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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_64_1 | Thanks to the fast action of the Federal Reserve in cooperation with the SEC and the Treasury, we dodged a bullet when Bear Stearns collapsed. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_69_2 | To protect against systemic risk, we must ensure that when a firm fails, it does not bring down the entire financial system with it, i.e., an orderly liquidation. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_71_0 | In conclusion, of necessity we have to plan for how to handle the failure of a major institution. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_77_0 | Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Chairman, this hearing comes at a critical juncture. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_78_2 | As the economy reels from a widespread, far-reaching financial crisis that continues to wreak havoc on everything from the housing market to student loans, while we remain focused on many current economic difficulties average Americans face, we must simultaneously look to the future to determine how to prevent or at le... | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_78_3 | As the economy reels from a widespread, far-reaching financial crisis that continues to wreak havoc on everything from the housing market to student loans, while we remain focused on many current economic difficulties average Americans face, we must simultaneously look to the future to determine how to prevent or at le... | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_80_1 | But we must develop innovative, regulatory and oversight responses to keep pace as these market transactions evolve. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_86_0 | No one else can borrow money without conditions, and the American people do not expect that the investment bank be allowed to do so. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_87_0 | Chairman Bernanke spoke 2 days ago and raised many of these issues and offered ideas for consideration, noting that the financial turmoil since August underscores the need to find ways to make the financial system more resilient and more stable. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_102_0 | Mrs. Biggert: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding today's hearing on systemic risk. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_114_0 | I think without delay, we need to strike the right balance and create a simpler, stronger, regulatory system that preserves the resilience of our economy, protects taxpayers, and maintains the position of our financial system as the envy of the world. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_123_0 | As you know, our financial markets have been experiencing turmoil since last August. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_124_0 | It will take additional time to work through these challenges. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_130_0 | Their regulator has made clear that they are adequately capitalized. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_135_2 | Although our regulatory architecture and authorities are outdated and less than optimal, we have been working together; while respecting our different authorities or responsibilities, we have been working together to ensure the stability of the financial system, because it is in the interest of the American people that... | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_142_0 | I look forward to discussing these ideas with you today, even as we continue our primary focus on confronting current challenges and maintaining stable, orderly financial markets. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_159_0 | Secretary Paulson: When we released the Blueprint, I said that we were laying out a long-term vision that would not be implemented soon. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_160_0 | Since then, the Bear Stearns episode and market turmoil more generally have placed in stark relief the outdated nature of our regulatory system and has convinced me that we must move much more quickly to update our regulatory structure and improve both market oversight and market discipline. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_210_0 | For example, since September 2005, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has been leading a major joint initiative by both the public and private sectors to improve arrangements for clearing and settling credit default swaps and other OTC derivatives. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_243_0 | I have to say that there are people who say, well, either you create a brand new regulator, it seems to me, which would be I think a mistake, or you give it to the Federal Reserve. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_245_0 | A situation in which the Federal Reserve is available and is under pressure to provide funding, but does not have the ability to act well before that time to diminish the need for that and to oppose conditions, that is unacceptable. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_257_1 | I think this is an important task, and there's a great deal of agreement, that we should be moving to empower the Federal Reserve to have regulatory authority over a wide range of financial institutions in recognition in part of the fact that they have a systemic impact and that the current situation puts the Fed in an... | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_276_0 | Here is the question: Working together as we have within existing authorities, with yourselves, with I hope cooperation--that you understand cooperation with us--can we get by until the end of the year? | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_72_0 | It is important, however, that we create a system focused not on failure, but on success. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_148_0 | These include formalizing the current informal coordination among U.S. financial regulators by amending and enhancing the Executive Order which created the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, and while retaining State level regulation of mortgage origination practices, creating a new Federal level commissio... | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_17_0 | We will allow the answers to conclude. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_75_0 | Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and thank you to our witnesses. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_96_0 | To the extent that we can glean further insight from our panelists today, that would be of tremendous help, for it is true that speculators bear blame. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_148_1 | These include formalizing the current informal coordination among U.S. financial regulators by amending and enhancing the Executive Order which created the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, and while retaining State level regulation of mortgage origination practices, creating a new Federal level commissio... | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_183_0 | Again, thank you for your leadership. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_187_0 | The financial turmoil that began last summer has impeded the ability of the financial system to perform its normal functions and has adversely affected the broader economy. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_201_3 | Since the near collapse of the Bear Stearns companies in March, the Federal Reserve has been working closely with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is the functional supervisor of each of the primary dealers and the consolidated supervisor of the four large investment banks, to help ensure that those firms ... | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_203_0 | Cooperation between the Fed and SEC is taking place within the existing statutory framework, with the objective of addressing the near-term situation. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_206_0 | Strong holding company oversight is essential, and thus in my view the Congress should consider requiring consolidated supervision of those firms and providing the regulator the authority to set standards for capital liquidity holdings and risk management. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_206_1 | Strong holding company oversight is essential, and thus in my view the Congress should consider requiring consolidated supervision of those firms and providing the regulator the authority to set standards for capital liquidity holdings and risk management. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_281_0 | Secretary Paulson: Mr. Chairman, let me respond by saying first of all, the role of the Fed as a macro stability regulator will take time to think through. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_285_0 | That will clearly take some time to consider and to get the legislation through. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_285_1 | That will clearly take some time to consider and to get the legislation through. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_286_0 | Even more pressing is--which is again a complex issue which will take time--is the issue of the resolution process and procedures for complex financial institutions that aren't federally insured. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_289_0 | But that will take some time. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-1.ann_146_3 | If implemented, these recommendations eliminate regulatory competition that creates inefficiencies and can engender a race to the bottom. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_1_0 | There are many steps that could be taken at the regulatory and supervisory level to strengthen the oversight of banks and other financial institutions. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_6_0 | So there are a number of things we can do to strengthen the oversight under existing statutes and to make sure that the infrastructure is working as well as possible. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_7_0 | For example, I mentioned also the private-public cooperation that we are now having to strengthen the OTC derivatives infrastructure and the like. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_13_0 | Mr. Bachus: You know, one thing I have noticed, I know the President's Working Group, you know, as far back as say a year ago or I think as late as March, talked about the risk management practices of the investment banks as being faulty and that resulted in a lot of what we are seeing, market turmoil. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_21_0 | We have encouraged, both of our organizations have encouraged financial institutions to recognize losses and to raise capital, because capital is available, and that is a much better alternative than shrinking their balance sheets and pulling back from the activities that are so necessary. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_23_0 | Mr. Bernanke: Congressman, our first objective is to make sure that these firms are safe and able to withstand the current stresses. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_29_0 | But I think it's something that as we go forward, we will want to look at much harder to try to limit the regulatory impact on the procyclicality of credit. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_34_0 | We are currently looking at that in the hope that we will make a clearer statement about when private equity can come in and add capital to the banking system. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_40_0 | And what occurs to me is that this gap we are talking about between now and when the new Congress convenes it could pass the emergency powers or extraordinary powers or change powers that are necessary to meet this crisis. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_74_0 | To the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and to Secretary Paulson, I would just like to thank them I think for what has been excellent work in very difficult circumstances, as well as the chairman and the ranking member of the committee. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_87_0 | First of all, your committee has been out in front on this, but let's get the GSE reform legislation done, to have a strong, independent regulator that will inject confidence into those institutions and into the markets, and that's a very positive thing. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_91_0 | But this is going to take some time, so begin work urgently on that. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_115_0 | But if you don't know which way you would like to head, you know, you have no chance of getting there. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_120_0 | And then the things we have talked about here that can be done quickly are the resolution authorities for complex financial institutions that aren't federally insured, giving the Federal Reserve authority and responsibility over the payment systems, which can be done very quickly; moving to have the Fed while retaining... | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_127_0 | I would like to thank you first for holding this very important hearing today, and I would like to thank both Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke for being here today. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_128_0 | Let me start by saying that which you have probably heard too often, how disappointed I am with all of us, Members of Congress, for what appears to have been weak oversight of our regulatory agencies, and our regulatory agencies for what appears to have been weak oversight of our financial institutions. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_129_0 | I have to tell you, I have been holding hearings throughout the country on the subprime meltdown, and I'm absolutely stunned by the extent of the devastation to some of our families and communities caused by this subprime meltdown. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_136_0 | I have to tell you, I'm surprised, because I thought that our regulatory agencies, no matter how they were organized, whether it was by financial institution category or not, had as its prime objective, all of those things that you talk about doing now. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_137_0 | So what I really want to know is not so much what you plan that may not be instituted for some time, because it takes some time to get this into practice, I want to know what you're doing now. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_140_0 | And I want to know if you have anything in your plans to deal with them, because after we get finished with all of the President's HOPE NOW program and the money that we are giving to NeighborWorks and other organizations to do counseling, they can't do very much good, because the servicers are the ones who make the de... | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_179_0 | And in a sense, when there's a principal writedown or other loan modification that is essentially what is happening, that you're giving a break to the borrower so the borrower can stay in the home, and I think that's a good thing to do. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_180_0 | The Chairman: Let me ask, Mr. Secretary, that you respond in writing, particularly because of our time constraints, on the servicer issue. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_185_0 | I want to thank you, Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke, for being with us, and I want to begin with a question to Secretary Paulson. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_190_0 | Such private prudential regulation can be impaired, indeed even displaced,'' said Greenspan, ``if some counterparties assume that government regulators obviate private prudence. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_191_0 | We regulators are often perceived as constraining excessive risk-taking more effectively than is demonstrably possible in practice, except where market discipline is undermined by moral hazard, for example, because of federal guarantees of private debt, private regulation generally has proved far better at constraining... | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_194_0 | Other runs arise from fundamental developments, and for these, central bank intervention interference with market discipline distorts market prices.'' | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_204_0 | But our system will never be what it should be unless we can get to the point where market discipline plays its necessary role. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_205_0 | And in order to get there, I want to emphasize what Ben Bernanke said. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_206_0 | We need to do some things to strengthen the infrastructure we have, the over-the-counter derivative market, the tri-party repossession market, and that which is secured financing between institutions, and we need to do that so that the appearance and the reality that institutions are too interconnected to fail no longe... | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_214_0 | Avoiding the moral hazard, having strong market discipline makes the system work better, and an example would be the counterparty discipline between the banks, investment banks, and the hedge funds, has protected the banks and the banks and the investment banks from any losses from hedge funds. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_215_0 | There have been no material losses to banks or investment banks because of failing hedge funds, and because the banks have been doing due diligence, and that's what we want to see. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_216_0 | Now in my view, our action to address the Bear Stearns situation was necessary, given the financial conditions at the time, but it's absolutely correct, as President Lacker has pointed out, it does raise moral hazard concerns going forward, and then the question is how do you address those. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_218_0 | The first is supervisory oversight of those institutions to make sure that they are in fact doing what they need to do to be safe and sound, are not taking advantage of the implicit backstop. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_221_0 | Second, as Secretary Paulson mentioned, if we can strengthen our infrastructure sufficiently so that it could absorb the failure of a large firm--we felt it wasn't able to do so in March. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_222_0 | But if it were clearer that the system could withstand the failure of a firm of Bear Stearns' size, then we would be much more comfortable letting it happen, because we would think the system would be preserved. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_233_0 | It's clear from recent events that many expected synergies of financial service activities, whatever benefits that they gave during times of economic prosperity, gave rise to conflicts and excessive risk taking. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_234_0 | It appears that many firms are in so many lines of businesses that conflicts and excessive risk arise. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_236_0 | For example, some have said Bear Stearns' trading operation may have caused risk to its clearing operations. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_249_0 | I believe that the biggest problems we are dealing with is not the diversification of these organizations but it is the amount of risk that was taken on, and the amount of leverage, much greater than was understood, because a lot of it was taken on through complex products that were difficult to understand. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_250_0 | And that's why it's taking so long to work through this. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_264_0 | And we are also trying to do a better job of our consolidated supervision whereby we focus not just on the holding company but we make sure that we interact more intensively with the functional regulators of the subsidiaries or the affiliates. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_271_0 | I'm delighted the two of you are here today because I might just get to the bottom of the question I have been asking for many years, which is, who is in charge of the dollar? | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_273_0 | I do want to acknowledge the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Garrett, for playing a part in bringing these hearings about, and also Chairman Frank for having these hearings because I deeply appreciate it. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_274_0 | But I would like to take a minute to just challenge something he said during his questioning, because he made the flat statement that there was no alternative to the Federal Reserve system. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_282_0 | I would like to see a lot more regulations on the government and on the Federal Reserve, because I think it's the ability of the government, through regulatory agencies as well as the Federal Reserve, to disrupt markets and destroy market discipline. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_284_0 | When Enron failed, we immediately said, well, it must have happened because we didn't have enough regulation, so Congress immediately responded by passing Sarbanes-Oxley. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_290_0 | And of course I maintain that they're in disarray because our monetary policy disrupts the markets because we create interest rates below market rates. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_294_0 | And we wonder why there are disruptions when you have artificially low interest rates, you cause the malinvestment, you cause excessive debt to accumulate, and you cause the bubbles to burst. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_308_0 | So my question is directed to Secretary Paulson dealing with the dollar, because evidently he is the spokesman and he is the champion of the dollar, and all public statements are that the dollar is to be strong. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_84_0 | Is there anything--and you probably have identified this in your testimony, but I must admit it's complicated enough for me to have trouble following. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_95_0 | It's just our sense, and of course you're in a better place than we are to make the judgment, that the more complex issues like resolution or even financial regulatory restructuring are simply not likely to happen in a short term, and we need to take the time to make sure it's done right and thoroughly worked through. | [
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because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_117_0 | And as I look at what can be done in terms of the timing the one thing we are not talking about a lot here, but I do believe we don't want to forget, is the fact that a lot of this problem came about as a result of sloppy and lax mortgage origination procedures. | [
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199
],
[
215,
261
]
] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_12_0 | Secretary Paulson: I agree very much with what Chairman Bernanke has said, and I would just simply say that even if the structure isn't optimal and all of the authorities aren't optimal, regulators are working together seamlessly to address some of the issues that have arisen, and I think progress has been made. | [
[
188,
230
],
[
234,
277
]
] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_38_0 | Secretary Paulson, Chairman Bernanke, listening to your response to the chairman about timing, since last August of course all of us have examined and watched market failure occurring in various and sundry areas growing from subprime failure in August to what we call now a credit crisis. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_47_0 | We are dealing in a financial market that has evolved greatly since the time that many of our rules were put in place, that many of the--that the regulatory structure was set. | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_50_0 | But I will again say to you, even though this is a difficult period we are going through, and we both said that it's going to take some time to get through it, there will be some more bumps on the road, I really want to emphasize that you have seen the Federal Reserve, by opening up the discount window to the investmen... | [] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_51_0 | And I have seen those investment banks working with the Fed and the SEC to strengthen their liquidity, strengthen their capital positions, and re-price risk. | [
[
16,
71
],
[
75,
156
]
] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_66_0 | Secretary Paulson: Well, let me mention the student loans, because here is a case where I think you have seen our department work creatively with the Department of Education to deal with a problem that's here and now, and so we have a program in place which I think is going to be acceptable to most fellow lenders. | [
[
111,
174
],
[
178,
217
]
] |
because_CHRG-110hhrg44900-2.ann_78_0 | When you're in Congress, you sort of think in terms of the next election or whatever it may be. | [
[
5,
23
],
[
25,
94
]
] |
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