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the French reconquest of southern Vietnam and contribute to the construction of the DRV in the north. While searching for allies, the DRV government tried to build alliances or solicit support for their new state within Southeast Asia, with the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese (Chiang Kai-Shek government... |
moderating pressure on France.8 During early 1947, shortly after the outbreak of full-scale war between the Vietnamese and the French, the DRV launched a four-month diplomatic initiative to secure the support of the Truman administration. The initiative was led by Dr Pham Ngoc Thach, deputy minister in the Office of t... |
Vietnamese officials took place in early spring 1947.11 From 23 March to 2 April, a Soviet delegation led by comrades Zhukov and Plishevskii participated at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi.12 During the conference the Soviets met with Tran Van Giau, former leader of the August Revolution in Saigon and sout... |
s colonial strategies in the period from 1947 to 1950. From 1945 to 1947 Moscow seemed to follow a relatively moderate strategy. A change came, according to Mclane, towards the end of 1947, when Zhdanov presented a more militant line in Soviet foreign policies. This was further enhanced with the acceptance of Chinese v... |
.21 In his speech Zhdanov encouraged Communists abroad to be more energetic in their ways of advancing the common goal. He underlined that through economic power the Americans aimed at organizing Western Europe and countries politically and economically dependent on the United States such as Near Eastern and South Amer... |
Choosing sides revolutionary struggle in Vietnam was more sympathetic after the Zhdanov speech. Thus the picture ought to change after September 1947, but Soviet archival sources do not support this view. In the period after the Cominform meeting Moscow was equally hesitant once the issue of practical economic or mili... |
changed in 1947. They offered only very prudent political and diplomatic support to the DRV in 1946 while the PCF was a member of the French government coalition and war had not yet broken out in Indochina. In the spring of 1947, however, the war had become a highly debated issue in France, and the PCF was evicted fro... |
more Soviet attention after the Calcutta conference and full Soviet approval from the spring of that same year.32 The conference took place between 19 and 25 February, and 39 organisations from both Communist and non-Communist countries sent their delegations to participate in, or observe, its work. Many of the discus... |
be applied to the rest of the colonial world. As such the overall conclusion must be that, to find explanations for the uprisings in the Southeast Asian countries in those years, it will be more fruitful to look at conditions within the countries themselves.36 Whether it was due to the Calcutta conference or not, from... |
equipment and present this as a loan. In case of a positive answer to the inquiry, Le Hy wondered whether the Soviet Union could send a plenipotentiary delegation to Vietnam for proper negotiations.39 Le Hy also had another request. He wondered whether the Soviet government would allow some Vietnamese students to come... |
join. Thailand was accepted as a UN member, and Moscow formed its first formal diplomatic post in Southeast Asia by March–April 1948.43 The purpose of Nguyen Duc Quy’s visit to the Soviet envoy was to establish contacts with the representative of the Soviet Communist Party in Thailand. He assumed that the envoy, Nemtc... |
US dollars. However, with the ongoing French blockade it was too difficult to transfer money out of Vietnam. Nguyen Duc Quy explained that they did have an opportunity to buy weapons from American smugglers, overcome the blockade and transport these into Vietnam. On numerous occasions during the conversation Nguyen Du... |
a war against the French. That encounter was important for the future of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Although no evidence suggests that the CCP provided regular contributions to the Vietminh until 1949, the CCP sub-bureau in British Hong Kong seems to have provided them with some funds on a more irregular basis from 19... |
believed that the DRV was part of the Communist world. The unsuccessful attempts at establishing relations with the Americans were followed by an attempt to secure assistance from the Soviet Union in the fall of 1947. But Moscow was no more eager than Washington to assist the Vietnamese, and the DRV was rejected once ... |
the Vietnamese Communists was primarily a Chinese responsibility.1 The victory of the Chinese revolution had radically transformed international relations in East Asia. Not only did it destroy the existing international order based on the Yalta agreements and the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty, it also forced the established... |
control of the rest of the country. The PRC aimed to build a new society based on the development of agriculture and industry. The Guomindang was declared reactionary, and in principle all citizens were guaranteed rights such as free speech and free religion. The PRC planned land reforms, collectivization and heavy in... |
Mao, Stalin once again encouraged China to take the lead in promoting revolution in Asia, while at the same time emphasizing that the Soviet Union would provide the necessary assistance.6 A Vietnamese account of Ho’s trip to the Soviet Union fixes his arrival to 3 February7 and further tells that Setting the stage 15 ... |
functioned as a door opener to the Vietnamese Communists, who, since the outbreak of the Franco-Vietnamese war, found themselves increasingly isolated from the outside world. The Chinese Communist victory enabled the DRV to establish successful relations with, and obtain recognition from, the Communist world. However,... |
encouraged Ho Chi Minh to send out the declaration and then advised Moscow to follow the Chinese lead in this matter. The events surrounding Chinese recognition of the DRV is a story illustrating how Mao’s victory in China prompted closer relations between Hanoi and Beijing. In December 1949, about two months after Ma... |
China’s past influence in Vietnam played a decisive role in how the Chinese looked upon this neighbouring country. From a Chinese perspective, Vietnam was, without doubt, within its ‘sphere of interest’ – and just as the Chinese devoted themselves to the revolution in Vietnam, Beijing expected the Vietnamese to submit... |
to Stalin personally, and thus there would be no trace of this in the files. Given the fact that at the time the DRV had no permanent resident capital it would also be difficult for it to coordinate and convey a swift formal answer to Moscow.19 They might also have chosen to trust that their leader would take care of ... |
one way or another. In February 1950 the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Wang Jiaxiang, informed Andrei Gromyko that Ho Chi Minh had already asked Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai whether the Chinese ambassador could represent Vietnamese interests in the Soviet Union until the arrival of the Vietnamese ambassador. Th... |
V would do the same; consequently, this was the first intention of both countries. A week before the recognition took place on 23 January 1950, this was outlined in a letter from Vietnam to the Soviet Union and other people’s democracies. However, in a second letter sent in February that year, the DRV foreign minister ... |
strength increased American fears of Communist expansion in the area. In Paris and London the Communist victory in China was seen primarily as a threat to European colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. From a French point of view this was reflected in an immediate concern for a possible direct Chinese intervention i... |
s countries immediately, recognition in itself did not contribute to a more steady flow of information between them. In spite of this situation, recognition both increased the interest in the situation in Vietnam among Soviet leaders and also led to an increase in information about Vietnam arriving through other source... |
on Asia up to 1950 was on developments within China. His first priority was the relationships with the United States, France and Great Britain, and all of these states were much more important to Kremlin than events in Indochina. When negotiations between Ho Chi Minh and the French failed to produce more than a modus ... |
of the people’s democracies also in a situation when the state in question is established in an occupied zone, and the opposite party, the marionette regime, is on the way to breakdown without any opportunities to strengthen its position’.35 This report shows some of the channels through which the Soviets received the... |
several civilian tasks such as strengthening of government positions and, not least, the formal establishment of the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) had been successfully completed during 1951, the army had not been able to gain control over more vital territory. The larger cities and most important lines of communicat... |
to the Vietnamese, and in early 1952, this time initiated by the CMAG, the PAVN began planning a large campaign in the northwest territory of Vietnam. There were two main reasons for targeting this region in particular: First, the French defences there were considered to be rather weak and the odds for a Vietminh vict... |
Bang could add more details to the tale. In his report to Setting the stage 25 the Soviet foreign ministry handed over on 14 May 1952, he stated that 80 per cent of the weapons used by the PAVN were supplied by the Chinese. Parts of the Vietnamese army in the northern regions of the country were rather well equipped w... |
policies of the Vietminh.51 On 19 November Ho wrote in his farewell letter to Stalin that he would work hard on the implementation of land reform and the war. Since the details of these discussions remain unavailable on the Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese side, the actual details of the talks remain unknown; however, t... |
charge of developments in Asia. However, Stalin’s division of labour proposal should be viewed with some suspicion. Even if the Sino-Soviet relationship functioned well at the time, Stalin’s previous experience with independent Communist leaders, more precisely Tito, suggests that he would not allow Mao any independen... |
it was through Chinese channels. Later on, the Vietnamese leaders would regret that they had been unable to forge close relations with Moscow in this period and hence had became too dependent on China. In retrospective, Moscow might have shared these regrets wishing that it had not made its own relationship with the V... |
cooperation. Moscow was the more moderate partner of the two and expected less from the final outcome than the Chinese and much less than the DRV.4 The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 1953–1954 29 In the aftermath of the conference, strategists in Moscow and Beijing were accused of restraining the DRV while ... |
DRV, by Ho Chi Minh and the Communist party.7 One of Moscow’s main aims before and during the conference was to actively integrate the PRC into the club of the Four Great Powers – the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. That was an acknowledgement of the role China was playing both in Korea and,... |
Soviet comment regarding the organizational aspects of the conference stating that ‘the Soviet Union had been discussing organizational questions regarding the conference with Beijing’, and that ‘the People’s Republic of China agreed with the Soviet position’, seriously provoked the Americans.10 Ambassador Bohlen made... |
speeches to his associates Zhou analysed the prospects, indicating that while it would probably be difficult to achieve a peaceful settlement in Korea, the chances of reaching agreement on the Indochina issue were much better. Zhou further argued that the main reason why it could be possible to reach consensus on the ... |
and start preparations. The Chinese premier emphasized to the Vietnamese Communists that the current international situation and military developments in Vietnam were advantageous for the DRV to conduct a diplomatic struggle. Furthermore, no matter what came of the Geneva conference it would serve the cause of the Vie... |
ceasefire in the whole territory of Vietnam. In the sphere of Franco–Vietnamese relations it required French recognition of the full sovereignty and independence of the DRV, withdrawal of all French forces from the territory of Vietnam within six months, the establishment of a French–Vietnamese commission to discuss a... |
questions and to prevent a resurrection of military actions.24 In the very last comment on the prospects for successful negotiations, the Soviet memorandum concluded that ‘in case we reach no agreement on the Indochinese problem, we should submit for consideration to the conference the suggestion recommending that Fra... |
Western powers over the Indochina issue. On a more general level the thorough planning in the spring of 1954 also shows that the Soviet leaders were determined to achieve a solution before the closure of the conference, even if it meant going back on some of their initial wishes laid out in the socalled ‘maximum progr... |
, if not, whether representatives from these countries could be included in the DRV delegation. If the conditions were acceptable to the DRV, the Soviet Union suggested that the Communist side not initiate a proposal for ceasefire, but support France if she suggested that. Likewise, a settlement was dependent upon Fren... |
and the Geneva conference, 1953–1954 The final offensive Information on developments in the Franco-Vietnamese war was a vital part of Soviet planning. In 1954, Moscow had no official representative in Vietnam, but there are indications that Soviet officers visited the southern part of China bordering Vietnam, or even ... |
contrast to what we have seen from Moscow. While the Chinese concluded that a victorious Vietnamese army would help secure success at Geneva, Moscow was reluctant to provide overt assistance to the Vietnamese in this crucial period leading up to the conference, even when confronted with rather small requests from the ... |
in their positions. The Vietminh suffered heavy losses during this ‘human wave’ attack both because they had trouble moving artillery pieces fast enough and because the French troops moved much faster than expected. But because of the problems during this first attack, the CMAG and Vietminh decided to change tactics. ... |
ai always sought advice, and received approval, from Molotov before presenting the parties with new suggestions. The reason for this good cooperation was that the Soviet and the Chinese views were consistent; they both wanted to end the war in Indochina. However, their expectations from the conference were different. W... |
the Geneva conference, Foreign Minister Molotov gave a preliminary report on the work of the conference to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The conference had now finished its first phase. During this phase it had mainly discussed the Korean question, on which it had not been able to find common ground, but the part... |
. But the Vietnamese reluctance to withdraw, or even admit to the fact that 40 The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 1953–1954 they had troops in Laos and Cambodia, complicated the Chinese wish for a friendly atmosphere that would encourage continued discussions at the conference. The leader of the Chinese dele... |
on 16 June. Mendès-France had promised to resolve the situation in Indochina within 20 July, or resign. With the new climate and a renewed French eagerness to reach an agreement on Indochina, the Soviet Union and the PRC used all their influence on Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong to convince them that now was the time t... |
yet another change of government in France, combined with the failure of the conference participants to reach agreement on the Korea question, the pressure to reach an agreement on the Indochina issue would become even greater. As earlier, the problem was the DRV attitude, and their refusal to admit the existence of t... |
Vietnamese took place during the conference break at Geneva, when Zhou Enlai travelled to the Chinese city of Liuzhou to meet the leaders of the VWP.64 Realizing the difficulties of discussing only through telegraphic exchanges, Zhou took this opportunity to personally discuss the problems of the conference with the V... |
s-France could accept. When briefing Molotov on the discussion during the Liuzhou meeting, Zhou admitted that Ho Chi Minh had agreed to the possibility of accepting the 17th parallel as the provisional demarcation line, if it should prove impossible to reach consensus over the 16th parallel. However, at the same time P... |
between the Soviets and the Vietnamese on the eve of the conference? The Soviet Union and the DRV had no bilateral meetings either before or during the conference. All meetings were at least tripartite and took place with Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese representatives present – and the occasional North Korean. In cont... |
�civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement’.74 In addition, the provisions agreed upon in the ceasefire part of the Agreement stated that there were to be no troop reinforcements, no augmentation of weapons, ... |
of a government headed by Pierre Mendès-France, who was not enthusiastic about the idea of the EDC. On 30 August 1954, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC proposal and thereby undermined the plans for German rearmament at that point.78 Sino-Soviet cooperation during the conference was also a huge su... |
continued, ‘[...] when I think twice, I see that he was right. The mood of the people in the South at that time was rising high. Why did we have the Geneva Conference? Perhaps, France wanted it’. Pursuing Mao’s argument Zhou Enlai added that the suggestion to hold a conference had come from Khrushchev, who had wanted ... |
V at the time. To Moscow, the idea of consolidating the North while waiting for elections to reunite both zones was fully compatible with how a Communist The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 1953–1954 47 society should develop. In other words, Moscow was satisfied with the results of the conference, both in te... |
foreign and domestic policies’.1 Four topics were particularly central in these first years after the Geneva conference: the reconstruction and consolidation of Vietnam; the struggle to implement the provisions of the agreement reached in Geneva, especially the consultations for and holding of all-Vietnamese free elec... |
V leaders. The first Soviet ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Aleksandr Andreevich Lavrishchev, arrived in Hanoi in late September 1954.4 The establishment of a Soviet embassy in the DRV enabled Moscow to opt for a more active policy in Vietnam and relieved the Soviet leaders of their dependence on Chin... |
and advice the North Vietnamese both economically and to some extent militarily, they maintained that the Lao Dong would remain the authority on internal Vietnamese affairs. However, contrary to this attitude the instructions to the Soviet ambassador contained a number of suggestions aimed at future North Vietnamese p... |
, consisting mostly of Catholics who, encouraged by Diem with promises of land and livelihood, fled from the northern Communist regime. Thereafter followed the sect crisis lasting until the spring of 1955. During his first year in office Ngo Dinh Diem consolidated his power in all possible areas. He eliminated his main... |
would arrive in Vietnam to assist in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.15 Moscow was aware of the DRV’s need for advice and suggested that a group of advisors should be dispatched to Vietnam. The decision was not made without concern for possible Chinese reactions. Chinese military advisors had been active... |
-Soviet foreign policy cooperation. Such a picture was further strengthened by the fact that this cooperation continued even when relations between Moscow and Beijing began to deteriorate, and also when the Chinese announced their decision to withdraw from North Vietnam. Economic assistance was the most important part ... |
o Dong seems to have made little difference in the economic relations between the Soviet Union and the DRV. Agreements like the one signed in July 1955 were renewed on a regular basis, and there was no significant increase in the amount of aid given during the first years after Geneva.22 Military cooperation and Chines... |
delegation led by Defence Minister Vo Nguyen Giap made a secret trip to Beijing. While there, they discussed the reconstruction of the DRV armed forces, as well as future war plans with Chinese Defence Minister Peng Dehuai and Lieutenant General Petroshevskii, a senior Soviet military advisor in China. We first met Pe... |
the CMAG. The group had been Together for Communism? 55 in Vietnam since July 1950, but by mid-March 1956 all members of the group had returned to China.32 It is difficult to say whether the Soviet leaders knew about the Chinese decision in advance. If so, it could explain why they emphasized the Vietnamese need for C... |
as having a special responsibility for the implementation of the agreements. According to the provisions in the Final Declaration of the Geneva conference, general elections should be held in all of Vietnam in July 1956. The purpose of the elections was a reunification of the two zones under a government freely chosen... |
the referendum. To both the North Vietnamese and the Soviets, it was now clear that the government of Ngo Dinh Diem would stay in power for a while. During the spring of 1956 the Lao Dong leaders were worried not only because of the reluctant attitude of the South Vietnamese government but also by the French position ... |
the idea of holding elections could provoke a strong reaction from the people of Vietnam. ‘To inform people of this now, would’ – according to Truong Chinh – ‘result in a serious worsening of their spirits’.42 Based on this the Vietnamese acknowledged, during the spring of 1956, that ‘to insist on a full implementatio... |
region, and especially the attempt of the United States, Great Britain and France to undermine the agreement, the Soviet ambassador suggested that the Soviet Union, China and the other Socialist states should strive to exploit the existing disagreements between these powers, and especially India, in order to strengthe... |
Chinese wanted to provoke another crisis in Vietnam over the question of national reunification and may even tacitly have considered a continued partition of Vietnam to suit their interests. Policy makers in both Moscow and Beijing had more pressing issues coming up – the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, and China firs... |
on 28 February 1956. It stated that the DRV fully supported the results of the CPSU congress but added that the Lao Dong ‘would further endeavour to study Marxist-Leninist theory and to apply it creatively to the concrete situation in Vietnam, to combine this theory with the practice of Vietnam’s revolution’.54 Commen... |
work of the Lao Dong based on the resolutions of the Soviet congress, the report from the CPSU CC and Khrushchev’s secret speech on the cult of personalities and its consequences.58 Le Duan’s suggestions for a new strategy towards South Vietnam could have been discussed in either of the two sessions. The discussions d... |
Twentieth Congress but had not explicitly stated its full commitment to the policies outlined there. Neither the Soviets nor the Vietnamese have outlined the purpose of Mikoyan’s visit, and no official communiqué was issued during his stay.62 Still, it is safe to assume that the purpose was to discuss the results of t... |
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