WITH AN EGYPTIAN JOURNALIST SANA AL-SA\'ID, WAS FINALLY PUBLISHED MAY 6 (SEE FBIS JNO70944). SADDAM TYPICALLY PREFERS ARAB TO NON-ARAB JOURNALISTS, PARTLY OUT OF NATIONALISM AND PARTLY BECAUSE THEY TEND TO ASK LESS DELICATE QUESTIONS. SANA AL-SA\'ID DID TRY A FEW INTERESTING QUESTIONS, BUT SADDAM DOGGEDLY DODGED THEM. SHE TRIED TO GET HIM TO SAY SOMETHING PROVOCATIVE ABOUT HOW FAO IS A HARBINGER OF ARAB VICTORY OVER JERUSALEM, BUT HE MEALY-MOUTHED ABOUT LACK OF ARAB UNITY AND PROBLEMS WITH WORLD OPINION. SHE TRIED TO GET HIM TO CASTIGATE OMAN, QATAR, AND THE EMIRATES, BUT HE DID NOT BITE. SHE INSINUATED SUPERPOWER UNHELP- FULNESS, BUT THERE WERE NO WORDS OF CRITICISM FOR THE SOVIET UNION, AND HE EXCUSED U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF AS BEING LONGSTANDING AND, IN ANY CASE, SOMETHING FOR WHICH IRAN IS ENTIRELY TO BLAME. HE REFUSED TO BLAME THE PLO FOR RAP- PROCHEMENT WITH SYRIA. HE LIED EFFUSIVELY ABOUT HOW THE IRAQIS NOW RELY ON THEMSELVES FOR MOST WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE HUSSEIN MISSILE, ALTHOUGH HE DID CONTRADICTORILY ADMIT THAT \"PURCHASES OF SOVIET ARMS ARE STILL BIG.\" 8. ARAFAT, WHO ARRIVED IN BAGHDAD FROM DAMASCUS ON APRIL 26, IS STILL IN TOWN, GETTING PUBLICITY FOR HIS PROMINENCE IN SADDAM\'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS AND IN MEETINGS WITH SADDAM ON APRIL 27 AND MAY 7. BE- TWEEN THESE DATES THERE WERE MEETINGS OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE HIGHER COMMITTEE FOR OCCUPIED LAND AFFAIRS. PLO STATEMENTS AS PUBLISHED IN THE BAGHPAD PRESS ARE MAINLY DEVOTED TO PRAISE OF THE VICTORY AT FAO \"LEADING TO VICTORY IN JERUSALEM.\" 9. SAUDI ARABIA\'S RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN HAS BEEN A MAJOR SOURCE OF PRAISE AMONG EDITORIALISTS, WITH A STRONG UNDERCURRENT THEME THAT OTHER ARAB STATES MUST FOLLOW SUIT. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TAHA YASIN RAMADAN, CARRYING SADDAM\'S LETTER OF PRAISE FOR SAUDI ARABIA\'S TOUGH STAND AGAINST IRAN, MET KING FAHD IN RIYADH MAY 6 AND MADE HIS SECOND UMRA TO MECCA IN LESS THAN THREE WEEKS. 10. COMMENT: IN THE SHORT TERM, THERE IS HOPE FOR A CONTINUED LULL IN THE MISSILE WAR. WHILE THE IRAQIS GREATLY RELISHED THE DISRUPTION IN TEHRAN, THEY ARE RESTRAINED BY COUNTERVAILING FACTORS. BAGHDAD WAS ALSO DISRUPTED, EVEN IF TO A MUCH RE- DUCED DEGREE THAN TEHRAN; BAGHDADIS WERE BEGINNING TO BE VERY MUCH ON EDGE. THE IRAQIS MAY HAVE WORRIED ABOUT SUPPLY PROBLEMS; NO MATTER WHICH REPORT ONE BELIEVES, IRAQ\'S SUPPLY OF MISSILES IS NOT LIMITLESS. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, THE IRAQIS MAY HAVE--OR SHOULD HAVE, BY ANY LOGIC-- CALCULATED THAT MISSILES ARE MORE EFFECTIVE AS A DETERRENT IF NOT OVERUSED. NOW THE IRANIANS PAINFULLY KNOW WHAT THE IRAQIS CAN DO, AND TEHRAN IS BEING REPOPULATED; HENCEFORTH, THE IRANIANS WILL HAVE TO CALCULATE CAREFULLY ABOUT THEIR ATTACKS ON THE GROUND OR WITH MISSILES. 11. IN THE LONGER RUN, THE PICTURE MAY NOT BE SO HOPEFUL. WE ARE IN A REGIONAL ARMS RACE, AND IF THE IRANIANS ARE ABLE TO CATCH UP, A DEADLIER MISSILE WAR MAY ULTIMATELY BE IN THE OFFING. IN THIS RACE, THE IRANIANS HAVE A DISTINCT ADVANTAGE OVER THE IRAQIS, NAMELY, THAT BAGHDAD AND OTHER IRAQI POPULATION CENTERS LIE FOUR OR FIVE TIMES NEARER THE BORDER THAN DO MOST IRANIAN CITIES. THE IRANIANS THEREFORE ONLY NEED SMALLER MISSILES WHICH MAY BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO SPEEDIER PRODUCTION IN GREATER QUANTITY, OR IN THE CASE OF MISSILES OF SIMILAR SIZE AND PROPELLENT, THEY ARE ABLE TO PACK IN MUCH MORE EXPLOSIVES. EITHER PROSPECT SHOULD GIVE THE IRAQIS PAUSE, AS THEY CONGRATULATE THEMSELVES ON THEIR NEW MISSILES. NEWTON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	31,495
217	5/19/1988 13:17	88TUNIS5278	Embassy Tunis	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	P 191317Z MAY 88 FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5978 INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY ROME ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 05278 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, TS SUBJECT: RAMADAN IN TUNISIA: OBSERVANCE AND TOLERANCE 1. C O N F I D E N T I A L -- ENTIRE TEXT. ------- SUMMARY ------- 2. IN ITS FIRST RAMADAN SINCE COMING TO POWER LAST FALL, THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS BROKEN WITH THE SECULARISM OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME AND ACTIVELY PROMOTED RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES. IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, IT HAS ENCOURAGED TOLERANCE OF NON-FASTING MOSLEMS AND TOURISTS. GOT\'S MEASURES CREATED AN UNPRECEDENTED ESPRIT DE CORPS AMONG TUNISIANS WHO OBSERVED THE HOLY MONTH. THE PROMOTION OF SUCH RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES REFLECTS NOT ONLY PIETY, BUT ALSO A DESIRE TO STEAL THE THUNDER FROM ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. END SUMMARY. -------------------- GOT PROMOTES RAMADAN -------------------- 3. PRESIDENT ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI AND HIS GOVERNMENT HAVE BROKEN WITH THE PREVIOUS REGIME\'S SECULAR APPROACH TO RAMADAN. UNDER BOURGUIBA, GOT\'S OFFICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE HOLY MONTH WAS AT BEST NEUTRAL. ONCE, WHEN THE FORMER PRESIDENT APPEARED ON NATIONAL TV DRINKING A GLASS OF ORANGE JUICE AND DISPARAGING RAMADAN AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO DEVELOPMENT, IT WAS OPENLY HOSTILE. THIS DISTANCING FROM RAMADAN OBSERVANCE WAS ALWAYS OUT OF STEP WITH THE FOLKWAYS OF THE COUNTRY. TUNISIANS, HOWEVER, HAD SUCH RESPECT FOR THE FORMER PRESIDENT THAT HIS SECULARISM DID NOT POSE A MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEM UNTIL LATE IN HIS RULE. 4. BY CONTRAST, THIS YEAR THE GOT HAS ACTIVELY REVIVED TUNISIA\'S CUSTOMS AND FOLKWAYS REGARDING RAMADAN. EARLY ON THE GOT DROPPED THE CALENDAR METHOD (BASED ON SCIENTIFIC CALCULATIONS) USED BY THE PREVIOUS REGIME TO DETERMINE THE ONSET AND END OF THE MONTH AND OPTED FOR THE SIGHTING METHOD (BASED ON ACTUAL HUMAN SIGHTING OF THE NEW MOON) WHICH IS CONSIDERED MORE TRADITIONAL. (ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS HAD LONG CHAMPIONED THE SIGHTING METHOD). GOT ALSO RETURNED TO THE TUNISIAN CUSTOM OF USING CANON BLASTS TO ANNOUNCE THE BEGINNING AND BREAKING OF THE DAILY FASTS. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE FRENCH LANGUAGE TELEVISION STATION CARRIED A LARGE NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS. FURTHER, GOT ORDERED THE REHABILITATION OF 190 MOSQUES AND SPONSORED CONCERTS AND OTHER CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AT NIGHT IN THE TUNIS MEDINA DURING THE ENTIRE MONTH. THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS PROMINENTLY ATTENDED LOCAL CEREMONIES. 5. TOWARDS NON-FASTING MOSLEMS AND TOURISTS, HOWEVER, THE GOT FOLLOWED THE TOLERANT POLICY OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. THIS RAMADAN (17 APRIL - 15 MAY) CORRESPONDED WITH THE START OF THE TOURIST SEASON, AND THE HOTELS AND OTHER FACILITIES THAT CATER TO TOURISTS OPERATED NORMALLY. AS UNDER BOURGUIBA, DRINKING AND SMOKING OUTSIDE CAFES WERE EFFECTIVELY DISCOURAGED, BUT THE LARGER CAFES WERE PACKED INSIDE WITH NON-FASTING TUNISIANS. PUBLIC BARS STOPPED SERVING ALCOHOL, AND ONE MAJOR BAR DOWNTOWN WAS VEILED TO HIDE CLIENTS SMOKING CIGARETTES AND DRINKING SOFT DRINKS. SOME OF THE SMALLER RESTAURANTS AND CAFES CLOSED BY PERSONAL CHOICE. AS BEST WE CAN DETERMINE, THERE WAS ONLY ONE MAJOR EXCEPTION. ISLAMISTS AT THE UNIVERSITY HARASSED STUDENTS WHO DID NOT OBSERVE THE FAST, BUT SUCH HARASSMENT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED TO THE CAMPUSES. --------------------------------- FOR THE PUBLIC, A \"LIGHT\" RAMADAN --------------------------------- 6. SEVERAL AVERAGE TUNISIANS HAVE DESCRIBED THIS YEAR\'S RAMADAN TO US AS \"LIGHT\" (KHFIF), IE, AN EASY ONE. THE MILD WEATHER OVER THE PAST MONTH CONTRIBUTED SOMEWHAT. THE GOT\'S MEASURES, HOWEVER, CREATED AN ESPRIT DE CORPS AMONG THOSE WHO BORE THE INCONVENIENCE OF THE FAST THAT DID NOT EXIST UNDER BOURGUIBA. EXPLAINING THIS ESPRIT DE CORPS, TUNISIANS MENTION THE SIGHTING METHOD WHICH ENABLED EVERYONE TO START AND END RAMADAN AT THE SAME TIME, THUS AVOIDING THE SOCIAL AWKWARDNESS OF SOME FASTING AND OTHERS NOT. THEY ALSO SAY THAT GOT\'S REVIVAL OF LOCAL TRADITIONS, WITH THE NOSTALGIA AND AWARENESS OF A SHARED CULTURAL HERITAGE THE TRADITIONS EVOKED, FOSTERED A SENSE OF TOGETHERNESS. PARENTS HAVE REMARKED, FOR EXAMPLE, THEIR SATISFACTION IN TAKING CHILDREN OUT TO LOOK FOR THE NEW MOON AND EXPLAINING ITS SIGNIFICANCE. BEN ALI\'S APPEARANCE AT RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES AND THE UNPRECEDENTED MEDIA COVERAGE SHOWED THAT THEY WERE NOT ALONE IN FASTING. AT EMBASSY FUNCTIONS, WESTERNIZED TUNISIANS OF THE ELITE WHO ORDINARILY DRINK ALCOHOL ABSTAINED AND REMARKED THAT MORE OF THEIR FRIENDS WERE OBSERVING RAMADAN THAN BEFORE. --------------------------------------------- -- COMMENT: GOT GETS IN SYNC WITH POPULAR RELIGION --------------------------------------------- -- 7. GOT\'S APPROACH TO RAMADAN IS THE LATEST INDICATION THAT IT WANTS TO GET IN SYNC WITH POPULAR RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT. EARLIER EXAMPLES INCLUDED BEN ALI\'S NUMEROUS GESTURES TO ISLAM AND AND THE HEAVY COVERAGE OF THE RELIGIOUS RITES HE PERFORMED WHILE ON A FORMAL VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. 8. PART OF THIS APPROACH MAY STEM FROM PERSONAL PIETY, BUT PART ALSO STEMS FROM A DESIRE TO PREVENT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS FROM BECOMING A GREATER POLITICAL FORCE. GOT HAS ADOPTED THOSE ITEMS OF THE ISLAMIC AGENDA THAT MESH WITH TUNISIA\'S TOLERANT FOLKWAYS (EG, ISLAMIC INCANTATIONS, VIP ATTENDANCE AT RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES, PROMOTION OF RAMADAN, ETC.) BUT ESCHEWED THOSE PURITANICAL ITEMS (REVISION OF THE PERSONAL STATUS CODE, RESTRICITIONS ON TOURISTS) THAT WOULD RADICALLY CHANGE TUNISIA. PELLETREAU "	Success: CSV parsed	null	31,662
218	7/6/1988 11:44	88MOGADISHU8032	Embassy Mogadishu	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88MOGADISHU7910", "88STATE214518" ]	P 061144Z JUL 88 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5599 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/DSAA/OPS-D// USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ4/7-S/CCJ5// ","C O N F I D E N T I A L MOGADISHU 08032 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PGOB, PINS, ET, UR, US, SO SUBJECT: SOMALI INSURGENCY: ETHIOPIAN COMPLICITY? REF: (A) STATE 214518, (B) MOGADISHU 7910 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT 2. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF A MEETING JULY 3 WITH ACTING PERMSEC ABDULLAHI EGAL NUR TO PROBE A BIT REGARDING GSDR\'S CURRENT POSITION ON ETHIOPIAN ROLE IN NORTHERN INSURGENCY. I HOPED IN PARTICULAR TO OBTAIN INSIGHT INTO AMBASSADOR ADDOU\'S DEMARCHE \"UNDER INSTRUCTIONS\" (REF A), IN WHICH HE SEEMED TO TAKE A MUCH MORE FORCEFULLY CRITICAL LINE ON ETHIOPIANS THAN HAD PRESIDENT SIAD HIMSELF IN OUR CONVERSATION JULY 1 (REF B). 3. CHOOSING HIS WORDS CAREFULLY, AMB ABDULLAHI TOLD ME SOMALIA DID NOT CONSIDER ETHIOPIANS \"CLEAN-HANDED\", BUT IT LACKED HARD EVIDENCE OF ANY SORT TO SUBSTANTIATE ETHIOPIAN COMPLICITY. SOMALI GOVERNMENT WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE FACT THAT SNM FORCES HAD NOT/NOT BEEN DISARMED BEFORE BEING EXPELLED ACROSS BORDER. IT WAS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER THIS WAS A DELIBERATE OVERSIGHT OR MERELY INADVERTENCY. 4. AMB ABDULLAHI THEN POINTED TO \"GROSS EXAGGERATION\" BY ETHIOPIAN AUTHORITIES OF NUMBERS OF SOMALI REFUGEES THAT HAD REPORTEDLY FLED ACROSS BORDER TO ESCAPE FIGHTING IN NORTHERN REGION. ALTHOUGH ETHIOPIANS CLAMED TO HAVE RECEIVED OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND REFUGEES, SOMALI GOVERNMENT WAS \"CERTAIN\" THAT FIGURE WAS NO HIGHER THAN THIRTY THOUSAND. I SUGGESTED TO ABDULLAHI THAT THIS HAD LITTLE BEARING ON QUESTION OF ETHIOPIAN COMPLICITY WITH SNM, BUT HE CONTENDED THAT IT IMPLIED AN ANTAGONISTIC BIAS ON ETHIOPIA\'S PART. 5. I ASKED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT EVIDENCE THAT ETHIOPIA HAD HELPED RESUPPLY SNM AFTER ATTACKS BEGAN. HE REPLIED THERE WAS NO/NO HARD EVIDENCE, ONLY \"CIRCUMSTANTIAL\" INDICATIONS. 6. AS I LEFT THE MEETING WITH ABDULLAHI, ESCORTED BY PROTOCOL CHIEF ABDI HAJI, I REGISTERED MILD SURPRISE TO THE LATTER THAT ABDULLAHI HAD NOT/NOT MENTIONED INSTRUCTIONS TO AMB ADDOU (REF A) TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH A/S CROCKER. ABDI RESPONDED THAT HE WAS UNAWARE THA ANY SUCH INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO WASHINGTON FROM MINISTRY. HOWEVER, HE CONFIDED THAT ADDOU HAD TELEPHONED PRESIDENT SIAD DIRECTLY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS RECENTLY, IMPLYING THAT INSTRUCTIONS COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED TO ADDOU DIRECTLY BY PRESIDENT. 7. ABDI HAJI ALSO VOLUNTEERED HIS SUGGESTION THAT CROCKER SHOULD CLOSELY QUESTION SOVIET VICE MINISTER ADAMISHIN ABOUT ETHIOPIA\'S ROLE AND WHAT SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO DO TO ENSURE ETHIOPIANS KEPT HANDS OFF. HE EXPLAINED THAT, WHEN ADAMISHIN VISITED MOGADISHU IN APRIL, HE MADE A BIG FUSS ABOUT WHETHER SOMALIA COULD PERSUADE USG TO SERVE AS \"GUARANTOR\" OF SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN PEACE AGREEMENT. SOVIETS, HE DECLARED, WERE PREPARED TO SIGN ON ETHIOPIA\'S BEHALF. - 8. COMMENT: JUDGING FROM WHAT I\'VE HEARD FROM PRESIDENT SIAD AND AMB ABDULLAHI, I SUSPECT OUR FRIEND ADDOU MAY HAVE PROMPTED THE PRESIDENT TO ISSUE THE INSTRUCTIONS HE THEN CARRIED TO A/S CROCKER. MORE AND MORE, IT APPEARS THAT PEOPLE AROUND SIAD ARE PUSHING HIM IN WHATEVER DIRECTION APPEARS TO SERVE THEIR OWN INTERESTS (OR THEIR OWN CONCEPT OF THE NATION\'S INTERESTS), WHILE SIAD HIMSELF IS BUFFETED BY THEIR CROSS PURPOSES. I DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE WE ARE ANY CLOSER THAN BEFORE TO SEEING HARD EVIDENCE OF ETHIOPIAN COMPLICITY, BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT -- WHETHER SIAD LIKES IT OR NOT -- THE BLUSH IS OFF OF HIS VAUNTED PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ETHIOPIA. CRIGLER "	Success: CSV parsed	null	31,803
219	7/15/1988 23:27	88LIMA9331	Embassy Lima	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	R 152327Z JUL 88 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0144 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA AMEMBASSY LA PAZ AMEMBASSY QUITO USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM DIA WASHDC SECDEF WASHDC ","C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 09331 DIA FOR IR BRANCH DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD JOHN YOULE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PE SUBJECT: SENDERO ASSASSINATES APRA GOVERNOR 1. (U) AT LEAST TWO UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN JULY 14 SHOT AND KILLED THE GOVERNOR OF CHINCHA PROVINCE, LOCATED IN LIMA\'S NEIGHBORING ICA DEPARTMENT. THE TERRORISTS SHOT HIM SIX TIMES IN FRONT OF HIS HOME AND IN THE PRESENCE OF HIS WIFE. THE 53-YEAR-OLD GOVERNOR, WHO WAS ALSO A SCHOOL PRINCIPAL, HAD EARLIER BEEN THREATENED AND GIVEN FIVE DAYS TO RESIGN FROM THE SCHOOL. ACCORDING TO THE LEFT-OF-CENTER DAILY, \"LA VOZ,\" HIS SCHOOL DID NOT SUPPORT THE NATIONAL TEACHERS\' STRIKE. THE PRESS HAS GIVEN THE MURDER CONSIDERABLE COVERAGE; THE PRO-SENDERO DAILY, \"EL DIARIO,\" IN ITS FRONT PAGE HEADLINE ATTRIBUTED THE ATTACK TO SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL), AND CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST ASSASSINATION OF AN APRA FUNCTIONARY IN THIS PART OF THE COUNTRY. - 2. (C) COMMENT: SL MAY HAVE TARGETTED THE GOVERNOR FOR HIS FAILURE TO SUPPORT THE TEACHERS\' STRIKE. \"EL DIARIO,\" HOWEVER, DID NOT MENTION HIS STANCE ON THAT ISSUE. SENDERO REMAINS ACTIVE OUTSIDE OF LIMA, WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A LULL IN TERRORISM SINCE THE JUNE 12 ARREST OF THE GROUP\'S SECOND-IN-COMMAND, OSMAN MOROTE. WATSON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	31,899
220	7/18/1988 16:20	88CAIRO17073	Embassy Cairo	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	P 181620Z JUL 88 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7153 INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL DIA WASHDC ","C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 17073 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, PINR, PINS, EG SUBJECT: ESCAPE OF THREE ISLAMIC JIHAD MEMBERS FROM PRISON 1. (C) SUMMARY. THREE MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION JAILED SINCE THE AFTERMATH OF THE OCTOBER 1981 ASSASSINATION OF SADAT ESCAPED JULY 17. THEY OVERPOWERED TWO GUARDS, STOLE THEIR WEAPONS AND ESCAPED ON MAKESHIFT ROPE LADDERS, SPARKING RUMORS THAT THEY HAD BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE. THOSE SUSPECTED OF LINKS WITH ISLAMIC JIHAD ARE BEING ROUNDED UP FOR QUESTIONING, AND AN ENRAGED ZAKI BADR HAS SACKED A NUMBER OF HIS OFFICERS. HOWEVER, WE ARE ALSO HEARING GRUMBLINGS THAT THE INTERIOR MINISTER\'S POLICY OF SUMMARY TRANSFERS AND OTHER PUNISHMENTS FOR MINOR INFRACTIONS HAS CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE OF TIMIDITY IN WHICH OPERATIONS SUCH AS THIS ESCAPE ARE EASIER TO PULL OFF. END SUMMARY. 2. (U) THREE MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION WHO WERE IMPLICATED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF ANWAR SADAT IN OCTOBER 1981 ESCAPED FROM THE MAXIMUM SECURITY AL TORAH PRISON IN CAIRO BEFORE DAWN JULY 17. SECURITY FORCES SNARLED RUSH HOUR TRAFFIC IN A FRUITLESS SEARCH FOR THE ESCAPEES, BUT REFRAINED FROM ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRISON BREAK UNTIL LATE AFTERNOON. A BRIEF INTERIOR MINISTRY STATEMENT SAID THAT A SUBSTANTIAL REWARD WOULD BE OFFERED FOR THEIR CAPTURE. THE THREE WERE IDENTIFIED AS KHAMIS MOHAMMED MOSSLAM, MOHAMMED MAHMOUD EL-ASWANI, AND ESAMEDDIN EL-KAMARI. 3. (C) AN EMBASSY SOURCE WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN THE SECURITY FORCES SAID THAT THE THREE APPARENTLY ESCAPED ABOUT FIVE AM ON JULY 17, BUT THEIR ABSENCE WAS NOT DETECTED UNTIL A ROLL CALL SEVERAL HOURS LATER. THE THREE WERE HOUSED IN A SINGLE CELL FROM WHICH THEY ESCAPED BY PULLING OUT AN AIR VENT AND THEN OVERPOWERING A GUARD. THEY TOOK HIS WEAPON AND MADE THEIR WAY TO THE PRISON WALLS WHERE THEY OVERCAME A SECOND GUARD IN THE WATCHTOWER AND THEN WENT OVER THE WALL USING IMPROVISED ROPE LADDERS. CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS, OUR SOURCE SAID THAT NO SHOTS WERE FIRED, BUT BOTH GUARDS WERE BADLY INJURED. THE ESCAPEES MADE OFF WITH THEIR SEMI-AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND SOME 200 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION. 4. (C) OUR SOURCE DESCRIBED EL-KAMARI AS BY FAR THE MOST DANGEROUS OF THE THREE. HE IS A FORMER MAJOR IN THE ARMY\'S ELITE RANGER BATTALION AND HAS A REPUTATION FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RUTHLESSNESS. HE IS BELIEVED TO BE THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF ISLAMIC JIHAD\'S \"MILITARY\" WING, BUT SINCE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE LINKING HIM DIRECTLY WITH SADAT\'S ASSASSINATION, HE WAS NOT GIVEN THE DEATH PENALTY. MOSSLAM AND ASWANI WERE CHARGED WITH THE MURDER OF A POLICE OFFICER IN 1981. OUR SOURCE SAID THE FACT THAT THEY HAD BEEN HANDLED VERY HARSHLY BY AUTHORITIES AFTER THEIR ARREST HAS CONVINCED SECURITY FORCES THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RECAPTURE THEM WITHOUT A BATTLE. IN AN EFFORT TO TRACE THE ESCAPEES, A ROUNDUP OF INDIVIDUALS KNOWN OR BELIEVED TO HAVE CONTACTS/SYMPATHIES WITH ISLAMIC JIHAD HAS ALREADY BEGUN, AS HAS THE INTERROGATION OF A JIHADIST STILL IN AL TORAH PRISON. 5. (C) THE ESCAPE OF THE THREE WILL BE A MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT TO INTERIOR MINISTER ZAKI BADR AFTER A PUBLICIZED STRING OF SUCCESSES AGAINST TERRORIST GROUPS. HE MOVED IMMEDIATELY TO CASHIER THE HEAD OF THE PRISONS DEPARTMENT, AND OUR SECURITY SOURCE SAID THAT OVER TWO DOZEN OTHER OFFICERS HAVE BEEN CALLED IN FOR QUESTIONING OR SUSPENDED FROM THEIR DUTIES. THE APPARENT EASE OF THE ESCAPE HAS ALREADY SPARKED RUMORS THAT THE THREE HAD ASSISTANCE FROM BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE PRISON. OUR SOURCE ADDED THAT MANY OF HIS CONTACTS, ALREADY DEMORALIZED BY THE INTERIOR MINISTER\'S AUTOCRATIC AND INTIMIDATING WAYS, ARE GRUMBLING THAT HIS POLICIES OF PUNISHMENT AND SUMMARY TRANSFER FOR THE SLIGHTEST INFRACTION HAVE CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE OF TIMIDITY AND DISCONTINUITY THAT HAMPERS THE EFFICIENCY OF THE SECURITY SERVICES. WISNER "	Success: CSV parsed	null	31,948
221	8/9/1988 17:35	88LONDON16998	Embassy London	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88LONDON16351", "88LONDON5653" ]	R 091735Z AUG 88 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8426 INFO AMEMBASSY DUBLIN NATO COLLECTIVE SECDEF WASHDC JCS WASHDC DIRFBI WASHDC USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAFF/SPACOS// USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD/J5// CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD// CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD// USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF// USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//POLAD// CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD// AMCONSUL BELFAST POUCH) AMCONSUL EDINBURGH POUCH) ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 16998 TERREP E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KPRP, PTER, PGOV, MARR, MCAP, UK, EI SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND - CONTROLLING THE VIOLENCE REF: A) LONDON 16351 B) LONDON 5653 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: THE RECENT ESCALATION OF IRA ATTACKS, WHICH HAVE INCLUDED NOT ONLY MORE KILLINGS IN NORTHERN IRELAND BUT ALSO BOMBINGS AT UK MILITARY BASES IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST BOMBING IN BRITAIN ITSELF SINCE 1984, HAVE CAUSED HMG TO REEXAMINE ITS EFFORTS TO CONTROL IRA TERRORISM. THE INITIAL PROGNOSIS BY OFFICIALS IN LONDON IS THAT THERE IS NOT A GREAT DEAL MORE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE SHORT TERM OTHER THAN TO INCREASE ALERT LEVELS AND OTHER PRECAUTIONS AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICES, AND OTHER LIKELY IRA TARGETS. THE IRA MIGHT BE PLANNING ATTACKS DIRECTLY AGAINST OR TO COINCIDE WITH CERTAIN UPCOMING EVENTS, INCLUDING THE BEGINNING OF THE CORONER\'S INQUEST IN GIBRLATAR INTO THE KILLING THERE OF THREE IRA TERRORISTS LAST JANUARY, AND THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE AT BRIGHTON IN OCTOBER. THE ATTACKS HAVE NOT WEAKENED THE GOVERNMENT\'S RESOLVE TO CONTINUE WITH ITS CURRENT POLICIES, WHICH INCLUDE TRYING TO RECTIFY CATHOLIC GRIEVANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THERE HAVE BEEN NEW DEMANDS TO INCREASE UK MILITARY FORCES IN ULSTER AND TO REINTRODUCE THE PREVENTIVE INTERNMENT OF KNOWN IRA ACTIVISTS; THE GOVERNMENT HOPES THESE STEPS WILL NOT BE NECESSARY AND FOR NOW HAS NO SUCH PLANS. UK OFFICIALS ARE PLEASED WITH PROGRESS IN GAINING THE COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE IRA, BUT ALSO ARE CONVINCED THAT THE IRISH REPUBLIC COULD DO MORE TO HELP. PERHAPS THE SHOCK OF THE CURRENT WAVE OF ATTACKS, SAYS HMG, WILL ACCELERATE THE IMPROVEMENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. LONDON HOPES THAT IMPROVED INTRA-EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN COMBATTING TERRORISM WILL HELP TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IRA ATTACKS ON BRITISH MILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN EUROPE. END SUMMARY. THE IRA PLAYS TO THE NEWS AND CHALLENGES LONDON TO REACT --------------------------------------------- ----------- 3. THE RECENT ESCALATION OF TERRORIST ATTACKS BY THE IRA, INCLUDING BOMBINGS OF UK MILITARY TARGETS IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST IRA BOMBING IN BRITAIN ITSELF IN FOUR YEARS, HAS REFOCUSED ATTENTIONS IN WHITEHALL ON THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING IRA TERRORISM. WHAT THE KILLINGS BY THE IRA HAVE NOT DONE IS UNDERMINE EITHER THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT\'S RESOLVE TO STICK TO ITS POLICIES ON NORTHERN IRELAND OR THE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL CONSENSUS BEHIND THOSE POLICIES. 4. THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE AND HMG POLICE OFFICIALS CALCULATE THAT THE IRA PLANS ITS ATTACKS MAINLY FOR NEWS VALUE. SPOKESMEN FOR THE IRA AND ITS POLITICAL WING, SINN FEIN, HAVE CONFIRMED THIS IN RECENT INTERVIEWS WITH JOURNALISTS. THE IRA WANTS ITS ATTACKS TO SHOCK THE PUBLIC IN BRITAIN AND WEAR DOWN BRITISH DETERMINATION TO STAY IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE UK SUNDAY NEWSPAPER \"THE OBSERVER\" REPORTED ON AUGUST 7 THAT IRA SOURCES TOLD ITS REPORTERS THE AUGUST 1 BOMBING OF AN ARMY DEPOT IN LONDON (REFTEL A) WAS UNDERTAKEN ON THE BORDER OF PRIME MINISTER THATCHER\'S OWN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCY WITH THE HOPES THAT IT WOULD KILL MANY SOLDIERS (ONE DIED IN THE BLAST) AND FORCE MRS. THATCHER TO RETURN EARLY FROM HER AUSTRALIA VISIT. 5. THE BOMBINGS HAVE EMBARASSED THE GOVERNMENT BUT NOT NEARLY SO MUCH AS THE IRA APPARENTLY WOULD LIKE. SO FAR, IT HAS STIFFENED RATHER THAN WEAKENED LONDON\'S RESOLVE. AND, WHILE THE KILLINGS HAVE SCORED INTENSIVE NEWS COVERAGE, THEY PROBABLY HAVE NOT INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY THE NUMBERS OF BRITONS WHO AGREE WITH THE \"TIME TO GO\" MOVEMENT FOR A BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM ULSTER. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT MANY ORDINARY CITIZENS DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OTHER POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS CANNOT BE PROTECTED BETTER. IN UK TELEVISION INTERVIEWS, SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO LIVE NEAR THE NORTH LONDON ARMY BASE ATTACKED ON AUGUST 1 SAID THEY HAD ALWAYS BEEN AMAZED THAT SECURITY WAS SO LAX AT THE BASE. BUT MANY OTHER BRITONS, EVEN WHILE THEY WINCE AT EACH DAY\'S TALLY OF BOMBING VICTIMS, DO NOT EXPECT THEIR GOVERNMENT TO BE ABLE TO FEND OFF TERRORISTS EVERY TIME. THEY APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND, AS EX-PRIME MINISTER STANLEY BALDWIN TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN 1932, THAT DESPITE ANY PRECAUTIONS \"THE BOMBER WILL ALWAYS GET THROUGH.\" THE ESCALATION WAS EXPECTED --------------------------- 6. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND TOM KING DECLARED IN LATE JULY THAT THE IRA WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY \"INCOMPETENT,\" AS EVIDENCED BY A SERIES OF BUNGLED ATTACKS IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN WHICH INNOCENT BYSTANDERS WERE KILLED OR INJURED INSTEAD OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES. THE RECENT ESCALATION OF KILLINGS CAME SO FAST AFTER KING\'S STATEMENT AS TO SEEM PROMPTED BY IT. THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) TOLD US THAT KING\'S PRONOUNCEMENT WAS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC AND WAS NOT REFLECTED IN ANY RELAXATION OF VIGILANCE BY THE POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES. SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE KNOWN THE IRA WAS MERELY PAUSING AND WAS OVERDUE FOR A COME-BACK. 7. NIO OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT EVER SINCE UK SECURITY FORCES REVEALED THEIR PENETRATION OF IRA COMMUNICATIONS WHEN THEY KILLED EIGHT IRA TERRORISTS IN MAY 1987 AT LOUGHGALL, NORTHERN IRELAND, THE IRA HAS BEEN HOLDING BACK WHILE IT CHANGED ITS METHODS. THE TERRORISTS HAVE AMASSED TONS OF ARMAMENTS, CHIEFLY FROM LIBYA, BUT HAVE BEEN FEELING THEIR WAY WITH NEW PROCEDURES FOR MAKING AND COMMUNICATING DECISIONS. THE KILLING OF CIVILIAN BYSTANDERS AT ENNISKILLEN IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR AND IN SEVERAL OTHER APPARENTLY BUNGLED IRA ATTACKS SINCE THEN PROBABLY WAS DUE IN PART TO A DECENTRALIZATION OF IRA DECISION-MAKING. TO AVOID LEAKS AND INTERCEPTS, LOCAL IRA UNITS WERE TOLD TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY. SAS AND POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH UNITS HAVE EXCELLENT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES WHICH THE IRA CORRECTLY ASSUMES INCLUDE \"MOLES\" IN ITS OWN RANKS. THE SAFETY WARNING FOR THE IRA, AND THE BOAST OF UK AUTHORITIES, IS THAT IN NORTHERN IRELAND \"EVERY TREE HAS ITS SPECIAL BRANCH.\" 8. AFTER MORE THAN HALF A YEAR OF PREPARATIONS, UK OFFICIALS TOLD US, THE IRA PLANNED A SERIES OF ATTACKS WHICH WAS TO INCLUDE THE GIBRALTAR BOMBING IN JANUARY. THE FAILURE OF THAT ATTACK (REFTEL B) AND THE REVELATION THAT ONCE AGAIN UK SECURITY OFFICIALS WERE AWARE OF ITS PLANS PROBABLY CAUSED THE IRA TO DELAY OR DEFER OTHER ATTACKS. IT WENT AHEAD WITH BOMBINGS DIRECTED AGAINST UK MILITARY PERSONNEL IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, APPARENTLY SECURE IN THE BELIEF THAT AT LEAST ONE \"ACTIVE SERVICE UNIT\" EMPLACED TO OPERATE IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS HAD NOT BEEN DETECTED BY EITHER UK OR LOCAL SECURITY OFFICIALS. WHATEVER ATTACKS HAD BEEN PLANNED IN BRITAIN ITSELF PROBABLY WERE JUDGED TO BE MORE RISKY AND WERE DELAYED AGAIN, BUT UK AUTHORITIES WERE CONVINCED THEY WOULD OCCUR EVENTUALLY. 9. UK SECURITY OFFICIALS KNEW OF MANY IRA MEMBERS AND SYMPATHIZERS IN BRITAIN AND WATCHED THEM AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE. BUT WHEN THE ATTACK CAME IN NORTH LONDON ON AUGUST 1 IT WAS BY A \"SLEEPER,\" AN INDIVIDUAL OR A UNIT OF THE IRA NOT KNOWN BY SPECIAL BRANCH TO BE IN ENGLAND AND READY FOR AN ATTACK HERE. THERE MIGHT BE, OF COURSE, OTHER TERRORISTS IN BRITAIN PREPARING FOR ADDITIONAL ATTACKS. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CONTACTS TOLD US THAT A GREAT MANY DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS HERE ARE \"SOFT TARGETS\" SUCH AS RECRUITING OFFICES AND URBAN DEPOTS WHERE IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO INCREASE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS SIGNIFICANTLY. IF A WELL-TRAINED IRA UNIT IS POISED AND EQUIPPED FOR ANOTHER ATTACK, SAID THE MOD, IT COULD WELL FIND ITS MARK. INTERNMENT FOR THE IRA IN ULSTER? --------------------------------- 10. WHILE THERE MAY NOT BE MUCH MORE BY WAY OF PRECAUTIONS THAT CAN BE TAKEN IN BRITAIN, THE SITUATION IS DIFFERENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. SOME BACKBENCH CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT HAVE REACTED TO THE RECENT ATTACKS HERE AND IN ULSTER BY DEMANDING THE REINTRODUCTION OF INTERNMENT, THE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT TRIAL OR FORMAL CHARGES IN COURT OF KNOWN MEMBERS OF THE IRA AND OTHER VIOLENT GROUPS, BOTH CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT. 11. INTERNMENT WAS ADOPTED IN AUGUST 1971 WHEN 450 MEMBERS OF THE IRA WERE ROUNDED UP BY THE ARMY AND POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN \"OPERATION DEMETRIUS.\" 100 OF THOSE ARRESTED HAD TO BE RELEASED BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE TO BE CERTAIN OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM, SO THAT THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE IRA APPARENTLY WAS LEFT INTACT. OPPONENTS OF INTERNMENT NOW CONCEDE THAT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS SO MUCH BETTER THAT A NEW ROUND-UP PROBABLY WOULD SUCCEED IN GREATLY DISRUPTING IRA PLANS. TOM KING SAID RECENTLY THAT THE OPTION OF INTERNMENT REMAINS \"UNDER REVIEW,\" BUT OUR CONTACTS IN GOVERNMENT TOLD US THAT IRA ATTACKS WOULD HAVE TO BE FAR MORE SERIOUS FOR THE OPTION TO BE CHOSEN. HMG KNOWS THAT ADOPTING INTERNMENT WOULD BE A PROPAGANDA VICTORY AND A RECRUITMENT BOON FOR THE IRA. ALSO, INTERNMENT VERY LIKELY WOULD NOT WORK UNLESS IT WAS ADOPTED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND, WHICH UK OFFICIALS REGARD AS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. THE UK WANTS MORE HELP FROM IRELAND ----------------------------------- 12. UK OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT ONE KEY TO SUCCESS IN THE WAR AGAINST IRA TERRORISM IS IMPROVED SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. THEY THINK THAT DUBLIN HAS NOT YET FELT COMPELLED TO PUT ITS WEIGHT FULLY AGAINST THE TERRORISTS IN PART BECAUSE THE IRA, EVEN THOUGH IT DECLARES THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT IS \"ILLEGAL\" AND THAT THE IRISH POLICE AND MILITARY ARE LEGITIMATE TARGETS FOR ATTACK, HAS WISELY REFRAINED FROM ENDANGERING ITS SANCTUARY ON THE IRISH SIDE OF THE BORDER BY ATTACKING THE REPUBLIC\'S OFFICIALS AND ARMED FORCES THERE. 13. THERE WERE EVENTS IN 1987 WHICH EMBARRASSED THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT INTO GREATER ACTION, SAY UK OFFICIALS, SUCH AS THE CAPTURE OF THE ARMS SHIP EKSUND AND THE REVELATION THEREFROM THAT THE IRA HAD BEEN IMPORTING LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS FROM LIBYA INTO IRELAND TO BE USED AGAINST FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE INTENSIVE EFFORT OF IRISH FORCES IN \"OPERATION MALLARD\" TO FIND MANY OF THOSE ARMAMENTS, AND THE PROLONGED INABILITY OF THE IRISH POLICE IN LATE 1987 TO CAPTURE THE RENEGADE EX-IRA MEMBER AND RAMPANT CRIMINAL DESI O\'HARE, THE POPULARLY STYLED \"BORDER FOX,\" EMBARRASSED IRELAND AND ITS SECURITY FORCES STILL MORE. NIO OFFICIALS TOLD US THEY BELIEVE IT IS MORE USEFUL NOW TO USE EACH ADDITIONAL IRA ATTACK, AND THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE IRA TRAVELS RELATIVELY FREELY IN THE REPUBLIC AND HAS MUNITIONS STORED THERE, AS ARGUMENTS TO PROD DUBLIN INTO MORE COOPERATION. 14. AT A RECENT EC MEETING IN HANOVER MRS. THATCHER ONCE AGAIN CONFRONTED IRISH PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY OVER THE NEED FOR DUBLIN TO BE MORE HELPFUL. ACCORDING TO CABINET SOURCES HERE, HAUGHEY CONCEDED THAT IRELAND\'S POLICE AND MILITARY DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH BRITISH FORCES IN STOPPING THE IRA. IN RESPONSE TO THATCHER\'S OFFER TO EITHER EXTEND BRITISH ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT OR TO ARRANGE SUCH ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IF NECESSARY, HAUGHEY PROMISED HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD REASSESS THE NEED FOR TRAINING AND OTHER SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS. NO END IN SIGHT --------------- 15. HMG OFFICIALS REGARD THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM AS A PERENNIAL IRRITANT WHICH WILL NOT GO AWAY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. NO ONE WILL FIND A SOLOMONIC WAY TO SATISFY THE CONTRADICTORY DEMANDS OF UNIONISTS AND REPUBLICANS. THE PERCEIVED GRIEVANCES OF BOTH SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO GENERATE CONFLICT. WITH NO NEAR-TERM SOLUTION IN SIGHT, THE PRINCIPAL GOALS OF GOVERNMENT ARE TO KEEP VIOLENCE DOWN TO TOLERABLE LEVELS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, STOP THE SPREAD OF IRA ATTACKS TO BRITAIN AND ELSEWHERE, AND RECTIFY THOSE OF THE GRIEVANCES UNDERLYING THE CONFLICT WHICH ARE LEGITIMATE. 16. THE GOVERNMENT IN LONDON BELIEVES THAT CONTINUED IRA TERRORISM IS INEVITABLE. THEY LIKE TO POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, EVEN WITH THE RECENT ESCALATION, IS VERY MUCH LESS THAN IN THE PEAK YEAR 1972 AND IN MOST INTERVENING YEARS. UK OFFICIALS ARE CONFIDENT THEY CAN KEEP THE KILLINGS IN ULSTER TO NOT MUCH MORE THAN CURRENT LEVELS WITHOUT ANY INCREASE IN SECURITY FORCES THERE. IRA ATTACKS IN BRITAIN ITSELF AND IN EUROPE ARE A DIFFERENT MATTER. COUNTER-TERRORISM TIES AND COOPERATION AMONG EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAS IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY IN RECENT YEARS, AND THE UK IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE IRA CAN BE HELD IN CHECK OUTSIDE OF NORTHERN IRELAND EVEN THOUGH ATTACKS WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUR. 17. THERE ARE MANY EVENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH MIGHT BRING IRA ATTACKS, SUCH AS THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MAZE PRISON ESCAPES ON SEPTEMBER 25 AND SEVERAL DIFFERENT DAYS WHEN CATHOLIC OR PROTESTANT ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE HAVING PUBLIC MARCHES. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE SEVERAL UPCOMING EVENTS AND ANNIVERSARIES WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED AS POSSIBLE PERIODS OF INCREASED THREAT OF IRA TERRORIST ATTACK IN BRITAIN AND EUROPE. PROMINENT AMONG THEM ARE: -- THE BEGINNING, NOW SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 6, OF THE INQUEST BY THE GIBRALTAR CORONER INTO THE KILLING OF THREE IRA TERRORISTS THERE LAST JANUARY. -- THE ANNUAL CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 11-14. THE CONFERENCE WILL BE AT BRIGHTON THIS YEAR, THE SAME PLACE WHERE AN IRA BOMB CAME CLOSE TO KILLING MARGARET THATCHER AND A MAJOR PART OF HER CABINET DURING THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN 1984. -- 1989 WILL MARK THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF BOTH THE INTRODUCTION OF BRITISH TROOPS INTO NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE CREATION OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA. 1989 COULD BE A BAD YEAR FOR COMMEMORATIVE TERRORISM. PRICE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	32,050
222	8/18/1988 16:40	88CAIRO19680	Embassy Cairo	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88ALEXANDRIA1019" ]	R 181640Z AUG 88 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8545 INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 19680 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, PREL, EG SUBJECT: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSONALITIES REF: ALEXANDRIA 1019 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. - 2. SUMMARY: A MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (MB) JOURNALIST (STRICTLY PROTECT) REPORTED TO EMBOFF THAT THE ORGANIZATION IS ANGERED AT THE AUTHORITIES OVER THE FIRST RECENT ARREST OF A \"PROMINENT MEMBER\" OF THE ORGANIZATION, COINCIDING WITH THE INTERIOR MINISTRY\'S RENEWED CRACKDOWN ON ISLAMIC GROUPS. THE JOURNALIST CRITICIZED THE POLICE FOR PROVOCATIVE AND UNNECESSARY BRUTALITY AGAINST THE JIHADISTS AT AINS SHAMS A FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY, BUT SAID THE MB MEMBERS \"HAVE ORDERS\" TO MAINTAIN THEIR DISTANCE FROM THE SUCH GROUPS\' ACTIVITIES. THE JOURNALIST ALSO IDENTIFIED \"EXTREMELY ANTI-AMERICAN\" ABDEL MONEIM SELIM HABBARA AS THE SUCCESSOR TO THE LATE GABIR RIZK AS THE MB\'S CHIEF JOURNALIST/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER. THE JOURNALIST EMPHASIZED THE MB\'S ORGANIZATIONAL INDEPENDENCE FROM IBRAHIM SHUKRY\'S SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY (SLP, UNDER WHICH MB DEPUTIES WERE ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT), BUT HE IDENTIFIED THE MB\'S BASES OF SUPPORT WITHIN THAT PARTY. HE SINGLED OUT \"AL-SHA\'AB\" (SLP NEWSPAPER) EDITOR ADIL HUSSEIN AS \"CLOSE\" TO THE MB AND A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FIGURE IN ISLAMIC POLITICS, COMBINING INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP WITH STRONG POPULAR CONTACT AND SUPPORT. END SUMMARY. - 3. NEW MB \"SPOKESMAN\": A VERY ACTIVE AND COMMITTED MB JOURNALIST (STRICTLY PROTECT) WELL KNOWN TO EMBOFFS COMMENTED FRANKLY ON MB-RELATED ISSUES DURING A RECENT VISIT TO THE EMBASSY FOR A VISA INTERVIEW. HE REPORTED THAT THE MB LEADERSHIP HAD SUMMONED ABDEL MONEIM SELIM HABBARA FROM (EVIDENTLY SELF-IMPOSED EXILE IN) THE GULF TO SUCCEED THE LATE GABIR RIZK AS THE MB\'S \"LIASON\" OFFICER AND EDITOR OF THE MB\'S MONTHLY \"LIWA\' AL-ISLAM\". THE JOURNALIST CONFIRMED THAT \"LIWA\' HAS REPLACED IL-DA\'AWA\" AS THE MB\'S MOUTHPIECE. \"SELIM\" NOW RUNS \"LIWA\'\" FROM ITS MID-TOWN OFFICE, WHICH IS SEPARATE FROM THE MB HQ AT THE FORMER LOCATION OF \"AL-DA\'WA\". HOWEVER, THE NAME OF BADR MOHAMMED BADR, NOT SELIM, WILL CONTINUE TO APPEAR ON \"LIWA\'S\" MASTHEAD, BECAUSE SELIM IS NOT REGISTERED WITH THE JOURNALISTS\' SYNDICATE AND THEREFORE IS UNLICENSED. SELIM IS UNLIKELY TO WELCOME CONTACT WITH U.S. DIPLOMATS, THE JOURNALIST SAID, BECAUSE HE IS EMOTIONALLY BOTH ANTI-SOVIET AND ANTI-AMERICAN. SELIM IS OF THE OLDER GENERATION OF MB LEADERS, HAVING BEEN IN PRISON CONTINUOUSLY FROM 1954 UNTIL SADAT RELEASED HIM FROM HIS LIFE SENTENCE IN 1974. HE HAD BEEN IN THE GULF FROM 1974 UNTIL SUMMONED BACK TO SUCCEED RIZK, ACCORDING TO THE JOURNALIST. - 4. (COMMENT: A JOURNALIST AND AUTHOR HIMSELF, RIZK HAD OFTEN SAT IN ON OUR CONTACTS WITH THE MB LEADERSHIP, AND HAD BECOME WELL KNOWN TO THE FOREIGN PRESS CORPS DURING THE 1987 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN AS THE MB \"SPOKESMAN\" AND PRESS LIAISON MAN. SELIM HAS NOT YET BECOME WIDELY-KNOWN AS RIZK\'S SUCCESSOR. THOUGH IT IS TOO SOON TO DISCERN WHETHER SELIM WILL PROVE AN ACTIVIST PR MAN, THE FACT THE AGING MB LEADERSHIP CHOSE A RELATIVELY UNKNOWN AND THUS FAR RECLUSIVE SUCCESSOR FOR THIS POST INDICATES ITS CONTINUED PREFERENCE FOR MATURITY AND PERSONAL LOYALTY OVER YOUTHFUL DYNAMISM OR PROVEN JOURNALISTIC OR PUBLIC RELATIONS SKILLS. THIS MAY BE ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE GENERATIONAL SPLIT BETWEEN THE MORE PR-CONCIOUS, OUTWARDLY LOOKING MB YOUTH AND A MORE AUTHORITARIAN AND CONSPIRATORIAL OLD GUARD, AND THE CONTINUED UNCHALLENGED DOMINANCE OF THE LATTER. END COMMENT.) - 5. MB-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS: THE JOURNALIST REPORTED THAT THE AUTHORITIES HAD ARRESTED WITHOUT CHARGE MOHAMMED ABDEL MONEIM, \"ONE OF OUR PROMINENT PEOPLE FROM ALEXANDRIA,\" AND HARRASSED THREE ACCOMPANYING MB FIGURES UPON THEIR ARRIVAL AT THE AIRPORT FROM A RECENT MB CONFERENCE IN THE FRG. (REFTEL REPORTS FURTHER ON THIS INCIDENT.) BECAUSE THEY ENJOYED PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY, PEOPLE\'S ASSEMBLY DEPUTIES \'ESAM EL-\'ARIAN, MOKHTAR NOH, AND MOHAMMED MAHDI KESHEF WERE NOT ARRESTED. THE JOURNALIST SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST ARREST OF ONE OF THEIR SENIOR FIGURES IN RECENT TIMES. THE INCIDENT HAS ANGERED THE MB, HE SAID, WHICH VIEWS IT AS A SIGNAL OF STEPPED-UP GOVERNMENT PRESSURE ON THEM, PROBABLY CONNECTED TO INTERIOR MINISTER ZAKI BADR\'S CRACKDOWN ON THE ISLAMIC GROUPS SINCE THE ESCAPE OF THE JIHADISTS LAST MONTH. AS FOR BADR, HOWEVER, THE MB BELIEVES ON THE BASIS OF \"RELIABLE INFORMATION\" THAT MUBARAK WILL DUMP HIM SOON, ONLY TO REPLACE HIM WITH SOMEONE \"EVEN TOUGHER, BUT MORE CLEVER.\" FOR ITS PART, THE JOURNALIST CONFIRMED, THE MB CONTINUES ITS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A LEGAL POLITICAL PARTY.. - 6. THE JOURNALIST WENT ON TO CRITICIZE THE PROVOCATIVE ATTACKS OF THE POLICE ON THE ISLAMIC GROUPS, STORMING MOSQUES WITH THEIR BOOTS ON, FOR EXAMPLE, AS THEY HAD DONE AT THE JIHADISTS\' \"ADAM\" MOSQUE AT AIN SHAMS A FEW DAYS AGO. SO WANTON WERE THE ARRESTS IN THAT INCIDENT, THE JOURNALIST ASSERTED IRONICALLY, THAT \"THREE OF OUR COPTIC BROTHERS WERE ARRESTED WITH THE JIHADISTS\". THE RECKLESS POLICE ACTION, RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF CHILD, HAD PROVOKED NEIGHBORHOOD SYMPATHY FOR THE JIHADISTS, HE SAID. THE MB CONDEMNS SUCH POLICE OPPRESSION AGAINST THE ISLAMIC GROUPS, THE JOURNALIST SAID, BUT ALSO \"DISAPPROVES OF VIOLENCE\" (BY SUCH GROUPS); THE MB LEADERSHIP HAS ISSUED \"STRICT ORDERS TO STAY AWAY FROM UPRISINGS AND ACTIVITIES\" OF THE ISLAMIC GROUPS. - 7. MB AMBIVALENCE TOWARD U.S.: THE JOURNALISTS SAID THE MB LEADERSHIP HAD DECLINED TO NOMINATE AN MB MEMBER OF THE PEOPLE\'S ASSEMBLY AS ONE OF TWO SLP MEMBERS INVITED TO JOIN A PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION TO THE U.S., SIMPLY BECAUSE THE USG HAD NOT ADDRESSED AN INVITATION TO THE MB DIRECTLY AND FORMALLY. EVIDENTLY UNCONSCIOUS OF ANY IRONY, THE JOURNALIST STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MB LEADERSHIP AT THE SAME TIME REMAINS WARY OF ANY OFFICIAL CONTACTS OR INVOLVEMENT WITH THE USG IN CONNECTION WITH MB TRAVEL TO THE U.S. HE REMARKED THAT MB MEMBERS OFTEN VISIT THE U.S. AT THE INVITATION OF ISLAMIC GROUPS THERE. (COMMENT: EMBASSY HAD INVITED SLP LEADER AND OPPOSITION SPEAKER IBRAHIM SHUKRY TO NOMINATE TWO SLP DEPUTIES OF HIS CHOICE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION INVITED TO THE U.S. BY A PRIVATE U.S. ORGANIZATION. EMBASSY EXPRESSED NO OBJECTION TO SHUKRY\'S INITIAL INQUIRY WHETHER MB MEMBERS COULD BE NOMINATED. SHUKRY LATER ADVISED US THAT THE MB HAD DECLINED TO PARTICIPATE, WITHOUT OFFERING A REASON. END COMMENT.) - 8. THE JOURNALIST FURTHER EMPHASIZED THE MB\'S ORGANIZATIONAL INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SLP, BUT SAID THAT FOUR FIGURES IN THE SLP LEADERSHIP ARE STRONG SUPPORTERS OF COOPERATION WITH THE MB: SLP CHAIRMAN SHUKRY, HIS DEPUTY HILMY MURAD, PARTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR YOUTH MAGDY HUSSEIN, AND SLP NEWSPAPER EDITORIALIST \'ADIL HUSSEIN. (COMMENT: MAGDY HUSSEIN RETURNED TO EGYPT VERY FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY HIS VISIT TO THE U.S. IN THE PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION. HILMY MURAD -- WHO PERIODICALLY \"RESIGNS\" FROM HIS PARTY POST PURPORTEDLY IN PROTEST OF ANTI-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT POLICIES -- HAD PRIVATELY INDICATED TO US STRONGLY SECULARIST, ANTI-MB VIEWS AT THE OUTSET OF THE SLP-MB ALLIANCE IN 1987. THE FOUR SLP FIGURES CITED ARE RELATED BY BLOOD AND/OR MARRIAGE TO EACH OTHER AND TO THE LATE AHMED HUSSEIN, ISLAMIC/NAZI FIREBRAND OF THE 1930\'S AND 40\'S. END COMMENT.) FURTHERMORE, THE JOURNALIST SAID, THE MB ENJOYS STRONG SUPPORT AMONG THE YOUNGER SLP CADRES. HOWEVER, THE MB FACES STRONG ANTAGONISM FROM THE \"MIDDLE RANKS\" OF THE OLD-TIME SLP MEMBERSHIP, WHICH INCLUDES \"NASSERISTS AND COMMUNISTS,\" AND OTHERS, SUCH AS PEOPLE\'S ASSEMBLY MEMBER DR. SALAH ABDULLAH, WHO MERELY \"DON\'T SUPPORT THE ISLAMIC TREND VERY MUCH.\" (COMMENT: JOURNALIST IMPLIED CONFIDENCE OF THE MB THAT ITS SUPPORT FROM THE TOP SLP LEADERSHIP AND THE YOUNGER ISLAMIC CADRES EVENTUALLY WOULD PREVAIL OVER THE LEFTIST SECULARIST ELEMENTS. END COMMENT.) - 9. \'ADIL HUSSEIN: RESPONDING TO EMBOFF\'S OBSERVATION THAT MANY OUTSIDERS QUESTION \'ADIL HUSSEIN\'S RELIGIOUS SINCERITY IN VIEW OF HIS PAST AS A MARXIST, THE JOURNALIST VIGOROUSLY ASSERTED THAT HUSSEIN HAD EXPERIENCED A PROFOUND CONVERSION AS A RESULT OF HIS NEAR-DEATH UNDER SEVERE TORTURE WHILE IN PRISON, WHERE HE HAD COME TO KNOW MB MEMBERS. THE JOURNALIST CLAIMED THAT \'ADIL HUSSEIN IS NOT MERELY AN INTELLECTUAL OR IDEOLOGUE, BUT HAS GOOD RAPPORT WITH ORDINARY PEOPLE, ENJOYING GREAT POPULARITY AMONG YOUTH. HOWEVER, HUSSEIN IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE MB, \"THOUGH HE IS VERY CLOSE TO US.\" (COMMENT: HUSSEIN IS INFAMOUS AS THE LEADING PROPONENT OF AN AMALGAMATION OF NASSERISM/MARXISM AND ISLAM, THROUGH HIS AUTHORSHIP OF BOOKS ON THE SUBJECT AND HIS WEEKLY, HIGHLY POLEMICAL EDITORIALS IN THE SLP\'S \"IL-SHA\'AB\". END COMMENT.) WISNER "	Success: CSV parsed	null	32,364
223	8/19/1988 4:24	88STATE271057	Secretary of State	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O P 190424Z AUG 88 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE ALL NATO CAPITALS INFO SECDEF WASHDC JCS WASHDC PRIORITY 3991 USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL ","C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 271057 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: MOPS, MCAP, PREL, US, XF, NATO SUBJECT: STAYING THE COURSE IN THE PERSIAN GULF 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.) 2. WITH THE APPROACH OF THE FORMAL CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ ON AUGUST 20, SOME ARE SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S. HAS ALREADY DECIDED TO BEGIN SOON TO REDUCE ITS NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF. RECENT STORIES IN THE U.S. PRESS HAVE FUELED THIS SPECULATION. AS APPROPRIATE, POSTS SHOULD USE THE TALKING POINTS PROVIDED BELOW TO BRIEF THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS (ESPECIALLY GCC STATES, EUROPEAN ALLIES WITH A NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF, AND IRAQ) ON U.S. POLICY. 3. TALKING POINTS: --WE HAVE WORKED CLOSELY TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. WE ARE PLEASED WITH GCC AND ALLIED COOPERATION AND BELIEVE IT WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS--THE CEASE-FIRE AND PROGRESS TOWARD FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF 598. --WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED THAT OUR FORCE AUGMENTATION AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE THREAT POSED TO OUR SHIPPING, AND TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION. WE HAVE ALSO CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED THAT, SHOULD THE THREAT ABATE, WE ARE PREPARED TO REVIEW AND, AS APPROPRIATE, TO REDUCE OUR NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE REGION. --GIVEN THE CLOSE COOPERATIVE AND SUPPORTIVE NATURE OF OUR PRESENCE, THAT OF OUR ALLIES, AND OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF, WE WILL ONLY DO SO AFTER CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH THE GCC STATES AND AFTER COORDINATING WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. WE WILL NOT TAKE PREEMPTIVE OR UNILATERAL ACTIONS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH YOU AS WE ASSESS THE SITUATION IN VIEW OF THE IMMINENT CEASE-FIRE. --AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, THE U.S. HAS HAD A NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF FOR OVER FORTY YEARS. THAT PRESENCE CLEARLY PRE-DATES THE GULF WAR; WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN AN APPROPRIATE NAVAL PRESENCE, EVEN AFTER THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ ARE RESOLVED. --THE U.S. INTENDS TO STAY THE COURSE IN THE GULF. OUR POLICY REFLECTS OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS AS WE HAVE DEFINED THEM OVER MORE THAN EIGHT ADMINISTRATIONS. IT HAS STRONG BIPARTISAN AND PUBLIC SUPPORT. (END TALKING POINTS) 4. FYI ONLY: THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF OUR AUGMENTED NAVAL FORCES WILL REMAIN COMMENSURATE WITH THE THREAT. AS THAT THREAT DIMINISHES, WE WILL REDUCE THE FORCE AS APPROPRIATE. THE DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE TO ADVISE WHEN FORCE LEVEL CHANGES ARE ANTICIPATED IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE EMBASSIES TO CONSULT WITH THE STATES OF THE REGION AND OUR ALLIES. END FYI. YYY WHITEHEAD "	Success: CSV parsed	null	32,562
224	8/22/1988 5:41	88BAGHDAD4559	Embassy Baghdad	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O 220541Z AUG 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDAITE 7958 INFO GULFWAR COLLECTIVE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 04559 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI COMMENTARY WARNS AGAINST TILT TOWARD IRAN REF: FBIS JN1808064588 (#) 1. SUMMARY: WE ARE SOMEWHAT PUZZLED BY IRAQ NEWS AGENCY COMMENTARY, ALMOST CERTAINLY COMING DIRECTLY FROM THE PRESIDENCY, ACCUSING \"IMPERIALIST POWERS\" (I.E., UNITED STATES MOST OF ALL) OF PRESSING IRAN TO ACCEPT UNSCR 598 IN ORDER TO PREVENT KHOMEINI\'S COLLAPSE. WE INTERPRET THIS BLUSTER AS SADDAM\'S BULLYING WAY OF SAYING WHAT IS PATENTLY TRUE, THAT THE UPCOMING PERIOD WILL BE A TEST OF IRAQ\'S RELA- TION WITH THE U.S. AND OTHER EXTERNAL POWERS. END SUMMARY. 2. BAGHDAD TELEVISION, RADIO, AND ALL NEWSPAPERS AUGUST 18 PROMINENTLY CARRIED A VEHEMENT BUT MORE THAN USUALLY INARTICULATE EDITORIAL (REF FBIS), ATTRIBUTED TO THE POLITICAL EDITOR OF THE IRAQ NEWS AGENCY, SHARPLY WARNING WORLD POWERS AGAINST GIVING SUPPORT TO IRAN DURING THE CEASE-FIRE PERIOD. FROM ITS PROMINENCE, IT UNDOUBTEDLY EMANATED FROM THE PRESIDENCY ITSELF. THE COMMENTARY WARNED THAT \"SOME IMPERIALIST POWERS\" (UNSPECIFIED BUT CLEARLY INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES) WANT TO KEEP ARAB COUNTRIES OCCUPIED IN DISPUTES WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS (I.E., IRAN) IN ORDER TO PROTECT ISRAEL. IT CLAIMED CERTAIN POWERS HAD PRESSED IRAN TO ACCEPT RESOLUTION 598 IN ORDER TO PREVENT KHOMEINI\'S COLLAPSE. 3. COMMENT: WHILE WE KNOW THE IRAQIS FEAR THAT THE U.S. WILL RESUME A PRO-IRANIAN POLICY TO THE DETRIMENT OF IRAQI INTERESTS, THE PROMINENCE AND TIMING OF THE EDITORIAL ARE CURIOUS. WE HAVE REASSURAD THE IRAWI AZ A HIGH GEVEL AND THROUGH DIFFERENT CHANNELS THAT WE DO NOT CONTEMPLATE \"TILTING\" IN EITHER DIRECTION. 4. WE CONCLUDE THAT THIS FORM OF INARTICULATE LASHING OUT SERVES MORE THAN ANYTHING TO DEMONSTRATE IRAQ\'S SENSE OF INSECURITY. A NEW ERA IS EMERGING, AND IRAQ IS NERVOUS ABOUT THE DEVELOPING ATTITUDES OF EXTERNAL POWERS. SADDAM\'S INSTINCTIVE REACTION IS TO WARN WITH BLUSTERING, UNSPECIFIC THREATS. TARIQ AZIZ AND THE MFA DIPLOMATSSTRESS THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SAME COIN, I.E., THEIR HOPE AND DESIRE THAT THE POST-WAR PERIOD WILL WITNESS BROADER AND CLOSER COOPERATION WITH THE USG THROUGHOUT THE REGION. GLASPIE NOTE BY OC/T: (#) OMISSION IN REF. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW. "	Success: CSV parsed	null	32,634
225	8/22/1988 8:30	88IZMIR710	Consulate Izmir	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "87IZMIR1213", "88ANKARA9490", "88IZMIR490" ]	R 220830Z AUG 88 FM AMCONSUL IZMIR TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7538 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL AMCONSUL ADANA ","UNCLAS IZMIR 00710 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER SUBJECT: 22 PKK TERRORISTS ARRESTED REF: ANKARA 9490 1. LOCAL PRESS AUGUST 19-20 CARRIED SPLASHY REPORTS OF COORDINATED POLICE RAIDS IN IZMIR AND ANTALYA WHICH NETTED A TOTAL OF 22 ACCUSED PKK TERRORISTS. (A TOTAL OF MORE THAN FIFTY WERE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY INITIALLY BUT ONLY 22 ACTUALLY WERE HELD.) ALSO SEIZED WERE A VARIETY OF EXPLOSIVES, HANDGUNS, AND WRITTEN AND TAPED PROPAGANDA IN BOTH TURKISH AND KURDISH. (THIS INCIDENTALLY IS THE FIRST TIME WE HAVE SEEN THE PRESS HERE USE THE TERM \"KURDISH\" IN REFERENCE TO LANGUAGE.) 2. AMONG THE CRIMES TO WHICH MEMBERS OF THE ARRESTED GROUP HAVE SUPPOSEDLY ALREADY ADMITTED ARE: THE BOMBING OF THE IZMIR SUMERBANK RETAIL STORE ON DECEMBER 29, 1987 (87 IZMIR 1213); A BOMB PLACED IN A GARBAGE BIN AT A CENTRAL BUS STATION IN IZMIR IN LATE JUNE, 1988 (WHICH WE DID NOT REPORT BECAUSE AT THE TIME THERE WERE REPORTS THAT THE EXPLOSION HAD BEEN CAUSED BY A DISCARDED AEROSOL CAN, WHICH POLICE WOULD NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY); THE BOMB WHICH WENT OFF AT THE HOTEL BILGEHAN IN ANTALYA ON JUNE 6 (IZMIR 490); AND A NUMBER OF OTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND/OR PROPAGANDA. WILLIAMS "	Success: CSV parsed	null	32,696
226	8/22/1988 23:45	88STATE274007	Secretary of State	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O 222345Z AUG 88 FM SECSTATE WASHDC INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 274007 GENEVA FO DCM MARSH; HELSINKI FOR IO DAS SHAW SMITH FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO USUN NEW YORK SECDEF WASHDC DIA WASHDC USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL AUGUST 17 QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 04483 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, UNSC, IZ, IR SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDINGS RELATING TO CEASE-FIRE AND UN OBSERVERS 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT. 2. DURING AUGUST 17 MEETING (SEPTEL), UNDER SECRETARY ZAHAWI AND INTERNATIONAL-LAW EXPERT QAYSI HANDED TO AMBASSADOR AS HDAS N DRCSMENTS. INCLUDED WERE TWO UNDATED \"ANNEXES,\" ONE ENTITLED, \"UNDERSTANDINGS RELATING TO THE CEASE-FIRE,\" AND THE OTHER, \"ARRANGE- MENTS PERTAINING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS.\" THESE ANNEXES BEGIN AT A PAGE NUMBERED TEN, SUGGESTING THAT THEY FOLLOWED A DECLARATION OR AGREEMENT. WE GUESS THAT THEY WERE PART OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL\'S AUGUST 8 DECLARATION OF CEASE-FIRE. 3. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT OF THE TWO ANNEXES: ANNEX I UNDERSTANDINGS RELATING TO THE CEASE-FIRE 1. IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE AGREED TO ISSUE THE NECESSARY ORDERS OF ALL FORCES UNDER THEIR COMMAMNND CONL SCRUPULOUSLY TO OBSERVE THE CEASE-FIRE AND TO DIS- CONTINUE ALL MILITARY ACTIONS ON LAND, AT SEA AND IN THE AIR ON 20 AUGUST 1988 STARTING AT 0300 HOURS GMT. IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO ENSURE THAT SUCH ORDERS ARE ISSUED IN TIME TO REACH ALL CONCERNED BY THE TIME THE CEASE-FIRE COMES INTO FORCE. 2. TO ENSURE THAT THE CEASE-FIRE HOLDS, IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE AGREED THAT: A. ON LAND: - UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS, TOGETHER WITH THE PARTIES, WILL ESTABLISH AGREED CEASE-FIRE LINES ON THE BASIS OF FORWARD DEFENDED LOCALITIES HELD BY THE TWO SIDES D-DAY. (THESE POSITIONS MAY BE ADJUSTED AS MAY BE AGREED, WHEN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES ARE JUDGED TO BE DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO EACH OTHER.) - THE FOLLOWING WILL BE PROHIBITED: - FIRING ACROSS THE CEASE-FIRE LINES; - NEW WIRING AND MINING OF ANY POSITION; - REINFORCING EXISTING FORWARD DEFENDED LOCALITIES WITH MEN OR WARLIKE STORES AND EQUIPMENT; - REDEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS TO OTHER AND MORE ADVANTAGEOUS GROUND; - FORWARD MOVEMENT OF A BODY OF TROOPS, WARLIKE STORES AND EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT FOR RELIEF AND MAINTENANCE B. IN THE AIR: - NO AIRCRAFT OF EITHER SIDE WILL FLY CLOSER TO THE CEASE-FIRE LINE THAN A DISTANCE TO BE AGREED UPON, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS THAT MAY BE AGREED UPON ON AN AD HOC BASIS. - IN ADDITION, NO ARMED OR RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OF EITHER SIDE WILL BE PERMITTED CLOSER THAN 25 KM TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER. C. AT SEA: - EACH PARTY SHALL RESPECT THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW; - ACCESS TO THE AIR-SPACE OUTSIDE THE LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE PARTIES SHALL BE LIMITED TO UNARMED AIRCRAFT, CIVILIAN HELICOPTERS AND TRANS- PORT PLANES INVOLVED IN CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES OF THE AREA; - IN ORDER TO AVOID INCIDENTS NEAR TO THE MOUTH OF THE SHATT-AL-ARAB, A UNITED NATIONS NAVAL PRESENCE WILL BE ESTABLISHED, IN AN AREA TO BE DEFINED, TO OBSERVE AND MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTIES. 3. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO EXAMINE IN GOOD FAITH THE FOLLOWING FURTHER ARRANGE- MENTS WOCH WOULD COME INTO EFFECT FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER: - NEITHER PARTY WOULD DEPLOY ITS MILITARY FORCES CLOSER TO THE BORDER THAN A DISTANCE TO BE AGREED UPON; - EACH SIDE WOULD AGREE, ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, TO OBSERVE CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBER AND CALIBER OF WEAPONS (ARTILLERY, MORTARS, TANKS AND ARMOURED VEHICLES) WHICTITXDED BY AN OFFICER IN THE RANK OF A MAJOR-GENERAL AND WILL BE ORGANIZED INTO A HEADQUARTERS OF ABOUT...OFFICERS ANDHTWO AYAKPVSOHF, EACH OF WHICH WILL BE ATTACHED TO THE ARMIES OF IRAN AND IRAQ IN THE FIELD. EACH DETACHMENT, TO BE HEADED BY AN OFFICER IN THE RANK OF BRIGADIER, WILL CONSIST OF A HEADQUARTERS AND SMALL INTERNATIONAL TEAMS TO SUPERVISE THE WITHDRAWAL, MONITOR THE CEASE- FIRE, INVESTIGATE ON THE GROUND COMPLAINTS REGARDING VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND RESTORE THE CEASE- FIRE IN CASE OF BREACHES. 4. GIVEN THE GREAT LENGTH OF THE LINE OF CONFONTA- TION AND IN ORDER TO FULFILL THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO THEM, UNITED NATIONS MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL BE DEPLOYED IN GROUPS WHICH SHALL BE CO-LOCATDD WITH THE FORMATION HEADQUARTERS SUCH AS DIVISIONAL HEAD- QUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF IRAN AND IRAQ IN THE FIELD. OBSERVERS SHALL BE SENT OUT FROM THESE GROUPS TO INVESTIGATE INCIDENTS, AS CIRCUMSTANCES MAY DEMAND. 5. TO FACILITATE THE EXECUTION OF THE TASKS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP, IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO ENSURE THE FOLLOWING: - FULL SUPPORT AND COOPERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP AND THE SUPPORTING PERSONNEL; - PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS, ACCOMMODATIN, TRANSPORTATION, AND OTHER FACILITIES THAT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OBSERVERS\' TASKS. (THE DETAILS OF THE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER AND THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES OF IRAN AND IRAQ.) - RELEVANT PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. - THE SAFETY OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP AND ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUP, WHILE OPERATING IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. 6. ADDITIONALLY, IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE AGREED TO: - PERMIT THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS AND THE SUPPORTING STAFF TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE AREA, NO LATER THAN TEN DAYS BEFORE D-DAY; - PROVIDE THE CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER AND THE TWO DETACHMENT COMMANDERS WITH ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR FORCES IN THE FIELD, IN ORDER TO ASSIST THEM IN DETERMINING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR PERSONNEL; AND - FACILITATE THE COMPLETION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MILITARY OBSERVERS AND THE SUPPORTING PERSONNEL WITH THEIR FORCES IN THE FIELD NO LATER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO D-DAY. END TEXT. GLASPIE UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD "	Success: CSV parsed	null	32,737
227	8/23/1988 12:07	88BAGHDAD4587	Embassy Baghdad	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88BAGHDAD4454", "88STATE270576" ]	O 231207Z AUG 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7964 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE GULFWAR COLLECTIVE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 04587 GENEVA FOR MARSH E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IZ SUBJECT: IRAN-IRAQ: EVE OF GENEVA REF: (A) BAGHDAD 4454 (B) STATE 270576 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEST. 2. SUMMARY: THE IRAQIS GO TO GENEVA HAVING CONCEDED TO IRAN WHAT IT WANTED MOST, I.E., A CEASE-FIRE, AND THEY ARE, WE SUSPECT, DUBIOUS ABOUT WHAT THEY THINK OHEZ CAN GET OUT OF THE TALKS. THEY WANT ASSURANCE OF FREE NAVIGATION (INCLUDING WARSHIPS) WITHOUT INSPECTION BY IRAN; NO REPARATIONS TO IRAN; NO VERDICT BY THE IMPARTIAL COMMITTEE ACCUSING IRAQ; CLEAR DEMARCATION OF LAND BORDERS; AND ULTIMATELY, A PEACE TREATY WHICH GUARANTEES THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE OF ALL, . NONINTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS (INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT OF KURDS). THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT THE IRAQIS PROBABLY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A CLERICAL REGIME, EVEN AFTER KHOMEINI DIES, CAN BE ANYTHING BUT EXPANSIONIST/REVOLUTIONARY, SO THAT NO PEACE TREATY WOULD BE WORTH MUCH IN THE LONG RUN. END SUMMARY. 3. THE IRAQIS GO TO GENEVA IN A QUANDARY. THEY HAVE ALREADY CONCEDED TO IRAN THE MAIN THING IRAN WANTED RIGHT NOW, I.E., CEASE-FIRE -- A BREATHING SPACE JUST WHEN IRAQ HAD TURNED THE TABLES MILITARILY. THEY MADE THIS CONCESSION PRESUMABLY BECAUSE OF NEARLH UNAH YUNCOLDS OVER IRAN IS MILITARY THREAT, AND THE REPUBLICAN GUARD CONTINUES TO BE MASSED OPPOSITE ABADAN AS A POTENT WARNING TO IRAN. BUT THE JUBILANT CELEBRATIONS ALL OVER IRAQ MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH THAT THREAT. 4. THE PRINCIPAL DETERMINANT OF WHETHER THE IRAQIS WILL BE FORTHCOMING OR OBSTRUCTIONIST AT GENEVA IS THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE KEY ISSUE: IS IRAN REALLY INERESTED IN COMPJEHENSIVE PEACE? WE BELIEVE THAT THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES DO WANT A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. FOR ALL THEIR PRESENT MILITARY ADVANTAGE, WE DOUBT THAT THEY ENTERTAIN NOTIONS OF MILITARY CONQUEST OF IRAN. THEY KNOW THAT THEY HAVE TO LIVE WITH IRAN AND THAT IN TIME THE TABLES MAY TURN BACK THE OTHER WAY AGAIN, WITH IRAN RESURGING IN STRENGTH MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE GAINED THE UPPER HAND WITH THE KURDS, THEY BADLY NEED A GUARANTEE OF NONSUPPORT OF THE KURDS FROM IRAN. BUT FOR ALL THEIR YEARNING FOR A GENUINE PEACE, WE DOUBT LHAHTHE IRAQIS ARE NAIVE ENOUGH TO BELIEVE THAT ANY CLERICAL REGIME IN IRAN, EVEN AFTER KHOMEINI DIES, WILL RENOUNCE THE REVOLUTION OR ITS INTEGRAL ELEMENTS, EXPANSIONISM AND INTER- FERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, PRINCIPALLY IRAQ\'S. 5. IF THIS ASSESSMENT IS CORRECT, WE PREDICT THAT EVEN THOUGH TARIQ AZIZ EMPHATICALLY WANTS TO AVOID A LONG PERIOD OF \"NO PEACE, NO WAR\" (ALONG THE LINES OF THE POST-1948 ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE), THE IRAQIS WILL NOT BE HIGHLY MOTIVATED TO BE FORTHCOMING IN THE GENEVA TALKS, SINCE A PEACE TREATY WOULD NOT IMPEL THE IRANIANS TO SCALE DOWN THEIR LONG- TERM REVOLUTIONARY AMBITIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE A SERIES BF ULTIMATE GAINS THE IRAQIS MIGHT AIM FOR, INCLUDING: -- ASSURANCE OF FREE NAVIGATION IN THE GULF/HORMUZ/ SHATT, INCLUDING FOR WARSHIPS WITHOUT INSPECTION OR HINDRANCE BY IRAN. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS POINT WAS ALREADY MADE CLEAR TWO DAYS AFTER IRAN\'S ACCEPTANCE OF 598 IN TARIQ AZIZ\'S JULY 20 LETTER, OVER HALF OF WHICH WAS DEVOTED TO THE ISSUE OF NAVIGATION. THE IRAQIS EMPHASIZE IT NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS IMPORTANT TO THEM IN ITS OWN RIGHT, BUT BECAUSE THEY VIEW IT AS A TEST OF IRANIAN INTENTIONS. AT A BASER LEVEL, THEY MAY ALSO WANT TO DRIVE THIS POINT HOME AS A WAY TO EMBARRASS IRAN; -- DEMARCATION OF LAND BOUNDARIES AS VOUCHSAFED IN PREVIOUS TREATIES INCLUDING THE ALGIERS ACCORD, WHICH IRAN FAILED TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON. THE IRAQIS NOW OCCUPY ZAYN AL-QAWS, SAIF SA\'D, AND THE OTHER TINY SECTORS (ONLY 356 SQ. KM. ALL TOLD), MAKING THEIR POSITION NOT ONLY LEGALLY (##) MISSION OFFICIALS SPENT FOUR YEARS FINDING EVER MORE INGENIOUS WAYS TO AVOID THE DEMARCATION, AND SO IRAN CONTINUED TO HOLD ZAYN AL-QAWS, SAIF SA\'D, AND THE OTHER POCKETS. DDING TO IRAQI ANGER IS THE FACT THAT IRAN SHELLED BORDER TOWNS IN SEPTEMBER 1980 FROM THESE POCKETS -- INDEED, THE IRAQIS ARGUE THAT THAT SHELLING WAS THE IMMEDIATE TRIGGER OF THE WAR; -- CANCELLATION OF THE ALGIERS ACCORD INSOFAR AS CONCERNS THE SHATT, I.E., RETURN OF SOVEREIGNTY TO IRAQ OVER THE ENTIRE RIVER COURSE. THE IRAQIS HAVE LEFT THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY OPEN AT PRESENT, SAYING THAT THE SHATT SHOULD BE CLEARED FOR UTILI- ZATION BY BOTH PARTIES AND SPEAKING INFORMALLY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION. BUT IF THE IRANIANS DO NOT COME FORWARD ON THEIR OWN OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ACCORD, BOTH IN REFERENCE TO NONINTERFERENCE AND DEMARCATION OF LAND BOUNDARIES, THE IRAQIS WILL CERTAINLY NOT CONCEDE ON SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL THE RIVER. (THEY MAY NOT CONCEDE AT ALL.); -- NO NEGATIVE VERDICT BY THE IMPARTIAL BODY. WE THINK THE IRAQIS UNDERSTAND FULL WELL THAT NO COM- MITTEE WILL EVER GIVE IRAQ A POSITIVE VERDICT -- THE ONLY POSSIBLE OUTCOMES ARE A \"NONVERDICT\" THAT IMPUGNS BOTH SIDES OR ONE THAT BLAMES IRAQ FOR STARTING THE WAR. THE IRAQIS HAVE ALWAYS EXUDED CONFIDENCE THAT THEY ARE NOT AFRAID OF AN IMPARTIAL BODY SET UP TO EXAMINE THE GENERALIZED ISSUE OF \"RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR,\" AS OPPOSED TO THE NARROW QUESTION OF \"WHO STARTED THE WAR\" -- INDEED, THE IRAQIS CALLED FOR SUCH AN IMPARTIAL INQUIRY AS FAR BACK AS 1982. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ARE NOT EAGER FOR SUCH AN INQUIRY AND INSIST ON EXAMINATION OF ISSUES IN 598 IN STRICT SEQUENTIAL ORDER; -- NO REPARATIONS TO IRAN. A YEAR AGO IF IRAN HAD ACCEPTED 598, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN WELL-PLACED, WITH MAJNUN AND FAW IN ITS POSSESSION, TO DEMAND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WORTH OF REPARATIONS. NOW THEY HAVE LOST THEIR LEVERAGE. THE IRAQIS WILL BE UNWILLING TO ADMIT THE CONCEPT OF REPARATIONS, AND THEY WILL WANT RECONSTRUCTION FOR ONE SIDE TO BE BALANCED BY RECONSTRUCTION FOR THE OTHER. 6. IMPORTANT AS THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES ARE FOR IRAQ, THE MOST IMPORTANT, AND MOST ELUSIVE, IS AN ASSURANCE OF NONINTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, MEANING NONSUPPORT FOR THE KURDS AND THE SHI\'A. THE IRAQI MFA STRESSES TO DIPLOMATS THAT KHOMEINI\'S BREACH OF THIS SINGLE ISSUE IN THE ALGIERS ACCORD IS THE BASIS FOR IRAQI INSISTENCE THAT IRAN HAS (DE FACTO) ABROGATED THE AGREEMENT. IT WAS THE ASSURANCE OF NONINTERFERENCE THAT PROMPTED THE IRAQIS -- SADDAM HUSSEIN AS THE PARTY\'S VICE-CHARIMAN AND SA\'DUN HAMMADI AS FOREIGN MINISTER -- TO SWALLOW THEIR PRIDE IN 1975 AND AGREE TO GIVING UP FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT, SOMETHING THAT IRAQ, AND BEFORE IT THE OTTOMANS, HAD ALWAYS STRENUOUSLY INSISTED UPON. (IRAQ, UNLIKE IRAN, HAS ONLY A TINY COAST AND VIEWS THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES RIVER SYSTEMS AS ITS OWN, NOTE BY OC/T: (##) OMISSION IN TEXT CORRECTION TO FOLLOW... COMPLETELY NON-PERSIAN.) THE SHAH\'S AGREEMENT TO NONINTERFERENCE IN 1975 HAD A STUNNINGLY IMMEDIATE IMPACT -- MULLA MUSTAFA BARZANI FLED TO THE UNITED STATES WITHIN WEEKS AND THE SUDDEN WITHDRAWAL OF IRANIAN SUPPORT COMPLETELY DEVASTATED THE KURDISH INSURGENCY -- AND A SIMILAR RESULT WOULD PROBABLY OCCUR NOW. HOWEVER, WHILE THE PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME HAS BEEN EMPHASIZING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ALGIERS ACCORD TO THE SHATT AL-ARAB, IT HAS BREATHED NOTHING ABOUT ITS OWN PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION UNDER THE AGREEMENT. 7. ANOTHER GOAL -- PARTICULARLY TRICKY -- FOR IRAQ WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT INTERNATIONAL STRICTURES ON SUPPLY OF ARMS TO IRAN CONTINUE AND THAT WESTERN FLEETS CONTINUE IN PLACE IN THE GULF. IRAQ IS OBVIOUSLY NOT WELL-PLACED TO PRESSURE EXTERNAL POWERS. THE FACT MAY NOT BE LOST ON THE IRAQIS THAT THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL IS TO ENSURE THAT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR REMAINS IN THE HEADLINES OF THE WORLD MEDIA. UNFORTUNATELY, THE BEST WAY TO DO THAT IS TO OBSTRUCT THE GENEVA PROCESS AND, INDEED, TO RENEW HOSTILITIES. IRAQ WANTS TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO DO THIS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BECOME ISOLATED OR HAVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY POINT A FINGER DIRECTLY AT IRAQ AS THE CONTINUER OF THE WAR. 8. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LEDGER, IRANIAN OBJECTIVES AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM HERE, ARE VERY DIFFERENT FROM IRAQ\'S: -- THE IRANIANS HAVE THE CEASE-FIRE; THE TRICK FOR THEM NOW IS TO MAINTAIN IT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, GIVING AS LITTLE AWAY AS POSSIBLE; -- THEIR IDEA OF A \"COMPREHENSIVE PEACE\" IS SIMPLY A NONAGGRESSION PACT. IN MAHALLATI\'S MOST RECENT PRONOUNCEMENT (TEHRAN RADIO INTERVIEW AUGUST 20, FBIS NC2008073888) THE ONLY SPECIFIC POINT HE MEN- TIONED THAT IS TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE GENEVA TALKS IS \"STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN TO PREVENT RENEWED AGGRESSION.\" -- REASSERTION OF THE ALGIERS ACCORD ONLY IN REGARD TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT, I.E., BOUNDARY AT THE THALWEG, WITHOUT MAKING ANY COMMITMENTS ON NONINTER- FERENCE OR DEMARCATION OF BORDERS; -- INSISTENCE ON RIGHT TO INSPECT ALL VESSELS IN THE GULF AND TO CONFISCATE ALL WAR-RELATED MATERIEL, INCLUDING SEIZING WARSHIPS; -- VERDICT BY THE IMPARTIAL BODY (WHICH THE IRANIANS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE STACKED WITH PARTIES OF THEIR CHOOSING) COMPLETELY IN IRAN\'S FAVOR; -- MASIVE REPARATIONS ONLY TO IRAN; -- PERIOD OF QUIET IN WHICH THE WORLD FORGETS ABOUT IRAN AND IRAQ, THE WESTERN FLEETS GO HOME, STRICTURES ON ARMS DELIVERIES ARE LIFTED. 9. THE IRANIAN CONCEPT OF THE DIRECT TALKS AT GENEVA IS ALREADY BECOMING CLEAR. AS MUCH AS THE IRANIANS PURPORT TO BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS COMPLETELY ON THEIR SIDE, THEY DO NOT SUPPORT THE PLAIN LANGUAGE IN HIS AUGUST 8 LETTER, SENT IDENTICALLY TO BOTH TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD: \"BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED THAT DIRECT TALKS SHALL BE HELD UNDER MY AUSPICES TO REACH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 598.\" TO THE CONTRARY, IN THE IRANIAN VIEW (AGAIN, MAHALLATI\'S AUGUST 20 IN- TERVIEW), \"THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL HAS BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO INVITE BOTH SIDES TO TALK ONLY ABOUT ARTICLE 4 OF THE RESOLUTION, AND NOT THE TOPICS INCLUDED IN ARTICLES 1-8.\" ARTICLE 4 DEALS WITH \"ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES,\" I.E., THOSE NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN THE RESOLUTION. 10. ANOTHER ELEMENT CALLING FOR PESSIMISM ABOUT THE HARMONIOUS PROGRESS OF TALKS IN GENEVA IS IRAQ\'S DEEP DISTRUST OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR. WELL AWARE OF THIS DISTRUST, THE SYG MIGHT HAVE MOVED QUICKLY TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, BUT HE HAS NOT YET DONE SO, AND INSTEAD HE IS SEEN AS JEALOUSLY GUARDING LEADERSHIP OF THE PROCESS IN HIS OWN HANDS AND OF ONE SUBORDINATE, GIANNI PICCO (WHOM THE IRAQIS HAVE ALSO TAKEN A DISLIKE TO, APPARENTLY). RECRIMINATIONS ROSE TO A CRESCENDO DURING THE PAST WEEK, WITH THE IRAQIS BELIEVING THE SYG WAS ABOUT TO ANNOUNCE A FORESHADOWING OF HIS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO THE ALGIERS ACCORD. THE SYG HAS ALLOWED HIMSELF TO APPEAR TO BE ARGUING THE IRANIANS\' BRIEF, WITH INCALCULABLE DETRIMENT TO HIS STANDING AS AN IMPARTIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PROCESS. 11. INITIAL PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN GENEVA -- NOT TO MENTION SUBSTANCE -- ARE LIKELY TO BE DIFFICULT. THE IRAQIS WILL REACT SHARPLY TO ANY SUGGESTIONS ON PROCEDURE THAT APPEAR TO BE IMPOSED BY THE SYG. THEY WILL PROBABLY INSIST THAT EVEN THE MOST MUNDANE MATTERS OF PROCEDURE BE WORKED OUT DIRECTLY BY THE TWO PARTIES. THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT A PREARRANGED AGENDA -- IN THEIR EMPHASIS ON STRICT SEQUENTIALITY, THE IRAQIS HAVE SIGNALED THAT AN AGENDA IS NOT \"MERE\" PROCEDURE FOR THEM. 12. FOR DCM MARSH IN GENEVA: AN EXCELLENT CONTACT IN THE IRAQI DELEGATION WILL BE DR. RIYAD AL-QAYSI. (AMBASSADOR HAS AN APPOINTMENT WITH HIM THIS EVENING, AUGUST 23, JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.) HE HAS BEEN THE FOREMOST INTERNATIONAL JURIST IN THE IRAQI MFA FOR OVER A DECADE. WHILE OFFICIALLY HE IS DIRECTOR OF THE MFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OFFICE, HE HAS BEEN WORKING FULL TIME FOR OVER A YEAR ON BUILDING THE IRAQI LEGAL CASE FOR THE IMPARTIAL COMMITTEE (IF IT IS EVER ESTABLISHED) AND FOR ALL OTHER MATTERS IN 598; HE KNOWS EVERY ASPECT, DOWN TO THE SMALLEST DETAIL, OF THE CENTURIES- OLD BORDER/SHATT DISPUTE. QAYSI HAS A SHARP MIND AND IS AN ENGAGING INTERLOCUTOR, ALTHOUGH HE CAN BE OVERLY LEGALISTIC. AS DEPARTMENT HAS INFORMED YOU, THE IRAQI DELEGATION WILL ALSO INCLUDE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE KITTANI AND AMBASSADOR ANBARI. MFA HAS INFORMED US THAT ANBARI WAS ASSIGNED TO THE IRAQI DELEGATION BECAUSE OF HIS OWN LEGAL BACKGROUND (ANOTHER LAWYER -- THE IRAQIS WILL BE FULLY PREPARED TO BE STICKLERS, AS THE NEED ARISES). GLASPIE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	32,916
228	8/23/1988 13:05	88BAGHDAD4589	Embassy Baghdad	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	P 231305Z AUG 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7968 INFO GULFWAR COLLECTIVE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 04589 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ STRESSES NORMALCY WHILE WARNING IRAN 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: WHILE STILL CELEBRATING ITS \"VICTORY\" IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, IRAQ APPEARS BENT ON RETURNING TO NORMALCY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. EMPHASIS IS LAID ON BASRA\'S RESURRECTION AND THE RE-OPENING OF THE PORT OF UMM QASR. MEANWHILE, IRAQ DENIED THAT IRAN HAD SEARCHED AN IRAQI SHIP AND WARNED THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO DO SO WOULD BRING REPERCUSSIONS. END SUMMARY. 3. IRAQIS CELEBRATED THE OFFICIAL CEASEFIRE WITH AS MUCH ENTHUSIASM AS THEY DID THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE ON AUGUST 8, BUT WITHOUT THE WIDESPREAD DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS WHICH MARKED THE EARLIER CELE- BRATIONS. JUBILANT CROWDS SURGED THROUGH THE STREETS DURING THE EVENING HOURS OF AUGUST 19-21. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN ATTENDED A HUGE GOVERNMENT RALLY AT GREAT FESTIVITIES SQUARE IN BAGHDAD AUGUST 20; UNUSUALLY FOR HIM, HE PERMITTED A THRONG OF THOUSANDS TO CONVERGE ON HIM. ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT, HE DECLARED AUGUST 21 A NATIONAL HOLIDAY. THE MEDIA REPORTED THAT \"TENS OF THOUSANDS\" OF PILGRIMS RENEWED THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO SADDAM ON VISITS DURING THE SHI\'A HOLY DAY OF ASHURA (AUGUST 22) TO THE \"SHRINE OF SADDAM\'S GREAT ANCESTOR\" THE IMAM HUSAYN,. IN THE SHI\'A HOLY CITY OF KARBALA. (ONE SHI\'A PILGRIM TO KARBALA TELLS US, HOWEVER, THAT REVERENCE TO SADDAM HAD NO PART AT ALL IN THIS YEAR\'S ASHURA CELEBRATION.) 4. AS THE CELEBRATIONS CONTINUED, THE IRAQIS OPENED THE AIRPORT AT BASRA TO CIVILIAN AIR TRAFFIC AUGUST 20, AND RE-OPENED THE PORTS OF UMM QASR AND KHOR AL-ZUBAIR TO MERCHANT SHIPPING. REPORTS IN BAGHDAD CLAIM BASRA HAS BEEN GIVEN FIRST CALL ON WHATEVER IS NEEDED TO RETURN THE TOWN TO ITS PREWAR CONDITION AND ITS STATUS AS IRAQ\'S SECOND LARGEST CITY. MOST OF BASRA\'S POPULATION, HALF OF WHICH FLED THE CITY DURING THE WAR, HAS NOW RETURNED. NOW, PAINT AND BUILDING MATERIALS ARE REPORTEDLY BEING DIVERTED THERE TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT SHORTAGES ARE FEARED ELSEWHERE IN IRAQ. GULF AIR, OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF BAHRAIN, QATAR, OMAN, AND ABU DHABI, ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD RESUME SERVICE TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN. 5. IRAQ\'S NAVAL COMMANDER DENIED THAT IRAN HAD SEARCHED AN IRAQI MERCHANT VESSEL IN THE GULF AUGUST 20, AND CLAIMED THAT IRANIANS HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO BOARD THE IRAQI SHIP. THE IRANIANS SENT A HELICOPTER GUNSHIP TO HOVER ABOVE THE VESSEL WHILE AN IRANIAN NAVAL SHIP SHADOWED IT, HE SAID. THE COMMANDER DECLARED THAT IRAQ WAS DETERMINED TO EXERCISE FULLY ITS RIGHTS TO FREE NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, AND WOULD COUNTER ANY IRANIAN MOVE WHICH INTERFERED WITH THESE RIGHTS. GLASPIE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	33,213
229	8/24/1988 13:12	88BAGHDAD4620	Embassy Baghdad	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	P 241312Z AUG 88 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7976 GULFWAR COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY MADRID AMEMBASSY PARIS ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 04620 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, IZ SUBJECT: \"THE GREAT SATAN NO LONGER A SATAN\" 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: IRAQ HAS CONTINUED TO WARN AGAINST COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD TRY TO \"DEPRIVE IRAQ OF ITS VICTORY\" AND REGAIN THEIR LOST INPLUENCE IN IRAN. REFLECTING IRAQI FEARS OF A U.S.-IRANIAN RAPPROCHE- MENT, THE WARNINGS QUOTE FOREIGN PRESS REPORTS THAT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN IS BEING REFURBISHED AND NOTE THAT \"NO ONE IN TEHRAN CURSES THE ARCH SATAN ANY LONGER.\" END SUMMARY. 3. IRAQI MEDIA AUGUST 22, GAVE PROMINENT COVERAGE TO REPORTS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE MADRID NEWSPAPER EL PAIS AND THE PARIS WEEKLY EXPRESS, THAT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY BUILDINGS IN TEHRAN ARE BEING REFURBISHED. EXPRESS IS QUOTED THAT THE IRANIAN REGIME INTENDS TO VINDICATE THE \"GREAT SATAN,\" WHILE EL PAIS IS REPORTEDLY MORE EXPLICIT, DECLARING THAT IRAN IS MOVING QUICKLY TO REESTAB- LISH RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. EL PAIS\'S TEHRAN CORRESPONDENT REPORTS THAT PREPARATIONS WERE UNDERWAY AT THE U.S. EMBASSY TO REINSTATE NORMAL ACTIVITIES. 4. ALSO ON AUGUST 22, THE MAIN EDITORIAL IN BOTH THE BA\'TH PARTY AND GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPERS (THAWRA AND JUMHURIYA) WARNED THAT UNNAMED POWERS ARE \"MANEUVERING TO DEPRIVE IRAQ OF ITS VICTORY.\" THESE POWERS ARE ACCUSED OF TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE UPCOMING NEGOTIA- TIONS TO REGAIN THEIR LOST INFLUENCE IN IRAN. A SIMILAR EDITORIAL IN THAWRA ON AUGUST 21 CLAIMED THAT \"NO ONE IN THE CAPITALS OF THESE STATES ANY LONGER CONDEMNS IRANIAN STATE TERRORISM OR IRANIAN EXTORTION THROUGH HOLDING HOSTAGES. AT THE SAME TIME, NO ONE IN TEHRAN CURSES OR REMEMBERS THE ARCH SATAN ANY LONGER\" (FBIS JN2108072288). 5. COMMENT: THE IRAQIS\' FEAR OF U.S.-IRAN RAPPROACHE- MENT HAS BEEN REFLECTED MORE PROMINENTLY IN THE PAST WEEK\'S MEDIA THAN PREVIOUSLY. WE WOULD ASSUME SADDAM GAVE A SIGNAL OF CONCERN TO HIS INFORMATION MINISTER JASIM, WHO HAS ALWAYS BEEN READY TO ABUSE THE UNITED STATES. WHAT IS NOT CLEAR TO US IS WHAT THE U.S. HAS DONE, SINCE THE TALABANI AFFAIR AT LEAST, THAT WOULD HAVE SPURRED THIS CONCERN. GLASPIE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	33,283
230	8/25/1988 17:03	88ROME19700	Embassy Rome	UNCLASSIFIED	[]	R 251703Z AUG 88 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3560 INFO GULF WAR COLLECTIVE ","UNCLAS ROME 19700 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PREL IR IZ IT SUBJECT: GUILT FOR THE GULF WAR: IRAQ PAYS FOR AD TO GIVE ITS SIDE 1. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT PAID FOR A HALF-PAGE ADVERTISEMENT WHICH APPEARED IN THE AUGUST 25 ISSUE OF ROME\'S CENTRIST \"IL MESSAGGERO.\" ENTITLED \"IRAN-IRAQ: WHO STARTED THE WAR,\" THE IRAQI AD DETAILS \"A SERIES OF (IRANIAN) VIOLATIONS AND MILITARY AGGRESSIONS\" AGAINST IRAQ IN 1979 AND 1980, LEADING UP TO SEPTEMBER 22, 1980, WHEN IRAQ \"WAS FORCED TO EXERCISE ITS RIGHT TO LEGITIMATE DEFENSE.\" THE IRAQI STATEMENT STRESSES THAT, DESPITE IRAQ\'S \"FAVORABLE ACCEPTANCE\" OF KHOMEINI\'S REGIME, IRAN \"CLAIMED\" ITS RIGHT TO \"EXPORT\" THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION \"WITH THE USE OF FORCE,\" SELECTING IRAQ AS ITS FIRST TARGET. IRAN, THE IRAQIS CLAIM, \"INSTIGATED\" CIVIL UNREST IN IRAQ, HOSTED AND AIDED BARZANI\'S IRAQI-KURDISH OPPOSITION GROUP, UNILATERALLY BACKED OUT OF THE IRAN/IRAQ 1975 ACCORD ON THE SHATT-EL-ARAB, AND CARRIED OUT A SERIES OF ATTACKS AGAINST IRAQI TERRITORY. 2. COMMENT: WITH THE DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ SET TO GET UNDERWAY IN GENEVA IT LOOKS LIKE THE IRAQIS ARE AT LAST TRYING TO PUT OUT THEIR SIDE OF THE STORY ON THE WAR\'S ORIGINS. RABB "	Success: CSV parsed	null	33,344
231	9/1/1988 8:01	88AMMAN10345	Embassy Amman	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	R 010801Z SEP 88 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1460 INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE ","C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 10345 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: KPAL, PGOV, PREL, JO, IS SUBJECT: PLO AND THE INTIFADA 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: DURING A COURTESY CALL ON THE CHARGE AUGUST 29, RATIB AMAR OF THE MFA\'S DEPARTMENT OF PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, DERIDED THE \"INCOMPETENCE\" OF THE PLO AND SAID THAT THE ORGANIZATION WAS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING DISUNITY AND TENSIONS WITHIN THE VARIOUS PALESTINIAN GROUPS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE OUTLINED IN SOME DETAIL DEVELOPMENTS AMONG THOSE GROUPS. AMAR ADDED THAT THE IDF LACKED DISCIPLINE AND WAS NOT ADEPT AT PUTTING DOWN DISTURBANCES. END SUMMARY. 3. RATIB AMAR, A RETIRED ARMY OFFICER AND, ACCORDING TO SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES, NOW THE GID\'S (THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT) POINT-MAN IN THE MFA\'S DEPARTMENT OF PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS (FORMERLY THE MINISTRY OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AFFAIRS), CALLED ON THE CHARGE AUGUST 29. AMAR, WHO HIMSELF IS FROM NEAR HEBRON, MADE NO ATTEMPT TO HIDE HIS DISDAIN FOR THE PLO. HIS BRIEF INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING POINTS: -- THE PLO FACES A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO SHOULDER ITS RESPONSIBILITY, I.E. DECLARE A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PROVIDE SERVICES TO PALESTINIANS. IF PAST EXPERIENCE IS ANY INDICATION, IT WILL LET THE OPPORTUNITY SLIP. (HE EXPECTS THAT WHEN THE PLO FAILS, ITS LEADERSHIP WILL BE DESTROYED FROM WITHIN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES -- BUT THE INSIDERS WILL BE RADICALS.) -- THE PLO LEADERSHIP IS UNABLE TO COORDINATE RESISTANCE ACTIVITY AND ITS INCOMPETENCE HAS CREATED SCHISMS AND SPLITS WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION. THE ISRAELIS, AFTER A BUNGLING START, ARE LEARNING HOW TO EXPLOIT THESE SPLITS. FOR EXAMPLE, ISRAELI-SPONSORED LEAFLETS ARE BEGINNING TO APPEAR IN THE NAME OF THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP. -- THE EMERGENCE OF HAMAS (WHICH INCLUDES ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS) IS A DANGEROUS TREND. CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS HAVE LIVED PEACEFULLY TOGETHER IN THE WEST BANK, BUT THE RELIGIOUS FERVOR OF HAMAS COULD DISRUPT THIS HARMONY. -- THE EMERGENCE OF HAMAS HAS PROVOKED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A \"CHRISTIAN-RESISTANCE MOVEMENT\" (HAMAM) WHICH IS NOW ACTIVE IN CHRISTIAN AREAS SUCH AS BETHLEHEM AND RAMALLAH. -- THE COMMUNISTS ARE ALSO INDEPENDENTLY ACTIVE IN THE NORTH, JERUSALEM, AND THE CHRISTIAN AREAS AS WELL. THE PLO HAS BOTCHED ITS ROLE OF COORDINATING THE RESISTANCE. -- THE PLO WILL BE UNABLE TO FILL THE VACUUM LEFT BY JORDANIAN WITHDRAWAL. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WILL SUFFER SINCE JORDAN NO LONGER PROVIDES NEEDED SERVICES. 4. AMAR, A RETIRED INFANTRY BRIGADIER, WAS ALSO CRITICAL OF THE IDF. ACCORDING TO AMAR, THE IDF HAS MISHANDLED THE DISTURBANCES BY USING WRONG TACTICS AND EQUIPMENT. AMAR CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD HAVE STAMPED OUT A SIMILAR DISTURBANCE MUCH SOONER. THE JOB CALLS FOR POLICE, NOT SOLDIERS, HE SAID. AS A FORMER ARMY OFFICER, AMAR WAS PARTICULARLY UNIMPRESSED WITH THE LACK OF DISCIPLINE AMONG ISRAELI SOLDIERS. HE SAID THAT THE SLOVENLY APPEARANCE OF IDF SOLDIERS NOT ONLY DOES NOT INSPIRE ANY RESPECT AMONG THE POPULATION BUT IN FACT ENCOURAGES FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS. AMAR SAID THAT THE ISRAELI ARMY -- ORGANIZED FOR WAR -- HAS BEEN SENT ON A MISSION THAT SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR THE POLICE. THE EFFECT WILL BE TO REDUCE THE IDF\'S CAPABILITY AS WELL. 5. COMMENT: AMAR IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF LABOR MINISTER DUDIN (FORMER MINISTER OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AFFAIRS). AMAR\'S PAST CREDENTIALS LEND CREDIBILITY TO HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. HOWEVER, WE ARE A LITTLE SURPRISED AT THIS UNSOLICITED BRIEFING (FOR THAT IT WAS) BY A SENIOR GOJ OFFICIAL. THEROS "	Success: CSV parsed	null	33,381
232	9/1/1988 13:45	88IZMIR740	Consulate Izmir	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88ANKARA10958", "88IZMIR710" ]	R 011345Z SEP 88 FM AMCONSUL IZMIR TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7559 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL AMCONSUL ADANA ","C O N F I D E N T I A L IZMIR 00740 E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PTER. TU SUBJECT: ARREST OF PKK MEMBERS IN IZMIR REFS: (A) ANKARA 10958, (B) IZMIR 710 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE IZMIR STATE SECURITY COURT, HULUSI OGUTCU, TOLD POL/ECONOFF AND VISITING DESK OFFICER HUGGINS ON AUGUST 31 THAT IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT\'S VIEW THAT THE ARRESTS REPORTED IN REFTELS HAD CLEARED THE PROBLEM OF POTENTIAL PKK ACTIVITY IN TOURIST AREAS OF THE AEGEAN. HE SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MORE DANGER IN CITIES LIKE IZMIR OR ANTALYA TO TOURIST FACILITIES. OGUTCU ALSO SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT TOOK MORE SERIOUSLY THE PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES OF WHICH THESE 9 PERSONS STAND ACCUSED THAN THE BOMB WHICH THEY REPORTEDLY SET, PARTICULARLY AS THE BOMBS WERE INEFFECTIVE AND HAVE CAUSED NO DEATHS. 3. (COMMENT: WHILE OGUTCU COULD BE ON AN OFFICIAL LEVEL EXPECTED TO TAKE A VIEW THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER PROBLEMS, WE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE MAY BELIEVE IT. IF SO, THE VIEW CERTAINLY SEEMS OVER OPTIMISTIC TO US, IN VIEW OF THE RESERVE OF MANPOWER IN THE EAST WHICH THE PKK COULD USE IF IT IS REALLY PLANNING A CAMPAIGN TO DISRUPT TURKEY\'S TOURIST INDUSTRY. ON THE OTHER HAND, SINCE THE THREATS AGAINST TOURISM WERE MADE BY A SPLINTER GROUP,IT MAY BE THAT THE POLICE FEEL CONFIDENT THEY HAVE CAPTURED ALL THAT GROUP\'S LOYALISTS.) 4. OGUTCU RECENTLY MOVED INTO HIS POST AFTER FOUR YEARS IN A SIMILAR POST IN DIYARBAKIR. CERTAINLY, AS HE POINTED OUT HIMSELF, PKK ACTIVITY IN IZMIR AND THE AEGEAN AREA IS MINUSCULE COMPARED TO THAT IN THE EAST. 5. WE WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO DEVELOP INFORMATION ON THIS TOPIC FROM OTHER CONTACTS. WILLIAMS "	Success: CSV parsed	null	33,476
233	9/1/1988 23:57	88BEIJING25961	Embassy Beijing	UNCLASSIFIED	[]	LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION EB-00 INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01 NSAE-00 COME-00 L-03 EAP-00 FAAE-00 DOTE-00 STR-17 INRE-00 OCS-06 CA-02 USIE-00 JUSE-00 DS-01 E-01 /041 W R 012357Z SEP 88 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8448 AMEMBASSY ULAANBATAAR POUCH) INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMCONSUL SHANGHAI AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU AMCONSUL CHENGDU AMCONSUL SHENYANG ","UNCLASSIFIED BEIJING 25961 The original message was classified Limited Official Use E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: EAIR, CH, MG, OTRA, ATRN SUBJECT: CIVAIR: AIR MONGOLIA - THE \"DO IT YOURSELF\" - AIRLINE 1. SUMMARY: THE RECENTLY INAUGURATED WEEKLY AIR MONGOLIA NON-STOP SERVICE BETWEEN ULAANBATAAR (U-B) AND BEIJING APPEARED TO US, AT FIRST BLUSH, TO BE SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF MANNA FROM HEAVEN. PRIOR TO THE EXISTENCE OF THIS FLIGHT, TRAVEL BETWEEN BEIJING AND U-B REQUIRED A 36 HOUR (ONE-WAY) TRAIN RIDE. THE EMBASSY\'S EFFORTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS FLIGHT, BOTH IN SUPPORT OF EMBASSY U-B AND TO FACILITATE TRAVEL OF DELEGATIONS TO U-B, HAVE ACHIEVED MIXED RESULTS, AT BEST. WE CANVASSED LOCAL AMMRICAN BUSINESSMEN TO FIND THAT THEY TOO REGARD THE FLIGHT WITH SOME TREPIDATION. A TELEPHONE CALL TO THE MONGOLIAN EMBASSY IN BEIJING REVEALED THAT ALTHOUGH THEIR AMBASSADOR MOONLIGHTS AS THE AIR MONGOLIA REPRESENTATIVE, HE IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR COMMENT ON THE AIR SERVICE. END SUMMARY. 2. IN EARLY JUNE THE EMBASSY ATTEMPTED TO DESPATCH OUR FIRST OFFICIAL TRAVELER, THE RSO, VIA AIR MONGOLIA TO U-B ON A POUCH RUN. THE RSO ARRIVED AT BEIJING AIRPORT OVER TWO HOURS AHEAD OF THE SCHEDULED DEPARTURE TIME. UNABLE TO FIND ANYONE TO CHECK HIS LUGGAGE THROUGH TO U-B, THE RSO MANAGED TO OBTAIN A BOARDING PASS AND PROCEEDED TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTURE AREA. HE WAS ASSURED THAT HE WOULD BE CALLED WHEN THE FLIGHT WAS READY TO DEPART. IN THE WAITING LOUNGE, THE RSO ENCOUNTERED SEVERAL TOURISTS ALSO WAITING FOR THE FLIGHT TO U-B, AND THE GROUP DECIDED TO WAIT TOGETHER. AS THE DEPARTURE TIME APPROACHED, THE RSO BECAME CONCERNED AND MADE INQUIRIES OF THE AIRPORT STAFF; HE WAS TOLD THAT THE PLANE WOULD TAKE OFF \"SOON\". ALMOST AN HOUR AFTER THE DEPARTURE TIME, THE RSO AGAIN ASKED ABOUT THE FLIGHT; HE WAS INFORMED THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD ALREADY TAKEN OFF WITHOUT PASSENGERS OR CARGO. THE TOWER TRIED TO CALL THE PLANE BACK WITHOUT SUCCESS; IT WAS ONLY LATER WHEN FACILITATING THE TRAVEL OF TWO DELEGATIONS TO U-B IN AUGUST THAT WE BEGAN TO UNDERSTAND SOME OF THE PROBLEMS FACING AIR MONGOLIA. 3. ON AUGUST 22, TWO EMBASSY ECON OFFICERS ACCOMPANIED CODEL DORNAN AND STAFFDEL OLIN TO CAPITAL AIRPORT TO ASSIST THEM IN CHECK-IN AND BOARDING FOR AIR MONGOLIA (OM) FLIGHT 152 TO U-B. ALTHOUGH MOST AIRPORT PERSONNEL REPLIED ONLY WITH QUIZZICAL LOOKS WHEN ASKED WHERE TO BOARD THE FLIGHT TO MONGOLIA, ECONOFFS WERE ABLE TO FIND THE DESIGNATED DEPARTURE GATE (RIGHT NEXT TO A FLIGHT TO PYONGYANG) WELL BEFORE THE SCHEDULED 17:10 DEPARTURE TIME. (THERE WAS A BRIEF HOLD-UP WHEN AIRPORT PERSONNEL DISCOVERED THAT THEY HAD GIVEN THE CODEL AND STAFFDEL BOARDING PASSES FOR THE NORTH KOREAN AIRLINES FLIGHT TO PYONGYANG, BUT THIS WAS QUICKLY RESOLVED.) HOWEVER, AS 17:10 CAME AND WENT, THERE WAS NO SIGN OF EITHER THE AIR MONGOLIA PLANE OR ITS FLIGHT CREW. AFTER ASKING THE AIRPORT PERSONNEL ABOUT THE STATUS OF FLIGHT OM 152, WE WERE TOLD THAT IT HAD JUST BEEN CANCELLED. NO REASON WAS GIVEN FOR THE CANCELLATION AND ECONOFFS WERE NOT ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE PLANE HAD ACTUALLY ARRIVED FROM MONGOLIA. THE ONLY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN WERE TO TRY AGAIN TOMORROW AT 9:00. 4. BY THIS TIME, THE TWO DELEGATIONS HAD MET THE ONLY OTHER PASSENGERS WAITING FOR OM 152, FOUR AMERICAN BIG GAME HUNTERS GOING TO MONGOLIA FOR SHEEP HUNTING. NO ONE IN THE HUNTING GROUP SPOKE CHINESE, SO THEY JOINED UP WITH THE EMBASSY GROUP AND STARTED THE PROCESS OF LEAVING THE AIRPORT. SINCE EVERYONE HAD ALREADY BEEN STAMPED OUT OF CHINESE EMIGRATION, THEY HAD TO HAVE THEIR EXIT STAMPS CANCELLED. THE GROUPS\' EFFORTS TO RECOVER THEIR LUGGAGE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, AS AIRPORT PERSONNEL TOLD THE GROUPS, \"YOU DON\'T NEED IT\". 5. AT 8:00 ON AUGUST 23, ECONOFF AGAIN HAD THE TWO DELEGATIONS AT THE DESIGNATED GATE READY TO DEPART ON FLIGHT OM 152. IN ADDITION TO THE TWO DELEGATIONS AND THE AMERICAN BIG GAME HUNTERS, THERE WERE ALSO ABOUT 10 JAPANESE TOURISTS WAITING FOR THE PLANE. (HOW DID THEY KNOW NOT TO SHOW UP FOR THE FLIGHT THE DAY BEFORE?) AIRPORT PERSONNEL ASSURED THE GROUP THAT THE FLIGHT HAD NOT YET ARRIVED FROM U-B, BUT WAS STILL EXPECTED TO DEPART AT 9:00. THE GROUP CALMLY WAITED. 6. AS 9:00 CAME AND WENT, ECONOFF STARTED TO PANIC. REMEMBERING EMBASSY RSO\'S STORY, HE FEARED THAT THE TWO DELEGATIONS WOULD BE STRANDED. AT ABOUT THIS TIME, STAFFDEL OLIN AND ONE OF THE JAPANESE TOURISTS SPOTTED A SMALL TWIN ENGINE PLAN ON THE FAR SIDE OF THE TARMAC. AS NO ONE WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY THIS PLANE AND THE AIRPORT PERSONNEL DENIED ITS EXISTENCE, ECONOFF DECIDED THE PLANE WAS PROBABLY OM 152, PREPARING FOR DEPARTURE. EXERCISING THE PRIVILEGES OF THE EMBASSY\'S AIRPORT PASS, HE WALKED ACROSS THE TARMAC TO THE PLANE. THE PLANE, AN AN-24/PB, WAS THE AIR MONGOLIA FLIGHT. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH THE MONGOLIAN FLIGHT CREW, ECONOFF DISCOVERED THAT THEY SPOKE NEITHER OF HIS LANGUAGES - CHINESE OR ENGLISH - ONLY RUSSIAN AND MONGOLIAN. HOWEVER, THROUGH GESTURES AND NODS, ECONOFF WAS ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THE PILOT WAS WAITING ON FUEL, PASSENGERS, AND BAGGAGE. BECAUSE THE MONGOLIANS COULD NOT COMMUNICATE WITH THE AIRPORT PERSONNEL, THEY DID NOT KNOW HOW TO GET ANY OF THESE. 7. AS EVERYTHING WAS RUNNING LATE AND THE MONGOLIANS SEEMED TO HAVE NO IDEA HOW TO GET WHAT THEY NEEDED, ECONOFF BORROWED THE BICYCLE OF ONE THE CHINESE AIRPORT STAFF AND WENT IN SEARCH OF FUEL, PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE. FUEL WAS RELATIVELY EASILY FOUND AND DELIVERED TO THE PLANE. A BUS TO TRANSPORT PASSENGERS WAS MORE DIFFICULT. SINCE THE CHINESE AIRPORT PERSONNEL CONTINUED TO DENY THE EXISTENCE OF THE MONGOLIAN PLANE, THEY SAW NO REASON TO SEND A VEHICLE TO TRANSPORT THE PASSENGERS TO THE PLANE. AFTER A SHORT ARGUMENT AND ANOTHER BIKE RIDE ACROSS THE TARMAC, ECONOFF WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THE AIRPORT STAFF THAT THE PLANE HAD ARRIVED AND THAT THE PASSENGERS SHOULD BE SENT OUT. AFTER A SLIGHTLY LONGER DISCUSSION THE AIRPORT STAFF AGREED TO SEARCH FOR THE BAGGAGE FOR THE PLANE. 8. EVENTUALLY, ABOUT 17 HOURS BEHIND SCHEDULE, ECONOFF (ON A BIKE) AND DELEGATIONS (IN A BUS) ARRIVED AT THE FUELED-UP PLANE. THE BAGGAGE ARRIVED SHORTLY AFTER. A SHORT ARGUMENT BROKE OUT BETWEEN THE MONGOLIAN FLIGHT CREW AND THE CHINESE BAGGAGE HANDLERS; BUT, SINCE THE MONGOLIANS SPOKE ONLY IN MONGOLIAN AND RUSSIAN AND THE CHINESE ONLY IN CHINESE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHAT WAS DISCUSSED. FINALLY, AT 10:25, FLIGHT OM 152 TOOK OFF FOR U-B. (ONE OF THE TRAVELERS LATER REPORTED THAT IN-FLIGHT SERVICE CONSISTED OF A STEWARDESS IN BLACK FISHNET STOCKINGS, A CHOICE OF BAD WINE OR VODKA, AND AN ANNOUNCEMENT -- SOMEWHERE DURING THE MIDDLE OF THE CIRCA TWO HOUR FLIGHT -- THAT THE PLANE WAS \"SEVEN MINUTES FROM THE MONGOLIAN BORDER\".) 9. OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN WHO ATTEMPTED TO FLY OR TO SHIP CARGO VIA AIR MONGOLIA TO U-B, THOSE WHO DISCUSSED THEIR EFFORTS WITH THE EMBASSY REPORTED A ONE HUNDRED PERCENT FAILURE RATE. CARGO, IN PARTICULAR, SEEMS TO BE DIFFICULT TO SHIP TO U-B. THE MONGOLIAN FLIGHT CREWS CANNOT READ THE ENGLISH/CHINESE CARGO MANIFESTS AND FREQUENTLY REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE BILLS OF LADING; THEY ARE UNABLE TO ASCERTAIN FROM THE CHINESE (DUE TO THE AFOREMENTIONED LANGUAGE BARRIER) WHETHER THERE IS CARGO TO BE SHIPPED; OR THE CHINESE REFUSE TO LOAD THE CARGO (ACCORDING TO ONE U.S. BUSINESSMAN) UNTIL AIR MONGOLIA PAYS SOME OF ITS LANDING AND GROUND HANDLING BILLS. THE SAME BUSINESSMAN COMMENTED THAT IN HIS (ADMITTEDLY BRIEF) EXPERIENCE, IT IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR AIR MONGOLIA TO DROP OFF PASSENGERS FOR BEIJING AND IMMEDIATELY TAKE OFF AGAIN (WITHOUT A RETURN LOAD) IN ORDER TO AVOID CHINESE AIRPORT OFFICIALS WITH DUNNING NOTICES. 10. ECONOFF CONTACTED THE MONGOLIAN EMBASSY TO LEARN THEIR SIDE OF THE STORY AND TO REQUEST A BRIEFING ON THE STATUS OF THE MONGOLIA-PRC CIVIL AIR TREATY. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, THE MONGOLIAN EMBASSY OFFICER ADMITTED THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR ALSO SERVED (CLEARLY, IN HIS SPARE TIME) AS THE AIR MONGOLIA REPRESENTATIVE IN BEIJING, BUT WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR COMMENT ON THE AIR SERVICE. THE MONGOLIAN DIPLOMAT SAID THAT HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE EXISTENCE OF A CIVIL AIR TREATY BETWEEN MONGOLIA AND THE PRC, BUT WOULD BE HAPPY TO INVESTIGATE AND ADVISE FURTHER. HE FINALLY REFERRED ALL OF ECONOFF\'S QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE AIR SERVICE TO THE MAIN OFFICE OF THE CIVIL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA (CAAC) WHICH SERVES AS AIR MONGOLIA\'S AGENT IN CHINA. LORD LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NNNN "	Success: CSV parsed	null	33,528
234	9/6/1988 16:25	88CAIRO21161	Embassy Cairo	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88CAIRO20169" ]	R 061625Z SEP 88 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9331 INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMCONSUL JERUSALEM AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY TUNIS USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL DIA WASHDC ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 21161 LONDON FOR MILLIKEN, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PINS, SOCI, EG SUBJECT: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD - \"JIHAD\" FRICTIONS REF: (NOTAL) CAIRO 20169 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. - 2. SUMMARY: TENSIONS SIMMERING BETWEEN THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (MB) AND A MORE EXTREME GROUP ERUPTED INTO A BLOODY CLASH IN ASSYUT IN LATE JULY. (THE EXTREMISTS WERE IDENTIFIED BOTH AS \"AL-JIHAD\" AND AS \"AL-GAMA\'A AL-ISLAMIYA\", OR THE ISLAMIC GROUPING, SINGULAR.) THE INTRA-ISLAMIC VIOLENCE IN ASSYUT PROVOKED SHAME AMONG SOME ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND REVULSION AMONG THE PUBLIC AT LARGE. THE CLASH APPEARED TO BE MOSTLY A CASE OF YOUTHFUL THUGGERY, MIXED WITH A FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCE OVER THE ACCEPTABILITY OF WORKING WITHIN A NON-ISLAMIC SYSTEM TO BRING ABOUT ISLAMIC GOALS. THOUGH THE MB SUPREME GUIDE AND ONE LEADER OF THE EXTREMISTS PERSONALLY CAME TO A PEACEFUL UNDERSTANDING, THEY MANAGED BARELY TO PAPER OVER THE CONTINUING FRICTIONS, BASED ON MUTUALLY HOSTILE PERCEPTIONS: THE MB REGARD THE \"JIHADISTS\" AS ERRANT AND IGNORANT YOUTH AT BEST, WHILE THE LATTER CHARGE THE MB WITH COWARDICE AND \"FORBIDDEN\" COLLABORATION WITH THE SECULAR STATE. MEANWHILE, THE INCIDENT HAS EXPOSED AN APPARENT RIVALRY BETWEEN THE MB AND THE JIHAD FOR LEADERSHIP OF \"AL-GAMA\'A AL ISLAMIYA\". END SUMMARY. - 3. ACCORDING TO UNUSUALLY WELL-DONE PRESS ACCOUNTS (SEE LAST PARA), THE MB AND THE EXTREMIST \"JIHAD\" GROUP (OFTEN IDENTIFIED BY THE PRESS AS \"AL-GAMA\'A AL-ISLAMIYA\", OF WHICH AL-JIHAD, HOWEVER, PROBABLY IS JUST ONE CONSTITUENT PART) HAD BEEN CIRCULATING LEAFLETS AGAINST EACH OTHER OVER SOME NINE MONTHS IN THE UPPER EGYPTIAN PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF ASSYUT. HANDBILLS SIGNED \"AL-GAMA\'A AL-ISLAMIYA\" CHARGED THE MB ARE COWARDS, WHO USED TO ATTACK MINOR OFFICIALS, AND THEN DENIED THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATTACKS (IN CONTRAST TO THE JIHAD, WHICH STOOD UP FOR ITS ASSASSINATION OF SADAT). THEY CHARGED THAT THE MB \"HATE TO SEE \'ISLAM\' EMERGE, EXCEPT FROM THEIR THROATS.\" IT CALLED THEM \"TRAINED CIRCUS LIONS\" FOR ENTERING THE PEOPLE\'S ASSEMBLY, THEREBY COLLABORATING WITH A GOVERNMENT SEEN AS ISLAMICALLY ILLEGITIMATE. IN TURN, THE MB\'S LEAFLETS INSULTINGLY DISMISSED AL-JIHAD\", AND ITS PRETENSIONS TO LEADERSHIP OF AL-GAMA\'A AL-ISLAMIYA, AS \"LITTLE ONES. . . WHO HAS LED THEM ASTRAY?\" - 4. AT LAST MAY\'S FEAST OF \'EID AL-FITR, THE PAMPHLETEERING RACHETED UP TO A \"WAR OF THE POSTERS\", AS EACH SIDE PLASTERED OVER ITS RIVAL\'S ANNOUNCEMENTS OF UPCOMING HOLIDAY PRAYER MEETINGS. THE POSTER WAR WAS RENEWED A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE LARGER FEAST OF THE SACRIFICE (JULY 24-25). AROUND THE SAME TIME, GANGS OF MB AND JIHADISTS REPORTEDLY USED MACHO INTIMIDATION TECHNIQUES REMINISCENT OF WEST SIDE STORY, INCLUDING MOTORCYCLE-MOUNTED MB YOUTHS AND SWITCHBLADE-WIELDING JIHADISTS. AN MB LEADER TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT THE JIHADISTS PROVOKED THE CULMINATING RUMBLE OF JULY 23 BY CLAIMING \"OUR (JIHADIST) WOMEN HAVE MORE VIRILITY THAN THEIR (MB) MEN.\" IN UPPER EGYPT, THOSE ARE FIGHTING WORDS THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED. - 5. ACCORDING TO THE INVESTIGATIVE PRESS REPORTS, VIOLENCE FINALLY BROKE OUT ON THE EVE OF THE FEAST OF THE SACRIFICE, AS MB YOUTHS WERE PREPARING SWEETS FOR CHILDRENS\' HOLIDAY GIFTS IN THEIR MOSQUE OF SHALNAB. MORE THAN 150 YOUTHS OF THE GAMA\'A SEALED OFF THE STREET, AND SHOUTED TO BYSTANDERS THAT \"POLICE\" INSIDE THE MOSQUE WERE PREVENTING PEOPLE FROM ENTERING TO PRAY. THEN THEY INVADED THE MOSQUE, AND OVER THE COURSE OF ABOUT 30 MINUTES DESTROYED ITS FURNITURE AND WINDOWS, KNIFING THE YOUTHS INSIDE AND BEATING THEM WITH CHAINS. 13 MB AND BYSTANDERS WERE INJURED. THE ATTACKERS FLED BEFORE POLICE ARRIVED BUT SEVEN WERE LATER ARRESTED, ACCORDING TO POLICE RECORDS REPORTED BY THE PRESS. ONE NEUTRAL BYSTANDER TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT HE HAD NEVER SEEN SUCH VIOLENCE IN HIS LIFE -- \"EVEN THE JEWS AND NASSERISTS COULD NOT DO ANYTHING LIKE THIS\|\" THE LOCAL POLICE PASSED UP THE OPPORTUNITY TO GLOAT, TELLING REPORTERS ONLY THAT \"IT IS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF (PUBLIC) SECURITY THAT THERE BE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MB AND THE JIHAD.\" - 6. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE CLASH THE MB LEADERSHIP REJECTED RECONCILIATION INITIATIVES BY \"AL-GAMA\'IYA AL-SHAR\'IYA\", WIDELY-KNOWN AS AN OFFICIALLY-REGISTERED AND ESTABLISHMENTARIAN GROUPING OF SOME 2,000 MOSQUES ENGAGED IN SOCIAL SERVICES. THE FOLLOWING WEEK, HOWEVER, DR. \'OMAR \'ABDURRAHMAN, IDENTIFIED IN THE SYMPATHETIC RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION PRESS AS \"AMIR (PRINCE) OF AL-GAMA\'A AL-ISLAMIYA,\" SPOKE FROM SAUDI ARABIA BY PHONE WITH MB SUPREME GUIDE ABUL NASR. ACCORDING TO THE \"SPOKESMAN\" OF THE GAMA\'A, DR. \'ALA\' MOHI AL-DIN, \'ABDURRAHMAN ORDERED THE GROUP TO SHOW \"SELF DISCIPLINE\". OTHER LEADING RADICAL RELIGIOUS FIGURES, INCLUDING ALEXANDRIA\'S AHMED AL-MEHALLAWI, ALSO INTERVENED. THE STAGE WAS THUS SET FOR THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF RECONCILIATION AT THE MOSQUE OF AL-GAMA\'IYA AL-SHAR\'IYA IN ASSYUT AUGUST 5. (DESPITE ITS REPORTED ROLE IN THE MB-JIHAD RECONCILIATION, HOWEVER, THE NATIONAL LEADER OF AL-GAMA\'IYA AL-SHAR\'IYA, TOLD US THAT HIS GROUP HAS NO CONNECTION, PERSONAL OR OFFICIAL, WITH EITHER THE MB OR THE GAMA\'A.) - 7. SINCE THEN, WESTERN JOURNALISTS WHO INTERVIEWED JIHAD/GAMA\'A MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THE AIN SHAMS INCIDENT IN CAIRO OF AUGUST 12-13, TOLD US THAT THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE MB AND RADICALS CLEARLY REMAIN. THE HEART OF THE ISSUE SEEMS TO BE THE MB\'S RESENTMENT OF THE JIHAD\'S ASSERTION OF A LEADERSHIP ROLE WITHIN WHAT APPEARS TO BE A KIND OF UMBRELLA GROUPING OF AL-GAMA\'A AL-ISLAMIYA. THE JOURNALISTS TOLD US THE YOUTHS EVIDENTLY SOUGHT DELIBERATELY TO OBSCURE THEIR GROUP\'S IDENTITY OR RELATIONSHIP WITH THAT OF THE AL-GAMA\'A AL-ISLAMIYA. ALSO, THOUGH THE MB\'S \'ESAM AL-\'ARIAN CONFIRMED TO EMBOFF THAT THE MB AND JIHAD WERE RECONCILED\", HE BROKE THE ISLAMICISTS\' NORMALLY MAFIA-LIKE CODE OF SILENCE TO PROVIDE SOME DETAILS ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC GROUPS. (SEPARATE REPORT WILL FOLLOW AS WE SORT OUT CONFLICTING DETAILS.) AL-\'ARIAN WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE JIHAD\'S CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP OF AL-GAMA\'A IS BOGUS. HE BLAMED POLICE OPPRESSION OF THE JIHAD FOR TURNING THEM INTO POPULAR HEROES, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT FAILS TO DISTINGUISH THE MB FROM THE VIOLENT GROUPS. - 8. COMMENT: THE BLOODY ASSYUT CLASH CLEARLY HAS EMBARRASSED SOME OF OUR CONTACTS AMONG ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTIVISTS BECAUSE OF ITS UGLY AND \"UN-ISLAMIC\" VIOLENCE. MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE SENSE UNHAPPINESS IN ISLAMIC POLITICAL QUARTERS OVER THE INCIDENT\'S EXPOSURE OF BITTER DIVISIONS IN ISLAMIC POLITICAL RANKS -- AND HENCE, SOME CLUES TO ITS SHADOWY ORGANIZATION. IN FACT, AL-NUR, THE SYMPATHETIC RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION PAPER THAT MOST FULLY OUTLINED THE STORY, REPORTED THAT HENCEFORTH IT WILL COMPLY WITH THE WRITTEN REQUESTS OF BOTH PARTIES TO AVOID PUBLISHING FURTHER ON THE ASSYUT INCIDENT. 9. MEANWHILE, THERE IS NO INDICATION YET THAT THE FORMAL MB-JIHAD RECONCILIATION HAS TAKEN DEEP ROOT, OR THAT THEIR RIVALRY WILL DEVELOP SOON INTO COOPERATION. WITH THE JIHAD LEADERSHIP AND MANY OF ITS \"FEW\" CADRES IN PRISON, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL SOURCES, THE MB WOULD SEEM TO HAVE THE UPPER HAND. WHAT REMAINS UNCLEAR IS THE EXACT ORGANIZATIONAL NATURE OF THE \"GAMA\'A AL-ISLAMIYA\", AND THE ROLE OF THE MB AND OTHER GROUPS WITHIN IT. THE ASSYUT INCIDENT, HOWEVER, HAS SHED SOME LIGHT ON THE SHADOWY RELATIONSHIPS OF THESE GROUPS, AND OVER THE COMING MONTHS WE WILL BE TRYING TO EXPLOIT SOME NEW LEADS TO TRY TO MAKE SENSE OF THESE TIES. - 10. FOR MORE DETAILED REPORTS OF THE ASSYUT INCIDENT, WE CALL ANALYSTS\' ATTENTION TO CENTER-LEFTIST, SECULARIST ESTABLISHMENT WEEKLY \"ROSE EL-YUSUF\" OF AUGUST 22 AND MODERATE ISLAMIC OPPOSITION WEEKLY \"AL-NUR\" OF AUGUST 3 AND AUGUST 10. AL-NUR INVESTIGATIVE ARTICLES ARE STARTLINGLY UNUSUAL AS EGYPTIAN JOURNALISM, STRIVING FOR OBJECTIVITY BY NAMING SOURCES AND DESCRIBING THE INCIDENT FROM THE DIFFERING VIEWPOINTS OF THE MB, JIHAD, POLICE, AND INNOCENT BYSTANDERS. ARTICLES PROVIDE MB AND JIHAD/GAMA\'A LOGOS FROM THEIR PAMPHLETS, AND PUBLISH PHOTOS AND NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS AND MOSQUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE VARIOUS ISLAMIC GROUPS IN ASSYUT. WISNER "	Success: CSV parsed	null	33,734
235	9/15/1988 16:42	88BONN31258	Embasy Bonn	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88ANKARA11311" ]	R 151642Z SEP 88 FM AMEMBASSY BONN TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1196 AMCONSUL ADANA AMCONSUL IZMIR AMCONSUL ISTANBUL ","UNCLAS BONN 31258 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, PHUM, GE, TU SUBJECT: HAS THE FRG CHANGED ITS VIEW OF THE PKK? REF: ANKARA 11311 1. WE SUSPECT THAT WHAT THE \"TERCUMAN\" COLUMNIST IS REFERRING TO IN CLAIMING THAT THE GERMANS VIEW THE PKK AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (REFTEL) IS THE ASSERTION IN THE GOVERNMENT\'S MOST RECENT INTERNAL SECURITY REPORT (VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZBERICHT), COVERING DEVELOPMENTS IN 1987, THAT \"IN TURKEY THE PKK OPERATES IN AN OPENLY TERRORISTIC MANNER.\" THIS ASSERTION DID NOT APPEAR IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR\'S REPORT. OUR CONTACTS IN THE INTERIOR MINISTRY HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION IN THEIR MINDS BUT THAT THE PKK USES TERRORIST TACTICS AND HAS PERPETRATED TERRORIST ACTS. 2. WHETHER THE PKK OR PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PKK HAVE ENGAGED IN WHAT MAY BE CONSIDERED AS TERRORIST ACTS ON GERMAN SOIL IS AN ISSUE THAT IS PRESENTLY BEFORE THE COURTS. FOLLOWING A SERIES OF VIOLENT CRIMES (INCLUDING MURDER AND ARSON) APPARENTLY PERPETRATED BY PKK MEMBERS IN GERMANY, AND SEARCHES OF SEVERAL APARTMENTS BELONGING TO PKK MEMBERS, THE FEDERAL PROSECUTOR INITIATED AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION HAD BEEN FORMED IN THE FRG ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE PKK, THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF KURDISTAN (ERNK) AND THE PEOPLE\'S LIBERATION ARMY OF KURDISTAN (ARGK). (NOTE THAT THIS INVESTIGATION IS NOT DESIGNED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PKK IN GERMANY IS AS SUCH A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.) AT THE SAME TIME, SOME TWENTY PKK MEMBERS ARE DUE TO COME TO TRIAL THIS FALL ON CHARGES OF MURDER, ARSON, OCCUPATION ACTIONS AND THE LIKE. THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THEY HAVE A STRONG CASE AGAINST A NUMBER OF THESE INDIVIDUALS; BUT THAT IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO PROVE THAT THE PKK ITSELF (IN THE FRG) IS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. 3. WE ARE FOR THE MOMENT UNABLE TO GET A DEFINITIVE OPINION ON WHETHER THE FACT THAT THE GERMAN INTERNAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES CONSIDER THE PKK (IN TURKEY) TO BE A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION RENDERS ITS MEMBERS INELIGIBLE FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE FRG. BURT "	Success: CSV parsed	null	33,933
236	9/19/1988 14:29	88BEIRUT5548	Embassy Beirut	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88BEIRUT5502" ]	O 191429Z SEP 88 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8837 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY ROME USMISSION USUN NEW YORK USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 05548 TERREP E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, LE, US SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 19 \"ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE\" COMMUNIQUE REF: BEIRUT 5502 1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF HAND-WRITTEN COMMUNIQUE (ARABIC) DELIVERED THE NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 18 TO BEIRUT DAILY NEWSPAPER \"AN-NAHAR\" AND PUBLISHED IN THE PAPER\'S SEPTEMBER 19 EDITION. COMMUNIQUE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A COLOR POLAROID PHOTOGRAPH OF BEIRUT UNIVERSITY COLLEGE (BUC) HOSTAGES ALAN STEEN, JESSE TURNER, ROBERT POLHILL AND MITHILESHWAR SINGH SEATED TOGETHER. EMBASSY HAS OBTAINED COPIES OF THE COMMUNIQUE AND PHOTO AND WILL POUCH TO DEPARTMENT. (NOTE: REFTEL IS TEXT OF SEPTEMBER 16 COMMUNIQUE FROM SAME GROUP. END NOTE.) 2. BEGIN TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE: ATTENTION\| PURSUANT TO THE POSITIVE INITIATIVE PROPOSED TO SOLVE THE ISSUE OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE SUBSEQUENT RESPONSES OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION, THE ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE ORGANIZATION ANNOUNCES THE FOLLOWING: FIRST - THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION. THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS ENDING THE HOSTAGE ISSUE IS NOT AN INVITATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS. RATHER, IT COMES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MORAL AND HUMAN VALUES THAT WE BELIEVE IN. THE DAY WILL NEVER COME THAT WE NEGOTIATE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF KILLING AND CRIME. FOLLOWING A CAREFUL, ATTENTIVE AND RESPONSIBLE STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL DETENTE IN THE REGION, HOWEVER, WE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO MOVE THIS DEVELOPMENT FORWARD WITH A POSITIVE INITIATIVE REGARDING THE HOSTAGE ISSUE, WHICH CONSTITUTES BOTH A PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL EVENTS. THIS IS A CHANCE FOR THE LEADING PERSONALITIES OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION TO CONSIDER AND THINK RESPONSIBLY OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THIS ISSUE, FOR THIS IS A CHANCE THAT MAY NEVER COME AGAIN. ALL WE ASK IN RETURN IS WHAT IS STIPULATED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS PACT (SIC) REGARDING THE INTIFADA OF OUR HEROIC PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ON THE ONE HAND, AND NHAT IS REQUIRED BY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SUPPORTING THE DETENTE WHICH HAS BEGUN IN THE REGION, ON THE OTHER. SECOND - THE JUST CAUSE OF OUR PEOPLE IS PART OF A GREATER WHOLE; THE SUPPORT OF LEGAL RIGHTS IS PART OF A GREATER WHOLE, AND THE ISSUE OF THE USE OF POWER AND VIOLENCE OR INITIATIVES OF PEACE AND STABILTY ARE ALSO FUNDAMENTAL. THIS IS THE BASIS OF WHAT IS ACHIEVED THROUGH OUR IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES. WEAKNESS WAS NEVER AN INCENTIVE FOR CHANGING OUR COURSE AND POWER HAS NEVER FORCED ANY CHANGES. WHAT IS NECESSITATED BY OUR PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTALS IS WHAT WILL BE. WE ARE ALWAYS PREPARED FOR VIOLENCE AND FOR CALM AND PEACEFUL ATTITUDES. THIS IS A TIME OF POSITIVE RESPONSES. DO NOT WASTE THIS OPPORTUNITY THROUGH HAUGHTY WORDS THAT PROVOKE US AND ENCOURAGE US TO DRAW BACK AND RESORT TO VIOLENCE AND FORCE TO GAIN RECOGNITION. THIS ISSUE MUST BE SOLVED POSITIVELY AND THE ADMINISTRATION MUST ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. THIRD - WE ARE ASTONISHED AT THE RIDICULOUS DEALS MADE BY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DUKAKIS IN ANNOUNCING THE TRANSFER OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY TO JERUSALEM IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF ZIONIST PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE ELECTIONS. HE HAS BLATANTLY DEFIED THE FEELINGS OF OUR HEROIC PEOPLE AND THE MOSLEMS OF THE WORLD. THIS FOREBODES A DARK FUTURE. WE DECLARE, HOWEVER, THAT JERUSALEM IS AN EVER-BURNING VOLCANO IN WHICH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WILL MELT. UNTIL THEN, WE HAVE VARIOUS POSITIONS. WE ARE CERTAIN THAT THIS VIEW OF HIS (DUKAKIS) DOES NOT REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THAT IS WHY IT WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE, OVER WHICH ALL THE SUITABLE CONDITIONS FOR A SOLUTION ARE GATHERED. FINALLY, THE INITIATIVE IS STILL THERE AND EXISTS. WE ARE WAITING FOR RESPONSES, IN THE LIGHT OF WHICH WE WILL DECIDE SUBSEQUENT STEPS, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IS REQUIRED BY OUR GLORIOUS INTIFADA. PEACE BE UPON HE WHO SERVES THE TRUTH FOR THE TRUTH. (SIGNED) ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE ORGANIZATION. END TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE. SIMPSON "	Success: CSV parsed	null	33,991
237	9/21/1988 7:54	88ANKARA12124	Embassy Ankara	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88ANKARA11311", "88BONN31258" ]	R 210754Z SEP 88 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO AMEMBASSY BONN INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 0258 AMCONSUL ADANA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL AMCONSUL IZMIR ","UNCLAS ANKARA 12124 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, PHUM, GE, TU SUBJECT: GERMANS AND PKK REF: (A) BONN 31258 (B) ANKARA 11311 1. POST THANKS EMBASSY BONN FOR ITS HELPFUL CONTRIBUTION IN REF A. IT PROVIDES USEFUL DETAILS OF PKK ACTIVITIES IN THE FRG WHICH HELP US IN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING. WE CAN ALWAYS USE MORE SUCH INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF TURKISH AND KURDISH ACTIVISTS IN THE FRG AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE. STRAUSZ-HUPE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	34,108
238	9/23/1988 14:35	88JERUSALEM3168	Consulate Jerusalem	SECRET	[ "88JERUSALEM3004", "88STATE303639" ]	O 231435Z SEP 88 FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3548 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03168 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA: DEFINING THE ISSUES REFS: A) STATE 303639, B) JERUSALEM 3004 1. S - ENTIRE TEXT. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ------------------------ 2. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IS POSING AN INCREASING CHALLENGE TO SECULAR NATIONALIST PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS ON THE WEST BANK. RECENT WEEKS HAVE SEEN DIRECT CHALLENGES BY THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD-CREATED GROUP \"HAMAS\" TO THE PLO/UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU) WHICH CURRENTLY LEADS THE UPRISING. THIS CHALLENGE, WHICH HAS MET WITH MIXED SUCCESS, HAS TAKEN THE FORM OF LEAFLETS CRITICAL OF UNLU AND THE PLO, ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ALTERNATIVE STRIKE DAYS, AND EVEN CLASHES IN CERTAIN LOCALITIES. THUS FAR, HAMAS HAS DEMONSTRATED STRENGTH IN THOSE AREAS WHERE EXISTING ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS HAVE WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT: NABLUS AND THE NORTHERN WEST BANK, WHERE IT SEEMS TO BE BEST ORGANIZED; THE RAMALLAH-EL BIREH AREA; AND HEBRON. ITS ATTEMPTS TO MAKE INROADS INTO THE CHRISTIAN ENCLAVE OF BETHLEHEM-BEIT JALA-BEIT SAHOUR HAVE BEEN RESISTED BY LOCAL RESIDENTS. HAMAS REMAINS WEAK IN COSMOPOLITAN EAST JERUSALEM. WHATEVER THE CURRENT ACTUAL STRENGTH OF HAMAS--AND ESTIMATES VARY WIDELY--IT HAS SUCCEEDED IN BECOMING A FACTOR TO BE RECKONED WITH IN CONSIDERING THE FUTURE OF THE INTIFADA ON THE WEST BANK. 3. HAMAS IS NOT THE ONLY MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALIST GROUP FUNCTIONING ON THE WEST BANK. THE FATAH- AFFILIATED \"ISLAMIC JIHAD\"--NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE SHIITE GROUP OF THE SAME NAME FOUND IN LEBANON AND ELSEWHERE--WAS CRIPPLED BY THE KILLING OF THREE SENIOR LEADERS IN CYPRUS. IT HAS NOT RECOVERED TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS AN INDEPENDENT PLAYER IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF WEST BANK PALESTINIANS. OTHER SMALL, SHADOWY GROUPS ALSO RISE AND FALL, CREATING LITTLE MORE THAN A RIPPLE. 4. THIS REPORT IS ONLY A PRELIMINARY ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PENETRATE; UNDERSTANDING THEIR INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND EXTERNAL GOALS WILL TAKE MUCH TIME AND PATIENCE. THIS IS A FIRST PASS AT THE SUBJECT ON THE WEST BANK, BASED TO A LARGE EXTENT ON CONTACTS FROM JERUSALEM AND THE NORTHERN WEST BANK CITY OF NABLUS. WE HAVE LESS COMPLETE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN WEST BANK. GAZA HAS ITS OWN PATTERN OF ISLAMIC POLITICS. WE WOULD WELCOME INFORMATION FROM CAIRO AND AMMAN ON EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN ISLAMIC POLITICAL TIES WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. HAMAS--BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ----------------------------------------- 5. HAMAS IS A CREATION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (MB), WITH TIES TO THE MB THROUGHOUT THE ISLAMIC WORLD. THE NAME \"HAMAS\" WAS APPARENTLY CHOSEN IN FEBRUARY 1988, BUT NOT USED EXTENSIVELY UNTIL MAY. AN ACRONYM FOR \"ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT,\" THE WORD ITSELF IS ARABIC FOR \"ZEALOTS.\" 6. ALTHOUGH PALESTINIANS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF THE WEST BANK HAVE STRONG ISLAMIC CONVICTIONS, THEY TEND TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES POLITICALLY IN SECULAR TERMS. ISLAM HAS, HOWEVER, PLAYED A ROLE IN WEST BANK POLITICS SINCE THE LATE 1940S, WHEN THE MB FIRST CAME TO THE WEST BANK. THE MB WAS SHORTLY AFTER DISCREDITED IN THE EYES OF PALESTINIANS BY ITS SUPPORT FOR KING HUSSEIN IN HIS POWER STRUGGLE AGAINST PM NABULSI IN THE MID-50S. DURING JORDANIAN RULE, IT WAS TIGHTLY MONITORED BY JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE AND DID NOT GAIN SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE UNTIL THE MID- TO LATE-70S, PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK. 7. IN 1976, M0 SUPPORTERS ATTACKED AND BURNED A NABLUS THEATER SHOWING AN \"IMMODEST\" PLAY. THIS IS OFTEN CONSIDERED THE BEGINNING OF THE MB\'S EMERGENCE AS A VIABLE POLITICAL FORCE IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS BUILT A POWER BASE IN AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY, WHERE THEY GAINED CONTROL OF THE STUDENT COUNCIL IN 1978. THIS SURGE IN POPULARITY WAS PROBABLY DUE TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS: 1) THE RISE OF KHOMEINISM IN IRAN, WHICH GAVE FUNDAMENTALISM A BOOST THROUGHOUT THE MUSLIM WORLD; 2) THE DISCREDITING OF TRADITIONAL ARAB LEADERS IN THE WAKE OF SADAT\'S TRIP TO JERUSALEM; 3) A LARGE INFLOW OF MONEY FROM THE MB IN JORDAN AND EGYPT; AND 4) THE DENIAL BY FUNDAMENTALISTS THAT THEY BELONGED TO THE FORMERLY DISCREDITED MB-- INSTEAD, THEY CALLED THEMSELVES THE \"INDEPENDENT ISLAMIC BLOC.\" 8. SUPPORT FOR THE FUNDAMENTALISTS AT AN-NAJAH, AS ELSEWHERE IN THE WEST BANK, HAS EBBED AND FLOWED ACCORDING TO THE PLO\'S FORTUNES AND THE STATUS OF FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD. SECULAR LEADERS IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK, AIDED BY PLO MONEY, WORKED TO CONTAIN THE FUNDAMENTALISTS AND REDUCE THEIR INFLUENCE IN AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY. THE FUNDAMENTALISTS LOST CREDIBILITY, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE PLO BORE THE BRUNT OF THE FIGHTING DU8ING THE 1982 INVASION OF LEBANON AND DURING THE PERIOD OF ARAFAT- HUSSEIN RECONCILIATION. THEY HAVE GAINED STRENGTH WHEN THE PLO APPEARED WEAK AND DIVIDED. 9. BY THE END OF 1987, FUNDAMENTALISTS AND NATIONALISTS IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK HAD ACHIEVED AN UNEASY STATUS QUO MARKED BY OCCASIONAL VIOLENT CLASHES. IN NABLUS THE FUNDAMENTALISTS TENDED TO BE RESENTED BY THE SECULAR COMMUNITY, BUT ALSOFEARED. 10. WHEN THE INTIFADA BEGAN, THE MB ACTED DECISIVELY TO SEIZE A ROLE. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE MB DECISION TO INVOLVE ITSELF FOR SEVERAL REASONS. ISLAMIC JIHAD HAD WON CONSIDERABLE PRESTIGE FOR ITS ROLE IN GAZA, AND THE MB FEARED LOSING SUPPORT AND CREDIBILITY IN THE FUNDAMENTALIST COMMUNITY. INDIVIDUAL MB MEMBERS WANTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTIFADA; THE MB LEADERSHIP FEARED THAT IF MEMBERS COULD NOT USE THE MB AS A VEHICLE FOR PARTICIPATION, THEY WOULD TURN TO OTHER FUNDAMENTALIST OR NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS. MB LEADERS BELIEVED, THEN AS NOW, THAT THE INTIFADA WILL BE CARRIED TO A CONCLUSION. THEY WANTED A SAY IN THAT FINAL SETTLEMENT. FINALLY, THE MB HAD A READY-MADE ORGANIZATION PRESENT IN THE WEST BANK. ACCORDINGLY, THE MB CREATED HAMAS IN FEBRUARY 1988 AND BEGAN ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE UPRISING. HAMAS--STRUCTURE ---------------- 11. THE MB HAS ITS HEADQUARTERS IN CAIRO, WITH A BRANCH IN AMMAN. SUB-BRANCHES ARE PRESENT IN THE WEST BANK (NABLUS) AND GAZA. THE HEAD OF THE MB IN THE WEST BANK REPORTEDLY IS NABIL BUSHTAWI, OF NABLUS. OTHER KEY WEST-BANK FIGURES FROM NABLUS ARE SHEIKH SAID BILAL AND HAMID BITAWI. 12. THE RELATION BETWEEN CAIRO, AMMAN, THE WEST BANK, AND GAZA REMAINS UNCLEAR, AS IS THE RELATION BETWEEN THE NABLUS LEADERSHIP AND OTHER AREAS OF THE WEST BANK. THERE ARE STRONG LINKS WITH CAIRO AND AMMAN, AND SOME MB LEADERS MAY HOLD POSITIONS IN JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE. APPARENTLY, KY DECISIONS ARE MADE IN CAIRO AND AMMAN, BUT LOCAL UNITS RETAIN CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION. MONEY FLOWS IN FROM CAIRO AND AMMAN, AS WELL AS BEING RAISED LOCALLY THROUGH THE MOSQUES. 13. THE MB IN NABLUS REPORTEDLY CONSISTS OF APPROXIMATELY 150 MEMBERS HEADED BY A 4 OR 5 MAN COMMITTEE. THE LEADERSHIP CONSISTS OF MUSLIM SHEIKHS, UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS AT AN-NAJAH AND BIR ZEIT UNIVERSITIES, INSTRUCTORS AT THE KULLIYET AL-DAWA (AN ISLAMIC COLLEGE AFFILIATED WITH JERUSALEM UNIVERSITY, LOCATED IN BEIT HANINA, NORTH JERUSALEM), EMPLOYEES OF THE ISLAMIC WAQF, A SHARIA JUDGE, AND VARIOUS MERCHANTS. THE \"FOOT SOLDIERS\" OF HAMAS/MB IN NABLUS CONSIST OF DISADVANTAGED YOUTHS FROM THE POORER SECTIONS OF THE OLD TOWN (CASBAH). THIS NETWORK SEEMS TO BE STABLE--FEW ARRESTS, FEW DEFECTIONS, FEW NEW CONVERTS. 14. THE LEADERSHIP MAKES USE OF THE MOSQUES TO PLAN, PROSELYTIZE, INSTRUCT, AND RAISE MONEY. THIS IS A MAJOR ADVANTAGE HAMAS POSSESSES OVER THE UNLU, SINCE MANY ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS UNIVERSITIES, CHARITIES, AND PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES THROUGH WHICH THE UNLU COULD OPERATE HAVE BEEN CLOSED BY ISRAELI AUTHORITIES. HAMAS--METHOD OF OPERATION -------------------------- 15. ACTIVITIES ARE CARRIED OUT BY TIGHTLY KNIT CELLS OF AS FEW AS FIVE MEMBERS. OUTSIDERS RARELY PARTICIPATE IN HAMAS ACTIONS, A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE FROM INTIFADA ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL, WHICH DERIVE CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH FROM THE SPONTANEOUS PARTICIPATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS. HAMAS ALSO SEEKS MAXIMUM PUBLICITY FOR ITS ACTS. BEFORE A STRIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, RED SPRAY-PAINTED INSTRUCTIONS--BOLDLY SIGNED \"HAMAS\"--ARE IN EVIDENCE THROUGHOUT AREAS OF HAMAS INFLUENCE. AS A RESULT OF ITS PENCHANT FOR TIGHT CONTROL AND PUBLICITY, HAMAS TENDS NOT TO COOPERATE IN UNLU-ORGANIZED ACTIONS. IN NABLUS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAMAS HAS REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN IMPROMPTU BLOOD DRIVES ORGANIZED ON SHORT NOTICE BY POPULAR COMMITTEES TO TREAT WOUNDED PALESTINIANS. 16. HAMAS USES DIFFERENT METHODS TO ENFORCE ITS STRIKE CALLS, DEPENDING ON ITS STRENGTH IN THE TOWN INVOLVED. IN RAMALLAH AND THE BEIT HANINA NEIGHBORHOOD OF NORTH JERUSALEM, FOR EXAMPLE, HAMAS FOLLOWERS REPORTEDLY WERE ON THE SCENE TO ENFORCE THE SEPTEMBER 9 STRIKE. ALTHOUGH NO CLASHES WERE REPORTED IN THESE AREAS, THERE HAVE BEEN CONFRONTATIONS WITH UNLU SUPPORTERS ON PRIOR OCCASIONS. NO CLASHES WERE REPORTED IN NABLUS, APPARENTLY BECAUSE THE UNLU CHOSE NOT TO TEST HAMAS\' STRENGTH. IN THE PAST, HOWEVER, HAMAS HAS FIREBOMBED CHRISTIAN SHOPS THAT SOLD LIQUOR OR OTHERWISE DEFIED ITS ORDERS. IN BETHLEHEM, TIRES WERE BURNED AND THERE WERE CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN HAMAS AND UNLU SUPPORTERS ON THE OCCASION OF THE SEPTEMBER 9 STRIKE. SOME SHOPS WERE INTIMIDATED INTO CLOSING EARLY. HOWEVER, MOST STAYED OPEN. IN JERUSALEM, HAMAS WAS NOT IN EVIDENCE, AND THE STIKE CALL WAS LARGELY IGNORED. HAMAS--RELATIVE REGIONAL STRENGTH --------------------------------- 17. HAMAS APPEARS TO BE STRONGEST IN GAZA. IN THE WEST BANK, IT SEEMS TO BE BASED IN THE TOWNS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHERE THE INHABITANTS ARE RELATIVELY HOMOGENEOUS AND HAVE A RELIGIOUS BENT. ITS PRIMARY WEST BANK STRONGHOLDS, IN DESCENDING ORDER OF INFLUENCE, APPEAR TO BE NABLUS, RAMALLAH, AND HEBRON. HAMAS IS PRESENT IN JERUSALEM, PARTICULARLY THE BEIT HANINA NEIGHBORHOOD IN NORTH JERUSALEM NEAR RAMALLAH. IN DOWNTOWN EAST JERUSALEM AND THE OLD CITY, HAMAS IS PRESENT BUT WEAK, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THE COSMOPOLITAN CHARACTER OF THESE AREAS. HAMAS IS TRYING TO INCREASE ITS FOOTHOLD IN THE CHRISTIAN AREA OF BETHLEHEM-BEIT JALA-BEIT SAHOUR, THOUGH THUS FAR ITS INTIMIDATION TACTICS HAVE NOT PROVED SUCCESSFUL. (IN FACT, HAMAS ACTIONS IN THESE CHRISTIAN AREAS HAVE LED TO THE REAPPEARANCE OF HAMAM, THE \"CHRISTIAN\" RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, WHOSE ACRONYM FORMS THE ARABIC WORD FOR \"DOVE.\") WE DO NOT YET HAVE A GOOD FEEL FOR HAMAS IN HEBRON, THOUGH WE KNOW IT HAS BEEN ACTIVE. THE AUGUST 21 AND SEPTEMBER 9 STRIKE CALLS WERE OBSERVED THERE. IN ADDITION, ITS INHABITANTS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE STRONG RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HERE AS ELSEWHERE MUCH OF HAMAS\' STRENGTH DERIVES FROM THE POPULATION\'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS, RATHER THAN FROM A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO CHOOSE BETWEEN HAMAS AND THE PLO. 18. HAMAS IS THOUGHT TO BE WEAK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, WHERE THE MB HAS TRADITIONALLY LACKED INFLUENCE AND ORGANIZATION, AND IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS, WHERE SECULAR NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS (FATAH, PFLP, COMMUNISTS, ETC.) REMAIN FIRMLY ENTRENCHED. AN INTERESTING EXCEPTION IS NEW ASKAR CAMP WHERE, BECAUSE OF THE ARREST OF ALMOST THE ENTIRE FATAH LEADERSHIP, HAMAS HAS BEEN ABLE TO MOVE IN AND ORGANIZE. 19. IT IS DIFFICULT ACCURATELY TO GAUGE HAMAS\' STRENGTH FROM THE SUCCESS OF ITS STRIKE CALLS. HAMAS HAS CHOSEN ITS DAYS WISELY--AUGUST 21 WAS THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATTEMPT TO BURN THE AL-AQSA MOSQUE, A TRADITIONAL DAY OF PROTEST, AND SEPTEMBER 9 WAS BOTH A FRIDAY, WHEN MANY SHOPS ARE CLOSED ANYWAY, AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW MONTH OF THE INTIFADA, AGAIN A TRADITIONAL DAY OF PROTEST. THUS, HAMAS WAS CALLING FOR STRIKES ON DAYS THAT PEOPLE CUSTOMARILY MARK WITH STRIKES AND PROTESTS AND DID NOT ACT AGAINST THE FLOW OF THE INTIFADA. HAMAS--RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL ------------------------------- 20. MANY WEST BANKERS BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL ACTIVELY SUPPORTS HAMAS IN AN EFFORT TO DIVIDE PALESTINIANS AND WEAKEN THE INTIFADA. THEY POINT TO THE FACT THAT HAMAS OPERATIVES ACT BOLDLY IN DISTRIBUTING THEIR LEAFLETS. SHOPKEEPERS IN JERUSALEM AND NABLUS REPORT THAT, WHEREAS UNLU LEAFLETS ARE DISTRIBUTED SECRETLY FOR FEAR OF ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES, HAMAS OPERATIVES WALK INTO SHOPS AND PRESENT THEIR LEAFLETS DIRECTLY TO THE OWNERS. MAYOR FREIJ OF BETHLEHEM CLAIMS THAT MEMBERS OF SOME WELL KNOWN FAMILIES WHO COLLABORATE WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SEEN AMONG HAMAS STREET GANGS IN BETHLEHEM. FURTHERMORE, DESPITE MASSIVE ARRESTS--AND THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF MANY MB LEADERS--RELATIVELY FEW HAMAS LEADERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED. IN RECENT WEEKS, FUNDAMENTALIST LEADERS HAVE GIVEN INTERVIEWS TO ISRAELI PUBLICATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE LANDED SECULARIST LEADERS IN DETENTION. WE BELIEVE THAT, WHILE ISRAELI FORCES MAY BE TURNING A BLIND EYE TO HAMAS ACTIVITIES, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT ISRAEL IS PROVIDING ACTIVE SUPPORT. HAMAS--RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP --------------------------------------------- --- 21. HAMAS\' FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, AS SET OUT IN ITS AUGUST 18 CHARTER (REF B), PUT IT IN OPPOSITION TO THE SECULAR LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA. ACCORDING TO THE CHARTER, HAMAS CONSIDERS ALL OF PALESTINE AN ISLAMIC \"WAQF,\" OR TRUST FROM GOD. CEDING ANY PART OF IT TO A JEWISH STATE WOULD VIOLATE THAT TRUST. HAMAS OPPOSES THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION TOWARD WHICH THE PLO SEEMS TO BE INCHING. IT OPPOSES THE CREATION OF A SECULAR STATE IN PALESTINE, AS CALLED FOR IN THE PLO COVENANT. INSTEAD, IT DEMANDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE. IT ALSO OPPOSES CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE. AS HAMAS LEAFLET NO. 28 SUCCINCTLY PHRASED IT, \"NEGOTIATION WITH THE ENEMY IS RETREAT AND CAPITULATION.\" INSTEAD, HAMAS CALLS FOR LIBERATING ALL OF PALESTINE THROUGH JIHAD--BOTH ARMED STRUGGLE AND PROSELYTIZING. 24. THIS HAMAS/UNLU COMPETITION HAS LED TO A BATTLE OF LEAFLETS AND STRIKE CALLS. HAMAS LEAFLETS EXCORIATE THE PLO--PARTICULARLY FATAH-- AND THE UNLU FOR CAPITULATING TO THE ZIONIST ENEMY. UNLU, IN RESPONSE, ACCUSES HAMAS OF SERVING ISRAEL BY DIVIDING THE UPRISING. AT THE SAME TIME, UNLU INVITES HAMAS TO JOIN THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP. 25. HAMAS, TO DATE, HAS REJECTED ALL CALLS FOR UNITY WITH UNLU. ONE EXCUSE OFTEN HEARD IS THAT HAMAS WILL NOT SIT ON THE SAME COMMITTEE WITH THE COMMUNISTS. OTHERS SAY IT WILL NOT SIT WITH ANY LEFTIST GROUP, SUCH AS THE PFLP. OTHER SOURCES, INCLUDING SOME CLOSE TO THE HAMAS LEADERSHIP IN NABLUS, HAVE TOLD US HAMAS HAS AGREED IN PRIVATE TO A TWO-STATE SOLUTION AND WILL SOON JOIN NOT ONLY THE UNLU BUT THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AS WELL. ACCORDING TO THESE REPORTS, HAMAS IS MAINTAINING ITS PUBLIC STANCE IN OPPOSITION TO THE UNLU IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN ITS ORGANIZATION. 24. UNDOUBTEDLY, THERE ARE CONTACTS AND EVEN OCCASIONAL COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. HOWEVER, RECONCILIATION AND/OR UNITY BETWEEN THEM SEEMS UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME. HAMAS APPEARS GENUINELY COMMITTED TO THE GOAL OF CREATING AN ISLAMIC STATE IN ALL OF PALESTINE. THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE WITH THE SECULAR NATIONALISTS THAT CANNOT BE PAPERED OVER. IT IS THEREFORE LIKELY THAT THE UNLU AND HAMAS WOULD FORGE A PERMANENT ALLIANCE. 25. MOST IMPORTANTLY, HAMAS RETAINS ITS FEAR OF BEING COOPTED INTO THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND BECOMING IRRELEVANT. THIS FEAR WAS ONE OF THE MAIN FACTORS SPURRING THE CREATION OF HAMAS. IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT THE MB WOULD SACRIFICE ITS CREATION NOW, JUST WHEN IT IS GAINING ACCEPTANCE AS A PLAYER. HOWEVER, SHOULD HAMAS FAIL TO MAINTAIN ITS FOOTHOLD AND BECOME THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION OR IRRELEVANCE, IT MIGHT AT THAT POINT CONSIDER COOPERATING WITH THE SECULARIST NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP OF THE UNLU FOR TACTICAL REASONS. HAMAS--PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE ------------------------------- 26. GAUGING THE CURRENT STRENGTH OF HAMAS IS A RISKY ENDEAVOR. IN MANY REGIONS OF THE WEST BANK, ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS ARE HELD IN HIGH REGARD, AND SUPPORT FOR HAMAS APPEARS TO DERIVE MUCH OF ITS STRENGTH FROM THAT TRADITIONAL RESPECT RATHER THAN FROM A CONSCIOUS CHOICE BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALIST AND SECULAR OPTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, HAMAS IS BEING TAKEN INCREASINGLY SERIOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE WEST BANK. WHETHER THAT IS BECAUSE OF ACTUAL STRENGTH AND INFLUENCE, OR MERELY DUE TO INSPIRED SELF-PROMOTION, WE CANNOT SAY. IN ANY CASE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE HAMAS PHENOMENON WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN FUTURE CALCULATIONS. 27. ALTHOUGH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM WILL REMAIN A FEATURE OF THE WEST BANK LANDSCAPE, IMPORTANT FACTORS WORK AGAINST IT BECOMING A PERVASIVE INFLUENCE OR REPLACING THE SECULARIST STRAIN IN WEST BANK POLITICS. WEST BANKERS AS A WHOLE ARE WELL EDUCATED, MUCH TRAVELED, AND CAPITALISTIC IN ORIENTATION. THEY ARE UNLIKELY WILLINGLY TO TURN TO THE NARROW ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST WORLD VIEW, NO MATTER HOW DEEP THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE PLO LEADERSHIP. 28. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE MB HAS HAD ONLY A BRIEF AND UNDISTINGUISHED HISTORY IN THE WEST BANK. IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT, THE INTIFADA ENJOYS VERY WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AMONG WEST BANKERS, WHO ARE GENERALLY OPPOSED TO ANY EFFORT TO DISRUPT THIS UNITY AND THREATEN THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE UPRISING. THUS FAR, PEOPLE HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE UNLU AND HAMAS, AND SUPPORT FOR THE FUNDAMENTALISTS HAS BEEN RELATIVELY COST FREE. IN A SHOWDOWN BETWEEN THE UNLU AND HAMAS, MUCH OF THAT SUPPORT COULD MELT AWAY. 29. IN ADDITION THE WEST BANK, UNLIKE GAZA, CONTAINS AN IMPORTANT CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. AS NOTED ABOVE, HAMAS IS MEETING RESISTANCE IN THE CHRISTIAN ENCLAVE OF BETHLEHEM-BEIT JALA-BEIT SAHOUR, EVEN TO THE POINT OF STIMULATING THE REACTIVATION OF A RIVAL CHRISTIAN GROUP. STILL, HAMAS HAS EXTENDED ITS INFLUENCE TO THE LARGELY CHRISTIAN RAMALLAH-EL BIREH AREA, PROVING THAT IT CAN SURVIVE IN A MIXED CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM ENVIRONMENT. THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER OF THESE AREAS IS ALSO SLOWLY BEING DILUTED AS CHRISTIANS EMIGRATE TO FRIENDLIER CLIMES. 30. NONETHELESS, DESPITE THE FACTORS WORKING AGAINST THE SPREAD OF FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE, THERE ARE SITUATIONS IN WHICH FUNDAMENTALIST STRENGTH COULD GROW TO THE POINT THAT HAMAS WOULD BECOME A SPOILER IN ATTEMPTS TO BRING PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS TOGETHER. ALTHOUGH WIDESPREAD DECAPITATION THROUGH ARREST OF THE UNLU LEADERSHIP IS NOT LIKELY, GIVEN ITS OVERWHELMING POPULAR SUPPORT, ISRAELI EFFORTS TO DO SO TEND TO PROMOTE HAMAS IN SPECIFIC AREAS, SUCH AS IN THE EXAMPLE OF THE NEW ASKAR CAMP GIVEN ABOVE. 31. WEST BANKERS ARE BOTH RELIGIOUS AND NATIONALISTIC. THUS FAR, THEIR POLITICS HAVE FOLLOWED THE NATIONALIST BENT OF THEIR CHARACTER AND CULTURE. THEY HAVE SUPPORTED THE PLO BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THE PLO IS THE ONLY VIABLE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED EXPRESSION OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM. THEY HAVE THEREFORE CONTINUED TO BACK THE PLO DESPITE MANY DISAPPOINTMENTS, AND THE MAJORITY ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. HOWEVER, SHOULD THE PLO FAIL TO OVERCOME ITS IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS AND TAKE INITIATIVES THAT WILL LEAD TO A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL, THE UNITY OF THE INTIFADA COULD BEGIN TO FRAY ONE CAN IMAGINE A SCENARIO IN WHICH PFLP, DFLP, AND COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES, WHO ARE NOW WORKING WITH FATAH, COULD REVERT TO MORE EXTREME POSITIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL BREAKTHROUGH. IN SUCH A SITUATION, THE SECULAR-NATIONALIST PRAGMATIC CONSENSUS THAT IS THE DOMINANT FEATURE OF THE INTIFADA COULD CRUMBLE, AND FUNDAMENTALISM COULD MAKE SIGNIFICANT NEW INROADS, ESPECIALLY AMONG DISPOSSESSED GROUPS. THUS, ALTHOUGH A MASS-BASED FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO EMERGE, THE FUNDAMENTALISTS COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF GROWING DESPAIR AND SECULAR- NATIONALIST DISUNITY TO FURTHER ITS POLICIES OF CONFRONTATION AND REJECTION. 32. DESPITE THE AVOWED ANTI-ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF HAMAS, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE MAIN CONTEST WILL, FOR THE TIME BEING, BE BETWEEN HAMAS AND THE UNLU. THE MB HAS TRADITIONALLY FOCUSED ON ONE MAINSTREAM OPPONENT AT A TIME--THE WAFD IN EGYPT, THE BAATH IN SYRIA. ITS CURRENT OPPONENT IN ITS STRUGGLE FOR THE SOULS OF PALESTINIANS IS THE MAJOR COMPONENT OF THE UNLU, FATAH. UNTIL THIS STRUGGLE IS DECIDED, HAMAS IS UNLIKELY TO DIRECT ITS EFFORTS PRIMARILY AGAINST ISRAEL. ISLAMIC JIHAD ------------- 33. THIS REPORT HAS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON HAMAS/MB BOTH BECAUSE HAMAS IS THE MAIN FUNDAMENTALIST GROUP ON THE WEST BANK, AND BECAUSE WE HAVE SO LITTLE INFORMATION ON THE OTHER ISLAMIC PARTIES. ISLAMIC JIHAD, THE ONLY OTHER SUCH GROUP WITH A SIGNIFICANT WEST-BANK FOLLOWING, WAS ESTABLISHED BY ABU JIHAD TO ENHANCE FATAH\'S APPEAL WITH RELIGIOUS MUSLIMS. ALTHOUGH IT HAS IN THE PAST CLAIMED INDEPENDENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS SUCH AS THE OCTOBER 1986 ATTACK AT THE DUNG GATE, IT WAS DECAPITATED WHEN THREE SENIOR LEADERS WERE ASSASSINATED IN CYPRUS. OUR INFORMATION IS THAT ITS CURRENT INFLUENCE ON THE WEST BANK IS MINOR AND THAT IT IS INCAPABLE OF ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OF THE MAINSTREAM FATAH ORGANIZATION ON THE WEST BANK. IT SEEMS TO BE DOING MOST OF ITS ORGANIZING IN WEST BANK PRISONS, WHERE A STRICT QUOTA SYSTEM AMONG GROUPS IS ENFORCED BY THE PRISONERS. WE HAVE NO FIRM INFORMATION ON LINKS BETWEEN ISLAMIC JIHAD ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA, OR WHETHER THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS ARE IN FACT THE SAME. QUESTIONS --------- 34. THIS BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST ACTIVITY ON THE WEST BANK DOES NOT ADDRESS SEVERAL ISSUES OF CONTINUING IMPORTANCE, SUCH AS KEY FIGURES IN MB/HAMAS AND ISLAMIC JIHAD; COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HAMAS UNITS IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WEST BANK, GAZA, CAIRO, AND AMMAN; THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMIC JIHAD AND HAMAS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA; AND FATAH-HAMAS RELATIONS. WE WILL BE EXPLORING THESE ISSUES IN FUTURE REPORTING. WILCOX "	Success: CSV parsed	null	34,137
239	10/3/1988 13:04	88MOGADISHU11685	Embassy Mogadishu	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	P 031304Z OCT 88 FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7454 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY ROME ","C O N F I D E N T I A L MOGADISHU 11685 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PREL, US, UR, SO SUBJECT: SOVIET FLIRTATION WITH SOMALIA REF: FBIS LONDON UK 281549Z SEP 88 1. (LOU) WISH TO DRAW DEPARTMENT\'S ATTENTION TO REF FBIS REPORT OF AN IZVESTIYA DISPATCH DATELINED MOGADISHU \"WARM WIND IN THE HORN OF AFRICA\". PIECE IS CLEARLY A SCENE-SETTER FOR CURRENT (AND LONG- POSTPONED) VISIT OF SOVIET ECONOMIC DELEGATION THAT ARRIVED HERE WITH MUCH HOOPLA LAST WEEKEND. IZVESTIYA CLAIMS THAT THERE IS WIDESPREAD ENTHUSIASM IN SOMALIA FOR A REVIVAL OF CLOSE SOMALIA-SOVIET RELATIONS AND NOSTALGIA FOR THE \'70S WHEN THESE TIES WERE VERY CLOSE. ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY IS THE CORRESPONDENT\'S INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER SAMANTAR, CONDUCTED IN RUSSIAN, IN WHICH SAMANTAR FONDLY RECALLS THOSE GOOD OLD DAYS. 2. (LOU) WE HAVE VERY LITTLE INFORMATION SO FAR ON HOW TALKS ARE GOING BETWEEN SOVIET DELEGATION AND SOMALIS. WE KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT IN ADDITION TO PREDICTABLE CALLS ON AGRICULTURE AND PLANNING MINISTERS, DELEGATION PAID A SPECIAL VISIT TO SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY PARTY HEADQUARTERS FOR TALKS WITH DE FACTO PARTY BOSS ABDULKADIR HAJI MOHAMED. - 3. (C) COMMENT: AS WE MIGHT HAVE PREDICTED, SOVIETS SUCCEEDED IN TIMING THE ARRIVAL OF THEIR DELEGATION TO COINCIDE WITH PERIOD OF SEVEREST STRAIN BETWEEN PRESIDENT SIAD AND HIS WESTERN FRIENDS, MOST NOTABLY OURSELVES. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT THIS VISIT HAS BEEN \"IMMINENT\" FOR NEARLY NINE MONTHS. WHILE SOVIET EMBASSY DOWNPLAYS ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO US, AT LEAST SOME SOMALIS ARE POINTING TO IT AS AN INDICATION OF CRISIS IN U.S.-SOMALI RELATIONS. END COMMENT. 4. (C) DELEGATION\'S CALL AT PARTY HEADQUARTERS SEEMS AN UNUSUAL MOVE TO US FOR A MISSION WHOSE OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE IS STRICTLY ECONOMIC. WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENT. CRIGLER "	Success: CSV parsed	null	34,692
240	10/25/1988 15:00	88ADANA638	Consulate Adana	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88ISTANBUL5140" ]	R 251500Z OCT 88 FM AMCONSUL ADANA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4559 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL AMCONSUL IZMIR ","UNCLAS ADANA 0638 E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: SOCI, TU SUBJECT: POLICE FOIL APPARENT PKK ESCAPE ATTEMPT IN DIYARBAKIR REF: ISTANBUL 5140 1. (U) SUMMARY: DIYARBAKIR POLICE OCTOBER 23 DISCOVERED A 120 FOOT TUNNEL INTO A PRISON WHICH HOUSES MANY CON- VICTED OF SUPPORT FOR THE OUTLAWED PKK. AUTHORITIES IMMEDIATELY ORDERED THE TRANSFER OF 120 PRISONERS FROM DIYARBAKIR TO ESKISEHIR, WHICH TRIGGERED A FIGHT BETWEEN INMATES AND GUARDS IN WHICH 20 PRISONERS WERE WOUNDED. END SUMMARY. 2. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, POLICE ACTED ON A TIP EITHER FROM A PKK SUSPECT BEING INTERROGATED OR FROM A PRISONER. THEY FOUND A TUNNEL (VARIOUSLY ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN 40 AND 60 METERS LONG) STRETCHING FROM A HOUSE IN THE SLUM (GECECONDO) AREA OF DIYARBAKIR TOWARD THE INTERIOR OF THE PRISON. ABOUT FORTY ADDITIONAL METERS OF TUNNELING WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY TO REACH THE INTERIOR OF THE PRISON. 3. SECURITY AUTHORITIES ANNOUNCED THE TRANSFER OF 120 OF THE PRISONERS IN DIYARBAKIR TO ESKISEHIR. AMONG THEM WAS THE NOTED WOMAN PKK MILITANT, SAKINE POLAT, SENTENCED TO 56 YEARS. THE INMATES PROTESTED THE TRANSFER, AND 20 WERE WOUNDED IN THE SCUFFLE WHICH ENSUED. A NUMBER OF THE PRISONERS VOWED TO BEGIN A HUNGER STRIKE TO DRAMATIZE THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE TRANSFERS. POLICE HAVE ALSO ROUNDED UP FOR INTERROGATION APPROXIMATELY 30 PEOPLE LIVING NEAR THE HOUSE WHERE THE TUNNEL WAS DISCOVERED. 4. COMMENT: RESPONDING TO COMPLAINTS ABOUT MILITARY ADMIN- ISTRATION OF THE PRISON (ITS FORMER DIRECTOR WAS MURDERED IN ISTANBUL OCTOBER 23 IN APPARENT REPRISAL FOR HIS ACTIVITIES, REFTEL.) THE GOT TRANSFERRED THE PRISON TO CIVILIAN CONTROL EARLY THIS SUMMER. COLE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	34,752
241	11/5/1988 11:55	88BEIRUT6604	Embassy Beirut	UNCLASSIFIED	[]	O 051155Z NOV 88 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9575 INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY RIYADH AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY ROME USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 06604 TERREP E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, LE SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 4 ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION COMMUNIQUE 1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF TYPEWRITTEN TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE FROM THE ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION, DELIVERED AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 4 TO BEIRUT DAILY NEWSPAPER \"AN-NAHAR.\" COMMUNIQUE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A POLAROID-TYPE COLOR PHOTOGRAPH OF U.S. HOSTAGE TERRY ANDERSON. EMBASSY WILL OBTAIN COPY OF TEXT AND PHOTO AND WILL POUCH TO DEPARTMENT. 2. BEGIN TEXT: IN THE NAME OF GOD THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE (KORANIC OPENING PHRASE) TO THE LIBERALS OF THE WORLD TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO THE FAMILIES OF THE DETAINEES DAY AFTER DAY THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO INCREASE ITS DECEPTIONS, LIES AND COMPLETE MISLEADING OF THE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE FAMILIES OF THE DETAINEES, IN ORDER TO REDUCE ANY ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION TO COMMENCE PRACTICAL STEPS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF THE DETAINEES AND TO SAFEGUARD ITS POSITIONS, PRIVILEGES AND SPECIAL INTERESTS. AFTER THE COMMENTS OF REAGAN AND BUSH ON THE CONTENTS OF THE VIDEOTAPE ISSUED BY TERRY ANDERSON, WE WISH TO CLARIFY THE FOLLOWING: 1 - THE VIDEOTAPE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT IT INCLUDED, WAS ISSUED DIRECTLY BY TERRY ANDERSON WITHOUT ANY PRESSURES AND AS A RESULT OF WRITTEN AND PHOTOGRAPHED MESSAGES SENT TO HIM THORUGH NEW AGENCIES. THE TAPE WAS ISSUED AFTER A SHARP AND LARGE DEBATE BETWEEN US AND HIM CONCERNING ALL THE IDEAS HE PRESENTED IN IT, WHICH WE FOUND WERE GREATLY INCOMPLETE. TERRY ANDERSON WILL HAVE A SUITABLE REPLY TO THE CLAIMS (OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION - ED.). 2 - AMERICA ALWAYS ATTEMPTS TO \"EVADE\" THE CONTENTS OF THE TAPE AND LETTERS, WHICH REPRESENT A TRUE REALITY WHICH CANNOT BE DEBATED, BY RAISING DOUBTS AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE TAPE AND (CLAIMING - ED.) THAT IT WAS ISSUED BY THE KIDNAPPERS. 3 - THE DETAINEES IN OUR POSSESSION ARE NOT ISOLATED FROM THE EXTERNAL WORLD. THEY RECEIVE ALL THE NEWS THROUGH NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES AND TELEVISION. THEY KNOW EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED OR HAPPENS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR SITUATION, BIG OR SMALL. WHAT REAGAN SAID IN THIS CASE IS LIKE THE OSTRICH WHICH HIDES ITS HEAD IN THE GROUND SO THE HUNTERS WILL NOT SEE IT. 4 - THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, HIS VICE PRESIDENT, STAFF AND ASSISTANTS, MADE ALL THE DEALS PERTAINING TO THE ISSUE OF DETAINEES; IF THIS WERE NOT SO, WHO ELSE NEGOTIATED THE CASE OF THE TWA AIRLINER? HOW WERE THE FORTY PASSENGERS AND 735 DETAINEES IN THE PRISONS OF ISRAEL RELEASED? WHO NEGOTIATED THE ISSUE OF \"IRAN-CONTRA?\" WHO GAVE THE ARMS, TOOK THE FUNDS AND TRANSFERRED SOME TO THE CONTRAS? WE WERE SURPRISED THAT REAGAN RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW UNTIL NOW WHO GAVE THE ARMS AND WHERE THE FUNDS CAME FROM IN THE \"IRANGATE\" ISSUE. WAS IT NOT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION? OR ARE THEY ALL ON A FARM WHERE EACH CROWS ON HIS OWN? IF THEY WERE AWARE, IT IS A CATASTROPHE WHICH CANNOT BE DENIED. IF THEY WERE UNAWARE, THE CATASTROPHE IS GREATER. 5 - AS FOR CLAIMS THAT THE CEASEFIRE IN THE GULF WILL SPEED THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES WITH US, WE REITERATE FOR THE ONE-THOUSANDTH TIME OUR INSISTENCE THAT THE ISSUE OF ALL THE DETAINEES IS UNCONNECTED, IN PART OR IN WHOLE, NEAR OR FAR, WITH WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE GULF. THE HOPE WHICH PREVIOUSLY PREVAILED HAS GONE AND CANNOT COME BACK. THE NON-RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES IS NOW DUE TO THE AMERICAN SANCTIMONY, FRAUD AND THE FACT THAT PROMISES AND GUARANTEES HAVE NOT BEEN FULFILLED. 6 - THE ONLY SAFE WAY FOR THE FREEDOM AND SAFETY OF THE DETAINEES IS ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR JUST DEMANDS. THIS IS THE PRINCIPAL FOCAL POINT OF THIS ISSUE; NOTHING ELSE. THE ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION NOVEMBER 2, 1988 END TEXT. MCCARTHY "	Success: CSV parsed	null	34,802
242	11/8/1988 15:49	88TUNIS11598	Embassy Tunis	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	P 081549Z NOV 88 FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8538 INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY ROME ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 11598 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ECON, ELAB, PREL, TS SUBJECT: TUNISIA CELEBRATES 7 NOVEMBER; ELECTIONS NEXT APRIL; NATIONAL PACT SIGNED REF: (A) FBIS LD0711185788; (B) FBIS LD0711163688 1. C O N F I D E N T I A L- ENTIRE TEXT. ------- SUMMARY ------- 2. TUNISIA CELEBRATED THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT LAST 7 NOVEMBER WITH FESTIVITIES AND CEREMONIES. TUNISIANS RESPONDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY. IN AN ADDRESS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES BEN ALI ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD 9 APRIL AND RECAPITULATED HIS GOVERNMENT\'S ACHIEVEMENTS OVER THE PAST YEAR. TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE LEGAL OPPOSITION AND PROFESSIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS HE SIGNED A \"NATIONAL PACT\" TO SERVE AS A UNIFYING CREDO. FOR MOST TUNISIANS BEN ALI HAS LIVED UP TO THE PROMISES AND EXPECTATIONS EVOKED LAST YEAR. END SUMMARY. ------------------------------------ 7 NOVEMBER: AN OCCASION TO CELEBRATE ------------------------------------ 3. THE 7TH OF NOVEMBER WAS THE OCCASION FOR A WIDE RANGE OF FESTIVITIES AND CEREMONIES. PRESIDENT ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI HAD SET THE MOOD TWO DAYS BEFORE ISSUING A CLEMENCY THAT BENEFITED SCORES OF PRISONERS, INCLUDING SUCH PROMINENT OPPOSITION FIGURES AS NAJIB CHEBBI AND THE ISLAMIST ABDELFATAH MOUROU (SEPTEL). STREETS WERE RENAMED, CONFERENCES HELD, AND PARADES ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT TUNISIA. (NATIONAL TV SHOWED THE TUNSIAN CONSUL IN LIBYA INAUGURATING A \"7 NOVEMBER AVENUE\" IN TRIPOLI.) GOT LET GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES LEAVE WORK EARLY. UNLIKE PAST PARADES, THE MILITARY ASPECT DID NOT DOMINATE: NO WEAPONS WERE DISPLAYED AND NO JETS OVERFLEW THE PROCESSIONS. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN TUNISIA\'S HISTORY, THE LEGAL OPPOSITION PARTIES WERE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PARADES: THE YOUTH WINGS OF THE LEGAL PARTIES HAD FLOATS. THE MOST PROMINENT FOREIGN DIGNITARY AT THE FESTIVITIES WAS LIBYAN COMMANDANT KHOUILDY HUMIDI WHO STOOD AT BEN ALI\'S SIDE ON THE VIEWING STAND. HABIB AMMAR, THE RECENTLY FIRED INTERIOR MINISTER, WAS ALSO PRESENT AND WAS ONE OF 12 RECIPIENTS OF A \"ORDER OF 7TH NOVEMBER RIBBON\" AWARDED BY BEN ALI THAT DAY. DIPLOMATS WHO OBSERVED AMMAR UP CLOSE, HOWEVER, SAID HE LOOKED DRAWN. 4. A FEW WEEKS BEFORE THE FESTIVITIES TWO INDEPENDENT PAPERS ASKED BEN ALI TO TREAT 7TH NOVEMBER AS AN ORDINARY DAY SO AS TO BREAK DEFINITIVELY WITH THE PERSONALITY CULT OF THE BOURGUIBA YEARS. THIS SENTIMENT WAS NOT WIDESPREAD, HOWEVER, AND THE THOUSANDS WHO ATTENDED THE PARADES, FIREWORKS, ETC. WERE OBVIOUSLY ENTHUSIASTIC, ALBEIT LESS BOISTEROUS THAN SUCH CROWDS WERE ON SIMILAR OCCASIONS DURING THE BOURGUIBA ERA. ------------------------------------- BEN ALI ADDRESSES CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ------------------------------------- 5. IN AN ADDRESS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (REF A) THE AFTERNOON OF 7 NOVEMBER PRESIDENT BEN ALI ANNOUNCED NEW MEASURES AND RECAPITULATED RECENT ACHIEVEMENTS. HE ANNOUNCED THAT EARLY PRESIDENTIAL AND GENERAL LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD 9 APRIL 1989. (FYI. THIS SUPPLANTS THE ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY AND NOVEMBER 1989. END FYI.) OTHER MEASURES INCLUDE: A SECRETARIAT OF STATE CHARGED WITH RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS; A DRAFT LAW ABOLISHING FORCED LABOR AS A PRISON SENTENCE; RESTRUCTURED AND ENHANCED GOVERNORATE COUNCILS; A COMMITTEE TO ENHANCE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY; AND A SUPREME COUNCIL OF COMMUNICATION. 6. BEN ALI MENTIONED THE RECENT POLITICAL REFORMS AND THANKED THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ARAB ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FOR SELECTING TUNISIA TO HOST THE ARAB/AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE. HE REITERATED GOT\'S PLAN TO ARABIZING EDUCATION AND OUTLINED PLANS TO TACKLE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (SEPTEL), ESPECIALLY UNEMPLOYMENT: \"OUR MAJOR CONCERN\". HE APPEALED TO HIS FELLOW TUNISIANS TO OVERCOME THE \"WAITING ATTITUDE\" AND ADMINISTRATIVE SLOWNESS AND ASKED TRADE UNIONIST TO BREAK WITH THE NEGATIVE PAST. AS FOR FOREIGN POLICY, HIS GOVERNMENT ASSIGNED PRIME IMPORTANCE TO THE MAGHREB, HAD REESTABLISHED THE COUNTRY\'S ARAB DIMENSION, AND HAD REINFORCED LINKS WITH OTHER MUSLIM, AFRICAN, MEDITERRANEAN, AND NON-ALIGNED STATES. RESPECT FOR MORALITY, HE SAID, IS BINDING ON EVERYONE. WOMEN, BEING ROLE MODELS FOR CHILDREN, MUST PROVE THEY ARE WORTHY OF THE RIGHTS THAT THEY HAVE GAINED. HE CALLED ISLAM A RELIGION OF TOLERANCE AND TUNISIA\'S REFUGE AND ASKED THEOLOGIANS TO GO HAND IN HAND WITH PROGRESS. ----------------- THE NATIONAL PACT ----------------- 7. EARLIER IN THE DAY THE LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS SIGNED THE \"NATIONAL PACT\" (REF B), A SORT OF NATIONAL CREDO. THE PACT IS THE JOINT EFFORT OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE LEGAL PARTIES, THE TUNISIAN TRADE UNION FEDERATION (UGTT), THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (UTICA), AND A SYMPATHIZER OF THE ISLAMIC TENDENCY MOVEMENT. OF THE FOUR BROAD TOPICS THAT THE PACT DISCUSSES, THE ONE ON \"IDENTITY\" IS THE MOST SPECIFIC. IT AFFIRMS FORCEFULLY THE NEED FOR ARABIZATION AND REITERATES TUNISIA\'S AVERSION TO POLYGAMY AND SUPPORT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN IN DIVORCE. UNDER THE HEADING \"POLITICAL REGIME\" THE NEED FOR RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE IS RESTATED; UNDER \"DEVELOPMENT\" THE PACT CALLS ON CITIZENS TO SUBMIT TO \"FISCAL DUTY\", ENDORSES AN EQUITABLE SHARING OF ECONOMIC SACRIFICES, AND ASSIGNS PRIORITY TO AGRICULTURE. THE \"FOREIGN RELATIONS\" SECTION AFFIRMS THE URGENCY OF CREATING AN ARAB MAGHREB AND TUNISIA\'S ATTACHMENT TO NON-ALIGNMENT AND SUPPORT FOR THE UN AND OAU. ------- COMMENT ------- 8. WHEN TUNISIANS COMPARE BEN ALI\'S RECORD WITH THE PROMISES AND EXPECTATIONS EVOKED LAST YEAR THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY BELIEVE HE HAS DELIVERED. GOT HAS FREED HUNDREDS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, ENACTED NUMEROUS POLITICAL REFORMS, AND -- PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY -- CONVINCED THE AVERAGE MAN THAT IT IS HONEST AND COMPETENT. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE PASSAGE IN BEN ALI\'S SPEECH BEFORE THE CHAMBER THAT DREW THE MOST APPLAUSE WAS THE SECTION WHERE HE SAID (ALLUDING TO HABIB AMMAR), \"NO ONE IS ABOVE THE LAW...THERE IS NO ROOM FOR THE EXPLOITATIONS OF NEPOTISM AND FAVORITISM....\" PELLETREAU "	Success: CSV parsed	null	34,913
243	11/15/1988 11:21	88HARARE5924	Embassy Harare	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE279799", "88STATE357278" ]	R 151121Z NOV 88 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9839 INFO AMEMBASSY MAPUTO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA AMEMBASSY LUSAKA AMEMBASSY GABORONE ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 05924 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: ZI, KPRP, PTER SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE - 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: A) STATE 357278, B) STATE 279799 1. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR SUBMISSION FOR THE ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT AS OUTLINED IN REF A: COURT PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING TERRORISM IN 1988 --------------------------------------------- -- 2. THERE WERE TWO NOTEWORTHY COURT CASES INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1988. THE FIRST CONCERNED SIX INDIVIDUALS ACCUSED OF A STRING OF SOUTH AFRICAN DIRECTED BOMBINGS OF SUSPECTED ANC TARGETS IN HARARE AND BULAWAYO OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. THE SECOND WAS THE CASE OF A MOZAMBICAN NATIONAL ACCUSED OF BEING A RENAMO TERRORIST. 3. ONE OF THE SIX ALLEGED SOUTH AFRICAN AGENTS, RORY MAGUIRE, WAS CONVICTED AND SENTENCED IN JULY TO SEVEN YEARS FOR HIS ROLE IN THE BOMBINGS. THREE OTHERS-- KEVIN WOODS, MICHAEL SMITH AND PHILLIP CONJWAYO--ARE BEING TRIED AT PRESENT. TWO--BARRY BAWDEN AND GUY BAWDEN--STILL AWAIT TRIAL. 4. THE ACCUSED RENAMO TERRORIST, JOHN SAMUEL MATAVEYA, WAS CONVICTED IN NOVEMBER ON SIX OF SEVEN COUNTS OF MURDER, ATTEMPTED MURDER, ARMED ROBBERY AND POSSESSION OF ARMS OF WAR. MATAVEYA KILLED TWO CIVILIANS, INCLUDING A YOUNG BOY, IN APRIL 1987. HIS WAS THE FIRST TRIAL IN ZIMBABWEAN COURTS OF AN ALLEGED RENAMO TERRORIST. PLO STATUS ---------- 5. THE PLO IS ACCORDED FULL DIPLOMATIC STATUS INCLUDING AN ACCREDITED AMBASSADOR. THIS IS UNCHANGED SINCE 1987. PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM ----------------------------------------- 6. NONE. MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN 1988 -------------------------------------- 7. THE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIONS THIS YEAR HAVE BEEN: -- CONTINUING EFFORTS TO COUNTER AND CONTAIN RENAMO INCURSIONS INTO EASTERN ZIMBABWE AND ESPECIALLY RENAMO ATTACKS ON BORDER CIVILIAN POPULATIONS. THOUGH THE LEVEL OF SUCH RENAMO ACTIVITY MAY HAVE DROPPED, CIVILIANS ALONG THE BORDER ARE STILL SUBJECT TO MURDER, MUTILATION AND DISAPPEARANCE. -- THE ARREST AND ELIMINATION OF A MAJOR NETWORK OF SOUTH AFRICAN AGENTS APPARENTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST SUSPECTED ANC TARGETS IN RECENT YEARS. -- THE AMNESTY DECLARED IN APRIL WHICH, ALONG WITH THE UNITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN ZANU AND ZAPU, EFFECTIVELY ENDED DISSIDENT VIOLENCE IN MATABELELAND. 113 DISSIDENTS TURNED THEMSELVES IN ACCOUNTING FOR MOST ALL THOSE BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING IN THE BUSH. RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ------------------------------- 8. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM HAS RESPONDED TO CASES OF ALLEGED TERRORISM BROUGHT BEFORE IT IN LINE WITH INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND PROFESSIONAL JUDICIARY. SO FAR THIS YEAR THERE HAVE BEEN TWO CONVICTIONS, AS OUTLINED ABOVE, WHILE OTHER TRIALS ARE STILL UNDER WAY. SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ----------------------------------- 9. ZIMBABWE ACCORDS THE ANC REPRESENTATIVE IN HARARE OFFICIAL STATUS AND SUPPORTS THE ANC\'S POLITICAL GOAL OF AN END TO APARTHEID. SOME 250 SOUTH AFRICAN EXILES FIND REFUGE IN ZIMBABWE. IN THE PAST, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS CHARGED THAT THE ANC HAS LAUNCHED ATTACKS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA FROM ZIMBABWEAN TERRITORY. BUT THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT MAKES A GENUINE EFFORT TO CONTROL ANC ACTIVITY ON ZIMBABWEAN TERRITORY. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY PERMANENT ANC MILITARY PRESENCE IN ZIMBABWE. RAWLINGS "	Success: CSV parsed	null	35,073
244	11/29/1988 15:22	88ACCRA8991	Embassy Accra	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE357278" ]	R 291522Z NOV 88 FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3224 ","UNCLAS ACCRA 08991 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, GH SUBJECT: 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT: GHANA REF: STATE 357278 GHANA FALLS OUTSIDE THE LIST OF COUNTRIES FOR WHICH AN ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT IS REQUIRED. FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO QUESTIONS POSED PARA 5, REFTEL: A) THERE WERE NO COURT PROSECUTIONS IN GHANA IN 1988 INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NOR WERE THERE ANY SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM. B) ACCORDING TO THE MOST RECENT (JANUARY 1988) OFFICIAL GOG DIP LIST, WHICH REPLACED ONE ISSUED IN 1984, THE PLO IS NOW OFFICIALLY LISTED AS AN EMBASSY. ITS CHIEF OF MISSION, IBRAHIM KHALIL OMAR, IS LISTED AS AEP IN THE ORDER OF PRECEDENCE, WHICH STATES HE PRESENTED CREDENTIALS ON JULY 17, 1986. C) GHANA HAS MADE NO OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENT IN 1988 IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE. LYNE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	35,179
245	11/30/1988 15:07	88LAGOS17750	Consulate Lagos	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88LAGOS17683" ]	P 301507Z NOV 88 FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7072 INFO AMCONSUL KADUNA PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 17750 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, KISL, NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: REACTION TO CESSATION OF SHARIA DEBATE REF: LAGOS 17683 1. (C) SUMMARY: INITIAL PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT\'S (FMG) DECISION TO HALT DEBATE ON SHARIA LAW IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN MUTED. CRITICISM HAS PREDICTABLY COME FROM PARTISANS ON THE ISSUE AND THOSE OPPOSED TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT. ATTEMPTS IN THE ASSEMBLY TO CONTEST THE GOVERNMENT ACTION WERE QUICKLY OVERRULED AND ORDINARY BUSINESS RESUMED. THE REACTIONS MAY PORTEND INCREASING SKEPTICISM TOWARDS THE ASSEMBLY\'S ROLE IN THE TRANSITION; SEE COMMENT, PARA. 6. END SUMMARY. 2. (U) THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT\'S DECISION TO END DEBATE IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ON THE INCLUSION OF SHARIA LAW IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION HAS SO FAR PROVOKED LITTLE OUTCRY FROM THE ASSEMBLYMEN OR THE PUBLIC AT LARGE. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, MOST DELEGATES ISSUED MILD STATEMENTS--MANY SUPPORTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT\'S ACTION--OR REFUSED COMMENT. TYPICAL WAS THE REACTION OF REPRESENTATIVE LAM ADESINA OF THE IBADAN SOUTH AREA OF OYO STATE, WHO WAS QUOTED IN THE NOVEMBER 29 EDITION OF THE INFLUENTIAL LAGOS DAILY, \"GUARDIAN,\" AS SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT\'S INTERVENTION WAS \"IN ORDER.\" HE ADDED THAT \"ANY GOOD GOVERNMENT WOULD DO EXACTLY WHAT THE BABANGIDA ADMINISTRATION DID\" TO BREAK THE SEVEN-WEEK DEADLOCK OVER THE ISSUE. THE SAME PAPER QUOTED EMBASSY CONTACT OLABIYI DURAJAIYE (REFTEL) FROM IDEJU SOUTH, OGUN STATE, AS SAYING THAT THE ASSEMBLY \"GOT WHAT WE DESERVE\" FOR NOT MOVING FASTER TOWARD A COMPROMISE. 3. MUCH OF THE CRITICISM FROM THE LAWMAKERS WAS COUCHED IN MODERATE TERMS. ACCORDING TO THE NOVEMBER 29 EDITION OF THE \"PUNCH\" NEWSPAPER, MALLAM ABBA DABO, A STRONG ADVOCATE OF SHARIA FROM KANO, CALLED THE GOVERNMENT ACTION \"SAD AND UNFORTUNATE.\" HE ASSERTED THAT, CONTRARY TO GOVERNMENT ALLEGATIONS, THE POLITICAL ELITE IS CAPABLE OF REACHING CONSENSUS ON CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS, BUT CONCEDED THAT THE ASSEMBLY WAS CULPABLE TO THE EXTENT OF CREATING AN \"IMPRESSION OF DISHARMONY\" THROUGH THE INORDINATE LENGTH OF THE DEBATE. OTHER MEMBERS, HOWEVER, WERE MORE FORTHRIGHT. THE \"GUARDIAN\" QUOTED SAMUEL FAGOYINBO (MUSHIN CENTRAL, LAGOS) AS DECLARING THE MOVE A \"CLEAR RAPE OF DEMOCRACY\" AND CHARGING THAT \"THE FACT THAT THE RIGHT TO FASHION A DEMOCRATIC DOCUMENT HAS BEEN TAKEN AWAY FROM THE ASSEMBLY DOES NOT AUGUR WELL FOR THE COUNTRY.\" 4. (U) OTHER SIGNIFICANT VOICES OF DISSENT CAME FROM PARTISANS IN THE SHARIA LAW DEBATE OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY. NOTABLE AMONG THEM WAS A STATEMENT IN THE NOVEMBER 29 \"GUARDIAN\" BY ANTHONY O. OKOGIE, ARCHBISHOP OF LAGOS AND PRESIDENT OF THE CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA (CAN), WHICH QUOTED HIM AS SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD \"STAY CLEAR\" OF ANY DISCUSSION OF RELIGIOUS ISSUES. \"PUNCH\" ALSO QUOTED NOTED CONSTITUTIONAL LAWYER--AND OPPONENT OF MILITARY RULE--OLU ONAGORUWA AS STATING SARCASTICALLY THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DISSOLVE THE ASSEMBLY ENTIRELY AND PUBLISH ITS OWN \"PRE-CONCEIVED CONSTITUTION.\" 5. (U) ACCORDING TO THE PRESS ACCOUNTS, THE ASSEMBLY PROCEEDINGS ON THE DAY AFTER THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT WERE ORDERLY. THERE WERE SOME TENTATIVE EFFORTS TO RAISE THE GOVERNMENT ORDER FOR DEBATE ON THE FLOOR, INCLUDING ONE ON THE PART OF EMBASSY CONTACT GAIUS YARO OF BAUCHI STATE (REFTEL) TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MOVE CONTRADICTED THE GOVERNMENT\'S OWN DECREE IN ESTABLISHING THE ASSEMBLY. ANOTHER MEMBER ALSO CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF AIKHOMU\'S SPEECH TO ALTER THAT DECREE SINCE THE SPEECH IS NOT A LEGAL DOCUMENT AND CARRIES NO OFFICIAL WEIGHT. CHAIRMAN ANIAGOLU RULED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SPEECH WAS IN ORDER AND SUFFICED TO REMOVE SHARIA FROM THE ASSEMBLY\'S AREA OF DELIBERATION. ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS, THE ASSEMBLY THEN PROCEEDED WITH ITS METHODICAL CLAUSE-BY-CAUSE CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION WITHOUT FURTHER INTERRUPTION. - 6. (C) COMMENT: SHARIA\'S SUDDEN REMOVAL FROM THE ASSEMBLY\'S PURVIEW APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN GREETED WITH RESIGNATION IN SOME QUARTERS, AND DISCRETION AND CYNICISM IN OTHERS. THERE IS LITTLE IN THE PUBLIC RESPONSE TO DATE TO SUGGEST THAT THE ISSUE WILL BE REKINDLED IN THE ASSEMBLY OR IN ANY OTHER INFLUENTIAL FORUM. THE QUESTION REMAINS, HOWEVER, WHETHER SUCH RESIGNATION IS SPECIFIC TO THE GOVERNMENT\'S ACTION IN THIS ONE INSTANCE OR, AS WE SUSPECT, WILL CARRY OVER TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ASSEMBLY\'S DELIBERATIONS AS WELL. WHILE SOME MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC MAY RALLY TO THE ASSEMBLY IN OPPOSITION TO MILITARY INTRUSION INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ASSEMBLY HAS PROBABLY LOST STATURE THROUGH NOT FULFILLING THE POPULAR HOPE THAT A CIVILIAN INSTITUTION, ALBEIT FUNCTIONING UNDER STRAITENED CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN DEMONSTRATE A CAPACITY FOR COOPERATIVE AND RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP ON ISSUES OF CRITICAL IMPORT. LYMAN "	Success: CSV parsed	null	35,214
246	12/2/1988 14:30	88HAVANA6766	US Interests Section Havana	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE357278", "88STATE42378" ]	R 021430Z DEC 88 FM USINT HAVANA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7182 ","UNCLAS HAVANA 06766 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, CU SUBJECT: CUBA: 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 357278 1. CUBA. - 2. TERRORISM SUPPORT: THE SIX-MAN PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) REPRESENTATION IS ACCORDED FULL DIP- LOMATIC STATUS AND PRIVILEGES IN HAVANA. ITS SENIOR MEMBER, IMAD JADA\'A, WHO HAS BEEN POSTED TO HAVANA SINCE MARCH 1985, IS TREATED AS AN AMBASSADOR. AS REPORTED EARLIER, OTHER PLO OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO VISIT CUBA ON A REGULAR BASIS. IN SEPTEMBER OF 1988, HAVANA HOSTED THE CONFERENCE FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF FRIENDSHIP WITH ARAB NATIONS (FEEAM), WHICH REPRESENTATIVES FROM IRAQ AND IRAN ATTENDED. - 3. MATERIAL AND FINANCIAL AID HAS BEEN GIVEN IN THE PAST TO SELECTED GUERRILLA GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA, INCLUDING THE FMLP AND THE M-19. THERE IS LITTLE INTELLIGENCE ON CURRENT CUBAN MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THESE TWO GROUPS, BUT TRAINING IN THE FORMER CASE AND LIAISON IN THE LATTER CONTINUE. EARLIER THIS YEAR, A MEMBER OF THE PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, WHO IS WANTED BY THE FBI, WAS RELEASED FROM JAIL IN MEXICO AND REPORTEDLY HAS TAKEN REFUGE IN CUBA. - 4. PER PARA 13 OF 87 STATE 42378, REMAINDER OF THE REPORT IS TO BE COMPLETED IN WASHINGTON. TAYLOR "	Success: CSV parsed	null	35,325
247	12/8/1988 0:07	88BOGOTA18301	Embassy Bogota	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88BOGOTA5976", "88STATE357278" ]	R 080007Z DEC 88 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1694 INFO DIA WASHDC DEA WASHDC CIA WASHDC SECDEF WASHDC USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY QUITO AMEMBASSY LIMA AMEMBASSY LA PAZ ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 18301 STATE FOR S/CT WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: KPRP, PTER, CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: A) STATE 357278, B) BOGOTA 5976 1. COLOMBIA HAS A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT WHOSE INSTITUTIONS ARE UNDER ATTACK BY FOUR MAJOR SUBNATIONAL GUERRILLA GROUPS AND BY NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. FAR FROM BEING A SUPPORTER OF TERRORISM, COLOMBIA IS THE VICTIM OF SUSTAINED TERRORIST ATTACKS. THE COUNTRY\'S INSTITUTIONS ARE THREATENED THROUGH FREQUENT ATTACKS BY INSURGENTS ON RELATIVELY SMALL RURAL TOWNS AND POLICE STATIONS. IN 1988 THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED TREND TOWARDS LARGER-SCALE ATTACKS BY COMBINED GUERRILLA GROUPS AGAINST HARDER MILITARY TARGETS. ATTACKS AGAINST ECONOMIC TARGETS, PARTICULARLY THE COUNTRY\'S NATIONAL OIL PIPELINE, HAVE INCREASED OVER THE LAST YEAR. 2. INSURGENT VIOLENCE CAN BE CONSIDERED INTERNATIONAL ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT ONE GROUP\'S ACTIVITIES HAVE AT TIMES CROSSED COLOMBIA\'S BORDER INTO VENEZUELA, WHERE KIDNAPPING AND EXTORTION SCHEMES WERE CARRIED OUT, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THE GROUPS\' RECEIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. 3. ANOTHER SOURCE OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE EMANATES FROM THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER ORGANIZATIONS. WHILE NOT ESSENTIALLY POLITICALLY MOTIVATED, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER INSTIGATED VIOLENCE HAS A POLITICAL EFFECT IN THAT MANY SUCH ACTIONS ARE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO INTIMIDATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND INSTITUTIONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO ASSURE THEIR OWN FREEDOM TO PURSUE THE NARCOTICS TRADE AND ENJOY THE BENEFITS THEREOF. NARCOTICS-RELATED TERRORISM DOES HAVE AN INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER SINCE THE TRAFFICKERS USE VIOLENCE TO EXTEND THEIR NARCOTICS NETWORKS BEYOND COLOMBIA, INCLUDING INTO THE UNITED STATES. 4. NARCOTICS TERRORISM DIRECTED AT THE COLOMBIAN JUDICIARY IN 1988 ACCOMPLISHED ITS GOAL OF MAKING THE PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION OF MAJOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS TOO DANGEROUS FOR MOST OFFICIALS. PRESIDENT BARCO RELEASED A STATEMENT IN SEPTEMBER STATING THAT THE BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY WAS A PRINCIPAL VICTIM OF NARCO TERRORISM DIRECTED AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COUNCIL OF STATE. A MAJOR TRAFFICKER, JORGE LUIS OCHOA, WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ON THE LAST DAY OF 1987 WHILE THE GOVERNMENT WAS ATTEMPTING TO FIND A WAY TO EXTRADITE HIM. MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE THREATS AND BRIBES WERE RESPONSIBLE. 5. THOSE ACCUSED OF ASSASSINATING THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN 1984 ARE CONNECTED TO MEDELLIN CARTEL CHIEF PABLO ESCOBAR. THEY WERE TRIED IN 1988 AND A JURY FOUND THEM INNOCENT. THE JUDGE THREW OUT THE VERDICT, DECLARING IT NULL AND VOID BECAUSE IT CONTRADICTED THE EVIDENCE. A NEW JURY WAS SO SEVERELY THREATENED THAT THE JUDGE DECLARED A MISTRIAL SHORTLY BEFORE A VERDICT WAS TO HAVE BEEN RENDERED. SEVERAL JUDGES AND OFFICIALS WHO TOOK FORCEFUL ACTIONS AGAINST THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS HAVE BEEN FORCED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. MAJOR COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS ------------------------------- 6. THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED STATE-OF-SIEGE DECREES AND ENACTED SWEEPING ANTI-TERRORIST DECREES IN JANUARY 1988 IN RESPONSE TO THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS\' KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF ATTORNEY GENERAL CARLOS MAURO HOYOS. THE DECREES DID NOT ADDRESS EXTRADITION. THEY DID, HOWEVER, EXPAND THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM, ENHANCE THE POWERS OF THE POLICE WITH REGARD TO ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND CONFISCATIONS, CREATE SPECIAL JUDGES AND POLICE TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM, AND PROVIDE STRICT RULES FOR THE USE OF HABEAS CORPUS. TWO PROVISIONS OF THE DECREES WERE SUBSEQUENTLY OVERTURNED BY THE SUPREME COURT, SPECIFICALLY THOSE ITEMS ALLOWING POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES TO MAKES SEARCHES AND ARRESTS ON THE BASIS OF SUSPICION AND WITHOUT WARRANTS, AND REQUIRING REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND INHABITANTS IN AREAS DEEMED TO BE USED BY TERRORISTS. 7. IN ADDITION, COLOMBIA HAS WORKED FOR ADOPTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES OF RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE ILLICIT CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE. THESE EFFORTS ARE DESIGNED TO LIMIT THE AVAILABILITY OF SOPHISTICATED CONVENTIONAL ARMS TO WEALTHY TRAFFICKERS AND GUERRILLAS. 8. THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA HAS MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. MCNAMARA "	Success: CSV parsed	null	35,367
248	12/8/1988 9:15	88RIYADH12430	Embassy Riyadh	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88STATE357278" ]	R 080915Z DEC 88 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2860 INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN AMCONSUL JEDDAH ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 12430 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, SA SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 357278 ------------------------ SECTION I - UNCLASSIFIED ------------------------ 1. THERE FOLLOWS DRAFT VERSION OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN SUBMISSION TO THE 1988 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, KEYED TO REFTEL. 2. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL POSTS-- - A. RESULTS OF 1988 COURT PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC TERRORISM: - FOLLOWING BOMBINGS IN MARCH AND APRIL AT TWO INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES AT RAS TANURA AND JUBAIL, IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE, AND THE DISMANTLING OF ANOTHER BOMB AT RAS TANURA, THREE YOUNG MEN WERE ARRESTED AT QATIF IN EARLY AUGUST AFTER A GUN BATTLE WITH POLICE. THE THREE AND AN ACCOMPLICE WERE CHARGED WITH TERRORISM, SABOTAGE, CONSPIRING WITH IRAN, AND, IN THE CASE OF TWO, MURDER. THEY WERE TRIED IN CLOSED SESSION, ACCORDING TO SAUDI LAW, DURING SEPTEMBER OF 1988, FOUND GUILTY AND SENTENCED TO DEATH. PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION, AUTHORITIES RECEIVED THREATS FROM AN UNKNOWN GROUP CALLING ITSELF \"HIZBOLLAH OF THE HEJAZ\". AFTER REVIEW OF THE SENTENCES BY THE KING, THE EXECUTIONS WERE CARRIED OUT BY DECAPITATION ON SEPTEMBER 30. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, AUTHORITIES RECEIVED THREATS OF RETALIATION FROM AN ALSO-UNKNOWN \"ISLAMIC JIHAD OF THE HIJAZ\", POSSIBLY THE SAME AS THE PREVIOUS GROUP. - B. STATUS OF THE PLO IN THE HOST COUNTRY: - THE STATUS OF THE PLO IN SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT CHANGE DURING 1988. THE PLO MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN THE KINGDOM, WITH A MISSION NEAR RIYADH\'S DIPLOMATIC QUARTER. SAUDI ARABIA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO RECOGNIZE THE DECLARATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ISSUED BY THE PNC IN NOVEMBER, 1988. - C. STATEMENTS BY THE HOST COUNTRY IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM OR TERRORISM-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES: - SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT MAKE ANY SUCH STATEMENTS DURING 1988. IN FACT, HIGH OFFICIALS CONDEMNED TERRORISM ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, MOST NOTICABLY IN THE CASE OF THE KUWAITI AIRLINER HIJACKING IN APRIL, WHICH INVOLVED SAUDI CITIZENS. AS IN THAT CASE, THEY HAVE GENERALLY CONDEMNED TERRORIST ACTS CARRIED OUT IN THE NAME OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE WHILE CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. 3. SPECIFIC POST REPORTING REQUIREMENTS-- - A. REVIEW OF MAJOR COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS IN CY 1988: - SAUDI ARABIA CONTINUED TO SPEAK OUT STRONGLY AND VOTE AGAINST TERRORISM IN 1988 ON ALL APPROPRIATE OCCASIONS. IN THE FIELD OF ANTI-TERRORISM TRAINING, WEST GERMAN SPECIALIST GEN. ULRICH WEGENER ARRIVED IN JUNE TO BEGIN ADVANCED TRAINING FOR THE ANTI-TERRORISM FORCES OF THE SAUDI SPECIAL SECURITY FORCE, FOUNDED IN 1979. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALSO SENT AN OFFICER TO A US SEMINAR ON NEGOTIATING IN HOSTAGE SITUATIONS. FOLLOWING THE EASTERN PROVINCE BOMBINGS, INDUSTRIAL SECURITY WAS CONSIDERABLY TIGHTENED, AND CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEES WERE PUT UNDER INCREASED SURVEILLANCE. THE SAUDIS ALSO TOOK ELABORATE SECURITY PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1988 HAJJ (THE ANNUAL PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA AND MEDINA) IN VIEW OF THE RIOTS CAUSED BY IRANIAN PILGRIMS THE YEAR BEFORE. THE HAJJ WENT SMOOTHLY. MONTHS AFTER THE HAJJ, THE PRESS REPORTED THAT ARMS HAD BEEN CONFISCATED FROM A FEW PILGRIMS. - B. RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: - IN AUGUST, THE ULEMA (THE NATIONAL BODY OF RELIGIOUS JURISTS) ANNOUNCED PROMULGATION OF A NEW LAW DEFINING SABOTAGE AS A MAJOR CRIME FOR WHICH THE DEATH PENALTY WAS POSSIBLE; THE DEFINITION OF SABOTAGE IN THE LAW INCLUDED HIJACKING OR BOMBING AIRPLANES. THIS LAW WAS REFERRED TO REPEATEDLY IN THE MEDIA DURING THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF THE MEN ARRESTED FOR THE EASTERN PROVINCE BOMBINGS, ALTHOUGH THEIR CRIMES WERE COMMITTED BEFORE THE LAW WENT INTO EFFECT. A ROYAL DECREE, WHICH WAS NEVER OFFICIALLY PROMULGATED BUT WAS DISCUSSED IN THE SAUDI PRESS, IMPOSED SIMILAR PENALTIES FOR DEMONSTRATING DURING THE HAJJ, ENGAGING IN TERRORIST ACTS, OR OTHERWISE ATTEMPTING DISRUPTION OF THE PILGRIMAGE. SAUDI OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD NOT HESITATE TO APPLY THESE LAWS FULLY IF NEEDED. - C. SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: - THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT DOES NOT SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND HAS REPEATEDLY SPOKEN AND VOTED AGAINST TERORIST ACTS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. SAUDI OFFICIALS MAKE A CAREFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM AND SUPPORT OF THE PLO, WHICH THEY CONSIDER A LEGITIMATE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT. WHILE DECRYING ACTS OF TERRORISM ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED IN THE NAME OF THE PALESTINIANS, SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTS THE PLO BOTH POLITICALLY AND FINANCIALLY (INDEED, IT IS ONE OF THAT ORGANIZATION\'S LEADING DONORS), AND WAS ONE OF THE FIRST NATIONS TO EXTEND DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO THE NEW PALESTINIAN \"STATE.\" SAUDI ARABIA IS NOT A KNOWN SANCTUARY FOR TERRORISTS. ------------------------- SECTION II - CONFIDENTIAL ------------------------- 4. IN REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 2, PART A, A POLICE SOURCE IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE HAS TOLD US THAT SEVERAL MORE PERSONS SUSPECTED OF COMPLICITY IN THE JUBAIL AND RAS TANURA BOMBINGS ARE STILL BEING HELD BY THE SAUDI GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIRECTORATE (GID) WHILE INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE CONTINUES. THUS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT FURTHER TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE. AT LEAST ONE OF THESE SUSPECTS IS SAID TO BE A SHIA OF LEBANESE ORIGIN, LEADING SAUDI POLICE TO BELIEVE THAT \"HIZBOLLAH OF THE HIJAZ\" AND \"ISLAMIC JIHAD OF THE HIJAZ\" ARE ONLY SURROGATES FOR THE LEBANESE HIZBOLLAH ORGANIZATION. CUTLER "	Success: CSV parsed	null	35,478
249	12/9/1988 6:05	88COLOMBO8559	Embassy Colombo	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE357278" ]	P 090605Z DEC 88 FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1883 ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 08559 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT-WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, CE, MV SUBJECT: LEGISLATIVELY MANDATED TERRORISM REPORTS: SRI LANKA AND MALDIVES REF: STATE 357278 1. DECONTROL UPON RECEIPT. --------------- 2. SRI LANKA ----------------- A. RESULTS OF ANY 1988 COURT PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM: EMBASSY KNOWS OF NO/NO 1988 COURT PROSECUTIONS IN SRI LANKA WHICH INVOLVED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. SEVERAL CASES WHICH WERE IN PROCESS DURING 1988, HOWEVER, INVOLVED INCIDENTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM ARISING OUT OF THE TWO SEPARATE INSURGENCIES WHICH SRI LANKA FACES: IN THE NORTH THAT OF SOME MILITANT TAMIL GROUPS--PARTICULARLY OF THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) WHICH CONTINUES TO OPPOSE THE INDO-SRI LANKA PEACE ACCORD SIGNED JULY 31, 1987--AND IN THE SOUTH THAT OF THE RADICAL REVOLUTIONARY, INTENSELY NATIONALISTIC SINHALESE GROUP, THE JANATHA VIMUKTHI PERAMUNA (JVP). AMONG THEM: --IN THE CASE OF THE TERRORIST GRENADE ATTACK AT PARLIAMENT ON AUGUST 18, 1987, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TELLS US THAT CHARGES ARE TO BE FILED \"SHORTLY,\" PROBABLY IN DECEMBER, AGAINST FOUR MEN. THEY ARE ACCUSED OF KILLING A DISTRICT MINISTER AND A PARLIAMENT OFFICIAL AND OF TRYING TO KILL THE PRESIDENT AND THE MINISTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. THE GRENADE ATTACK ON A MEETING OF SOME 140 MEMBERS OF THE RULING UNITED NATIONAL PARTY CAME AS PART OF PROTESTS AGAINST THE SIGNING OF THE INDO-SRI LANKA PEACE ACCORD. --THE CASE HAS COME TO COURT AGAINST THREE TAMILS ACCUSED IN THE MAY 1986 BOMBING OF AN AIR LANKA TRI-STAP WHICH KILLED 28 PEOPLE. ON DECEMBER 5 THE THREE PLEADED NOT GUILTY. THE CASE CONTINUES. --BEGINNING IN AUGUST 1987 FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE INDO-SRI LANKA ACCORD, AND CONTINUING THROUGHOUT 1988, SOME 4000 TAMILS SUSPECTFD MILITANTS, BEING HELD UNDER THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT AND EMERGENCY REGULATIONS, HAVE BEEN UNCONDITIONALLY RELEASED FROM DETENTION. B. HAS STATUS OF PLO CHANGED SINCE 1987: THE PLO HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE GSL AND CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN AN EMBASSY IN COLOMBO. IT IS HEADED BY THE EQUIVALENT OF A CHARGE D\'AFFAIRES WHO IS CALLED \"PLO REPRESENTATIVE AND HEAD OF THE MISSION\" ON THE DIPLOMATIC LIST; THERE IS ONLY ONE OTHER MAN, WITH COUNSELOR RANK, ON THE DIP LIST. SRI LANKA HAS RECOGNIZED THE STATE OF PALESTINE WHICH WAS PROCLAIMED AT THE PLO CONFERENCE IN ALGIERS IN MID-NOVEMBER. C. HAS SRI LANKA MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE? NO. D. A REVIEW OF MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN CY-88, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA: ON DECEMBER 6, SRI LANKA ENACTED ENABLING LEGISLATION TO CONFORM WITH THE SAARC CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM; IT THUS BECAME ONLY THE SECOND (AFTER NEPAL) OF THE SEVEN SAARC COUNTRIES TO BRING ITS OWN STATUTES INTO LINE WITH THE SAARC CONVENTION. E. RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, INCLUDING EXTRADITION ACTIONS, ACTIONS ON TERRORISM AFFECTING AMERICAN CITIZENS AND FACILITIES, OR DEALINGS WITH OTHER SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF TERRORISM: NOT APPLICABLE. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT GSL WOULD BE HELPFUL AND RESPONSIBLE TO USG CONCERNS IF TERRORISM ACTS HERE INVOLVED AMCITS/FACILITIES. F. SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT, IF ANY, FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: NOT APPLICABLE. ------------ 3. MALDIVES ------------ A. RESULTS OF ANY 1988 COURT PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM: EARLY ON THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 3, A GROUP OF SOME 150 ARMED TAMIL-SPEAKING MEN (LATER DETERMINED TO BE SRI LANKAN TAMILS, MERCENARIES WHO WERE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE\'S LIBERATION ORGANIZATION OF TAMIL EELAM, OR PLOTE), INVADED MALE, THE CAPITAL ISLAND CITY OF THE MALDIVES. TAKING THE MALDIVIANS COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE, THEY QUICKLY GAINED THE UPPER HAND IN MOST OF THE TINY ISLAND BUT WERE UNABLE TO CAPTURE THE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE, THE NATION\'S COMBINED (AND SOLE) SECURITY FORCE. PRESIDENT GAYOOM ASKED SEVERAL NATIONS FOR HELP IN QUELLING THE INVASION; SHORTLY BEFORE MIDNIGHT INDIAN TROOPS ARRIVED AND WERE ABLE TO RELIEVE THEIR BELEAGERED MALDIVIAN NSS BREATHERN. SOME OF THE INVADERS ESCAPED BY BOAT BUT WERE LATER CAPTURED BY INDIAN NAVY AND RETURNED TO MALE. AT THE END OF 1988, THE GOVERNMENT OF MALDIVES IS HOLDING ABOUT 70 OF THESE SRI LANKAN TAMIL INVADERS, AND INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE. THEY ALSO HOLD 2 MALDIVIAN CITIZENS, INCLUDING THE MEN ACCUSED OF MASTERMINDING THE PLOT, WHO WERE CAPTURED WITH THE FLEEING TAMILS. A FURTHER TWO MALDIVIANS HAVE BEEN DETAINED FOR QUESTIONING. SO FAR NO TRIAL DATES HAVE BEEN SET. B. HAS STATUS OF PLO CHANGED SINCE 1987: THE PLO HAS MAINTAINED A ONE-MAN EMBASSY IN THE MALDIVIAN CAPITAL SINCE THE EARLY 1980\'S. THE CURRENT PLO REPRESENTA- TIVE, WHO HOLDS THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR, APPARENTLY IS ONLY OCCASIONALLY IN COUNTRY. MALDIVES HAS RECOGNIZED THE STATE OF PALESTINE WHICH WAS PROCLAIMED IN MID-NOVEMBER AT THE PLO\'S ALGIERS CONFERENCE. C. HAS MALDIVES MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE: NO. MARKS "	Success: CSV parsed	null	35,622
250	12/9/1988 20:31	88MADRID15938	Embassy Madrid	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE357278" ]	O 092031Z DEC 88 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7349 ","UNCLAS MADRID 15938 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, SP SUBJECT: SPAIN: 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 357278 JUDICIAL RESPONSES AND MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS --------------------------------------------- -------- 1. SPAIN AND THE U.S. SIGNED A SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL EXTRADITION TREATY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1988 THAT STRENGTHENED COOPERATION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM BY PROVIDING THAT ANY FUGITIVE CHARGED WITH A VIOLENT CRIME CANNOT DEFEAT EXTRADITION BY CLAIMING HIS OFFENSE WAS POLITICAL IN NATURE. THE USG AND THE GOS ARE CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING A TREATY OF MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE (MLAT). 2. DURING 1988, SPAIN REPEALED ITS TOUGH ANTI-TERRORIST LAW DUE TO A 1987 RULING COURT RULING THAT CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE LAW, INCLUDING A PROVISION PERMITING UP TO TEN DAYS DETENTION PRIOR TO THE FILING OF CHARGES, WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. HOWEVER, MOST PROVISIONS OF THE OLD ANTI-TERRORIST LAW WERE INCORPORATED INTO THE ORDINARY PENAL CODE. THE NEW LEGISLATION, WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON MAY 26, PROVIDES THAT ARRESTEES IN TERRORISM CASES CAN BE HELD FOR UP TO FIVE DAYS WITHOUT CHARGES BEING FILED. 3. THE SPANISH COURTS DURING 1988 CONTINUED TO DEAL STERNLY, ALTHOUGH WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS, WITH TERRORIST CASES. FOUR MEMBERS OF THE BASQUE TERRORIST GROUP ETA WERE SENTENCED ON MARCH 14, 1988 TO 74 YEARS IN PRISON FOR POSSESION OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY AND BELONGING TO AN \"ARMED BAND.\" ALSO ON MARCH 14, AN ETA MILITANT WAS SENTENCED TO 50 YEARS ON CHARGES OF MURDER, ATTEMPTED MURDER AND OTHER OFFENSES. IN EARLY 1988 THE DISTRICT COURT IN MADRID, HOWEVER, FOUND INNOCENT FIVE ALLEGED MEMBERS OF AN ETA OPERATIONAL UNIT (\"COMANDO\") ON THE GROUNDS THAT \"SERIOUS DOUBT\" EXISTED REGARDING THEIR GUILT, AND THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANTS TO THE SPANISH NATIONAL POLICE WERE NOT \"FREELY GIVEN.\" 4. THE GOS ANNOUNCED ON DECEMBER 2, 1988 A 380 MILLION DOLLAR PLAN TO MODERNIZE THE POLICE. ACCORDING TO DIRECTOR FOR STATE SECURITY RAFAEL VERA, ONE OF THE PRIORITIES OF THE PLAN IS THE STRENGTHENING OF ANTITERRORIST PROGRAMS, INCLUDING NEW COMPUTER DATABASES AND NEW EQUIPMENT FOR THE FIELD SUCH AS ARMOURED VEHICLES. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ------------------------- 5. SPAIN PARTICIPATES ACTIVELY IN THE TREVI GROUP AND WILL BE TREVI PRESIDENT FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1989. ON DECEMBER 8, SPAIN PROPOSED THAT THE TREVI GROUP FORM A COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMEND COORDINATION OF LEGISLATION AND PRACTICAL SECURITY RESPONSES REGARDING THE OPENING OF EC BORDERS IN 1992, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TERRORISM. THE GOS ALSO COOPERATES IN ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS ON A BILATERAL BASIS, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE JOINT U.K.-GOS EFFORT THAT RESULTED IN THE SHOOTING OF THREE IRA TERRORISTS IN GIBRALTAR ON MARCH 6, 1988. THE TERRORISTS HAD BEEN UNDER OBSERVATION BY THE SPANISH POLICE FOR MONTHS BEFORE THEY ENTERED GIBRALTAR FROM SPAIN. IN ADDITION, FRANCE AND SPAIN MAINTAIN A POLICE LIAISON OFFICE TO STRENGTHEN ANTI-TERRORIST COOPERATION. NO SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -------------------------------------- 6. THE GOS DOES NOT SUPPORT, EITHER FINANCIALLY OR DIPLOMATICALLY, ANY INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE PLO MAINTAINS A REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE IN MADRID THAT DOES NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC STATUS. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THIS OFFICE SINCE 1987; THE GOS DECLINED A 1987 PLO REQUEST FOR DIPLOMATIC STATUS. BARTHOLOMEW "	Success: CSV parsed	null	35,764
251	12/9/1988 21:41	88LONDON26262	Embassy London	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE357278" ]	P 092141Z DEC 88 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2766 INFO EC COLLECTIVE AMCONSUL BELFAST AMCONSUL EDINBURGH ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 26262 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, UK SUBJECT: THE UK: 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 357278 1. OUR SUBMISSION FOR THE UK PORTION OF THE 1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM BEGINS AT PARAGRAPH 2. DEPARTMENT DRAFTERS SHOULD NOTE THAT AT THE TIME OF THIS WRITING, HMG IS WARNING THE PUBLIC THAT THE IRA APPARENTLY IS PLANNING A MAJOR BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AND POSSIBLY ALSO IN BRITAIN, BEFORE THE END OF 1988. IF SUCH A CAMPAIGN TAKES PLACE, OUR SUBMISSION MIGHT REQUIRE A YEAR-END UPDATE. BEGIN DRAFT TEXT MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN CY 1988 --------------------------------------------- ------- 2. IN 1988 THE UK MAINTAINED ITS LONGSTANDING POLICY OF NOT GRANTING CONCESSIONS TO TERRORISTS, DESPITE AN INCREASE IN PUBLIC AND MEDIA ATTENTION TO THE FATE OF THREE UK CITIZEN HOSTAGES IN LEBANON. UK OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO BE ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL BODIES WORKING AGAINST TERRORISM, INCLUDING THE TREVI GROUP, THE SUMMIT SEVEN, AND GROUPS WITHIN THE UN. THERE IS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM BETWEEN U.S. AND UK AUTHORITIES. THE UK CONTINUED IN 1988 TO PROVIDE TRAINING AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO SEVERAL COUNTRIES TO IMPROVE THEIR CAPABILITIES TO COMBAT TERRORISM. 3. IN RECENT YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE UK\'S LARGE COMMUNITIES OF IMMIGRANTS, WHICH INCLUDE PALESTINIANS, IRANIANS, IRAQIS, TAMILS, AND OTHERS. UK AUTHORITIES DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS THROUGH NORMAL POLICE AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES AND THROUGH EXCHANGES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED TO IDENTIFY AND APPREHEND TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. 4. IN JANUARY, A MAN OF IRAQI ORIGIN WHO WAS KNOWN AS A CRITIC OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT DIED IN LONDON OF POISONING. BEFORE HE DIED, HE TOLD UK AUTHORITIES THAT HE HAD BEEN POISONED AT A DINNER BY SEVERAL OTHER IRAQIS; THE AUTHORITIES CONFIRMED THAT TWO OF THEM HAD BEEN SENT TO BRITAIN BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND DEPARTED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INCIDENT. THE CASE IS STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION. 5. DOMESTIC TERRORISM BY GROUPS INVOLVED IN NORTHERN IRELAND\'S SECTARIAN VIOLENCE REMAINED THE MOST COMMON FORM OF TERRORIST INCIDENT DIRECTED AGAINST UK INTERESTS THROUGHOUT 1988. MOST INCIDENTS WERE PERPETRATED BY THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA). IN NORTHERN IRELAND ITSELF 32 MILITARY PERSONNEL, 6 POLICE OFFICERS, AND 53 CIVILIANS DIED IN 1988. 6. IN 1988 THE IRA ALSO MADE A NUMBER OF ATTACKS OUTSIDE NORTHERN IRELAND. IN FEBRUARY, BRITISH SECURITY FORCES THWARTED A PLANNED IRA BOMBING OF A PUBLIC SQUARE IN GIBRALTAR, A UK DEPENDENT TERRITORY, AND KILLED THREE OF THE TERRORISTS INVOLVED. SPANISH LEGAL AND POLICE AUTHORITIES GAVE SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE TO UK OFFICIALS IN THE CASE. IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT, HAD THE BOMBING OCCURRED ACCORDING TO THE IRA\'S PLANS, MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED PERSONS COULD HAVE BEEN KILLED AND MANY OTHERS INJURED, MOST OF THEM CIVILIAN BYSTANDERS AND TOURISTS. 7. THE IRA MADE OTHER ATTACKS ON BRITISH INTERESTS IN MAINLAND EUROPE DURING 1988. ON MAY 1, THREE OFF-DUTY UK SERVICEMEN WERE MACHINE-GUNNED IN A CAR IN THE NETHERLANDS; ONE DIED. ON THE SAME DAY, A CAR BOMB KILLED TWO RAF MEN AND SERIOUSLY INJURED ONE OTHER, ALSO IN THE NETHERLANDS. ON MAY 5 ANOTHER BOMB ATTACHED TO A UK SERVICEMAN\'S CAR IN GERMANY FAILED TO EXPLODE. ON JULY 13 IRA TERRORISTS CUT THROUGH A UK MILITARY BASE PERIMETER FENCE TO PLANT TWO BOMBS WHICH INJURED NINE SOLDIERS. ON AUGUST 5 A BOMB EXPLODED AT A MILITARY BASE IN GERMANY, INJURING THREE UK SERVICEMEN AND ONE GERMAN CIVILIAN. LATER IN THE YEAR, GERMAN AUTHORITIES ARRESTED TWO MEN WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING IRA MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THE SEVERAL INCIDENTS DESCRIBED. 8. IN BRITAIN ITSELF, THE IRA CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMBING IN AUGUST OF AN UNGUARDED MILITARY INSTALLATION IN NORTH LONDON. TWO SOLDIERS WERE KILLED AND EIGHT OTHERS WERE INJURED IN THE EXPLOSION. 9. ON DECEMBER 6, THE UK PARLIAMENT APPROVED LEGISLATION WHICH STRENGTHENS EXISTING LAWS TO COMBAT TERRORISM. THE LEGISLATION -- -- RENEWED THE 1984 PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACT AND MADE IT PERMANENT, SO THAT IT NO LONGER REQUIRES PERIODIC REVIEW AND RENEWAL BY PARLIAMENT; -- GAVE THE GOVERNMENT NEW POWERS TO SEIZE FUNDS DESTINED FOR TERRORISTS, TO COMBAT RACKETEERING AS A MEANS OF RAISING FUNDS BY TERRORIST GROUPS, AND TO PREVENT THE \"LAUNDERING\" OF MONEY INTENDED FOR TERRORIST GROUPS; -- REAFFIRMED THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO BAN CERTAIN PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE INVOLVED IN TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND FROM ENTERING OTHER AREAS OF THE UK; -- RENEWED THE PROSCRIPTION IN THE UK OF TWO TERRORIST GROUPS, THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA) AND THE IRISH NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (INLA); AND -- IN NORTHERN IRELAND ONLY, REDUCED THE REMISSION OF SENTENCES ALLOWED FOR CONVICTED TERRORISTS FROM ONE-HALF TO ONE-THIRD OF THEIR SENTENCES. THE LEGISLATION ALSO RENEWED THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO DETAIN SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR UP TO SEVEN DAYS WITHOUT FORMAL CHARGES OR ARRAIGNMENT BEFORE A JUDGE. IN NOVEMBER, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARED THAT THIS PRACTICE WAS ILLEGAL. THE UK IS EXAMINING STEPS IT MIGHT TAKE TO BRING UK LAWS AND PROCEDURES INTO ACCORD WITH THE COURT\'S FINDINGS. THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ----------------------------------- 10. THE UK JUDICIARY IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN WHOLLY SUPPORTIVE OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO BRING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE. THE UK HOME OFFICE AND FOREIGN OFFICE CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE COURTS TO IMPROVE PROCEDURES FOR EXTRADITION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. 11. IN FEBRUARY, POLICE ARRESTED A SIKH LIVING IN ENGLAND WHO WAS WANTED ON SUSPICION OF INVOLVEMENT IN A 1985 LUGGAGE EXPLOSION AT NARITA AIRPORT IN JAPAN IN WHICH TWO BAGGAGE HANDLERS WERE KILLED. THE LUGGAGE ARRIVED ON A FLIGHT FROM TORONTO AND EXPLODED AT THE SAME TIME THAT AN EXPLOSION DESTROYED AN AIR INDIA JUMBO JET, ALSO FLYING FROM TORONTO, OVER THE OCEAN NEAR IRELAND, KILLING ALL 329 PEOPLE ON BOARD. A UK COURT ORDERED THE MAN EXTRADITED TO CANADA, BUT HE HAS APPEALED. HIS CASE IS PENDING. END DRAFT TEXT. PRICE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	35,846
252	12/9/1988 23:06	88BOGOTA18358	Embassy Bogota	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88BOGOTA17707", "88BOGOTA18283" ]	P 092306Z DEC 88 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1720 INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY QUITO AMEMBASSY LIMA AMEMBASSY LA PAZ CIA WASHDC DIA WASHDC ","C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 18358 SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINS, PTER, MOPS, PGOV, CO SUBJECT: DESTRUCTION OF FARC\'S 45TH FRONT AND OTHER RECENT FARC LOSSES REF: A. BOGOTA 18283; B. BOGOTA 17707 1. (C) SUMMARY: A RARE SUCCESS BY THE ARMY AGAINST THE FARC GUERRILLAS IN META LAST MONTH (REF B), AND FARC LOSSES DURING THEIR SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER OFFENSIVES APPEAR TO HAVE RESULTED IN A REDUCTION OF THEIR PREVIOUS HIGH RATE OF ATTACKS. THESE LOSSES MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH THEIR SUDDEN RENEWAL OF INTEREST IN POLITICAL INITIATIVES, SUCH AS THE PEACE PLAN PROPOSED BY CONSERVATIVE SENATOR LEYVA DURAN (REF A). END SUMMARY. 2. (U) IN ITS DECEMBER 9 ISSUE, \"EL TIEMPO\" PUBLISHED A DETAILED REPORT THAT THE ARMY\'S VII BRIGADE TROOPS SUCCEEDED NOVEMBER 26 IN DISMANTLING AND RENDERING COMBAT INEFFECTIVE THE ENCAMPMENT OF THE FARC\'S 45TH FRONT IN ARIARI, META DEPARTMENT (SEE REFTEL). ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, THE ATTACK WAS SUPPORTED BY THREE BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS AND CAUGHT THE GUERRILLAS BY SURPRISE. THE ACCOUNT SAYS THAT THE GUERRILLAS LOST 21 KILLED IN THAT ACTION, MOST FROM BLASTS BY RIFLE-LAUNCHED GRENADES AS THE GUERRILLAS TRIED TO FLEE. GUERRILLA CASUALTIES INCLUDED THE LEADER OF THE FARC\'S 45TH FRONT, BUT SOME 30 SURVIVING GUERRILLAS MANAGED TO FLEE THE AREA IN A ROUT. 3. (U) BRIGADIER GENERAL HAROLD BEDOYA PIZARRO, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY\'S VII BRIGADE WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE ARMY WILL REMAIN IN THE ARARI ZONE TO \"CONTINUE HELPING ITS INHABITANTS FIGHT OFF THE FARC CRIMINALS, WHO FOR YEARS HAVE WROUGHT ONLY POVERTY, DESOLATION AND VIOLENCE TO PEACEFUL SETTLERS IN THAT REGION.\" 4. (U) WEEKLY \"SEMANA\" NEWS MAGAZINE PUBLISHED A BLURB ON THE WEEK OF DECEMBER 9 REPORTING FARC LOSSES INCURRED IN THE SERIES OF OFFENSIVES LAUNCHED BY THAT GROUP AFTER SEPTEMBER 1. QUOTING \"NATIONAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES,\" SEMANA REPORTED THAT DURING THIS THREE MONTH PERIOD THE FARC LOST 42 MEN KILLED, 87 WOUNDED, AND 242 WEAPONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES CAPTURED BY THE ARMED FORCES. THE ARTICLE ALSO REPORTED THAT FARC COLUMNS HAVE BEEN FORCED TO ABANDON 15 ENCAMPMENTS AND HAVE REVEALED THE LOCATION OF 12 OF THEIR 45 FRONTS. 5. (C) COMMENT: EVEN MAKING ALLOWANCES FOR POSSIBLY EXAGGERATED MILITARY REPORTING THAT LED TO THE NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS, IT APPEARS THAT THE MILITARY HAS CHALKED UP A RARE SUCCESS BASED ON A WELL EXECUTED OPERATION IN META. FARC LOSSES DURING THEIR SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER OFFENSIVES MAY EXPLAIN GOC THINKING, AS REVEALED RECENTLY BY PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELORS RAFAEL AND RODRIGO PARDO ON SEPARATE OCCASIONS TO EMBOFFS, THAT THE GUERRILLAS COULD NOT KEEP UP THEIR HIGH RATE OF ACTIONS, AND WOULD LIKELY TURN TO POLITICAL INITIATIVES. WE CAN SEE THE LATTER ALREADY UNDERWAY WITH THE FARC/M-19 TRYING TO USE THE LEYVA DURAN PEACE PLAN TO PRESSURE THE GOC INTO A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT (SEE BOGOTA 18283). MCNAMARA "	Success: CSV parsed	null	36,004
253	12/10/1988 9:11	88ANKARA16439	Embassy Ankara	CONFIDENTIAL	[ "88STATE393532" ]	R 100911Z DEC 88 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2066 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS AMCONSUL ADANA AMCONSUL ISTANBUL AMCONSUL IZMIR AMEMBASSY NICOSIA SECDEF WASHDC JCS WASHDC USMISSION USNATO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD// USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAFF// CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD// ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 16439 S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PTER, TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 393532 AND PREVIOUS 1. (U) THIS REPORT CONTAINS THE REPORT REQUESTED REFTEL. POST WILL SUPLEMENT THIS REPORT AS MORE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE. 2. (U) NAME OF COUNTRY: TURKEY 3. (U) (A) COUNTERTERRORISM PROSECUTIONS IN 1988: THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF TERRORISM TRIALS IN TURKEY IN 1988, INCLUDING ONE INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION. THE TRIALS THIS YEAR WERE AS FOLLOWS: 4. (U) KIRIKKALE MUNITIONS PLANT BOMBING TRIAL -- EIGHT INDIVIDUALS WERE SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS FOR PLACING A BOMB AT THIS PLANT WHICH KILLED EIGHT PEOPLE. THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION WAS INVOLVED IN THE PLOT AND A JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT WAS ORIGINALLY INDICTED IN THIS CASE BUT WAS RELEASED BECAUSE OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. HE HAS RETURNED TO JORDAN.. 5. (U) OTHER TRIALS: (U) -- THE TWO LIBYANS CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTING TO BLOW UP THE NATO OFFICERS CLUB IN ANKARA STILL HAVE THEIR CASE UNDER APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF IMPROPER PROCEDURES; ONE IS CLAIMING INSANITY. 6. (U) -- HIZBULLAH ACTIVISTS: ISLAMIC JIHAD BROUGHT 100 KGS. OF EXPLOSIVES TO USE AGAINST U.S. AND OTHER INTERESTS INTO TURKEY. ARRESTS WERE MADE IN MARCH, 1987. THE TRIAL IS ONGOING. 7. (U) -- MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: THE TRIAL OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN IMPORTING EXPLOSIVES FROM IRAQ TO SYRIA THROUGH TURKEY ALSO CONTINUES. 8. (U) -- MEHMET DEMIRAG, WHO ATTEMPTED TO ASSASSINATE PRIME MINISTER OZAL AT A POLITICAL CONVENTION JUNE 18, WAS SENTENCED TO TWENTY-ONE YEARS IN PRISON IN NOVEMBER. 9. (U) -- TWO IRANIAN DIPLOMATS ACCREDITED TO ANKARA WERE EXPELLED AND TWO OTHERS NOT ACCREDITED WILL GO ON TRIAL (ALONG WITH TWO OTHER IRANIANS) FOR THE ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING OF AN ANTI-KHOMEINI ACTIVIST FROM ISTANBUL TO IRAN. 10. (U) -- TWENTY-SIX INDIVIDUALS WERE ARRESTED IN NOVEMBER FOR AN ALLEGED PLOT TO KILL A FORMER ANKARA MARTIAL LAW COMMANDER. THE INVESTIGATION OF THE TURKISH COMMUNIST PARTY (B) MEMBERS ALLEGED TO BE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE IS CONTINUING. 11. THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF UNSOLVED TERRORIST ACTS, SUCH AS THE MURDER OF A SAUDI DIPLOMAT IN ANKARA IN OCTOBER, AND SMALL BOMBS PLACED IN ISTANBUL AND UNDER AN AMERICAN TEACHER\'S CAR IN IZMIR. INVESTIGATIONS IN THESE CASES ARE CONTINUING. 12. (B) PLO STATUS: TURKEY WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO RECOGNIZE THE DECLARATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN \"STATE.\" THE PLO ALREADY HAD DIPLOMATIC STATUS IN TURKEY. THE GOT HAS SIGNALLED THAT IT WILL NOT UPGRADE THE MISSION TO AN EMBASSY, ANY TIME SOON, THOUGH IT WILL CONSIDER DOING SO IF AND WHEN A \"PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT\" OF THE PALESTINIAN \"STATE\" DECLARED BY THE PNC IN NOVEMBER IS FORMED. 13. THE GOT HAS NOT MADE ANY STATEMENTS SUPPORTING GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED TERRORISM. IT CONDEMNED NORTH KOREA FOR ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THE KAL-858 BOMBING BUT AVOIDED COMMENT ON OTHER TERRORISM-RELATED ISSUES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN WORKING RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND LIBYA. THE GOT BELIEVES ITS METHOD OF DEALING WITH MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM HAS PROVEN SUCCESSFUL. ROPE "	Success: CSV parsed	null	36,088
254	12/14/1988 14:51	88TUNIS12749	Embassy Tunis	SECRET	[]	P 141451Z DEC 88 FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9063 AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST AMEMBASSY CAIRO USINT HAVANA AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY PRAGUE AMEMBASSY RABAT AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY VALLETTA AMEMBASSY WARSAW USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE ","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TUNIS 12749 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: KSPR, AINF, KPRP, PINR, TS SUBJECT: (U) SPR 0002, TUNISIA\'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1. (C) SUMMARY: ALMOST ALL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN TUNISIA. THE SOVIET AND CHINESE REPRESENTATIONS ARE, CHARACTERISTICALLY, THE LARGEST. OVERALL, TUNISIA\'S RELATIONS WITH THESE COUNTRIES ARE GOOD BUT NOT OVERLY WARM. 1988, TUNISIAN PRESIDENT ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI\'S FIRST FULL YEAR IN OFFICE, MARKED THE CONTINUANCE OF A PERCEPTIBLE WARMING TREND IN TUNISIAN-COMMUNIST BLOC RELATIONS. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS TREND PROBABLY LIES IN BEN ALI\'S DESIRE TO PRESENT HIMSELF TO HIS MAGHREB NEIGHBORS (PARTICULARLY LIBYA) AS A MODERATE, NON-ALIGNED ARAB CHIEF OF STATE. WHILE TUNISIA RETAINS HER TRADITIONAL STRONG TIES TO THE U.S., FRANCE, ITALY AND OTHER WESTERN POWERS, THE BEN ALI ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO PLAY DOWN THE TUNISIAN-WESTERN RELATIONSHIP TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. THIS NOTED, IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN MORE COSMETIC THAN SUBSTANTIVE IN NATURE. THIS IS PROBABLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT COMMUNIST BLOC COUNTRIES ARE NOT YET PREPARED TO OFFER BEN ALI THE KIND OF FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE THAT HE DESIRES. END SUMMARY. PART I. OFFICIAL COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION: 2. (C) DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR, EMBASSY NOTED NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COMMUNIST EMBASSY STAFFING OR ACCREDITATION LEVELS APART FROM THE NOVEMBER ACCREDITATION OF AN EAST GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE (RESIDENT IN ALGIERS, SEE MILITARY RELATIONS BELOW). THERE WERE NO COMMUNIST EMBASSY EXPULSIONS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. FOLLOWING ARE 1988 ESTIMATES FOR SOVIET EMBASSY AND OTHER PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO TUNISIA (SPOUSES, CHILDREN NOT INCLUDED): --ACCREDITED DIPLOMATS: 25 --EMBASSY, CONSULAR, AND CULTURAL CENTER STAFF: 27 --TRADE STAFF: 16 --GKES (SOON TO BE INCORPORATED WITH TRADE MISSION): 9 --AEROFLOT: 3 --JOURNALISTS: 3 --SOVIET EMBASSY GRADE SCHOOL EMPLOYEES: 4 --TOTAL: 87 (NOTE: THE REDUCTION FROM LAST YEAR\'S ESTIMATED TOTAL OF 120 IS PROBABLY DUE TO A REDUCTION IN STAFF VICE OFFICIAL PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION TO THE OFFICIALS LISTED ABOVE, ACCORDING TO A SOVIET DIPLOMAT, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 300 SOVIET COOPERANTS IN TUNISIA.) 3. (C) FOLLOWING ARE 1988 ESTIMATES FOR NON-SOVIET COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION IN TUNISIA (TOTAL PRESENCE FIGURES UNAVAILABLE UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED): --BULGARIA: 7 DIPLOMATS (D), 9 STAFF/TRADE/OTHER (S) --CZECHOSLOVAKIA: 7 D, 9 S --EAST GERMANY: 6 D (WITH MILATT IN ALGIERS), 5 S --HUNGARY: 4 D, 4 S --POLAND: 6 D, 3 S --ROMANIA: 3 D, 1 S --CUBA: 3 D --CHINA: 21 D (TOTAL S UNKNOWN BUT ESTIMATED AT 30) --ALBANIA: NON-RESIDENT AMBASSADOR (NRA) --NORTH KOREA: 3 D --VIETNAM: NRA --YUGOSLAVIA: 3 D, 4 S PART II. LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP: 4. (C) THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF TUNISIA (PCT) WAS LEGALIZED IN JULY 1981 AND HAS APPROXIMATELY 400-500 ACTIVE MEMBERS AND APPROXIMATELY 2000-3000 SYMPATHIZERS. IN 1988, PCT ACTIVITY ON TUNISIAN CAMPUSES WAS MINIMAL DUE TO GROWING ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST, ARAB NATIONALIST, AND RIVAL LEFTIST ACTIVITIES. THE LEFTIST STUDENTS, WHO STILL VIEW THE PCT AS TOO MODERATE, BELONG TO A SMALL GROUP OF POORLY ORGANIZED STUDENT COMMUNIST/LEFTIST MOVEMENTS THAT ARE LOOSELY UNITED UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE RECOGNIZED GENERAL UNION OF TUNISIAN STUDENTS (UGET) LED BY SELF-AVOWED MARXIST SAMIR LABIDI. DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD, THE \"HONEYMOON\" BETWEEN THE BEN ALI ADMINISTRATION AND PCT LEADER MOHAMMED HARMEL CONTINUED. HARMEL WAS ONE OF SEVERAL LEGAL OPPOSITION LEADERS WHO SIGNED THE 7 NOVEMBER 1988 \"NATIONAL PACT\" (A SYMBOLIC DOCUMENT PLEDGING COOPERATION AND FAIR PLAY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT, THE RULING PARTY, THE UNIONS, AND VARIOUS OPPOSITION PARTIES). HARMEL SPEAKS RUSSIAN AND MAINTAINS GOOD CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET AND OTHER EAST BLOC EMBASSIES AND THE PCT IS RECOGNIZED BY THE CPSU AS A LEGITIMATE COMMUNIST PARTY. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE PCT WILL BECOME AN APPRECIABLE POLITICAL FORCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. BEN ALI HAS MANAGED TO TAME THE PCT TO POINT OF ALMOST TOTAL CONCILIATION, AND THE PCT\'S POSSIBLE STUDENT BASE OF SUPPORT APPEARS TO HOLD DISDAIN FOR THIS MODERATE COMMUNIST PARTY. IN ADDITION, THE PCT REMAINS AT ODDS WITH THE BROAD POPULAR ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST SECTOR OF TUNISIAN SOCIETY. IN DECEMBER, THE PCT ATTEMPTED TO CAPITALIZE ON THE POPULARITY OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE BY STAGING THREE DAYS OF FESTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE INTIFADAH UPRISINGS. 5. (S) DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD, BEN ALI\'S DECISION TO LEGALIZE THE TRADITIONAL UGET STUDENT UNION HAS TAKEN THE WIND FROM THE SAILS OF THE MORE RADICAL LEFTIST STUDENT GROUPS. RADICAL LEFTIST INFLUENCE CONTINUED TO FLOURISH IN THE FORM OF ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE GOT-CONTROLLED GENERAL UNION OF TUNISIAN WORKERS (UGTT), HOWEVER, BEN ALI\'S ONGOING REFORM PROGRAM APPEARS TO BE ATTRACTING THE GREATER MAJORITY OF TUNISIAN WORKERS AWAY FROM THE RADICALS. THERE IS IN FACT AN UNRECOGNIZED COMMUNIST WORKER\'S PARTY OF TUNISIA (POCT) WHOSE MEMBERSHIP AND INFLUENCE IN THE TUNISIAN UNIONS AND ON CAMPUS REMAINS UNKNOWN. ALTHOUGH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE COULD GROW WITHIN THE INCREASINGLY LIBERAL TUNISIAN POLITICAL CLIMATE, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT BEN ALI WOULD ALLOW THE COMMUNIST/LEFTIST MOVEMENTS TO GO VERY FAR BEYOND ACTING AS DE FACTO COUNTERWEIGHTS TO THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS. IN SHORT, TUNISIAN COMMUNISM, WITH THE ESSENTIALLY WEAK PCT AS ITS CENTERPIECE, DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE A VERY PROMISING FUTURE. PART III. CULTURAL RELATIONS, EDUCATION EXCHANGE: 6. (LOU) THE SOVIET UNION PROMOTES SOVIET CULTURE IN TUNISIA. ITS CULTURAL CENTER OFFERS A TUITION FREE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PROGRAM AND ALSO SPONSORS FILMS, ART AND PHOTOGRAPHY EXHIBITS, AND MUSICAL PERFORMANCES. THERE IS A TUNISIAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION WHICH SPONSORS SUCH ACTIVITIES AS LECTURES BY VISITING SOVIET ACADEMICS. HE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ALSO SPONSOR CULTURAL EVENTS (MID JANUARY 1988 GAVE US A CZECHOSLOVAK CULTURAL WEEK ALONG WITH THE CONCURRENT VISIT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK CULTURAL MINISTER TO TUNIS). CUBAN SPONSORSHIP OF SUCH EVENTS IS USUALLY LIMITED TO ACTIVITIES CO-SPONSORED BY OTHER LATIN COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN TUNISIA. CHINESE CULTURAL INFLUENCE IS ALSO PRESENT BUT LIMITED AS CHINA TENDS TO CENTER ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH TUNISIA ON TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES. TASS AND THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY ARE BOTH REPRESENTED IN TUNIS. IN ADDITION, SEVERAL COMMUNIST JOURNALS, INCLUDING THE SOVIET FRENCH LANGUAGE VERSION OF \"MOSCOW NEWS\" ARE AVAILABLE AT DOWNTOWN TUNIS NEWSSTANDS. SOME LOCAL VIDEO CLUBS ALSO CARRY SOVIET FILMS FOR VIDEOCASSETTE RENTAL. 7. (C) THE NUMBER OF TUNISIAN STUDENTS STUDYING IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES REMAINED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME IN 1988. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT COMMUNIST EDUCATED PERSONNEL ARE ACCEDING TO POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY IN THE GOVERNMENT OR THE RULING PARTY. REGARDING THE PRC, ACCORDING TO THE ESTIMATE OF ONE CHINESE DIPLOMAT, THE MAJORITY OF TUNISIANS IN CHINA ARE LANGUAGE STUDENTS. OVERALL, THE MAJORITY OF TUNISIAN STUDENTS WHO STUDY ABROAD DO SO IN WESTERN COUNTRIES. THIS IS DUE BOTH TO THE GENERAL PERCEPTION THAT THE QUALITY OF A WESTERN EDUCATION CANNOT BE MATCHED ELSEWHERE, AND A CERTAIN TUNISIAN CULTURAL AFFINITY TOWARDS THE WEST. NO NEW MAJOR SCIENTIFIC OR CULTURAL AGREEMENTS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WERE SIGNED IN 1988. ACCORDING TO A SOVIET OFFICIAL WITH ALLEGED CONSULAR DUTIES, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT GRANTS APPROXIMATELY 60 FOUR YEAR UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIPS A YEAR AND CLAIMS THAT, AT ANY GIVEN TIME, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 400 TUNISIAN STUDENTS IN THE USSR. A BULGARIAN OFFICIAL SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT GRANTED SEVEN SCHOLARSHIPS A YEAR AND THAT THE TOTAL OF TUNISIAN STUDENTS IN HIS COUNTRY RARELY EXCEEDED FIFTY (INCLUDING THOSE WHO FINANCE THEIR OWN STUDIES). A CZECHOSLOVAK OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS STUDYING IN HIS COUNTRY HAS REMAINED CONSTANT SINCE THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATIONS IN TUNISIA. PART IV. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OTHER THAN THE ACCREDITATION OF SOME MILITARY ATTACHES (SEE MILITARY RELATIONS). PART VI. APPRAISAL OF POLITICAL/ECONOMIC/MILITARY RELATIONS: 8. POLITICAL: A. (S) PRIOR TO BEN ALI\'S LATE 1987 ASSUMPTION OF POWER, TUNISIA HAD MAINTAINED CORRECT BUT COOL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MOST COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FOR SEVERAL YEARS. FORMER PRESIDENT HABIB BOURGUIBA WAS A STAUNCH ANTI-COMMUNIST AND NOT AVERSE TO MAKING HIS PRO-WESTERN VIEWS KNOWN. DURING THIS PERIOD, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE MAJORITY OF COMMUNIST EMBASSIES IN TUNISIA WERE THERE SIMPLY TO CARRY ON RELATIONS WITH THE PLO AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE (BOTH OF WHICH ARE HEADQUARTERED IN TUNIS) RATHER THAN TO FOCUS ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH TUNISIA. SINCE THE 1987 CHANGE AND ON INTO 1988, THERE HAS BEEN A PERCEPTIBLE WARMING TREND IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER BLOC COUNTRIES THAT HAS MANIFESTED ITSELF WITH INCREASED CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AND INCREASED COVERAGE OF SOVIET INTERNAL EVENTS IN THE TUNISIAN MEDIA. TUNISIA\'S TRADITIONAL REASON FOR MAINTAINING CORRECT RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS STEMMED FROM THE GOT BELIEF THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE OVER LIBYA (WITH WHOM THE GOT REESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN DECEMBER OF 1987). NOW THAT THE TUNISIAN-LIBYAN RAPPROCHEMENT HAS CONTINUED FOR ALMOST A FULL YEAR, TUNISIA MAY NOT NEED THIS PERCEIVED \"RESTRAINING INFLUENCE\" OVER QADHAFI. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAVE NEITHER THE RESOURCES NOR THE DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE GREAT AMOUNTS OF FOREIGN AID TO TUNISIA, THE WARMING TREND MAY RETAIN ITS PRESENT COSMETIC NATURE AND NOT GO MUCH FURTHER. THE GOT WILL CONTINUE TO MARKET PHOSPHATES, FERTILIZERS, AND OLIVE OIL TO THE SOVIET BLOC. THIS SAID, PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THESE COUNTRIES TEND TO DRIVE HARD BARGAINS WITH TUNISIA. BEN ALI VERY OBVIOUSLY CONTINUES TO PLACE A GREATER EMPHASIS ON REGIONAL MAGHREB ISSUES THAN ON EAST-WEST AFFAIRS. B. (S) AFTER THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA HAS THE LARGEST COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION IN TUNISIA. OVERALL, SINO-TUNISIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE FOCUSED ON COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES AND LESS ON POLITICS PER SE. ONE CHINESE OFFICIAL VIEWED THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT AS CORDIAL BUT COOL. DESPITE THE LARGE IN COUNTRY PRC REPRESENTATION, THERE ARE ONLY A HANDFUL OF TUNISIAN DIPLOMATS IN CHINA. AS WITH MANY EMBASSIES IN TUNIS, THE PRINCIPLE REASON FOR THE CHINESE EMBASSY PRESENCE MAY WELL BE THE PRESENCE OF THE PLO. A CHINESE ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER VISITED TUNIS IN LATE 1988, HOWEVER ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT HE MET WITH TUNISIAN OFFICIALS TO CONVEY CHINESE VIEWS ON MAJOR WORLD EVENTS AND NOT TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE BILATERAL ISSUES. C. (C) ON THE EASTERN EUROPEAN SIDE, POLITICAL RELATIONS APPEAR TO BE GOOD BUT NON-SUBSTANTIVE. IN MID SUMMER, A MEMBER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY PRESIDIUM VISITED THE TUNISIAN PARLIAMENT, HOWEVER, APART FROM SOME VAGUE PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF FRATERNITY AND FRIENDSHIP, THE VISIT SEEEMS TO HAVE ACCOMPLISHED VERY LITTLE. THE EARLY 1988 VISIT OF THE ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER APPEARS TO HAVE PRODUCED SIMILAR RESULTS AND THE SAME CAN BE SAID FOR THE MARCH VISIT OF A BULGARIAN STATE COUNCIL VICE PRESIDENT. 9. ECONOMIC: A. (LOU) TUNISIA\'S ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL LINKS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ARE SLIGHT IN COMPARISON TO THOSE WITH TUNISIA\'S TRADITIONAL TRADING PARTNERS AND, DURING 1988, REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT. -USSR: IN NOVEMBER, THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO REINFORCE BILATERAL COMMERCIAL TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN 1989. TO THIS END, THE TUNISIAN-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION WILL MEET IN TUNIS IN DECEMBER (WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION LED BY THEIR MINISTER OF PLANS). ALSO DURING THIS PERIOD, THE SOVIETS PROVIDED MATERIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF TWO LARGE BIPLANE CROP DUSTERS TO ASSIST TUNISIA AGAINST THE NORTH AFRICAN LOCUST INVASION. THE SOVIET UNION EXPORTS LUMBER, AMMONIA, POTASSIUM, AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT, HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, BOOKS AND FILMS TO TUNISIA. IN 1988, THE USSR PURCHASED APPROXIMATELY 180,000 METRIC TONS OF TUNISIAN TRIPLE SUPERPHOSPHATE (FOR APPROXIMATELY U.S. DOLLARS 27 MILLION) AND OLIVE OIL. B. (C) EASTERN EUROPE: BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH SEVERAL EAST BLOC OFFFICIALS, THE CHANGE IN TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT HAS HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. -CZECHOSLOVAKIA: TRADE FIGURES DROPPED CONSIDERABLY FROM U.S. DOLLARS 10 MILLION WORTH OF CZECHOSLOVAK EXPORTS TO TUNISIA IN 1986 TO 4.9 MILLION IN 1987. TUNISIAN EXPORTS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOSTLY PHOSPHATE BASED PRODUCTS) DROPPED FROM U.S. DOLLARS 11 MILLION TO 6.6 MILLION DURING THE SAME PERIOD. ACCORDING TO A CZECHOSLOVAK OFFICIAL, BOTH FIGURES ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE BY APPROXIMATELY THIRTY PERCENT IN 1988. -POLAND: A POLISH OFFICIAL SAID THAT COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH TUNISIA HAD IN FACT CHANGED FOR THE BETTER SINCE THE CHANGE OF POWER. HE FIRST NOTED THAT THE TUNISIAN MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY NO LONGER HAD TO GRANT SPECIAL WAIVERS TO TUNISIAN COMPANIES WHO DESIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH POLAND AND THAT THE CENTRAL BANK BUREAUCRACY WAS \"MORE COOPERATIVE\". THIS NOTED, HE SAID THE TRADE FIGURES REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT, I.E. POLISH EXPORTS TO TUNISIA REMAINED AT THE APPROXIMATE U.S. DOLLARS 22 MILLION LEVEL AND TUNISIAN PRODUCTS IMPORTED TO POLAND ACTUALLY FELL TO APPROXIMATELY U.S. DOLLARS 1.5 MILLION IN 1988. THE OFFICIAL ATTRIBUTED THIS DROP TO ONGOING INTERNAL REFORMS IN POLAND. HE WOULD NOT SPECULATE ON WHAT EFFECT THE PLANNED JANUARY 1988 ABOLISHMENT OF POLAND\'S CENTRAL EXPORT/IMPORT PARASTATAL COMPANY WOULD HAVE ON POLISH-TUNISIAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE TUNISIAN SIDE \"PUSHED\" BARTER TRADE OVER HARD CURRENCY PURCHASES. -BULGARIA: A BULGARIAN OFFICIAL TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT BILATERAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT DURING 1988. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS NO BULGARIAN ECONOMIC AID FOR TUNISIA (CITING LIMITED RESOURCES AS THE REASON) AND SAID HE BELIEVED THIS WAS THE CASE FOR OTHER EAST BLOC COUNTRIES. -ROMANIA: A ROMANIAN OFFICIAL TOLD US THAT THERE IS NO ROMANIAN ECONOMIC AID PER SE TO TUNISIA AND THAT ROMANIAN-TUNISIAN COMMERCIAL TIES HAVE REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT. HE NOTED THAT THE \"LIBERALIZATION\" OF TUNISIA\'S IMPORT RESTRICTIONS COULD INCREASE ROMANIAN TRADE WITH TUNISIA DURING THE COMING YEAR. C. (LOU) CHINA: SINO-TUNISIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION HAS CONTINUED MUCH AT THE SAME PACE DURING THIS PERIOD AS DURING THE PAST. BASED ON A 1985 AGREEMENT, CONSTRUCTION BEGAN IN MID 1988 IN CHINA ON A SINO-TUNISIAN-KUWAITI FERTILIZER PROCESSING PLANT. TUNISIA\'S PARTICIPATION IN THE VENTURE IS 30 PERCENT AND TUNISIA WILL SUPPLY CHINA WITH 250,000 METRIC TONS OF PHOSPHORIC ACID PER YEAR. 10. MILITARY: (S) TUNISIAN MILITARY TIES WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ARE MINIMAL. AS OF THIS REPORT, ONLY ONE COMMUNIST MILITARY ATTACHE HAD BEEN ACCREDITED TO TUNISIA (GDR, RESIDENT IN ALGIERS). AS OF LATE NOVEMBER, THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PLANNING TO PRESENT THE ACCREDITATION PAPERS OF THEIR OWN MILITARY ATTACHE. IN EARLY DECEMBER, A CHINESE OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE PRC WOULD PROBABLY ACCREDIT A MILITARY ATTACHE BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. THIS MARKS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN TUNISIAN-COMMUNIST BLOC RELATIONS AS FORMER PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA HAD SPECIFICALLY BARRED THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FROM OPENING MILITARY ATTACHE OFFICES. AS OF THIS WRITING, THERE WERE NO COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS OR ADVISORS IN TUNISIA. ASIDE FROM THE SOVIET SHIP REPAIR CONTRACT, THERE IS NO KNOWN SIGNIFICANT COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITY IN TUNISIA. THERE HAVE BEEN NO CONFIRMED REPORTS OF TUNISIANS TRAVELING TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FOR MILITARY TRAINING. COMMUNIST BLOC MILITARY AID HAS THUS FAR BEEN NON-EXISTANT. THIS NOTED, A CHINESE OFFICIAL SAID THAT, DURING THE RECENT MAGHREB TOUR OF A CHINESE MILITARY DELEGATION, TUNISIA REQUESTED CHINESE AID IN THE FORM OF UNSPECIFIED NAVAL VESSELS. HE ADDED THAT, AS OF DECEMBER, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET COME TO A DECISION ON THE MATTER. PELLETREAU "	Success: CSV parsed	null	36,190
255	12/15/1988 11:57	88ATHENS19586	Embassy Athens	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88STATE357278" ]	O 151157Z DEC 88 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4804 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY NICOSIA AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI EC COLLECTIVE ","UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 19586 TERREP S/CT FOR WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, GR SUBJECT: GREECE: 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 357278 1. FOLLOWING IS THE EMBASSY\'S SUBMISSION FOR THE DEPARTMENT\'S UNCLASSIFIED ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON TERRORISM IN 1988. 2. 1988 WAS A VERY BAD YEAR FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM IN GREECE. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS INCREASED THEIR ACTIVITIES IN GREECE DURING THE YEAR, USING MORE LETHAL MEANS AGAINST AN EXPANDING ARRAY OF TARGETS. AMERICAN OFFICIALS WERE AT PARTICULAR HAZARD AND ONE U.S. EMBASSY OFFICER WAS KILLED. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT COUNTER-TERRORIST SUCCESSES ACHIEVED BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. IN CONTRAST, GREEK JUSTICE MINISTERS TWICE OVERTURNED DECISIONS OF GREEK COURTS AND PERMITTED TERRORISTS WANTED IN ITALY TO GO FREE. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS ITS RHETORICAL POSITION AGAINST TERRORISM, BUT THE RHETORIC HAS NOT BEEN MATCHED BY DEEDS. 3. A NUMBER OF DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATED WITH IMPUNITY IN GREECE IN 1988, CARRYING OUT REPEATED BOMBINGS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FACILITIES. HOWEVER, THE MOST DANGEROUS AND DEADLY TERRORIST ORGANIZATION REMAINS \"NOVEMBER 17\", WHICH CONTINUED ITS THIRTEEN-YEAR CAMPAIGN OF MURDEROUS ATTACKS WHICH HAVE OFTEN BEEN AIMED AT U.S. OFFICIALS. \"NOVEMBER 17\" FAILED IN A JANUARY ATTEMPT TO KILL U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OFFICIAL GEORGE CARROS WITH A BOMB, BUT UNFORTUNATELY SUCCEEDED ON JUNE 28 IN ASSASSINATING THE U.S. EMBASSY DEFENSE ATTACHE, NAVY CAPTAIN WILLIAM NORDEEN, WITH A BOMB OF GREAT EXPLOSIVE POWER. ON AUGUST 14, \"NOVEMBER 17\" DEMONSTRATED ITS OPEN CONTEMPT FOR GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY BY SEIZING A POLICE STATION IN SUBURBAN ATHENS, BRIEFLY DETAINING ITS STAFF AND STEALING A STORE OF WEAPONS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT. IN ITS FREQUENT WRITTEN PROCLAMATIONS, \"NOVEMBER 17\" HAS MANIFESTED A HIGHLY ETHNOCENTRIC AND RADICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY WHICH INCLUDES AMONG ITS PERCEIVED DEMONS THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, NATO, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, ALL GREEK POLITICAL PARTIES, A MARKET ECONOMY AND ALMOST ALL FACETS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. WHILE LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE IS KNOWN ABOUT THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF \"NOVEMBER 17\", IT HAS CONSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATED SEVERAL IMPORTANT QUALITIES: RIGID INTERNAL SECURITY, A COMMITMENT TO SELF-PRESERVATION, METHODICAL PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF ATTACKS, AND A PREFERENCE FOR HOMICIDAL OPERATIONS. OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS IT HAS ALSO SHOWN A WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO EXPAND SHARPLY THE NUMBER OF ITS ATTACKS WHILE EMPLOYING AN EXPANDED RANGE OF TECHNIQUES OF GREATLY ENHANCED LETHALITY. IN THIRTEEN YEARS OF OPERATION, NO MEMBER OF \"NOVEMBER 17\" HAS EVER BEEN PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED, APPREHENDED OR KILLED. 4. ANY ILLUSIONS THAT GREECE COULD REMAIN UNSCARRED BY THE SCOURGE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISPELLED IN 1988. FOREIGN TERRORISTS DEMONSTRATED THEIR ABILITY AND INTENT TO USE GREECE AS A BATTLEFIELD AND TO MAKE IT A VICTIM AS THEY SAW FIT. IN APRIL, A PROMINENT LEADER OF THE ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA (\"ASALA\") RESIDENT IN GREECE, HAGOP HAGOPIAN, WAS ASSASSINATED IN FRONT OF HIS HOUSE IN ATHENS IN AN APPARENT INTERNAL \"ASALA\" DISPUTE. IN AN EVENT WHICH ATTRACTED THE ATTENTION OF THE WORLD JULY 11, GUNMEN USED MACHINE GUNS AND GRENADES TO CONDUCT A MASSACRE OF PASSENGERS ABOARD THE DAY EXCURSION BOAT \"CITY OF POROS\" IN THE SARONIC GULF NEAR ATHENS. NINE PASSENGERS WERE KILLED AND NEARLY ONE HUNDRED INJURED. ONLY HOURS BEFORE THE ATTACK, AN AUTOMOBILE PACKED WITH EXPLOSIVES BLEW UP AT A MARINA IN PIRAEUS, THE PORT OF ATHENS, KILLING ITS OCCUPANTS. WHILE NO ORGANIZATION HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TWO EVENTS, WHICH WERE ALMOST CERTAINLY CONNECTED, CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE POINTS TO THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION. ALTHOUGH THE PURPOSE OF THE ATTACK ON THE \"CITY OF POROS\" REMAINS A MATTER OF SPECULATION, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT A MUCH LARGER TERRORIST OPERATION WAS IN PREPARATION AND WENT WRONG. THERE HAVE BEEN NO ARRESTS IN CONNECTION WITH THESE EVENTS. 5. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY STATED ITS \"PRINCIPLED\" POSITION IN OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM OF ALL FORMS. THESE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN MATCHED BY SUBSTANTIVE COUNTER-TERRORIST ACHIEVEMENTS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS REPORTEDLY INCREASED THE RESOURCES AND PRIORITY IT ASSIGNS TO COMBATTING TERRORISM, GREEK SHIPOWNERS HAVE BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT INTERNATIONALLY IN PROPOSING AND IMPLEMENTING IMPROVED SECURITY MEASURES ON PASSENGER VESSELS, AND THE U.S. EMBASSY RECEIVED SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED COOPERATION FROM GREEK AUTHORITIES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE KILLING OF CAPTAIN NORDEEN. HOWEVER, IN 1988 THERE WAS ONLY ONE ARREST (CITED BELOW), NO CONVICTIONS AND NO EXTRADITIONS OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS IN GREECE. INDEED, THE CONTRARY IS THE CASE. IN NOVEMBER AN ATHENS COURT DISMISSED CHARGES AGAINST TWO SUSPECTED MEMBERS OF THE \"ANTI-STATE STRUGGLE\" ORGANIZATION FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. 6. MUCH MORE SERIOUSLY, GREEK JUSTICE MINISTERS TWICE DURING THE YEAR OVERTURNED RULINGS BY GREEK COURTS (INCLUDING THE SUPREME COURT) WHICH FAVORED EXTRADITIONS OF PERSONS WANTED IN ITALY FOR TERRORIST OFFENSES. IN FEBRUARY THEN JUSTICE MINISTER KOUTSOYIORGAS EXERCISED HIS AUTHORITY TO REFUSE THE EXTRADITION OF MAURIZIO FOLINI, WANTED IN ITALY FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE \"RED BRIGADES\", AND PERMITTED HIM TO GO FREE. IN DECEMBER JUSTICE MINISTER ROTIS REFUSED EXTRADITION TO ITALY OF PALESTINIAN ABDEL OZAMA AL-ZUMAR, WANTED FOR HIS ROLE IN THE 1982 FATAL BOMBING OF A ROME SYNAGOGUE BY THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION, AND ALLOWED HIM TO DEPART FOR LIBYA. IN BOTH CASES THE JUSTICE MINISTERS CITED THE SUPPOSEDLY \"POLITICAL\" CHARACTER OF THE CRIMES AS THE BASIS FOR OVERRULING THE GREEK JUDICIARY. MINISTER ROTIS WENT SO FAR AS TO PUBLICLY REFER TO AL-ZUMAR\'S CRIME AS \"AN ACT ON BEHALF OF FREEDOM\" WHICH HE COMPARED TO THE WARTIME RESISTANCE IN GREECE TO THE NAZI OCCUPATION. 7. THE SINGLE SUCCESS IN COUNTER-TERRORISM IN GREECE DURING 1988 WAS THE DETENTION ON MAY 30 OF PALESTINIAN MOHAMMED RASHID, WANTED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE 1982 BOMBING OF A PAN AMERICAN AIRLINER OVER THE PACIFIC IN WHICH A FOURTEEN-YEAR OLD JAPANESE BOY WAS KILLED. ON OCTOBER 10 AN ATHENS COURT VOTED TWO-TO-ONE IN FAVOR OF THE U.S. REQUEST FOR THE EXTRADITION OF RASHID. AT YEAR\'S END, THE CASE IS BEFORE THE GREEK SUPREME COURT FOR CONFIRMATION OF THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT. UNDER THE GREEK CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMS OF THE BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY, THE FINAL DECISION ON EXTRADITION WILL LIE WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IN THE PERSON OF THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO SECRET OF THE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE SUCCESSFUL EXTRADITION OF RASHID AND THE IMPORTANT PRECEDENT WHICH WOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY BRINGING HIM TO JUSTICE. 8. GREECE MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) AND PERMITS A PLO OFFICE TO OPERATE IN ATHENS. HOWEVER, GREECE HAS NOT RECOGNIZED THE RECENTLY-DECLARED \"PALESTINIAN STATE\". 9. DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1988 IN CONNECTION WITH ITS ROLE AS ROTATING PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, GREECE CHAIRED THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TREVI GROUP, A COORDINATING BODY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS OF EC MEMBERS TO WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE U.S., HAVE OBSERVER STATUS. GREECE THEREFORE HOSTED THE SEMI-ANNUAL MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE TREVI GROUP IN ATHENS DECEMBER 8-9. THIS EVENT WAS UNFORTUNATELY OVERSHADOWED BY THE RELEASE OF AL-ZUMAR ON THE EVE OF THE MEETING. KEELEY "	Success: CSV parsed	null	36,581
256	12/21/1988 9:23	88GUANGZHOU8077	Consulate Guangzhou	CONFIDENTIAL	[]	O 210923Z DEC 88 FM AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1439 AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY AMCONSUL SHANGHAI PRIORITY AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L GUANGZHOU 08077 BEIJING PLEASE PASS CHENGDU E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PINR, PGOV, CH SUBJECT: HU JINTAO--A GLANCE AT HIS CHARACTER 1. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT. 2. DURING A RECENT CALL ON THE CONSUL GENERAL, U.S. POLITICAL SCIENTIST PARRIS CHANG RECOUNTED A CONVERSATION HE HAD RECENTLY HAD ABOUT HU JINTAO. IN TRAVELLING BACK FROM HAINAN TO GUANGZHOU HE WAS SEATED NEXT TO AN ENTREPRENEUR FROM GUIZHOU. CHANG ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT OF HU JINTAO, WHO HAD BEEN THE PARTY SECRETARY IN GUIZHOU BEFORE BEING NAMED TO TIBET. THE ENTREPRENEUR SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HU HAD TWO SIGNIFICANT FAILINGS WHICH MADE IT DOUBTFUL HE COULD SUCCEED IN TIBET. FIRST, HU HAD NO CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY. SECOND, HE WAS A CAUTIOUS, VACILLATING LEADER. AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF HU\'S TIMIDITY, THE ENTREPRENEUR SAID THAT DURING ONE OF HIS TRIPS HE HAD WORKED OUT A PROJECT WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE EXPANSION OF GUIZHOU\'S EXPORTS. HE SENT A COPY OF HIS SUGGESTION TO HU WHO SAID THAT IT SEEMED LIKE A GOOD IDEA AND HE SHOULD SUGGEST THAT THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS IMPLEMENT IT. WHEN THE ENTREPRENEUR TRIED TO DO SO, THERE WAS THE USUAL BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION FROM VARIOUS OFFICES, AND IN THE END NOTHING WAS DONE. HE COMMENTED THAT HU WAS PREPARED TO MOVE ONLY IF EVERYONE AGREED WITH SOMETHING; HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO TACKLE OPPOSITION. GIVEN THE SITUATION IN TIBET, HU WILL BE FACING MANY DIFFERENCES AND WILL GET LITTLE DONE IF HE IS NOT PREPARED TO EXERT HIMSELF. 3. COMMENT. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY HEARSAY INFORMATION, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT CHANG ACCURATELY RECOUNTED WHAT THE GUIZHOU ENTREPRENEUR TOLD HIM. THE REMARKS SEEM SOMEWHAT OVERLY FRANK FOR SUCH A PERSON TO MAKE TO AN UNKNOWN TAIWAN AMERICAN, BUT THEY MAY REFLECT WHAT SOME CHINESE ARE SAYING TO EACH OTHER ABOUT HU. PRATT "	Success: CSV parsed	null	36,770
257	12/23/1988 16:26	88BOGOTA19003	Embassy Bogota	UNCLASSIFIED	[ "88BOGOTA18301" ]	R 231626Z DEC 88 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2025 INFO DIA WASHDC CIA WASHDC SECDEF WASHDC USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY QUITO AMEMBASSY LIMA AMEMBASSY LA PAZ ","UNCLAS BOGOTA 19003 STATE FOR S/CT WHARTON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: KPRP, PTER, CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: ADDITIONS TO 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: BOGOTA 18301 1. EMBASSY SUBMISSION FOR THE 1988 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT INADVERTENTLY OMMITTED REFERENCE TO THE QUESTION ON PLO REPRESENTION. THE PLO DOES NOT/NOT, NOR HAS IT IN THE PAST, HAD ANY OFFICIAL STATUS OR RECOGNITION IN COLOMBIA. HOWEVER, AN INDIVIDUAL NAMED MANDOUH GABER HAS BEEN NOTED IN THE PAST YEAR PRESENTING HIMSELF AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PLO AND ISSUING CALLING CARDS SO IDENTIFYING HIMSELF. HE DOES NOT ENJOY ANY DIPLOMATIC OR QUASI OFFICIAL STATUS, HOWEVER. 2. IN ADDITION, SUBSEQUENT TO THE EMBASSY\'S ORIGINAL SUBMISSION, THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA DECREED ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY MEASURES IN LATE NOVEMBER TO DEAL WITH MOUNTING TERRORIST VIOLENCE. THE MEASURES INCLUDE THE IMPOSITION OF MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCES ON PERPETRATORS OF MASSACRES OR HOMICIDES COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS; IMMEDIATE DETENTION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF CONSPIRING AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER; AN INCREASE IN MILITARY AND POLICE RECRUITMENT AND THE CREATION OF SPECIAL GROUPS TO COMBAT TERRORISM; ADDITIONAL MATERIALS RESOURCES FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO IMPROVE MOBILITY; THE SPECIAL PROTECTION OF JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES INVESTIGATING MASSACRES OR ATTACKS AND THE ELIMINATION OF TRIAL BY JURY IN CASES OF \"MONSTROUS CRIMES\". THESE DECREES ARE, HOWEVER, SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC SUPREME COURT REVIEW, AND SEVERAL, PARTICULARLY THE MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE, ARREST ON SUSPICION OF CONSPIRACY AND THE ELIMINATION OF JURY TRIAL FOR SOME MURDER TRIALS, ARE APT TO BE OVERTURNED. MCNAMARA. "	Success: CSV parsed	null	36,828

Subsets and Splits

No community queries yet

The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.